Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-024-00553-0

The opportunities and limits of Islamist ideological

developments on the rights of non‑Muslims and women

Joas Wagemakers1

Accepted: 20 January 2024 / Published online: 1 February 2024

© The Author(s) 2024

Abstract
Most academic scholars of the Muslim Brotherhood and like-minded Islamist organ-
isations seem to agree that these groups have come to accept the nation state and the
rules of the democratic game over the past few decades. At the same time, several
scholars have shown in their work that reforms and developments among Islamists
with regard to the state and democracy have not been accompanied by similar trends
on religious minority rights and especially women’s rights. The long-held Islamist
ideal of an Islamic state in which Islam provides the identity of the state remains dif-
ficult to square with full and equal citizenship for non-Muslims. Similarly, Islamists
have been willing to make concessions with regard to women’s rights by reinterpret-
ing Islamic tradition, but this has not moved as far as their revisionism with regard
to the state and democracy. What is holding them back? The objective of this special
issue is to begin to answer this question through various case studies, all of which
focus on gaining greater insight into (the development of) views on the rights of reli-
gious minorities and women among non-violent Islamists since the Islamic revival
in the Middle East and North Africa in the 1960s.

Keywords Islamism · Citizenship · Gender · Non-Muslim rights · Women’s rights

Introduction

Islamism remains a controversial topic. The term itself is sometimes abused by

supposedly secular dictators in the Middle East to consciously blur the differences
between democratically inclined Islamic activists — the subject matter of this spe-
cial issue — and violent and radical groups such as al-Qa‘ida and the Islamic State
(IS), in order to obtain support for their own anti-Islamist policies (Al-Azami, 2020).
This blurring goes beyond terminology, however, and is not limited to dictators.
Several analysts portray non-violent Islamist organisations across the Middle East

* Joas Wagemakers
[email protected]
1
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Utrecht University, Utrecht, the Netherlands

13
Vol.:(0123456789)
180 Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196

— and especially the Muslim Brotherhood — as merely pragmatic radicals willing

to bide their time (Rubin, 2010), terrorists (Farahat, 2017) or conspiratorial plotters
(Obaid, 2020).
Most academic scholars of the Muslim Brotherhood and like-minded Islamist
organisations, such as Ennahda in Tunisia and the Parti de la justice et du dével-
oppement (PJD) in Morocco, seem to agree, however, that these groups have come
to accept the nation state and the rules of the democratic game.1 With regard to the
former, it is clear that early Egyptian Islamist ideologues such as Hasan al-Banna
(1906–1949), the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder, ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Awda (1906–1954)
and Hasan al-Hudaybi (1891–1973) were still heavily influenced by ideas on the
caliphate, albeit in various ways (Wagemakers, 2020; Zollner, 2009). Yet later,
Islamist thinkers in the same organisations have become thoroughly “nationalised”
in the sense that they have accepted and acted upon the opportunities given to them
within the confines of their respective nation states. This is not just apparent from
their long-time involvement in national politics, despite the repression and author-
itarianism they have endured (Brown, 2012; Cavatorta & Merone, 2013; El-Gho-
bashy, 2005; Rosefsky Wickham, 2013; Wagemakers, 2020, 2022; Zeghal, 2005),
but also from their willingness to move beyond the caliphate and even the “Islamic
state” and accept a civil state (Harnisch & Mecham, 2009).
The same applies to democratisation. The aforementioned early Islamist ideo-
logues from Egypt certainly saw a role for the Muslim community in the affairs of
state, but they believed that this should be circumscribed by the sharia, dealt with
it through the prism of shura (consultation) rather than democracy and accorded a
rather dominant role to the ruler, particularly if he was a pious Muslim (Kutscher,
2011; Moussalli, 1994; Shavit, 2010; Wagemakers, 2020). Yet decades of oppor-
tunities in the form of electoral and parliamentary participation have not only ren-
dered the question of accepting democracy a theoretical issue at most, but various
Islamists have also made ideologically underpinned choices in favour of democ-
racy, sometimes boycotting elections merely out of political and pragmatic — not
ideological — considerations (Mishal & Sela, 2002; Schwedler, 2006; Tamimi,
2001; Wagemakers, 2022). Some Islamists have even taken their reformist views on
democracy and democratic participation so far that they are sometimes referred to as
“post-Islamist” (Abu Rumman, 2018; Bayat, 2013; Stacher, 2002).
The changes in Islamists’ views on the state and democracy and their use of the
opportunities provided to them in this regard have mostly taken place since the
1960s. Islamism has grown exponentially and has greatly gained in influence since
then because of the Arab military loss to Israel in the war of 1967 and the search
for a new, Islamic alternative to the dominant Arab nationalism of that era (Kepel,
2002). This greater influence often led to stronger Islamist social and political entan-
glements, forcing Islamists to apply their views, accept compromises, join coalitions
and make decisions accordingly; to take responsibility towards a societal or electoral

1
The literature on this subject is vast, and only a few examples will be referred to here. For a much more
extensive overview of publications showing Islamists’ political and ideological developments, see Wage-
makers, 2022, pp. 227-30.

13
Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196 181

base to which they are accountable; and to become involved in a closer relationship
with the state, on whose acceptance and tolerance they at least partly rely. While
these opportunities may well have contributed to a greater acceptance of the state
and democracy,2 they seem not to have equally done so with regard to the rights of
non-Muslims and women.
To be sure, the specific role of especially Christians in Islamist thought and
practice has received some attention (Al-Anani, 2018; El Fegiery, 2012; Ruther-
ford, 2006, 2008; Scott, 2010). This has particularly been the case in light of the
Arab uprisings that started in 2010 (the “Arab Spring”) (Abu-Munshar, 2012; Al-
Anani, 2018; Skovgaard-Petersen, 2017) and with regard to the role the pro-Muslim
Brotherhood scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926-2022) has played in this (Warren &
Gilmore, 2012, 2014). Much of this literature focusses on Christians’ role as citi-
zens equal to Muslims and how such equality can be achieved in a state that reflects
the Islamists’ ideals, which is part of a broader focus on citizenship in the fields of
Islamic and Middle East Studies (Butenschon et al., 2000; Butenschon & Meijer,
2018; March, 2009; Meijer & Butenschon, 2017).
The subject of women’s rights in the Middle East has also been dealt with in
light of the concept of citizenship (Joseph, 2000), but the topic has also received
attention in the context of Islamist thought and practice in various countries (Abu
Haniyya, 2008; Bydoon, 2011; Clark, 2006; Clark & Schwedler, 2003; El Fegiery,
2012; Maktabi, 2017; Taraki, 1995, 1996; Utvik, 2022). Some of this attention also
concentrates specifically on the ideas of prominent Islamist thinkers, such as the
aforementioned al-Qaradawi or the long-time leader of the Tunisian Islamist party
Ennahda, Rashid al-Ghannushi (b. 1941) (Mahmoud, 1996; Stowasser, 2009). Others
have focussed clearly on the new developments in Islamist experiences with regard
to women’s rights since the “Arab Spring” (Biagini, 2020, 2021; Škrabáková, 2017).
In a more general sense, several scholars have shown in their work that reforms
and developments among Islamists with regard to the state and democracy have
not been accompanied by similar trends on religious minority rights and especially
women’s rights (Hamid, 2014; Rosefsky Wickham, 2013; Skovgaard-Petersen, 2017;
Utvik, 2022; Wagemakers, 2020). Indeed, to quote Utvik about women’s rights: “In
the discourse of Islamists, there has long been an awkward coexistence between a
declared recognition of women as equal political actors and an explicit affirmation
of a traditional Muslim view of the man as the head of the family” (2022, 1).
To mention merely a few examples of this broader phenomenon: the long-held
Islamist ideal of an Islamic state in which Islam provides the identity of the state —
even in the revised version promoted by Islamists in the past few decades — remains
difficult to square with full and equal citizenship for non-Muslims. Similarly, Islam-
ists have been willing to make concessions with regard to women’s rights by rein-
terpreting Islamic tradition, but this has not moved as far as their revisionism with
regard to the state and democracy. What is holding them back? The objective of this

2
This is a point made by proponents of the “inclusion-moderation thesis”, which — in short — holds
that the political inclusion referred to above will lead actors to moderate their ideological or practical
behaviour.

13
182 Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196

special issue is to begin to answer this question through various case studies, all of
which focus on gaining greater insight into (the development of) views on the rights
of religious minorities and women among non-violent Islamists since the Islamic
revival in the Middle East and North Africa in the 1960s.
This introduction argues that there are at least two reasons3 that, broadly speak-
ing, account for Islamists’ reluctance to extend their ideological development on
the state and democratic participation to the topics of non-Muslims and women:
(1) unlike on the subjects of the state and political participation, there are numer-
ous and relatively clear religious texts about these topics (especially women) that
are taken seriously enough to limit ideological flexibility; and (2) the socio-polit-
ical context in which Islamists operate can sometimes facilitate opportunities, but
often also causes them to adopt certain restrictive positions or at least limits their
ability to be ideologically flexible. By dealing with a representative selection of
these limiting texts and contexts, this introduction provides a general framework
for the rest of the contributions to this special issue, gives an overview of aca-
demic scholars’ work on this topic and also provides a broad basis on which the
rest of the articles can build.

Limiting texts

It should be made clear from the outset that it is by no means the intention of this
editor — or any of the authors in this special issue — to suggest that “Islam” or
“Islamic texts” are preventing Muslims in general from reforming their ideas on reli-
gious minorities’ and women’s rights. Indeed, the sheer diversity of Islam is merely
one indication that Muslims have numerous ways of dealing with their sacred texts,
including in modern times (Taji-Farouki, 2006). Yet Islamists — although they, too,
are a very diverse group — not only take the texts of the Qur’an and the Sunna very
seriously, but also tend to read them in a rather definitive and legislative way, which
limits their own ability to view Qur’anic verses or traditions of the Prophet Muham-
mad as abrogated, irrelevant or best left untouched. Islamists’ own approach to the
texts, in other words, hampers their ideological flexibility.4

Religious minority rights

In the empires of Islam, ranging from the Umayyad Empire in the seventh century
to the Ottoman Empire that ended in the twentieth century, Muslim sacred texts
— together with contextual factors such as the interests of the rulers and political
considerations — resulted in a long — but mixed — tradition on dealing with non-
Muslims as second-class believers. The treatment of Jews and Christians — since

3
These are certainly not the only reasons, however. As Škrabáková has pointed out, issues such as Islamist
groups’ institutionalisation and centralisation can also be of great importance (see Škrabáková, 2017).
4
For more on how Islamists read the Qur’an, see Carré, 2004; Yavari, 2014; Wild, 2006.

13
Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196 183

those were the religious minorities mostly encountered by Muslims — varied from
outright discrimination to peaceful and respectful treatment. If discriminatory meas-
ures were taken, these ranged from concrete actions such as a poll tax for Jews and
Christians (the jizya) to more general policies of treating non-Muslims as the peo-
ple of protection (ahl al-dhimma) (Cohen, 2008; Courbage & Fargues, 1997; Fried-
mann, 2003; Levy-Rubin, 2011; Lewis, 2014; Stillman, 1979, 1991).
The Islamic textual tradition with regard to non-Muslims and their rights is far
more detailed, however, than the concepts mentioned above may suggest. Some
Qur’anic texts dealing with Jews and/or Christians are quite negative about them,
speaking about them as “apes” or “swine” (Q. 2: 65; 5: 60; 7: 166).5 While such
verses can easily be used for polemical purposes, of course, to refer to modern-day
Jews as “the descendants of apes” in the context of the hostile relations that emanate
from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Dankowitz, 2002), they actually play no sig-
nificant role in Islamist writings on Jewish-Muslim relations.6 This may be because
it is quite clear from these verses that they deal with a pre-Islamic episode in which
God supposedly punished some Jews and/or Christians for their sins by turning
them into apes (and swine), as opposed to a period from the Prophet Muhammad’s
life in which believers themselves are called upon to refer to non-Muslims as such.
Another reason these verses play no significant role in Islamist discourse on non-
Muslim minorities may be that the references to the sabbath that they contain sug-
gest that they mostly refer to Jews, while — given the lack of any sizeable Jewish
community in the Arab world today — Arab Islamists mostly focus on Christians in
their writings on this subject.
A very different verse that purportedly deals with relations between Muslims and
non-Muslims is Q. 2: 256: “No compulsion is there in religion […]”. It appears that
global Islamist scholars seem to take this verse and the broad sense of free expres-
sion of religion that it exudes as a general framework for religious minority rights.
The Egyptian Islamist Muhammad al-Ghazali (1917–1996), for example, confirms
that “Islam absolutely refuses (yarfudu l-Islam rafdan hasiman) to compel anyone
to convert to [Islam]” and emphasises that people can believe what they want (Al-
Ghazali, 1985, 59). Similarly, al-Ghannushi describes the early Islamic “religious
tolerance” during the life of Muhammad as “the embodiment of a great principle
of Islam in deciding freedom of conviction and religion, the basis of all freedoms”,
connecting this to Q. 2: 256 (Al-Ghannushi, n.d., 63).

5
These verses (in the translation of A.J. Arberry) read: (Q. 2: 65) “And well you know there were those
among you that transgressed the Sabbath, and We said to them, ‘Be you apes, miserably slinking!’”; (Q.
5: 60) “Say: ‘Shall I tell you of a recompense with God, worse than that? Whomsoever God has cursed,
and with whom He is wroth, and made some of them apes and swine, and worshippers of idols – they are
worse situated, and have gone further astray from the right way’”; (Q. 7: 166) “And when they turned in
disdain from that forbidding We said to them, ‘Be you apes, miserably slinking!’”
6
A seeming exception is the Jordanian Islamist Salah al-Khalidi, who paints a very negative portrait of
Jews. He does so, however, through the prism of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, not in an effort to write
about Muslim-Jewish relations in general. See Holtzman and Schlossberg (2008).

13
184 Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196

Within this broad framework of religious tolerance, however, a number of verses

exist that may qualify what this means in practice. One of these is Q. 9: 29,7 which
calls for fighting (specific) people from among “those who have been given the
Book” (i.e. Jews and Christians) and to continue this until, among other things,
they pay “the tribute” (i.e. the aforementioned jizya). The precise reason why Jews
and Christians should pay this tax is not always clear and it could be seen as a dis-
criminatory measure, but the jizya can also be interpreted as a tribute to the rulers
paid for protection (dhimma) (Cahen, 1991a, b). It is also as such that prominent
Islamist scholars with global influence, like al-Ghannushi and al-Qaradawi, interpret
the concept. As a result, they believe that levying the jizya becomes obsolete once
non-Muslims engage in the protection of a Muslim entity. While this may have been
uncommon during Muslim empires, when warfare was often equated with jihad (in
which non-Muslims were unlikely to participate), national military service in mod-
ern Muslim states has made such participation the general norm (al-Ghannushi,
1993, 99-102; Al-Qaradawi, 2005, 34-9; Al-Qaradawi, 2006, 205).
While the interpretation mentioned above removes the duty to fight non-Muslims
in general, the Qur’an still states that believers should not take Jews and Christians
(or non-Muslims in general) as friends in, for example, Q. 5: 51 and Q. 60: 1.8 Al-
Qaradawi, however, who has had an enormous influence on the Muslim Brother-
hood (Tammam, 2009), points out that these verses refer to specific unbelievers who
were actively hostile to Muslims, not to non-Muslims in general. This is confirmed
by other verses that explicitly allow cordial relations with friendly non-Muslims,
including Q. 60: 8-99 (Al-Qaradawi, 1999, 293-6; Al-Qaradawi, 2005, 6, 72-5). In
fact, al-Qaradawi even refers to these two verses as “a comprehensive constitution
(dusturan jami‘an) on this issue” (Al-Qaradawi, 1999, 290).
The above-mentioned verses thus seem to point to a general willingness to treat
non-hostile Jews and Christians in a peaceful and friendly way, at least in the inter-
pretation of Islamist scholars with a global influence. Indeed, major global Islam-
ist scholars like al-Ghannushi, al-Ghazali, al-Qaradawi and the prominent Sudanese
Islamist ideologue Hasan al-Turabi (1932–2016) all indicate that they support free-
dom of religion for non-Muslim minorities in an Islamic state in the sense that they
are free to express their religious rituals and preach their beliefs (Al-Ghannushi,

7
Q. 9: 29: “Fight against those who believe not in God and the Last Day and do not forbid what God
and His Messenger have forbidden – such men as practise not the religion of truth, being of those who
have been given the Book – until they pay the tribute out of hand and have been humbled”.
8
Q. 5: 51: “Oh believers, take not Jews and Christians as friends; they are friends of each other. Whoso
of you makes them his friends is one of them. God guides not the people of the evildoers”; Q. 60: 1: “O
believers, take not My enemy and your enemy for friends, offering them love, though they have disbe-
lieved in the truth that has come to you, expelling the Messenger and you because you believe in God
your Lord. […]”
9
Q. 60: 8–9: “[8] God forbids you not, as regards those who have not fought you in religion’s cause,
nor expelled you from your habitations, that you should be kindly to them, and act justly towards them;
surely God loves the just. [9] God only forbids you as to those who have fought you in religion’s cause,
and expelled you from your habitations, and have supported in your expulsion, that you should take them
for friends. And whosoever takes them for friends, those – they are the evildoers”.

13
Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196 185

2011, 48-9; Al-Ghazali, 1985, 59-62; Al-Qaradawi, 2005, 47-55; Al-Turabi, 2009,
220, 222).
Yet these same scholars qualify religious minority rights when it comes to poli-
tics. Al-Ghannushi, for example, uses Q. 5: 5910 to claim that members of parlia-
ment are not the ones meant by the words “those in authority among you (uli l-amr
minkum)”, who need to be obeyed. As such, he argues that non-Muslims should
be allowed to participate in parliaments of Islamic states, but simultaneously con-
tends that “the core legislation (al-tashri‘ al-asli)” remains the prerogative of God.
Moreover, he also suggests that “those in authority” (i.e. the rulers) should be Mus-
lims (Al-Ghannushi, 2011, 140-3, quotation on 143). More specifically, while al-
Ghannushi sees no objection to non-Muslims obtaining “all general positions (kull
al-waza’if al-‘amma) in the Islamic state”, he excludes them from the position of
overall leader (imam) and the leadership of the army because he sees these as posts
related to Islam (Al-Ghannushi, 1993, 79).
Al-Qaradawi concurs with this approach of giving non-Muslims their political
rights, but only within a framework ultimately controlled by Muslims. He sees no
objection to allowing non-Muslims to become members of parliament in an Islamic
state on the basis of aforementioned verses like Q. 60: 1, but only as long as the
overwhelming majority of deputies remains Muslim (Al-Qaradawi, 2001, 193-
5). Similarly (and like al-Ghannushi), he excludes non-Muslims from top political
positions because he considers them related to Islam (Al-Qaradawi, 2005, 23-4).
The implications of such Islamist views for non-Muslims’ status as full citizens
are addressed by Skovgaard-Petersen and Scott in this special issue. It has already
become clear, however, that there are obvious textual limits that Islamist scholars
such as those mentioned are not willing to go beyond.

Women’s rights

The Qur’an is probably more explicit about the equality of men and women than
it is about equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. Verses such as Q. 3: 195
and Q. 24: 30-3111 clearly suggest a parity between men and women by explicitly
stating “the one of you is as the other” or applying rules of chastity equally to men
and women, respectively. Yet as Tucker has noted, classical Muslim scholars have
often interpreted such rulings in a one-sided way, stressing or highlighting only the
responsibilities of women (Tucker, 2008, 53). Islamist scholars with a global influ-
ence, however, do not appear to have done so, but have presented verses like those
mentioned above as such (Al-Ghazali, 1985, 153-4; Al-Qaradawi, 1999, 138-9; Al-
Turabi, 2000, 16). In fact, with references to hadiths and to verses like those cited

10
Q. 4: 59: “O believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. […]”
11
Q. 3: 195: “And their Lord answers them: ‘I waste not the labour of any that labours among you, be
you male or female – the one of you is as the other[’]”; Q. 24: 30-31: “[30] Say to the believers, that they
cast down their eyes and guard their private parts; that is purer for them. God is aware of the things they
work. [31] And say to the believing women, that they cast down their eyes and guard their private parts
[…]”.

13
186 Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196

above, global Islamist scholars claim that women are equal in human dignity and
religiosity to men and refer to them as “sisters”, although they also make clear that
equality does not mean that men and women are the same (al-Ghannushi, n.d., 160;
al-Ghazali, 2003, 50; al-Qaradawi, 1996, 9-16; Qutb, 2002, 57; al-Turabi, 2000, 8).
Yet just like with regard to non-Muslim minorities, the Qur’an also offers texts
that are less easily explained as promoting equality between the sexes and that
global Islamist scholars have to deal with. Some texts about female dress and chas-
tity, such as Q. 24: 3112, are so detailed and generally formulated that a scholar like
al-Qaradawi does little else than to explain and clarify them (al-Qaradawi, 1999,
139-47). Other verses, such as those about unequal rights (Q. 2: 228)13, different
inheritance shares for men and women (Q. 4: 11, 176)14 or the unequal value of a
witness statement (Q. 2: 282)15, are nevertheless portrayed by global Islamist schol-
ars as signs of equality. They do so by pointing out that a woman’s smaller inherit-
ance is meant as compensation for a man having to pay the dower (mahr) at the
start of their marriage (al-Ghazali, 1985, 51-2; al-Qaradawi, 1996, 23-7). Similarly,
al-Qaradawi points out that women — in their capacity as mothers and wives who
often do not work outside the home and are therefore ignorant of some things — are
incapable of forming proper judgements about the subjects dealt with in many court
cases, thereby naturally rendering their witness statements less valuable than men’s
(al-Qaradawi, 1996, 17-23).
The latter problem could, of course, be solved by allowing women to work out-
side the home. This way, they could gain the experience needed to act as full wit-
nesses. Yet several texts related to this topic have the potential to limit Islamist
options in this respect, since they seem to compel women to remain separate from
men by staying at home (Q. 33: 33)16 or to set up a physical separation between men
and women (Q. 33: 53)17. Such texts may be related to a broader idea about women

12
Q. 24: 31: “[…] and reveal not their adornment save such as is outward; and let them cast their veils
over their bosoms, and not reveal their adornment save to their husbands, or their fathers, or their hus-
bands’ fathers, or their sons, or their husbands’ sons, or their brothers, or their brothers’ sons, or their sis-
ters’ sons, or their women, or what their right hands own, or such men as attend them, not having sexual
desire, or children who have not yet attained knowledge of women’s private parts; nor let them stamp
their feet, so that their hidden ornament may be known. And turn all together to God, O you believers;
haply so you will prosper”.
13
Q. 2: 228: “[…] Women have such honourable rights as obligations, but their men have a degree
above them; God is All-mighty, All-wise”.
14
Q. 4: 11: “God charges you, concerning your children: to the male the like of the portion of two
females […]”; Q. 4: 176: “They will ask thee for a pronouncement. Say: ‘God pronounces to you con-
cerning the indirect heirs. If a man perishes having no children, but he has a sister, she shall receive
half of what he leaves and he is her heir if she has no children. If there be two sisters, they shall receive
two-thirds of what he leaves; if there be brothers and sisters, the male shall receive the portion of two
females. God makes clear to you, lest you go astray; God has knowledge of everything”.
15
Q. 2: 282: “[…] And call in to witness two witnesses, men; or if the two be not men, then one man
and two women, such witnesses as you approve of, that if one of the two women errs the other will
remind her […].”
16
Q. 33: 33a: “Remain in your houses; and display not your finery, as did the pagans of old. […]”
17
Q. 33: 53b: “[…] And when you ask his [i.e., the Prophet’s] wives for any object, ask them from
behind a curtain; that is cleaner for your hearts and theirs. […]”

13
Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196 187

as a source of temptation for men, which means that gender-mixing (ikhtilat) could
lead to unwanted situations (sexual harassment, extra-marital sex, etcetera). A had-
ith ascribed to the Prophet stating “I have not left after me a temptation more harm-
ful to men (fitna adarra ‘ala l-rijal) than women”18 seems to underline this.
It is to avoid the very fitna mentioned in this hadith that Islamist scholars with
global influence argue in favour of limiting ikhtilat between men and women some-
what, for example in situations when it may easily lead to seclusion and intimacy
(al-Ghazali, 1985, 154-5; al-Ghannushi, 2000, 81-2; al-Qaradawi, 1996, 41-66).
Regarding the Qur’anic verses mentioned, however, several global Islamist scholars
state that these only applied to the Prophet’s wives, not to women in general, thereby
severely limiting their applicability today (Stowasser, 2009, 204; al-Turabi, 2000,
13-14). As a result, these scholars believe women should be allowed to work out-
side the home, but only under certain conditions of modesty and chastity and/or as
long as caring for their families comes first (al-Ghannushi, 2000, 74-7; al-Qaradawi,
1996, 159-64; al-Qaradawi, 2006, 175-6).
Similar arguments can be heard from Islamist scholars with a global influence
regarding women’s political participation, although their room to move is further
limited by other texts that specifically address the issue of ruling. These include Q.
4: 34, which states that “men are the managers of the affairs of women”.19 Despite
the political overtones this verse may have for some, several global Islamist scholars
limit its applicability to marriage, thereby depriving it of broader (political) implica-
tions (al-Ghannushi, 2000, 119; Stowasser, 2009, 203; see also al-Turabi, 2000, 11).
This is different, however, with a hadith that states that “a people ruled by a woman
will not be successful”.20 Both al-Ghannushi and al-Qaradawi claim that this means
that women cannot have overall leadership over a state. Moreover, while they do
believe women are allowed to work in politics and become members of parliament,
they should never occupy a majority of seats so as not to have them “rule” over men
(Al-Ghannushi, 2000, 119; al-Qaradawi, 2001, 165). Furthermore, any work that
women do in politics does not mean they can freely mingle with men or abandon
their tasks as mothers and wives (Al-Ghannushi, 2000, 120; al-Qaradawi, 1996, 31).
Similar conclusions are drawn by the writers dealt with in Santing’s contribution to
this special issue.

18
Sahih al-Bukhari, book 62 (“Kitab al-Nikah”), bab 18 (“Ma Ittaqa min Shu’m al-Mar’a wa-Qawl
Ta‘ala Inna min Azwajikum wa-Awladikum ‘Aduwwan Lakum”), no. 33.
19
Q. 4: 34: “Men are the managers of the affairs of women for that God has preferred in bounty one of
them over another, and for that they have expended of their property. Righteous women are therefore
obedient, guarding the secret for God’s guarding. And those you fear may be rebellious admonish; ban-
ish them to their couches, and beat them. If they then obey you, look not for any way against them; God
is All-high, All-great”. It goes without saying that the issue of beating women, as stated in this verse,
touches upon the question of physical abuse and is therefore an important issue in the context of women’s
rights. Because this is a private, family issue (rather than a public one, which is the focus of this article),
this will not be dealt with here.
20
Sahih al-Bukhari, book 59 (“Kitab al-Maghazi”), bab “Kitab al-Nabi Salla llah ‘alayhi wa-Sallam ila
Kisra wa-Qaysar”, no. 709.

13
188 Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196

Limiting contexts

So far, we have looked at how texts can act as limits to global Islamists’ willingness
or ability to reform beyond their own hermeneutical standards, but such interpreta-
tions obviously take place in various contexts. The latter also influence their views
and may limit their desire to reform their ideas, especially on the rights of religious
minorities and women. In this regard, we can distinguish the influence that broadly
held views in society may have on Islamists’ willingness to reform and the role that
the state plays in (not) forcing certain rules or views upon them.

Society

As mentioned above, the Arab world has gone through an Islamic revival since the
late 1960s, expressing itself in an increased role for public expressions of religion.
This has resulted in the building of more mosques, more overtly Islamic dress in the
streets, more influence of Islamist political actors, etcetera. This Islamic revival has
not just expressed itself in outward factors, however, but can also be discerned in
people’s views. According to extensive polling research conducted by Pew in 2013,
clear or even overwhelming majorities of Muslims in Tunisia (56%), Jordan (71%),
Egypt (74%) and Morocco (83%), among others, supported making the sharia the
law of the land. In the Middle East and North Africa as a whole, where support
for the sharia among Muslims was 74%, only a bare majority of 51% of Muslims
believed Islamic law should only be applied to Muslims, with sizeable minorities
(and, sometimes, clear majorities) in favour of applying it to non-Muslims, too
(Pew, 2013).
With regard to women’s rights, clear majorities of Muslims in the region wanted
religious judges to oversee family law (78%) and believed women should obey their
husbands (87%) in 2013. More specifically, a minority of 33% of Muslims in the
Middle East and North Africa believed women should have the right to divorce,
while only 25% believed sons and daughters should have equal inheritance rights.
These points of view are clearly part of a broader sense of social conservatism,
with overwhelming majorities of Muslims in the region disapproving of suppos-
edly immoral behaviour such as homosexuality (93%), extra-marital sex (94%) and
drinking alcohol (83%), while 56% of them favoured execution for people who leave
Islam (Pew, 2013).
Such polling results are not incidental. Other scholars have pointed to similar
results in opinion research (Hamid, 2014, 173), and the Arab Barometer has shown
equally conservative views regarding women’s rights in 2022 (Arab Barometer,
2023). Moreover, Islamist successes in the free elections that were held after the
“Arab Spring” may also support these findings. The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated
Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, for example, won 47.2% of the vote in the 2012
parliamentary elections and Salafi parties won almost a quarter of the seats in the
same elections. Together, this amounted to almost 70% of the total number of seats
(Pargeter, 2016, 39-40). Similarly — though less overwhelmingly — the Islamist
Ennahda in Tunisia won about 37% of the national vote in parliamentary elections in

13
Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196 189

2011. This seems like much less than in Egypt, but it received more than four times
as many votes as the party that came second, Al-Mu’tamar min Ajl al-Jumhuriyya
(Congrès pour la République (CPR)), which won 8.7% of the vote. Moreover, it
won in virtually every constituency (McCarthy, 2018, 136-7; Wolf, 2017, 133-4).
Although support for Islamist parties can have multiple reasons and does not neces-
sarily mean support for their socially conservative ideas, the large share of votes
Islamist parties received does indicate that their socially conservative agendas are
apparently not enough of an obstacle for people to refrain from voting for them.
Given this strong support for social conservatism among Muslims in Arab soci-
eties, socially progressive points of view, particularly with regard to women, are
unlikely to be very popular. This means that Islamist proposals of a more socially
progressive nature (such as more female candidates) are bound to meet with soci-
etal resistance, which acts as a limiting context, making them less attractive from
an electoral point of view (Škrabáková, 2017, 334, 344). In fact, as several schol-
ars have shown, Islamists have argued in favour of their own (socially conservative)
views partly because they accurately reflect the people’s will, thereby underlining
Islamists’ democratic credentials, but undermining their liberal ones. Moreover,
Islamists are often in competition with one another, leading to their outbidding of
each other based on their Islamic credentials. Such a climate is unlikely to lead to
more support for socially progressive ideas (Al-Anani, 2018, 38, 39-40; Hamid,
2014, 80, 171-89; Rosefsky Wickham, 2013, 214-18, 225-6; Wagemakers, 2020,
218, 227, 230), as Santing and Scott also show in their contributions.

The state

A second factor that may act as a limiting (or, conversely, as a facilitating) context
is the state. While society may merely keep Islamist groups from taking electorally
risky positions, the state can actually impose its views, forcing Islamists to adjust to
a certain situation. Such state pressure may sometimes be against Islamists’ wishes,
but it can also facilitate and empower certain elements within Islamist organisations,
helping them to gain the upper hand in internal conflicts. Yet states can also decide
not to act or not to exert pressure, thereby providing Islamists with more freedom to
decide on their own. While this may sound attractive to them, it can also implicitly
limit the options for more socially progressive Islamists to turn against a socially
conservative society.
Examples of the state not interfering in certain issues related to women’s rights
can be seen in Jordan and Morocco. In the former, elements of the state and human
rights activists have long spoken out against honour killings, in which adulter-
ous women are murdered to save their tribe’s honour, yet the state has never fully
imposed its will regarding this issue. Although the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated
Islamic Action Front (IAF) party rejects such honour killings, it also rejects the idea
of extra-marital affairs so strongly that it consistently voted against outlawing the
practice for fear of condoning adultery (Rosefsky Wickham, 2013, 211-12; Wage-
makers, 2020, 215-16). Similarly, in Morocco in 1999, King Muhammad VI wanted
to reform the country’s personal status law, which included an expansion to women’s

13
190 Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196

rights, such as the right to enter a marriage without permission from a guardian. The
Islamist PJD (together with others) opposed these reforms because it believed them
to be Western and secularist and the proposals were eventually dropped altogether
(Wegner, 2011, 87-8; Zeghal, 248-52). In both cases, the lack of state action on this
front allowed (or compelled) Islamist groups to conform to socially conservative
norms, as Santing’s contribution also shows.
On the other hand, states may also impose laws that force all political actors
— including Islamists — to abide by them. This sets new rules for Islamists with
which they have to deal. Again, this is especially clear regarding women’s rights. In
Morocco, the situation described above changed after the terrorist attacks in Casa-
blanca of 2003. Although the attacks had been committed by al-Qaida, Islamism as
a whole came under fire in this period. The regime, realising that Islamist opposition
was on the back foot, decided to introduce its personal status law reforms again. This
time, the anti-Islamist climate made the PJD feel it could not refuse the regime’s
proposed reforms, which entailed that they were adopted, forcing Islamists to deal
with them (Rosefsky Wickham, 2013, 234-6; Wegner, 2011, 83-9; Zeghal, 2005,
252-4).
An example from Kuwait is even more instructive. There, the Islamic Consti-
tutional Movement (Al-Haraka al-Dusturiyya al-Islamiyya; Hadas) had long been
divided on the issue of women’s rights, pitting socially conservative members
against more socially progressive ones. In this context, the regime decided — against
a parliamentary majority — to give women the right to participate politically. This
not only decided the internal Islamist debates on this issue in favour of the more
socially progressive position by imposing a decision on Hadas, but it also enabled
the organisation as a whole — freed from the possibility to be “out-Islamised” by
other Islamists on this issue — to actively work towards including women (Freer,
2018, 110; Lahoud-Tatar, 2011, 219; Rosefsky Wickham, 2013, 226-7). As such, the
state’s imposition of its views is not limited to pushing Islamists in a certain direc-
tion, but can also decide internal disputes about matters such as women’s rights.

Outline and main findings

The articles in this special issue are presented in two different ways: chronologi-
cally (from earliest (Skovgaard-Petersen) to latest (Scott) ideas and developments)
and from individual ideologues (Skovgaard-Petersen) and popular discourse (Sant-
ing) to actual practice (Scott). In his article “Islamists, Civil Rights and Civility:
The Contribution of the Brotherhood Siras”, Skovgaard-Petersen concentrates on
specific textual sources used by Muslim Brotherhood activists in their smallest
organisational cells (usar, sing. usra), namely the sira (biography) of the Prophet
Muhammad. More specifically, he focusses on the Brotherhood interpretations
of the Prophet’s biography by the first leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,
Mustafa al-Siba‘i (1915-1964), the aforementioned Egyptian pro-Brotherhood
scholar Muhammad al-Ghazali and the Libyan Islamist politician ‘Ali al-Sallabi (b.
1963), all of whom admonish the reader to learn practical lessons from the Prophet’s
life. This is particularly the case for the so-called Constitution of Medina, in which

13
Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196 191

Muhammad set down rules about relations between the Muslims and the Jews of
Medina. As Skovgaard-Petersen shows, the authors defend the Prophet’s expulsion
of the city’s Jews, treat the latter as untrustworthy or see them as citizens, but only
in a limited way, essentially meaning that all three Islamist authors see Jews (and
non-Muslims in general) through the prism of dhimma, rather than full equality.
Santing, in her article “The Muslim Brotherhood and Women’s Issues under
Sadat: Dogmas and Discussions”, deals with the question of why the Egyptian Mus-
lim Brotherhood, while clearly changing its views on politics and the use of vio-
lence during the presidency of Anwar al-Sadat (r. 1970–1981), was apprehensive
about developing its ideas on women in the same period. She shows that Egyptian
Islamists in this period successfully tried to steer legislation into a more sharia-
based direction, including with regard to women’s rights, despite — and contrary
to — the regime’s own efforts to promote gender equality. Making extensive use of
the Egyptian Brotherhood’s own periodicals, Santing makes clear that the organisa-
tion believes in, for example, a woman’s right to choose her own husband and that
it wants women to get an education. At the same time, however, the Brotherhood’s
publications maintain that female education must take place in accordance with the
sharia, that women’s employment should be limited and centred around their pri-
mary job — that of wife and mother — and that women should not give in to “West-
ern” or “colonial” ideas on gender, behaviour and clothing.
Finally, Scott, in her article “Points of Convergence: Islamist Conceptions of Citi-
zenship and the Struggle of Egyptian Christians for Rights as a Religious Group”,
focusses on Egyptian Islamist ideas on the concept of citizenship. She challenges
the view that there is a specific universal idea of citizenship and argues that there is
much variation in views on citizens’ rights, both in the West and the Middle East.
Concentrating on a communitarian approach to citizenship — as opposed to one
focussing on the rights of individuals — espoused by Egyptian wasati (centrist)
Islamists since the late 1980s, Scott finds that these intellectuals — unlike those
analysed in Skovgaard-Petersen’s contribution — have moved away from dhimma
as a lens through which to view non-Muslims. This has not yielded a form of citi-
zenship that concurs with liberal interpretations of the concept dominant in Europe
and the USA, but a communitarian type of citizenship that is not only espoused by
wasati Islamists, but is also shared by members of the Christian Coptic community
in Egypt.
The main findings of the articles of this special issue concur with but also build
on those set out in this introduction. Firstly, this pertains to the textual limits ana-
lysed above. As Skovgaard-Petersen shows, unlike those Muslims he refers to as
“revisionists”, who have used the Constitution of Medina as the religious basis of
the idea of full and equal citizenship (including in politics) for Muslims and non-
Muslims, the Brotherhood-affiliated scholars he deals with in his article have not
gone so far. While they clearly adopt some aspects of citizenship for Jews and Chris-
tians — for example the recognition that an Islamic state may very well include non-
Muslims, who also enjoy certain rights there — they are careful not to take this too
far. Instead, they are inclined towards more traditional readings of the life of the
Prophet as someone who provides Islam as a definitive system of laws, rather than
seeing Muhammad’s words and actions as representing a particular stage in Islam’s

13
192 Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196

development. As such, they are reluctant to incorporate certain elements of politi-

cal equality into their idea of citizenship. This, in turn, shows that their continuing
adherence to relatively clear texts seen through the prism of a clearly Islamist inter-
pretation is not just limited to the Qur’an and the Sunna, but also extends to the sira,
partly explaining their reluctance to change their ideas on non-Muslim rights.
Secondly, we find the same concurrence with the aforementioned factor of lim-
iting contexts. Santing’s findings show that under al-Sadat’s presidency, there was
a clear effort by the president’s wife, Jihan, to lead a state-sponsored campaign in
favour of women’s rights. Given what we have seen above, this might suggest that
more socially progressive elements in the Brotherhood would seize their chance to
push their own views to the fore. This did not happen, however, because the state
never actually imposed its views on this topic, allowed its efforts to be offset by
the abovemention legislative developments that went in the opposite direction and
because Jihan al-Sadat’s efforts were partly meant to portray the presidential cou-
ple as Western, delegitimising them to much of Egyptian society. President al-Sadat
therefore had to resort to presidential decrees to push through socially progressive
reforms, rather than relying on a more socially conservative (yet more represent-
ative) parliament. The latter points to an important factor in this respect, namely
the socially conservative attitudes prevalent in Egyptian society since the start of
the Islamic revival after 1967. This was even more the case given that the Broth-
erhood’s Salafi competitors for societal influence and authority could challenge
and “out-Islamise” the organisation if it became more progressive on the issue of
women’s rights. Moreover, all of this took place in a broader “culture war” in which
the Brotherhood sought to keep and expand its role in shaping morality in Egyptian
society. As such, Santing’s contribution shows that even in the case of a state that
is actively involved in promoting women’s rights, pressure from various actors in
a socially conservative society may be more important to a democratically inclined
organisation like the Muslim Brotherhood.
The subject of Scott’s contribution is very different, but her main findings nev-
ertheless align with Santing’s. She shows that support for communitarian forms of
citizenship as espoused by wasatis are widely shared in Egyptian society, includ-
ing among Muslims beyond the Islamist movement. This shows that, again, Islam-
ists do not so much deviate from society in their views on citizenship and rights
for non-Muslims, but reflect it. Scott goes beyond this insight, however, by pointing
out that there is societal support for wasati Islamists’ views on the communitarian
form of citizenship even among non-Muslims — in this case, Christian Copts. The
“points of convergence” between the two communities, as she calls them, include
(1) a shared emphasis on opposition to a neutral state and, instead, favouring the
state as the promotor of the common good in the form of monotheism and Muslim-
Christian unity, an attitude that has also been enshrined in the constitution; (2) a
common desire for communal rights (rather than as individuals), which have also
been enshrined in the constitution; and (3) a shared belief that individual civil rights
and liberties strongly at odds with religious teachings — such as divorce, in the case
of Coptic Orthodox Christians — should not be granted to people.
All of this underlines that both texts (the Qur’an and the Sunna as well as the
sira) and contexts (the influence of both society and the state) can act as limiting

13
Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196 193

factors in reforming Islamists’ ideas on non-Muslim and women’s rights, particu-

larly when compared to the more far-reaching changes in their views on the state and
democracy. In fact, the contributions to this special issue show that these factors are
even more important than hitherto suspected. To be sure, Islamists are not trapped in
either their texts or their contexts, as the development of post-Islamism shows. Nor
should it be ignored that there is a strong focus on Egypt in this special issue and
that other contexts may yield different results. It is nevertheless clear that the limits
provided by both textual sources and contextual factors like the state’s specific poli-
cies and societal pressure help explain Islamists’ reluctance to reform their views on
non-Muslim and women’s rights.

Author contribution Not applicable.

Data availability All data used in this article are available in the public domain.

Declarations
Ethical approval Not applicable.

Competing interests The author is an Editorial Board member of the journal.

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permis-
sion directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.

References
Abu Haniyya, H. (2008). Al-Mar’a wa-l-Siyasa min Manzur al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi l-Urdunn.
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Abu Rumman, M. (Ed.). (2018). Post-Islamism: A New Phase or Ideological Delusions? Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung/Centre for Strategic Studies.
Abu-Munshar, M. Y. (2012). In the shadow of the ‘Arab Spring’: The fate of non-Muslims under Islamist
rule. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 23(4), 487–503.
Al-Anani, K. (2018). The Muslim Brotherhood’s conception of citizenship rights in Egypt. Contempo-
rary Arab Affairs, 11(3), 25–46.
Al-Azami, U. (2020). Why Words Matter: The Problem with the Term Islamist. Sadeq Institute Retrieved
October 4, 2022, from https://​www.​sadeq​insti​tute.​org/​short-​reads/​why-​words-​matter-​the-​probl​em-​
with-​the-​term-​islam​ist
al-Ghannushi, R. (1993 [1989]). Huquq al-Muwatana: Huquq Ghayr al-Muslim fi l-Mujtama‘ al-Islami.
Al-Ma‘had al-‘Alami li-l-Fikr al-Islami.
al-Ghannushi, R. (2000). Al-Mar’a bayna l-Qur’an wa-Waqi‘ al-Muslimin. Al-Markaz al-Magharibi li-l-
Buhuth wa-l-Tarjama.
al-Ghannushi, R. (2011). Al-Hurriyyat al-‘Amma fi l-Dawla al-Islamiyya. Dar al-Mujtahid li-l-Nashr
wa-l-Tawzi‘.

13
194 Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196

al-Ghannushi, R. (n.d.). Al-Dimuqratiyya wa-Huquq al-Insan fi l-Islam. Al-Dar al-‘Arabiyya li-l-‘Ulum

Nashirun/Markaz al-Jazira lil-l-Dirasat.
al-Ghazali, M. (1985). Hadha Dinuna. Dar al-Thaqafa.
al-Ghazali, M. (2003). Mushkilat fi Tariq al-Hayat al-Islami. Nahdat Misr li-l-Taba‘a wa-l-Nashr
wa-l-Tawzi‘.
al-Qaradawi, Y. (1996). Markaz al-Mar’a fi l-Hayat al-Islamiyya. Dar al-Furqan li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi.
al-Qaradawi, Y. (1999). Al-Halal wa-l-Haram fi l-Islam. Maktabat Wahba.
al-Qaradawi, Y. (2001 [1997]). Min Fiqh al-Dawla fi l-Islam: Makanatuha… Ma‘alimuha… Tabi‘atuha
Mawqifuha min al-Dimuqratiyya wa-l-Ta‘addudiyya wa-l-Mar’a wa-Ghayr al-Muslimin. Dar
al-Shuruq.
al-Qaradawi, Y. (2005). Ghayr al-Muslimin fi l-Mujtama‘ al-Islami. Maktabat Wahba.
al-Qaradawi, Y. (2006 [2000]). Ummatuna bayna l-Qarnayn. Dar al-Shuruq.
al-Turabi, H. (2000). Al-Mar’a bayna Usul wa-l-Taqalid. Markaz Dirasat al-Mar’a.
al-Turabi, H. (2009). The islamic state. In R. L. Euben & M. Q. Zaman (Eds.), Princeton Readings in
Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden (pp. 213–223). Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Arab Barometer. (2023). Gender Attitudes in MENA 2022. Retrieved December 21, 2023, from https://​
www.​arabb​arome​ter.​org/​2023/​02/​gender-​attit​udes-​in-​mena/.
Bayat, A. (Ed.). (2013). Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam. Oxford University Press.
Biagini, E. (2020). Islamist women’s feminist subjectivities in (r)evolution: The Egyptian Muslim Sis-
terhood in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 22(3),
382–402.
Biagini, E. (2021). Women and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood post-2013: Calls for gender reforms
and pluralism. Middle East Law and Governance, 13(2), 171–195.
Brown, N. J. (2012). When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics. Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
Butenschon, N. A., Davis, U., & Hassassian, M. (Eds.). (2000). Citizenship and the State in the Middle
East: Approaches and Applications. Syracuse University Press.
Butenschon, N. A., & Meijer, R. (Eds.). (2018). The Middle East in Transition: The Centrality of Citizen-
ship. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Bydoon, M. (2011). Reservations on the “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW)” based on Islam and its practical application in Jordan: Legal perspec-
tives. Arab Law Quarterly, 25, 51–69.
Cahen, C. (1991a). Dhimma. In B. Lewis, C. Pellat, & J. Schacht (Eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam – New
Edition, Vol. II (pp. 227–231). Brill.
Cahen, C. (1991b). Djizya. In B. Lewis, C. Pellat, & J. Schacht (Eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam – New
Edition, Vol. II (pp. 559–562) Brill.
Carré, O. (2004). Mystique et politique: Le Coran des islamistes – Lecture du Coran par Sayyid Qutb,
Frère musulman radical (1906-1966). Les Éditions du Cerf.
Cavatorta, F., & Merone, F. (2013). Moderation through exclusion? The journey of the Tunisian Ennahda
from fundamentalist to conservative party. Democratization, 20(5), 857–875.
Clark, J. A. (2006). The conditions of Islamist moderation: Unpacking cross-ideological cooperation in
Jordan. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 38(4), 539–560.
Clark, J. A., & Schwedler, J. (2003). Who opened the window? Women’s activism in Islamist parties.
Comparative Politics, 35(3), 293–312.
Cohen, M. R. (2008 [1994]). Under Crescent & Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages. Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Courbage, Y., & Fargues, F. (1997). Christians and Jews Under Islam: From the Arab Conquests to the
Lebanese Civil War (translation Judy Mabro). I.B. Tauris.
Dankowitz, A. (2002). Based on Koranic verses, interpretations, and traditions, Muslim clerics state: The
Jews are the descendants of apes, pigs, and other animals. MEMRI Special Report no. 11, https://​
www.​memri.​org/​repor ​ts/​based-​koran​ic-​verses-​inter ​preta​tions-​and-​tradi​tions-​muslim-​cleri​cs-​state-​
jews-​are, accessed 8 November 2022.
El Fegiery, M. (2012). A Tyranny of the Majority? Islamists’ Ambivalence About Human Rights. Fride.
El-Ghobashy, M. (2005). The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers. International Journal of
Middle East Studies, 37(3), 373–395.
Farahat, C. (2017). The Muslim Brotherhood, fountain of Islamist violence. Middle East Quarterly,
24(2), 1–10.

13
Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196 195

Freer, C. (2018). Rentier Islamism: The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gulf Monarchies. Oxford
University Press.
Friedmann, Y. (2003). Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition.
Cambridge University Press.
Hamid, S. (2014). Temptations of Power: Islamists & Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East. Oxford
University Press.
Harnisch, C., & Mecham, Q. (2009). Democratic ideology in Islamist opposition? The Muslim Brother-
hood’s “Civil State”. Middle Eastern Studies, 45(2), 189–205.
Holtzman, L., & Schlossberg, E. (2008). Fundamentals of the modern Muslim-Jewish polemic. In E.
Karsh & P. R. Kumaraswamy (Eds.), Islamic Attitudes to Israel (pp. 13–28). Routledge.
Joseph, S. (Ed.). (2000). Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East. Syracuse University Press.
Kepel, G. (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (translation Anthony F Roberts). Belknap/Harvard
University Press.
Kutscher, J. (2011). Islamic shura, democracy, and online fatwas. CyberOrient, 5(2).
Lahoud-Tatar, C. (2011). Islam et politique au Koweït. Presses Universitaires de France.
Levy-Rubin, M. (2011). Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Lewis, B. (2014 [1984]). . Princeton University Press.
Mahmoud, M. (1996). Women and Islamism: The case of Rashid al-Ghannushi of Tunisia. In A. S.
Sidahmed & A. Ehteshami (Eds.), Islamic fundamentalism (pp. 249–265). Westview Press.
Maktabi, R. (2017). Reluctant feminists? Islamist MPs and the representation of women in Kuwait after
2005. Die Welt des Islams, 57(3–4), 429–457.
March, A. F. (2009). Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus. Oxford
University Press.
McCarthy, R. (2018). Inside Tunisia’s Al-Nahda: Between Politics and Preaching. Cambridge University
Press.
Meijer, R., & Butenschon, N. A. (Eds.). (2017). The Crisis of Citizenship in the Arab World. Brill.
Mishal, S., & Sela, A. (2002). Participation without presence: Hamas, the Palestinian authority and the
politics of negotiated coexistence. Middle Eastern Studies, 38(3), 1–26.
Moussalli, A. S. (1994). Hasan al-Turabi’s Islamist discourse on democracy and shura. Middle Eastern
Studies, 30(1), 52–63.
Obaid, N. (2020). The Failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World. Praeger Security
International.
Pargeter, A. (2016). Return to the Shadows: The Muslim Brotherhood and An-Nahda since the Arab
Spring. Saqi Books.
Pew. (2013). The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. https://​www.​pewre​search.​org/​relig​ion/​
2013/​04/​30/​the-​worlds-​musli​ms-​relig​ion-​polit​ics-​socie​ty-​overv​iew/, accessed 15 November 2022.
Qutb, M. (2002 [1999]). Qadiyyat al-Tanwir fi l-‘Alam al-Islami. Dar al-Shuruq.
Rosefsky Wickham, C. (2013). The Muslim Brotherhood: The Evolution of an Islamist Movement. Prince-
ton University Press.
Rubin, B. (2010). Comparing three Muslim Brotherhoods. In B. Rubin (Ed.), The Muslim Brotherhood:
The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement (pp. 7–18). Palgrave MacMillan.
Rutherford, B. K. (2006). What do Egypt’s Islamists want? Moderate Islam and the rise of Islamic consti-
tutionalism. Middle East Journal, 60(4), 707–731.
Rutherford, B. K. (2008). Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World.
Princeton University Press.
Schwedler, J. (2006). Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge University Press.
Scott, R. M. (2010). The Challenge of Political Islam: Non-Muslims and the Egyptian State. Stanford
University Press.
Shavit, U. (2010). Is Shura a Muslim form of democracy? Roots and systemization of a polemic. Middle
Eastern Studies, 46(3), 349–373.
Skovgaard-Petersen, J. (2017). Brothers and citizens: The second wave of Islamic institutional thinking
and the concept of citizenship. In R. Meijer & N. Butenschon (Eds.), The Crisis of Citizenship in the
Arab World (pp. 320–337). Brill.
Škrabáková, K. (2017). Islamist women as candidates in elections: A comparison of the party of justice
and development in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Die Welt des Islams, 57(3-4),
329–359.

13
196 Contemporary Islam (2024) 18:179–196

Stacher, J. (2002). Post-Islamist rumblings in Egypt: The emergence of the Wasat party. Middle East
Journal, 56(3), 415–432.
Stillman, N. A. (1979). The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book. The Jewish Publication
Society of America.
Stillman, N. A. (1991). Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times. The Jewish Publication Society of America.
Stowasser, B. F. (2009). Yusuf al-Qardawi on women. In B. Gräf & J. Skovgaard-Petersen (Eds.), Global
mufti: The phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi (pp. 181–211). Columbia University Press.
Taji-Farouki, S. (Ed.). (2006). Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qur’an. Oxford University Press.
Tamimi, A. S. (2001). Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism. Oxford University Press.
Tammam, H. (2009). Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the Muslim Brothers: The nature of a special relationship.
In B. Gräf & J. Skovgaard-Petersen (Eds.), Global mufti: The phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi
(pp. 55–83). Columbia University Press.
Taraki, L. (1995). Islam is the solution: Jordanian Islamists and the dilemma of the ‘modern woman’.
British Journal of Sociology, 46(4), 643–661.
Taraki, L. (1996). Jordanian Islamists and the agenda for women: Between discourse and practice. Middle
Eastern Studies, 32(1), 140–158.
Tucker, J. E. (2008). Women, Family, and Gender in Islamic Law. Cambridge University Press.
Utvik, B. O. (2022). What role for the sisters? Islamist movements between authenticity and equality.
Religions, 13, 1–10.
Wagemakers, J. (2020). The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Cambridge University Press.
Wagemakers, J. (2022). The Muslim Brotherhood: Ideology, History, Descendants. Amsterdam Univer-
sity Press.
Warren, D. H., & Gilmore, C. (2012). Rethinking neo-Salafism through an emerging fiqh of citizenship:
The changing status of minorities in the discourse of Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the ‘School of the Mid-
dle Way’. New Middle Eastern Studies, 2, 1–7.
Warren, D. H., & Gilmore, C. (2014). One nation under God? Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s changing fiqh of citi-
zenship in the light of Islamic legal tradition. Contemporary Islam, 8, 217–237.
Wegner, E. (2011). Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes: The Party of Justice and Development
in Morocco. Syracuse University Press.
Wild, S. (2006). Political interpretations of the Qur’an. In J. Dammen McAuliffe (Ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to the Qur’an (pp. 273–289). Cambridge University Press.
Wolf, A. (2017). Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda. Hurst & Co..
Yavari, N. (2014). Tafsir and the mythology of Islamic fundamentalism. In A. Görke & J. Pink (Eds.),
Tafsir and Islamic intellectual history: Exploring the boundaries of a genre (pp. 289–319). Oxford
University Press.
Zeghal, M. (2005). Les islamistes marocains: Le défi à la monarchie. La Découverte.
Zollner, B. (2009). The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology. Routledge.

Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

13