TIME AND LOGIC:

ON THE CONTRADICTION OF TEMPORALITY AS A DIALETHEIC PHENOMENON

Isaac Michael Hicks

1009166322

MA in Philosophy

University of Toronto

Dr. Owen Ware

May 7, 2023
Introduction

Formal logic has advanced exponentially since the time of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand

Russel. While Classical Logic continues to be the standard system taught within the halls of

analytic Departments of Philosophy today, the developments occurring in Non-Classical Logic

cannot be ignored. Throughout the 20th century, Paraconsistent Logics - or logics which reject

the classical Principle of Explosion - have slowly gained popularity in their study and

development. A central figure in this development has been the logician Graham Priest. Priest

has played a central role in the advocacy of Non-Classical Logic, as well as in the development

of his own paraconsistent system known as the Logic of Paradox.

The possible applications for such systems are currently unknown. While some research

has been done on the integration of Paraconsistent Logic into the disciplines of philosophy,

mathematics, and science, their relevant uses - as well as the relevant systems of Paraconsistency

- remain as an exotic and often contentious area of study. Priest’s Logic of Paradoxes remains

especially contentious in its allowance for dialetheia, or true contradictions. Many Classical

Logicians who explicitly oppose such an idea claim that the allowance of true contradictions

trivializes logic and the negative consequences of adopting such a system outweighs any possible

benefits. However, in the history of philosophy, some fundamental phenomena - specifically time

- have been deemed as unreal precisely because they are contradictory. J. Ellis McTaggart

provides such a treatment of temporality within his essay “Unreality of Time”. If Classical Logic

forces us to abandon from our ontology such a foundational concept such as time due to an

inherent contradiction, given recent developments within Paraconsistency, this may be precisely

the area of application appropriate for a Dialetheic Logic. While Dialetheism has traditionally

1
been motivated by linguistic paradox, a more appropriate motivation might be an acceptance of

temporality’s inherent contradiction and thus its continued existence in our ontologies.

In this paper, I will attempt to construct a foundation for Dialetheic Logic through an

analysis of Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox and J. Ellis McTaggart’s contradiction of

temporality. Through this analysis, I hope to construct a positive argument against the Law of

Non-Contradiction using the contradiction inherent to McTaggart’s changing A-Series of Time.

In the construction of this foundation, my paper will be divided into three distinct sections: 1. A

technical summary of Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox - as well as Three-Valued Logic more

broadly - using Priest’s Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is, 2. A summary of J.

Ellis McTaggart’s argument for the contradictory nature of temporality using his essay

“Unreality of Time”, and 3. An argument for time as a dialetheic phenomenon using both Priest’s

Logic of Paradox and McTaggart’s contradiction of time. While Classical Logic has traditionally

been understood as a philosophical tool in the analysis of the truth of propositions and

arguments, I believe that the technologies of formal logic - specifically Paraconsistent Logic -

may be utilized in solving the paradoxes of observable phenomena. In its application to

phenomenological paradoxes - as opposed to merely linguistic ones - Paraconsistent Logic may

hopefully find a relevant application in the empirical sciences.

1. Priest on the Logic of Paradox

Within “Book IV” of his Metaphysics, Aristotle describes the two fundamental laws of

logic: the Law of Non-Contradiction - or LNC - and the Law of Excluded Middle - or LEM.

These laws represent the axiomatic foundation for all rational inquiry and their expressions in

symbolic logic are defined as logical truths - always true - as per Barker-Plummer’s Language,

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Proof and Logic.1 Aristotle defines the Law of Non-Contradiction as the principle by which “it is

impossible for anyone to take the same thing to be and not to be.”2 Aristotle designates this

principle as being the most stable and foundational starting point for all knowledge. Within

symbolic logic, LNC is translated as “~(A & ~A)”. Aristotle then defines the Law of Excluded

Middle as the principle by which “it is necessary either to affirm or to deny one thing.”3 Aristotle

designates this principle as providing the necessity of a truth-value: a proposition which is

not-true is false and a proposition which is not-false is true. Within symbolic logic, LEM is

translated as “A or ~A”. While both Aristotelian and Fregean logics treat LNC and LEM as

logical truths, the possible existence of truth-gaps and truth-gluts have provided Non-Classical

Logicians a motivation for the rejection of the universality of “~(A & ~A)” and “A or ~A”.

Graham Priest provides a description of truth-gaps and truth-gluts within his Introduction

to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is. According to Priest, a truth-gap is a proposition which

may be considered as neither true nor false. While his description of truth-gaps is found within

the chapter on “Many-Valued Logics”, the strongest example of a truth-gap is given within the

previous chapter on “Intuitionistic Logic”: the twin prime conjecture. Intuitionistic Logic - while

not Paraconsistent - treats the truth of a proposition as the possibility of the construction of its

proof. Because there exists no proof that there is an infinite number or pairs of primes which are

two apart - and there exists no proof that there is not - Intuitionistic Logic claims that within this

example, there exists no proof of “A or ~A”. Therefore, within Intuitionistic Logic, the Law of

Excluded Middle cannot be proven as a logical truth.4 When interpreted within a Three-Valued

Logic, the twin prime conjecture may be considered as a truth-gap: that which is neither true nor
1
Dave Barker-Plummer, Jon Brawise & John Etchmenedy, Language, Proof and Logic (Stanford: CSLI
Publications, 2011), 94.
2
Aristotle, Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2016), 53.
3
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 65.
4
Graham Priest, Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008), 104.

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false. Thus, the existence of truth-gaps is a denial of the truth of the Law of Excluded Middle or

a denial that it is always the case that “A or ~A” is true.

Priest likewise provides a description and motivation for the existence of a truth-glut, or a

proposition which may be considered as both true and false. The strongest examples of

truth-gluts given by Priest are the paradoxes of self-reference. There exists two famous

paradoxes of self-reference which might prove to be both true and false: the Liar’s Paradox -

“this sentence is false” - and Russell’s Paradox - “the set of all sets which are not members of

themselves”. When examining the Liar’s Paradox, if “this sentence is false” is true, then the

sentence must be false. But, if “this sentence is false” is false, then it must be true. In either case,

we derive the conclusion that “this sentence is false” is both true and false. The same logic may

be applied to Russell’s Paradox. According to Priest, both the Liar’s Paradox and Russell’s

Paradox are prima facie sound arguments and yet they derive the true conclusion of “A & ~A”.5

If there exists truth-gaps, contradiction cannot be considered as always false. Thus, the existence

of truth-gaps - or a proposition which is both true and false - is a denial of the necessary

falsehood of contradiction or a denial that it is always the case that “A & ~A” is false.

Three-Valued Logic accounts for truth-gaps and truth-gluts through the introduction of a

third truth-value. We will refer to this third truth-value as “U” for undetermined, alongside “T”

for true and “F” for false. As per Classical Logic, the negation of “T” is “F” - and the negation

of “F” is “T” - but, unlike Classical Logic, the negation of “U” is “U”. Thus, the truth-value

of undetermined acts as its own negation. The question that may be raised through the

introduction of a third truth-value is whether “U” is neither true nor false or both true and false.

Does this value refer to a truth-gap or a truth-glut? The consequence of either motivation is

found in the redefining of designated truth-values, or truth-values which are preserved in valid
5
Priest, Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, 129.

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inferences. Because Classical Logic is bivalent - it has only two truth-values - there exists only

one designated value - true - but from the introduction of a third truth-value, we must ask

whether “U” is preserved in valid inferences. In the Logics of Kleene and Lukasiewicz - or K3

and L3 - undetermined is treated as neither true nor false and thus non-designated, but in

Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox - or LP - undetermined is treated as both true and false and

thus designated.6

Between K3 and LP, there exists no substantial difference in the redefining of the logical

functions of conjunction, disjunction, and implication. These truth-tables will be given below:7

& T U F or T U F -> T U F

T T U F T T T T T T U F

U U U F U T U U U T U U

F F F F F T U F F T T T

In any case wherein the inputs of the function are traditional - “T” or “F” - the output of the

function is the same as in Classical Logic. However, in all cases wherein the input is two “U”

values - specifically within K3 and LP - the output is also a “U”. Therefore, within K3, there

does not exist any logical truths - including the Law of Identity or “A -> A” - as all propositions

may be assigned two “U” values and thus output the non-designated value of undetermined. The

Logic of Lukasiewicz - or L3 - fixes this problem through redefining the implication function

wherein the input of two “U” values produces the output of true. Thus, when “U” is neither

true nor false, only within L3 does even the Law of Identity - or LI - hold as a logical truth.8

From the truth-tables of conjunction, disjunction, and implication, we can see that the

Law of Identity - “A -> A” - Law of Non-Contradiction - “~(A & ~A)” - and Law of

6
Priest, Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, 124.
7
Priest, Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, 122.
8
Priest, Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, 124.

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Excluded Middle - “A or ~A” - are all made invalid in K3 as both “A” and “~A” can always

take the truth-value of “U”, thus resulting in the non-designated output of neither true nor false.

However, within LP, “U” is defined as both true and false and thus a designated value.

Therefore within the Logic of Paradox, LI, LNC, and LEM can all be proven valid as either “A”

is defined as true - and thus “~A” is defined as false - or “A” is defined as undetermined - and

thus “~A” is also defined as undetermined. In both circumstances, the output is a designated

value: either true or both true and false. The peculiarity which arises is in the negation of each

law. While K3 successfully invalidates the Law of Excluded Middle, its negation also becomes

invalid. “~(A or ~A)” can always take the value of neither true nor false from two “U”

values. Likewise, while LP successfully allows for meaningful contradictions - or sound

propositions taking the form of “A & ~A” - the Law of Non-Contradiction is still provable.

Only the universality of the law is questioned.

One motivation behind the acceptance or rejection of either system of Three-Valued

Logic is the existence of true contradictions. Because Intuitionistic Logic also allows for a

rejection of the Law of the Excluded Middle, it acts as an alternative to a three-valued system

when the motivation behind the adoption of a Non-Classical Logic is a denial of “A or ~A”.

Both Intuitionistic Logic and the Logics of Kleene and Lukasiewicz allow for a denial of the

Law of Excluded Middle as a logical truth. Only when we can meaningfully assert that either

“A” or “~A” is either true or false does the law hold. What is unique about Graham Priest’s

Logic of Paradox however is that it allows for true contradictions. While Kleene and

Lukasiewicz deny the logical truth of “~(A & ~A)”, they do not assert the truth of “A & ~A”.

LP allows for both non-contradiction and contradiction to be true. This unique function of the

Logic of Paradox makes it particularly well suited for the role that its name explicitly suggests:

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paradox. It is in the treatment of philosophical contradiction that Priest’s system is most

appropriate, and it is in J. Ellis McTaggart’s contradiction of temporality that we will employ it.

2. McTaggart on the Contradiction of Temporality

Time, according to J. Ellis McTaggart, necessitates change. Within his essay “Unreality

of Time”, McTaggart claims that “it would . . . be universally admitted that time involves

change” and “a universe in which nothing whatever changed . . . would be a timeless universe.”9

It is from this basic assumption that McTaggart attempts to demonstrate the contradiction

inherent to temporality. Time’s necessitation of change is not a new or novel position. The

foundations of this relationship were initially established within the philosophy of Aristotle. In

“Book IV” of his Physics, Aristotle claims that “ . . . but neither does time exist without change;

for when the state of our minds does not change at all . . . we do not think that time has

elapsed.”10 And while this assumption has been critiqued - most notably within the thought

experiment proposed by Sydney Shoemaker in his essay “Time Without Change” - the

contradiction which McTaggart will identify within temporality is dependent upon the granting

of this assumption. For the purposes of modeling McTaggart’s contradiction using Graham

Priest’s Logic of Paradox, it is necessary that we too grant McTaggart this assumption. The

essentiality of change to time - and the contradiction which ensues - is then a necessary

conclusion for Priest’s Logic to be applicable.

There are two primary forms of measurement by which we can make temporal

distinctions. Either an event can be past, present, or future; or an event can be before, with, or

after another event. It is from this distinction that McTaggart divides time into two distinct series:

the A-Series of Time - or the measurement of past, present, or future - and the B-Series of Time -

9
J. Ellis McTaggart, “Unreality of Time” Mind, New Series 17, no. 3 (1908): 459.
10
Aristotle, “Physics” Complete Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 69.

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or the measurement of before, with, or after. Take for example the event of the movement of a

clock. Understood through the distinctions of the A-Series of Time, when the clock reads

“12:00PM”, the event of the clock reading “11:00AM” is in the past and the event of the clock

reading “1:00PM” is in the future. However, when the clock reads “1:00PM”, the original event

of the clock reading “12:00PM” is now in the past. When we then understand the movements of

these events through the distinctions of the B-Series of Time, the reading of “11:00AM” is

always before the reading of “12:00PM”, just as the reading of “1:00PM” is always after both.

Thus, while the A-Series is constantly changing, the B-Series remains static.11

According to McTaggart, because a time series necessitates change in order to be truly

temporal, only the A-Series of Time can be considered as essential to temporality. The only

change found within a B-Series of Time is the changing measurement of past, present, and

future. The sequence of events - the before, with, or after which defines the B-Series - remains

fundamentally unchanging. While I can describe an event as either before, with, or after another

event, it is only insofar as the initial event was once present - but is no longer - from which I may

derive the distinctions found within the B-Series of Time. I cannot derive the measurements of

past, present, or future from the distinctions of before, with, or after, but I can derive the

distinctions of before, with, or after from the measurements of past, present, or future. That

which is future always lies ahead of that which is present, while that which is past always lies

behind both. However, if the time is “12:00PM”, while both “10:00AM” and “11:00AM” are

past - and both “1:00PM” and “2:00PM” are future - “10:00AM” is always before “11:00AM”

just as “2:00PM” is always after “1:00PM”. There exists no explicit present within a B-Series.12

11
McTaggart, “Unreality of Time,” 458.
12
McTaggart, “Unreality of Time,” 463.

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 Some have argued however - contrary to McTaggart’s claim - that the B-Series of Time

can constitute an essentially temporal sequence. Change can exist without the dynamic

measurements of past, present, and future contained within the A-Series of Time. They argue - as

expressed within McTaggart’s essay - that the change within a B-Series is the change from one

event to another. The event of “12:00PM” is after the event of “11:00AM” precisely because the

earlier event changed into the latter. However, McTaggart claims that this is impossible as no

event can ever cease-to-be an event. If one event is after another event, the original event does

not change into the next. When understood using the distinctions contained within the B-Series

of Time, “11:00AM” - the event prior to “12:00PM” - does not change into or become the event

of “12:00PM”. Rather, “11:00AM” and “12:00PM” are instead two different events, understood

through their unchanging order of before and after. As the relationships of before and after within

the B-Series are permanent, the events of “11:00AM” and “12:00PM” must have always had a

position within the B-Series and thus they cannot come-to-be and cease-to-be within it.13

Thus, only within the A-Series of Time can be ascribed genuine temporality as only

within this series can we find genuine change. An event changes from being future, to being

present, and finally to being past. Even within the states of past and future, there exists a

changing measurement. If the present time is “12:00PM”, the future time of “1:00PM” is closer

to the present than the future time of “2:00PM”. Likewise, the past time of “10:00AM” is farther

away from the present than the past time of “11:00AM”. Thus, even the past and future are

changing. However, McTaggart claims that the A-Series of Time contains a fundamental

contradiction. The distinctions of past, present, or future are mutually exclusive. To be present is

not to be past or future, just as to be past or future is not to be present. And yet, all events within

an A-Series exist simultaneously in all temporal states. At “12:00PM”, the time of “1:00PM” is
13
McTaggart, “Unreality of Time,” 459.

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future. At “1:00PM”, the time of “1:00PM” is present. And at “2:00PM”, the time of “1:00PM”

is past. Thus, at any moment, an event defined by an exclusive temporal state - past, present, or

future - exists simultaneously as present, present, and future.14

One might argue that this contradiction is merely a misunderstanding of language and

may be resolved through an analysis of verb tenses. It is not the case that a future event is, rather

a future event will be, just as a past event has been. An event is therefore not past, present, and

future, for only a present event is to be defined using the present tense of the verb “to be”.

However, McTaggart claims that this argument produces a vicious cycle as the assertion of an

ontological difference between “is”, “will be”, and “has been” requires the existence of

temporality to produce that difference. And as McTaggart has claimed to demonstrate, only the

changing A-Series of Time can be considered as essentially temporal. Thus, to assert an

ontological difference between the existence of the three temporal states of the A-Series requires

you to presuppose the A-Series to make this distinction. In all attempts to remove the

contradiction inherent to the A-Series itself, we must presuppose another A-Series to solve the

initial contradiction. But then the contradiction arises again, and thus another A-Series must be

produced to account for this contradiction ad infinitum.15 And so - McTaggart concludes - time is

essentially contradictory.

The conclusion that McTaggart derives from this contradiction is the unreality of time.

Because all time requires change, and all change requires an A-Series, and an A-Series is

fundamentally contradictory, therefore time itself must not be real. Instead, all temporal

categories are merely a type of mental state: memory or anticipation. The present is the act of

immediate perception, while the possible ontological categories which we refer to as past or

14
McTaggart, “Unreality of Time,” 468.
15
McTaggart, “Unreality of Time,” 469.

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future are merely the mental states of memory or anticipation. We remember a perception and we

anticipate another. However, there does not exist distinct temporal and ontological categories of

past, present, or future. Instead, only the present exists in the mental act of immediate perception.

The true distinction of temporality is then the present act of perception versus the present act of

memory or anticipation. It is from the qualitative difference between these mental phenomena

that we falsely derive the ontological distinctions of time. The unreality of time - the

impossibility of temporality as understood through the ontological distinctions of past, present,

or future - is not an intuitive view. Rather, it is quite opposed to our ordinary understanding.

Through Priest’s Logic of Paradox however, time may be both saved and modeled logically.

3. Time as a Phenomenon of Dialetheism

According to Graham Priest, “the formal logician is essentially an applied

mathematician” whose “job [it] [is] to construct mathematical systems which model . . . some

natural phenomenon.”16 It is the natural phenomenon of time that we will attempt to model using

Priest’s Logic of Paradox. Within his essay “Dialectic and Dialetheic”, Priest’s argument for

dialetheia rests upon examples given by Hegel and Marx.17 Given the contentious nature of

dialectical reasoning - dialectical in the properly Hegelian sense of the word - and of the

seemingly semantic nature of the Liar’s Paradox, I believe that a better foundation for

Dialetheism may be found in McTaggart’s contradiction of temporality. If McTaggart’s argument

for the inherently contradictory nature of time is accurate, within a system of Classical Logic, we

must deny the existence of temporality. However, through the advent of Paraconsistent Logics -

in particular Priest’s Logic of Paradox - we now have the capacity to derive the opposite

conclusion from McTaggart’s argument: the unreality of the Law of Non-Contradiction. If time is

16
Graham Priest, “Logic of Paradox,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 8, no. 1 (1979): 225.
17
Graham Priest, “Dialectic and Dialetheic,” Science & Society 53, no. 4 (1989/1990): 389.

11
inherently contradictory, why is it the phenomenon of temporality which must be denied? Might

it be the foundations of our logic which need to be reconsidered, rather than the existence of time

as an ontological phenomenon? Might time be dialetheic?

Priest defines a dialetheia as “a true contradiction, where ‘contradiction’ has its ordinary

logical sense” or “a true statement of the form ‘A & ~A’”.18 Thus, Dialetheism is a type of

philosophical logic which allows for true contradictions. Priest’s Logic of Paradox is the most

notable - and explicit - system of Dialetheic Logic. But what exactly is meant by a true

contradiction? Given the form of contradiction “A & ~A” and the possible truth-values which

either side of the antinomy may take - either “A” is true and “~A” is false or “A” is both true

and false and “~A” is also both true and false - the only two possible truth-values which a

contradiction may be assigned are false or both true and false. In neither case can a contradiction

ever be true in the sense of being assigned a “T” value. Priest’s solution to this is in his

redefining of “T” and “F” as true and only true and false and only false.19 Thus, the designated

value of “U” - or both true and false - is sufficient in the acceptance of true contradictions as

“U” is not false and only false, and thus may be preserved as true in valid inferences. “U” is

enough for a true contradiction.20

The value of Classical Logic in its treatment of contradiction is the logical falsehood of

“A & ~A”. Because all contradictions are defined as false, there exists no necessity in

determining which contradictions are to be considered false and only false and which are to be

considered both true and false. This is the task for the Dialetheic Logician. As the Logic of

Paradox does not treat all contradictions as being true - or all contradictions as being false - there

exists the need for a method of proof which allows us to determine whether a contradiction is - or

18
Priest, “Dialectic and Dialetheic,” 388.
19
Priest, “Logic of Paradox,” 226.
20
Priest, “Logic of Paradox,” 227.

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is not - a dialetheia. Logic traditionally models propositions; however, time is not traditionally

understood as being fundamentally a proposition. Rather, time is a phenomenon or a

metaphysical concept. Thus, in the construction of a proof that “A & ~A” is both true and false

when understood as referring to temporality, it is necessary to construct this proof through a

modeling of the phenomenon itself. Intuitionistic Logic denies the Law of Excluded Middle

through a demonstration that its proof as a logical truth cannot always be constructed. In the

demonstration that the Law of Non-Contradiction is not a logical falsehood, a similar proof must

be constructed.

The first question to ask in the construction of this proof is what exactly is the

relationship between time and change which McTaggart considers to be inherently necessary.

McTaggart is firm in his position that time cannot exist without change, but whether change can

exist without time is not a question which has been given sufficient inquiry. McTaggart - as well

as Aristotle - appear to be making the argument that time implies change. This relationship has

led - as McTaggart has attempted to demonstrate - to a contradiction within the A-Series of Time.

This contradiction we will accept as necessary in our proof of the dialetheia of temporality.

However, the question must also be asked as to whether change implies time. Can change exist

without temporality? Given McTaggart’s treatment of the B-Series as inherently non-temporal

precisely because it is unchanging, and it is unchanging precisely because it is non-temporal, it

seems that the relationship between change and time is better understood as a biconditional

relationship - or IFF - rather than simple material implication - or IF-THEN. How might a

change within an event exist without temporality? In the denial of time as a dialetheic

phenomenon, this must be the first question that is answered. I propose that their true

relationship is biconditional: change if-and-only-if time.

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 Some might consider this association to be begging the question. If what is under

investigation is the existence of time and we consider time to necessarily imply change, to claim

that change necessarily implies time appears to be arguing in a circle. However, without a

sufficient reason to accept the existence of change without the existence of time, this question is

fundamental in the recovery of the existence of temporality as a dialetheia. If we are to accept the

biconditional relationship between these two concepts, the next question is whether change is

observable. Within the present, do we properly observe change? When I watch the hands of a

clock move from “12:00PM” to “12:01PM”, have I in fact observed a change in event? The

present phenomenon - the position of the hands of the clock - appears to be different. While we

often think of events in the far future and the far past in terms of anticipation and memory, the

immediate changes we observe within the present itself are much better suited for an analysis of

the A-Series of Time. In our observation of present change, our mental state is not qualitatively

different from immediate perception. Rather, our mental state is immediate perception itself.

If time nor change can exist without the other, and we can immediately observe change

within the present itself, then what is the cause of this change without the existence of

temporality? Thus, from both the biconditionality of change and time, as well as the immediate

perceivability of change within the present, time as a phenomenon may be saved. None of this

proof however eliminates the contradiction within the A-Series itself. Therefore, we must engage

in the next step: the logical modeling of time as a contradictory - yet existent - phenomenon. In

its modeling, we must first examine the phenomenon of the present. What defines the present?

The present is the rate of change within an immediately perceived phenomenon. What we

experience within the present is an event moving from the future into the past. If we think of

time as the space between two points on a ruler or a number line, the present is both the space

14
itself as well as the subdivision between these two points. On either side of the subdivision lies a

new space, half of the original length. These two spaces are the future and the past. They do not

exist outside of the present, but are rather always contained within it.

Thus, the present is the movement through the future to the past. But within the present,

we are always simultaneously experiencing both. In our present experience of change, we

witness the becoming of the future into the becoming of the past. Thus, all three states are

experienced simultaneously. The present - our experience of change - may be understood through

the contradictory form of “A & ~A”, with “A” representing the category of the future and

“~A” representing the category of the past. From our present perspective of change, the future -

that which we are moving into - both exists and does not exist, as what which was once before us

is now behind us. And the past - that which we are moving away from - both does not exist and

exists, as in our present experience of change, only when an event has once been future can it

then become past. To truly be present, we need both. So too, temporality itself takes the form of

“A & ~A”. We are always present and not-present, as that which is currently present becomes

no longer present and which will be present becomes present itself. Thus, the present is both

future and past, and temporality itself is both present and not-present.

Conclusion

In our conception of time as a dialetheic phenomenon, the contradictory nature of

temporality identified by McTaggart may become a metaphysical foundation for the denial of the

Law of Non-Contradiction present within Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox. The present -

understood as the change from future to past - may be expressed as “A & ~A”. The future is

both existent and non-existent as it changes into the past within the present. The past is then both

non-existent and existent as it is changed into by the future. Temporality itself - the relationship

15
between the present and the not-present - may too be expressed as “A & ~A”. In our experience

of the present - of the change from future to past - the phenomenon of this present is also always

changing. What was once present becomes no longer present and what will be present becomes

present itself. Thus, temporality is both present and not-present. Both propositions then take the

truth-value of “U” - of both true and false - a value which is designated and thus preserved in

valid inferences. Both the present and time itself become dialetheia, or true contradictions. Given

the developments in Paraconsistent Logic, when we are confronted with contradictions -

specifically contradictions which are phenomenological and not merely linguistic - Priest’s Logic

of Paradox allows for us to hold onto the existence of these phenomena. While McTaggart

believes that he constructed a proof for the unreality of time, I believe that what McTaggart more

appropriately constructed is a proof for the unreality of the Law of Non-Contradiction and

therefore for the existence of true contradictions.

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 Bibliography

Aristotle. “Physics.” Complete Works. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

Aristotle. Metaphysics. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2016.

Barker-Plummer, Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy. Language, Proof and Logic. Stanford:

CSLI Publications, 2011.

McTaggart, J. Ellis. “Unreality of Time.” Mind, New Series 17, no. 63 (1908): 457 - 474.

Priest, Graham. “Dialectic and Dialetheic.” Science & Society 53, no. 4 (1989/1990): 388 - 415.

Priest, Graham. Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2008.

Priest, Graham. “Logic of Paradox.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 8, no. 1 (1979): 219 - 241.

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