1AC

1AC v1
 1AC – Homeland
Advantage 1: Homeland

Water resources serving domestic military installations and the Pentagon are
unprotected from cyber – disrupts mission-essential functions here and abroad
Stockton 21 [Dr. Paul Stockton was the Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs
from May 2009 until January 2013. In that position, he was responsible for Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection and led the creation of the
Department’s Mission Assurance Strategy. Prior to Dr. Stockton’s confirmation as Assistant Secretary, he served as a Senior Research Scholar at
Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and as Associate Provost of the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Paul
Stockton holds a PhD in Government from Harvard University. He currently chairs the Grid Resilience for National Security subcommittee of
DOE’s Electricity Advisory Committee and serves on the Strategic Advisory Council of the Idaho National Laboratory and as a Senior Fellow of
the Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory. “STRENGTHENING THE CYBERRESILIENCE OF AMERICA’S WATER SYSTEMS:
INDUSTRY-LED REGULATORY OPTIONS.” American Water Works Association. 8-27-21. DOA: 11-12-21.
https://www.awwa.org/Portals/0/AWWA/Government/STRENGTHENINGTHECYBERRESILIENCEOFAMERICASWATERSYSTEMS-INDUSTRY-
LEDREGULATORYOPTIONS.pdf //shree]

Water sector utilities also face threats from hackers who do not hold their systems up for ransom but
nevertheless use cyber means to disrupt system operations. The February 2021 hack of the water
treatment facility in Oldsmar, FL, exemplifies this threat. DHS found that unidentified cyber actors
exploited unsecured remote access software to gain unauthorized access to the industrial control
system (ICS) at a US drinking water treatment plant in Oldsmar, Florida. Once on the network, the unidentified cyber
actors had full access to the plant’s virtual human machine interface (HMI) and used that access to increase the amount of
sodium hydroxide—also known as lye, a caustic chemical—in the water treatment process. 8 The hacker
sought to raise the levels of sodium hydroxide being used to treat water by more than 100 times -- a
hazardous level that could sicken customers and require the costly replacement of corroded pipes. An on-
site human operator quickly restored the plant to the proper levels. 9 However, the risk of more sophisticated and successful
hacks will continue to grow as new, low-cost malware becomes widely available on the darknet. 10

Insider threats pose a further cybersecurity challenge. According to a recently unsealed Federal indictment, on March 27, 2019, a
former employee of the Post Rock Rural Water District in Kansas “recklessly caused damage” to the system. In particular, he manipulated the
system’s controls that shut down the processes which affect the facility’s cleaning and disinfecting procedures with intention to harm.11
Guidance’s from the water sector recommends voluntary measures to deal with potential insider threats. In the WaterISAC’ s 15
Cybersecurity Fundamentals for Water and Wastewater Utilities, recommendation #4 (“Enforce User Access
Controls”) discusses the importance of properly disabling credentials for separated employees to minimize
damage that that they could cause through unauthorized access – physical or computer.” 12 Such initiatives are
essential. Going forward, however, personnel security initiatives will need to encompass more severe threats than
disgruntled employees – including the risk that China or other nation state adversaries will recruit utility insiders to assist cyberattack
planning and execution.

B. WATER SYSTEM CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL DEFENSE AND US SECURITY

The drinking water and wastewater systems contribute to the defense of the United States in ways that
are underappreciated and, in some cases, poorly understood. The most immediate contribution is that of enabling
US Department of Defense installations to carry out their critical missions at home and abroad . Those
bases are utterly dependent on the availability of drinking water. Defense installations also depend on
drinking water service to public safety functions for fire suppression and support operational need associated with
HVAC operations for computer centers, and other crucial functions. Wastewater service is just as essential for public
health and safety of base operations. Indeed, absent
sewerage, major defense office buildings and other national
security facilities would quickly become unusable.
Adversaries are aware of these dependencies even if many Americans are not. The Department of Defense (DOD) Mission Assurance Strategy
emphasizes the growing risk that adversaries may seek
to disrupt U.S. defense capabilities indirectly, by attacking
the critical infrastructure systems on which military bases depend. The Strategy warns that “The Department of
Defense’s ability to ensure the performance of its Mission-Essential Functions (MEFs) is at growing risk.
Potential adversaries are seeking asymmetric means to cripple our force projection, warfighting, and sustainment capabilities by targeting
critical Defense and supporting civilian capabilities and assets -- within the United States and abroad -- on which our forces depend. 13

Many current DOD initiatives to strengthen mission assurance are focused on ensuring the availability of resilient power.
Those efforts are vital and should continue. However, military bases depend on drinking water and
wastewater services as well. Some Defense installations have their own wells and other on-base sources of water.
Many others, including the Pentagon itself, rely on a community drinking water and wastewater utility to meet
their critical needs. And even if military bases have their own water sources and treatment facilities, most employees of large
installations live in surrounding communities. If cyberattacks disrupt the water utility serving those employees and
their families, the Defense workforces on which national security depends will be at increasing risk.

Adversaries can also jeopardize military operations by attacking the water systems that serve a broader
array of defense-related assets. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America notes
that under DOD’s Global Operating Model, the Department needs the ability to “ surge” war-winning
forces from their bases on US territory to conflict zones abroad . 14 Civilian operated ports and supporting
transportation systems will be essential for such surge operations.

That infrastructure and the workers who operate those assets need water service – again, almost always provided by the local water system.
Adversaries may target water systems accordingly. The National Defense Strategy emphasizes that “ the homeland is no longer a
sanctuary. America is a target,” including for cyberattacks against private and public sector infrastructure.15

The importance of water sector services to national defense has significant implications for options to
develop mandatory cybersecurity standards. One implication is that standards should be scaled to deal with
threats from high-capability nation states. Ransomware attacks or other criminal activities will probably continue to be the most
frequent type of cyber incidents that water systems face. Those attacks will also use malware that is vastly more primitive than possessed by
China, Russia, and other potential adversaries. The
same is true of efforts by terrorist hackers or disgruntled
employees to disrupt industrial control systems in the water sector. Standards that help strengthen
water sector resilience against such common (and increasingly frequent) incidents offer a prime opportunity for
progress.

Adversaries have motive and capacity to hack military water CI (critical infrastructure)
Clark et al 18 [Robert; PhD in Environmental Engineering, Former Environmental Engineer @ US Public Health Service and EPA; Simon
Hakim; Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Competitive Government @ Temple University; Srinivas Panguluri; Senior Project
Engineer @ CB&I Federal Services LLC; “Protecting water and wastewater utilities from cyber-physical threats,” Water and Environment Journal
32, p. 384-391; AS]

From a public health and an economic perspective, public

water supply (PWS) and wastewater systems represent a CI
that needs protection. After September 11, 2001, the federal government directed efforts to secure the nation’s CI and initiated
programs such as the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Bush 2003). This program addresses the vulnerabilities of Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Information Control Systems (ICSs) and calls for the public and private sectors to work together to
foster trusted control systems (Dakin et al. 2009; Edwards 2010). This paper discusses the vulnerability of water supply and wastewater to
cyber-threats and suggests actions for dealing with these threats.

Cyber-security challenges in the United States

The US GAO has conducted a number of comprehensive studies on the vulnerability of US governmental and societal functions to cyber-threats.
According to these studies advanced persistent threats (APTs) pose increasing risks in the United States and
throughout the world (US GAO 2011). APTs occur where adversaries possess sophisticated levels of expertise and
significant resources to pursue their objectives repeatedly over an extended period of time. Some of these adversaries
may be foreign militaries or organized international crime. Growing and evolving threats can potentially affect
all segments of society, including individuals, private businesses, government agencies and other entities.

National threats to security include those aimed against governmental systems and networks including
military systems, as well as against private companies that support government activities or control CI (US GAO 2011). Cyberthreats
may target commerce and intellectual property. These threats may include obtaining confidential intellectual property of private
companies and governments, or individuals with the objective of using that intellectual property for economic gain. Threats to individuals could
lead to the unauthorised disclosure of personally identifiable information, such as taxpayer data, Social Security numbers, credit and debit card
information or medical records. The disclosure of such information could cause harm to individuals, including identity theft, financial loss and
embarrassment.

Cyber-attacks can result in the loss of sensitive information and damage to economic and national security,
the loss of privacy, identity theft or the compromise of proprietary information or intellectual property. According to the US Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), between 2006 and 2012, the incidents have increased from 5 503 to 48 562; an increase of
782% (US GAO 2013).

The following examples illustrate the potential for attacking CI in the United States:

• In Eastern Ukraine in late December, 2015 power was cut to more than 600 000 homes and Russia was identified as the
likely source of the attack. Ukraine’s security service and the Ukraine government blamed Russia for the attack. The US including experts
at the CIA, National Security Agency and the DHS are investigating whether samples of malware recovered from the company’s network
indicate that the blackout was caused by hacking and whether it can be traced back to Russia. Researchers from a private global security
company claimed they had samples of the malicious code that affected three of the region’s power companies, causing ‘destructive events’.
The group behind the attack has been identified as the ‘the Sandworm gang’, which is believed to have targeted NATO, Ukraine, Poland and
European industries in 2014 (Russian Hackers 2016).

• A city within the Australian state of Queensland found that a computer technician rejected for a job with local government
decided to seek revenge by hacking into the city’s wastewater management system. During a 2-month period, he directed
computers to spill hundreds of thousands of gallons of raw sewage into local rivers, parks, and public areas before authorities were able to
identify him as the perpetrator (Janke et al. 2014).

• A major
cyber-security problem occurred in the City of Boca Raton, Florida, a medium sized water and
wastewater facility. The utility experienced a series of cyber-security incidents resulting in plant shutdowns.
Eventually the SCADA system locked-up and caused the water plant to shut down and it took 8 h to re-establish control of the system. There
was no monitoring system for the network traffic so it was difficult to diagnose the source of the problem. Ultimately it was concluded that the
network had experienced a data storm. Eventually the utility was able to update the SCADA system without losing any of the systems
functionality (Horta 2007).

Protecting water and wastewater systems in the United States

SCADA/ICS systems are an essential component for the effective operation of most water and wastewater
utilities in the US. In the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD–7 2002) and its successor, the Presidential Policy Directive
issued in 2013 (PPD-21 2013), the Water Sector has been identified as one of the 16 CI sectors that must be protected.

Figure 1 shows that, in 2015, the DHS responded to 245 incidents. The Water sector reported the fourth largest number of incidents
resulting in DHS incident response support (DHS 2016). The Energy sector reported the second largest number of reported incidents.
Clearly these incidents could have a direct impact on water supply systems.
Water lags behind other CI – increased protections key.
Clark et al 18 [Robert; PhD in Environmental Engineering, Former Environmental Engineer @ US Public Health Service and EPA; Simon
Hakim; Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Competitive Government @ Temple University; Srinivas Panguluri; Senior Project
Engineer @ CB&I Federal Services LLC; “Protecting water and wastewater utilities from cyber-physical threats,” Water and Environment Journal
32, p. 384-391; AS]

Common vulnerabilities in the water supply industry

Historically, business and SCADA networks were separate. Even if a utility owner recognised the value of integrating SCADA data into their
strategic decision-making support systems, limitations in network topologies made integration difficult. Older SCADA systems relied heavily on
serial connectivity and very low frequency radio communications that could provide enhanced range and partial line-of-sight connectivity, none
of which supported standard internet protocol (IP) connectivity desired by business networks (Panguluri et al. 2011). This virtual isolation has
led to a false sense of security by many SCADA system administrators. Increasingly, however, SCADA and
business networks of most
medium-to large-scale PWSs areinter-connected to provide integrated operation. If such integration is not
secured, it will generally lead to greater vulnerability; this is very important to the water sector because it is
thought to lag behind most other CIs in securing its control systems (Baker et al. 2010; Weiss 2014). The top five
areas of common security gaps in water supply are: (1) network configurations, (2) media protection, (3) remote
access, (4) documented policies and procedures, and (5) trained staff.

A hacker, depending on motive and objectives, may try to extract information (data) to further develop attacks or sell the
information for gain. In terms of water systems, an objective may be to cause public distrust or fear, the hacker may
attempt to deny access to the system and/or destroy equipment. Hackers will often change files to cover their tracks to be
undetectable. Cyber-impacts may also have process impacts depending on the process and system design. For instance, if
attackers change database parameters in the real-time database (impacts system integrity), they could turn on pumps potentially
causing a tank to overflow as illustrated by the successful attack against the wastewater treatment plant in the Maroochy Shire in
Queensland, Australia (Panguluri et al. 2004; Janke et al. 2014; Weiss 2014).

Protecting drinking water systems

Creating a cybersecurity culture

Many water managers are unfamiliar with information technology (IT) and SCADA/ICS technology, much less
cybersecurity defences. Therefore, they must depend on their technical staff. However, there are steps that utility managers can
take to secure their systems against cyber-attacks (Clark & Hakim 2016; Panguluri et al. 2016). Fisher (2014) lists an eight-stage
process for creating major change:

• Establishing a sense of urgency by identifying the potential crises.

• Creating the guiding coalition by putting together a group with the power to lead change.

• Developing a vision and strategy including policies and procedures to define and enforce security.

• Communicating the change vision.

• Empowering broad-based action.

• Generating short-term wins.

• Consolidating gains and producing more change.

• Anchoring new approaches in the emergent culture.

Establishing a cyber-security culture is the framework for implementing a strong defensive program. It
puts the three legs of cyber-security on a firm foundation, namely, technology, people and physical
protection. The last of these items implies locating IT equipment in a safe location.
Secured network design

It has been traditional for industrial control systems to apply standard IT security systems to control networks, including physical security,
personnel security and ICS network perimeter protections including firewalls and network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). However, a
Ponemon Institute study (Ponemon Institute LLC 2013) found that malicious cyber breaches took an average of 80 days to
detect, and 123 days to resolve. An example of a technological approach that may protect an ICS is a unidirectional gateway.
Therefore, many experts recommend that technological innovations such as unidirectional gateways be used as the
modern alternative to firewall perimeter protections for ICSs (Waterfall 2016). Figure 2 illustrates a unidirectional gateway
deployment. All unidirectional gateways are combinations of hardware and software as shown below. A possible approach is a
unidirectional gateway which results in a system able to transmit information from a protected
individual network, but physically unable to transmit any information back to that protected network
from outside the system.
In cases where a unidirectional gateway is unaffordable (e.g., in smaller-sized utilities) or is technically challenging to implement, utilities should
investigate other
alternatives such as implementing virtual routing and forwarding (VRF) (Stack 8 2015). VRF
technology is included with some off-the-shelf routers that allow different routing tables to work simultaneously within a
given router. Devices using the different routing tables are virtually isolated, unable to communicate with
each other even though they are connected to the same hardware. This allows network paths to be virtually
segmented without using multiple devices. Internet service providers often take advantage of VRF functionality to create separate virtual
private networks (VPNs) for customers. This technology is also referred to as VPN routing and forwarding.

Cybersecurity designs should strive to limit access or incorporate isolation capabilities of ICS/SCADA systems. The
isolation of an ICS system can be achieved by establishing security enclaves (or zones) with virtual local area
networks (VLANs) or subnets that are segregated from lower security zones like corporate networks or any Internet
accessible zones. Information passing from one security zone to another should be monitored. Figure 3 illustrates an example of a secure PWS
architecture.

In this example, the ICS environment has been isolated with no ingress electronic connections. The use of data diodes between the SCADA/ICS
(process control) and corporate (business analytics, payroll, accounting, email, etc.) IT environments allows for information sharing from the ICS
environment through a truly one-way transfer of data from ICS historians (databases) for business needs and reporting.

The use of true isolation through data-diode technologies between the treatment plant ICS and the corporate environment (Fig. 3) is more
recent. The adoption of this technology within the water sector has been observed by the authors at one utility but is gaining increasing
acceptance within the water sector. Some PWSs have identified the use of this technology in their advance security posture planning
documents. However, the implementation of this technology requires an investment in both capital and labour.
At least two full-time-equivalent (FTE) technology staff are typically required for several months during the development, testing, verification
and deployment phases. Additionally, depending upon the complexity of the architecture, a successful deployment may require three or more
FTEs. After the full implementation and optimisation of the secure PWS architecture, at least 1=4 to 1=2 FTE will be necessary to manage and
support this type of security posture. Based on current water sector cybersecurity implementation and execution costs, it is estimated that this
technology implementation (depending on the features) would average around $300 000 for initial implementation and optimisation.

The applicationof secure architecture and isolation of the ICS environment prevents both remote access
connection and unauthorised computers or network devices including third party vendors from entering
into the ICS environment. Furthermore, the utility will also need to address the issue of securely installing patches, anti-virus
signature files and application updates. These approaches typically involve the use of portable media (USB memory and USB hard drives) which
present security concerns. By deploying unidirectional gateways (based on data Diode technology) the cyber risk of
compromise from external networks, like the internet, is significantly reduced if not eliminated. However, trusted insiders,
portable media, and physical intrusions still present a potential vector into the system. Therefore, a strong media protection policy,
as well as strong physical controls needs to be developed to maintain the integrity of the environment.
Prior to adding a network device or computer to the ICS environment, a thorough analysis should be conducted. Once approved, the equipment
should stay at a secure off-site location for future use and identified as an ICS component.
3 scenarios.
1 – Air Force – Water CI for USAF installations are vulnerable to cyber
Pollock 21 [John D, Captain, United States Air Force. Master’s Thesis for the Degree of Master of Science in Engineering Management.
“Water Security at United States Air Force Installations. Theses and Dissertations. 4956. https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/4956 //shree]

1.4 Research Questions

The objectives from the previous section are the initiatives this research proposes to address. A study published in 2020 stood on the idea that
water will be the primary medium that climate change impacts will be felt, and therefore it is imperative that enhanced water security be an
intricate part of climate change response6 . While many factors contributed to water security, the solution must
provide framework and motivation that advocates for a method to measure water security across USAF
locations. The following research focuses primarily on collecting available resources reflective of water scarcity conditions with the purpose
of determining how each may contribute to a greater overall understanding of water scarcity. Additionally, cyber-attacks on the
water supply sector are a growing concern. A 2019 publication by the American Water Works Association cited that the
Director of National Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland
Security concur that cyber risk is a top threat to critical water infrastructure in the United States7,8 . For
this reason, cyber risks to entities that supply water to USAF installations must be considered in the overall discussion for water security.
Primary questions this research aims to address are:

1. Does a lack of water security leave USAF installations at risk from a perspective of mission readiness?

2. Will lack of water security subject USAF installations to vulnerability in the future ?
3. What can enhance the USAF’s determining factors for water security from a longterm planning perspective?

1.5 Motivation

Recent publications authored by representatives of the USAF and the DOD recognize that climatic impacts demand greater consideration in
future water security planning, and past methods that address at-risk installations may not have been leading practices1,9 . The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) specifically identified that no effort was made to identify future water availability nor was an account for all ground
and surface water sources included1 . Decisions to ensure improved research and corrective steps must be implemented or the status quo of
data inadequate to deliver water security answers will continue to affect military installations. The United States Army found that using utility
privatization to upgrade utility infrastructure reduces risk and liability by transferring asset responsibility to local utilities ,
thus providing them a water resilience benefit4 . While these contracts offer tangible advantages, the relinquished control of signing
over water responsibilities may indicate that installations could be removing themselves from the ability
to shape water resource strategy and maintain internal cyber risk protection. Despite the motivation from
these benefits and the potential of decreased burdens on USAF installation municipal technicians, privatization
agreements could expose the USAF and the DOD to risks that could threaten future mission assurance.

Decks Air Force readiness

Pollock 21 [John D, Captain, United States Air Force. Master’s Thesis for the Degree of Master of Science in Engineering Management.
“Water Security at United States Air Force Installations.” Theses and Dissertations. 4956. https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/4956 //shree]

4.7.1 Protecting Water Resources

Assessing water resources across the United States today requires consideration of multiple factors. Considering only a narrow framework
would be detrimental as multiple stressors integrate to affect water security37 . Installations presented with opportunities to adopt new
missions must consider the security of a long-term water supply before agreeing to expansion. Competition from industrial, agricultural, and
other domestic users will continue to put pressure on water resources despite downward trends in water usage3 . Figure
8 below from
the 2019 United States Government Accountability Office shows the areas that water is imperative for
in the military. All category listings are no-fail status, so a loss of water supply would be detrimental to
national defense.
Operate mission-critical and support facilities
- Air stations
- Ports
- Storage and Maintenance
- Weapons Testing
- Research and development
- Communications
- Training
- Medical Services

Protect health and safety/maintain equipment

-Boilers
-Cooling Computer Servers
-Landscaping
-Washing
-Fire Suppression
-Power Generation
Provide quality of life
- Drinking Water
- Personal Hygiene
- Food Preparation
- Laundry
- Sanitation
- Recreation

Categories and Examples of Installation Activities That Require Water to Conduct and Support
Figure 8:
Military Missions1

The USAF’s decision at some installations to surrender responsibility for water supply to the hands of
local municipal providers brings up concern for mission readiness. This may solve fiscal problems in the short-term,
but a major downside from relinquished control is the inability to influence policy ensuring future water
resources. Accounting for these factors poses a great challenge to those responsible for developing long-term water resource strategy to
meet future projected demands. The DOD on behalf of the USAF must pursue action plans that consider the full breadth of factors when
planning for a water supply capable of sustaining long-term needs.
4.7.2 The Impacts of Climate Change

The definition the DOD recognizes for climate change states, variations in average weather conditions that persist over multiple decades or
longer that encompass increases and decreases in temperature, shifts in precipitation, and changing risk of certain types of severe weather
events9,42. A report from 2012 regarding climate impacts on national security suggest that energy decisions and defense infrastructure are
among the sectors that are already threatened by climate change. The report concludes that over the next few years the risk of “major societal
disruption from weather and climate-related extreme events can be expected to increase”43. Past records of data and models projecting future
climate change impacts on water scarcity must be an integral part in determining water security planning.

4.8 Summary

The methods to develop an index at USAF installations was one approach to generating a measure of water scarcity. No evidence of correlation
between the water scarcity index values and the IDP data was concluded in the comparison. Comparing the index with data collected from IDPs
drive the fact that reported measures beyond what is currently being asked from installation water managers must be expanded.

Nearly every operation on USAF installations holds a common link of reliance on a viable water source. For
reasons of maintaining mission readiness to ensure national defense, water security must be a top consideration moving forward. Failure to
attain water security may leave some capabilities vulnerable to meeting their complete
force capability if restricted by lack of
available water resources. USAF leadership must first be informed of the significant impacts that failing to
achieve water security would have. Then a push toward adopting proven scientific measures to design and execute methods to
ensure water security will be accelerated. Doing so is key to maintaining readiness and strengthening capabilities to
deter enemy threats on the global stage.

Air Force readiness caps nuclear war

Roth et al 21 [Statement of: The Honorable John P. Roth. Acting Secretary of the Air Force. General Charles Q. Brown, Jr. Chief of Staff,
United States Air Force. General John W. Raymond Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force. “Department of the Air Force Posture
Statement, Fiscal Year 2022.” Department of the Air Force Presentation to the Committees And Subcommittees of the United States Senate And
the House of Representatives 1st Session, 117th Congress. 5-5-21. DOA: 8-24-21.
https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2021SAF/05_May/FY22_DAF_Posture_Statement.pdf //shree]

America fights as a joint team, and the

U.S. Air Force is the only Service that can meet our Nation’s adversaries
with mass, speed, agility and survivability on near-immediate timelines. The Air Force sees, senses, and
communicates globally. The Air Force monitors our adversaries’ movements, deploys forces en masse, deters
competitors, and strikes enemies without warning. No one else can do it. Without the Air Force, the
joint force loses. Only with a modernized and ready Air Force is the joint team—and our Nation—secure.
The American homeland is no longer a sanctuary. Our citizens face threats from a variety of actors in both the physical and digital arenas.
Competitors, especially the China and Russia, continue aggressive efforts to negate our long-standing warfighting advantages
while challenging America’s interests and geopolitical position. While the Nation was focused on countering violent extremist organizations,
great power competitors focused on the American way of war. They studied, resourced, and introduced systems specifically
designed to defeat Air Force capabilities that have strengthened the joint force for a generation . That is
why the Air Force must accelerate change now, so we can protect the American way of life in 2030 and for decades to come.
Simply put, if we do not change, we risk losing. We risk losing in great power competition, we risk losing in
a high-end fight, and we risk losing quality Airmen and families. The President clearly stated that diplomacy is our primary means of
engaging with the world: it must be our first tool of choice. The President likewise recognizes that our decisions and actions must come from a
position of strength. The
Air Force offers safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrence, which strengthens national
policies. It is also important to recognize that air dominance is not an American birthright. The
Air Force is pivotal to deterring
these aggressors and bolstering our allies and partners. America remains committed to freedom of the commons to
support maintaining the rules-based international order around the globe. Control of the air and enabling domains ensures that the jointforce
has full freedom of maneuver.

The diversity of our Airmen is both a tactical and strategic advantage. We

are committed to recruiting and retaining the
best of America. While the COVID-19 pandemic provided new challenges to our force , we remain devoted to
caring for Airmen. Suicide and sexual assault persist as challenges that we are tackling head-on. Likewise family support programs are vital to
our resiliency as a Service. A diverse and inclusive Air Force helps us out-innovate adversaries today and overcome challenges tomorrow. And,
we know that each Airman—active duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian, no matter their background—took an oath to defend the Nation for all
Americans.

Airmen in the near future are more likely to fight in highly-contested environments. These complex, all domain conflicts will result in combat
attrition rates and risks to the Homeland that are more akin to World War II than the uncontested environments to which we have become
accustomed. Given our ability to project power from afar, independent of forward access or lengthy prepositioning timelines, Airmen will be
the first to respond to many emerging crises. In any scenario, the Air Force plays a unique and integral role to our collective deterrence and
joint warfighting credibility. We must accelerate change to meet the challenges our Nation faces. This requires a relevant, modern force based
on cutting-edge capabilities that will survive in future conflicts and shifting away from legacy platforms that are increasingly irrelevant.

The Air Force is expected to provide enduring airpower capabilities irrespective of the threat
encountered, the technology utilized, or the budget provided. The core missions of airpower—air superiority; global
strike; rapid global mobility; command and control; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance— provide unequivocal advantage to the
joint force. Only the Air Force provides air superiority, global strike, and rapid global mobility for the Nation. Without these missions, the
Homeland is unprotected and America cannot project power around the globe. We are innovating and advancing our competencies with
innovative capabilities such as the Advanced Battle Management System, which will increase commanders’ decision advantage. Moreover, new
approaches to our core missions enhance the joint force and answer the challenges posed by great power competitors.
The Air Force’s future force design recognizes the need for change and the range of threats to the Nation, our allies, and partners. In 2021, we
identified three key capability development areas for investment: connect the joint force, generate combat power, and conduct logistics under
attack. Moving forward we will prioritize the resources that will allow us to continue to make investments in these areas, with more to come.
Additionally, the Air Force will prioritize within its resources, affordable, analytically defensible, force structure and system capability proposals.
Through partnership with Congress, the Air Force will prioritize resources to guard the foundations of national freedom and independence for
America and our allies.

AIR SUPERIORITY

Combat power, regardless of Service, often depends on the Air Force’s ability to deliver air superiority. Our competitors have fielded air forces,
radar systems, and missiles that can attack our territory, bases, forces, and allies and partners, or defend against our military actions. Our job is
to stop them through control of the air. To do this, we build understanding of the air situation and then use the right mix of capability and
capacity to control the air while creating windows of air superiority—no matter the threat. As we stay ahead of our competitors, the Air Force
needs flexible systems and agile design processes to field new capabilities at speed.

Current platforms will not fully support tomorrow’s demands. Airmen are deliberately balancing today’s readiness risk with
capability modernization. Remaining ahead of adversaries who are committed to negating our technological edge requires investment in
advanced capabilities. Likewise, access
to domestic airspace allows us to train in realistic environments, which is essential to
developing and maintaining these advanced capabilities. Near-peer competitors are challenging our capability to
command the air. We must take action now to ensure the joint force’s success tomorrow.

2 – Cascading effects – power depends on water CI

Montgomery & Logan 21 [Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology
Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Trevor Logan is a research analyst at CCTI. “Poor Cybersecurity Makes
Water a Weak Link in Critical Infrastructure.” Research Memo. Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 11-18-21. DOA: 11-27-21.
https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/fdd-memo-poor-cybersecurity-makes-water-a-weak-link-in-critical-infrastructure.pdf
//shree]

America’s critical infrastructure is only as strong as its weakest link, and in the United States, water
infrastructure may be the greatest vulnerability. The significant cybersecurity deficiencies observed in the drinking water
and wastewater sectors result in part from structural challenges. The United States has approximately 52,000 drinking water and 16,000
wastewater systems, most of which service small- to medium-sized communities of less than 50,000 residents.1 These systems operate with
limited budgets and even more limited cybersecurity personnel and expertise. Conducting effective federal oversight of, and providing sufficient
federal assistance to, such a distributed network of utilities is inherently difficult.

Compounding this challenge, the increasing

automation of the water sector has opened it up to malicious cyber
activity that could disrupt or manipulate services. This past February, a hacker nearly succeeded in raising the concentration
of a caustic agent in the drinking water of a small Florida city one hundred-fold after breaching the system the utility uses for remote-access
monitoring and troubleshooting. The automation of such systems reduces personnel costs and facilitates regulatory compliance, but few
utilities have invested the savings from automation into the cybersecurity of their new systems.

The expanded attack surface resulting from automation could also allow hackers to cause disruptive and
cascading effects across multiple critical infrastructures. “Water is used in all phases of energy
production and electricity generation,” the Department of Energy noted in a report on the nexus between the water
and energy sectors.2 Water and power systems are often physically interconnected .3

The federal government — in particular, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which is the sector risk management agency
(SRMA) responsible for the water sector — bears responsibility for the fragility of the sector’s cybersecurity posture. The EPA is
not resourced or organized to assess and support the water sector consistent with the scope and scale
of the critical infrastructure challenges the sector faces. As part of its congressional mandate to assess and recommend
improvements to national cyber resilience, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC) reviewed the responsibilities and performance of all
SRMAs. Regarding the water sector, the CSC concluded that there is “insufficient coordination between the EPA and
other stakeholders in water utilities’ security.”4 The Government Accountability Office has expressed similar concerns.5
Cascading failure at domestic bases breaks CCMDs
Stockton 19 [Dr. Paul N. Stockton is Managing Director of Sonecon, LLC. From 2009 to 2013, Dr. Stockton served as Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs. Strengthening Mission Assurance Against Emerging Threats: Critical Gaps and
Opportunities for Progress. 11-18-19. https://www.whs.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2018953/strengthening-mission-assurance-against-
emerging-threats-critical-gaps-and-oppo/ //shree] CCMD = Combatant Commands; OPLAN = Operation Plans

The Defense Department should move beyond outdated “tooth versus tail” debates over how to invest scarce resources and adopt a risk
management approach to bolster end-to-end improvements in joint force lethality. In
the past, DOD invested relatively little in
ensuring the survivability of supporting infrastructure. That low priority made sense at the time; DOD
could conduct warfighting abroad operations without concerns that adversaries would disrupt U.S.
installations and the privately owned infrastructure systems that they depended on. In recent years, however,
military bases in the United States have taken on increasingly important roles in conducting UAV
operations and other warfighting and sustainment activities to execute CCMD OPLANs . As DOD
dependence on U.S.-based installations has grown, adversaries have ramped up their ability to disrupt
the flow of power and other critical infrastructure services that those bases rely on. Intelligent, adaptive
adversaries will seek to defeat the United States without facing the point of its spear. Treating
infrastructure resilience as a core warfighting requirement, and ensuring that adversaries cannot break the shaft of that
spear, constitute an essential paradigm shift for mission assurance.

CCMDs check nuclear war

Kehler 16 [C. ROBERT KEHLER is a retired General of the United States Air Force. He served as Commander of United States Strategic
Command at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Prior to Strategic Command, he commanded the Air Force Space Command, and also served as
Director of the National Security Space Office. Over his distinguished career, he served in nuclear and space units and commanded at the
squadron, group, wing, major command, and combatant command levels. Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Use. Daedalus (2016) 145 (4): 50–61.
https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00411 //shree]

Among the many responsibilities I had as the Commander of United States Strategic Command ( usstratcom), none was greater than my
responsibility to plan, operate, and, if ordered by the president, employ the nation's long-range nuclear forces in combat. Beginning with
General George C. Kenney in 1946, a long line of senior officers has held that responsibility in what is arguably one of the most consequential
military posts in the world. While usstratcom's responsibilities have grown since 1992-when it assumed the combatant command and planning
roles of its predecessors, Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (jstps) – every commander since Kenney has
shared a common critical mission: to deter attack (primarily nuclear attack) against the United States and its
allies and partners, and to use nuclear weapons to defend the nation if deterrence fails.
But the twenty-first-century international security environment is far different from the bipolar Cold War contest that originally defined this
mission. The massive conventional threat posed by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact disappeared almost
twenty-five years ago. While it is still possible (and still must be deterred), the likelihood of a large-scale surprise nuclear attack has declined.
The traditional regional battlefield is becoming a global battlespace as adversaries acquire technologies and exploit the interconnected nature
of our world to quickly transit political, geographic, and physical boundaries. Attacks by violent extremists and the possibility of nuclear
terrorism are immediate security concerns; cyber weapons and drones present new challenges; and traditional weapons like ballistic missiles
and advanced conventional capabilities are more available, affordable, and lethal. usstratcom
and its sister Combatant
Commands (ccmds) may be called on to face diverse contingencies that unfold suddenly and range from small arms
in the hands of violent extremists to nuclear weapons in the hands of hostile state leaders.

3 – Pentagon – incapacitation shuts down conventional forces, goes nuclear

Pifer 20 [Steven Pifer is a nonresident senior fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Center for 21st Century Security
and Intelligence, and the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, and a William J. Perry fellow at the Center for
International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs with responsibilities for Russia and Ukraine (2001-2004), ambassador to Ukraine (1998-2000), and special assistant to the
president and senior director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia on the National Security Council (1996-1997). In addition to Ukraine, Ambassador
Pifer served at the U.S. embassies in Warsaw, Moscow, and London as well as with the U.S. delegation to the negotiation on intermediate-range
nuclear forces in Geneva. “How COVID-19 might affect US nuclear weapons and planning.” 5-18-20. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2020/05/18/how-covid-19-might-affect-us-nuclear-weapons-and-planning/ //shree]

That has potentially negative consequences for the security of the United States and its allies. While
nuclear forces provide day-
to-day deterrence, the Pentagon leadership spends most of its time thinking about how to employ
conventional forces to manage security challenges around the world. The renewed focus on great power competition
further elevates the importance of conventional forces. It is important to get the balance between nuclear and conventional forces right,
particularly as the
most likely path to use of nuclear arms would be an escalation of a conventional conflict.
Having robust conventional forces to prevail in or deter a conventional conflict in the first place could
avert a nuclear crisis or worse.

Plan solves:
1 – Categorizes critical defense facilities (CDFs) for mandatory CI protection standards
over and above the civilian sector – they are attractive targets
Stockton 21 [Dr. Paul Stockton was the Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs
from May 2009 until January 2013. In that position, he was responsible for Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection and led the creation of the
Department’s Mission Assurance Strategy. Prior to Dr. Stockton’s confirmation as Assistant Secretary, he served as a Senior Research Scholar at
Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and as Associate Provost of the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Paul
Stockton holds a PhD in Government from Harvard University. He currently chairs the Grid Resilience for National Security subcommittee of
DOE’s Electricity Advisory Committee and serves on the Strategic Advisory Council of the Idaho National Laboratory and as a Senior Fellow of
the Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory. “STRENGTHENING THE CYBERRESILIENCE OF AMERICA’S WATER SYSTEMS:
INDUSTRY-LED REGULATORY OPTIONS.” American Water Works Association. 8-27-21. DOA: 11-12-21.
https://www.awwa.org/Portals/0/AWWA/Government/STRENGTHENINGTHECYBERRESILIENCEOFAMERICASWATERSYSTEMS-INDUSTRY-
LEDREGULATORYOPTIONS.pdf //shree] Note: “CIP” = “Critical Infrastructure Protection”

D. CATEGORIES FOR APPLYING MANDATORY STANDARDS TO WATER SYSTEMS

A risk-based approach can help guide decisions on which a water utility should be covered under new
cybersecurity mandates. One option is to apply specialized requirements to the systems that serve
military bases designated by the Federal government as Critical Defense Facilities (CDFs). The
interruption of water services to CDFs would disrupt their ability to carry out their essential missions,
making the water system(s) that serve those facilities potentially attractive targets. It might be possible to
adopt a risk-based approach to categorizing water systems and require CDF supporting systems to take
resilience measures over and above those applied to the rest of the sector.

Congress already requires the designation of especially critical electric systems. In the FAST ACT amendments to the
Federal Power Act, legislators created two such categories. The first, “critical electric infrastructure” (CEI), includes a
system or asset of the bulk-power system, whether physical or virtual, the incapacity or destruction of which would negatively affect national
security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of such matters.” The
second category is “defense critical
infrastructure” (DCEI), which
includes systems that serve CDFs in the 48 contiguous States and the District of
Columbia.29 Congress might partner with the water sector, USEPA, and other agencies to develop an
equivalent risk-based designation for water systems that serve critical customers.

Congress gave the Secretary of Energy specialized emergency authorities over CEI and DCEI but did not require
NERC to establish additional CIP standards that would apply only to those categories of infrastructure and
their operators. Future Executive Orders may require the “responsible parties” that operate DCEI to meet specialized cybersecurity
requirements. As those efforts go forward, water
sector leaders may want to consider whether and how such implementation
priorities and standards-setting requirements might be adapted to meet their needs
2 – Applies bulk power system requirements and NIST framework for cyber and
physical protection against cascading failure.
Stockton 21 [Dr. Paul Stockton was the Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs
from May 2009 until January 2013. In that position, he was responsible for Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection and led the creation of the
Department’s Mission Assurance Strategy. Prior to Dr. Stockton’s confirmation as Assistant Secretary, he served as a Senior Research Scholar at
Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and as Associate Provost of the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Paul
Stockton holds a PhD in Government from Harvard University. He currently chairs the Grid Resilience for National Security subcommittee of
DOE’s Electricity Advisory Committee and serves on the Strategic Advisory Council of the Idaho National Laboratory and as a Senior Fellow of
the Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory. “STRENGTHENING THE CYBERRESILIENCE OF AMERICA’S WATER SYSTEMS:
INDUSTRY-LED REGULATORY OPTIONS.” American Water Works Association. 8-27-21. DOA: 11-12-21.
https://www.awwa.org/Portals/0/AWWA/Government/STRENGTHENINGTHECYBERRESILIENCEOFAMERICASWATERSYSTEMS-INDUSTRY-
Note: “BPS” = “Bulk Power System” “NIST” = “The National Institute of
LEDREGULATORYOPTIONS.pdf //shree]
Standards and Technology” – a Federal Agency under Dept of Commerce

APPENDIX A: HOW
THE WATER SECTOR MIGHT LEVERAGE CURRENTLY ENFORCEABLE BPS STANDARDS TO
HELP MEET ITS OWN, SECTOR-SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

The BPS standards examined below borrow from the terminology used by NERC. The water sector will almost certainly want to
modify the titles of many of these standards; their overall areas of focus, however, have useful analogs for water systems. Note
also that the NERC Standards employ the term “Bulk Electric System” rather than Bulk Power System. The NERC Glossary of Terms defines both
terms.38 For the purpose of this study, they will be used interchangeably. NERC also recognizes the importance of the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework and works to ensure all elements of the NIST framework’s voluntary efforts are taken into consideration and tracked to all
mandatory CIP standards. The sections below identify some specific NIST Framework components that apply to specific cybersecurity issues.

Cyber Security: BES Cyber System Categorization (IP-002-5.1a). The purpose of this standard is to identify and categorize BES Cyber Systems and
their associated BES Cyber Assets in terms of the “adverse impact that loss, compromise, or misuse of those BES Cyber Systems could have on
the reliable operation of the BES.” 39 Some of these provisions parallel components of the Asset Management recommendations in the NIST
CSF.

An equivalent standard could be very useful for the water sector. Water system resources available to invest in cybersecurity are limited, and
potential investments will differ in the extent of the benefits they provide. The NIST Framework and more specifically AWWA cybersecurity
guidance already offers prioritized criteria system components which, if they failed, would have serious consequences for system operations –
and, potentially, for public health and safety. Requiring water utility operators to “rack and stack” their components
in terms of low, medium, and high criticality could help guide future investments in cybersecurity. Categorizing
system components in this way can also help prioritize the implementation (and enforcement) of additional cybersecurity standards.

Cyber Security: Security Management Controls (CIP-003-8) This standard requires BPS entities to “specify consistent and sustainable security
management controls that establish responsibility and accountability to protect BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to
misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES).”40 Some of these challenges are addressed by the NIST provisions regarding the
Business Environment.

The water sector almost certainly needs equivalent, but sector-specific, requirements to protect their
cyber assets. Incidents have already occurred involving the intentional misoperation of water utility
control mechanisms and the evasion of systems for securing them. Significant variation may also exist across the water sector in terms
of the strength of its security systems. Establishing mandatory requirements for consistent and sustainable security
management can help ensure that all CWS “level up” to performance standards that account for
intensifying threats.
Cyber Security: Personnel & Training (CIP-004-6). This standard is structured to minimize the risk against compromises that could lead to
misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES) from individuals accessing BES Cyber Systems by requiring an appropriate level of
personnel risk assessment, training, and security awareness in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems. 41

All water systems have procedures in place to train personnel to ensure the safe operation of water treatment plants and other key facilities.
However, in terms of preparedness against cyber threats, not all systems may be keeping pace with the threat. Nation states and criminals are
developing increasingly effective means to conduct personalized, hard-to-detect spear phishing campaigns to access employee accounts and OT
control systems. Water systems also need to examine their preparedness against insider threats, bolster
employee training to detect and counter artfully designed (and carefully camouflaged) attacker efforts to access ICS
from internet-connected systems. The NIST Framework and emerging best practices in the water sector might be
leveraged to establish a mandatory standard to help address all of such threats.
Cyber Security: Electronic Security Perimeter(s) (CIP-005-6) and Cyber Security: Systems Security Management (CIP-007-6). Both of these
standards have significant potential applicability to meet water sector needs. The purpose of the first is to “manage electronic access to BES
Cyber Systems by specifying a controlled Electronic Security Perimeter in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that
could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES.” 42 The second requires BPS entities “to manage system security by specifying select
technical, operational, and procedural requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to
misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES). 43 NIST Framework recommendations regarding Access control and Data Security
address many of these issues.

These two standards and their implementation by BPS entities reflect many power system design features and potential vulnerabilities that are
specific to the electricity subsector. Their basic purposes, however, are very much in line with emerging water system cybersecurity needs. As
follow-on work goes forward to establish potential priorities for water standards development, CIP-005-6 and CIP-007-6 should be prime areas
of focus.

Cyber Security: Incident Reporting and Response Planning (CIP-008-6) This standard specifies requirements for BES entities to report “Cyber
Security Incidents.”44 NIST CSF components that address the Detection Process address some of these same reporting topics. As with auditing
and enforcement, incident reporting constitutes what might be considered a “touchy subject” for both power companies and water systems.
Reports, especially if leaked (and exaggerated) by the press, can create risks of litigation, reputational damage, drops in stock valuations for
investor-owned systems, or political problems for public or municipal utilities. Technical problems can also impede incident reporting. Until
recently, many OT systems lacked the logs that allow for forensics and detailed reporting for IT systems. Finally, in infrastructure sectors that
have enforceable standards, violations can lead to investigations that result in fines or other enforcement actions.

Yet, the value proposition for establishing reporting requirements is long standing. In addition to this CIP standard, NERC
standard EOP-004-4 requires incident reporting. If water operators remain unaware of attacks that are occurring in
the sector, they will be unable to prepare against them. The unfortunate reality of today’s cyber environment is that
advancements in attack technologies, techniques, and procedures often outpace the efforts of infrastructure operators to anticipate and
defend against them. The SolarWinds attack and recent malware operations exemplify this asymmetric situation -- and also the imperative for
rapid incident warning so that other system operators can avoid becoming victims themselves.

Establishing procedures and technical capabilities to protect the confidentiality of report data (as with data from
compliance audits) will be a prerequisite for moving forward. It will be equally important to reach consensus on the level of detail that
reports should require. Too much, and water systems may resist the establishment and enforcement of reporting requirements. Too little, and
the reports will provide little value for defending the sector. Water sector leaders should consider launching discussions on what would
constitute a “happy medium” early on in the standards development process.

Cyber Security: Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems (CIP-009).45 This standard exemplifies the value of building on existing water sector
requirements and best practices to establish a stronger regulatory framework. AWIA already mandates that certain CWSs conduct risk and
resilience assessments and create emergency response plans that reflect those assessments, including cyberrelated vulnerabilities. Leveraging
those provisions of law, water
system operators might consider opportunities to strengthen the requirements for response
and recovery planning. One such opportunity will be especially important for preparedness against attacks by nation state adversaries:
the risk of sustained attacks that will greatly complicate system restoration.

If a crisis with the United States prompts China or other potential adversaries to conduct cyberattacks against US water systems,
those attacks areunlikely to be “one and done.” US opponents will continue (and perhaps intensify) those attacks until the
opponents achieve their objectives. In the electricity subsector’s GridEx Exercises, threat scenarios assume that attacks will
occur for many weeks; participating utilities are able to exercise their emergency plans and coordination capabilities against such
long-duration challenges. Perhaps in a phased process, water sector standards might require that system response
plans account for the risk that restoration operations will need to go forward in the midst of ongoing
cyberattacks.
Cyber Security: Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments (CIP-010-3). The purpose of this standard is to “prevent and
detect unauthorized changes to BES Cyber Systems by specifying configuration change management and vulnerability assessment
requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems.” 46 Some components of the NIST CSF’s provisions on Data Security,
Information Protection Process & Procedures and Security Continuous Monitoring address similar issues. Adapting this standard to
meet the challenges facing water systems could be timely and useful. Across the sector, system
operators are rapidly modernizing their control systems and adopting new, digitized mechanisms to reduce their costs and
improve the effectiveness of their water treatment and other operations. All such changes run the risk of opening up
new attack surfaces for cyber-armed opponents. Mandatory standards may be able to help water systems
manage these risks.
Cyber Security: Information Protection (CIP-011-2) This standard is structured to “prevent unauthorized access to BES Cyber System
Information by specifying information protection requirements” in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems. 47 NIST CSF’s provisions on Data
Security, Information Protection Process & Procedures and Security Continuous Monitoring are useful in this realm as well. Adversaries are
seeking to steal detailed technical knowledge of US infrastructure systems and their operational characteristics to help them plan and (if
necessary) execute future attacks. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is giving China and other potential adversaries new tools and
techniques to take advantage of this sensitive information and develop system specific playbooks to disrupt infrastructure
operations. 48 Against this intensifying threat, it is becoming all the more important to establish criteria to identify water
system data that must be protected, and establish requirements to make sure those protections are built and maintained.

Cyber Security: Supply

Chain Risk Management (CIP-013-1).49 The NIST Maintenance, Security Continuous Monitoring, and Analysis
provides a close analogue. Water systems should consider moving the development of an equivalent standard
much further up the queue. The US Counterintelligence Strategy warns that “The exploitation of key supply chains by foreign
adversaries—especially when executed in concert with cyber intrusions and insider threat activities—represents a complex and growing threat
to strategically important U.S. economic sectors and critical infrastructure. Foreign adversaries are attempting to access our nation’s key supply
chains at multiple points—from concept to design, manufacture, integration, deployment, and maintenance—by inserting malware into
important information technology networks and communications systems.”50

CIP-013-1 is the first step in developing standards for SCRM that will need to continuously evolve to keep pace with emerging threats to
hardware, software, and shared services such as cloud-based data storage. CWS
should carefully review CIP-013-1 and more recent
SCRM initiatives in the electricity subsector to assess the potential utility for water systems. However, two sectors also have
SCRM processes and emerging best practices that will be valuable to consider. The first is the HSCC Health Industry Cybersecurity SCRM Guide
v2.0 (HIC-SCRiM), which offers detailed and proven methods to assess and manage supply chain risks. 51 SCRM initiatives developed by the
Financial Services Sector and DHS’ Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Task Force
provides detail points of reference as well for the development of SCRM standards for water systems. 52

CIP-014-2 Physical Security. This standard purpose is to identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission
substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a
result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an interconnection. While
not directly applicable to standards development for cybersecurity, water sector leaders may want to review CIP-014-2 as a
reference point as they continue to strengthen the physical security of their own systems .
 1AC – Plan
The United States federal government should substantially increase its critical
infrastructure protection of water resources serving Critical Defense Facilities in the
United States.
 1AC – Forward Presence
Advantage 2: Forward Presence

Plan links resource protection and CI – modeled by bases abroad and allies.
Weed 17 [Scott A Weed, Major, USAF. “US Policy Response to Cyber Attack on SCADA Systems Supporting Critical National
Infrastructure.” Air University. Air Force Research Institute: Perspectives on Cyber Power.
https://media.defense.gov/2017/Nov/20/2001846609/-1/-1/0/CPP0007_WEED_SCADA.PDF //shree] Note: CI/KR = “Critical Infrastructure and
Key Resources”

Automated tools, operating at network speeds across machine-to-machine interfaces are vital for defenders to detect and describe malicious
activity, deduce adversaries’ objectives, and provide authorities with response options amid the pervasive fog of war. The
DHS, acting with
new legal and regulatory authorities, in concert with sector-specific agencies, should deploy a sensor system analogous to the
Einstein 2/3A program across CI/KR enterprises to provide automated detection capability, intrusion
protection, and decision-quality intelligence, underpinned by analysts well trained in ICS and SCADA
cybersecurity. Beyond technology, the DHS and its ICS-CERT arm should ensure strong linkage with private sector SOCs, with their
continuous monitoring and organic incident response mechanisms, while providing aid to organizations in the formal development of cyber
continuity of operations planning (COOP).

Linking federal cyber, intelligence, and law enforcement capabilities with the critical infrastructure
sectors in an effective manner, as outlined in PPD-21, also represents one of the few feasible strategies to countering our
adversaries’ asymmetric offensive cyber advantage. Cross-organizational threat information sharing, proactive
assessments, next-generation endpoint detection and prevention technologies, strengthened internal security controls,25 increased priority for
corporate security clearances, and greater cross-flow of industry experts through government positions are necessary for improving our
abilities to identify anomalous behavior and detect broader threat streams. Organizations that experience cyber attacks must report them to
the DHS Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program.26 Cyber-attack data is critical to infrastructure cyberhealth awareness. The DHS
must protect this extraordinarily proprietary information from accidental release or legal discovery. However, the financial sector has
experienced that there is no competitive advantage in hoarding sector cybersecurity information because competitors are certain to be victims
of the same or similar attacks, and therefore, cybersecurity transparency is actually an existential requirement.

There are also established international information sharing channels that support domestic and
international cybersecurity. These channels must remain prioritized, coordinated where needed, and frequently exercised, and
include diplomatic (DOS-to-ministries of foreign affairs), law enforcement (legal attachés-to-ministries of justice and
interior), technical (CERT-to-CERT), and the liaisons between the various national intelligence services. These relationships
represent myriad potential opportunities for engagement with international partners and with adversaries as well. These relationships
can reinforce cyber due diligence across the international community, help address the challenges of threats coming
from extraterritorial malicious actors, and provide greater resources for the protection of the average Netizen. Critical US
infrastructure also exists outside of the territory of the United States —DOD-operated facilities in allied
countries or simply foreign infrastructure supporting US activities . Relationships with foreign host
governments, their CERTs, and IT companies are invaluable as adversaries seek softer targets that
underpin the ability to project US interests abroad.

2 scenarios.
1 – Forward Operating Bases – securing water resources key to FOB resilience
Crouch 21 [Kelsie L. Crouch, First Lieutenant, USAF. Thesis for the Master of Science in Engineering Management at Air Force Institute of
Technology. “EVALUATION OF EFFICIENT WATER REUSE TECHNOLOGIES FOR SUSTAINABLE FORWARD OPERATING BASES” March 2021.
https://scholar.afit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6003&context=etd //shree]
A secure water source is essential to the resiliency and readiness of military installations and contingency operation
locations, especially those located in the dry climates the Department of Defense operates in today . There are
multiple issues of concern when identifying water sources, such as security, cleanliness, accessibility, and sustainability. Water resources
pose a potential vulnerability to mission readiness in a remote, agile environment, such as a forward
operating base (FOB). Having a secure water resource would help facilitate mission readiness in the
contingency environment, offering the opportunity to be more resilient and cost-effective.

FOB disruptions escalate to great power war

Vitali et al 18 [Juan Vitali, Chief, Army Nuclear Power Branch, Office of the Chief of Engineers. Joseph G Lamothe, Charles J Toomey,
Virgil Peoples, Kerry Mccabe. This study was commissioned by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff. “Study on the use of Mobile Nuclear Power
Plants for Ground Operations.” 10-26-18. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1087358.pdf //shree]

The Army faces a fundamental change in the character of warfare with a confluence of evolving threats
with increasing technological sophistication spanning the competition continuum, an alternative to the obsolete peace/war
binary (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018). First among these threats is the return of great power competition with China and
Russia. This competition threatens our nation’s core interests and may result in the return of protracted, large-scale combat operations (LSCO).
To meet these threats, Army readiness requires lethal, resilient, and agile forces ready to rapidly deploy and fight in contested environments,
operate effectively across the entire competition continuum, and win decisively as part of the Joint Force against near-peer adversaries in large-
scale combat operations and high-intensity conflict (U.S. Army 2018; Suits 2018). Warfare
will become more violent, lethal, and
swift; creating more consequential risks in terms of casualties, cost, and escalation beyond armed conflict.

The Army will face these challenges in all domains of battle, in all types of terrain, and particularly in urban centers. Political
stresses
affecting international stability and security will develop new areas of competition in which adversaries seek to
expand influence and threaten the balance of power. Finally, fiscal instability threatens to limit the Army’s ability to prepare for this
complex environment, forcing it to choose between the priorities rather than operate cohesively among them. With the reemergence of long-
term strategic competition with potential near-peer adversaries like China and Russia, U.S.
joint force forward locations and
operating bases serve to counter long-term adversarial coercion tactics and act as a strategic stabilizing
force providing the predictability necessary for sustaining a favorable regional balance of power. Should
deterrence fail, these same forward locations can support, receive, and project military power to fight and win.

Forward and remote locations allow the United States to deter and compete with near-peer adversaries
below the threshold of war; however, the future world order will see a number of states with the political will, economic capacity,
and military capabilities to compel change at the expense of others (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2016, p. ii). Adversary forces will be augmented by
advanced command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, information technologies, lethal precision strike and
area effect weapons, and the capacity to field first-rate technological innovations (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2016, p. ii). The proliferation of weapons
and other technologies include a variety of surface-, air- and submarine-launched ballistic and cruise missiles enabling near-peer challengers to
accurately attack forward bases and deploying U.S. forces and their supporting logistics at ranges exceeding 1,000 nautical miles (DOD 2012).
Because the principal MNPP locations are envisaged to be employed at major aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, and forward
operating bases (FOBs) where intelligence-gathering capability and protection from enemy interdiction by air, ground, naval and cyber forces
are greatest, an MNPP is less likely to be captured, damaged, or destroyed than liquid fuel resupply convoys.

Adversaries may also attempt to disrupt the ability of the United States to conduct overseas military operations through attacks on
major nodes of the global trade and logistics network such as large container ports or major airports (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2016). Some
adversaries might also attempt to attack military
bases and facilities to disproportionately degrade the ability of the
United States to generate, deploy, and maintain the Joint Force (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2016). The survivability of
the joint sustainment system will be critical. For land-based logistics especially, the challenge will be to
ensure the survivability of the infrastructure (DOD 2012, p. 33) and the ability to reconstitute bases and other infrastructure
required to project military force, including points of origin, ports of embarkation and debarkation, and intermediate
staging bases (DOD 2012, p. 34). Forward and remote sites must be smaller, networked, and sustained by a much reduced logistical
footprint.
2 – Allies – NATO and Canada model
DOD 20 [US Department of Defense. “Partnering.” Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security. Last
modified 9-16-20. DOA: 8-29-21. https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/ASD-for-Homeland-Defense-and-Global-Security/Defense-Critical-
Infrastructure-Program/Partnering/ //shree] Note: CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection

The interconnected nature of Critical Infrastructure requires cooperation and teamwork with a host of private and
public entities, both domestic and international. These partnerships provide a conduit to exchange ideas, approaches,
and best practices, facilitate security planning and resource allocation, and strengthen the bonds among
the CIP community.
Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Data (HILFD)

The HIFLD Working Group is a coalition of Federal, state, and local government organizations and supporting private industry partners who are
involved with geospatial issues related to Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, Civil Support, and Emergency Preparedness and Response.
HIFLD members share the common goal of identifying and facilitating acquisition of authoritative homeland infrastructure geospatial data for
the Homeland Defense and Homeland Security mission areas and promoting domestic infrastructure geospatial information sharing, protection,
collaboration, and knowledge management. The HIFLD Working Group is sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense with strong participation from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National-Geospatial Intelligence Agency
(NGA), the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and the Mission Assurance Division of the Naval Surface
Warfare Center (NSWC), Dahlgren Division.

Please login to the HIFLD website (https://www.hifldwg.org) for more information about upcoming meetings and to register to attend. If you
need to request a password for the HIFLD website, please go to http://www.hifldwg.org and select the "How to Join" link at the top of the page.
Password and login instructions will be sent to you via e-mail once your request is submitted and approved.

International Efforts

Department of Defense operations are global. Because of international interdependencies, military operations depend on
infrastructures that extend beyond our national boundaries. The resilience and reliability of supporting infrastructures throughout areas of
military operations and DoD activities are crucial. Military
commanders and defense sectors place a value on the
growing interdependency of national, international, and multinational infrastructures. Facilitating international
cooperation and information exchanges are necessary to assure global critical infrastructures are available to DoD
when required.

DoD cooperates with a number of international partners to ensure the availability of critical assets. DoD has worked
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through the Conference of National Armaments
Directors (CNAD), to identify opportunities for collaboration in the research, development, and production of military equipment and
weapon systems. DoD representatives have participated in CNAD efforts to improve the protection of fixed,
critical infrastructure on NATO-member territory using current technologies and leveraging ongoing research
and design efforts.

The U.S. also enjoys a strong partnership with Canada, befitting our common border, interlinked
economies, and shared history. The North American Technology and Industrial Base Organization (NATIBO), chartered in March
1987, is a key partnership linking the respective Defense Departments of the U.S. and Canada . Its mission is to
promote a cost effective, durable technology and industrial base that is responsive to the national security and economic needs of each
country. The
NATIBO seeks to foster cooperation between the U.S. and Canadian governments in development of
coordinated technology and defense industrial base policies and programs, promote data sharing, and provide a forum
for exchanging information and ideas.

The U.S. and Canada, in conjunction with Mexico, also launched the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
(SPP) in March 2005 as a trilateral effort to increase security and enhance prosperity through greater cooperation and information sharing.
Key priorities for the SPP include emergency management; influenza pandemics; energy security; and safe and secure border gateways. The
U.S. and Canada have established a close working relationship with regards to SPP Goal 9: developing and implementing a
common approach to critical infrastructure protection, and response to cross-border terrorist
incidents and, as applicable, natural disasters. Specifically, the SPP CIP efforts focus on protection and response
strategies and programs in mutually determined priority areas , including but not limited to, energy, dams,
telecommunications, transportation, nuclear, radiological, DIB, and cyber systems.

NATO CI is a cyber target – water is baseline for resilience

Roepke & Thankey 19 [Wolf-Diether Roepke and Hasit Thankey work on Resilience and Civil Preparedness in NATO’s Defence
Policy and Planning Division. “Resilience: The First Line of Defence.” NATO Review. 2-27-19.
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/02/27/resilience-the-first-line-of-defence/index.html //shree]

Through much of the Cold War era, civil

preparedness (then known as civil emergency planning) was well organised and resourced by
Allies, and was reflected in NATO’s organisation and command structure. During the 1990s, however, much of the
detailed civil preparedness planning, structures and capabilities were substantially reduced, both at
national level and at NATO.
Events since 2014 – most notably Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the rise of ISIS/Daesh – signalled a change in the strategic
environment, prompting the Alliance to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture. Meanwhile, terrorist and hybrid threats
(particularly recent cyber attacks) continue to target the civil population and critical
infrastructures, owned largely by the private
sector. These developments had a profound effect, bringing into sharp focus the need to boost resilience
through civil preparedness. Today, Allies are pursuing a step-by-step approach to this end – an effort that complements NATO’s
military modernisation and its overall deterrence and defence posture.

NATO’s baseline requirements

In 2016, at the Warsaw Summit, Allied

leaders committed to enhancing resilience by striving to achieve seven
baseline requirements for civil preparedness:

1) assured continuity of government and critical government services;

2) resilient energy supplies;

3) ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people;

4) resilient food and water resources;

5) ability to deal with mass casualties;

6) resilient civil communications systems;

7) resilient civil transportation systems.

This commitment is based on the recognition that the strategic environment has changed, and that the resilience of civil structures,
resources and services is the first line of defence for today’s modern societies.
More resilient countries – where the whole of government as well as the public and private sectors are involved in civil preparedness planning –
have fewer vulnerabilities that can otherwise be used as leverage or be targeted by adversaries. Resilience
is therefore an important
aspect of deterrence by denial: persuading an adversary not to attack by convincing it that an attack will
not achieve its intended objectives.

Resilient societies also have a greater propensity to bounce back after crises: they tend to recover more
rapidly and are able to return to pre-crisis functional levels with greater ease than less resilient
societies. This makes continuity of government and essential services to the population more durable. Similarly, it enhances the ability for
the civil sector to support a NATO military operation, including the capacity to rapidly reinforce an Ally.
Such resilience
is of benefit across the spectrum of threats, from countering or responding to a terrorist
attack to potential collective defence scenarios. Consequently, enhancing resilience though civil
preparedness plays an important role in strengthening the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture.

NATO resilience checks existential crises

Gallagher 19 [Mike and Colin Dueck; January 2019; Representative for Wisconsin’s Eighth District in the U.S. House of Representatives;
Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; National Review, “The Conservative Case for NATO,”
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/nato-western-military-alliance-bolsters-american-interests/]

The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American
national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s
Western alliance
provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their
European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism,
cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that
allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a
point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s
strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in
Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.

Canada water CI is a target – cyber protection key to NORAD defense

Brewster 19 [Murray, “Norad asked Canada to 'identify and mitigate' cyberthreats to critical civilian sites.” 9-9-19.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/norad-cyber-civilian-1.5273917 //shree]

The notion that a cyberattack could shut down civilian infrastructure — such as power grids, water
treatment plants or traffic systems — in the vicinity of a military base is nothing new.

What is unusual is that Norad sought reassurance, at the highest levels of the military, that Canada
was on top of the evolving threat.

The Norad commander asked Gen. Jonathan Vance to "identify and mitigate" Infrastructure Control
Systems (ICS) vulnerabilities on Canadian military bases, particularly at "installations that are critical for
accomplishing Norad missions."
The March 24, 2016 letter also urged Canada's top military commander to "advocate developing capabilities to respond to cyber incidents on
CAF [infrastructure control systems] and defend CAF if required."

Gourtney's concern was not limited to defence installations; he asked Vance to "work with Public Safety
Canada to identify civilian infrastructure that is critical to CAF and Norad missions. This includes
developing processes for reporting cyber incidents on the identified civilian infrastructure."
Vance responded to Gourtney (who has since retired and was replaced by U.S. Air Force Gen. Terrence O'Shaughnessy) three months later and
directed the military to hunt for vulnerabilities.

"I share Norad's concerns for the cybersecurity" of critical defence infrastructure, Vance wrote on June 10, 2016, in a letter obtained by CBC
News under access to information legislation.

the Canadian government has identified "adversaries" that pose "a significant threat and
He noted that
efforts have been made to identify and develop protective strategies for Canadian critical
infrastructure."
The Liberal government — through its defence strategy and overhaul of security legislation — tackled some of the concerns raised by Norad.
It gave the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and the military new powers to conduct offensive cyber operations. Perhaps more
importantly, it set up the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security for civilian infrastructure, which — according to CSE — aims to "be a place where
private and public sectors work side-by-side to solve Canada's most complex cyber issues."

David Masson, a cyber expert, said minimizing the vulnerability of civilian, privately operated
infrastructure continues to be an extraordinarily complex task.

The major vulnerability is in what's known as operational technology systems, the kind of computer-
driven tasks in utilities and other infrastructure that open and close valves or perform remote functions.

The task of securing them is made extraordinary difficult in part by the wide variety of operating
systems out there.
"There's lots of them," said Masson, the country manager in Canada for Darktrace, a leading cybersecurity company. "Look at it as 50, 60, 70
different bespoke communications systems. There's no real standardization because they're so old. Many of them were never
expected to be connected to the internet."

He pointed to the 2015 and 2016 cyberattacks on Ukraine's power grid, which in one instance cut electricity to 225,000 people, as examples of
what's possible when hackers go after operational technology systems.

It is also the kind of event that Norad is concerned about.

"The kinds of equipment and machinery that supports the transport of natural gas or the provision of air conditioned services, or our water
supply — all of those are critical to Canadians and our militaries," Lt.-Gen.Christopher Coates, the Canadian deputy
commander, said in a recent interview with CBC News.

He said Noradis focused on the capabilities that are essential to doing its job of defending North America
against attack, and they try to "minimize those vulnerabilities where we can."

NORAD defense collapse kills deterrence – goes nuclear.

Vanherck 21 [Glen D Vanherck. General, USAF Commander. Commands USNORTHCOM and NORAD. “NORAD & USNORTHCOMM
Strategy Executive summary.” March 2021. https://www.northcom.mil/Portals/28/(U)%20NORAD-USNORTHCOM%20Strategy%20EXSUM
%20-%20Signed.pdf //shree]

THEORY OF SUCCESS: A capable and persistent defense at home is a prerequisite to projecting power to a
globally integrated forward fight. Our ability to deter in competition, de-escalate in crisis, and deny and
defeat in conflict requires all-domain awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority. We
must improve critical infrastructure resiliency, strengthen partnerships, and provide rapid flexible
options and decision space in support of civil authorities.

Nuclear deterrence remains the bedrock of the United States' defense . In this deterrence by punishment approach,
we depend upon our competitors fearing the prohibitive costs of reprisal. However, we must also bring deterrence
by denial into our planning calculus. Reliance on nuclear deterrence alone leaves a gap for competitors to exploit if they believe they can
achieve their objectives below the nuclear threshold ranging from cyberattacks to conventional weapons. NORAD and USNORTHCOM will close
this gap by further developing flexible, responsive options that complicate a potential adversary’s decision calculus. The
American and
Canadian people are safe and secure today but, without intentional efforts to counter our competitors’
fast-paced advances, our competitive advantage will erode.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

For decades, our nations enjoyed the benefits of dominant military capabilities in all domains and we relied
on our geography to serve as a barrier to keep our nations beyond the reach of most conventional threats. Our ability to project power forward
along with our technological overmatch has allowed us to fight forward and focus our energy on conducting operations overseas. However,
our competitors have analyzed our ability to operate overseas and have invested in capabilities such as
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, small unmanned aircraft systems, artificial
intelligence, cyber capabilities, and delivery platforms to offset our strengths while exploiting our
perceived weaknesses. These advancing capabilities embolden competitors and adversaries to challenge us at
home, looking to threaten our people, our critical infrastructure and our power projection capabilities. As a result, the stakes are
higher than they have been in decades and, for NORAD and USNORTHCOM, successful continental
defense is the only option.

Fed key – states are pre-empted

Liu 12 [Edward; Legislative Attorney, JD @ Catholic University; Gina Stevens; Legislative Attorney; Kathleen Ann Ruane; Legislative Attorney;
Alissa M. Dolan; Legislative Attorney; Richard M. Thompson II; Legislative Attorney; “Cybersecurity: Selected Legal Issues,” Congressional
Research Service; AS]

Preemption

As the body of federal cybersecurity law grows, the possibility that it will preempt conflicting state law will increase with it. After September 11,
2001, states took various measures to protect their critical infrastructure. This included defining “critical infrastructure,” creating security
standards for these entities, and carving out exceptions under public disclosure laws so vital information would not get into the hands of bad
actors.

It is well established that the Supremacy

Clause of the United States Constitution can invalidate any state law that
interferes with or is contrary to federal law.331 This is known as preemption. The preemptive effect of a federal statute can be
either expressly stated in the statute or implied by the structure and purpose of the legislation.332 If there is express language, the court will
interpret the words used by Congress and assume that the ordinary meaning of the text expresses the legislative purpose.333 For example, if
Congress uses broad language in its preemption provision, the court will construe its preemptive effect broadly.334 Absent explicit preemptive
language, there are two types of implied preemption: (1) field preemption, where the federal regime is “so pervasive to make the reasonable
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it”;335 and (2) conflict preemption, where state law “stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”336

Because any preemption analysis relies on congressional intent, the language

of the statute is of primary importance. Many of the
proposals provide explicit language preempting state laws. For example, Title I of S. 2105, the Cybersecurity Act of
2012, contains an express preemption provision, stating: “This Act shall supersede any statute, provision of a
statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision of a State that expressly requires comparable cybersecurity
practices to protected covered critical infrastructure.”337 This section is followed by a savings clause that states: “Except as
expressly provided in subsection (a) and section 105(e), nothing in this Act shall be construed to preempt the applicability of any other State law
or requirement.”338

Because the scope of “covered critical infrastructure” has yet to be determined, it is impossible to identify with specificity which state critical
infrastructure laws would be preempted by this provision of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012. However, certain categories of state laws may be
more likely to be preempted, such as those that directly regulate industrial facilities. For example, New Jersey has enacted the Toxic
Catastrophe Prevention Act which was designed to prevent the release of hazardous substances from industrial plants and provide an
abatement and evacuation plan in the event a catastrophic release occurs.339 That act requires that an owner or operator of a covered facility
establish a risk management program. Likewise, Maryland requires that any facility where hazardous materials are stored analyze the security
of the facility every five years in accordance with rules adopted by the Department of State Police.340 Similarly, New York requires the
commissioner of the state division of homeland security to review security measures for all critical infrastructure relating to energy generation
and transmission in the state every five years.341 The state public service commission has the discretion whether to require the owners of
these facilities to implement these plans. The application
of these and other similar state requirements to covered critical
infrastructure may be preempted if they are “comparable” to the risk-based performance standards to
be established by the Secretary of DHS under the Cybersecurity Act of 2012.

It could also be argued that the broad

language “comparable security practices,” coupled with a savings clause
that fails to carve out exceptions for state regulation of covered critical infrastructure, evidences
Congress’s intent to cover the whole field of protecting critical infrastructures.342 Further, DHS may argue
for a broad construction of this preemption provision as it has argued in the past that “the law of
preemption recognizes that state laws must give way to Federal statutes and regulatory programs to
ensure a unified and coherent national approach in areas where the Federal interests prevail—such as
national security.”343 Because cybersecurity has been equated with national security, this deference
theory could apply here.344
2AC
Spark
 2AC Yes Extinction---2AC
Extinction---nuke winter, ag
Steven Starr 17. Director, University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program; senior scientist,
Physicians for Social Responsibility. 1/9/2017. “Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders
Reject Nuclear Winter Studies.” Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-
blind-eye-towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-winter-studies/
Now 10 years ago, several of the world’s leading climatologists and physicists chose to reinvestigate the long-term environmental impacts of
nuclear war. The
peer-reviewed studies they produced are considered to be the most authoritative type of
scientific research, which is subjected to criticism by the international scientific community before final
publication in scholarly journals. No serious errors were found in these studies and their findings remain
unchallenged.
Alan Robock et al., “Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic
consequences,” Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres 112 (2007).

Owen Brian Toon et al., “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual
nuclear terrorism,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 7 (2007).

Michael Mills et al., “Massive global ozone loss predicted following regional nuclear conflict,” Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America 105, no. 14 (2008).

Michael Mills et al., “Multidecadal global cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict,” Earth’s Future
2.

Alan Robock et al., “Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 7 (2007).

Working at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of Colorado-Boulder, the Department of Environmental Sciences
at Rutgers, and the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at UCLA, these
scientists used state-of-the-art
computer modeling to evaluate the consequences of a range of possible nuclear conflicts. They began with a
hypothetical war in Southeast Asia, in which a total of 100 Hiroshima-size atomic bombs were detonated in the cities of India and Pakistan.
Please consider the following images of Hiroshima, before and after the detonation of the atomic bomb, which had an explosive power of
15,000 tons of TNT.

The detonation of an atomic bomb with this explosive power will instantly ignite fires over a surface area of three to five square miles. In
the recent studies, the scientists calculated that the blast, fire, and radiation from a war fought with 100 atomic bombs could
produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a “counterforce”
nuclear war between the superpowers. However, the long-term environmental effects of the war could significantly disrupt the
global weather for at least a decade, which would likely result in a vast global famine .

The scientists predicted that nuclear firestorms in the burning cities would cause at least five million
tons of black carbon smoke to quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it could not be
rained out. The smoke would circle the Earth in less than two weeks and would form a global
stratospheric smoke layer that would remain for more than a decade. The smoke would absorb warming sunlight,
which would heat the smoke to temperatures near the boiling point of water, producing ozone losses of 20 to 50 percent
over populated areas. This would almost double the amount of UV-B reaching the most populated regions of the mid-latitudes, and it
would create UV-B indices unprecedented in human history. In North America and Central Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at
mid-day in June could decrease to as little as six minutes for fair-skinned individuals.

As the smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from reaching the Earth’s surface, it
would produce the coldest average surface
temperatures in the last 1,000 years. The scientists calculated that global food production would decrease by 20
to 40 percent during a five-year period following such a war. Medical experts have predicted that the shortening of
growing seasons and corresponding decreases in agricultural production could cause up to two billion
people to perish from famine.

The climatologists also investigated the effects of a

nuclear war fought with the vastly more powerful modern
thermonuclear weapons possessed by the United States, Russia, China, France, and England. Some of the
thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s were 1,000 times more powerful than an atomic bomb.

During the last 30 years, the average size of thermonuclear or “strategic” nuclear weapons has decreased. Yet today, each
of the
approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by the United States and Russia is seven to 80 times more
powerful than the atomic bombs modeled in the India-Pakistan study. The smallest strategic nuclear weapon has an
explosive power of 100,000 tons of TNT, compared to an atomic bomb with an average explosive power of 15,000 tons of TNT.

Strategic nuclear weapons produce much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic bombs. For example, a
standard Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to 152
square miles.

A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite
immense nuclear firestorms covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of thousands of
square miles. The scientists calculated that these fires would produce up to 180 million tons of black carbon soot
and smoke, which would form a dense, global stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke would remain in the
stratosphere for 10 to 20 years, and it would block as much as 70 percent of sunlight from reaching the surface of
the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from the Southern Hemisphere. So much sunlight would be blocked by the smoke
that the noonday sun would resemble a full moon at midnight.

Under such conditions, it would only require a matter of days or weeks for daily minimum temperatures
to fall below freezing in the largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere , where freezing temperatures
would occur every day for a period of between one to more than two years. Average surface temperatures would become
colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age, and the prolonged cold
would cause average rainfall to decrease by up to 90%. Growing seasons would be completely
eliminated for more than a decade; it would be too cold and dark to grow food crops, which would
doom the majority of the human population.2

Even if not directly existential---that spurs system collapse AND pandemics, which are
Julian Cribb 19. Author, journalist, editor and science communicator, principal of Julian Cribb &
Associates who provide specialist consultancy in the communication of science, agriculture, food,
mining, energy and the environment, more than thirty awards for journalism. 10/03/2019. “6 - Food as
an Existential Risk.” Food or War, 1st ed., Cambridge University Press. DOI.org (Crossref),
doi:10.1017/9781108690126.

Humanity is facing its greatest test in the million-year ascent of our kind. This isn’t a single challenge. It’s a
constellation of huge man-made threats, now coming together to overshadow our civilisation’s stability and even, maybe,
its future survival. These ten intersecting risks are: ecological collapse, resource depletion, weapons of mass destruction, climate change,
global poisoning, food insecurity, population and urban failure, pandemic disease and uncontrolled new technologies (like killer robots, artificial
intelligence and universal surveillance) – reinforced by a prodigious capacity for human self-delusion. But sticking our heads in the sand and
trying to ignore them will not remove the danger.

These threats are known as ‘existential risks’ because they imperil our future existence, both as individuals, as a civilisation
and maybe even as a species.
Their most important feature is the fact that they are not isolated from one another. They are deeply interwoven. They
play into and feed one another. They cannot be addressed separately or singly, because to do so creates a situation
where curbing one risk only makes other risks worse. Together they constitute a single existential emergency facing all of
humanity.
An example of why they cannot be addressed piecemeal is trying to solve the global food problem by intensifying agriculture worldwide using
fossil fuels, fertilisers and petrochemicals: this will only destroy the very climate, resources and ecosystem services on which agriculture, itself,
depends – and is not, consequently, a viable or enduring solution. Other answers must be sought. Another example is that trying to end the
Sixth Extinction of wildlife on our planet by turning half of it back to forest and grassland will not work on its own, because it would involve the
sacrifice of half the current human food supply: consequently, we need a solution that achieves both aims – sustainable food for all and a
sufficient haven for the Earth’s other species. So, the problem of extinction needs to be solved, in part, by solving the problem of food – and
that, in turn, entails solving the problems of climate, global poisoning, resource depletion and other mega-risks. It is absolutely clear from this
that the solutions we adopt must be cross-cutting. They must comprehensively address all the perils we face, not just one or a handful of them.

Take these ten great risks together and what you have is the focal issue of our time – the greatest and most profound challenge ever to
confront human civilisation. The risks are all selfinflicted, a direct result of the overgrowth in human numbers and our unbridled demands on
the planet – for food, resources, space and a healthy environment. By solving them together, we ensure our future. By denying them or failing
to solve them all in time, we knowingly create untold misery and suffering for most of humanity and generations to come through the centuries
ahead. We are gambling with the very survival of our civilisation and species. The risks are described below, along with observations about how
they play into the Food or War scenario. The detail, the scientific sources and the solutions, collective and individual, to each risk are described
in more detail in Surviving the 21st Century.

Extinction and Ecological Collapse

More than half of the large animals that once inhabited the Earth have been wiped from it by human action since 1970, according to the
Worldwide Fund for Nature’s Living Planet Index.3 So, too, have half the fish in the sea on which humans rely for food.4 Humans are, in the
words of the great biologist E. O. Wilson, ‘tearing down the biosphere’, demolishing the very home that keeps us alive.5

Extinction, it should be noted, is a part of life: 99.9 per cent of all species ever to evolve on this planet have disappeared, and new ones like
ourselves have arisen to replace them. But extinction rates like today’s – a hundred to a thousand times faster than normal – are a freak
occurrence that usually takes tens of millions of years, not mere decades. Animal, plant and marine species are presently vanishing so fast that
scientists have dubbed our time “the Sixth Extinction” – the sixth such megadeath in the geological history of the Earth.6 By the end of the
present century, Wilson says, it is possible that up to half of the eight million species thought to exist here will be gone. Furthermore, in all
previous extinctions, natural events like asteroid strikes and vast volcanic outbursts have been to blame. This will be the only time in the Earth’s
history when the wipe-out was caused by a single species. Us.7

The probability of humans becoming extinct during the twentyfirst century is not high – but there are scenarios, such as an all-out nuclear war,
runaway climate change (+5–10 C or more), or a compound collapse in the Earth’s main life support systems, in which it must be regarded as a
possibility – and the fact that it is unpleasant to contemplate is no excuse for doing nothing to stop it.

However, there are also a number of credible scenarios in which large-scale ecosystem collapse could endanger civilisation and cause very high
mortality among the world’s population. These revolve around the notion of ‘environmental security’ which is, in turn, very closely tied to
human security – i.e. peace or war. An ecosystem is a biological community of mutually dependent species – and the removal of one species
after another can undermine it and render it dysfunctional, in the same way that pulling one brick at a time out of your home will eventually
cause it to fall down. Ecosystems support all life on the planet, and maintain the quality of air, water and soil on which it depends. For humans,
they provide food and clean water (provisioning services), disease and climate regulation (regulatory services), spiritual and aesthetic fulfilment
(cultural services), useful chemical energy (from plants) and soil formation (support services). As ecosystems decay, the decline and loss of
these services often causes significant harm to human wellbeing and can inflame the tensions that lead to conflict.

The most destructive object on the planet, as we noted in Chapter 3, is the human jawbone. The need to keep it fed is responsible, every year,
for the loss of up to 75 billion tonnes of topsoil, the wasting of six trillion tonnes of water, the release of five million tonnes of pesticides, and 30
per cent of the world’s climate-wrecking carbon emissions. In addition, the contemporary food system is the chief driver of deforestation,
desertification, wildlife extinctions and impaired ecosystems. Among the most striking examples of food’s impact on the wild world are the
400+ ‘dead zones’ spreading through the world’s oceans from the Arabian Sea, to the Baltic and the Mississippi delta. These are oxygenless
layers in the sea, where fish cannot survive. They are caused by topsoil dislodged by land clearing, over-farming and over-grazing, the use of
huge quantities of artificial fertilisers, toxic chemicals and human sewage. Along with overfishing they contribute to an ongoing collapse in
world wild fisheries and are a clear example of how the activity of one part of the food system can impair another. Similarly, most inland rivers
and lakes in populated regions are eutrophic and polluted – and no longer capable of producing as much food as in the past. The loss of wild
fisheries increases tensions between nations and fishers over what remains and can lead to ‘fish wars’. 8
The existing global food production system is therefore a major contributor to the decline and failure of ecosystem services needed to support
the human population. This in turn rebounds on the food system itself. Furthermore, the extinction of wild animals and plants deprives the food
industry of many edible species that may be needed as part of a healthy, diverse global diet in future.

The solution to the extinction crisis is to cease farming and grazing on about half the currently farmed area of the planet (25 million square
kilometres), transfer food production to the cities where it can take advantage of all the nutrients and water currently being wasted, and
employ many of the world’s farmers and indigenous people as Stewards of the Earth to manage the rewilding and regeneration of former
farmlands. Food production can continue on the remaining 24 million square kilometres using eco-agriculture. This process is further described
in Surviving the 21st Century and in Chapter 9 of this book.

How the existing food system plays into the risk of war can also be viewed through the lens of environmental security: war damages
environments, making it harder for humans to sustain and feed themselves – and ruined environments themselves become cauldrons of war.
This is plainly to be seen in the cases of Syria, South Sudan, Yemen and the Horn of Africa. What we most need are food systems that do not
cause knock-on damage to either the environment and wildlife, the climate, the oceans or to consumer health – and which ease tensions, so
promoting peace, not conflict. These are described in Chapters 8 and 9.

Resource Scarcity

The average citizen of planet Earth today uses at least ten times the volume of resources used by their grandparents a century ago. Since the
human population has also quadrupled over the same time, this means humanity’s gargantuan appetite for minerals, metals, timber, water,
food and energy has grown fortyfold in barely a hundred years. As the Global Footprint Network explains, we are presently using enough ‘stuff’
for 1.6 Earths, not just the one we have. We now outrun the Earth’s natural ability to supply our needs in August each year.9 As with the mining
of groundwater, the decline and collapse of global resources like soil, water and phosphorus, is often imperceptible to the individual: people
have simply no idea they are living on borrowed time and, with that, comes enormous risk.

To make the issue of resource consumption a little more personal: you (as an average individual citizen of the planet) will in your lifetime

– use 99,720 tonnes (i.e. 40 Olympic pools) of fresh water

– displace 750 tonnes of topsoil

– consume 720 tonnes of metals and materials

– use 80 billion joules of energy

– release 288 tonnes of CO2

– release 320 kilograms of toxic chemicals

– waste 13.4 tonnes of food

– destroy 800 square metres of forest.

Because of the long, cryptic, industrial and international trade chains which hide it, most of us are unaware of the vast damage we do to the
planet through our simple habit of shopping.

Yes, some of us have a notion that some of our purchases may be bad for gorillas in the Congo, orangutans in Borneo or flamingos in the
Atacama – but we mostly have no true appreciation of the wider havoc we inflict on the Earth and its natural systems by the ‘innocent’ act of
consumption, which business and governments try constantly to convince us is essential to ‘growth and jobs’.

It should therefore come as no surprise that the world finds itself increasingly short of key resources like fresh water, soil, phosphorus, timber
and certain minerals – and that these shortages are giving rise to tensions and even to conflicts. Indeed, resource scarcity has for some time
been considered by strategic experts to be one of the most likely causes of war in the twentyfirst century.10

However, people are not equally responsible for the devastation of Planet Earth. The diagram below (Figure 6.1), from [[FIGURE 6.1
OMITTED]] Oxfam, illustrates how just one tenth of humanity consumes five times as much in the way of material resources (expressed
here in the form of their carbon footprint) as the poorest half of the world population. The affluent are chiefly responsible for the destruction
taking place on a global scale as they seek to sustain lifestyles that the planet can no longer afford or support.

The significance of this blind spot around consumption for global food security is very great. As described in earlier chapters, the world food
system depends critically on soil, water, nutrients and a stable climate, to supply humanity’s daily need for nutriment – and all of these
essential resources are in increasingly short supply, chiefly because of our own mismanagement of them and our collective failure to appreciate
that they are finite. On current trends, the existing food system will tend to break down, first regionally and then globally, owing to resource
scarcity from the 2020s onward, and especially towards the mid century – unless there is radical change in the world diet and the means by
which we feed ourselves. This will lead to increasing outbreaks of violence and war. Nobody, neither rich nor poor, will escape the
consequences.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Detonating just 50–100 out of the global arsenal of nearly 15,000 nuclear weapons would suffice to end civilisation
in a nuclear winter, causing worldwide famine and economic collapse affecting even distant nations, as
we saw in the previous chapter in the section dealing with South Asia. Eight nations now have the power to terminate
civilisation should they desire to do so – and two have the power to extinguish the human species. According to the
nuclear monitoring group Ploughshares, this arsenal is distributed as follows:

– Russia, 6600 warheads (2500 classified as ‘retired’)

– America, 6450 warheads (2550 classified as ‘retired’)

– France, 300 warheads

– China, 270 warheads

– UK, 215 warheads

– Pakistan, 130 warheads

– India, 120 warheads

– Israel, 80 warheads

– North Korea, 15–20 warheads.11

Although actual numbers of warheads have continued to fall from its peak of 70,000 weapons in the mid 1980s, scientists argue the danger
of nuclear conflict in fact increased in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. This was due to the
modernisation of existing stockpiles, the adoption of dangerous new technologies such as robot delivery systems,
hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare, and the continuing leakage of nuclear materials
and knowhow to nonnuclear nations and potential terrorist organisations.
In early 2018 the hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’, maintained by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, were re-set at two minutes to midnight,
the highest risk to humanity that it has ever shown since the clock was introduced in 1953. This was due not only to the state of the world’s
nuclear arsenal, but also to irresponsible language by world leaders, the growing use of social media to destabilise rival regimes, and to the
rising threat of uncontrolled climate change (see below).12

In an historic moment on 17 July 2017, 122 nations voted in the UN for the first time ever in favour of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons. This
called for comprehensive prohibition of “a full range of nuclear-weapon-related activities, such as undertaking to develop, test, produce,
manufacture, acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the use or threat of use of these
weapons.”13 However, 71 other countries – including all the nuclear states – either opposed the ban, abstained or declined to vote. The Treaty
vote was nonetheless interpreted by some as a promising first step towards abolishing the nuclear nightmare that hangs over the entire human
species.

In contrast, 192 countries had signed up to the Chemical Weapons Convention to ban the use of chemical weapons, and 180 to the Biological
Weapons Convention. As of 2018, 96 per cent of previous world stocks of chemical weapons had been destroyed – but their continued use in
the Syrian conflict and in alleged assassination attempts by Russia indicated the world remains at risk.14

As things stand, the only entities that can afford to own nuclear weapons are nations – and if humanity is to be wiped out, it will
most likely be as a result of an atomic conflict between nations. It follows from this that, if the world is to be made safe from
such a fate it will need to get rid of nations as a structure of human self-organisation and replace them with wiser, less aggressive forms of self-
governance. After all, the nation state really only began in the early nineteenth century and is by no means a permanent feature of self-
governance, any more than monarchies, feudal systems or priest states. Although many people still tend to assume it is. Between them, nations
have butchered more than 200 million people in the past 150 years and it is increasingly clear the world would be a far safer, more peaceable
place without either nations or nationalism. The question is what to replace them with.

Although there may at first glance appear to be no close linkage between weapons of mass destruction and food, in the twentyfirst century
with world resources of food, land and water under growing stress, nothing can be ruled out. Indeed, chemical weapons have frequently been
deployed in the Syrian civil war, which had drought, agricultural failure and hunger among its early drivers. And nuclear conflict remains a
distinct possibility in South Asia and the Middle East, especially, as these regions are already stressed in terms of food, land and water, and their
nuclear firepower or access to nuclear materials is multiplying.

It remains an open question whether panicking regimes in Russia, the USA or even France would be ruthless enough to deploy atomic weapons
in an attempt to quell invasion by tens of millions of desperate refugees, fleeing famine and climate chaos in their own homelands – but the
possibility ought not to be ignored.

That nuclear war is at least a possible outcome of food and climate crises was first flagged in the report The Age of Consequences by Kurt
Campbell and the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, which stated ‘it is clear that even nuclear war cannot be excluded as
a political consequence of global warming’. 15 Food insecurity is therefore a driver in the preconditions for the use of nuclear weapons,
whether limited or unlimited.

A global famine is a likely outcome of limited use of nuclear weapons by any country or countries – and would
be unavoidable in the event of an unlimited nuclear war between America and Russia, making it
unwinnable for either. And that, as the mute hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’ so eloquently admonish, is also
the most likely scenario for the premature termination of the human species.
Such a grim scenario can be alleviated by two measures: the voluntary banning by the whole of humanity of nuclear weapons, their technology,
materials and stocks – and by a global effort to secure food against future insecurity by diverting the funds now wasted on nuclear armaments
into building the sustainable food and water systems of the future (see Chapters 8 and 9).

Climate Change

The effects of food and war on climate change as it is presently predicted to occur were described in Chapter 3: in brief, the stable climate in
which agriculture arose over the past 6000 years is now becoming increasingly unstable as a result of the billions of tonnes of carbon that
humans are injecting into the atmosphere and oceans, forming a colossal heat engine to drive more frequent, violent weather. This in turn
impairs food production in regions of the world already facing severe stresses from population growth and resource depletion. Military analysts
describe climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’, augmenting the tensions, conflict and instability which already exist. In reality it is a feedback
loop, in which worsening climate conditions cause greater food insecurity, which is met by measures (like increased land clearing and use of
fossil fuels and chemicals), which in turn worsen climate conditions, which worsen food security, which cause wars, which inflict more eco-
damage...

Two degrees (2 C) of global warming – described as the danger point for humanity – are predicted to occur well before 2050 because of our
collective failure to curb our carbon emissions.16 Those 2 C of warming portend bad things for any food system that depends on the weather –
but just how bad cannot easily be forecast as both the climate state and the response of the global food system are governed by human
behaviour, which is fairly unpredictable. Current estimates suggest crop losses of the order of 20–50 per cent at the very time we are trying to
raise food output by 50–70 per cent. What can be confidently predicted, however, is that there will be an increase in both the frequency and
scale of harvest failures and agricultural disease outbreaks around the world as we approach the mid century – and that beyond 2 C of
warming it will become very hard indeed to maintain a stable outdoors, agriculture-based system to meet an anticipated doubling in world
demand for food by the 2060s. The ‘worst case’ risk of this, as previously outlined, would be ten billion people having to subsist on enough food
to feed only four billion.

That, however, is by no means the worst case of the climate story. There are ominous signs that humans have already unleashed planetary
forces over which we have absolutely no control – and that these, should they become large enough, will take charge of the Earth’s climate
engine and drive it into a superheated condition of +9–10 C or even higher.

Today, more people are aware that global warming may lead to complete melting of all glaciers and the polar ice-caps, thereby raising sea
levels by 65 metres and inundating almost all of the world’s seaboard cities, fertile river deltas and coastal plains.17 This would clearly have a
devastating effect on coastal food production. However, this process will probably take several centuries, allowing populations ample time to
relocate inland. That sea levels previously rose by a similar quantum at the end of the last Ice Age, flooding part of Australia, severing Britain
from Europe and America from Asia, is proof enough that such events occur as a regular part of the Earth’s warming and chilling cycles.

The great existential threat to humanity lies in vast stores of frozen methane gas (CH4) locked into the soils of the tundra regions of Canada and
Siberia, in colossal deposits of frozen methane on the continental seabed surrounding the Arctic Ocean, and in massive stores of methane
submerged in peat deposits and swamps in places such as the Amazon and the wet tropical forests of Southeast Asia and Africa. Methane is a
gas with 20–70 times the climate-forcing power of carbon dioxide. These deposits are the accumulation of the slow decomposition of planet
and animal matter in the Earth’s sediments over several hundred million years – they are identical in origin to the gas bubbles that surface
when we stir the bed of a pond or lake.

The actual volume of these methane deposits is still being assessed by science. Recent estimates suggest:

• seabed deposits – between 500–2500 billion tonnes of frozen carbon;18

 • tundra deposits – potentially emitting 180–420 million tonnes of carbon a year by 2100; and

• tropical peat swamps – could emit 480–870 million tonnes of carbon a year by 2100.19

That carbon released from peat swamps, tundra and possibly the oceans can have a catastrophic effect on the Earth’s climate is foreshadowed
by an event known as the Palaeocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM), which took place some 55 million years ago, when Earth took a
sudden fever and its temperature rocketed upwards by +5–9 C. This ‘heat spike’ caused a lesser extinction event involving widespread loss of
ocean life and a smaller toll of land animals.20 However, the heating occurred over a much longer period – 100–200,000 years, compared with
human-driven heating (50–100 years) – and is thought to have been mainly caused by the drying out and burning of tropical peat swamps as
the climate warmed. However, the volume of carbon which caused this sharp planetary heat spike in the past is estimated to be barely a tenth
of that released by humanity today.21

Today, human activity in clearing rainforests, draining swamps and burning the world’s forests to open them up for farming and food
production is releasing vast amounts of methane and CO2. Explosion craters have been reported across Canada and Siberia as frozen methane
deposits well up and erupt with the melting of the tundra. And scientists from Sweden, Russia, Canada and America have reported methane
bubbling from the seabed of the Arctic Ocean, though not yet in massive volumes. The risk in all this is that, by warming the planet by only 1–2
C, we have set in train natural processes that we are powerless to control, setting ourselves on an inescapable trajectory to a Hothouse Earth,
5–10 C or more above today’s levels.

Although it is hard to estimate, some scientists are of the view that fewer than one billion humans would survive such an event22 – in other
words, nine people out of every ten may perish in the cycle of famines, wars, heatwaves and pandemic diseases which global overheating
would entail. This underlies the deadly urgency of ceasing to burn all fossil fuels, locking up as much carbon as possible and re-stabilising the
Earth’s climate. In that, food production can and will play a central role.

Poisoned Planet

‘Earth, and all life on it, are being saturated with man-made chemicals in an event unlike anything which has occurred in all four
billion years of our planet’s story. Each moment of our lives, from conception unto death, we are exposed to thousands of
substances, some deadly in even tiny doses and most of them unknown in their effects on our health and wellbeing or upon the
natural world. These enter our bodies with every breath, each meal or drink, the clothes we wear, the products with which we adorn
ourselves, our homes, workplaces, cars and furniture, the things we encounter every day. There is no escaping them. Ours is a
poisoned planet, its whole system infused with the substances humans deliberately or inadvertently produce in the course of
extracting, making, using, burning or discarding the many marvellous products on which modern life depends. This explosion in
chemical use and release has all happened so rapidly that most people are blissfully unaware of its true magnitude and extent, or of
the dangers it now poses to us all as well as to future generations for centuries to come.’

This is a summation of the chemical crisis facing all of humanity, as well as all life on Earth, which I wrote in Surviving the 21st Century, and
which is based on the extensive scientific research reported in Poisoned Planet.23 It is a crisis with profound impact for everyone.

According to the medical journal The Lancet, nine million people – one in six – die every year from chemical pollution of their air, water, food
and living environment.24 A further 40 million die from the so-called noncommunicable or ‘lifestyle’ diseases (NCDs), cancer, heart disease,
diabetes and lung disease, which are mostly diet-related.25

Food production, as we have seen, is deeply implicated in the chemical deluge. However, it is also an existential threat to human health, both in
terms of infectious disease and the new ‘lifestyle’ diseases. No-one to my knowledge has compiled an accurate assessment of the total
chemical effusion of humanity or presented a realistic impression of its true scale. Box 6.1 represents my own best estimate, drawn from
various reliable sources.

From this it can easily be seen that the scale of humanity’s chemical assault on ourselves and on the planet is many times the scale of our
climate assault – yet this issue commands nowhere near the political or scientific priority that it should. It is arguably the most under-rated,
under-investigated and poorly understood of all the existential threats to humanity.

The poisoning of the Earth by human activities has grave implications for the health and safety of the global food chain and its eight billion
consumers. It is not only the use of chemicals in food production that is of concern, but also the contamination of water, soils and livestock by
industrial pollutants from other sources, such as mining or manufacturing. It is also the disruption of vital services such as pollination by insects
of a [[BOX 6.1 OMITTED]] third of the world’s food crops and 90 per cent of wild plants.26 It is the contamination of up to three
quarters of the world fish catch with microscopic plastic particles and clothing microfibres made by the petrochemical industry.27

The ending of this flood of poisons is a prerequisite for a safe, healthy and sustainable global food supply in future. And, since government
regulation has largely failed to stem the worldwide flood, the task now falls to consumers – to choose foods which have been produced by safe
methods and shun foods produced by unsafe methods. That is the only way that the food industry can be encouraged (and penalised) into
doing the right thing by humanity and the planet: by consumers rewarding it for producing clean food and punishing it for toxic food. Otherwise
it will continue to pollute as profitably as it can. It follows that the urgent global education of consumers about which foods are safe and which
are toxic is also a pre-requisite.
Food Security

Our demand for food is set to double by the 2060s – potentially the decade of ‘peak people’, the moment in history when the irresistible
human population surge may top out at around 10 billion. However, as we have seen, many of the resources needed to supply it agriculturally
could halve and the climate for the growing of food outdoors become far more hostile.

Why food insecurity is an existential threat to humanity should, by now, be abundantly clear from the earlier chapters of
this book: present
systems are unsustainable and, as they fail, will pose risks both to civilization and,
should these spiral into nuclear conflict, to the future of the human species.

The important thing to note in this chapter is that food

insecurity plays into many, if not all, of the other existential
threats facing humanity. The food sector’s role in extinction, resource scarcity, global toxicity and potential
nuclear war has already been explained. Its role in the suppression of conflict is discussed in the next chapter. Its
role in securing the future of the megacities, and of a largely urbanised humanity, is covered in Chapter 8. And
its role in sustaining humanity through the peak in population and into a sustainable world beyond is
covered in Chapter 9.

Food clearly has a pivotal role in

the future of human population – both as a driver of population growth when supplies are
abundant and as a potential driver of population decline, should food chains collapse. It is no exaggeration
to state that the fate of civilisation depends on it.
Pandemic Disease

Disease pandemics have been a well-known existential risk to humanity since the plague of Athens in 430
BC – itself linked to a war. However, a point that escapes many people nowadays is that, as humans have become so numerous –
indeed the predominant lifeform on the planet – we have also become the major food source for many microbes. We
are now the ‘living compost heap’ on which they must dine and in which they must reproduce , if they are
themselves to survive.

As our own population grows, pandemics are thus likely to increase, as more and more viruses and bacteria are forced to take
refuge in humans following the depletion or total extinction of their natural hosts, the wild animals we are exterminating. This process is greatly
assisted by our creation of megacities, tourism and air travel, schools and child-minding centres, air-conditioned offices, night clubs, sex with
strangers, pet and pest animals, insects which prosper from climate change or human modification of the environment (like mosquitoes),
ignorance, poor public hygiene, lack of clean water, and deficient food processing and handling.

So, while
humanity is confronted with an ever-expanding array of parasites, we are simultaneously doing
everything in our power to distribute them worldwide in record time – and to seed new pandemics.
The World Health Organisation has identified 19 major infectious diseases with potential to become pandemic:
chikungunya, cholera, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, Ebola, Hendra, influenza, Lassa fever, Marburg virus, meningitis, MERS-CoV,
monkeypox, Nipah, plague, Rift Valley fever, SARS, smallpox, tularaemia, yellow fever and Zika virus disease.28 While none of these is likely to
fulfil the Hollywood horror movie image of wiping out the human species – for the simple reason that viruses are usually smart enough to
weaken to a sublethal state once comfortably ensconced in their new host – the apocalyptic horseman representing
Pestilence and Death will nevertheless continue to play a synergetic role with his companions warfare,
famine, climate change, global poisoning, ecological collapse, urbanisation and other existential threats.

Food insecurity affects the progression of pandemic diseases, often in ways that are not entirely obvious. First, new
pandemics of infectious disease tend to originate in developing regions where nutritional levels are poor or agricultural
practices favour the evolution of novel pathogens such as, for example, the new flu strains seen every year – which arise mainly from places
where people, pigs and poultry live side-by-side and shuffle viruses between them – and also novel diseases like SARS and MERS. Second,
because totally unknown diseases tend to arise first in places where rainforests are being cut down for farming and viruses hitherto confined to
wild animals and birds make an enforced transition into humans. Examples of novel human diseases escaping from the rainforest and tropical
savannah in recent times include HIV/AIDS, Hendra, Nipah, Ebola, Marburg, Lassa and Hanta, Lujo, Junin, Machupo, Rift Valley, Congo and
Zika.29 And thirdly, because the loss of vital micronutrients from heavily farmed soils and from food itself predisposes many populations to
various deficiency diseases – for example, a lack of selenium in the diet has been linked with increased risk from both HIV/AIDS and bowel
cancer.30 A key synergy is the way hunger and malnourishment exacerbate the spread of disease, classic examples
being the 1918 Global Flu Pandemic which spread rapidly among war-starved populations, or the more recent cholera
outbreak in war-torn Yemen. In a fresh twist, Dr Melinda Beck of North Carolina University has demonstrated that obesity – itself a
form of malnutrition – may cause increased deaths from influenza by both aiding the virus and
suppressing the patient’s immune response.31
 Yes Nuclear Winter---AT: Reisner 18
Reisner’s wrong – 5 warrants
---simulation was done in a country club in the suburbs, fuel load was too small to be a city, omitted key
factors that would allow for higher smoke rise, did not simulate until the end, only an Indo-Pak war (not
global)

Bardeen et. al 19 – researcher at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, with a specialization
in Atmospheric Chemistry; worked at the University of Colorado Boulder with a focus in atmospheric
science (Owen Toon; Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmospheric and
Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado; Alan Robock; Department of Environmental
Sciences, Rutgers University; “Comment on “Climate impact of a regional nuclear weapons exchange: An
improved assessment based on detailed source calculations” by Reisner et al.”; April 2019 (Revised
August 2019);
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336673165_Comment_on_Climate_impact_of_a_regional_n
uclear_weapons_exchange_An_improved_assessment_based_on_detailed_source_calculations_by_Rei
sner_et_al; accessed 12/5/19) dc

In summary, Reisner et al. (2018) modeled a fire in an area with much different characteristics than considered in
our studies including: 1. targeting a sparsely populated suburb surrounding a country club, not a city center, 2.
having a fuel load that is more than an order of magnitude less than any of the 100 urban areas of
Pakistan or India considered by Robock et al. (2007) and Mills et al. (2014), 3. omitting factors known to be important
to smoke lofting (e.g., latent heat release), and 4. failing to model the full duration of the event. Because of these
choices, they did not simulate firestorms, which would be expected in densely populated urban areas and
are known to have high altitude smoke plumes. Critically, they have not shown that their model is capable of
reproducing historic firestorms, thus making it impossible to interpret their failure to generate a classic firestorm.
Reisner et al. do raise an important point that not all mass fires in a nuclear war will be firestorms; however, these mass fires cannot be
assumed to be weak conflagrations, either. Accurate understanding of target locations, fuel loads, and the effects of meteorology on
the fire and smoke injection heights are critical to understanding the climatic consequences of fires from a nuclear
war. Fire models like HIGRAD-FIRETEC can be valuable tools for studying these issues, but the case presented by Reisner et al. is
not typical of the conditions that would be expected in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan and
certainly does not represent an upper bound on these effects.
 Regeneration---2AC
Civilization will regenerate
Dr. Toby Ord 20, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, DPhil in Philosophy from
the University of Oxford, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, p. 40-41

In this book, I shall use the term civilization collapse quite literally, to refer to an outcome where
humanity across the globe loses civilization (at least temporarily), being reduced to a pre-agricultural
way of life. The term is often used loosely to refer merely to a massive breakdown of order, the loss of
modern technology, or an end to our culture. But I am talking about a world without writing, cities, law,
or any of the other trappings of civilization.

This would be a very severe disaster and extremely hard to trigger. For all the historical pressures on
civilizations, never once has this happened—not even on the scale of a continent.10 The fact that
Europe survived losing 25 to 50 percent of its population in the Black Death, while keeping civilization
firmly intact, suggests that triggering the collapse of civilization would require more than 50 percent
fatality in every region of the world.11

Even if civilization did collapse, it is likely that it could be re-established. As we have seen, civilization
has already been independently established at least seven times by isolated peoples.12 While one
might think resource depletion could make this harder, it is more likely that it has become substantially
easier. Most disasters short of human extinction would leave our domesticated animals and plants, as
well as copious material resources in the ruins of our cities—it is much easier to re-forge iron from old
railings than to smelt it from ore. Even expendable resources such as coal would be much easier to
access, via abandoned reserves and mines, than they ever were in the eighteenth century.13 Moreover,
evidence that civilization is possible, and the tools and knowledge to help rebuild, would be scattered
across the world.
 AT: Impacts
No runaway AI
Geist 15 – Edward Moore Geist, MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for
International Security and Cooperation, Former Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the RAND
Corporation, Doctorate in History from the University of North Carolina, “Is Artificial Intelligence Really
An Existential Threat to Humanity?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 8-9,
https://thebulletin.org/2015/08/is-artificial-intelligence-really-an-existential-threat-to-humanity/

Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies is an astonishing book with an alarming thesis: Intelligent
machines are “quite possibly the most important and most daunting challenge humanity has ever
faced.” In it, Oxford University philosopher Nick Bostrom, who has built his reputation on the study of
“existential risk,” argues forcefully that artificial intelligence might be the most apocalyptic technology
of all. With intellectual powers beyond human comprehension, he prognosticates, self-improving
artificial intelligences could effortlessly enslave or destroy Homo sapiens if they so wished. While he
expresses skepticism that such machines can be controlled, Bostrom claims that if we program the right
“human-friendly” values into them, they will continue to uphold these virtues, no matter how powerful
the machines become.

These views have found an eager audience. In August 2014, PayPal cofounder and electric car magnate
Elon Musk tweeted “Worth reading Superintelligence by Bostrom. We need to be super careful with AI.
Potentially more dangerous than nukes.” Bill Gates declared, “I agree with Elon Musk and some others
on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned.” More ominously, legendary
astrophysicist Stephen Hawking concurred: “I think the development of full artificial intelligence could
spell the end of the human race.” Proving his concern went beyond mere rhetoric, Musk donated $10
million to the Future of Life Institute “to support research aimed at keeping AI beneficial for humanity.”

Superintelligence is propounding a solution that will not work to a problem that probably does not exist,
but Bostrom and Musk are right that now is the time to take the ethical and policy implications of
artificial intelligence seriously. The extraordinary claim that machines can become so intelligent as to
gain demonic powers requires extraordinary evidence, particularly since artificial intelligence (AI)
researchers have struggled to create machines that show much evidence of intelligence at all . While
these investigators’ ultimate goals have varied since the emergence of the discipline in the mid-1950s,
the fundamental aim of AI has always been to create machines that demonstrate intelligent behavior,
whether to better understand human cognition or to solve practical problems. Some AI researchers even
tried to create the self-improving reasoning machines Bostrom fears. Through decades of bitter
experience, however, they learned not only that creating intelligence is more difficult than they initially
expected, but also that it grows increasingly harder the smarter one tries to become. Bostrom’s concept
of “superintelligence,” which he defines as “any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance
of humans in virtually all domains of interest,” builds upon similar discredited assumptions about the
nature of thought that the pioneers of AI held decades ago. A summary of Bostrom’s arguments,
contextualized in the history of artificial intelligence, demonstrates how this is so.

In the 1950s, the founders of the field of artificial intelligence assumed that the discovery of a few
fundamental insights would make machines smarter than people within a few decades. By the 1980s,
however, they discovered fundamental limitations that show that there will always be diminishing
returns to additional processing power and data. Although these technical hurdles pose no barrier to
the creation of human-level AI, they will likely forestall the sudden emergence of an unstoppable
“superintelligence.”

The risks of self-improving intelligent machines are grossly exaggerated and ought not serve as a
distraction from the existential risks we already face, especially given that the limited AI technology we
already have is poised to make threats like those posed by nuclear weapons even more pressing than
they currently are. Disturbingly, little or no technical progress beyond that demonstrated by self-driving
cars is necessary for artificial intelligence to have potentially devastating, cascading economic, strategic,
and political effects. While policymakers ought not lose sleep over the technically implausible menace of
“superintelligence,” they have every reason to be worried about emerging AI applications such as the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s submarine-hunting drones, which threaten to upend
longstanding geostrategic assumptions in the near future. Unfortunately, Superintelligence offers little
insight into how to confront these pressing challenges.
T
 2AC T – “Protection of Water Resources”
B – Function – plan regulates water quality – stops external, point source pollutants
Sowby 16 [Robert, Masters in Engingeering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013. Writing while he was a phD Candidate at the
University of Utah in Civil and Environmental Engineering. Hydroterrorism: A Threat to Water Resources. Wasatch Water Review. April 18
2016. DOA: 8-22-21. http://www.wasatchwater.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/hydroterrorism_sowby_2016.pdf //shree]

Like other critical infrastructure, water resource systems are potential terror targets. They “have been designed, built,
and operated in an open and free society. Thus, they always have been vulnerable to violent acts, including terrorist attacks” (Haimes 2002). Most water resource
systems have many centralized and distributed facilities, offering multiple access points for potential attackers. In the past, few stringent security measures were
established to protect such systems, though precautions at major U.S. facilities like Hoover Dam have increased in the post-9/11 era.

A terrorist attack could impair, damage, or destroy water infrastructure on a variety of scales. The Department of Homeland Security acknowledged that the
nation’s 160,000 public drinking water systems, which serve 84% of the U.S. population, are “vulnerable to a variety of attacks, including contamination with deadly
agents, physical attacks such as the release of toxic gaseous chemicals, and cyberattacks” (DHS 2016). The EPA (2010) stated that “plausible attack methods include
explosive devices; contamination in drinking water distribution systems; sabotage of water treatment systems; hazardous material releases; and cyberattacks.”
Complete destruction notwithstanding, infrastructure targets may include:
-water sources, which may be contaminated or disrupted;

-water and wastewater treatment works, which may be disrupted by equipment failure, power failure, chemical manipulation, or other means;

-pump stations, which may be disrupted by equipment failure, power failure, or other means;

-storage tanks, which may be contaminated or depleted;

-dams and reservoirs, which may be controlled to hold back or release water in harmful ways;

-hydropower facilities, in which the control of energy resources is desired (Al Amin 2013);

-pipelines, which may be severed, overpressurized, or otherwise impaired; and

- valves and other controls, which may be manipulated to restrict, reroute, or release flows in harmful ways.

In addition to the infrastructure threats, hydroterrorism cascades into effects on public health. Clean water is a vital human need from hydration to waste removal;
any denial of drinking water or wastewater services could result in “large numbers of illnesses or casualties” (EPA 2010). Other critical services such as firefighting
and healthcare also depend on water resources.

Environmental impacts are another concern. Deliberate flooding or drought may damage sensitive ecosystems, wetlands, and waterways, as well as affect food
production. Major river systems, by nature of their size and flux, can effectively spread point-source contaminants over large areas, as the Gold
King Mine spill last August, though accidental, so clearly illustrated.

Cybersecurity

While physical attacks are still a risk, water utilities may be even more vulnerable to cyberattacks, both intentional and accidental, through their supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems (AWWA 2014; Saparia and Ginter 2013; EPA 2012; EPA 2010; Gleick 2006; Haimes 2002; Gellman 2002). Designed with

little or no attention to security, SCADA systems may be hacked to achieve the same objectives as physical attacks.

Gellman (2002) reported how Vitek Boden in Queensland, Australia, used a remote computer and radio transmitter to control a wastewater system and release

“hundreds of thousands of gallons of putrid sludge” into parks, rivers, and private properties. His illicit activity went undetected for two months before he
was arrested during his 46th intrusion. The deliberate spills—avenging Boden’s rejection from a local government job—killed marine life, turned rivers black, and
stunk unbearably. With his “unlimited command of 300 SCADA nodes governing sewage and drinking water alike,” the damage could have been much worse.

In 2002, U.S. analysts found that al Qaeda had been researching SCADA programming instructions that run power, water, transport, and communications grids in
the United States and abroad (Gellman 2002). Since much of the technical information is available in online forums, security flaws are well known and “an intruder
could use virtual tools to destroy real-world lives and property.” A recent investigation found that over 14,000 U.S. Department of the Interior laptops were not
properly secured and were “at high risk of compromise” (OIG 2015). The Department includes the U.S. Geological Survey, the Bureau of Land Management, and the
Bureau of Reclamation, which oversees many dams in the western United States. In addition to accessing sensitive data, cybercriminals could use the machines “to
gain unauthorized access to the Department's computer networks and systems.”

Response

Responses to hydroterrorism and related threats depend on the risk. Some measures may be easy to implement, while others may be impossible because of size,
cost, expectations, or other factors. Not all water systems merit the same level of security. While both deliberate and accidental disruptions are possible, a proper
risk assessment should precede major planning decisions. Fundamental practices to reduce risk include the following (AWWA 2014; EPA 2012; EPA 2010; Gleick
2006; Beering 2002; Haimes 2002):
- Limit or deny physical access to facilities.

- Install security lighting, surveillance, and motion detectors at facilities.

- Secure and regularly inventory treatment chemicals.

- Limit access to maps, plans, and sensitive operational information.

- Secure SCADA systems with firewalls and strong passwords. Limit users and their permissions. If possible, separate SCADA systems from the internet.

- Automate monitoring of water quality, water levels, pressures, etc.

- Develop an early warning system to detect contamination events.

- Establish procedures and train for temporary shutdowns.

- Plan a public notification system that leverages social media, local radio, local television, and other disseminators.

Many resources related to these practices are available from the American Society of Civil Engineers, American Water Works Association, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and other organizations.

Where clear hydroterrorism risks exist, they must be addressed. The best approaches will consider both the probability
and the consequences to respond accordingly to protect water resources.

2 – Counter Interp: “Protection of water resources” includes physical and digital

security of water supply
Underwood 19 [Kimberly. Senior Editor for the Air Force Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA). “Stopping the Flow of
Cyber Breaches.” 4-1-19. DOA 8-21-21 https://www.afcea.org/content/stopping-flow-cyber-breaches //shree]

The need to protect the security of water resources has extended through time, says Maj. Colin Brooks, USA,
a signal officer who is an assistant professor of military science at the University of Massachusetts.
“There are terrorist threats where water facilities are targeted, and that’s nothing new ,” says Maj. Brooks, who
also teaches history. “In fact, in the 1930s, J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, was concerned about possible Nazi infiltration and risks of damage
to the water sector,” he says. “In the 1970s there were attacks on the water sector by neo-Nazi groups.” More recently, al-Qaida
operatives abroad were found to have the diagrams of water systems supplying the U.S. consulate in a foreign
country. “So it’s known to be something being targeted by terrorists ,” he notes.

The need for physical security at water facilities is now compounded by the additional need for digital
protections. Maj. Brooks examined the cybersecurity of the water sector as part of his Master of Science
in cybersecurity, which he received from National Defense University (NDU) last spring, and he found weaknesses in the
industry.

“One of the classes I took when I was at NDU was on critical infrastructure protection, and I started doing some research on
water and wastewater treatment facilities and just found it particularly fascinating because there are a wide variety of
vulnerabilities to that sector.”

Includes 8 categories.
Chung et al 20 [P.-Y. Chung, J.-S. Li, I-H. Liu, and Q.-R. Song are with the Institute of Computer and Communication Engineering,
Department of Electrical Engineering, National Cheng Kung University. C.-F. Li is with Department of Finance, National Formosa University. G.-L.
Huang is with Water Resources Agency, MOEA. “Cyber Security of Critical Infrastructure Protection: Overview in Taiwan's Water Resource
Domain.” International Journal of Information and Electronic Engineering. Vol 10 N2. June 2020. DOA: 8-22-21. doi:
10.18178/ijiee.2020.10.2.717 //shree]

A. Literature Analysis

In order to carry out the assessment of critical

infrastructure security protection in the field of water resources,
this paper collects other literatures including the cyber security management act and related sub-Act,
“Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Recommendations”, NIST SP 800-82, etc. The main basis for the
ICS security protection assessment program.

B. Research and Development of the Security Protection Assessment Project

This paper draws on the "Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Recommendations", NIST SP 800-
82 and other literature on the protection of critical infrastructures for water resources , develop a list of ICS
security protection assessments based on the characteristics of the water resources. The content includes organizational
security, network security, physical security, access security, operational security, system monitoring and protection, event processing and
auditing, and operational continuity. As the main basis for the field survey and personnel interviews, and through the feedback of the
interviewees, the fine-tuning of the evaluation project was carried out. The description of each security protection is shown in Table III.

TABLE III: EIGHT KEY SECURITY PROTECTIONS DIRECTIONS FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF WATER
RESOURCES
SECURITY PROTECTION DESCRIPTION

Organizational security Internal and external personnel information security

responsibility requirements and protection, as well as
ICS risk assessment and improvement procedures

Network security ICS network management and monitoring behavior

Physical security Physical protection and monitoring of station area and

outbound facilities

Access security ICS system access control and protection behavior

Operational security System daily operation control and change

management procedures

System monitoring and protection ICS system abnormal condition monitoring and alarm,
as well as system vulnerability protection.

Event processing and auditing Information security incident notification operations

and ICS audits and controls.

Operational continuity ICS system, equipment operation continuous planning

and backup measures.
 2AC T – Subs ≠ Subset
2 – “Substantially” is considerable – prefer plain meaning
Arkush 2 (David, JD Candidate – Harvard University, “Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the Freedom of Information Act in the
Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources”, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties
Law Review, Winter, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 131)

Plaintiffs should argue that the term "substantially prevail" is not a term of art because if considered a term of art, resort to Black's 7th
produces a definition of "prevail" that could be interpreted adversely to plaintiffs. 99 It is commonly accepted that words
that are not
legal terms of art should be accorded their ordinary, not their legal, meaning, 100 and ordinary-usage dictionaries
provide FOIA fee claimants with helpful arguments. The Supreme Court has already found favorable, temporally relevant
definitions of the word "substantially" in ordinary dictionaries: "Substantially" suggests "considerable"
or "specified to a large degree." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining "substantially" as "in a
substantial manner" and "substantial" as "considerable in amount, value, or worth" and "being that specified to a large degree or in the main");
see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 66-67 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial": "relating to or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "of
ample or considerable amount, quantity or dimensions"). 101

6 – Reasonability – avoids substance crowd out – key for enviro law

Stadler 93 [Linda. “NOTE: Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA: Asbestos in the Fifth Circuit--A Battle of Unreasonableness
” Tulane Environmental Law Journal Summer, 1993 6 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 423
n3 Matthew J. McGrath, Note, Convergence of the Substantial Evidence and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review During Informal
Rulemaking, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 541, 546 n.30 (1986), (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1945)), reprinted in
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 233, 279 (1945). The substantial
evidence standard does however possess some ambiguity as to the definition of "substantial." See, e.g.,
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 899 F.2d 344, 359 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that "'substantial' is an inherently imprecise word").
However, 'substantial' is generally held to a reasonableness standard, i.e., would a reasonable mind accept
it as adequate to support a conclusion. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
Bunkers
 2AC
5 - Long-term environment AND radiation damage is too strong.
Julius London & Gilbert F. White 19. London, an outstanding contributor to the atmospheric
sciences, a former chair of the Astrophysical and Planetary Sciences (APS) Department at the University
of Colorado; White was a prominent American geographer. 07/11/2019. “1. The Environmental Effects
of Nuclear War—An Overview.” The Environmental Effects Of Nuclear War, Routledge.

Until recent years the evaluation of nuclear

warfare effects has been chiefly in terms of the direct impacts of the blast,
heat and local radioactive fallout as they destroy humans, artifacts and social structure. Much of the public
debate over the notions of a winnable, limited nuclear war and of survival thereafter has focused on the
enormity of demands placed upon medical assistance for those people who live through the initial blast, the rationale or
absurdity of plans to carry out massive evacuations as a means of deterring or mitigating the consequences of nuclear attacks, and the
complexity of reconstruction.

Now, greater attention is turning toward the environmental consequences of nuclear detonations. This is basically because of increasing
recognition that regardless of
the immediate impact on lives, health, buildings, public facilities and the means of production,
nuclear explosions might drastically alter if not, perhaps, fatally impair the life support systems of the globe . The
vision of increasing through civil defense the number of survivors from direct impacts becomes morbidly
whimsical if the survivors are in environments no longer capable of providing essential water and food.

It is now generally believed that there

is no tenable concept of a winnable nuclear war. Most observers agree that once
a nuclear exchange is started it would most likely quickly escalate to a "total" war. Whether or not they
are correct could only be proven by an initially limited nuclear exchange that might or might not trigger a broader,
cataclysmic conflict. It has, however, become clear that the consequences of a mass nuclear exchange, if it were
to occur, would be so catastrophic that all efforts must be exercised to prevent it . What are these consequences?

The following papers review recent efforts towards providing information on the short and long-term environmental consequences of total
nuclear war. They do not deal with social or economic disruption to normal functions of society, nor with psychological trauma that may be
caused by the extreme events, nor the breakdown of medical and other emergency support systems, topics which are nevertheless of profound
importance in consideration of global consequences of such a calamitous event (see, for instance. Chazov and Vartanian, 1982; Laulan, 1982).

In the case of a widespread nuclear exchange as envisaged by some analysts, the intermediate and long-term
effects would not
necessarily be contained within any specific geographic area. In those circumstances the concept of a
battlefield would no longer be applicable even if it were possible to limit the exchange to so-called
tactical weapons. The use of tactical or counterforce targets would, in the view of those analysts, quickly extend
to attacks on other than purely military nuclear installations.
The quality and extent of impairment to widespread life support systems from various patterns of nuclear explosions have been in controversy.
Some sanguine observers have predicted that populations remote from direct bomb produced effects of light, heat and explosive blasts, and
adequately protected from short-term fallout, would survive those early threats to life and health and promptly could set about the task of
reconstructing their damaged physical and social systems. At the other extreme, observers have asserted that the impacts of a major exchange
of nuclear warheads
would wound the environment sufficiently to render the globe unable to support any
substantial human population beyond a period of months or years. In between, and depending in part on assumptions made
as to the number and nature of the detonations, are a variety of estimates as to the scope of environmental effects.

7 – 100 isn’t enough---survivors still inbreed and can’t repopulate

Bochkov ’84 [Academician. Dir Medical Academy of Sciences at the Institute of Genetics at the USSR
Academy of Sciences. The Cold and the Dark: The World After Nuclear War, 1984 Pg 141-2]
Academician Bochkov: When we talk about the ecological and biological consequences of a nuclear
war, we are of course focusing on humankind. Thus, in thinking about the possibilities of human survval
after a nuclear catastrophe, we should not be afraid to reach the conclusion that the conditions that
would prevail would not allow the survival of human beings as a species. We should proceed from the assumption that man has
adapted to his environment during a long evolutionary process and has paid the price of natural selection. Only over the past few thousand years has he

adapted his environment to his needs and has created, so to speak, an artificial environment to provide
food, shelter, and other necessities. Without this, modem [humankind] man cannot survive. Compared
to the dramatic improvements made in the technological environment, biological nature has not
changed in the recent past. In the statements of Dr. Ehrlich and Academician Bayev, we have heard about the many constraints there would be on the possibility of
man's survival after a nuclear catastrophe. Because we also have to look at the more long-range future, I would like to point out that most long-term effects of a

nuclear war will be genetic. If islands of humanity—or as Dr. Ehrlich has said, groups of people on islands somewhere in the ocean—should survive, what will they face
in terms of genetic consequences? If the population drops sharply, the question then arises of the critical numbers of a population that would be necessary to ensure its reproduction. On

the one hand there will be minimum numbers of human beings; on the other hand, because of the small
numbers, there will be isolation. There will definitely be inbreeding, and lethal mutations will come to
the fore as a result of this, because of fetal and neonatal exposure to radiation and because of exposure
to fallout. New mutations will arise and genes and chromosomes will be damaged as a result of the
radiation, so there will be an additional genetic load to bear. There will be natural aberrations and
death at birth, so that the burden of hereditary illnesses will be only part of a large
load. This undoubtedly will be conducive to the elimination of humanity, because humankind will not
be able to reproduce itself as a species.

9 – Cobalt bombs salt the Earth longer than we could shelter for.
Max Tegmark 15, Ph.D. in Physics from the University of California Berkeley, Professor at MIT and
scientific director of the Foundational Questions Institute, 11/23/15, "Dr. Strangelove Is Back: Say ‘Hi’ to
the Cobalt Bomb!" https://www.huffpost.com/entry/dr-strangelove-is-back-sa_b_8632032

I must confess that, as a physics professor, some of my nightmares are extra geeky. My worst one is the C-bomb, a
hydrogen bomb surrounded by large amounts of cobalt. When I first heard about this doomsday device
in Stanley Kubrik’s dark nuclear satire Dr. Strangelove, I wasn’t sure if it was physically possible. Now, I unfortunately know
better, and it seems like it Russia may be building it.

The idea is terrifyingly simple: Just encase a really powerful H-bomb in massive amounts of cobalt. When
it explodes, it makes the cobalt radioactive and spreads it around the area or the globe, depending on the
design. The half-life of the radioactive cobalt produced is about five years, which is long enough to give
the fallout plenty of time to settle before it decays and kills, but short enough to produce intense
radiation for a lot longer than you’d last in a fallout shelter. There’s almost no upper limit to how much
cobalt and explosive power you can put in nukes that are buried for deterrence or transported by sea, and climate
simulations have shown how hydrogen bombs can potentially lift fallout high enough to enshroud the
globe, so if someone really wanted to risk the extinction of humanity, starting a C-bomb arms race is
arguably one of the most promising strategies.

11 – Survivors will get killed in the post-apocalypse

Veronese 12 (Keith Veronese, 6-15-2012, "No, a bunker will not save you from the apocalypse," io9,
https://io9.gizmodo.com/no-a-bunker-will-not-save-you-from-the-apocalypse-5917780) ank
Everybody talks about the apocalypse, but almost nobody actually prepares for it. But let's say you're one of the few visionaries who actually
plans for every eventuality. You've been stashing your supplies. You've built a personal bunker, or you've purchased your own spot in a
communal "survival suite." When
the apocalypse finally comes — possibly later this year — will you really
survive if you're locked inside a bunker? (Answer: No.) Top image: Jorge Louzao Penalva/Flickr Illustration for article titled
No, a bunker will not save you from the apocalypse Protecting against any 2012 scenario A thriving industry exists to offer structures that will
defend against a variety of 2012-related events. These scenarios include pole shifts (and the earthquakes that would follow), electromagnetic
pulses, and solar flares — along with more traditional scenarios, such as biological and nuclear attacks. Article preview thumbnail Could an
electromagnetic pulse send us back to the Dark Ages? The electromagnetic pulse. It's the big, bad boogeyman of the electronic age where we
depend… Read on io9.com One of the most successful manufacturer of disaster bunkers, Hardened Manufacturers, speaks of the Maya
Calendar as a reason why they've created their structures: Article preview thumbnail This is the oldest Maya Calendar Ever Discovered For
years, archaeologists have referred to an ancient set of texts known as the Maya codices to… Read on io9.com Illustration for article titled No, a
bunker will not save you from the apocalypse From our perspective as architects, engineers, physicists, future-scanning analyst and
construction program managers, we view the 2012 phenomenon not as a question of the accuracy or validity of the Mayan date, but as a
problem of shelter design optimization under severe constraints. In this perspective, we look at the anticipated possible effects and the design
measures necessary to mitigate those effects. Hardened
and other survivor bunker building companies like Vivos and
Survival Condo say you should have multiple backups of critical life support systems, air filtration,
installation of an air-lock, and multiple escape hatches, to increase your chances of surviving a 2012-
related event. These structures are not cheap — estimates from several survival shelter companies place
a spot in these bunkers from $40,000 to $1 million. The companies also market their structures as
"vacation homes" or unique corporate retreats, should a 2012 disaster scenario never arise. You cannot
plan for everything There are some events that simply cannot be planned for, let alone imagined, among the
multiplicity of possible 2012 disaster scenarios. A pole shift, and the ensuing tectonic movement, could lead to a chain of volcanic eruptions.
The Yellowstone Caldera in the mid-western United States is long overdue for an eruption, with the U.S. Geological Survey closely monitoring
seismic activity at Yellowstone National Park. These
fortified shelters will also have difficulty defending against
strikes from above, as they are only prepared for a 500 pound (roughly the size of a small boulder)
airborne impacts. Hardened Structures claim their bunkers will provide protection from the air burst
resulting from a 100 megaton bomb detonated 20 miles away — but a ground impact in the same 20-
mile radius would likely destroy the shelter, and render the surroundings uninhabitable. Illustration for article
titled No, a bunker will not save you from the apocalypse The biggest threat? "Hell is other people." - Translation of a line from Jean-Paul
Sartre's Huis-clos Many
apocalyptic scenarios call for extended periods of isolation. With bunkers designed to
supply and care for up to 1000 people, would you really want to spend a year or more of your life
trapped underground in an isolated community, cut off from whatever remains of the human race
outside? Recent Videos from GizmodoVIEW MORE > The 5 Coolest Working-Class Heroes in Science Fiction 9/02/19 11:00AM What
about the unforeseen psychiatric issues that would arise in the aftermath of the apocalypse, as people
realize their extended family and friends are dead? Such an event would be akin to a bizarre
psychological experiment. It's easy to imagine how the survival prospects of extremely bored people
lacking distinct social ties could drop, the longer they're kept in a confined space together. And then
there would be the threat of other survivors — once all the local Wal-Mart, Target, and sporting goods
stories have long since been picked clean, the roaming scavengers would regard any remaining shelters
as a major jackpot. Anyone searching through rural areas of Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Texas (areas with a high proportion of
these bunkers) could simply canvass the area with a metal detector, since these bunkers include EMP shielding, which requires a metal lattice.
Construction contractors that worked on the bunkers, regardless of the confidentiality standards held
during the building process, will also know the specific location of bunkers in the area. So the people
inside the bunkers could easily become sitting ducks, waiting for a series of assaults from other
survivors. Illustration for article titled No, a bunker will not save you from the apocalypse Lottery ticket If you lack the desire or finances to
build a structure for yourself, Surefire Living offers a program for qualified individuals who want to live to see 2013. Surefire Living is creating 10
survival sites scattered across the globe, providing a financially friendly option for those who cannot pay for an entire bunker with personal
finances. Inhabitants are chosen based on their education and usefulness. Surefire Living also offers a Lottery of Fate option. Write an essay,
pay an $80 entry fee — and if you're chosen, you win a vacation in one of their facilities. You are not guaranteed you'll have a spot should the
apocalypse arrive, but you do get a free concealed carry gun permit course, along with the chance to write an essay for eighty bucks. Surviving
the unforeseen It's extremely difficult to imagine every possible disaster scenario, and prepare for all of them. Not to mention all the changes
that every scenario would wreak on the world afterwards. And then there's the more basic question :
if society as we know it stops
and your family and friends are dead, do you want to go on living? And if you survive these initial events,
will you live though the madness and chaos that will come along with the long struggle to restart
society?
NGA
 2AC CP – States
2 – Enclave Clause – counterplan is nullified or links to politics
Miller 11 [Emily, Associate Attorney in the Labor & Employment Group at Cozen O'Connor, "The Strongest Defense You've Never Heard
of: The Constitution's Federal Enclave Doctrine and its Effect on Litigants, States, and Congress", Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal,
https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1524&context=hlelj]

The U.S. Constitution's Enclave Clause offers a little-known, but extraordinarily powerful, defense for the
multitude of entities operating within "federal enclaves." These enclaves include , inter alia, military bases,
national parks, post offices, and federal courthouses t The Enclave Clause has spawned the "federal enclave doctrine,"
which renders certain state and common law claims inapplicable within areas 2 of land ceded by a state
to the federal government. Recent cases reveal the doctrine's potential as a sleeping giant for the
defense bar, with one court going so far as to permanently enjoin the New York State Division of Human
Rights from enforcing the state's Human Rights Law against an entity working within a military
reservation.3

The Enclave Clause, found at Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution, grants the
United States exclusive legislative jurisdiction over any parcel of land ceded by a state to the federal government "for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dockyards, and other needful Buildings. ' 4 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this
clause to mean that state laws passed after the date upon which the parcel was ceded by the State to
the federal government - thereby creating a "federal enclave" - do not apply within the enclave , unless the
state specifically retained jurisdiction over the subject matter at issue.5 Further, common law causes of action that gained
recognition after the date of cession have no application within the enclave .6 Moreover, state laws in existence at
the time of cession that are inconsistent with federal purposes do not apply within the federal enclave. 7 State laws can, however, be
saved from an Enclave Clause bar if Congress specifically authorizes their enforcement within federal
enclaves.8 Finally, state laws in existence at the time of cession that do not conflict with federal purposes become federal laws within the
enclave. 9 These basic rules form the foundation of the "federal enclave doctrine."'

Perm solves uncooperative federalism.

Pozen 9 [Jessica Bulman-Pozen; 2009; Betts Professor of Law and a director of the Center for Constitutional Governance at Columbia Law
School; Heather K. Gerken; “Uncooperative Federalism,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 118, No. 7, p. 1293] |Trip|

To begin with, the administrative safeguards of federalism extend the time horizon for states to
challenge federal policy. When states are outside the federal scheme, their best chance of challenging federal policy
is likely to arise when the statute is passed or amended -times when lobbying and partisan ties ought to
be particularly effective. States that will ultimately be insiders to the federal scheme, in contrast, are likely to have more
than one bite at the apple. They can fight when the statute is passed. But if they lose that fight, they will
still have ample opportunity to amend and challenge federal policy once the scheme is put in place. For
instance, Wisconsin and Michigan successfully changed welfare policy that was statutorily entrenched.
 AT: Bargain/NGA – General
9 – Fed won’t respond or delay
Lowery et al 8 [David, Department of Public Administration, University of Leiden, with Virginia Gray and Frank Baumgartner, “Policy
Attention in State and Nation: Is Anyone Listening to the Laboratories of Democracy?”, paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, August, 2008]

Let us start with the null hypothesis that state policy activity and the content of the Congressional hearing
agenda may well be unrelated to each other. Or rather, given the findings by Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery (2009) that national
attention to issues does influence policy activity in the states, the relevant null hypothesis is that the converse may not be true. Certainly,
despite ever more rapid diffusion of policy innovations, not all states focus on the same issues at the
same time (Gray et al. 2005). Thus, it is not obvious that the states as whole might influence the national
policy agenda in a systematic manner. And even if state agendas moved together in lockstep, much of
what attracts the attention of state legislators may well not be what concerns their national
counterparts. This would be especially true for a number of issues that are mainly influenced by national
policy or on the other hand mainly by state policy. State attention to corrections policy, for example, may be partly related to
federal concerns, but the states are the primary force behind corrections policy whereas the federal role is very limited. The reverse is true with
regard to other policies of broader national concern, such as nuclear proliferation. Thus, different policy areas of concern to the
states feature more or less involvement of the federal government. This might well suggest that, at best, we
should expect a more limited impact of state policy activities on the distribution of federal attention to
issues in those areas where the states play relatively little role. And last, given Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) punctuated equilibrium model,
legislative agendas are quite sticky, changing only periodically and with some difficulty. If so, then it is not clear
that the national policy agenda would respond in anything close to a contemporaneous manner to
activity at the state level. For example, the collapse of President Clinton’s national health care proposal in 1994 arguably did lead to
greater state attention to health care, but this developed rather slowly over several years as the realization that the national government was,
at least for a time, out of the health care game (Gray, Lowery, and Godwin 2007a; 2007b). In sum, there
are plenty of good reasons
to not expect to find a strong relationship between levels of state policy attention and such attention at
the national level.

10 – No net benefit – not intrinsic to water CI, federalism not zero sum, pressure
occurs for non-federalism reasons
Roesler 19 [Shannon Roesler; 9/9/2019; ELR Staff summarizing Law Professor Roesler’s book; “Federalism as a Zero-Sum Game,”
Environmental Law Institute Review, https://www.eli.org/vibrant-environment-blog/federalism-zero-sum-game] |Trip|

In this month’s featured ELR article, Competitive Federalism: Environmental Governance as a Zero-Sum Game, Prof. Shannon
Roesler of the Oklahoma City University School of Law evaluates the causes of the recent turn to
competitive federalism in the context of anti-pollution regulation. Her article, adapted from the new ELI
Press book Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism, argues that despite rhetoric fueled by state federalism, politics, and
economics, there is evidence that people do not view environmental protection and economic well-being in zero-sum
terms. Moreover, Roesler challenges the rhetoric used among public officials, arguing that it does not align with public interest or values.

Contrary to arguments that state sovereignty is the leading driver of competitive federalism, Roesler
maintains that challenges to decisions like the Clean Power Plan or the WOTUS Rule actually stem from
something other than constitutional or federalism principles. She observes that states are motivated to
challenge federal rules if they are imposing burdens on state institutions that are costly enough to
justify fighting them; further, state attorneys general may be more likely to pursue litigation if they will
benefit personally or politically. Roesler thus contends that recent environmental governance has been
influenced by concentrated, well-financed, short-term interests.
Filibuster
 2AC CP – Filibuster
“The USFG” isn’t all branches – all but Senate Republicans can act in its name
UChicago 7. University of Chicago Manual of Style. 2007. “Capitalization, Titles”,
http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/CMS_FAQ/CapitalizationTitles/CapitalizationTitles30.html

Q. When I refer to the government of the United States in text, should it be U.S. Federal Government or U.S. federal government? A. The
government of the United States is not a single official entity. Nor is it when it is referred to as the federal
government or the U.S. government or the U.S. federal government. It’s just a government, which, like those in all
countries, has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of government: the Congress, the
Senate, the Department of State, etc.

7 – No climate impact
Gleditsch 21 [Nils, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, “This time is different! Or is it? NeoMalthusians and
environmental optimists in the age of climate change,” Journal of Peace Research, pg. 5-6, 2021, SAGE]

The most extreme contrarian position is, of course, to deny one or both key conclusions of the IPCC: the reality of global warming or the human
contribution to it. However, most environmental optimists accept these two key conclusions but raise other problems with
the panel’s discussion of the social effects of climate change and even more so with popular interpretations of
the panel reports. For instance, Hausfather & Peters (2020), by no means ‘climate deniers’, decry the common use of choosing
the high-risk RCP8.59 to illustrate ‘business as usual’ as misleading.

The causal chains from climate change to the proposed effects on human beings are long and complex,
and the uncertainty increases every step of the way. In the literature on the social effects of climate change,
including the IPCC reports, statements abound that something ‘may’ lead to something else, or that a
variable ‘is sensitive to’ another, without any guidelines for how to translate this into probabilities
(Gleditsch & Nordås, 2014: 87f). Uncritical use of the precautionary principle, where any remotely possible
calamity unwittingly becomes a probable event, is not helpful.

Gleditsch & Nordås (2014: 85) note that while AR5 (IPCC, 2014) did not find strong evidence for a direct link
between climate change and conflict, it argued that climate change is likely to impact known conflict-inducing
factors like poverty and inconsistent political institutions and therefore might have an indirect effect on conflict. But this assumes that
correlations are transitive, which is not generally the case. If A correlates with B and B with C, we know
nothing about how A relates to C unless both correlations are extremely high. The strongest case for the climate–
conflict link is the effect of interaction between climate change and factors like poverty, state failure, or ethnic polarization. It may be more
cost-effective to try to deal with these other risk factors than with global warming itself if the goal is to reduce the ‘risk multiplier’ effect of
climate change on armed conflict.

The articles in this special issue do not generally see scarcity by itself as necessarily resulting in strongly negative outcomes. Factors like
development, state failure, and previous overload on ecosystems continue to play an important role in that they interact with climate change
to produce conflict and other social outcomes. For instance, Ide, Kristensen & Bartusevicˆius (2021) conclude that the impact of floods on
political conflict are contingent on other factors such as population size and regime type. Moreover, most of the articles do not assume that
scarcities are likely to arise at the global level. They may be regional (mostly in Africa), national, or local. Urban and rural areas may be affected
by different scarcities. Climate change may also affect particularly strongly groups that are already at an economic or political disadvantage. The
effects can be alleviated and adaptations constructed at these levels.

The argument about how climate change may indirectly impact conflict leans heavily on the negative
economic consequences of climate change, but with little or no reference to the research that explicitly deals
with this topic. In fact, the relevant chapter in AR5 concluded that for most sectors of the economy, the impact of climate change was
likely to be dwarfed by other factors. Tol (2018) finds that the long-term global economic effects are likely to be negative, but that a century
of climate change will have about the same impact on the economy as the loss of one year of economic
growth. Other economists are more cautious, but the dean of climate change economics, William Nordhaus (2018: 345, 359), estimates that
‘damages are 2.1 percent of global income at 3C warming and 8.5 percent of income at 6C’, while also warning that the longer the delay in
taking decisive action, the harsher the necessary countermeasures. Stern (2006) is more pessimistic, based mainly on a lower discount rate (the
interest rate used to calculate the present value of future cash flows) as are Wagner & Weitzman (2015). Heal (2017) argues that the Integrated
Assessment Models generally used
in the assessment of the economics of climate change are not accurate
enough to provide quantitative insights and should not be taken as serious forecasts. Yet, all these economists
take the basically optimistic view that climate change is manageable with appropriate policies for raising the price on the emission of
greenhouse gases. With a chapter heading from Wagner & Weitzman (2015: 17): ‘We can do this’.

This more optimistic assessment of climate change does not assume that the challenge will go away by itself or can be left to the market. A
plausible approach, favored by most economists,10 is the imposition of a robust and increasing price on carbon emissions (whether as a carbon
tax or through a cap and trade scheme) high enough to reduce the use of fossil fuels and encourage the search for their replacement. More
than 25 countries had such taxes by early 2018 (Metcalf, 2019), but generally not at a level seen as necessary for limiting global warming to,
say, 2C. This approach relies on the use of the market mechanism, but with targets fixed by public policy. Income from a carbon tax can be
channeled back to the citizens to avoid increasing overall taxation. To speed up the transition, funds can also be allocated to the research and
development of cheaper and more efficient production of various forms of fossil-free energy, including nuclear power (Goldstein & Qvist,
2019).

The response of the environmental

optimists continues to emphasize the role of innovations; technological innovations,
such as improvements in battery technology, the key element in the 2019 Nobel Prize in chemistry,11 but also social
innovations, as exemplified by the experimental approach to the alleviation of poverty, rewarded in the same
year by the Nobel Prize in economics.12

While the most important countermeasures will be directed at the mitigation of climate change, there is also a strong case for
adaptation. If sea-level rise cannot be totally prevented, dikes and flood barriers will be cost-effective and
necessary, at least in high-value urban areas. If parts of Africa suffer from drought, there will be increased use for new crops
that are more suitable for a dry climate, possibly developed in part by GMO technology. Industrialization in
Africa can decrease the one-sided reliance on rain-fed agriculture, as it has in other parts of the world, which have
moved human resources from the primary sector to industry (and then to services). Continuing urbanization will move millions out
of the most vulnerable communities (Collier, 2010). While structural change failed to produce economic growth in Latin America
and Africa after 1990, Africa has experienced a turnaround in the new millennium (McMillan & Rodrik, 2014) and there are also
potentials for increasing productivity by structural change within agriculture in Africa (McCullough, 2017).
Futarchy
1AR
 Yes Extinction---Endocrine Disruption
Nuclear radiation causes endocrine disruption
Niazi et. al, 11 (Shaharyar Khan, “Endocrine effects of Fukushima: Radiation-induced
endocrinopathy”, Indian J Endocrinol Metab. 2011 Apr-Jun; 15(2): 91–95.) gbn-rkp
This has led to continuous, chronic morbidity, even though the initial radiation exposure has passed long since. Children with congenital anomalies still continue to
be born in the affected areas. A large number of mental and physical anomalies were seen in the children born soon after the accident.[6] Down's syndrome, neural
tube defects, chromosomal abnormalities, cardiovascular diseases, immunologic disorders, lens changes, cancer, mental retardation, thyroid diseases and leukemias
were some of the more frequent problems seen in the children from affected areas.[7] One hopes that such a situation will not be repeated in Japan.
Pathophysiology of Radiation-Induced Damage The harmful effects of ionizing radiation, especially its carcinogenic potential, are fairly well known. Ionizing
radiations above a threshold level, which varies for each organ, lead to tissue destruction. However, even at levels below the threshold level, damage can occur to
functional and structural proteins in the cells, including DNA and RNA. In addition to burns and radiation sickness which may themselves lead to immediate death,
there are some delayed effects of a high-dose radiation exposure as well. The delayed effects cause most damage to the rapidly dividing cells of the body and to
those cells which have an inherent ability to concentrate the radioactive materials. An example of the latter includes the thyroid gland, which concentrates
radioactive iodine. Due to the rapid cell division and growth in fetuses, they form a group more prone to be affected by radiation exposure. This is consistent with
the morbidity pattern seen after Chernobyl. Go to: Other Types of Radiation Exposure Ultraviolet radiation (UVR) whether of solar or artificial origin, is a known
carcinogen. Excessive exposure to UVR increases the risk of several types of cancer, cortical cataract, some conjunctival neoplasms, ocular melanoma, autoimmune
and viral diseases.[8] Iatrogenic radiation exposure, for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, holds the same risks as does environmental radiation exposure.
However, a key difference is that in most iatrogenic cases the radiation exposure is focused and concentrated on a specific region of the body. Although the
radiation exposure involved in this case may be less, repeated exposure may lead to considerable tissue damage. Although diagnostic imaging such as X-rays and
computed tomography (CT) scans provide great benefits, their use is associated with small increases in cancer risk.[9] Similarly, mammography, although very
useful, is associated with the amount of radiation that an ordinary person would be exposed to over a 3-month period. Exposure to diagnostic radiography in utero
has been associated with increased risk of childhood cancer, particularly leukemia.[10] Radiation is a well-known etiology for many central nervous system (CNS)
tumors as well especially meningiomas, sarcomas and gliomas.[11] Go to: Endocrine Effects of Radiation Exposure Radiation
exposure affects
virtually every endocrine gland, but to different degrees. While some glands such as pituitary, thyroid
and gonads are sensitive to radiation, the adrenal is extremely resistant. Pituitary The risk of developing pituitary tumors
after exposure to ionizing radiation is increased. Even small doses (i.e. <1 Sv) are associated with statistically significant higher risks for
CNS and pituitary gland.[12] A study conducted on the nuclear bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed that the excess relative risk per sievert (ERRSV) of
pituitary gland tumors was ERRSv = 1.0 (95% CI = 0.2 to 3.5).[12] Although rare, pituitary adenomas after radiation therapy of the head and neck region have been
reported.[11] Patients
treated with brain tumors frequently develop hypothalamic–pituitary dysfunction
which may lead to growth hormone (GH) deficiency, hypothyroidism, gonadal or adrenal dysfunction .[13]
A gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) deficiency related decrease in serum luteinizing hormone (LH), follicle stimulating hormone (FSH) and testosterone is
seen in these patients. In some of the patients presenting with deficiencies of anterior pituitary hormones, hypothalamic dysfunction is the cause.[14] Although the
deficiencies most commonly develop in the order GH, gonadotrophins, adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH) followed by thyroid stimulating hormone (TSH), this
sequence may not be predictable in an individual patient. Comprehensive testing is therefore indicated. Investigations should ideally be performed annually, for at
least 10 years after treatment or until deficiency has been detected and treated. It is not only the patients with pituitary disease who are at risk of developing
hypopituitarism after radiotherapy, but also any patient who receives a total dose of irradiation of 20 Gy or more to the hypothalamic–pituitary axis is at risk of
hypopituitarism, although the threshold dose may be lower than this.[15] Cranial radiation at low doses is associated with accelerated puberty in exposed
individuals; however, girls are affected more than the boys.[16] Thyroid and parathyroid The endocrine gland most commonly affected by external radiation is the
thyroid. The
effect of exposure to leaked radioactive substances on the thyroid was first observed after
Chernobyl. As previously discussed, the incidence of thyroid carcinomas and other thyroid diseases rose
significantly after irradiation. Multiple hypotheses have been postulated to explain the radiation-induced carcinogenic processes in the thyroid
gland. These include radioactive iodine being concentrated in this gland[17] and impairment of the ability of T cells to fight cancerous cells.[18] Stable iodine
supplements (such as potassium iodide) can be used prophylactically to decrease the risk of cancer development in the people exposed to radiation.[19] However,
the effectiveness of this method decreases significantly after 3 hours of radiation. Thyroid and parathyroid diseases after head and neck irradiation are well known.
Radiation doses to the thyroid that exceed approximately 26 Gy frequently produce hypothyroidism, which may be clinically overt or subclinical. Pituitary or
hypothalamic hypothyroidism may arise when the pituitary region receives doses exceeding 50 Gy with conventional 1.8–2 Gy fractionation. Direct irradiation of the
thyroid may increase the risk of Graves′ disease or euthyroid Graves' ophthalmopathy. Silent thyroiditis, cystic degeneration, benign adenoma, and thyroid cancer
have been observed after therapeutically relevant doses of external radiation. Direct or incidental thyroid irradiation increases the risk for well-differentiated,
papillary, and follicular thyroid cancer from 15- to 53-fold.[20] Hyperparathyroidism has also been reported with the same frequency in the patients who have
undergone radiation therapy in head and neck region.[21] Pancreas Although literature associating pancreatic disease with radiation exposure is unavailable, studies
have associated radon exposure to pancreatic cancer.[22] Radon,
a radioactive gas produced by decay of uranium, has been
shown to be a significant risk factor for pancreatic cancer by a number of studies. Thus, we may
presume that excessive radiation exposure may lead to an increased risk of pancreatic disease; however,
studies are needed to provide evidence for this. Adrenals The adrenal gland is quite resistant to radiation exposure. However, radiation exposure may affect the
pituitary gland and lead to decreased secretion of ACTH. This is evidenced by the fact that the serum ACTH levels of Chernobyl accident survivors were below
normal.[5] In a large radiation exposure, the adrenal gland may be affected directly as well.[5] This may lead to a decrease in adrenal function and a lower
circulating level of cortisol and other adrenal gland hormones. Morphological disorders were seen in the adrenal gland, thyroid gland and ovaries of the rodents
inhabiting the area exposed to radiation in Chernobyl.[23] Gene mutations and chromosomal abnormalities were also seen. This may suggest that similar changes
could also have occurred in the adrenal glands of human survivors. Gonads Gonads are also profoundly affected by irradiation. Irradiation to the CNS may affect the
timing of the onset of puberty, result in hyperprolactinemia, or cause gonadotropin deficiency if the hypothalamic–pituitary axis is involved in the radiation field.
Abdominal, pelvis, spinal or testicular radiotherapy may directly affect the gonads and lead to less sex steroid production and infertility. If this happens in a child,
pubertal development either may not occur or may be arrested. Ionizing
radiation has been shown to be a significant risk factor
for spontaneous abortions if exposure occurs during pregnancy. It can also lead to infertility in men and
women.[24] Direct irradiation may affect the uterus, which may cause arrested growth in prepubertal girls and miscarriages in pregnant
women; the ovaries, which may drastically decrease the number of oocytes which may lead to infertility and

may even induce menopause if the patient is above 40 or the dose used is very high ; or the testes, which causes
aspermia. The aspermia may be temporary or permanent, depending on the dose of radiation and its timing.[25] The effects of radiation therapy on the
reproductive system are especially significant because patients may want to cryopreserve their eggs or sperms for later use. The severity of these effects can be
seen by the fact that 1 in every 6 women exposed to radiation therapy in childhood experienced ovarian failure.
[26]

Extinction
Atsuji, 13 – Shigeo Atsuji, Professor of Informatics at Kansai University, Research Fellow at Kyoto
University, Ph.D. policy sciences, D.B.A. organization theory; Kazunori Ueda, Kansai University Graduate
School of Informatics; and Ryosuke Fujimoto, Kansai University Graduate School of Informatics; “Our
Stolen Sustainability: Unsafe Eden Contaminated by Environmental Hormones,” Kansai University
General Information Bulletin of the Faculty of "Information Research" No. 39, 8-10-2013,
http://journals.isss.org/index.php/proceedings57th/article/viewFile/2016/678

I. Brain contamination by environmental hormones (1) Bio-accumulation of environmental hormones The endocrine disruptors which
are known collectively as environmental hormones are
recognized to include around 600 substances, all of which are
artificially compounded chemical substances. The best known are dioxins and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Even in
extremely small amounts, these substances disturb the endocrine system that controls the body’s internal
regulatory functions. Environmental hormones are also contained in dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) and other agricultural chemicals,
herbicides and plasticizers, and in the artificial preservatives, colorants, and flavorings used in processed foodstuffs. In recent years, atrazine
and bisphenol, which are contained in plasticizers, have been found
to affect sex determination in animal species and to
alter the male-female birth ratio. Unbalanced sex determination threatens the preservation and the very survival
of the species. Instead of being broken down, environmental hormones - chemical substances not
originally present in the natural world - accumulate in the body. As a result, these artificial chemical compounds
unleash a chain of contamination through the bio-environments which are formed through the
interdependence of diverse life forms.