END SEM NOTES - INTERPRETATION OF

STATUTES
● These notes have been prepared based on my revision method.
● Points are explained in brief and are based on the materials I have.
● The color scheme in the notes are as follows:
○ Additional points have been mentioned in BLUE
○ Asynch is in GREEN
● DO NOTE THAT THESE ARE NOT EXHAUSTIVE NOTES.

For any doubts and clarity or if you think I would have missed out on a topic please do let me
know!

All the Best and hope this helps!

- Titash
 UNIT 1: INTRODUCTION

Why do we need SI?

● Broad terms used in the statute itself
○ Usage of vague terms
○ Statute may contain technical definitions -- simple words might not be defined in
the statute and may be open to multiple interpretations.
○ Eg: 2005 Sept 9 - HSA - woman as coparcener in Hindu ancestral property --
issue with ‘on the date of passing of this amendment’ became very ambiguous
■ The date was the ambiguous term -- when will the right emanate from?
■ If it is retrospective? - no
● Ambiguity
○ Individual’s understanding is irrelevant -- for this we go to the ‘functions of the
court’
○ Eg: ejusdem generis -- reading with the ‘same kind’ -- drafting error can be
rectified
● When there is change in the use of Language
○ Modern laws - more technical terms used in drafting
● Drafting or printing error

Functions of the court w.r.t interpretation:

● Find out the facts of the case when the dispute is brought to the court and find out the
issues
● Find out which law is applicable
● Analyse the law applicable
○ Finding out the meaning of the law
○ After meaning -- honour the meaning of clear and if not (due to ambiguity for
example) then apply to the best possible way
● Apply law to the facts to the particular case (imp.)
○ Honouring the meaning of the law
● Judgement delivery - here the court interprets the law wherever necessary
● What ‘law’ means --
○ Salmond -- Statute is a legislative will of the legislature
○ Statute made by the Legislature
○ Legislative will is addressed to the individual or categories of individuals (i.e. to
whom is the law addressed).

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 ○ A statute is the legislative will of the legislature. Therefore, the first function of
the persons to whom statutes are addressed – and that includes courts – should be
to find out the meaning of the statute and honour the meaning so found. That is
what is meant by analysis (finding out the meaning) and application (honouring
the meaning so found) of law.
● Checking constitutionality of law
○ The court until and unless its challenged before the court will always presume its
constitutional until and unless proved otherwise.
“More often than before, statutory text is the ending point as well as the starting point for
interpretation”
● Interpretation within 4 corners of law
● Court will only look in the statutory text for interpretation
● Statutory text

Reed Dickerson’s View

● “When law is imperfect, incomplete, absent the judge has to extend and cover the case
at hand. If there is a directly applicable law, the judge applies the law otherwise
supplies the law..” -- Cognition and creation -- Reed Dickerson
○ Functions of the court:
■ cognition (ascertaining the meaning of the statute)
■ creation (assigning the meaning)
● Thus judges make the law in the guise of interpreting the existing law
● Legislative words are like empty vessels in which the judges pour judicial meaning
● A judge in this context has two difficult but closely related and equally important
responsibilities (Traditional Approach)
○ To read the statute and find out how far it is applicable to the dispute at hand; and
○ If the meaning so ascertained does not resolve the dispute, to adjust the law so
that it is applicable to the dispute and if necessary even create law for that
purpose.
● Interpretation is essentially an act of recognition or discovery
● This task is very difficult because communication are often imperfectly framed and
inadequately transmitted.
○ This results in a loss of corresponding part of the message. The reader has to
make a compensating effort to find the true meaning of the communication.
● He has to apply logical induction and deduction
● This is more difficult in case of complex communication such as statute
● Statute is the medium of communication between lawmaker and the law user.
● According to Keeton the function of judges:

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 ○ The judge has to decide upon the exact meaning of what legislature has actually
said, and
■ This in real life situation is possible to an extent (my view)
■ Exact meaning → literal interpretation
■ Very difficult to establish the exact meaning of law
■ How does the court do it?
● Analyse the law within the 4 corners of the law
● Use internal and then external aids
○ The judge has to consider what the legislature might have intended to say, but
did not say because of some reason

Ambiguity and Misunderstanding in law - Sanford Schane (Asynchronous ||

Essay)
The present article begins with the fact that ‘words’ play a crucial role in the creation and
understanding of any legal context or matter. The interpretation of such legal provisions may at
times vary between individuals and this is when the necessity of the intervention of the courts is
duly recognised to assist in the removal of the ambiguities (be it in contracts or legislative acts).
The article further discusses 3 cases with respect to how courts have addressed the scope and
issues of ‘ambiguity’ in legal parlance.
1. Frigailment Importing Co. v. BNS International Sales Corpn. - better known as the
‘chicken’ case involves a contractual interpretation of “what chicken is based on the
contractual agreement”. The judge reasoned that the interpretation of ‘chicken’ by both
the sides are to be accepted and referred to the terms of the contract for being assisted
with any grounds of interpretation (if provided) and stated that "the word 'chicken'
standing alone is ambiguous
The case has also dwelled into the objective and the subjective theory attributable to
contract law; where these two theories play a crucial role in understanding the burden of
interpretation in contracts and one such key principle is that was explained by Arthur L
Corbin - "Contracting parties must be made to know that it is their written words that
constitute their contract, not their intentions that they try to express in the words. They,
not the court, have chosen the words;...”. This case thus follows the strict adherence of
the plain meaning rule. The essential principle of contract relating to the meeting of
minds is also quintessential to understanding the scope of the words included in the
contract.
The judge also referred to the interpretation practice of ‘four corners’ (which basically
deals with the interpretation to be done within the ambit of the contract/text itself).
2. Raffles v. Wichelhaus - the case involves the transportation of bales of cotton between
Bombay to Liverpool on an English ship called “Peerless”. The issue arose due to the fact

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 that the parties were bonafidely unaware about the existence of two ships bearing the
same name and travelling between the same locations but at different times. The buyer
and seller intended on the transportation being done through the different ships without
benign aware of each other’s intent. The primary contention was that the contract did not
explicitly mention which ship is to be used but merely mentioned the name of the ship,
thus leading to latent ambiguity.
The case, unlike the Frigaliment case deals with the subjective theory of contractual
interpretation that held that the contract lacked a meeting of minds (consensus ad idem),
thus not making the contract binding on the parties.
Courts sometimes make a distinction between latent ambiguity and patent ambiguity.
The latter applies when words in an agreement have more than one objective meaning.

3. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Allen E. Kroblin Inc - this case as well included
about the types of chicken and the category that they fall in - manufactured product or
agricultural product, as certain exemptions were granted to agricultural products. The
court noted that the classification of chicken bore ambiguous words.
The court relied on a point of view pertaining to the semantic enigma that arises from
vagueness of categorization, where two inherently different things should not be placed
together. The court also relied on the legislative history for means of extrinsic aid.
Hence with these 3 cases, the author then proceeded to define as to what ‘ambiguity’ exactly
means. Few key points are:
● Lack of clarity
● Doubtful or uncertain words
● Obscure meaning having indefiniteness of expression.
● Lexical ambiguity potentially occurs whenever a word has more than one objective or
dictionary meaning.
● Syntactic ambiguity is the other common type. It has to do with grammatical structure.
The article further goes on to explain the varying dictionary meanings and usage of the words
that lead to having multiple meanings thus expanding the scope of interpretation that was
attributed to the case by the judges.

In conclusion:
a. In Frigaliment, the ambiguity that the court realised was "lexical ambiguity".
b. In Raffles, the court was faced with "referential indeterminacy".
c. In ICC, the court encountered with "vagueness in categorization" when it came to the
ambiguous terms. The Court noted that the legislature had failed to provide definitions
for the two crucial terms mentioned in the Act

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Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?
One of the key methods of interpretation that has been discussed in the present article is
regarding the interpretation from the analysis of the legislative intent involved in the statute
(which is said to be an external mode of interpretation), which has always fallen in a vexatious
grey area. For example, the author has referred to to the method adopted by Prof. Moore who
would have liked to use "intention" as a possible way to find determinate meaning in a statute,
but after thorough consideration he reluctantly concluded that the meaning of a statute cannot be
ascertained by recourse to legislative intent; and that of Stanley Fish who contended that there
can never be a definitive theory or set of rules of interpretation.
Hence due to the fluidity that has existed since time pertaining to interpretation, jurists
and academicians have always felt that there exists a ‘meta-theory’ of interpretation that is quite
often required. One of the most notable methods of interpretation followed by the
‘deconstructionists’ (those who break-down the statute to gain a better understanding) is as
follows:
Reading the statute → observing and choosing the best method of interpretation →
explain as to how the said rule was used and followed to arrive at a ground of
simplification.
The Author lays down the hypothesis that he seeks to address though the article - the
anticipated mental context of addressees partially shapes the strategy of legislators in formulating
statutes; surmising primarily based on the contention of Stanley Fish.
Interpretation is said to be a stage in the process of communication between the
legislature that enacts a statute and the members of the judiciary (or practicing bar or the public)
who are the addressees of the statute. The primary concern of the legislature is to not have the
statute declared void by the vice of such interpretation.
1. Communication is constrained by the receivers mindset
● A statute is said to be effective from the legislator's point of view, if it is
interpreted with reasonable accuracy.
● Due to this, the legislators tailor the words of the statute so that the audience will
interpret it the way they intend on it being interpreted.
● There is an example about how communication through coded messages works in
the military.
● Any form of ambiguity is seen to arise or increase if the sender is increasingly
unsure about who the receiver is.
● Ascribing desires, beliefs, purposes of the author are said to be quintessential in
the process of deriving meaning and interpretation
2. Can the message prepare its audience?
○ Basic surmise of interpretation is that the reader is a ‘reasonable’ reader which
leads to a subsequent ease in understanding so that the crux of the topic remains.
○ The author has also cited the discussion between Einstein and Nabokov regarding
what is “common sense” and the difference in approach taken in their works.

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 ■ Nabokov's opening paragraph itself assumes the existence of a decoder in
the minds of his readers.
3. The Problem of Inferring Intent
○ The approach taken here is distinct from the Fishian approach
○ In reality it is observed that one can ever know with certainty what any author's
intention or strategy was.
○ According to Fuller, statutes are enacted by legislatures in order to manage the
affairs of society with some degree of general rationality. When we read a statute,
we have to interpret it in light of this assumed rea-sonable purpose. Fuller's best
example, I think, is in his "Case of the Speluncean Explorers."
○ Case: In Fehler v. Neegas there was before this Court for construction a statute in
which the word "not" had plainly been transposed from its intended position in
the final and most crucial section of the act. This Court refused to accept a literal
interpretation of the statute, and in effect rectified its language by reading the
word "not" into the place where it was evidently intended to go.
○ It is also observed that usually whatever the Congress intended, the courts were
able to find some intent or purpose in the statutes that, in particular cases, led to
results at variance with what Congress intended.
○ One such innovative approach that has been taken in this discussion is the
“business purpose rule” that developed in the Gregory v. Helvering Case -- which
was used in the interpretation of Tax Statutes which have been interpreted in the
most strict manner based on the nature of the legislation
4. Radical Interpretation:
○ According to Professor Kelman -- most extreme and excessive cases have
"critical" rhetorical power.
○ The author has referred to Dworkin’s position where he claims that one cannot or
should not misinterpret any text unless someone is deliberately perverse.
○ Dworkin’s writing has also been criticized as a having scope of radical
interpretations; which when compared to that of Shakespeare is more liberal as
the exists a reasonable claim and understanding that the audiences that were far
more "knowing" about Shakespeare's actual "intent" than theatergoers have been
since then; when compared to Dworking’s works.
5. Jurisprudence as audience preparation:
○ This section relies the role jurisprudence plays in the interpretation and
understanding of texts.
○ The most difficult problems of audience pre-selection and preparation are not to
be found in literature but rather in jurisprudence. Legislators (and framers of
constitutions) have an unlimited number of words at their disposal, but they can
use them only once, and what they say has significant consequences.

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 ○ A statute once enacted lays down the law until it is amended; and even if it is
amended, the time gap between the original enactment and the amendment is
governed by the once-only choice of words that the legislature passed.
○ Jurisprudence consists of theories of interpretation of law: meta-interpretive
theories that are supposed to stand apart from any particular body of law. A great
deal of the effort that has gone into jurisprudence has been devoted to attempts to
define "law."
○ Statutes are said to ideally favour one specific approach of jurisprudence.
○ If an audience believes a given jurisprudential theory, that audience has forfeited a
few of its degrees of interpretive freedom, and that if the legislature knows this
fact about its audience, it may be able to use jurisprudence to its advantage.
○ Any existing language qualifies as a system of at least as much complexity as
ordinary arithmetic, and hence Godel's proof applies to legal, textual, and
linguistic demonstrations.
○ Hart's positivistic core-penumbra distinction to two propositions:
■ (a) what we think of as falling within the core of the statute could be
subject to radical reinterpretation, and
■ (b) what we think of as falling within the penumbra is the typical
"arguable" case.
Concluding points:
● If, the legislature knows in advance that its interpretive com munity will consist mostly of
positivists, its best strategy would be to write those specific exceptions into the statute.
(vehicle example of Fuller and Hart)
● the inclusion of specific exceptions requires the legislature to have foreseen the panoply
of desired exceptions in advance.
● there is no a priori reason why positivists rather than naturalists will take a wider view of
any given statute.
● that there will be a tendency toward varying breadths of interpretation depending upon
the general jurisprudential theory of the interpretive community.
● A legislature that knows in advance what that general jurisprudential theory is
likely to be will have a slightly more precise way of communicating the message it
wants to communicate than a legislature that is oblivious to this theory

Interpretation and Construction

● Salmond - “by interpretation or construction is meant, the process by which the courts
seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislation through…”
● Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher
○ “English knowledge is not an instrument of mathematical precision… it would
certainly save the judges from the trouble if the acts of parliament were drafted

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 with divine precision and perfect clarity, in the absence of it, when a defect
appears, a judge cannot simply fold hands and blame the draftsmen…”
● G Williams -- Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to the
refernents.
○ But in the case of Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports vs. K.T.
Kosalram -- “but words of any language are capable of referring to different
context and times”.
● After the enacting process the legislature becomes functus officio so far as that particular
statute is concerned, so that it cannot itself interpret it.
● The Legislature can no doubt amend or repeal any previous statute or can declare its
meaning but all this can be done only by a fresh statute after going through the normal
process of law making. -- J. P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, 2003 5 SCC 134
● Shyam Sundar vs. Ram Humar, 2001 8 SCC 24 -- Rules of interpretation are not our
masters, they are our servants. They are aids to construction, presumptions and pointers.
They are meant to assist the court in advancing the ends of justice
●
Interpretation Construction

● It is the art of finding true sense of ● It is the drawing of conclusion

any form of word, i.e., the sense respecting subjects that lie beyond
which author intended to convey. the direct expression of the text
● It is the process referring to both from elements known from and
spirit and reason of law. given in the text.
● It is the mental exercise to gather ● It relates to the meaning of the
the intention of the maker of the words used in the statute.
law. ● Construction is the result of the
mental exercise.
● Interpretation find the meaning and construction establishes that meaning
● Meaning of Interpretation:
○ Webster’s Dictionary: To interpret means to explain the meaning of ; to conceive
in the light of individual belief, judgement or circumstance. Interpretation,
therefore, means the act or the result of interpreting.
○ Thus, Interpretation of statute is finding out the meaning of the statute in order to
ascertain the will of the legislature.
○ Cooley: interpretation is the art of finding out the sense of any form of words,
while construction is the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects
which are beyond the direct expression of the text.
○ Therefore, when court goes beyond the language of the statute and seeks help
from external aids it is construing the statute.

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 ○ Justice Scalia in United Savings Association vs. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates 1988
■ Statutory Construction is a holistic endeavour
■ A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the
remainder of the statutory scheme because the same technology is used
elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear or because only one of
the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible
with the rest of the law.
○ Words used in a particular statute and the courts find that its ambiguous, the same
words may have meaning in the statute and the court can interpret it harmoniously
-- from the same statute itself
○ Intention of legislature == scheme of the legislation

Meaning and Classification of Statutes:

● Black’s Law -6th Ed:
○ Statute - formal written enactment of a legislative authority that governs a
country/state/city etc; or declare policy.
○ Typically statutes command or prohibits something or declare policy -- often used
to distinguish law made by legislative bodies from the judicial decision of the
common law and regulations issued by Govt agencies.
● Will of the legislature
● Bouvier Law Dictionary:
○ “A law established by the act of the legislative power, that is to say, an Act of the
legislature
○ Among civilians -- the term “statute” is generally applied to laws and regulations
of every sort, every provision of the law which ordains, permits or prohibits
anything is designed a statute, without considering from what source it arises.”
● Bill: Act when introduced in the House of Parliament is known as Bill. It transforms into
Act, when passed by the Houses of Parliament, and the same approved by the Hon’ble
President of India. Bills are of four kinds:
○ Ordinary Bill
○ Private Members’ Bill
○ Money Bill &
○ Financial Bill
● Types of Statutes:
○ Codifying- codify rewritten law on a subject
○ Declaratory- merely declare or explain an existing law
○ Remedial- alteration of common law or a judge made law

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 ○ Amending – alteration of statute
○ Consolidating – when they consolidate several previous statute relating to the
same subject matter with or without alterations.
○ Enabling- remove a restriction or disability
○ Disabling – restrain the alienation of property
○ Penal – when they impose a penalty.

Need for Interpretation:

● Complexity of statutes: The nature of the subject, numerous draftsmen and the blend of
legal and technical language can result in incoherence, vague and ambiguous language.
● The impossible task of anticipating every possible scenario also leads to the use of
indeterminate language.
● Language, words and phrases are an imprecise form of communication. Words can have
multiple definitions and meanings. Each party in court will utilize the definition and
meaning of the language most advantageous to their particular need.

Basic Principles of Interpretation:

● Determination of legislative intent
● A statute must be read as a whole in its context.
● If the meaning is plain, effect must be given to it, irrespective of its consequences
● A statute should be so construed as to make it effective and workable

BASIC RULES OF INTERPRETATION:

Sentia legis → intention of the legislature

● When a statute is clear and unambiguous or could be interpreted in more than one
fashion, the inquiry into legislative intent ends at that point.
● inferred from sources other than the actual text of the statute.
● Mens or sententia legis (the duty of judicature is to act upon the true intention of the
legislature) It assimilates two aspects-
○ What the word mean
○ Conveys the concept of purpose and object (so process of construction is both
literal and purposive)
● Ita Scriptum est – as the words are
● Sources of Legislative Intent:

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 ○ The text of the bill as proposed to the legislative body
○ Amendments to the bill that were proposed and accepted or rejected,
○ The documentation of hearings on the subject
○ Legislative records or journals
○ Speeches and floor debate made prior to the vote on the bill
○ Legislative subcommittee minutes, factual findings, and/or reports
○ Other relevant statutes that can be used to understand the definitions in the statute
on question
○ Other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in question
○ Legislative files of the executive branch, such as the governor or president
○ Legislative intent, which is the reason for passing the law
● Intention of legislature can be explored through:
○ Words
○ The context
○ The subject matter
○ The effects and consequences
○ Spirit and reasons of law.
○ A bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of legislative intent
devoid of concept or purpose will reduce most of the remedial and beneficent
legislation to futility.
○ If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation the court has to
choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature.
District Mining Officer v Tata Iron and Steel Co. (2001) 7 SCC 358
● One of the well-recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its minds
by use of correct expression and unless there is ambiguity, the court should adopt literal
construction if it does not lead to absurdity. → Usha Devi v. Madhya Pradesh AIR 1990
● The court is not entitled to alter the language of section to fit in with the supposed
intention of the legislature. → Dattatraya Baliram Naik v. Ramanbhai AIR 1962
● Union of India v. Elphinstone spinning and weaving co. 2001 SC 724c- Supreme Court
approved the usage of literal rule as ‘cardinal principle of construction’
● Gajendragadkar in Kannailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan AIR 2002 SC 1334 held
that -- “The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature
must be found in the words used by the legislature itself.”
● It is not what may be supposed to have been intended but what has been said.
Wazirchand Mahajan v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 990
● R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 has held: “… If the words of the Statute
are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural
meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in
the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be
self-defeating.” (para 18)

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● The purpose of Interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention of
the Legislature – not to control that intention or to confine it within the limits, which the
Judge may deem reasonable or expedient.
● Statute should be constructed so as to make it Effective and Workable – if statutory
provision is ambiguous and capable of various constructions, then that construction
must be adopted which will give meaning and effect to the other provisions of the
enactment rather than that which will give none.
● The process of construction combines both the literal and purposive approaches. The
purposive construction rule highlights that you should shift from literal construction
when it leads to absurdity.
● The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature,
as expressed in the statute, considering it as a whole and in the context. Mahesh Kumar
v. Addl. Collector, Hoshangabad and Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India
● According to Salmond, there are two cases in which the litera legis need not be taken
as conclusive and to find out the sententia legis external aid may be sought.
○ When the letter of law is obviously defective and fails to express a single, definite
coherent and complete idea.
○ When the text leads to such an unreasonable result that it is self evident that the
legislature could not have meant what it has said.
○ This leads us to two types of interpretation.
■ 1. Grammatical or literal and
■ 2. Logical interpretation.
○ (Important)
■ Literal legis → literal meaning
■ Sentia legis → intention of the legislature (i guess)
■ Rule says that we must stick to the literal rule always and only if not
possible then we have to seek external aid
■ Eg: Berriman case -- railway accident where court denied relief based on
interpreting the law based on literal rule
● PROCESS OF INTERPRETATION
○ The process of interpretation is very important as it conveys how to find out the
true intention of the maker and enables us to come to a suitable conclusion free
from absurdity.
○ SALMOND has defined it as “the process by which the Courts seek to ascertain
the meaning of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in
which it is expressed.”
○ Karnataka State Financial Corporation v N . Narsimahaiah (2008) 5 SCC ;
AIR 2008
■ The Supreme Court said while interpretation the following questions shall
always be considered by the interpreter:

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 ● (i) Why the particular law has been made?
● (ii) What is the purpose?
● (iii) Has the purpose been achieved?
● Related to the mischief rule (Hedon’s case)
● The process of interpretation has two elements namely ;-
○ GRAMMATICAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION
■ Grammatical interpretation provides for the literal construction. It means
that words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning if
such meaning is clear. In such a case, effect should be given to the
provisions of the statute irrespective of the consequences.
■ The language of the statute is to be interpreted according to the rules of
grammar.
■ This is considered the safest rule of interpretation.
■ Union Of India v Flip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (1990)
SCC 277 → The very purpose of interpretation is to provide a clear
legislative intent and to prevent unreasonableness, and when the words
used are themselves very clear then there is no need of further
interpretation of it.
■ If the language of the court is plain the duty of the court is only to give
effect to it.
■ The courts should not construe words contrary to their ordinary and literal
meaning.
■ There has been circumstances where courts have faced difficulties in the
process of grammatical interpretation like inconsistency & Ambiguity.
The inconsistency may arise when a particular law or statute is
inconsistent with one and other. The ambiguity may arise as a result of a
particular word having two or more meanings.
■ Manik Lal Majumdar v Gouranga Chandra Dey (2004) SCC 448 →
When the words in a statute give out two meanings of a particular word
then the meaning that is most suitable and precise shall be taken.
○ LOGICAL INTERPRETATION
■ Logical Interpretation means such an interpretation aims to logically fulfill
the intention of the legislature. It is known by various names like-
Doctrine of liberal interpretation: sententia legis.
■ Under it, courts have to find out the intention of the legislature by a
thorough study of statutes, and it has to see what the reasons for framing
this statute are.
■ When the language of a statute is unclear or the object and meaning of
statute are not derived then the rules of logical interpretation are used to
know the intention of the statute. This was proved by the Allahabad High

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 court in Ramashreya v/s District Panchayat Raj Officer, Gorakhpur
(A.I.R. 1998 Allahabad 87).
■ In N. Shaeydamani v/s Alexander Court decided that those situations and
circumstances have to be considered under logical interpretation which are
the reasons for framing the Statute.
■ The most accepted mode of interpretation or construing the statute is to
adopt the interpretation or construction according “to the intent of them
that make it”.
● It is the duty of Judicature to act upon the true intention of the legislature. This is
guided by the Maxim “Sententia Legis” i.e., true intention of legislature.
● Intention of the legislature always serves as reference to the meaning of words used by
legislature which are objectively determined. It is nowhere seen or expressly provided, it
has to be assessed by the guiding rules of interpretation.
● According to Salmond the duty of the judicature is to discover and to act upon the true
intention of the legislature under the Maxim, ‘sententia legis’.
● Essence of the law lies in the spirit, not in its letter, but letter are the only way in which
intentions are expressed. The words are external manifestation of intention that it
involves. When there is possibility of one or more interpretation of statute, courts has to
adopt the interpretation which reflects the ‘true intention of legislature’ which can also be
considered as the legal meaning of the statutory provisions.
● There are certain rules of logical interpretation that can be followed to know the intention
of the legislature.
○ a) Read the Statute as a whole.
■ State of West Bengal v/s Union of India (1964) S C R 371—it decided
that the Court should not only depend on that section which is under
consideration before it, to know the intention of legislature. The court
should seriously consider every provision of Statute.
○ b) Provisions of Statute should not be separated.
○ c) Remove the Inconsistency of Words
○ d) Consequences are not considered.
○ e) Logical Construction should be done
○ f) Equitable Construction
● The intention of legislature shall have two aspects:-
○ “Meaning’’: That which tells what the words mean.
○ “Purpose and Object”: That which includes purpose and object of enacting the
statute. So, when intention of legislature is not found, it is assessed from the
statute with a combination of ‘meaning of the words’ and in the light of the
purpose or objects.
● Guiding lines to frame the intention of legislature are: –
○ 1. The context

14
 ○ 2. The subject matter.
○ 3. The effects and consequences.
○ 4. The spirit or reason of the law.
● Intention of legislature is assessed either in express words or by necessary implication
keeping in mind the purpose or object of the statute.
● Sententia Legis means to bring out the true meaning of law.
○ The Sententia legis gives liberty to the courts to go beyond the literal meaning of
the words. Whenever there is a problem as to the meaning of a particular word
expressed in the statute then the courts can apply the logical interpretation that
brings out the true meaning of the words expressed in the statute.
● The logical interpretation is based on the belief that the words used may have different
meaning than the maker has thought to have, and there may be a chance of
miscommunication and then the courts are at the liberty to peep in to the true nature of
words so expressed.
● State of MP v. Balram Mihani (2010) 2 SCC 602, → “where language of a statute is
very general and not clear, the courts should interpret it with contextual background.”
● Bharat Petroleum Corp. v. Maddula Ratnavalli (2007) 6 SCC 81 → “Where two views
are possible the view which satisfies the Constitutional rights or requirements must be
preferred.”
● Shanker Raju vs UoI WP C No. 311 of 2010 →
○ In a court of law, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can
only be legitimately ascertained from what it has chosen to enact either in express
words or by reasonable and necessary implication
○ Where the Legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme of a language of
Statute, it is the duty of the Court to give full effect to the same without scanning
its wisdom or policy and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which
is not congenial to or consistent with such express intent of legislature
● Kehar Singh v. State (delhi admin) 1988 3 SCC 609 →
○ The court first examines the words of the statute. If the words are precise and
cover the situation in hand, there is no need to go further. Those words should be
expounded in the natural and ordinary sense.
○ But if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms
employed, it is the paramount duty of the court to put upon the language of the
legislature a rational meaning.
○ The meaning of every word, section and provision should be examined. The Act
as a whole with reference to the necessity which gave rise to the Act has to be
examined. It should be considered to ensure coherence and consistency
within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences. For these
purposes Court calls in external and internal aids.
● Dadi Jagannadhan vs. Jammulu Ramulu 2001 7 SCC 71

15
 ○ The court must start with presumption that legislature did not make a
mistake
○ It must interpret so as to carry out the obvious intention of legislature.
○ It must not correct or make up a deficiency, neither add or read into a provision,
words which are not there particularly when literal reading leads to an intelligible
result.
● Sultana Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain 1997 SCC 373
○ It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the
Act and to construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other
in such a manner as to harmonize them.
○ The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat the other
provisions unless the court, in spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect
reconciliation between them.
○ Courts have to bear in mind that when there are two conflicting provisions in the
act which cannot be reconciled with each other , they should be so interpreted that
if possible effect should be given to both.

EX VISCERIBUS ACTUS
● “4 Corners Rule”
● Introduction:
○ While interpreting a statute, no particular section of the statute should be
read in isolation to determine its meaning.
○ In the exposition of statutes, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered
from the whole of the statute, and every part of it taken and compared with
other parts.
○ The reason behind this rule is that there should not be any contradiction between
one part of the statute and another, and also that one part would ideally help in the
understanding of another.
○ “Construing one part of the statute by another part of the same statute" is the best
expression of the meaning of the makers.
○ When there might be contradictions between provisions (eg: in Land laws or
non-obstante clause) -- court will look into the Ex Visceribus Actus and see
whether the contradiction can be remedied by looking into the statute itself
● Meaning and Scope:
○ This rule propounds the contextual reading of statutes.
○ Dictionary meaning cannot be used.
○ The clauses of a statute should be construed with reference to the context vis-à-vis
the other provisions so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute
relating to the subject-matter.

16
 ○ The parties’ intentions must be discerned from the four corners of the document,
and extrinsic evidence may not be considered.
● Fundamental rules of interpretation of statutes
○ Intention of Legislature
○ Statutes must be construed to make it effective and workable
■ Sometimes provisions in law may be vague and inconsistent. This rule
states that law should be construed in such a way that it will make the law
effective and operative.
○ Statutes must be read as a whole in it's context
● The maxim ex visceribus actus is a long- recognized rule of construction. The Literal
meaning of the maxim is “within the four corners of the Act”.
● As per this principle a provision in a statute cannot be interpreted in isolation, because it
may lead to undesirable results not intended by the legislature. By reading the entire
statute, the meaning of the words can be interpreted with the aid of provisions and words
contained in the light of other sections in the same statute.
● The principle states that the whole context and intent of enacting a statute that is
elucidated through its preamble must be kept in mind while interpreting a provision of
that statute. This must be especially true when the meaning of the Section is dubious.
● When the provisions in a statute are interpreted in this way, the courts should not deviate
from the intention of the legislature. The scheme of the act as a whole should be the
guiding principle while a statute is interpreted by applying this rule.
● “The authorities on the interpretation of statutes generally agree that a statute is to be read
as a whole and that every clause is to be construed with reference to the other clauses of
the act and its context, to the greatest extent possible”, Maxwell on Interpretation of
Statutes.
● Every clause of statute must be construed with reference of the context and other clauses
of the act, to make consistent enactment of the whole statute.

Cases:
● In Poppatlal Shah v State of Madras, the supreme court observed that it is a settled rule
of construction that in order to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a
statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in
the light of the general purpose and object of the statute.
● ‘’If the choice is between two interpretations’’, said Viscount Simon, L.C. In Nokes vs.
Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd. (AC at p. 1022) → “the narrower of which
would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should read the whole
statute and avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should
rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate
only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result.”

17
● In M/s Philips India Ltd v. Labour Court Madras (AIR 1985 SC 1034) , the Supreme
court held that no canon of statutory construction is more firmly established than that the
principle that statute must be read as a whole. This is a general rule of construction
applicable to all statutes alike. This rule is so firmly established that it is variously styled
as elementary rule and as a settled rule.
● “Context here means the statute as a whole, other statutes in pari materia, the scope of the
statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy”. ( Union of India v Elphinestone
Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd, 2001 )
● Case: Re:Appeal (civil) 7533 of 1997Indian Handicrafts Emporium Vs. Union of
India., (Judgement 27/08/2003) → “We are concerned with the reason and object for
which the amendments (to be read as law) have to be made. We must take into
consideration the text and context of the amending Acts and the circumstances in which
they had to be brought about.”
○ As quoted in the words of Jeevan Reddy. J: “A statute cannot always be
construed with the dictionary in one hand and the statute in the other. Regard must
also be had to the scheme, context and to the legislative history. Dictionaries are
not dictators of statutory construction where the benignant mood of a law, and
more emphatically, the definition clause furnish a different denotation.”
● In Appeal (civil) 2721 of 2001Appeal (civil)2722 of 2001 “U.O.I. & Ors v Harjeet
Singh Sandhu,” Judge Learned Hand cautioned not to make a fortress out of the
dictionary but to pay more attention to the sympathetic and imaginative discovery of the
purpose or object of the statute as a guide to its meaning.
● Tarlochan Dev Sharma .Vs. State of Punjab, 25/07/2001 (Appeal (civil) 1889 of 2000):
○ “To find the meaning of a word or expression not defined in an enactment the
courts apply the subject and object rule which means ascertain carefully the
subject of the enactment where the word or expression occurs and have regard to
the object which the Legislature has in view.
○ Forego the strict grammatical or etymological propriety of language, even its
popular use.
○ Let the subject or the context in which they are used and the object which the
Legislature seeks to attain be your lenses through which look for the meaning to
be ascribed.”
○ “In selecting one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always be
given to the context, as it is a fundamental rule that the meanings of words and
expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they
appear.
○ The intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It
is also equally well settled that when negative words are used the courts will
presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory
in character.

18
● Nasiruddin vs. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577
○ In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall
not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences
arising there from.
○ It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot
change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or
intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous.
○ It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not
there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that
there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words.
○ It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered
from the language used.
○ Interlinking with casus ommissus
● Superintendent and Remebrance of Legal Affairs to Govt of WB vs. Abani Maity
(1979) 4 SCC 85
○ “Exposition ex visceribus actus is a long-recognised rule of construction. Words
in a statue often take their meaning from the context of the statute as a whole.
They are therefore, not to be construed in isolation.
○ For instance, the use of the word 'may' would normally indicate that the provision
was not mandatory. But in the context of a particular statute, this word may
connote a legislative imperative, particularly when its construction in a
permissive sense would relegate it to the unenviable position, as it were, 'of an in
effectual angel beating its wings in a luminous void in vain'.
● Balram Kumawat vs. UoI 2003 (7) SCC 628
○ Brief Facts: The appellants M/s Unigems had imported mammoth fossil said to
be of an extinct species in the year 1937. The stock of mammoth fossil held by the
appellants is said to be periodically checked by the statutory authorities.
○ Issue: Whether 'mammoth ivory' imported in India answers the description of
the words 'ivory imported in India' contained in Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972
(hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') as amended by Act No. 44 of 1991 is the
question Involved in these appeals which arise out of a common judgment and
order dated 20.3.1997 passed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.
○ Decision:
■ What has been banned is ivory. There is complete prohibition of trade in
ivory. Such a complete prohibition is a reasonable restriction within the
meaning of Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
■ Commercial meaning or technical meaning of an object or article is
required to be taken recourse to when the same is necessary for the
purpose of meeting the requirements of law. The law in no uncertain terms

19
 says that no person shall trade in ivory. It does not say that what is
prohibited is trade in elephant ivory or either types of ivory.
■ The Parliament, therefore, advisedly used the word 'ivory' instead of
elephant ivory. The intention of the Parliament in this behalf, in our
opinion, is absolutely clear and unambiguous. we cannot assume that
the Parliament was not aware of existence of different types of ivory.
If the intention of the Parliament was to confine the subject matter of
ban under Act 44 of 1993 to elephant ivory, it would have said so
explicitly.
● In the case of Bidie v. General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, (1948)
2 All ER 995, Lord Greene has observed:
○ “Few words in the English language have a natural or ordinary meaning in the
sense that they must be so read that their meaning is entirely independent of the
context; however, when construing the meaning of a statute using such words, the
context gains predominance over the general meaning.”
● In the case of Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium. (1967) 2 All ER 576, Court remarked
that:
○ Words, therefore, derive colour from those which surround them. Sentences are
not mere collections of words to be taken out of the sentence, defined separately
by reference to a dictionary or decided cases and put back again into the meaning
assigned to those separate words.
● In R v. Eduljee Byramjee (1846) 3 MIA 468: 5 Moo PC 276, the Privy Council held:
○ “to ascertain the meaning of the clause, we must look at the whole Charter, at
what precedes and what succeeds and not merely the clause itself.” (while
observing the scope of the Bombay Charter, 1823)
● Viscount Simon, L.C. In Nokes vs. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd. (AC at p.
1022) held:
○ “'If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to
achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction
which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder
construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the
purpose of bringing about an effective result."
● Commonwealth vs. Bralley 69 Mass. 456, 457 (1855)
○ The statute provided that, “no person shall be allowed to be a manufacturer of any
spiritous or intoxicating liquors for sale, or a common seller thereof, without
being duly appointed or authorized…" It was urged that the word "thereof”
included ‘the liquors manufactured by the defendant.’
○ The defendant contended, that the statute prohibited only manufacturers from
selling or being common sellers of liquor. Grammatically, such construction is at
least ingenious; literally, the words might bear such meaning; but the context from

20
 another clause of the section made it clear that not only manufacturers but all
persons were prohibited from selling liquor without authorization.
○ Here, the contextual meaning is the proper one because the literal meaning does
not harmonize with other parts of the statute.
● United States vs. Howell 78 US 432 (1870)
○ The statute provided "that if any person or persons shall falsely make, forge,
counterfeit, or alter... any note, bond, coupon, or other security issued under the
authority of this act,... every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a
felony."
○ The defendant counterfeited certain treasury notes. But as they were not literally
"issued under the authority of this act,“ the defendant contended that the statute
only covered tampering with valid notes. The reasoning was based on the literal
meaning, that if the note was issued under the act, it was a valid note; if it were
not so issued, the passing of the note was not by the act an offense.
○ Here the literal meaning is senseless and would render the statute void. Similarly
it would run counter to the very object and purpose of the act, namely, to prevent
counterfeiting; and the statute would be repugnant to itself in using the word
"counterfeit" in one part and "issued under the authority of this act" at the end of
the section. But supplying the ellipsis by a contextual meaning, it is clear that the
making of any' note essentially similar to those issued by the government was
what was meant.
○ Contextual interpretation is therefore in part, an art involving the application of a
group of interpretative techniques or processes by which the interpreter evaluates
the indicia of meaning so as to reach the most sensible and consistent or
satisfactory meaning which the language as a whole is in good faith capable of
bearing.
○ Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and
other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment
of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject- matter.
○ Of two or more contextual meanings, both of which are consistent with the entire
statute, the one that is more satisfactory or gives the more satisfactory solution in
the particular case should be chosen.
● Lord Greene, M.R. said, ‘To ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute the courts
must look at the whole statute, at what precedes and at what succeeds and not merely at
the clause itself and the method of construing statutes that I prefer, is to read the statute as
a whole and ask oneself the question: In this state, in this context, relating to this subject-
matter, what is true meaning of that word?’

21
The Contextual Approach
● Contextual reading is a well-known proposition of interpretation of statute. The clauses
of a statute should be construed with reference to the context vis-à-vis the other
provisions so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute relating to the
subject-matter. The rule of 'ex visceribus actus' should be resorted to in a situation of this
nature.
● Sir Rupert Cross has stated that → “We are concerned with the reason and object for
which the amendments have to be made. We must take into consideration the text and
context of the amending acts and the circumstances in which they had to be brought
about. Dictionaries are not dictators of statutory construction where the benignant mood
of a law, and more emphatically, the definition clause furnish a different denotation”.
● In the words of Jeevan Reddy, “A statute cannot always be construed with the
dictionary in one hand and the statute in the other.” Regard must also be had to the
scheme, context and to the legislative history. Judge must pay more attention to the
sympathetic and imaginative discovery of the purpose or object of the whole statute as a
guide to its meaning. (As Quoted from: Appeal (civil) 2721 of 2001Appeal (civil)2722 of
2001 U.O.I & ORS.v HARJEET SINGH SANDHU.)
● This rule, that context must be used or the ex visceribus actus rule, that is ‘from the inside
of the Act’ was clearly implied in Broken Hill South Limited (Public Officer) v The
Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales) (1937) 56 CLR 337:
● “The question is one of interpretation, and, unless an artificial construction is adopted in
order to avoid an excess of constitutional authority, we must give that meaning to the
provision which we think it actually expresses. In forming an opinion as to what meaning
it does express, we must be guided by the rules of construction and, accordingly consider
the subject matter and examine the rest of the statute in which it occurs.”
● What the court was saying here is that the first approach must be to ascertain whether the
words have a clear meaning in the general context in which they appear. That general
context is the statute taken as a whole. Which might appear to be unclear when read in
isolation might be quite sensible when the whole of the statute is considered. There might
be other parts of the statute which show the court how particular words and phrases were
intended to be understood.
● A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted.
● The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law, the intention of
the law maker expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole. STATE OF PUNJAB V.
BALBIR SINGH [1994] INSC 152; AIR 1994 SC 1872; 1994 (3)
● It is well-settled principle that while interpreting a statute, the interpretative function of
the court is to discover the true legislative intent. It must be read, first as a whole, and
then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word and
therefore, taking into consideration the contextual connotation and the scheme of the Act,
its provisions in their entirety.

22
Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat
● The principle of UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT follows from the general
principle of interpretation pursuant to which interpretation must always seek to
effectuate the intention of the legislature.
● The literal meaning of the maxim is, ‘the thing may have effect rather than be
destroyed’.
○ The maxim means that it is better for a thing to have an effect than to be made
void, which means that it is better to validate a thing instead of invalidating it. A
statute is considered to be an authentic repository of legislative will and therefore
it is the function of the court to interpret it according to the intent of them that
made it. That function of the court has to be abided by the maxim Ut Res Magis
Valeat Quam Pereat.
● It is the duty of the court to try and avoid that construction which attributes irrationally to
the legislature. And hence must prefer such a construction which renders the statutory
provision constitutionally valid instead of making it void.
● In case of a situation where there are two constructions possible from a single
provision, of which one renders the provision inoperative while the other give effect to
the provision, the latter which gives effect to the provision is adopted and the former is
discarded. It usually begins with the presumption in favour of constitutionality and
prefers the construction which solely embarks the statute within the domain of
competency of the legislature.
○ However, it is also noted that if the presumption of a Constitution fails, then in
such a case the statute cannot be rendered operative or valid accordingly. In the
landmark case of Indira Sawhney Vs. Union of India and Others, the Supreme
Court had struck down the state legislation as it was a violation of the constitution
and was ultra-vires of the legislative competency.
● The principle of the maxim was enunciated on Murray v Inland Rev. Commisioner. It
was stated that, the alternative that will introduce uncertainty in the smooth working of
the legislation should be rejected and the alternative that promotes the object of the
statute must be chosen.
● Maxwell observes that if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower one
would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation. Under such a
circumstance, we should avoid the construction which would reduce the legislation to
futility and accept the bolder construction paving way for an effective outcome.
● When it comes to interpreting any provision or law it is very vital to note that there are
almost always two interpretations that may arise. One which is ultra vires while the other
which is intra vires. According to this maxim, the latter interpretation shall always prevail
over the former.
● While resuming the constitutionality of any problem the words of the provision
should not be given any form of unnecessary extension. Since the role is established to

23
 gauge the intentions of the legislature in a case where it couldn’t be gauged from the
word that are employed by it, thus reading this particular aspect of the rule essentially
leads to a claim for ‘textualist’ interpretation or can also be viewed as something
imposing a rider on the ‘contextual’ interpretation.
● It is a rule of Reasonable construction.
○ Example, in the case of Dr. A.L. Mudaliar vs. LIC of India (1963) 33 Comp Cas.
420 (SC), it was held that the Memorandum of Association of a company must be
read fairly and its import derived from a reasonable interpretation of the language
which it employs. Further, in order to determine whether a transaction is intra
vires the objects of a company, the objects clause should be reasonably construed:
neither with rigidity nor with laxity. Waman Lal Chotanlal Parekh vs. Scindia
Steam Navitation Co. Ltd. (1944) 14 Comp. Cas. 69 (Bom.)
○ Thus, if the Court finds that giving a plain meaning to the words will not be a fair
or reasonable construction, it becomes the duty of the court to depart from the
dictionary meaning and adopt the construction which will advance the remedy
and suppress the mischief provided the Court does not have to resort to conjecture
or surmise. A reasonable construction will be adopted in accordance with the
policy and object of the statute.
● Case laws:
○ The supreme court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Mangal Sen(AIR 1975 SC
1106), the court has to abide by the maxim, ut res magis valeat quam pereat, lesy
the intention of the legislature may go in vain or be left to evaporate in thin air.
○ In Tinsukia Electronic Supply Co Ltd. V State of Assam( AIR 1990 SC 123), the
Supreme Court strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a
statute to futility. It is of no doubt that if a statute is absolutely vague and its
language wholly intractable and meaningless, the statute could be declared void
for vagueness. It is therefore, the duty of the court to make what it can of the
statute knowing that, the statutes are meant to be operative and that nothing short
of impossibility should allow a court to declare a statute unworkable.
○ In Radha Sundar v. Mohammed Rahim, the Apex Court has held that it is settled
law of election that if two meanings of a document are admissible and in which
one meaning affects all the clauses of the document in question whereas another
meaning nullifies one or more clauses of the said document, then the earlier
meaning of the document should be accepted on the principle that it is better for a
thing to have an effect than to be made void.
● The principle of , ut res magis valeat quam pereat is variously referred to as effect
utile, the principle of effectiveness.
● An analogue to the international principle of effectiveness can be found in Roman law:

24
 ○ ‘When there is an ambiguity in a statute, the sense is to be preferred which avoids
an absurdity, especially when by this method the intendment of the act is also
secured”.
● Lauterpacht observed as much, citing the judgement in Ford v Beech that ‘an
agreement ought to receive that construction which will best effectuate the intention of
the parties to be collected from the whole of the agreement’. Other examples of the
common law iteration of this principle are Hillas & Co v Arcos, Langston v Langston
and Hill v William Hill (Park Lane) Ltd. (‘If there are two modes of reading an
instrument, and one destroys the instrument and the other preserves it … you should lean
towards that construction which preserves rather than towards that which
destroys’.)
○ This principle follows from the general principle of interpretation pursuant to
which contract interpretation must always seek to determine the common
intentions of the parties.
○ The assumption behind that Principle is that each contract is aimed at achieving
the parties' common commercial objective. Therefore, contract interpretation of
terms which convey different meanings and of which one renders the terms
redundant or even absurd or the contract invalid, should always focus on that
meaning of the contractual terminology which gives a certain effect to the words
or validity to the contract as a whole.
○ Another consequence of this rule is that in interpreting a contract, a solution
should always be found that avoids the premature termination of the contract by
one side, thus making the avoidance of the contract a remedy of last resort.
● Some International lawyers regard effect utile as a subsidiary principle arising from the
broader obligation to interpret treaties in good faith. In the ILC commentary, the ILC
referred explicitly to the maxim of ut res magis valeat quam peraet.
○ Scholars have long recognised the status of effect utile as a universally applicable
principle of interpretation. Effect utile has been widely applied in international
jurisprudence.
○ Some arbitral awards refer to effect utile as well. In American Manufacturing
and Trading v Zaire, tribunal member Golson, in his independent opinion,
referred to effect utile as a ‘Roman law principle.’ In the Cayuga Indians Case,
the tribunal held that ‘nothing is better settled, as a canon of interpretation in all
systems of law, than that a clause must be so interpreted as to give it a meaning
rather than so as to deprive it of meaning’.
○ The question of effect utile’s existence as a common law principle was at issue
in arbitral proceedings between PNG Sustainable Development Program.
■ The tribunal upheld the applicability of effect utile to the interpretation of
a statute, noting the ‘well-established common law principle of statutory

25
 interpretation that a court should strive to give effect to every element of a
statutory enactment.’
● Conclusion:
○ The provisions of any statute must be construed in an operative as well as
effective manner based on the principle of “Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat”.
There is obviously no doubt that if a statute is absolutely vague and the language
is mostly untraceable and somewhat meaningless the statute can be declared void
for the vagueness that it carries.
○ The maxim is pressed into service so as to contend that the duty of every court is
to constitute the enactment of a provision in such a way so as to implement it for
enforcing a taxing law or regulating law.
○ According to this maxim, the courts strongly lean against a construction which
reduces the statute to futility and there is a presumption in favour of the
constitutionality of the statute.

Dhoom Singh Vs. Prakash Chandra Sethi

Facts:
The present appeal is an election contention of the MP State Assembly where R1 was the
elected member and R3 filed the election petition (EP) against R1. The case involves certain
documents that did not meet the required compliance as per s.81 of the RPA and was contested
by R1 against R3, thus contesting that the EP should be thus dismissed.
In the HC, after several hearings before the single bench (EP along with misc pet.) and it
was observed by the other parties in the case that R3 had colluded with R1 and requested the
court that the EP should not be dismissed and requested to intervene in the same. The
Appellant’s contended that the requirements u/s81 had been met. The case also involved an
aspect about how the Appellant and R3 had the same counsels.
The Appellant raised grounds u/s. 116A and even Art.136 for the appeal to be heard
against the respondents.
Issue:
1. Should the EP be dismissed as per s.86(1)?
2. What will happen when there is clubbing of s.116A of RPA along with the presence of
Art.136 of the Constitution?
3. If the Appellant’s counsel is competent
Law:
a. Section 81(3) RPA
b. Section 86(1) RPA
c. Section 116A RPA
d. Art. 136 Constitution of India
Analysis:

26
 It is seen as to how there was a ‘question of law’ involved which gave rise to the hearing
and contention regarding the SLP that was raised in due course of the EP. This was surrounding
the fact about the competence of the counsel of the appellant who had served as the counsel of
the respondent and was seen to have caused significant delay in the proceedings as there was a
constant extension of time requested before the court by him for both the sides in the same case.
Issues of locus standi was also debated before the court in light of s.116A RPA and the fact that
the EP was dismissed by the HC based on the grounds u/s.86 of RPA, which subsequently raised
concerns over the maintainability of the appeal.
The locus standi contention against the appellant was a strong point of contention in the
case, hence the court disallowed the appellant to challenge the order of the HC made u/s.86 on
grounds of merit.
The court further dwelled into the scope and meaning under Chapter 2 - 4 of RPA that in
general deals with EPs and trial of EPs and associated procedures (withdrawal and abatement out
of which the following grounds were given stronger consideration:
● Grounds for withdrawal of EP under s.109-110 RPA
● Substitution of abettors in EP based on grounds u/s 112 RPA.
Hence after observing this the court realised and concluded that none of the provisions relating to
withdrawal of EP could be attracted in the present matter. To arrive at the grounds of conclusion
regarding the scope of the provisions surrounding the withdrawal and/or abatement of EPs, the
court looked into and considered the intention of the Legislature, following being the key
observations for consideration:
● The Legislature in its wisdom has chosen to make special provisions for the continuance
of the election petition only in case of its withdrawal or abatement.
● It has yet not thought it fit to make any provision in the Act permitting intervention of an
elector of the Constituency in all contingencies of failures of the election petition either
due to the collusion or fraud of the original election petitioner or otherwise.
● If the court were to deliberate on this and pass an opinion regarding the omission by the
Legis, it would be indulgin in a case of casus omissus.
○ To this the court also mentioned that - “a well-known rule of construction of
statutes that "A statute, even more than a contract, must be construed, ut res magis
valeat quam pereat, so that the intentions of the legislature may not be treated as
vain or left to operate in the air." A second consequent of this rule is that "a statute
may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and
undoubtedly not been made"
Conclusion:
Hence after long deliberations regarding the scope of the impugned sections, the court did
not resort in indulging in causus omission based on the reasoning that under the principle of ut
res magis valeat quam pereat the intention of the legislature must not be treated in vain or left to
be operated without any cause and the fact that any statute can not be extended to meet a case for
which a provision in the law has not been clearly, undoubtedly and deliberately missed out on.

27
Hence concluding on the actions of the HC with respect to the dismissal of the EP, the HC
deviated from the principles when it involved itself in matter of collusion, which the RPA was
silent on. It also held that “It is difficult to press into service the general principles of law
governing an election petition as was sought to be done on behalf of the appellant for his
intervention in the matter. If there be any necessity of avoiding any such situation as the present
one was said to be it is for the legislature to intervene and make clear and express provision of
law for the purpose.”
Hence, based on the arguments put forth and the interpretation principles followed the
court held that “the intention of the legislature that a petition should not fail by reason of any
bargain or collusion between the election petitioner and the successful candidate would be
frustrated'' was repelled on the ground "There is undoubtedly a lacuna in the Act, because it
makes provision when an election petitioner is allowed to withdraw, but makes no such provision
if he just refuses to prosecute it”. Hence dismissing the appeal.

Scope and Meaning of ut res magis valeat quam pareat:

The maxim deals with the situations as to where at times legal provisions may give rise to
complex situations involving the scope of their application. Here the general principle of
interpretation should be in pursuance to the interpretation that addresses the true intent of the
legislature. The issue in this case was primarily surrounding the scope of ‘abatement’ and
‘collusion’. Under this maxim, it is to be observed that a statute is always considered to be an
authentic repository of legislative will and it is thus the function of the court to interpret it
according to the will of the drafters. Furthermore it is also the duty of the court to avoid to the
best possible extent any construction that may attribute irrationality to the legislature. Hence the
same is observed in the present case as to how the SC did not overstep its limits and interpreted
the scope of collusion to the nest possible way under the RPA.

General Principles and Rules of Interpretation:

Literal Rule
● Often, judges look to see if there can be a literal meaning to the words used in the
disputed statutory provision.
● No Legal Rules exist which state which rule of Interpretation can be used and the rules of
interpretation that have been identified, are not themselves legal rules.
● Problems of Interpreting Statutes:
○ Language is not a precise tool
■ Twinning vs. Myers 1982:
● “It shall be a criminal offence for any vehicle to enter the park”.

28
 ● What is a vehicle? Could we expect a vehicle for a disabled person
from entering parks, or a child’s bicycle, or did roller skates
amount to a vehicle? These are all open to debate depending on
our interpretation of the word ‘vehicle’ therefore words often take
their meaning from their context, so there are shades of meaning.
■ Courts have to read and understand the words used in light of the specific
statute (eg: so for vehicles, it would have to read the MV Act).
○ The meaning of words changes over time.
■ When the Telegraph Act 1869 was passed the telephone had not been
invented, so in subsequent cases it was necessary to extend certain
provisions of the Act to cover telephone messages.
○ The drafting of the legislation might have been hurried.
■ When the courts need new laws, they need to pass a new law quickly
through parliament. Nobody challenges the wording because everyone is
happy with the purpose of the legislation
● The intention of Parliament is best achieved by giving the words their ordinary natural
meaning wherever such words are capable of a literal meaning.
● R v Bloxham:
○ Bloxham paid £500 for a car, and promised a further £800 once the log book was
delivered. The log book was not delivered and Bloxham realised the car must
have been stolen. Eventually he sold the car for £200.
○ Is Bloxham liable for theft?
○ S22 Theft Act 1968(1) - “A person handles stolen goods if he dishonestly
undertakes or assists in their disposal by or for the benefit of another person”.
○ Answer → X is another person who benefited from buying a cheap car, therefore
Bloxham is guilty.
● The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and
phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning unless that
leads to some absurdity. →
○ Crawford v Spooner (1846) → According to LORD BROUGHAM, “the true way
is to take the words as the Legislature have given them, and to take the meaning
which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those
words is, either by preamble or by the context of the words in question controlled
or altered.”
○ Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545
○ Reiterating the same objects Das Gupta J. in Mahadeolal Kanodia v
Administrator General of West Bengal AIR 1960 SC 936 observed that “the
intention of the Legislature has always to be gathered by words used by it, giving
to the words their plain, normal, grammatical meaning.”

29
● This rule is the basis of all court decisions in relation to statues. Here judges rely on the
exact wording of the statute for the case.
● Lord Diplock in the Duport Steel v Sirs case (1980) defined the rule:
○ “Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not then
for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect
to it’s plain meaning because they consider the consequences for doing so would
be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.”
○ Unjust - (discussion) The fact that by using thier own method of interpretation
which may be unjust despite providing a just remedy, they would tend to
overpower the functionality of what the legislature has done, thus invading into
the doctrine of separation of powers. Process of interpretations have been duly
accepted and followed by the Legis and Judiciary, hence judges are to abide by it.
● In M/s. Hiralal Ratanlal v. STO AIR 1973 SC 1034, the Court observed that
○ In interpreting a statutory provision the first and foremost rule of interpretation is
the literal construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does
the provision say. If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the
legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of
construction of statutes. The other rules of construction are called into aid only
when the legislative intent is not clear.
● Rule:
○ Words must be given their natural, popular and grammatical meanings.
■ words of a statute must first be given their natural, ordinary and popular
meaning, and
■ sentences and phrases must be given their grammatical meaning.
■ The courts should not be over zealous in searching for ambiguities or
obscurities in words which are plain. Tata Consultancy Services V. State
of A.P. (2005) 1 SCC 308
■ S.A. Venkataraman vs. State: Sec. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 makes it mandatory to obtain prior sanction for prosecuting a public
servant who is employed. The Supreme Court held that sanction is not
necessary for prosecution of an accused who has ceased to be a public
servant on the date on which the prosecution is initiated. Supreme Court
refused to construe ‘is employed’ as ‘was employed.’
■ P. Venkataswamy vs. D.S. Ramareddi: Has cultivated was interpreted by
A.P. High Court to include intention to cultivate, Supreme Court over
ruled this liberal construction as there is no ambiguity
■ In Municipal Board v State Transport Authority, Rajasthan: The
location of a bus stand was changed by the Regional Transport Authority.
An application could be moved within 30 days of receipt of order of
regional transport authority according to section 64 A of the Motor

30
 Vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the
contention that statute must be read as “30 days from the knowledge of the
order”. The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made
and hence rejected the application as invalid.
● so here the court should not interpret knowledge and receipt
interchangeably and should not replace the words of the statute.
■ Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1961 SC
1325: The Supreme court was faced with a question with the meaning of
"vegetable", as it had occurred in the C.P and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 as
amended by Act of 1948,whether the word vegetables included betel
leaves or not. The Supreme Court held that "being a word of everyday use
it must be construed in its popular sense". It was therefore held that betel
leaves were excluded from its purview.
○ Exact meaning should be preferred to loose meaning.
■ Pritipal Singh V. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 1413, P. 1419(1982)), it
was held that there is a presumption that the words are used in an Act of
Parliament correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly.
○ Technical words must be construed in their technical sense.
■ According to Lord Esher waist or skin are well known terms applied to a
ship and nobody would think of their meaning the waist or skin of a
person when they are used in a statue dealing with ships.
● Language of the Statute must be preserved:
○ Courts should not add words to the statute or substitute different words for the
words used by the legislature.
○ Matter which should have been included by the legislature, but has not been
included (casus omissus) should not be supplied by the Courts.
○ No word should be rejected as surplus or redundant.
● Conditions of Literal Rule:
○ Statute may itself provide a special meaning for a term, which is usually to be
found in the interpretation section.
○ Technical words are given ordinary technical meaning if the statute has not
specified any other.
○ Words will not be inserted by implication.
○ Words undergo shifts in meaning in course of time.
○ It should always be remembered that words acquire significance from their
context.
● Fisher v. Bell (1960) → very important!!!!!!!
○ The Law: Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1951 – convict people who offer
knives for sale . The Act intended to reduce the number of dangerous weapons
available.

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 ○ Facts of the Case: A shopkeeper displayed in his shop window flick knives with a
price ticket behind it.
○ Defendant was initially charged, however on appeal he was acquitted because:
○ He had not technically ‘offered’ the knives for sale, because under contract law,
his display was an invitation to treat and it was the customers who were making
the offers.
○ Court assumed that parliament knows the legal technical meaning of the
word ‘offer’ so the Act was rendered ineffective here.
● Whiteley v Chappel (1868) – As dead people cannot vote, the defendant was held not to
have committed an offence
● London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman (1946): VERY IMPORTANT
○ In this case a rail worker was killed whilst oiling a track; no ‘stopping man’ had
been provided. Under statute, compensation is provided on death of workers
‘replacing or relaying’ track. The statute did not cover oiling and so compensation
wasn’t given.
● R V Harris case (1836)
○ where the defendant bit the nose off the victim. The statute stated the offence was
‘to stab or wound’. Under The Literal Rule, biting is not stabbing, cutting or
wounding (implying the use of an instrument). The defendant was proven not
guilty.
● Procter & Gamble v HMRC [2008]:
○ Pringles are not potato crisps because they are not made wholly or exclusively
from potato, the potato content is less than 50%, they are also made from dough.
Also distinguishing them from crisps is their packaging, and "unnatural shape”.
What Pringles are made from was a question of law; which is found by combining
two issues of fact; were they made of mostly of potato, in a way other crisps are
made.
○ Regular Pringles are not potato crisps applying these tests.
○ Following the judgment, Pringles, in all flavours are free from Value Added Tax
(VAT). Because they are manufactured from dough, “Pringles” are more like a
cake or a biscuit
● Advantages of Literal Rule:
○ No scope for the judges own opinions or prejudices to interfere.
○ Respects parliamentary supremacy and upholds separation of power.
○ Encourages drafting precision, promotes certainty and reduces litigation.
● Disadvantages of Literal Rule:
○ The Literal Rule can create loopholes in law, as shown in the Fisher v Bell (1960)
case and the R v Harris (1960).
○ The Literal Rule can also lead to injustice.

32
 ○ In the London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman (1946) This can undermine
public confidence in the law.
○ Clearly, the literal approach has another disadvantage in that one judge’s literal
interpretation might be very different from another’s. Casey says: “What may
seem plain to one judge may seem perverse and unreal to another.”
○ Sometimes the use of the literal rule may defeat the intention of Parliament.
○ For instance, in the case of Whiteley vs Chappel (1868; LR 4 QB 147), the court
came to the reluctant conclusion that Whiteley could not be convicted of
impersonating "any person entitled to vote" at an election, because the person he
impersonated was dead. Using a literal construction of the relevant statutory
provision, the deceased was not "a person entitled to vote." This, surely, could not
have been the intention of Parliament. However, the literal rule does not take into
account the consequences of a literal interpretation, only whether words have a
clear meaning that makes sense within that context. If Parliament does not like the
literal interpretation, then it must amend the legislation
● Other rules of statutory interpretation include, but are not limited to:
○ Statutes should be internally consistent. A particular section of the statute should
not be inconsistent with the rest of the statute.
○ When the legislature enumerates an exception to a rule, one can infer that there
are no other exceptions.
○ When the legislature includes limiting language in an earlier version of a statute,
but deletes it prior to enactment of the statute, it can be presumed that the
limitation was not intended by the legislature.
○ The legislature is presumed to act intentionally and purposely when it includes
language in one section but omits it in another.
○ Where legislation and case law conflict, courts generally presume that legislation
takes precedence over case law.
○ The Rule of Lenity: in construing an ambiguous criminal statute, a court should
resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant.
○ A court may also look at: the common usage of a word, case law, dictionaries,
parallel reasoning, punctuation
○ Statutes are sometimes ambiguous enough to support more than one
interpretation. In these cases, courts are free to interpret statutes themselves. Once
a court interprets the statute, other courts usually will not go through the exercise
again, but rather will enforce the statute as interpreted by the other court.

Mischief Rule
Asynch: The Mischief rule emanates from the judgement of Lord Coke in the landmark
Heydon’s case. This rule of interpretation emphasises on a purpose construction which can be

33
attributed to the fact that the purpose of a statute is the most important consideration while being
applied to a case. In essence, this rule of interpretation focuses on ‘curing’ the mischief done by
the law. The rule factors in the following questions that are to be addressed by the judge:
a. What was the common law before the making of an act.
b. What was the mischief for which the present statute was enacted.
c. What remedy did the Parliament sought or had resolved and appointed to cure the disease
of the commonwealth.
d. The true reason of the remedy.
The application of this rule has certain drawbacks, the major being that the judges get more
discretion to ascertain the intent of the legislature while making the law, thus undermining the
supremacy of the legislature in the law-making power.The rule has nevertheless been used to
resolve ambiguities in cases where the literal or golden rule cannot be duly and effectively be
applied. The mischief rule has been seen as a modern rule of statutory interpretation rather than a
stand-alone tool. The following are a few notable cases:
1. RMDC v. UOI - In RMDC v Union of India the definition of ‘prize competition’ under s
2(d) of the Prize competition act 1955, was held to be inclusive of only those instances
in which no substantive skill is involved. Thus, those prize competitions in which some
skill was required were exempt from the definition of ‘prize competition’ under s 2(d) of
the Act. Hence, in the aforementioned case, the Supreme Court has applied the Heydon’s
Rule in order to suppress the mischief was intended to be remedied, as against the literal
rule which could have covered prize competitions where no substantial degree of skill
was required for success.
2. Brown v. Brown - In Brown v Brown, Sir Jocelyn Simon P said that the disadvantage of
the old law on condonation of adultery was that, though a resumption of cohabitation
might actually promote a reconciliation which had yet taken place, a wronged spouse
might be reluctant to resume cohabitation in case it did not succeed and he or she would
then have lost the right to complain of the matrimonial offense. The provision in s 2(1) of
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1963 (now contained in s 42 of the Matrimonial Causes
Act 1965) that adultery shall not be deemed to be condoned by reason of a continuation
or resumption of cohabitation between the parties for a period of up to three months was,
therefore, limited to cases within this ‘mischief’- where the cohabitation was with a view
to effecting a reconciliation, and did not extend to cases where it was in consequence of
reconciliation.
3. Elliot v Grey - The defendant’s car was parked on the road. It was jacked up and had its
battery removed. He was charged with an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1930 of
using an uninsured vehicle on the road. The defendant argued he was not ‘using’ the car
on the road as clearly it was not driveable. It was held: The court applied the mischief
rule and held that the car was being used on the road as it represented a hazard and
therefore insurance would be required in the event of an incident. The statute was aimed
at ensuring people were compensated when injured due to the hazards created by others.

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 4. DPP v Bull - A man was charged with an offense under s.1(1) of the Street Offences Act
1959 which makes it an offense for a ‘common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a public
street or public place for the purposes of prostitution’. The magistrates found him not
guilty on the grounds that ‘common prostitute’ only related to females and not males. The
prosecution appealed by way of case stated. The court held that the Act did only apply to
females. The word prostitute was ambiguous and they applied the mischief rule. The
Street Offences Act was introduced as a result of the work of the Wolfenden Report into
homosexuality and prostitution. The Report only referred to female prostitution and did
not mention male prostitutes. The QBD, therefore, held the mischief the Act was aimed at
was controlling the behavior of only female prostitutes.
5. Pyare Lal v. Ram Chandra - the accused in this case, was prosecuted for selling the
sweeten supari which was sweetened with the help of an artificial sweetener. He was
prosecuted under the Food Adulteration Act. It was contended by Pyare Lal that supari is
not a food item. The court held that the dictionary meaning is not always the correct
meaning, thereby, the mischief rule must be applicable, and the interpretation which
advances the remedy shall be taken into consideration. Therefore, the court held that the
word ‘food’ is consumable by mouth and orally. Thus, his prosecution was held to be
valid.
6. Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration - Issues of the case were as follows- section 418
of Delhi Corporation Act, 1902 authorised the corporation to round up the cattle grazing
on the government land. The MCD rounded up the cattle belonging to Kanwar Singh.
The words used in the statute authorised the corporation to round up the abandoned
cattle. It was contended by Kanwar Singh that the word abandoned means the loss of
ownership and those cattle which were round up belonged to him and hence, was not
abandoned. The court held that the mischief rule had to be applied and the word
abandoned must be interpreted to mean let loose or left unattended and even the
temporary loss of ownership would be covered as abandoned.

R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India [AIR 1957 SC 628]

The Parliament enacted the Prize Competitions Act, 1955. The petitioner contended that the
provisions laid down in the Act, and Rules made thereunder, encroached upon the fundamental
rights to carry on business guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) and that it amounted to prohibition and
not merely a regulation. Moreover, S.2(d) that defined Prize Competition not only included
Competitions in which success rate was depended upon chance but also those in which success
rate was depended upon substantial degree of skill and, therefore, the impugned law constituted a
single, inseverable enactment, it must fail in its entirety.

The rule of interpretation used in this case is the mischief rule. An illustration of the application
of the rule is also furnished in the construction of section 2(d) of the Prize Competitions Act,

35
1955. This section defines "Prize Competition" as meaning "any competition in which prizes are
offered for the solution of any puzzle based upon the building up arrangement, combination or
permutation of letters, words or figures". The question was whether in view of this definition, the
Act applies to competitions which involve substantial skill and are not in the nature of gambling.
The Supreme Court, after referring to the previous state of the law, to the mischief that continued
under that law and to the resolutions of various States under Article 252(1) authorising
Parliament to pass the Act stated, "Having regard to the history of the legislation, the declared
object thereof and the wording of the statute, we are of opinion that the competitions which are
sought to be controlled and regulated by the Act are only those competitions in which success
does not depend on any substantial degree of skill".

The Supreme Court held that S. 2(d) should be construed keeping in mind the historical
background of the Act and the mischief it intends to suppress. Keeping these factors in mind, it is
clear that the legislation was enacted to regulate and control prize competitions of gambling
nature. The use of word control would not have been appropriate if it was intended towards
competition of skill. Therefore, the competitions which were intended to be controlled and
regulated under the Act were only those in which success does not depend upon any substantial
degree of skill.

Golden Rule
● Example → CLRA Act: Judicial Interpretation --
○ Main Issue regarding the act is that → Whether the Act itself provides the
workers of an industry, the right to get absorbed by the industry after contract
labour is abolished there?
○ Following are the observations of the court:
■ No specific legislation which dealt in detail with the problem of the
contract labour
■ No law to regulate contract labour.
■ requirement of an Act which completely dealt with the regulations of the
contract labour.
■ After the enactment of the Act, which took place on the 5th September,
1970 but came in force on the 10th February, 1971, the courts did not have
to face much difficulties as regarding
● the facilities which should be provided to these contract labour (S.
16,17,18 and 19).
● The definition of employer,
● contractor (S.2(c))
● and workmen (S.2(b)) were also provided by this Act which helped
the court to interpret the meaning of these words.

36
 ■ The courts also construed as to when the laborers would be considered as
contract laborers or not.
○ In the case of R.K. Panda v. Steel Authority of India
■ Where the same issue was in question the Supreme Court held that the Act
regulates contract labour but has never proposed to abolish it entirely. The
primary object of the Act can be taken as to save the contract labourers
from exploitation. But the right to be absorbed by the employer directly is
neither proposed nor mentioned in the Act.
■ The Supreme Court also said that insertion of certain clauses in the
contract with the contract labourers by the industry does not give them a
right to escape from the duty of providing the contract labourers rights.
■ On these basis the Supreme Court gave the following decision –
● The labourers who were continuing in the employment for the last
10 years, in spite of change of contractors and have not crossed the
age of superannuation and were medically fit, should be absorbed
as regular employees in the order of seniority.
● Regular wages will be payable only for the period subsequent to
absorption and not prior to that.
○ Interpretation of the Act:
■ The Court interpreted the Act in a correct way i.e. the Act strives for
regulation of Contract Labour and not for its abolishment in entirety and
accepted that the Act does not expressly provides the right to get absorbed
to the labourers.
■ It realized that courts should achieve that which the legislations are not
able to achieve and which keeps up the faith of people in judiciary.
■ The judges here used the freedom which the common law system confers
upon them that is to look into the objective of a matter and device new
principles which could suit justice.
■ This principle was clearly in the interests of those who worked same as the
regular employees but were exploited by the unfair practices of the
industrialists.
● Maunsell v Olins [1975] HL
○ Rules of Interpretation are not rules as such, but rather are principles of
interpretation developed by the courts.
● Lord Reid
○ "They are not rules in the ordinary sense of having some binding force. They are
our servants not our masters. They are aids to construction, presumptions or
pointers. Not infrequently one 'rule' points in one direction, another in a different
direction. In each case we must look at all relevant circumstances and decide as a
matter of judgment what weight to attach to any particular 'rule'."

37
● River Wear Commissioners v Adamson [1877] HL
○ Lord Blackburn described the golden rule, stating:-
○ "I believe that is it not disputed that what Lord Wensleydale used to call the
golden rule is right, vis, that we are to take the whole statute together, and
construe it all together, giving the words their ordinary signification, unless when
so applied they produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so
great as to convince the Court that the intention could not have been to use them
in their ordinary signification, which though less proper, is one which the Court
thinks the words will bear."
● Therefore, the golden rule requires that the literal rule should be applied to the statute in
the first instance, but that if the literal rule results in an ambiguity or absurdity the court
should try to interpret it in another manner so as to avoid the ambiguity or absurdity.
● Adler v George [1964] QBD
○ Adler gained access to a RAF station (a prohibited place within the meaning of
the Official Secrets Act 1920) and was actually within its boundaries. He
obstructed a member of Her Majesty's forces engaged in security duty in relation
to the station ‘in the vicinity of a prohibited place’ He argued that, as he was
actually in the prohibited place, he could not be said to be "in the vicinity" of the
prohibited place.
○ Held: The defendant was guilty of the offence because "in the vicinity of" should
be interpreted to mean on or near the prohibited place
● Grammar is a good guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate.
○ The rule was evolved by Parke B (who later became Lord Wensleydale) in
Becke v Smith (1836) and Grey v Pearson, (1857), who stated, "The grammatical
and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some
absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in
which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so
as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.
■ if the words used are plain and unambiguous, judges are bound to construe
them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead to an absurdity or
manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is
doubtful or obscure, but the function of legislature is assumed when
judges depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words.
■ Followed in the cases of State of Kerala vs. West Coast Planters (and)
Sirsilk Ltd. vs. Govt of AP.
■ Presumption of the court starts from the beginning of the case. Begins
even before interpretation starts.
■ 1st presumption looked into by the court -- there is no ambiguity and the
lawmaker knows what he is doing. The lawmaker has purposefully done
what he has done (even ifts a mistake) unless proven otherwise.

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● This rule is a departure from the literal rule of interpretation and asserts that the
literal rule may be modified
● “Golden Rule” is the modified form of interpretation. According to the rule if the
grammatical or literal interpretation leads to some absurdity or some repugnancy or
inconsistency with the rest of the provisions, that sense may be modified so as to avoid
that absurdity or inconsistency; but not further.
● A rule of statutory or legal document interpretation which allows a shift from the
ordinary sense of as word(s) if the overall content of the document demands it.
● Thus, Golden rule
○ avoids obvious foolishness
○ only applied when literal rule leads to absurdity
○ where an absurdity arises from the literal interpretation,
○ give a reasonable meaning the words being construed
● R v Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367
○ The defendant was charged with the offence of bigamy under s.57 of the Offences
Against the Person Act 1861. The statute states 'whosoever being married shall
marry any other person during the lifetime of the former husband or wife is guilty
of an offence'. Under a literal interpretation of this section the offence would be
impossible to commit since civil law will not recognize a second marriage any
attempt to marry in such circumstances would not be recognized as a valid
marriage
○ Held: The court applied the golden rule and held that the word 'marry'
should be interpreted as 'to go through a marriage ceremony'. The
defendant's conviction was upheld.
● Narrow and Wide Approach:
○ Under the Narrow approach the court “can only choose between the possible
meanings of a word...” i.e. if one meaning is apparent that one must be adopted
○ Under the wider approach the courts are granted the right to “modify the words in
order to avoid a problem”, this situation arises where there is an obvious and clear
meaning but this meaning would lead to an absurd result.
○ Re Sigsworth (1935).
■ The judge would not allow for a murderer to benefit from his crime thus
applied the golden rule and held the next of kin would not inherit the
estate “where they had killed the deceased”.
● Problem with Golden Rule:
○ Judges are able to add or change the meaning of statutes and thereby become law
makers infringing the separation of powers.
○ Judges have no power to intervene for pure injustice where there is no absurdity
● Advantages of Golden Rule
○ Errors in drafting can be corrected immediately eg: R v Allen (1872).

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 ○ Decisions are generally more in line with Parliament's intention
○ Closes loopholes
○ Often gives a more just result
○ Brings common sense to the law
● Illachi Devi (D) By Lrs. And Ors vs Jain Society, Protection Of ... on 26 September,
2003
○ One Ratan Lal executed a Will on 15.10.1977 bequeathing a part of his estate to
Jain Bal Ashram which is run by the Jain Society formed for protection of
orphans in India.
○ The Society is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. On 4th
March, 1978, Ratan Lal, the testator died. On his demise, the Society submitted an
application before the Court for grant of Letter of Administration in pursuance of
Will executed by late Ratan Lal, under Section 276 of the Act. The said petition
was contested by the appellant and on her death by her legal representatives, on
the ground that the petition filed by the Respondent-Society is not maintainable in
view of Section 236 of the Act. The High Court being of the view that it is
permissbile under Section 236 of the Act to grant Letter of Administration in
favour of the Society, rejected the objection of the appellant and, it is in this way,
the appellants are before us by means of a special leave petition.

Harmonious Construction
Asynch: When there is a conflict between two or more statues or two or more parts of a statute
then the rule of harmonious construction needs to be adopted. The rule follows a very simple
premise that every statute has a purpose and intent as per law and should be read as a whole. The
interpretation consistent of all the provisions of the statute should be adopted. In the case in
which it shall be impossible to harmonize both the provisions, the court’s decision regarding the
provision shall prevail.
The rule of harmonious construction is the thumb rule to interpretation of any statute. An
interpretation which makes the enactment a consistent whole, should be the aim of the Courts
and a construction which avoids inconsistency or repugnancy between the various sections or
parts of the statute should be adopted. The Courts should avoid “a head on clash”, in the words
of the Apex Court, between the different parts of an enactment and conflict between the various
provisions should be sought to be harmonized. The normal presumption should be consistency
and it should not be assumed that what is given with one hand by the legislature is sought to be
taken away by the other. The rule of harmonious construction has been tersely explained by the
Supreme Court thus, “When there are, in an enactment two provisions which cannot be
reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted, that if possible, effect should be given
to both”. A construction which makes one portion of the enactment a dead letter should be
avoided since harmonization is not equivalent to destruction.

40
Harmonious Construction should be applied to statutory rules and courts should avoid absurd or
unintended results. It should be resorted to making the provision meaningful in the context. It
should be in consonance with the intention of Rule makers. Rule of Harmonious construction is
applicable to subordinate legislature also.
The objective of harmonious construction is to avoid any confrontation between two enacting
provisions of a statute and to construe the provisions in such a way so that the harmonize. The
basis of this rule is that the Legislature never envisages to provide two conflicting provisions in a
statute, for the reason that it amounts to self-contradiction.
The real legislative intent, that we try to discover in the process of interpretation cannot be to
provide for something in one provision and deny the same in subsequent one. Hence, even if an
inconsistency is found, the same should be considered to be unintentional and as such, is
required to be cured by way of harmonious construction.
An inconsistency should neither be created nor be readily inferred. Where all alternatives
constructions are possible, that construction should be accepted by which consistency is achieved
and the constructions leading to inconsistency should be rejected.
The intention of legislature is that every provision should remain operative. But where two
provisions are contradictory, it may not possible to effectuate both of them and in result, one
shall be reduced to futility as against the settled basic principle of ut res magis valeat qauam
pereat.
Therefore, such a construction should be allowed to prevail by which existing inconsistency is
removed and both the provisions remain in force, in harmony with each other.

Cases:
1. K M Nanavati v. State of Bombay (1960)
The matter was related to the power conferred to the Governor under Art 161 and the court has to
interpret the scope of Art 161 and Art 142 (1) of the constitution. In the present case, Bombay
HC passed sentence against the accused. The petitioner then approached the Governor who
passed a suspension order against the sentence of Bombay HC.
When the matter reached before Hon’ble Supreme Court, the court applied the rule of
Harmonious Construction and held that the absolute power of granting suspension to the
Governor under Art 161 becomes absolved when the matter becomes sub judice. In such
situations, there is a complete scope of interference with the judicial power of the court under
Art.142.

2. Sri Venkataram Devaru & Ors v. State of Mysore & Ors (1957)
In this case the Supreme Court applied the rule of harmonious construction in resolving a
conflict between Articles 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the Constitution and it was held that the right of
every religious denomination or any section thereof to manage its own affairs in matters of
religion [Article 26(b)] is subject to a law made by a State providing for social welfare and

41
reform or throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and
sections of Hindus [Article 25(2)(b)].

3. Pandit MSM Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and Ors. (1959)
The Supreme Court applied the rule of harmonious construction and held that though Art. 194
(3) is subordinate to Art. 21 but Indian Constitution is the supreme law in the country and
therefore, a person can be expunged from publishing the official records of the Assembly. This is
not a complete prohibition on FR of that person.

4. The Sirsilk Ltd & Ors. v Govt. of AP & Ors (1963)

An interesting question relating to a conflict between two equally mandatory provisions, viz., ss
17(1) and 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is a good illustration of the importance of
the principle that every effort should be made to give effect to all the provisions of an act by
harmonizing any apparent conflict between two or more of its provisions. Section 17(1) of the
Act requires the government to publish every award of a Labour Tribunal within thirty days of its
receipt and by sub – section (2) of section 17 the award on its publication becomes final. Section
18(1) of the Act provides that a settlement between employer and workmen shall be binding on
the parties to the agreement. In a case where a settlement was arrived at after the receipt of the
award of a Labour Tribunal by the Government but before its publication, the question was
whether the Government was still required u/s 17(1) to publish the award. In construing these
two equally mandatory provisions, the Supreme Court held that the only way to resolve the
conflict was to hold that by the settlement, which becomes effective from the date of signing, the
industrial dispute comes to an end and the award becomes infructuous and the Government
cannot publish it.

Subsidiary Rules of Interpretation:

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

● Express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.
● Express words in the statute shut the door to further implication.
● “Notwithstanding anything…” - bars the possibility of inclusion of any other condition
● If one or more things of a particular class are expressly mentioned in an enactment, it
means that the other things belonging to the same class are excluded from the domain of
the enactment.
● Maxwell - Where two expressions have been used in a statute one of which generally
includes the other, the more general expression excludes the less general.

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● Lopes L.J. observed that it is often a valuable servant but a dangerous master to follow in
the construction of statutes
● Applicability: This maxim will be applied where specific words are being mentioned in
any statute or enactment. This maxim will not be applied where general words are
mentioned along with specific words.
● Applicable: where specific words are mentioned in any statute or enactment.
● Where it does not apply: where general words are mentioned along with specific words
● Words are added with consciousness. If words are excluded then the legislators did not
want to have added the same
● R vs. Inhabitants of Sedgely:
○ A statute raised taxes on 'lands, houses and coalmines'.
○ The defendant owned a limestone mine.
○ The court held that it did not apply to limestone mines as these were not
specifically mentioned nor did the statute suggest that it would apply to other type
of mines.
● R vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department:
○ Held by the court to exclude the father of an illegitimate child from rights under
immigration law at the time, because the definition section specifically mentioned
the mother alone
● Tempest vs. Kilner:
○ The court had to rule whether the Statute of Frauds 1677 applied to the sale of
stocks and shares.
○ The Act required contracts for the sale of 'goods, wares and merchandise' to be
evidenced in writing if they were above a specified value.
○ The court decided that stocks and shares were not covered by the Act as the
specific words 'goods, wares and merchandise' were not followed by general
words.
● Hakam Singh vs. Gammon India Ltd.
○ Held: It is not open to the parties by agreement to confer jurisdiction on a court,
which it does not possess under the Civil Procedure Code. But where two court or
more have jurisdiction to try a suit, an agreement between the parties that the
dispute between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public
policy. Such an agreement does not contravene S. 28 of the Contract Act.
● M/s Swastik Gases Pvt. Ltd. V. Indian Oil Corp. Ltd
○ The SC provided clarity by stating that "the absence of words like 'alone', or
'exclusive jurisdiction' is neither decisive nor does it make any material difference
in deciding the jurisdiction of a court.
○ The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius would be applicable to such
cases.

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 ○ Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of courts at a particular place and
such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an inference
may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts.
● Parbhani Transport Coop. Society Ltd. v. Road Transport Authority
○ Permits to ply buses have been given to the State of Bombay under Chapter IV of
the MV Act 1939.
○ Petitioner contended that since the Act by Chapter IV-A provided that the govt
would be entitled to run buses under a scheme, it impliedly prohibited the running
of buses by the govt otherwise, and reliance was placed on the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.
○ Chapter IV-A entitles govt to run buses under a scheme; if there is no scheme,
govt has to apply like everyone else under Chapter IV for the necessary permits.
● State of M.P. v. Kedia Leather and Liquor Ltd.
○ Supreme Court ruled that when the new Act contains a repealing Section
mentioning the Acts which it expressly repeals, the presumption against implied
repeal of the other laws is further strengthened on the principle expression unius
est exclusio alterius.
● Taylor vs. Taylor
○ The court observed that when a statutory power is conferred on a court for the
first time and the mode of exercising it is pointed out, then no other mode is to be
adopted.
○ But if a statute contains provisions giving more than one power, then the rule
cannot be applied so as to take away the powers conferred by anyone of the
provisions.
● Shree Durga Distributors v. State of Karnataka
○ Supreme Court relied on punctuation for deciding that the entry in Karnataka VAT
Act, 2003, exempting "animal feed and feed supplements, namely, processed
commodity sold as poultry feed, cattle feed, pig feed, fish feed, prawn feed,
shrimp feed" is exhaustive and does not apply to dog feed and cat feed.

Ejusdem Generis
● In an enumeration of different subjects in an Act, general words following specific words
may be construed with reference to the antecedent matters, and the construction may be
narrowed down by treating them as applying to things of the same kind as those
previously mentioned, unless of course, there is something to show that a wider sense
was intended.
● If the particular words exhaust the whole genus, then the general words are construed as
embracing a larger genus.
● Latin term for "of the same kind".

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● General words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the
preceding specific words.
● Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams
○ The Supreme Court defined ejusdem generis as a situation in which "general
words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated
by the preceding specific words."
● When a general word follows specific words of a distinct category, the general word may
be given a restricted meaning of the same category.
● The general expression takes its meaning from the preceding particular expression
because the legislature by using the particular words of a distinct genus has shown its
intention to that effect.
● This rule is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and should be used prudently and
cautiously.
● When it is used:
○ The rule is applied to resolve the problem in giving meaning to groups of words
where one of the words is ambiguous or inherently unclear or vague.
● Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Harishankar
○ The statute contains an enumeration of specific words.
○ The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category.
○ That class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration.
○ The general terms follow the enumeration.
○ There is no indication of a different legislative intent.
● Nature Lovers Movement v. State of Kerala
○ K. S. Radhakrishan J. held "it is essential for the application of ejusdem generis
rule that the enumerated things before the general word must constitute a category
or a genus or a family which admits a number of species or members. If the
specified things preceding general words belong to different categories, this
principle of construction will not apply".
● Powell v. Kemptom Park Racecourse
○ The defendant had been operating an outside betting place.
○ The Act stated "house, office room or other place of betting."
○ The court had to define if 'other place' would cover defendant's situation.
○ As the terms in the list all referred to indoor places, it was decided that 'other
place' also referred to an indoor place.
● Ratansi Hirji v. Emperor
○ Section 412 A of the Bombay Municipal Act required a person to acquire a
license before he could use any place for the sale of milk, butter or other milk
products.

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 ○ The question was whether ghee would come within the expression 'other milk
products' and whether a person has to obtain a license for the sale of ghee.
○ The court observed that the words 'other milk products' should be construed
Ejusdem generis with reference to what precedes those words.
○ If the words 'other milk products' are to be used Ejusdem generis with butter, they
would include such products of milk as are the direct results of milk but would
not include ghee which is not a direct product of milk, but is prepared out of
butter which is a direct product of milk.
○ It would include such products of milk as are liable to speedy decay like butter
but would not include ghee which is not liable to speedy decay.
● Clark v. Gaskarth
○ Section 8 of the Distress for Rent Act, 1737 authorizes the distress for rent of
"corn, grass or other product" growing on the demised lands. The court applied
the rule of ejusdem generis and held that the words 'other products' did not extend
to tress and shrubs growing on the demised land, but were confined to products of
a similar nature with those specified in that section.
● Amar Chandra vs. Collector of Excise Tripura 1972
○ 5 rules are provided.
● In Ujjain Bai v. State of U.P. the Supreme Court observed that Article 12 winds up the
list of authorities falling within the definition by referring to “other authorities” within
the territory of India which cannot, obviously, be read as ejusdem generis with either the
Government or the Legislature or Local authorities.
● Allen v. Emmerson
○ Examples of particular words followed by general words were given;
○ In the expression, "books, pamphlets, newspapers and other documents" private
letters may not be held included if 'other document' be interpreted ejusdem
generis with what goes before.
○ But in a provision which reads "newspaper or other documents likely to convey
secrets to the enemy", the words 'other documents' would include documents of
any kind and would not take their meaning from newspaper.
● When does it not apply
○ If the preceding term is general, the rule of ejusdem generis will not apply.
○ If the specific words do not belong to a distinct genus, this rule is inapplicable.
○ If a general word follows only one particular word, that single particular word
does not constitute a distinct genus and therefore ejusdem generis rule cannot be
applied.

Casus Omissus
● Term casus omissus means “cases of omission”.

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● Omission in a statute cannot be supplied by construction.
● A matter which should have been provided but actually has not been provided in a statute
cannot be supplied by the courts, as to do so will be legislation and not construction. →
Hansraj Gupta v. DMET Co. Ltd. AIR 1933 P.C. 63
● Court can interpret the law but cannot legislate. → Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N.
● A casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court by judicial interpretative process except
in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the
statute itself.
● The language employed in the statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent.
The first and primary rule of the construction is that the intention of the legislature must
be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be
supposed and has been intended but what has been said. The court only interprets the law
and cannot legislate it.
● Francis J. Mc. Coffery observes that it is a rule of statutory construction that Casus
Omissus which means that case omitted from the language of a statute but within the
general scope of the statute and which appears to have been omitted due to inadvertence
or by overlook cannot be supplied by the court.
● S.P. Gupta v. President of India AIR 1982 SC 149
○ the Supreme Court held that when the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous there is no room for application of the doctrine of Casus Omissus or
of pressing into service external aid in such a case, the words used by the statute
speak for themselves and it is not the function of the court to add words or
expression merely to suit what court thinks is the supposed intention of the
legislature
● Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank (2007) 2 SCC 230
○ The Apex Court observed that even if there is defect or omission in the words
used by the Legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiencies
especially when literal reading thereof produces an intelligible result
● Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand Siinghvi AIR 2004 SC 2258.
○ The Supreme Court observed that although court cannot supply to casus omissus,
it is equally clear that it should not interpret a statute so as to create a casus
omissus when there is really none.
● Hiradevi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur AIR 1952 SC 362
○ Section 71 and Section 90 of the U.P. District Board Act, 1922 and the
Amendment Act 1933 were in question.
○ Section 71 provided that a Board may dismiss its Secretary by special resolution,
which was amended in 1933. However, the corresponding Section 90 in the old
Act which provided for dismissal of the Secretary pending enquiry was not
amended. Therefore, Section 71 was amended but not Section 90.

47
 ○ Justice Bhagwati in this case observed that, it was unfortunate that when
legislature came to amend Section 71, it forgot to amend Section 90 in conformity
with amendment of Section 71. But this lacuna cannot be supplied by any liberal
construction. No doubt, it is the duty of court to try and harmonize the various
provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature. But, it is certainly not the duty of
the court to stretch the word used by Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the
provisions of an Act.
● When can omitted words be supplied?
○ When the lacuna in the language is of such a nature that unless the omitted word
is supplied the statute cannot operate or the true intention of the legislature could
not be established, the courts have inserted the missing word in the language of a
statute to ensure that law is not turned to nullity.
○ Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1,
■ Section 304-A of the IPC was construed by the Supreme Court and Casus
Omissus was supplied. It was held that the word “gross” has not been used
in Section 304-A, yet it is settled that in criminal law negligence and
recklessness to be so held must be of such a high degree as to be “gross”.
The Expression “rash or negligent act” as occurring in Section 304-A has
to be read qualified by the word “gross”.
● Important cases for Casus Omissus and Harmonious construction:
○ Basavantappa v. Gangadhar Narayana Dharwadkar (1986) 4 SCC 273
○ P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries AIR 1990 SC 933
○ Dadi Jagannadam v. Jammulu Ramulu AIR 2001 SC 2699
○ These cases relate to construction of Rule 89 of Order 21 of CPC after the
Amendment of Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
■ Rule 89 of Order 21 of CPC provides that if any person claiming an
interest in the property sold in execution of a decree applies to have the
execution sale aside and deposits within 30 days from the date of sale, 5%
of the sale money for payment to the purchaser and the amount payable to
the decree holder, ‘the court shall make an order setting aside the sale.’
■ The period of limitation for applying under Rule 89 was also 30 days
which was enlarged to 60 days by way of an amendment in the Limitation
Act.
■ The Parliament however failed to make corresponding amendment in the
Rule 89 to enlarge the period.
○ The two judge bench in Dharwadkar held that it is implied that the period in both
the cases is enlarged to 60 days
○ Which was not accepted in Nirma Industries Case
○ Later in Ramulu’s case Nirma Case was overruled and the Supreme Court held
that the court must try to harmonise the conflicting provisions.

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 ● When two statutes are complementary to each other. One statute cannot be allowed to
overrule the other. Instead one statute should be interpreted in such a way to compromise
with the another statute. This is called Harmonious construction of Statutes.

Reddendo Singula Singulis

● Meaning:
○ Reddendo singula singulis is a Latin term that means by referring each to each;
referring each phrase or expression to its corresponding object.
○ It is one of the best settled rules of construction that words in different parts of the
statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place
its proper force, and if possible rendering none of them useless or superfluous.
● Introduction:
○ “I devise and bequeath all my real and personal property to A”, which will be
construed reddendo singular singulis by applying “devise” to real property and
“bequeath” to personal property.
○ The best example of the rule reddendo singular singulis was quoted from
Wharton’s Law Lexicon thus:
■ “ If any one shall draw or load any sword or gun, the word draw is applied
to ‘sword’ only and the word load to ‘gun’ only, the former verb to former
noun, and the latter because it is impossible to load a sword or to draw a
gun.
● In K.V. Kamnath v. K.Rangappa Baliga and Company, AIR 1969 SC 504,
○ the Supreme Court stated that where a sentence contains several antecedents and
several consequents they are to be read distributively. That is, the words are to be
applied to the subjects to which they appear by context most properly to relate and
to which they are most applicable.
● Where a complex sentence has more than one subject, and more than one object, it may
be the right construction to render each to each, by reading the provision distributively
and applying each object to its appropriate subject.
● Raja Katra vs Corporation of Calcutta, 1973 CriLJ 1505on 16 February, 1973
○ The object or purpose of all construction or interpretation is to ascertain the
intention of the law-makers and to make it effective ... if the courts were permitted
to ignore the expressed intent of the legislature, they would invade the province of
the legislature and violate the tripartite theory of Government.
○ A reference was also made to the principle known as "Reddendo Singula
Singulis“
○ It is also well established as a principle of Statute construction that words in
different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving
to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and if possible rendering none of

49
 them useless or superfluous even if strict grammatical construction demands
otherwise.
● The applicability of this rule came up for examination in Bishop v. Deakin (1936) 1 All
ER 255. The Court was seized with the interpretation of Section 59(1) of the Local
Government Act, 1933
○ The Court held that the period of five-years for a person who has already been
elected refers to that which is "since election" and not "before the day of
election". The reason given was that if it was to be otherwise, the effect would be
that a member would be disqualified, when he acts as a councillor, but he would
be eligible at once for re-election to the vacant office, the period of five years
have expired before the new election.
● This shows that the rule reddendo singula singulis is to be invoked while interpreting a
section or a statute when different words of the section or statute have reference to
different situation, or person, which problem may almost entirely be eliminated if short
sentences with a single subject and single object are used.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
● Know from the association
● A word will be interpreted in the context of surrounding words.
● Meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps.
● A word or phrase can be read on its own as it stands. However, the maxim proposes
another possible meaning.
● Words and phrases next to and near the word or phrase in question might indicate a
meaning that is not apparent when the word or phrase is viewed on its own.
● In the obvious case the neighbouring words create an alternative meaning by suggesting
that words in question should receive a restricted scope.
● Maxwell: When two or more words susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled
together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense.
● The words take their color from and are quantified by each other.
● Meaning of the general words restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general.
● Rainbow Steels Ltd. And Anr. V. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh
○ The interpretation of the word 'old' as used in "old, discarded, unserviceable or
obsolete machinery, stores or vehicle etc. was considered.
○ It was held that the four adjectives – old, discarded, unserviceable, obsolete,
which are susceptible to analogous meaning are clubbed together while qualifying
machinery. The first adjective is more general than the other three and the
meaning of the more general adjective 'old' is being restricted to a sense
analogous to that of less general namely 'discarded, unserviceable or obsolete.'

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 ○ The expression 'old' was therefore construed to refer to machinery that had
become non-functional or non-usable.
● According to Lord Mc Millan, "Noscitur a sociis" means 'a word may be known by the
company it keeps.'
● V. R. Krishna Iyer J. expressed the necessity of the maxim in the following words:
○ "If birds of a feather flock together, noscitur a sociis is a common sense guide to
construction."
● When can it be used:
○ When the intention of the legislator is not clear.
○ When the associated words have analogous meaning.
● Dr. Devendra M. Surti v. State of Gujarat
○ Section 2(4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 reads:
'Commercial establishment means an establishment which carries on any business
or trade or profession.'
○ Whether a private dispensary of a doctor will fall within the definition of
commercial establishment?
○ The word 'profession' was construed with the associated words and the Supreme
Court held that a private dispensary of a doctor was not within the definition of
commercial establishment.
● Pradeep Agarbatti, Ludhiana v. State of Punjab
○ Schedule 'A' Entry 16 of Punjab Sales Tax Act reads: "cosmetics, perfumery and
toilet goods excluding toothpaste, tooth powder, kumkum and soap."
○ Whether dhoop and agarbatti will fall under 'perfumery' as mentioned above?
○ With reference to the Punjab Sales Tax Act, it was held that the word 'perfumery'
means such articles as used in cosmetics and toilet goods viz, sprays etc. But does
not include dhoop and agarbatti.
● Alamgir v. State of Bihar
○ The interpretation of the word 'detained' under S. 498 of IPC was involved.
○ The word 'detain' normally implies confinement against will.
○ SC held that the word 'detain' is to be interpreted with reference to the expression
'takes, entices and conceals' used in S. 498.
○ Therefore, in this case, it would mean detention without the consent of the
husband.
● Foster v. Diphwys Casson
○ A statute stated that explosives taken into a mine must be in a "case or canister."
○ The defendant used a cloth bag.
○ Court held that the bag could not have been within the statutory definition
because the Parliament's intention in using 'case or cannister' was referring to
something of the same strength as a canister.
● Pengelly v. Bell Punch Co. Ltd.

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○ S. 28 of the Factories Act, 1961 provided that floors, steps, stairs, passages and
gang ways must be kept free from obstruction.
○ The court applied the rule of noscitur a sociis and held that the expression 'floor' is
limited to those parts of the factory floor upon which the workmen are intended to
pass.
EJUSDEM GENERIS NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

● 'of the same kind' ● 'know from the association'

● Arises if a catchall phrase ends a ● Arises if questionable meaning of
list. a doubtful word.
● Used for interpreting loosely ● Used for interpreting questionable
written statutes. words in statutes.
● If the statute lists specific classes ● The meaning of a doubtful word
of the things and then refers to can be known from the
them in general. accompanying.
● A general term after a list of ● The surrounding usage of words
particular terms is only about those can reveal the meaning of the
things similar to the particular questionable words or phrases.
terms.

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UNIT 2: INTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION

INTRODUCTION
● When can aids of construction be ‘legitimately’ invoked?
○ Words having more than one meaning
○ Uncertainty
○ No clarity as to which meaning to be assigned with reference to assembly of
words.
○ Language of the provision
○ More than one distinct constructions of the language are possible.
○ When result of literal interpretation is absurd
○ Results after literal interpretation is against the policy or object of the Act.
○ Natural and ordinary meaning fails to effectuate the legislative intent
○ Obstructs advancement of the object of the statute.
● Intention of Legislature - State of Maharashtra v Marwanhee F Desai (2002) SC
○ The Supreme Court held that true intent of the legislature shall have to be
gathered and deciphered in its proper spirit having due regard to the language
used therein.
● Intrinsic aid to interpretation
○ Various parts of the same statute/act pressed into service by the courts for
construing anyone of its provisions.
○ whenever difficulty arises as to meaning of a statutory provision due to ambiguity
of words and the true intention of Legislature cannot be inferred from
language in such an event it is necessary to read the statute as a whole in its
context following the principle ex visceribus actus (within the four corners of
the Act) and every part of the statute may be called in aid.
● Ram Narain v State of UP 1957 SC -- It is no sound principle of construction to interpret
expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act. The meaning of
the words and expressions use in an Act must take their colour from the context in
which they appear. (ex visceribus actus)
● Jagir v State of Bihar 1976 SC -- ‘The general rule of construction is not to look at the
words but to look at the context’, said the Supreme Court while interpreting the word
‘owner’ in a transport legislation in Bihar.

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TITLES
● Ashwini Kumar Ghose v Arabinda Bose 1952 SC -- well settled law that title of a statute
is an important part of the Act and may be referred to for the purposes of ascertaining its
general scope and of throwing light on its construction.
● The title of a statute gives a fairly good idea as to what subject matter the statute deals
with or what is contained in the enactment.
● Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra & Ors. vs. State of Orissa & Ors.
○ “The title of a statute is no doubt an important part of an enactment and can be
referred to for determining the general scope of the legislation. But the true nature
of any such enactment has always to be determined not on the basis of the given
to it but on the basis of its substance.”

Long Titles
● Long title describes the enactment and does not merely identify it.
● Long title is a part of the Act and can be referred to ascertain the object, scope and
purpose of the Act.
● Long title cannot override the plain and clear meaning from the enactment.
● R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 1994 -- Long Title of an
Act is the part of the Act and is admissible as an aid to its construction.
● gives a general description of the object of the Act and as such, the policy and purpose
of the Act may be derived from its long title.
● Donovan J -- long title may be looked into to resolve that ambiguity or doubt but in
absence of doubt or ambiguity, the meaning of statute cannot be narrowed down or
restricted by reference to long title.
● Lord Moulton in Vacher & Sons v London Society of Compositors 1911-13 -- Title is a
statutory nickname to obviate the necessity of always referring to the Act under its full
and descriptive title.

Short Title
● Short title merely identifies the enactment and is chosen for convenience.
● The short title is always given on the top of the statute book.
● An Act or Regulation may be cited by reference to its short title.
● The object of short title is identification and not description

Use of Titles for resolving ambiguity

● Kedarnath v State of WB 1953

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 ○ Section 4 of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act
1949 was challenged before the Supreme Court on the ground that it violated
Article 14 of the Constitution.
○ Long Title of the Act read, “An Act to provide for more speedy trial and more
effective punishment of certain offences.”
○ In the view of the Long Title, the Supreme Court held that the Act was meant to
give discretion to the State Govt. as to which offence deserved to be tried by
special courts under special procedure and therefore contention that Act was
violative of Article 14 was rejected.

Limitations of Titles as Internal Aid

● Title has no role to play when the words employed are plain and precise and bear only
one meaning.
● Title can be called in aid only when there is an ambiguity in the language.
● Title cannot be used to narrow down or restrict the plain meaning of the language.
● Title cannot prevail over the clear meaning of an enactment

PREAMBLE
● Expresses the scope, object and purpose of the Act more elaborately than the long title.
● Preamble may recite the ground and the cause of making a statute and the evil which is
sought to be remedied by it.
● Can be used when:
○ When wording gives rise to doubts or where the phrase has more than one
meaning.
○ To understand the primary intention of the statute
● Anit Das v State of Bihar 2000 SC -- The Preamble is a key to unlock the legislative
intent.
● However, it can ONLY be used when the language of the statute is NOT CLEAR.
● statement given in the beginning of the statute.
● Sets out the scope, object and purpose of the Act.
● summary and reflects the gist of law.
● Expression of intention of the legislature in bringing out the enactment.
● It may recite the ground and cause of making the statute, the evils sought to be remedied.
● In the following cases, the Supreme Court has held that the preamble can be used as an
aid in construing a provision, when the provision is ambiguous.
○ Re Kerala Education Bill, 1957
○ Sita Devi v State of Bihar 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 670
○ Thangal Kunju Musaliar v Venkatachalam AIR 1956 SC 246

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 ● Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, AIR 1994 SC 787,
○ The Supreme Court observed that although the preamble can be a useful
assistance to ascertain legislative intent, but, it cannot be used to control or
qualify the precise and unambiguous language of enactment.
● Burakar Coal Co. Ltd v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 954
○ It is one of the cardinal principles of construction that where the language of an
Act is clear, the preamble must be disregarded though, where the object or
meaning of an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to explain
it.
● Gullipilli Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani (2009) 1 SCC 714
○ Word ‘may’ used in Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which provides : ‘ A
marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus….’.
○ A marriage between a Christian and a Hindu solemnized under the Hindu
marriage Act was held to be void based on reference to the preamble which read
as :
■ “An Act to amend and codify the law relating to marriage among Hindus.”
● State of WB v Anwar Ali Sarkar
○ It was contended that Sec.5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, was
unconstitutional and void as it contravened Art. 14 of the constitution.
○ That section provided that a special court shall try such offences or class of
offences, or cases or classes of cases, as the state Government may direct.
○ It was contended on behalf of the state that the preamble should be read as part of
the section, (The Preamble read, 'whereas it is expedient to provide for the
speedier trial of certain offences') and that the proper interpretation would be
‘only those cases and offences which in the opinion of the State Government
required speedier trial could be assigned to the special court’.

Constitution Preamble
● Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. X.
○ A resolution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly that “preamble stands part
of the Constitution.”
● In numerous cases it was held that the Constitution, including the Preamble, must be
read as a whole and in case of doubt interpreted consistent with its basic structure to
promote the great objectives stated in the Preamble.
○ Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,
○ Minerva Mills v. Union of India,
○ Re. Kerala Education Bill.
○ The majority judgement in Kesavananda and Minerva Mills strongly relied upon
the Preamble in reaching the conclusion that the power of Amendment conferred

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 by Article 368 was limited and did not enable Parliament to alter the basic
structure or framework of the Constitution.

Limitations of Preamble as Internal Aid to Construction

● Language of the provision is reasonably capable of alternative construction
● Preamble cannot either restrict or extend the meaning and scope of the words
● In case of conflict between preamble and a section, the preamble would succumb and
Section shall prevail.
● Preamble cannot be used to control or qualify the clear and precise language of enactment
● Preamble cannot limit the operation of a provision
○ In Motipur Zamindari Co. v. State of Bihar
■ the assessee was asked to pay taxes for 1951-52 and 1952-53 under Bihar
Sales Tax as it fell under category of dealer under section 2 of the Act.
■ The Act was amended in 1950 and the Preamble to amending Act stated it
amends the existing act and lays down rules of sales tax under the Act for
the financial year beginning on April 1st 1950. Assessee relied on the
preamble to not pay taxes among other things. Court rejected the appeal.

INTERPRETATION/DEFINITION CLAUSE
● provides the meaning of the words used in the statute so as to avoid any uncertainty of
the meaning of that word.
● The object of having a definition clause is to avoid the necessity of frequent repetitions
in describing all the subject matter to which the word or expression so defined is
intended to apply.
● Serves two purposes
○ It provides meaning of the word used in the body of statute
○ It helps in avoiding a situation in which the detailed meaning of the word is
required to be given at every place where such a word is used.
● Prima facie the definition governs whenever that word is used in the body of the statute.
● Indian City Properties Ltd. v. Municipal Commissioner of Greater Bombay (2005)
○ Section 299(i) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 was in question
○ ‘Building’ appearing in the section was construed by the Supreme Court as
appearing in Section 3(s) of the Act as an inclusive one and therefore can be
widely construed.
● Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Annapurna Construction (2008) 6 SCC 732
○ The Apex Court explained the effect of the expression “Unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or context” in the definition clause. It was held that the
said expression permits departure from defined meaning of a word where the
context so warrants.

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 ● In N.D.P. Namboodiripad (Dead) by LRs v. Union of India (2007) 4 SCC 502.
○ The Supreme Court held that where a word is defined there can be no reference
reliance on any general meaning.
● In the absence of any reference or a definition, it is not a sound principle of interpretation
to find the meaning of a word from another statute, particularly when such statute is not
dealing with the same subject matter.
○ Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. C.I.T (2008)
■ It was held that to seek meaning of words used in an Act, the definition
clause of another statute should not be referred to.
● Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain
○ A definition clause in a statute is a legislative device with a view to avoid making
different provisions of the statute cumbersome.
○ Where the effect is that wherever the word defined is used in a provision to which
that definition is applicable, the definition of the word gets substituted.
○ Where, however, the definition is preceded by the words "unless the context
otherwise requires", the connotation is that normally it is the definition given in
the section which should be applied and given effect to.
○ This normal rule may, however, be departed from, if there be something in the
context to show that the definition should not be applied.

Construction of Definitions
● Restrictive and Extensive Definitions
○ Different words or phrases are used to furnish definitions.
○ These do not take away the ordinary and natural meaning of the words. They
either extend the meaning or give meaning to ambiguous words.
○ ‘Means’- exhaustive.
○ ‘Includes’- extends the ordinary meaning.
○ ‘Means and includes’- exhaustive.
○ ‘denotes’- same significance as ‘includes’.
○ ‘Deemed to be’- creates a legal fiction.
○ ‘that is to say’- illustrative of definition.
○ Many definitions start with “unless the context requires otherwise”
○ P. Kasilingam v PSG College of Technology
■ “The use of the word 'means' indicates that definition is a hard- and-fast
definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than
what is put down in the definition.
■ The word ‘includes’ when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression
defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify
according to their natural import, but also those things which the clause
declares that they shall include.

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 ■ The words ‘means and includes’, on the other hand, indicate ‘an
exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act,
must invariably be attached to these words or expressions.
● Borrowed definitions
○ Sometimes definition section may borrow definitions from an earlier Act
○ The definitions so borrowed may not necessarily be in the definition section but in
some other provision of the earlier Act.
○ Public nuisance.
○ In absence of such pari materia definitions, the General Clauses Act can be looked
into.
● Ambiguous definitions
○ Normally definition is intended by legislature to be precise.
○ However, when a definition is ambiguous it requires interpretation for the want of
clarity.
○ In order to understand in complete the meaning of the word, it should not be read
in isolation and should require taking help of other provisions or the definition for
the same word provided in different statutes.
○ The context and general purpose may also be looked upon.
○ Pradyat Kumar v CJ Calcutta
■ The apellant was dismissed from his services by the respondent and one of
the contentions raised was that he had no power under law to do so. It was
held that Article 229 (1) also contains power of dismissal.
■ The court took help of Section 16(1) of GCA which clearly provides that
‘power of appointment’ includes the ‘power to suspend or dismiss’.

Tools to interpret scope of interpretation/definition clause

● MEANS
○ Such definition where the word ‘means’ is used in the definition is prima facie
restrictive or exhaustive in nature and does not permit addition of anything else
to the enumerations already mentioned in the definition itself.
● INCLUDES
○ Where the word ‘includes’ is used, it is prima facie extensive in nature. The
things of same kind or genus can be added in the enumerations already
provided in the statute.
● MEANS & INCLUDES
○ Such definitions where both the words are used are supposed to be exhaustive
● DEEMED TO INCLUDE
○ Where the words ‘deemed to include’ are used, it brings in something within the
scope of the defined word which otherwise would not have fallen under it. Such
definition is considered to be inclusive or extensive

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 ● INCLUDES & SHALL NOT INCLUDE
○ Such definitions are both inclusive and exclusive.
● Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Coop. Bank Employees Union (2007)
○ The Supreme Court held that the use of words “means” followed by the word
“includes” in the definition is clearly indicative of legislative intent to make
definition exhaustive.

Use of Definition for resolving ambiguity

● DELHI JUDICIAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION V. STATE OF GUJARAT AIR 1991
○ The words “including the power to punish for contempt of itself” occurring in
Article 129 of the Constitution of India were construed by the Supreme Court that
these words do not limit the inherent power of the Supreme Court to punish for
contempt of itself as also of subordinate courts.
● LUCKNOW DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. M.K.GUPTA AIR 1994
○ Whether “Housing Construction” is included in “service” as per the definition
provided in Section 2(o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.?
○ Held that “housing construction” was included in “service”. It is worth
mentioning that subsequently, by way of amendment, the words “housing
construction” were inserted between the expressions : “board or lodging or both”

HEADINGS
● Generally headings are attached to almost each section, just preceding the provisions.
● Headings are not passed by legislature but they are subsequently inserted after the Bill
has become law.
● Headings are of two kinds:
○ One those which are prefixed to a section and the other;
○ Which are prefixed to a group or set of sections.
● Headings can be called in aid while construing a section but the importance attached to
headings as internal aid to construction has been differently described by two groups of
thought.
○ One group says that heading is to be regarded as preamble to the provisions
following them and providing key to the interpretation of clauses arranged under
it.
■ Lord Upjohn -- While construing the Act, the Court must read the
headings as well as the body of the Act and that will always be useful
pointer as to the intention of parliament.
○ But the other group says that headings can only be taken when enacting words are
ambiguous.

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 ■ Lord Hudson -- The construction of relevant section ought not to be
governed ultimately by consideration of headings even though some
attention may be paid to them.
● N.C. DHOUNDIAL V. UNION OF INDIA (2004) 2 SCC 579
● IQBAL SINGH MARWAH V. MEENAKSHI MARWAH (2005) 4 SCC 370
● Bhinka v Charan Singh
○ S. 180 of UP Tenancy Act- ejectment of a person who possessed a land ‘otherwise
than in accordance with the provisions of law’.
○ The appellants were in possession of the disputed lands and magistrate under s
145 CrPC, declared that they were entitled to be in possession thereof until
evicted therefrom in due course of law.
○ The question before Supreme Court arose whether appellants can be ejected
without having title but a declared possession.
○ Supreme Court answered in affirmative.
○ The court construed ‘possession in accordance with the provisions of law’ as
‘possession with title’
○ They came to this conclusion by looking at the heading of the section which read
‘ejectment of a person occupying land without title’

MARGINAL NOTES
● Marginal notes are those notes which are printed on the side of a section, generally in a
fine or small print.
● These notes summarize the effect of the section
● However, marginal notes as an aid to construction is not used nowadays.
● C.I.T. Bombay v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Co.
○ Patanjali Shastri J. observed that marginal notes cannot be referred to for the
purpose of construing the statute.
● Tara Prasad Singh v. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1682
○ it was held that marginal notes to a section of the statute cannot take away the
effect of the provisions.
● In Bengal Immunity co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661
○ it was observed that the marginal notes which are appended to Articles of the
Constitution have been held to constitute part of the Constitution as passed by the
Constituent Assembly.
○ For this reason these marginal notes or headings have been made use of in
construing the Articles.
● Balraj Kunwar v Jagatpal Singh
○ marginal notes to the sections of an enactment cannot be referred to for the
purpose of construing the act.

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 ○ There is no justification for restricting the contents of a section by its marginal
notes.
○ They are not part of the act.
○ A marginal note is merely an abstract of the clause intended to catch the eye.
● State of Bombay v Bombay Education Society
○ It was contended that Art-29(2) did not confer any fundamental right on all
citizens generally but guaranteed the rights of citizens of minority groups.
○ Reference was made to the marginal note to Art.29 which states : ‘Protection of
interests of minorities. This contention was rejected by the Supreme Court and it
was held that Article 29(2) applies to all citizens

Limitations of Marginal Notes as Internal Aid to Construction

● Rarely used
● Only if ambiguity persists.
● More than one construction possible.
● Cannot control the plain meaning of the words of the enactment
● Can be used for interpretation of only the Section to which they are appended.
● They cannot frustrate the effect of a clear provision.

EXPLANATION
● Explanation removes the doubt which might arise if the explanation was not given
● Explanation may be appended to include something or to exclude something from the
embracement or ambit of the main enactment.
● It also serves to connote the sense of a word or a phrase occurring in the provision.
● Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare AIR 1989
○ An explanation is not a substantive provision, it is merely meant to explain or
clarify certain ambiguities crept in a statutory provision

Objective of explanations
● to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act
● Where there is any ambiguity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so
as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to sub-serve.
● To provide additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it
meaningful and purposeful.
● Where some gap is left explanation is necessary to suppress the mischief and advance the
object of the Act.

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Limitations of Explanation
● It cannot :
○ Curtail or enlarge the scope of section
○ Control the plain meaning of the words
● Is meant to further explain the meaning of the provision and to remove the doubts.
● An Explanation can be used only for clarification of that section only to which it is
appended.

PUNCTUATION MARKS
● According to traditional view punctuations cannot be used to construe the Act.
● Like the previous aids they can also be used only when meaning is ambiguous.
● They are always subordinate to the requirement of the context.
● Mohd. Shabir v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1979
○ In this case Section 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 came before the
Court for construction.
○ According to this Section, whoever “manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or
exhibits for sale or distributes” a drug without license is liable for punishment.
○ The lower court held that mere stocking is not an offence, however, the Supreme
Court pointed out the presence of comma after “manufactures for sale” and
“sells” and the absence of any comma after “stocks”.
○ Consequently, it was held that only stocking for sale could amount to an offence
and not mere stocking.
● Ashwini kumar v Arbinda Bose
○ When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning,
weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation.
○ Punctuation may have its uses in some cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded
as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of the
statute
● M.K. Salpekar v. S.S. Chandari AIR 1998 SC 1841.
● Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1.

ILLUSTRATIONS
● They are examples or instances appended to a section in order to explain the provision of
law contained in a statute.
● They make the meaning of the section abundantly clear by giving examples.
● Mahesh Chandra Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma AIR 1996 SC 869.

63
 ○ They help to elucidate the principle of the Section.
● Mohamed Sydeol Ariffin v. Yeah Oai Gark 43 IA 256
○ Case relates to Section 32 (5) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which provides
statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found is relevant.
○ An illustration is appended to Sub-Section 5 .
○ Lord Shaw, in the given case observed that it is the duty of the court to accept
illustrations given, as being both of relevance and value in construction of text.

PROVISO
● When a statute is framed in general terms, the limitation are recorded by use of proviso.
● A proviso ordinarily carves out an exception from the general rule enacted in the main
provision.
● a proviso is a clause which is added to the section to except something from enacting
clause or to limit its applicability.
● Thus, the intention with which a proviso is added, is to carve out an exception to the main
provision thereby removing something from its scope, which otherwise would have been
included in the section.
● Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj
Sinha AIR 1961 SC 1596
○ Hidayatullah J. has observed that as a general rule, a proviso is added to an
enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and
ordinarily a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule.
● State of Punjab and Anr v Ashwani Kumar
○ “If the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions
which are said to occur in it you cannot derive these provisions by implication
from a proviso”.

Limitations of Proviso
● Proviso attached to one section or sub-section cannot be used to qualify another section
or sub-section, nor it can be used to except any thing from any other section.
● The ambit and scope of enacting section cannot be widened or curtailed by the proviso.
● Proviso cannot be used to frustrate the real object of the main enactment, unless the
words of the proviso are such that it is its necessary effect.

SCHEDULES
● Schedules are added in the end of the enactment.

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 ● Schedules are considered to be a part of the statute. They generally provide as to how
claims under the Act can be enforced or as to how the powers vested by virtue of the
statute is to be exercised.
● They mainly contain details as prescribed forms for working out the policy underlying
the sections of the statute.
● M/s. Aphali Pharmaceuticals Limited vs. State of Maharashtra
○ The Supreme Court held that, in case of a clash between the schedule and the
main body of an Act, the main body prevails and the schedule has to be rejected.

EXCEPTION AND SAVING CLAUSES

Exceptions
● Exception exempts something which would otherwise fall within the purview of the
general words of a statute.
● For instance, there are ten exceptions attached to section 499, IPC which defines
‘Defamation’. These ten exceptions are the cases which do not amount to defamation.
● Similarly there are five exceptions attached to section 300 of the Indian Penal Code
which defines ‘murder’. These five exceptions are the cases which are not murders but
culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
● An exception affirms that the things not exempted are covered under the main provision.
● In case a repugnancy between an operative part and an exception, the operative part must
be relied on.
● Exceptions must be construed strictly and strongly against the party trying to take the
benefit.
● The mention of certain exceptions to the general rule implies that no other exceptions
were contemplated.

Saving Clause
● Saving clauses are generally appended in cases of repeal and re-enactment of a statute.
● By this the rights already created under repealed enactment are not disturbed nor new
rights are created by it. A saving clause is normally inserted in the repealing statute.
● In case of a clash between the main part of statute and a saving clause, the saving clause
has to be rejected.

Non Obstante Clause

● A section sometimes begins with the phrase ‘notwithstanding anything contained etc.’
● It gives the provision to which it is attached an overriding effect in the event of conflict.

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 ● For reference, in the case of
● Aswini Kumar vs. Arabinda Bose
○ “the non obstante clause can reasonably be read as overriding ‘anything
contained’ in any relevant existing law which is inconsistent with the new
enactment, although the draftsman had primarily in his mind a particular type of
law as conflicting with the new Act.”

TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES
● preparatory works.
● It constitutes the materials used in preparing the ultimate form of an agreement or statute,
especially of an international treaty.
● The materials constitute a legislative history.
● Travaux preparatoires contain the various documents including reports of discussions,
hearings and floor debates that were produced during the drafting of a Convention, treaty
or an agreement.
● Travaux preparatoires of a statute or treaty are usually recorded so that it can be used
later in order to interpret that particular statute or treaty.
● This is a secondary form of interpretation and is used to clarify the intent of the makers of
the statute or treaty.
● Travaux Preparatories comes into play in certain strenuous circumstances, when internal
aids breaks down
● Basically its used as an external aid of interpretation

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UNIT 3: EXTERNAL AIDS OF INTERPRETATION
External Aid of Interpretation - R Sarani
● Internal aids -- primary source -- preamble, headings, object, scheme, schedule etc…
● Materials which are not included in the Statute and of which aids are sought in
interpreting the statute are known as “externals to interpretation” of statute.
● They are called as “surrounding circumstances” or “external sources of statutes” or
“extraneous sources of interpretation”.
● When internal aids are not adequate, courts have to take recourse to external aids. They
are very useful tools for the interpretation or construction of statutory provisions.
● External aids are employed in the construction of statutes if the words and language
employed are not free from ambiguity and which cannot be cleared even by resort to
intrinsic aids.
● External aids in the construction of statutes are given permission to explain the state of
the law at the time it was passed , but not to interpret the Act
● External vs. Internal Interpretation:
○ Internal aid to interpretation is the primary source,
○ External aid to interpretation is the secondary source
○ “When two interpretations are possible, the task of the court would be to find
which one or the other interpretation would promote the object of the Statute,
serve its purpose, preserve its smooth working and prefer the one which subserves
or promotes the object to the other which introduces inconvenience or uncertainty
in the working of its systems.” –
● Types of External Aids of Interpretation:
○ Statement of Objects and reasons of Legislature
○ Legislative debates [ Proceedings in Literature ]
○ Identification of purpose sought to be achieved through legislation
○ Reference to the other statutes
○ Foreign decisions
○ Usage and Practice [ Contemporanea Expositio ]
○ Dictionaries
○ Text books
○ Government circulars and publications

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS OF LEGISLATION

● A Statement of objects and reasons is attached by the minister or promoter of the bill
during the introduction of the bill in the legislature. It is not a part of the bill and they
seek to propound the objective which it stands for.

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 ● Though it is appended to the bill, it is not admissible as an aid to the construction of the
Act as passed, but may be referred to only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the
conditions prevailing at the time which necessitated the making of the law.
● It can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the precise extent and urgency
of the evil.
● It is the cardinal rule of interpretation that the Statement of Objects and reasons of a
statute is to be looked into as an extrinsic aid to find out the legislative intent only when
the meaning of the Statute by its ordinary language is obscure or ambiguous. This was
stated in the State Bank Staff Union vs Union of India [(2005) 7 SCC 584]
● To conclude about the first external aid of interpretation – when the words are perfectly
plain, the court need not look at the Statement of Objects and Reasons.

PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY
● Parliamentary history includes following material:
○ Debates on Bills in the process of its passing
○ Statements of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Legislative Bill
○ Reports of Commission, Inquiry Committee, Joint Parliamentary Committee or
Study Group.
● TRADITIONAL VIEW: NOT ACCEPTED AS A TOOL OF INTERPRETATION:
○ according to this view, the intention of the legislature cannot be gathered from
Parliamentary History of that law. Black Clawson International Ltd. v
Papierwerke Waldhof Aschaffenburg A.G. (1975) 1 All ER 810 HL.
○ However, the courts are entitled to consider:
■ Those external facts which are necessary to understand the subject matter
■ The mischief which it intended to be remedied by the present statute.
● MODERN VIEW: according to this view, the Parliamentary material
○ is the background material which unfolds the position of common law,
○ the mischief for which the common law did not provide and
○ defects or shortcomings in the common law due to which it failed to effectively
control the mischief.
○ PEPPER V. HART (1993) 1 ALL ER (HL), it was held that reference to
parliamentary material should be permitted as an aid to the construction of
legislation which is ambiguous or obscure or the literal meaning of which leads to
absurdity.
● Indian Scenario:
○ Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Prahlad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (2002) 3
SCC 676.
■ Section 53 A was inserted in Transfer of Property Act, which was
interpreted in the light of recommendation made by the Special

68
 Committee’ Report and aims and objects contained in the Amending Act,
1929 of the Act.

HISTORICAL FACTS AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES

● The state of things/affairs existing at the time when a law was enacted are called
“HISTORICAL FACTS AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES”
● The method of historical interpretation is employed when the language of the statute does
not give any clue as to the intention of the legislature.
● In this method the courts consider the circumstances prevailing at the time of original
enactment and decipher the intention.
● Heydon’s case
● It must however be noted that, inferences from the historical facts and surrounding
circumstances cannot control the clear language employed in the enactment itself.
● In case of inconsistency between the two, it is the plain language that will prevail.
● The courts may also refer to contemporary treaties which may have induced the makers
of the law to use a particular word or phrase or expression in the enactment.
● Auckland Jute Co. Ltd. v. Tulsi Chandra Goswami AIR 1949 FC 153
○ It was observed by Mukherjee J. that, the interpreter should palce himself as far as
possible, in the position of those whose words he is interpreting and the meaning
of certain words and terms used in an ancient document or a statute can be
properly explained only by reference to the circumstances existing at the time
when the statute was enacted – or the document was written
●

LEGISLATIVE DEBATES
● For the passing of the bill, after introduction a discussion takes place and some members
may propose amendments, then by way of majority vote the bill will be passed and
becomes a Statute.
● At the beginning the High Courts used to refer the proceedings in the legislature which
resulted in the passing of the Act, but various judges have dissented from practicing this.

INADMISSIBILITY AS AID OF INTERPRETATION

● In the past the courts used to look at the legislative history of a statute occasionally to
know its true context. But the modern views seems to be that it is not permissible as an
aid to interpretation so the legislative debates, reports of the select committees and the
statement of objects and reasons are therefore inadmissible as aids to interpretation.
● The basis of this rule seems to be that whatever was in the mind of the legislators has
been already expressed through words and further, that any attempt on the part of the
legislators to influence courts with their individual views must be released.

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 ● In Golaknath vs State of Punjab [1967 ALJ 813 (SC)], reference was made to the
speeches of two legislators made in the Constituent Assembly not with a view to interpret
the provisions of the Article in question, which the court did on its own terms, but only to
notice the transcendental character given to the fundamental rights by two of the
important architects of the Constitution.

IDENTIFICATION OF PURPOSE SOUGHT TO BE ACHIEVED

THROUGH LEGISLATION
● In the construction of statutes, it is proper to identify the purpose sought to be achieved
through legislation. The intention of legislature is to eliminate mischief relating to
national policy.
● To identify the purpose sought to be achieved through legislation, the court has to seek
external aid of Construction of Statutes such as the mode of
○ LAW COMMISSION
■ The legislatures are not expert body which can study a piece of Legislation
thoroughly in all its aspects and formulate Law commission was
established for purposes of formulating proposals for law reform from
time to time. The first law commission was headed by T.B.Macaulay
under the Charter Act of 1833.
■ In G.Sekar vs Geeta [AIR 2009 SC 2649], The SC held that Report of the
Law Commission of India may be looked into for the purpose of
construction of Statute. But the same would not prevail over clear and
unambiguous provision contained therein.
○ LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
■ Historical settings means the course of events which give rise to the
enactment and is also called as Historical facts, Historical background,
Parliamentary History, History of legislation and surrounding
circumstances.
■ The court is at liberty to look into the history of the law and legislation
and to seek help from other historical facts which in the opinion of the
court will be necessary to get to the true meaning of an enactment.
■ The historical setting interpretation is employed when the language of the
Statute does not give any clue as to the intention of the Legislature.
■
○ SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
■ While making law, the legislature use the existing terminology. A law
remains in force perpetually, unless expired or abrogated. In the meantime,
there is likely to be a sea change in social, political and economic set up
and new scientific inventions may come into existence.

70
 ■ Therefore strict adherence to that meaning of a word could cause
inconvenience. The court is bound to construe a statute in such a manner
so as to remove hardships and make the law effective and workable.
■ In Kashmir Singh vs Union of India [(2008) 7 SCC 259], The SC has
observed that the courts while construing an ongoing statute must take into
consideration the changes in the societal condition. The courts should also
take into consideration development in science and technology

REFERENCE TO OTHER STATUTES

● a) Reference to statutes in Pari Materia
○ Pari means same, Materia means subject matter so pari-materia means same
subject matter. The two statutes are said to be in pari materia when they deal with
same subject, person or thing.
○ According to Sutherland: “Statutes are considered to be in pari materia – to
pertain to the same subject matter – when they relate to the same persons or thing
or have the same purpose or object.”
○ Therefore, statutes in pari materia means statutes dealing with the same subject
matter or forming part of the same system.
○ Extension of the rule Ex Visceribus Actus.
○ The basis of this rule is the presumption that where the same words are used in
similar connection in two statutes on the same subject matter, they are intended to
convey the same meaning.
○ Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 3081,
■ Explanation 1 to Section 77(1) of the Representation of People Act, 1950.
read with Sections 13- and 13 (4-B) of the Income Tax Act.
○ Benefits of the Rule:
■ Use of Later Statute
■ Use of earlier statute
■ Contradiction avoided
■ Presumption
○ State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyar AIR 1958 SC 61
■ Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act “it shall be presumed” was
read with Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act
● b) Previous Legislation
○ Sometimes courts while interpreting the existing act they look towards the
previous act for its interpretation when the intention of the legislature is not
changed.
● c) Assistance of later statutes
○ There are conflicting opinions relating to assistance of subsequent statutes. One
opinion is that it is not permissible to refer to a later statute for construction of an

71
 earlier statute. The other opinion is that normally an earlier statute is referred to
for resolving ambiguity in a later act.
● d) Incorporation of earlier act into later
○ While law making, legislature adopt a device of incorporation of an earlier act
into a later act for the sake of convenience. In order to avoid verbatim
reproduction of the provision of an earlier act into the later, the legislature
incorporate the required provisions of the earlier act or referred to in the later act
and they form part and parcel of the later act as if they had been bodily transposed
into it. The result is to form an independent legislation which is not modified or
repealed by a modification or repeal of the earlier act.
● e) Constitution of consolidated statutes
○ The word consolidate means to make solid or to combine, It is a statute which
presents whole body of statutory law on the subject in complete form repealing
the former statute. It is a statute which consolidates various laws on a particular
subject at one place.
● f) Codifying statutes
○ It is a statute which presents an orderly and authoritative statement of the leading
rules of law on a given subject.

FOREIGN DECISIONS/JUDICIAL DECISIONS

● The Indian judicial system is the replica of English Jurisprudence and where the Indian
statute practically reproduces the English enactment, it would not be proper to neglect
the judicial decisions in England which have decided the proper construction of the
section to be one thing and not another.
● These foreign decisions have persuasive value only and are not binding on Indian courts
and where guidance is available from binding Indian decisions; reference to foreign
decisions is of no use.
● The use of foreign decisions is permissible but there are certain conditions in this regard:
● The foreign judgements referred must be of those countries that follow same system of
jurisprudence
● Language, circumstances and setting, conditions in which the act was enacted must be
given prime importance
● Similarity in political thought of India and that country
● Conditions:
○ The foreign judgements must be of those countries which follow same system of
jurisprudence
○ Prime importance is given to the language of Indian statute,
○ There should be similarity in political thought of India and that country, the
decision of the court of which is being relied.

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 ○ Liverpool and London S.P. and I. Assn. Ltd. v. MV Sea Success I. (2004) 9 SCC
512
○ Union of India v. Naveen Jindal (2004) 2 SCC 510.

CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO
● The maxim means contemporaneous exposition.
● The word “contemporaneous” denotes “of the same time or period” and “exposition”
denotes “explanation”.
● This means that the words should be understood in the sense which they bore at the time
when the statute was passed.
● The word “contemporanea” or “contemporaneous” means of the same time or period and
exposition or exposition means explanation. The meaning is that interpreting a statute or
any other document by referring to the exposition it has received from contemporary
authority.
● Maxwell observed, “It is said that the best exposition of a statute or any other document
is that which is received from contemporary authority.”
● Lord Esher observed, “The first point to be borne in mind is that the Act must be
construed as if one were interpreting it the day after it was passed.”
● Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Gram Panchayat, Pimpri Waghere, the
word ‘houses’ used in Section 89 of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act 1933 was
construed as not limited to dwelling houses but included all buildings whether used for
residence or for commercial purposes.
● The rule of contemporanea exposition was first laid down by Lord Coke, - it is that the
words of a statute will generally be understood in the sense which they bore when it was
passed or in other words they are to be understood as used with reference to the subject
matter in the mind of the legislature and limited to it
● Limitations:
○ Contemporaneous interpretation can be called in aid only where the statute is
obscure or ambiguous and its true meaning cannot be ascertained by resort to
intrinsic aids to construction
○ The rule does not apply to the construction of modern statutes
○ If an ancient error is clearly proved, it acquires no prescription to pass as right in
the construction of Statutes.

DICTIONARIES
● It is a book listing and explaining the words of a language. It contains meanings of
various words used in the language. It provides precise definition of each word
● There is no escape from referring a dictionary to ascertain the meaning of a word, term or
phrase used in a statute when it is not defined in the statute.
● The words take colour from the context and the settings in which they have been used.

73
 ● When a word is not defined in the statute, a common parlance meaning out of several
meanings provided in dictionaries can be selected having regard to the context in which
the word appears in Statute.
● When words are to be understood in their ordinary signification, good dictionaries such
as OXFORD or WEBSTER’s dictionaries may afford some guide to the use of term in a
statute.
● Dictionaries including law dictionaries are useful guides in the task of interpretation of
statutes provided appropriate meaning which fits in the context is chosen, otherwise it
will be fruitless exercise
● In Nagulapati Lakshmamma vs Mupparaju Subbaiah [(1998) 5 SCC 255] SC held that
dictionary meaning cannot be relied upon where there is an express statutory provision in
regard to their matter.
○ When a word is not defined in the Act itself, as the case in Nagalapati
Lakshnuamma v. M. Subbaiah, it is permissible to look into a dictionary to find
out the general sense of the word, in the sense in which the word is understood in
common usage.
● Krishna Aiyar J. in State Bank of India v. Sundara Mani AIR 1976 SC 1111, observed
that dictionaries are not dictators of statutory construction where the benignant mood of
law, more emphatically, the definition clause furnishes a different denotation.
● The word “GOODS” was construed by referring to dictionary in South Bihar Sugar
mills Ltd vs Union of India [(1968) 2 SCJ 433]
● The word “Furniture” was construed on the basis of dictionary meaning in New Chelur
Manufacturers (P) Lts vs CCE [(1997) 94 ELT 467]

TEXTBOOKS
● Textbooks may be referred to by the courts to arrive at the true meaning of an
enactment. It is however not necessary that the views expressed therein are the views of
the court also.
● Where the language of a statute is not precise and words employed therein are capable of
bearing more than one meaning, the text books may be referred to resolve the ambiguity.
● The exposition or analysis of statute by a text writer of repute may also help to
understand the meaning of an enactment and hence may be consulted for ascertaining
the meaning of the ambiguous word or language.
● Article 38 of the statute of the International court of justice authorises the court to apply
the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of various nations as a subsidiary
means for the determination of the rules of law.
● However reference to text books shall not bind the court in any manner, it shall be the
discretion of the court either to accept or to reject the meaning given in the text book

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 ● A commentary in a text book is not binding on the court but when it is to be found in a
learned treatise on a relevant law, it can and does have persuasive value in so much as it
demonstrates that the view of the jurist and that of the court coincide.
● In Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala [AIR 1973 SC 1461], a large number of text
books were quoted by both the contesting parties in support of their respective rival
contentions, but most of the judges of the Supreme Court deciding the case were of the
opinion that in view of many opinions and counter opinions it was not desirable to follow
the opinions and that the safest course for the court was to interpret keeping in mind
always whole context of the issues.

GOVERNMENT CIRCULARS, PUBLICATIONS

● Government circulars, publications and reports have been considered as external aids in
construction of statutes. Hence the courts at the time of interpretation of statutes refer
them unless they do not go against the spirit of statute under which they are issued
● Case law – Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd vs Union of India (AIR 1958 SC 578) – In this
case SC referred the Press Commission’s Report.

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 UNIT 4: PRESUMPTIONS IN INTERPRETATION

INTRODUCTION
● In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the courts will presume that it was the
intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law, and one which should
change the prior law no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose
of the act in question.
● if the words of the law are doubtful or ambiguous, or if the statute is susceptible of more
than one construction, the courts will lean in favour of that interpretation which will
reconcile the enactment with the limitations of legislative power and with the' dictates of
justice and expediency.
● The object of all construction and interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and intention
of the legislature.
● The presumptions’ interpretive function has been described as purely auxiliary and they
may be involved in interpretation only if the language in question is not clear.

Presumptions of General Application

● fundamental legal principles that should always be kept in mind, even where the language
is clear and unambiguous.
● They are presumed to apply unless excluded by express words or necessary implication.
● When all relevant contextual considerations have been duly weighed, the interpreter
should again test his conclusions in light of the presumptions of general application.
● Examples of presumptions of general application are as follows:-
○ The presumption of that mens rea (legal intention) is required in statutory crimes,
○ The presumption that statutory powers must be exercised reasonably,
○ The presumption that administrative tribunals and other such bodies will act in
accordance with the principles of natural justice, and
○ The principle that no person shall be allowed to gain an advantage from his own
wrong.

Presumption for use in doubtful cases

● where the language of a provision is equivocal.
● Most presumptions fall into this category.
● Courts have described them as announcements to legislature that certain meanings will
not be assumed unless expressed in clear terms.
● In the absence of clear terms courts will follow the presumption.
● Examples of these presumptions are as follows:-
○ Presumption against changes in the common law,

76
 ○ Presumption against ousting the jurisdiction of the courts,
○ Presumption in favour of individual liberty, and
○ Presumption against retrospective legislation

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE

● Every Act of the legislature is presumed to be valid and constitutional until the contrary
is shown.
● The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of a statute.
● Every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favour of the statute not against it and the
courts will not adjudge it invalid unless its violation of the constitution in their
judgements is clear, complete, and unmistakable.
● An Act of parliament is presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is shown.
○ it is necessary to be able to show, clearly, how and in what particular it is
inconsistent with the organic law;
○ it is not enough to show that it is impolitic, unwise, or even absurd
● Since the rule-making authority is presumed to enact a law which does not contravene the
constitutional provisions, the court ought not to interpret the statutory provisions in such
a manner as would involve its unconstitutionality
● Though presumption is that, the Act is constitutional and that the legislature understands
and appreciates needs of the people, but when the Act is ex facie discriminatory and
arbitrary, such presumption cannot stand.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXCEEDING CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS

● 3 Lists in the constitution that can be seen to delegate the powers of the Legislature and
Parliament
○ Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters in
List I (Union List)
○ State Legislatures have exclusive power to make laws with respect to matters in
List II (State List)
○ Regarding List III (Concurrent List), both, Parliament and the State Legislatures,
have power to make laws.
● There is a presumption of constitutionality of the rule or the legislation, unless ex facie it
violates the fundamental rights.
● Thus, there is a presumption that the legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction and the
burden of establishing that the Act is not within the competence of the legislature, or that
it has transgressed some constitutional mandates, such as those regarding fundamental
rights, is always on the person who challenges the vires

77
 ● There is a general presumption that a legislature does not intend to exceed its
jurisdiction and the general words in a statute are to be construed with reference to the
powers of the legislature which enacts it.

No lacune left
● The presumption is that legislature does not leave any lacuna.
○ Either by negligence, or by lack of foresight, or because it did not know its job, it
has left some lacuna-no such presumption be made.
● Utkal Contractors & Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa(1987)
○ Parliament is neither expected to use unnecessary expressions nor is expected to
express itself unnecessarily.
○ As it does not use word without meaning something, it does not legislate where
no legislation is called for.

Territorial Operation Presumption

● It is presumed that the legislature does not design any attempt to transcend the rightful
limits of its authority, to violate the principles of international law, or to give exterritorial
effect to its statutes.
● It must be assumed that the legislature has intended to keep within the prescribed limits
of its authority, and to enact a valid law.
● Hence, if a statute is fairly susceptible of two interpretations:
○ one of which would make it transcend the boundaries of legislative competence,
and the other would make it valid, the latter interpretation is to be adopted.
○ Secondly, a construction involving the exercise of a doubtful power will not
readily be adopted in the absence of direct words, when the words used admit of
another construction which steers clear of all, questions in regard to power.
● Prima facie, every statute is confined in its operation to the persons, property, rights and
contracts which are within the territorial jurisdiction of the legislature when enacted it.
● The presumption is always against any intention to attempt giving to the act an extra
territorial operation and effect.
● The principle of the separation of the powers of government into three coordinate
departments requires that each of these should be independent of the others, and that
neither should usurp the functions nor encroach upon the lawful powers of the others.
● Hence any act of legislation which should amount to an unlawful assumption of either
executive or judicial powers, or which should arrogate to the legislative department
duties or prerogatives which the fundamental law confides to the other branches of the
government, would be, for that reason, invalid and of no effect.
● The presumption is that territorial statutes are not intended to apply to foreigners:

78
 ○ Supreme Court in Moloji Nar Singh Rao Shitole v. Shankar Saran'(1962)
■ held that no territorial legislation can give jurisdiction, which any foreign
court ought to recognise against foreigners, who owe no allegiance or
obedience to the power which so legislates.

Presumption against exceeding Territorial nexus

● Non-sovereign legislatures are competent to legislate with extra territorial effect.
● Law made by such a legislative body bear a real territorial connection with the
subject-matter with which it is dealing.
● Article 245 - No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground
that it would have extraterritorial nexus.
● The presumption that statutes do not obtain extra-territorially or do not have
extra-territorial application or do not strike acts committed beyond the limits of
jurisdiction of the legislature roots in respect for the territorial integrity of other states.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE

● It is presumed that the legislature never intends to do injustice.
● When laws are made by elected representative of the people, it is proper to assume that
they enact laws which the society considers as honest, fair and reasonable.
● As a result, justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in every piece
of legislation.
● If this is not there and harsh and ridiculous effect was actually intended by the legislature,
it could not be easily accepted that it represents the legislative intent
● If a statute is doubtful or ambiguous, or fairly open to more than one construction that
construction should be adopted which will avoid this result.
● In construing statutes, it is not reasonable to presume that the legislature intended to
violate a settled principle of natural justice or to destroy a vested right to property.
● Moreover, it is only when the construction is doubtful that the argument from injustice or
failure of justice is of force.
● The cornerstone of this presumption is the natural law thesis that law should be just.
● Bennion asserts that it is a principle of legal policy that law should be just and that court
decisions should further the ends of justice.
● In view of the doctrine of separation of powers, the presumption is clearly rebuttable
because where a statute is unequivocal in its import, the court must give effect to the
meaning, no matter how unjust it may be.
● The presumption could be excluded by the legislature.

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PRESUMPTION AGAINST INCONVENIENCE
● It is always to be presumed that the legislature intends the most reasonable and beneficial
construction of its enactments, when their design is obscure or not explicitly expressed,
and such as will avoid inconvenience, hardship, or public injuries.
● Hence if a law is couched in doubtful or ambiguous phrases, or if its terms are such as to
be fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, the courts, haying this presumption in
mind, will attach weight to arguments drawn from the inconvenient results which would
follow from putting one of such constructions upon the statute, and will therefore adopt
the other.
● When laws are made by elected representative of the people, it is proper to assume that
they enact laws which the society considers as honest, fair and reasonable.
● As a result, justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in every piece
of legislation.
● If this is not there and harsh and ridiculous effect was actually intended by the legislature,
it could not be easily accepted that it represents the legislative intent.
● Where the language of a statute is plain and admits of but one construction, the courts
have no power to supply any real or supposed defects in such statute, in order to avoid
inconvenience or injustice.
● It may be proper, in giving a construction to a statute, to look to the effects and
consequences when its provisions are ambiguous, or the legislative intent is doubtful.
● If the words are ambiguous and one construction leads to enormous inconvenience and
the other construction does not, the one which leads to the least inconvenience is to be
preferred.

MISCELLANEOUS

Presumption against Altering the Common Law

● It is a well established principle of construction that a statute is not to be taken as
affecting a fundamental alteration in the general law unless it uses words that point
unmistakably to that conclusion.
● It is well established that the legislature will not introduce something new in the common
law without an unambiguous expression of its intent
● Statutes should be construed as far as possible in conformity with the common law rather
than against it.
● The presumption requires clear and unequivocal language to alter the common law.
Legislation must be interpreted in light of the common law, must as far as possible be
reconciled with related precepts of the common law and must be read to be capable of
co-existing with common law in pari materia.

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 ● This presumption reflects an inherent respect and esteem for our common law heritage.
○ Common law is seen as the basis of the current law and statute law is thought to
be an exception to common law.
● The presumption means that in interpreting subsequent act, it is assumed that the
legislature did not intend to repeal or modify the earlier Act.
○ Any repeal or amendment must be effected expressly or by necessary implication.
● This presumption enhances legal certainty as it discourages an undue destabilisation or
unsettlement of the law as it stands.
● It also manifests esteem for the worth of the common law as the outcome of historical
evolution.

Presumption against Retrospective Legislation

● There is a presumption against enactments having retrospective effect.
● Even where retrospectivity is expressly provided for the provision will be strictly
construed to keep retrospectivity to plainly applicable circumstances
● This presumption appears to be stronger in penal statutes than in civil ones.
● In civil statutes, although the presumption exists, it is certainly very weak in character.
● The Courts may even introduce a retrospective effect in civil matters if there seems to be
enough justification.
● The general presumption is that a law should affect future actions only and not those of
the past.
● Midland Railway Co.v. Pye : (1861)
○ "It manifestly shocks one's sense of justice that an act legal at the time of doing it
should be made unlawful by some new enactment."
● Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India provides against ex post facto law in
respect of conviction for offences.

Presumptions Relating to Statutes in Pari Materia

● The presumption is that a consolidating statute, which embodies the provisions of earlier
legislation, does not alter the law.
● There is also the presumption that the judicial interpretation of the preceding legislation
covers the consolidating statute as well.
● This principle however does not debar the Courts from invalidating earlier decisions.
● In the case of a 'codifying' statute, i.e., a statute which replaces earlier enactments in
different terms, the presumption is that the case law under the earlier statute has expired
with them.
● When a later enactment expands the scope of the earlier statutes, the earlier statutes may
themselves be accorded a wider interpretation than they would command had the later
enactment not been passed.

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 ● Where a subordinate legislation coming under an Act is left unchanged by a subsequent
Act repealing the main Act, there is the presumption that the subordinate legislation
continues to be in operation.
● Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of the previous Act, then the borrowed
provision becomes an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are
unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act, except certain contingencies.
● There is a rule of construction that where a statute is incorporated by reference into a
second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the second, as the
incorporated provisions have become part of the second statute.

The presumption against interpreting a statute so as to oust or restrict the

jurisdiction of superior courts
● There is a presumption against the legislature interfering with the jurisdiction of courts
which is related to the presumption against changing existing law.
● This presumption rests on the theory that the law-giver no more intends to affect the state
in its judicial than in its executive organ.
● The object of this presumption is to vouch for the horizontal division of powers (or trias
politica) and in particular, for the independence of the judiciary, and to ensure access for
individuals to the courts and to adjudicative procedures.
● Under the doctrine of separation of powers the judiciary stands on an equal footing with
the executive and the legislative pillars of the state.
○ Note that it applies only to superior courts.

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 UNIT 5: STATUTES AFFECTING JURISDICTION
OF COURTS

PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXCLUSION OR OUSTING THE

ESTABLISHED JURISDICTION
● A statutory enactment is not competent to take away the jurisdiction conferred by the
Constitution; this jurisdiction can be taken away only by means of amending the
Constitution.
● Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1993)
○ observed that even a provision in the Constitution conferring finality to the
decision of an authority is not construed as completely excluding judicial review
under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution, but it limits it to
jurisdictional errors, for example mala fides, non compliance with rules of natural
justice, infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandates and perversity.
○ If the legislature states that the decision or order of a tribunal, or a court shall be
final and conclusive, the remedies available under the Constitution remain
unrestrained or uninhabited."

THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST INTERPRETING A STATUTE SO AS TO

OUST OR RESTRICT THE JURISDICTION OF SUPERIOR COURTS
● There is a presumption against the legislature interfering with the jurisdiction of courts
which is related to the presumption against changing existing law.
● This presumption rests on the theory that the law-giver no more intends to affect the state
in its judicial than in its executive organ.
● The object of this presumption is to vouch for the horizontal division of powers (or trias
politica) and in particular, for the independence of the judiciary, and to ensure access for
individuals to the courts and to adjudicative procedures.
● Under the doctrine of separation of powers the judiciary stands on an equal footing with
the executive and the legislative pillars of the state.
○ Note that it applies only to superior courts.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES PERTAINING TO JURISDICTION OF COURTS

Exclusion must be Explicitly Expressed or Clearly Implied

● The provisions excluding jurisdiction of civil courts and provisions conferring
jurisdiction on authorities other than civil courts are strictly construed.

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 ● There is a strong presumption that civil courts have jurisdiction to decide all questions of
civil nature. Therefore, the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil courts is not to be readily
inferred and such exclusion must either be ‘explicitly expressed or clearly implied’.
● Ramayya v. Laxminarayan, [1934].
○ The existence of jurisdiction in civil courts to decide questions of civil nature is
the general rule and exclusion is an exception of this rule. Therefore, the burden
of proof to show that jurisdiction is excluded in any particular case is on the party
who raises such a contention
● Bhimsen v. State of U.P., AIR 1955
○ Principle applies to all courts of general jurisdiction including criminal courts.
○ Exclusion of jurisdiction of ordinary criminal courts can be brought about by
setting up courts of limited jurisdiction in respect of the limited field, only if the
vesting and the exercise of that limited jurisdiction is clear and operative and
there is adequate machinery for the exercise of the limited jurisdiction.
○ Rule against exclusion of jurisdiction of courts will not arise, if the intention
of the legislation is plain, clear and manifest to oust the jurisdiction
● Bhatia international v. Bulk Trading
○ It was held that, the court in India would have Jurisdiction even in respect of an
international Commercial Arbitration. An ouster of jurisdiction cannot be implied,
it has to be expressed.

Determining the nature of case (class of case) to understand Jurisdictional

extent of courts
● Tests laid down by Justice Willes
○ where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed
by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the
remedy which existed at common law.
■ PVX Granite Co’s case (HoL): legislation in question did not create any
new rights but restricted the already existing rights of a land-owner and
the remedy provided under the statute was alternative and did not take
away the ordinary remedy available under the general law
○ Where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of
remedy, there, the party can only proceed by action at common law.
○ Where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the
same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it.
■ Secretary of State v. Mask & Co;
● The liability to pay any particular tax does not exist apart from the
statute imposing the tax. The subject is bound to resort to the
remedies provided in the statute for challenging any assessment of
the tax. It was therefore, held that an order of customs authorities

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 passed under section 182 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and
confirmed in appeal under section 188, was not open to challenge
in civil court.
● With respect to first and third of the three classes of cases mentioned by Willes J it has to
be ascertained
○ whether the statute in question deals with and regulates an already existing right
or liability, or,
○ whether it creates a new right or liability which has no existence apart from the
statute.
● the special remedy provided therein, subject to any provision for the exclusion of
ordinary remedy, will only be construed as an alternative one.
● the remedy will be construed as exclusive even though the statute makes no express
provision for exclusion of ordinary remedy

Cases of breach of statutory duties

● Doe d. Bishop of Rochester v Bridges: Lord Tenterden CJ said:
○ When an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified
manner, we take it to be a general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any
other manner.
○ If an obligation is created but no mode of enforcing its performance is ordained,
the common law may, in general find a mode suited to the particular nature of the
case.
● When a statute creating the duty provides for the penalty of fine or imprisonment
for breach of the duty it is regarded as the only manner of enforcing the duty.
● Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram, AIR 1975
○ When a statute creating the duty provides for the penalty of fine or imprisonment
for breach of the duty it is regarded as the only manner of enforcing the duty.

Omission to exercise statutory power

● Subject to exceptional case, the normal rule is that an omission by a public authority to
exercise a statutory power conferred for the benefit of the public does not give rise to
breach of duty sounding in damages.
● Stovin v. Wise [1996]
○ a motor accident took place at a road junction partly because the view was
obstructed by an earth bank adjacent to the road. Although under sections 41 and
79 of the Highways Act, 1980 the local authority has statutory power to remove
the earth bank but it took no steps in that direction.

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 ○ The House of Lords held that there was no common law duty on the authority to
exercise the power and omission to exercise it did not give rise to a claim for
damages in negligence
● Union of India v. United India Insurance Company ltd
○ Facts: Express Train- collided –bus
○ UOI, which owning railways was held guilty of negligence of breach of common
law duty for failing to convert unmanned level into manned level.
○ UOI was also held liable for omission to exercise the power under section 13 of
the Railways Act, which provides that the Central Government may inquire a
railway administration to erect fences, screen gates etc.

EXTENT OF EXCLUSION

Construction of Exclusionary Clauses

● If there is no provision to enable an authority or tribunal to hold an enquiry, the same
indicates that civil courts jurisdiction is not excluded.
● If a provision setting up of hierarchy of judicial tribunal exists, it is sufficient to indicate
or to infer that court’s jurisdiction is barred.
● Tribunal may use the principles of procedure contained in the CPC unless inconsistent
with the provisions of the Act
● Even in cases where jurisdiction is excluded by use of prima facie comprehensive
language, it is open to civil courts which are courts of general jurisdiction to decide
whether a court, or tribunal or authority having limited jurisdiction, has acted in excess of
its statutory powers.
● However, civil courts can interfere when the order of the tribunal or authority is really not
an order under the Act conferring special jurisdiction but is a nullity.
● Gaekwar Sarkar of Baroda v Gandhi Kachrabhai
○ “It has been determined over and over again that if a person or body of persons
having statutory authority for the construction of works exceed or abuses the
powers conferred by the Legislature, the remedy of a person injured in
consequence is by action or suit, and not by a proceeding for compensation under
the statute which has been so transgressed. Powers of this sort are to be exercised
with ordinary care and skill, and with some regard to property and rights of
others. They are granted on the condition sometimes expressed and sometimes
understood, but if not expressed always understood that the undertakers shall do
as little damage as possible in the exercise of their statutory powers.”
● Firm Radhakrishnan v Ludhiana Municipality

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 ○ A suit in civil court will always lie to question the order of a tribunal created by a
statute, even if its order is, expressly or by necessary implication, made final, if
the said tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the Act but in violation of
its provisions

Cases of Nullity
● An order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity
● Jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement of a proceeding-properly
assumed-order passed thereafter will be within jurisdiction.
● Ujjan Bai v State of UP
○ shows that an adjudication by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction is void, when:
○ (1) action is taken under an ultra vires statute
○ (2) the subject matter of adjudication is beyond its competence or the order passed
is such which it has no authority to pass
○ (3) the adjudication is procedurally ultra vires being in violation of fundamental
principles of judicial procedure and
○ (4) jurisdiction is assumed by wrongly deciding jurisdictional questions of law or
fact.
● Violation of fundamental provisions of the Act under which the tribunal functions and
fundamental principles of judicial procedure make the tribunal's order void.
● Cases of nullity may also arise during the course or at the conclusion of the inquiry.
● O'Reilly v Mackman
○ In the following cases the want of jurisdiction is necessary:
■ (a) when the tribunal has wrongly determined a jurisdictional question of
fact or law
■ (b) when it has failed to follow the fundamental principles of judicial
procedure, For example: has passed the order without giving an
opportunity of hearing to the party affected;
■ (c) when it has violated the fundamental provisions of the Act,
● For example: when it fails to take into account matters which it is
required to take into account or when it takes into account
extraneous and irrelevant matters.
■ (d) when it has acted in bad faith

Rule of Conclusive Evidence

● The Legislature may make certain matters non-justiciable by enacting rules of conclusive
evidence or conclusive proof.

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 ● Section 4 of the Evidence Act, 1872 “ When one fact is declared by this Act to be
conclusive proof of another, the court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as
proved, and shall now allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it.
● Rajasthan State Road Transport Corp v Poonam Pahwa,
○ In a proper case the High Court or this court in the exercise of its special
jurisdiction has the power to determine how far provisions of the statute have or
have not been complied with. But special powers of this court or of the High
Court cannot extend to reopening a finding by the State Government under
section 5 of the Act that the tenant has not actually resided in the premises for a
continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the order or
under section 6 that the premises had become vacant at about the time indicated in
the order impugned.
○ The Legislature in its wisdom has made those declarations conclusive and it is not
for this court to question that wisdom.

EXCLUSION OF JURISDICTION OF SUPERIOR COURTS

● The question of curtailing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or High Courts as
conferred by the Constitution does not arise in India
● The jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution can be taken away only by amending the
Constitution and not by statutory enactments
● Exception-Article 262(2) of the Constitution- enables Parliament to provide by law that
"neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall exercise jurisdiction" in respect of
any dispute relating to waters of inter-state rivers or river valleys
○ The law enacted by Parliament in this context is Inter-State Water Disputes Act,
1956 which provides for constitution of Water Disputes Tribunal for adjudication
of such disputes and section 11 of which bars the jurisdiction of all courts
including the Supreme Court in terms of Article 262(2).
○ Interpreting this provision it has been held that the bar under section 11 will come
into play when a Tribunal is constituted and till then the Supreme Court can issue
interim order preserving the status quo.
○ If the Legislature states that the decision or order of a court or tribunal shall be
final and conclusive, the remedies available under the Constitution remain
unfettered.
● The High Court of India apart from exercising supervisory powers under the constitution,
exercise a similar power under the section 115 of the CPC, 1908, over all subordinate
courts. This power of revisions under section 115, which can be excluded by legislative
enactments is construed as readily excluded except by express provision to the effect.
● Statutes should not be construed so as to take away the jurisdiction of the superior courts,
tribunals, government agencies, must be strictly construed and the procedure prescribed
must be followed exactly

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 ● Deep Chand v. Land Acquisition Officer,
○ it was held that, the appellate and revisional jurisdiction is not excluded simply
because the subordinate court exercises special jurisdiction.
○ This is because when a special act confers a jurisdiction on an established court,
without any words of limitation, then the ordinary procedure of that court
including general right of appeal or revision against its decision is attracted i.e
the right is not taken away.

Kihoto Hollohan and the concept of exclusion of superior courts’ jurisdiction

The case dealt with the question that if the decision of the speaker of the House
pertaining to defection, under Para 7 of the 10th Schedule of the Constitution could be subjected
to judicial review. The most relevant observations made by the court subsequent to the arguments
of both the parties can be summarised as under:
● By negating the remedy of judicial review by implementation of Para 7, there would be a
complete exclusion of the power of the SC under Art136 and the HC under Art 226-227.
But it was contended that Para 7 is to be observed as a remedy and not a right and due to
this the jurisdiction of the SC and HC would remain ‘unimpaired’.
● The contention that the provisions of the Tenth Schedule, along with the exclusion of
Paragraph 7, would violate the basic structure of the Constitution by affecting the
democratic rights of elected members and, therefore, of the principles of Parliamentary
democracy was observed as unsound and was rejected.
● A provision in the Constitution conferring finality to the decision of an authority is not
construed as completely excluding judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the
Constitution
● As the powers of the Supreme Court under Articles 32 and 136 and that of the High
Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are parts of its basic structure, it is
impossible even by Constitution Amendment to deny the power of judicial review.
● “One of the constructions suggested at the hearing was that this expression covers only
the intermediate stage of the proceedings relating to disqualification under para 6 and not
the end stage when the final order is made under para 6 on the question of
disqualification. It was suggested that this construction would be in line with the
construction made by this Court in its several decisions relating to exclusion of Courts'
jurisdiction in election disputes at the intermediate state under Article 329 of the
Constitution. This construction suggested of para 7 does not commend to us since it is
contrary to the clear and unambiguous language of the provision. The expression `in
respect of any matter connected with the disqualification of a member of a House under
this Schedule' is wide enough to include not merely the intermediate stage of the
proceedings relating to disqualification but also the final order on the question of

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disqualification made under para 6 which is undoubtedly such a matter. There is thus
express exclusion of all courts' jurisdiction even in respect of the final order.” (have taken
this as it deals with the construction of the statute).
○ In the face of this clear language, there is no rule of construction which permits
the reading of para 7 in any different manner since there is no ambiguity in the
language which is capable of only one construction, namely, total exclusion of the
Jurisdiction of all courts including that of the Supreme Court and the High Courts
under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of every matter
connected with the disqualification of a member of a House under the Tenth
Schedule including the final decision rendered by the Speaker/Chairman, as the
case may be. Para 7 must, therefore, be read in this manner alone.

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 UNIT 6: GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES,
CLASSIFICATION

REPEAL OF STATUTES

Introduction
● Repeal means to revoke, abrogate or cancel, particularly a statute.
● Repeal maybe expressed or implied by enacting a matter contrary to and inconsistent
with the prior legislation.
● General Clauses Act – Section 6, Repeal is defined as; “abrogation/obliteration of one
statute by another.”
● The end effect of Repeal is as though the first statute had never been passed.
● Modification is NOT Repeal.
● Repeal may be Expressed or Implied.
● Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works Ltd V. UOI
○ It was held by the court that proceedings shall be discontinued upon Repeal of a
statute unless:
■ Covered under Sec 6 of General Clauses Act
■ Savings provision

Kinds of Statutes
● Perpetual
○ No time period is fixed for its duration.
○ Remains in force until Repealed.
○ Called perpetual as it is not abrogated by time or by non use of it.
● Temporary
○ They come to an end on the expiry of a specified time.
○ Cannot be amended post expiry.
○ Can be revived only through re-enactment.
○ Effect of repeal
■ Section 6, general clauses act:
● Revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the
Repeal takes effect.
● Affect the previous operation of any enactment so Repealed or
anything duly done or suffered thereunder.
● Affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued
or incurred under any enactment so Repealed.

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 ● Affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of
any offence committed against any enactment so repealed.
● Affect any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of
any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or
punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal
proceeding or remedy maybe instituted, or continued or enforced
and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as
if the Repealing act or regulation had not been passed.
● Repeal by a Temporary Statute
○ State of Orissa V. Bhupendra Kumar - Whether the previous statute which has
been Repealed will revive is subject to the construction of the temporary statute.
● Repealed provisions are treated as if they never existed – They apply only to past
transaction.

Effect on Offences
● After expiration no person can be prosecuted under the act.
● If prosecution has not ended before expiry, the proceedings end.
● If offenses are punishable under ordinary laws, but were being tried by special courts –
where such courts were such statutes – trial will continue in ordinary courts.

Types of Repeal
● Express:
○ By express provision
○ No special form of words are necessary
● Implied:
○ By necessary implication
○ Not preferred by courts
○ May be inferred by
■ Where there is a direct conflict between two provisions
■ When the legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of
the subject matter replacing the earlier law
■ When the two laws occupy the same field, but in absence of conflict
between general law and special law Repeal cannot be implied
● Doctrine of Implied Repeal
○ It is presumed that the legislature knows the existing state of law and that it did
not intend to create any confusion by retaining any conflicting provisions
○ The courts in applying this doctrine are merely supposed to give effect to
legislative intent by examining the object and scope of the two enactments
○ Ratanlal Adukia v UoI

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 ■ in the above case, it was held that where subsequent special legislation on
the same subject is a self contained compete code in itself, legislative
intent is deemed to be, to exclude the earlier general laws on the subject.

Implied Repeal Cases Laws:

● Dr. Tariq Mehmood Mian V. Govt of Punjab
○ Courts do not favour Implied Repeal
○ The presumption is always against the intention of the legislature to Repeal by
Implication
○ The presumption arises due to the presence, generally, of an express statement to
repeal
○ An express statement exists, which shows not only legislative intent, but the
knowledge of the legislature on laws that already exist pertaining to the same
subject matter
● Abdul Samad v Ahmed Khan Lodhi
○ Only where two Acts are inconsistent with each other, the latter Act will be said
to impliedly Repeal the former
○ Court must be satisfied that both Acts cannot be harmoniously constructed
○ Implied Repeal is possible only if the statute’s provisions are plainly repugnant to
a subsequent statute
● Jamshed Ali v State
○ In this case, the court laid down that where inconsistency exists, the latter special
Law Repeals, by implication, the former general law

Presumption against Repeal

● Courts can lean against implied Repeal.
● If by any fair interpretation both statutes can stand together, there shall be no implied
Repeal if possible, implied Repeal shall be avoided.
● The scope for application of this Doctrine arises only when the latter Statute provides for
a different punishment or procedure for an offense in comparison to the previous Statute.

Expiry and Repeal of Statutes

A law is repealed when it is revoked, abrogated, or repealed. Any law may repeal any
Act, in whole or in part, by enacting matters that are contrary to and inconsistent with the prior
legislation, either explicitly or implicitly. As a result, it is common for a statute to state that
certain previous statutory provisions are repealed as a result. Only if the earlier and later
legislative provisions are explicitly incompatible can the courts treat the matter as repealed by
implication. When a repealing clause is abolished, it would not bring back any provisions that
were previously repealed by it, unless the repealing provision was itself repealed.

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 While there is a clear intention to revive, it is possible that common law rules will once
again apply. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1897 "The term "repeal" refers to the full
abrogation or obliteration of one statute by another from the statute book, as if it had never been
enacted. "When an Act is repealed, it must be treated as though it never existed (except in the
case of past and closed transactions)."
No law will guarantee that it will not be repealed. There is nothing that prevents a
Parliament from enacting a law that cannot be changed or repealed in certain circumstances. Any
Parliament has the right to repeal any Act passed by its predecessors, but it does not have the
power to prohibit the repeal of its own Acts or to bind its successors.
A legislation may be permanent or temporary. It is permanent because no time limit is set
for its lifetime, and such a law remains in effect until it is repealed, whether explicitly or
implicitly. A permanent law is not in the sense that it cannot be repealed; rather, it is perpetual in
the sense that it is not abrogated by the passage of time or non-use. A legislation is temporary if
its term is limited to a set period of time, and it expires at the end of that period unless it is
repealed earlier. Simply because the intent of a statute is temporary, as stated in its preamble, the
statute cannot be considered temporary if no defined date for its length is indicated. A temporary
statute's term may be prolonged by enacting a new statute or exercising a power granted by the
original statute. When it comes to
A temporary Act's existence is only extended; it cannot be claimed that a new statute has
been enacted; but, if the extension is not followed by any significant changes, it will not be a
success.
It's a case of simple extension. It seems that a temporary law cannot be renewed until it has
expired. By simply changing the same, you can make it more powerful. The only logical way to
resurrect the long-since-expired law is to by re-enacting a statute in similar terms or enacting a
statute specifically stating that the act, which had previously expired, is now resurrected.
General Clauses Act of 1897, Section 6 Repealing Effect - Any right, privilege, duty, or
liability gained or accrued under any repealed enactment is protected under this provision. This
provision saves any tax, forfeiture, or sentence imposed in connection with any crime committed
against any enactment so repealed, pending prosecution and legal proceedings.
Section 6A deals with Repeal of an Act that modifies the text of an Act or a Regulation If
any Central Act or Regulation enacted after the commencement of this Act repeals any
legislation by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was modified, the repeal shall not
impact the life of the repealed enactment until a different purpose occurs.
Section 7: revival of repealed enactments. - If any act or regulation is required after the
commencement of this Act for the purpose of reviving any enactment, that purpose must be
stated explicitly.
The Repealing and Amending Act, 2016, is an Act of the Indian Parliament that repealed
295 Acts and made minor changes to the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
(Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013, and the Governors (Emoluments,
Allowances, and Privileges) Amendment Act, 2014. The Act's aim was to repeal outdated

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legislation. Any jurisdiction, office, tradition, responsibility, right, title, privilege, or restriction
shall not be revived or restored by this Act.

Principles of interpretation used for delegated legislation or subordinate

legislation
● "Delegated legislation" refers to legislation enacted by the executive branch, a legislative
entity, a state or other body acting under the authority of the competent legislature. It
allows the bodies that report to parliament to enact their own laws. It is law that is
enacted by anyone or someone other than Parliament. Parliament may grant authority to
another person or entity to render laws by an Act of Parliament. An Act of Parliament
establishes the basis for a specific law and usually only contains a summary of the Act's
intent. By delegating legislative power to other people or bodies, Parliament allows other
people or bodies to add more information to an Act of Parliament.
● Delegated legislation may also be used to make minor modifications to the law, such as
changing the sanctions under a particular statute. A Local Authority, for example, has the
authority granted to them by some regulations to make delegated legislation and to enact
laws that are specific to their jurisdiction. Since there is more delegated legislation passed
each year than there are Acts of Parliament, delegated legislation plays a critical position
in the making of law. Furthermore, delegated law has the same legal status as the Act of
Parliament that established it.
● Delegated legislation may also be used to make minor modifications to the law, such as
changing the sanctions under a specific statute. A Local Authority, for example, has the
authority granted to them by some regulations to enact delegated legislation and make
laws that are appropriate for their jurisdiction. Since there is more delegated legislation
passed each year than there are Acts of Parliament, it plays a critical role in the making of
law. Delegated law therefore has the same legal status as the Act of Parliament from
which it was derived.
● Second, delegated legislation requires those with specific expert expertise to make laws.
A local government, for example, should make laws that are tailored to the needs of their
community rather than making a blanket rule that may or may not apply to them. A single
Local Authority, rather than Parliament, will make a law to meet local needs, and the
Local Authority would have a better understanding of what is best for the community.
● Finally, delegated legislation can be used to address a condition that Parliament did not
expect before the legislation was passed, making it versatile and useful in lawmaking. As
a result, delegated legislation will adapt to evolving societal needs as well as
circumstances that Parliament did not expect when enacting the Act of Parliament.
● Since the Constitution of India is supreme, any act passed by the legislature must comply
with the constitutional requirements, and if it does not, the court may find it
unconstitutional and void.

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● Articles 13, 245 and 246 of the constitution define the constitution's express limits.
Article 13(1) states that all laws in effect in India immediately prior to the
commencement of the constitution that are incompatible with the provisions of Part III
(fundamental rights) are invalid to the degree of the inconsistency. According to article
13(2), the state shall not make any law that abridges or takes away the rights granted by
part III (i.e. the Fundamental Rights), and any law that does so shall be invalid to the
degree of the abridgement.
● As a result, the legislature is prohibited from violating the human rights clauses of
Section III of the constitution. If the parent or enabling Act violates part III of the
constitution's Fundamental Rights, the court will declare it unconstitutional and void, and
any subordinate or delegated law enacted as a result of the act will therefore be found
unconstitutional and void.
● The legislative powers of the parliament and state legislatures are all subject to the
provisions of the constitution, according to Article 245. Parliament may enact laws that
apply to all or part of India's territory, and state legislatures may enact laws that apply to
all or part of a state's territory.
● The Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, 1991 was ruled
unconstitutional by the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal on many grounds, including
that it had extraterritorial operation in that it interfered with the equal rights of Tamil
Nadu and Pondicherry to the Cauvery River's waters.
● In other words, no legislation passed by Parliament may be declared unconstitutional
because it has extraterritorial effects. The state legislature's rule, on the other hand, may
be questioned on the grounds of extraterritorial operation. If the parent act is ruled
unconstitutional, the delegated acts enacted under it will be declared unconstitutional as
well.
● If the Enabling or Parent Act violates the Constitution's implied cap, it will be
unconstitutional and void, and any delegated legislation enacted under the Act will be
similarly unconstitutional and void. The implicit restriction of the Constitution is that it
cannot delegate basic legislative functions assigned to the legislature by the Constitution.
The determination of legislative policy and its formulation as a code of conduct is the
most important legislative feature. Delegating legislative power requires the legislature to
establish legislative policy and guidelines for the exercise of the delegated power by the
delegate.
● Where the Enabling or Parent Act is in conflict with delegated legislation: When
delegated law is found to be in direct or indirect conflict with the Enabling Act or Parent
Act's provisions, it is deemed ultra vires the Enabling Act or Parent Act. A rule was
found invalid in Delhi Transport Undertaking v. B.R.I. Hajelay because it conflicted with
the provisions of the Enabling or Parent Act. All persons earning less than 350 rupees per
month must be appointed only by the general manager of the Delhi Transport
Undertaking, according to Section 92 of the Delhi Corporation Act, 1957.

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 UNIT 7: INTERPRETATION OF FISCAL
STATUTES

INTRODUCTION
● Revenue law is the sole creation of statute and cannot be imposed out of common law.
This means that it is a statute alone which can impose an obligation upon citizens to pay
a specified tax.
● Considered to be a special class of statutes, but warrant no special or own rules of
interpretation.
● Attorney General vs. Caltin Ban 1989
○ There was no apparent reason for taxing statutes to warrant principles of
construction distinct from those applicable to other statutes. Once a court has
ascertained the subject-matter to which a taxing statute intended to be applied,
there is no scope for the court to go beyond such a conclusion.
● Tax vs Fees
○ A tax is imposed for public purpose for raising general revenue of the State.
○ A fee in contrast is imposed for rendering services and bears a broad
co-relationship with the services rendered.
● Tax laws are highly complex, complicated and beyond the understanding of a tax-payer.
The words and expressions used are not simple.
● No one can be taxed by implication.
○ A charging section has to be construed strictly
● Keshavji Ravji & Co. vs. CIT – [(1990) 183 ITR 1 (SC)
○ The need of interpretation arises only when the words used in the statute are on
their own term, ambivalent and do not manifest the intention of the legislature.

Constitutional Provisions
● Article 265 of the Constitution provides: “No tax shall be levied or collected except by
authority of law”
● Article 366(28) of the Constitution which defines Taxation and Tax reads: “Taxation
includes the imposition of any tax or impost whether general or local or special and ‘tax’
shall be construed accordingly”.
● A scrutiny of Lists I and II would show that there is no overlapping anywhere in the
taxing power and the Constitution gives independent sources of taxation to the Union and
the States.
● A taxing statute is not per se a restriction on the freedom under Article 19 (1) (g) of the
Indian Constitution.

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 ● A taxing statute if divisible in nature and partly falls within and partly outside the
Constitution should not be declared wholly ultra vires. The principle of severability
includes separability in enforcement and this principle should be applied in cases of all
taxing statutes
○ Cibatul Ltd v Union of India
■ the court held that while the charging section may not be ultra vires , the
procedural section could be held to be ultra vires if it exceeded the
constitutional competence of the legislature which enacted it. It was held
that while section 3, the charging section of the Central Excise and Salt
Act 1944 was valid, section 4, the machinery or procedural section, was
invalid as it impinged upon the legislative authority of the state.

CANONS/PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

Strict Construction
● Statutes which impose taxes or monetary burdens must be construed or interpreted as per
the principle of strict construction.
● Logic: Imposition of taxes is also a kind of imposition of penalty, which can only be
imposed if the language of the state unequivocally states so.
● No scope for intendment, presumption, inference or analogy as to tax.
● Rowlatt J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC (1921 1 KB 64)
○ "In a taxing statute one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no
room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption
as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can look fairly
at the language used.”
○ Also held in the case of CIT v. Ajax Products Ltd. [1965] 55 ITR, 741
● No tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intention
of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter.
● CIT v. Elphinstone Spg & Wvg Mills Co Ltd.
● CIT v Motors & General Stores Ltd.
○ Subject cannot be taxed unless he comes within the letter of the law. “spirit” of
the law argument is invalid.
● Tarulata Shyam v. CIT [1971] 108 ITR 345 (SC)
○ There is no scope for importing into the statute words which are not there.
○ The rule of literal construction is widely accepted rule for interpreting the taxing
statutes.
○ If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we have to accept the
plain meaning even if it leads to some harshness or injustice to the assessee.

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 ○ As long as there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, the rule of literal
interpretation has to be applied.
○ A dealer or assessee cannot be subjected to tax without clear and unambiguous
words for the purpose of levying the tax which is authorised by law, enacted by
the Parliament or by the State Legislature.
● Mathuram Agrawal v.State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2000 SC 109
○ In the taxing statute a person or a transaction cannot be subjected to tax on the
ground of spirit of the law or by inference or by analogy.
● CIT vs. Calcutta Knitwears (2014) 362 ITR 673 (SC)
○ A taxing statute should be strictly construed even if the literal interpretation
results in hardship or inconvenience, common sense approach equity, logic and
morality have no role to play.
● Vidarbha Irrigation Devs. Corpn. vs. ACIT [(2005) 278 ITR 521 (Bom)
○ While interpreting tax statute, the function of the court of law is not to give words
in the statute a strained and unnatural meaning to cover and extent its applicability
to the areas not intended to be covered under the said statute.
● CIT vs. Vadilal Lallubhai [(1972) 86 ITR 2 (SC)
○ It is not permissible to construe any provision of a statute, much less a taxing
provision, by reading into it more words than its contains

Strict Construction of Charging Sections

● Charging sections – strict construction
● Benevolent And Procedural Sections – liberal construction
○ Bajaj Tempo Ltd. 196 ITR 188 (SC)
■ A provision in a taxing statute granting incentives for promoting growth
and development should be construed liberally, and since as provision for
promoting economic growth has to be interpreted liberally, the restriction
on it too has to be construed so as to advance the objective of the
provision and not to frustrate it.
● The rule of construction of a charging section is that before taxing any person, it must be
shown that he falls within the ambit of the charging section by clear words used in the
section. No one can be taxed by implication.
○ Upheld in WT Commissioner, Ahmedabad v. Ellis Bridge Gymkhana. AIR 1998
● Practical rule of interpretation and generally resorted to while interpreting the sections
pertaining to incentives, exemptions and deductions etc. A provision for appeal should
also be liberally construed.
● Gursahai Saigal v. CIT 1963 AIR 1062.
○ Held: Those sections which impose the charge or levy should be strictly
construed; but those which deal merely with the machinery of assessment and
collection should be construed in a way that makes the machinery workable.

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 ● Commissioner Trade Tax vs. DSM Group of Industries
○ The object of provisions of taxing statute being to promote the setting of the new
units and to increase the production of goods such provision has to be interpreted
liberally so that the object can be achieved.
● Vodafone International Holdings V. UOI
○ Issue- taxability in India of offshore transfer of shares of a Cayman Islands
company by the Hutchison Group to the Vodafone Group.
○ Sec 9- charging section for capital gains
○ Direct and indirect transfer
○ Literal rule and purposive rule of construction

Beneficial Construction
● When construing a fiscal statue, courts must lean their interpretation toward, or in favour
of, the subject rather in favour of the state.
● Thus, where two interpretations are possible, the one which is beneficial to the assessee
would be preferred.
● IRC v. Duke of Wesminister (1936 AC 1)
○ Laid down above principle.
○ Held: An assessee may arrange his affairs within the bounds of the law so as to
minimize the incidence of tax.
○ In cases where there are two interpretations possible, the one which is
beneficial to the assessee would be preferred.
● A statute which is intended for the benefit of the tax-payer must be construed liberally in
favour of the tax-payer with a view to ensuring that benefit to him and not in a narrow
and pedantic manner with an eye to deprive him of the benefit.
○ There is thus no equitable construction permitted in a taxation statute, and the
benefit of the doubt in such statutes invariably goes to the subject.

Construction of Penal Provisions

● Strict interpretation
● Prospective in operation and not retrospective
○ Reliance Jute & Industries Ltd v. CIT, West Bengal,1980 AIR 251.
■ The cardinal principle of tax laws is that the law to be applied to the
assessee is the law in force in the assessment year unless otherwise
provided expressly or by necessary implication. No retrospective effect to
fiscal statute is possible unless the language of the statute is very clear and
plain and allows for the same.
● Presumption of mens rea

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 ○ Concealment of income may be presumed by the department (without mens rea)
and the onus of proof lies on the assessee to show that there is no concealment.

Meaning in Common Parlance

● Meaning in common usage, parlance special in commercial and trade circles must be
considered.
● Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, UP. 1981
○ Held: Taxing statutes should be construed in the way in which they are
understood in ordinary language in the area in which the law is in force.
● Dunlop India Pvt Ltd v. Union of India. 1977 AIR 597.
○ Supreme Court held “latex” to fall within the meaning of “rubber” for the purpose
of tax.

Fiscal Statute to be Read as a Whole

● The entire content of a fiscal or taxing statute has to be read as a whole, and not in
piecemeal, to find out the intent of the legislature.
● Grasian Industries Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh. 1964 AIR 1179.
○ Held: Any exemption notification in a fiscal statute must be read in its entirety
and not in parts, to find out the meaning

No Presumption as to Tax
● Presumption of tax does not exist with regard to imposition of taxes.
● Mohammed Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax
○ Held that no tax can be imposed by inference, analogy or probing into the
intention of the legislature.

Intention of the Legislature

● Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI [1998 (2) SCC 299
○ It has to be reiterated that the object of interpretation of a statute is to discover the
intention of Parliament as expressed in the Act.
● GEM Granites vs. CIT (2004) 271 ITR 322 (SC)
○ the Hon’ble court observed that what one may believe or think to be the intention
of Parliament cannot prevail if the language of the statute does not support that
view, thus object of the statute has to be gathered from language and not on what
one believes or thinks.

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Harmonious Interpretation
● Wherever it is possible to do so, the provision must be harmoniously constructed by
avoiding a conflict. A construction which reduces the statute to a futility has to be
avoided.
● CIT vs. R. M. Amin (1971) 82 ITR 194 (Guj)
○ Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and
other clauses of the statute so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent
enactment of the whole statute
● CIT vs. West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. – [(1993) 203 ITR 422,
430 (Cal)
○ Parliament is normally presumed to legislate in the knowledge of, and having
regard to, relevant judicial decisions.
○ If, therefore, Parliament has a subsequent opportunity to alter the effect of a
decision on the legal meaning of an enactment, but refrains from doing so, the
implication is that Parliament approves of that decision and adopts it.
○ That was amply demonstrated by the amendment of Sec. 36 (1) (viii) made in
1985.

Mischief Rule
● This rule is also one of the cardinal rules of interpretation when the words of a taxing
statute are ambiguous and incapable of a literal interpretation.
● CIT vs. Shahzada Nand & Sons. (1966 ) 60 ITR 392 (SC)

Purposive Interpretation (Golden Rule)

● However the application of this rule in the interpretation of taxing statutes is rather
limited since the literal rule is more often applicable and it is oft remarked that equity and
taxation are strangers
● Vikrant Tyres Ltd vs. ITO (2001) 247 ITR 821, 826 (SC)

EXTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION

Finance Minister’s speech

● There is no bar in resorting to or referring to speech of FM.
● Interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything
which is logically relevant should be admissible – Chunnilal Onkarmal (P.) Ltd. v. UOI
[1996] 221 ITR 459 (MP)

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 ● In Builders Association vs. Union of India (1994) 209 ITR 877 (SC) the court held that
the opinion of law minister and reply of minister in Parliament regarding a taxing
provision cannot be treated as binding on the Court.

Circulars and Interpretation by Tax Authorities

● Navnitlal Zaveri vs. K.K. Sen (1965) 56 ITR 198 (SC)
○ The circulars issued by the CBDT would be binding on officers and persons
employed in the execution of the Income-tax Act and the effect of the circular was
taken into account in deciding the constitutionality of a provision contained in the
Act.
● CIT vs. K. Srinivasan and K. Gopalan (1953) 23 ITR 87 (SC)
○ The interpretation placed by the department in the Income-tax Manual has been
held not to be a proper guide when the construction of a statute is involved.

Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant

● In the case of overlapping provisions- freedom of the assessee to chose the one imposing
a lighter burden
● CIT v. Shahzada Nand and Sons 60 ITR 392 (SC)
○ The Courts have held the expression to mean that when there is a conflict between
a general and special provision, the latter shall prevail.

EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION

● They have to be interpreted strictly and in its entirety and not in parts.
● CIT vs. Dungarmal Tainwala (1991) 191 ITR 445 (Patna)
○ An exemption clause in a taxing statute must be, as far as possible, liberally
construed and in favour of the assessee, provided no violence is done to the
language used.
● Where an exemption is conferred by a statute by an exemption clause, that clause has to
be interpreted liberally and in favour of the assessee but must always be without any
violence to the language used.
● The rule must be construed together with the exemption provision, which must be
regarded as paramount.
● If the tax-payer is within the plain terms of the exemption it cannot be denied its benefit
by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority.
● In Grasim Industries Limited v State of Madhya Pradesh,
○ the Supreme Court held that an exemption notification in connection with a fiscal
statute has to be read in its entirely and not in parts.
● In Tata Oil Mills Company Collector of Central Excise,

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 ○ there was a notification which exempted imposition of excise duty on ‘such soap
as is made from indigenous rice bran oil’. This oil can be used in making soap
only after it get converted into fatty acid.
○ The Supreme Court held that the exemption applied to both rice bran oil and rice
bran fatty acid.

DOCTRINE OF FAIRNESS
CIT v. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd. (2014)
The SC in this case dealt with the aspect of retrospective application of Tax
Amendments. The notable points are as under:
● The principle of “lex prospicit non respicit” which translates as “the law looks forwards
and not backwards” was duly considered and upheld by the Supreme Court.
● Any retrospective legislation would be contrary to the general principle of law and would
go against the principle under Art.20
● The court relied on the principle of fairness which stands against the surmise of
retrospective application of laws.
● Any law which modifies any accrued right or would impose disabilities should be treated
as prospective laws unless they were covering up for any previous omission.
● The doctrine of fairness is a relevant factor when construing a statute that confers a
benefit without the infliction of any corresponding or allied detriment, and then the it
could be given a retroactive effect.
● The Supreme Court stated that until there is evidence to the contrary, law is believed not
to be meant to have a retroactive effect. The Supreme Court has pointed out that
confidence in the essence of the rule is based on the bedrock that any human being is
entitled to organise his affairs in accordance with current law and should not be surprised
when his arrangements are disrupted retroactively
● In this case, the Court referred to the case of Govt. of India & others v. Indian tobacco
Association (2005) 7 SCC 396 wherein the Doctrine of fairness was held a relevant factor
to construe a statute conferring a benefit, in the context of it to be given a retrospective
operation.

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UNIT 8: INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES

INTRODUCTION
● Remedial Statute - if a Statute is of such a nature that it doesn't make the offender liable
to any penalty in favour of the State, then it is Remedial Statute. It is just implemented to
ensure that mischiefs are cured and then there is a type of social reform.
● Penal Statute - provides for penalties for disobedience of the law and are directed
against the offender in relation to the Statue by making him liable to imprisonment, fine,
forfeiture or any other penalty
● Remedial Statute is constructed and interpreted liberally and Penal Statute is to be
constructed and interpreted strictly
● A criminal statute may not be enlarged by implication or intent beyond the fair meaning
of the language used .
● In a penal law if there appears to be a reasonable dubiety or ambiguity, it shall be
decided in favour of the person who would be liable to the penalisation.
● If a penal provision fairly be so construed as to avoid the punishment, it must be so
interpreted. If there can be two reasonable interpretations of a penal provision, the more
lenient should be made applicable.
● An accused can be punished only if his act falls clearly into the four corners of the
law without resorting to any special meaning or interpretation of the law.
● If a penal provision is capable of two reasonably possible constructions, then the one
that exempts the accused from penalty must be used rather than the one that does not.
● If a penal provision allows accused to go scot-free because of ambiguity of the law, then
it is the duty of the legislature and not of the courts to fix the law.
● Unless the words of a statute clearly make an act criminal, it cannot be construed as
criminal.
● Penal liability will not be implied by the courts in the absence of clear and unambiguous
words.
● Maxwell identifies four aspects of the rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed:
○ the requirement of express language for the creation of an offence;
○ strict interpretation of the words setting out an offence;
○ fulfilment to the letter of statutory conditions precedent to the infliction of
punishment;
○ strict observance of technical provisions concerning criminal procedure and
jurisdiction.
● If two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the court
must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than
the one which proposes penalty.

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 ● The rule of construction stated by Maxwell is that if there are two reasonable
construction, the court must give the more lenient one which will avoid the penalty in any
particular case.
● According to Lord Esher, the settled rule of construction of penal section is that ‘if there
is reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case we must
adopt that construction.
● Rule of construction in penal statutes does not prevent the court from interpreting a
statute according to its current meaning and applying the language to cover developments
in science and technology not known at the time of passing the statute.
○ R v Ireland (1987), Psychiatric injury caused by silent telephone calls was held to
amount to assault and bodily harm under the Person Act, 1861 in the light of the
current scientific appreciation of the link between the body and psychiatric injury.
● Penal provision cannot be extended by implication to a particular case or circumstances.

STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES

● If the scope of prohibitory words cover only some class of persons or some well defined
activity, their scope cannot be extended to cover more on consideration of policy or
object if the statute.
● Prohibitory words can be widely construed only if indicated in the statute. On the other
hand if after full consideration no indication is found the benefit of construction will be
given to the subject.
○ If the prohibitory words in their own signification bear wider meaning which also
fits in with the object or policy of the statute.
● When in a statue dealing with a criminal offence impinging upon the liberty of citizens, a
loophole is found, it is not for the Judges to cure it, for it is dangerous to derogate from
the principle that a citizen has a right to claim that howsoever mich his conduct may seem
to deserve punishment, he should not be convicted unless that conduct falls within the
definition of the crime of which he is charged.
● In M.V.Joshi v M.V Shimpi
○ it was held that “it is now well settled that in the absence of clear compelling
language, the provision should not be given a wider interpretation”.
● In R v Hunt 1987
○ it was held that A penal statute must be construed according to its plain, natural
and grammatical meaning.
● N.K. Jain v. C.K. Shah, 1991.
○ Unless the words of a statute clearly made an act criminal, it shall not be
construed as criminal. If there is any ambiguity in the words which set out the
elements of an act or omission declared to be an offence, so that it is doubtful
whether the act or omission falls within the statutory words, the ambiguity will be
resolved in favour of the person charged

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 ● Feroze N. Dotivalaz v. P.M Wadhwani and Co., (2003)
○ Generally, ordinary meaning is to be assigned to any word or phrase used or
defined in a statute.
○ Therefore, unless there is any vagueness or ambiguity, no occasion will arise to
interpret the term in a manner which may add something to the meaning of the
word which ordinarily does not so mean by the definition itself, more particularly,
where it is a restrictive definition.
○ Unless there are compelling reasons to do so, meaning of a restrictive and
exhaustive definition would not be expanded or made extensive to embrace things
which are strictly not within the meaning of the word as defined.
● Anup Bhushan Vohra v. Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at Calcutta on
(16 September, 2011
○ contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature, burden and standard of
proof is the same as required in criminal cases.
○ The charges have to be framed as per the statutory rules framed for the purpose
and proved beyond reasonable doubt keeping in mind that the alleged contemnor
is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
○ Law does not permit imposing any punishment in contempt proceedings on mere
probabilities; equally, the court cannot punish the alleged contemnor without any
foundation merely on conjectures and surmises.
○ As observed above, the contempt proceeding being quasi-criminal in nature
require strict adherence to the procedure prescribed under the rules applicable in
such proceedings.

PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION APPROACH

● It is not necessary that courts must always favour the interpretation which is favourable to
the accused and not the prosecution but it may also choose to go for the interpretation
which is consistent with the object provided in the law.
● In State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy. (1999) 7 SCC 685.
○ the expression ‘any property’ in section 102 of Cr.P.C. was interpreted to be
inclusive of a ‘bank account’ and hence a police officer who was investigating the
matter was justified in seizing the same
● It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when language of the statute is
plain and unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute
and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground
that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.
● In Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co. Ltd. 1955 (2) ALL ERa 345., Lord Reid pointed out
as to what is the meaning of ‘ambiguous’ and held that – “a provision is not ambiguous
merely because it contains a word which in different context is capable of different

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 meanings and it would be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length which does not
contain such a word.

SUPPRESSION OF THE MISCHIEF

● The language of the penal statute can also be interpreted in a manner which suppresses
the lacuna therein and to sabotage the mischief in consonance with the Heydon’s Case.
● Ganga Hire Purchase Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Punjab AIR 2000 SC 499,
○ while interpreting the section 60(3) of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985, the word ‘owner’ was given a wider meaning for the
purpose of confiscation of the vehicle used in furtherance of the offence
mentioned therein i.e. inclusive of the registered owner where the vehicle was
purchased under a hire purchase agreement when all the instalments were not paid
by him.

Retrospective Effect
● It is well established that Penal Statutes do not have Retrospective Effect. (Nag PO
Nature v/s Emperor, J.C.R. 7 Rangoon 355).
● In other words, it could be said, that an accused can neither be convicted nor be penalised
by applying any law retrospectively.
● State of Bombay v/s Vishnu Ramchandra, A.I.R. 1961 S.C 307).
○ But, Supreme Court did say in a case that if the retrospective effect of an act is in
favour of the accused, then it can be done so.
● Kedarnath v/s State of West Bengal (A.I.R. 1953 S C. 404)
○ included a similar question. In this case, the accused was charged with such an
offence for which he can be sentenced or penalised. Later, the amount of fine was
increased by an amendment, Supreme Court held that the amended amount of fine
can be applied with retrospective effect because it shall be violative of Article 20
(l) of the Constitution.

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 UNIT 9: MIMANSA AND MAXWELL RULES OF
INTERPRETATION

MIMANSA RULES
● The word Mimansa means enquiry or investigation.
● Mimansa - (from the Sanskrit word for `reflection' or `interpretation')
● An orthodox Hindu philosophy concerned with the interpretation of Vedic texts and
literature and comprising one part dealing with the earlier writings concerned with right
practice and another part dealing with the later writings concerned with right thought,
called Purva Mimamsa, Uttara Mimamsa.
● The Mimansa principles of interpretation were created for resolving the practical
difficulties in performing the yagyas.
● Although the Mimansa principles were created for religious purpose, they were so
rational and logical that they subsequently began to be used in law, grammar, logic,
philosophy, etc. i.e. they became of universal application.

Rules
● The first rule is about the 'preamble' and the 'epilogue' of the work.
○ Any work or article begins with a particular purpose, which is noted in the
'preamble' and ends in epilogue when that purpose is achieved.
○ Therefore, Mimansakars are of the view that while entering into the discussion of
interpretation one must see the preamble and the epilogue.
● other rule is of that of 'Abhyas'
○ that is the repetitive process, meaning thereby that what has been repeatedly said
for achieving the goal, it is because of the author's continuous effort to support
his aim by various reasoning.
○ Therefore Mimansakars say that novelty of the work and aim achieved at must
also be looked at while interpreting. The result arrived at also leads to a correct
interpretation
● Then the last rules spoken of by the Mimansakars are of going through the eulogy.
○ Almost in every work something is always said in praise of the aim and object.
○ They must be ignored while discussing the interpretation.
● The last but most important rule to be followed is to see how the author criticises the
hurdles in his way and supports his cause.

Vidhi
● The main obligatory rule is called a Vidhi (or a Nishedha, if it is in negative form).

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 ● Four types
○ UtpattiVidhi, or a substantive injunction
○ ViniyogaVidhi, or applicatory rules
○ PrayogVidhi, or rules of procedure
○ AdhikaraVidhis or rules regarding rights and personal competence

RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT (INTERPRETATION TOOLS) UNDER

MIMANSA RULES (the axioms)

Primary Rules of Interpretation

● Sarthakya
○ It states that every word that is stated in the scriptures consists of meaning and
there is no world which is used there without meaning.
● Laghav
○ This rule indicates that in the case a single rule is generated from a particular text
or word, other interpretations giving different interpretations should not be
resolved.
● Arthekatwo
○ This rule signifies that the single word or the sentence used must be given a single
meaning and should not be given different meanings.
● Gunapradhan
○ It states that whenever a word denoting the secondary thought stands contrary to
the primary thought, the word should either be corrected as per the primary
thought or should be left.
● Samanjasya
○ It states that the possible coalition between the word and sentence of the particular
text should be used as per the spirit of the text itself. The opposite coalition of the
words and sentences should not be used.
● Vikalpa
○ It states that whenever controversy arises between two texts, any one text should
be adopted as an alternative.

Basic Principles of Interpretation

● Shruti - It refers that the words should be taken in their simplest meaning.

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 ● Wachan - Wachan indicates that if there arises any conflict regarding the resolving
meaning of the word in terms of tense, the interpretation should be made looking at the
tense used in remaining texts or words.
○ In this regard, Maxwell has also given similar kind of rule of interpretation that
the interpretation of particular text should be done in accordance to other texts as
well.
○ No interpretation of the tenses contrary to the Vedic Wachan is permitted under
Mimansa.
● Linga - This rule states that in the condition where a word cannot stand on its ordinary
meaning, then the technical meaning of that word should be resolved.
○ For example, the word denoting the masculine gender also refers to the feminine
gender.
● Wakya - This rule states that whenever a word or a sentence in the text does not give
clear meaning, then the composition of such sentence or word should be taken into
concern and the possible relevant meaning should be resolved.
● Prakaran - When the words or the sentence of text fails to give concrete meaning, the
meaning of those words of sentences should be resolved with the context of the text.

General Rules regarding the application of texts

● The principle of conceptualizing the texts of compulsive, quasi-compulsive and non-
compulsive nature.
● The following five groups are divided under this rule:
○ Kanoon/ Vidhi - It defines law as a command which is positive in nature,
possesses meaning and has meaningful objective.
○ Nisedh - It refers to such a law which is mandatory in nature. It consists such
provisions which denote “not to be done”. Thus all the texts of Smiritis which
signify the works which should not be done, falls under this category.
○ Arthavadh and Naamdhaya - They are not mandatory in nature. It is used only
in the course of helping the interpretation and clarification of law.
○ Mantra - Mantra is considered as the formula. It is sometimes mandatory in
nature and sometimes not-mandatory in depending upon the situation.
○ Adhikar Vidhi - Adhikar Vidhi states to whom the law applies to. It directs
towards the ownership of result of any action of someone.
○ Uha Bichar - The general meaning of Uha Bichar becomes ‘Arguments.’
○ Vadh - Vadh is such a principle of interpretation which talks about the exclusion
of some things which are contrary. This principle helps to coordinate conflict of
texts. It says that if two unusual procedures are such that one is former while the
other is latter, the latter would prevail.

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Principles having special relation with the interpretation of texts and customs
● According to this rule, Smirities are superior to Shrutis but the customs are superior to
Smirities.
● Such customs can also be denied under undesirable conditions. In the situation the two
customs contradict each other, the customs which is supported by the Sasthras are
followed.

CASES DECIDED BY JUSTICE KATJU

● Sardar Mohd. Ansar Khan v. State of U.P. 1995 Lab IC 1217
○ Markandey Katju J. used the “atidesh” principle of Mimansa and held that the
same principle which applies for teachers should also be applied to clerks and
hence the senior in age would be senior.
○ Atidesh means “going from the known to the unknown”
● Udai Shankar Singh v. Branch Manager, 1998(2) All CJ 1364
○ Markandey Katju J. allowed the petition holding that the literal rule has not to be
followed and instead the “linga or lakshana” principle has to be followed.
○ After all, paralysis of the hand was as bad as amputation of the hand, because
both lead to loss of use of the hand.
○ The word ‘amputation’ has hence to be regarded as only illustrative and not
exhaustive. The intention had to be seen and that was to pay compensation for
loss of use of hand.
○ The text “kaake bhayo dadhi rakshitam” follows.
● Tribhuwannath Misra v. D.I.O.S. Writ Petition no. 17554 of 1990
○ “Samanjasya” principle (principle of harmonious construction) was used.
○ Using the Samanjasya principle Katju .J. held that ordinarily the senior most
teacher can officiate, but in exceptional circumstances the next in seniority can
officiate, but in such cases reasons and opportunity of hearing should be given to
the senior most teacher.
● Mahabir Prasad Dwivedi v. State of U.P.
○ The “Anusangha” principle was used which states that an expression occurring in
one clause is often also meant for neighboring clause, and it is only for economy
that it is not mentioned in the latter
● B. Premanand & Others v Mohan Koikal & Others:
○ “It may be mentioned that it is not stated anywhere in the Constitution of India
that only Maxwell’s Principles of Interpretation can be utilised. We can utilise any
system of interpretation which can help to resolve a difficulty. Principles of
interpretation are not principles of law but are only a methodology for explaining
the meaning of words used in a text. There is no reason why we should not use
Mimansa Principles of Interpretation in appropriate occasions.”

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 ● Uttar Pradesh State Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd v Kisan Upbhokta Parishad and
Ors
○ The question before the Supreme Court in the present appeal – whether Animal
Driven Vehicles could be understood as “equipment” or “implement”?
○ Applying the Mimansa principles to the present case, it was held that tools or
equipment in the context in which it was used was considered to mean things used
by humans with their hands or legs – hence Animal Driven Vehicles or carts
would not come within the purview of the term.

MAXWELL AND MIMANSA RULES

● The Mimansa and Maxwell systems stressed that the spirit of a statute must be seen in
order to correctly interpret it; however, this does not mean that the Court must always
follow the literal rule of interpretation. It all depends on the situation, the subject, and the
goal.
● The required arrangements were made, and so on. The terms of a law, according to
Maxwell's scheme, should be interpreted in the way that best fits the subject of the
enactment and the goal that the Legislature is pursuing.
● A thing that is within the letter of a statute is not within the statute unless it is also within
the Legislature's real meaning, and the terms, if reasonably versatile, must be construed
in the sense that is more in line with that intention, even if it is less right grammatically.
● The literal rule of interpretation in the Mimansa system is known as the Shruti (or
Abhida) principle, and it is this principle that is usually applied when reading a text.
However, there are times when we must deviate from the literal law, and we must rely on
other values.

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