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2011 SCC OnLine Cal 3915 : (2011) 3 LACC 250

In the High Court of Calcutta

(BEFORE I.P. MUKERJI, J.)

Tata Motors Limited and Another

v.
State of West Bengal and Others
W.P. No. 9949 (W) of 2011
With
W.P. No. 10198 (W) of 2011
Decided on September 28, 2011
For the petitioners : Mr. Samaraditya Pal, Sr. Adv. Mr. Siddhartha
Mitra, Sr. Adv. Ms. Vineeta Meharia, Adv. Mr. Soumitra Dutta, Adv.
For the respondent Nos. 1, 3, 5, 6 & 7 : Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra,
learned Advocate General, Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, Sr. Adv., Mr. Asoke
Banerjee, Ld. Govt. Pleader, Mr. Kalyan Kr. Bandyopadhyay, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Protik Prokash Banerji, Adv., Mr. Paritosh Sinha, Adv., Mr.
Abhratosh Majumdar, Adv., Mr. Sakya Sen, Adv., Mr. Subhobrata Datta,
Adv., Mr. Ramanand Agarwal, Adv., Mr. Swagata Datta, Adv., Mr. Mintu
Goswami, Adv., Mr. Sandip Chakraborty, Adv., Mr. Sumon Sengupta,
Adv., Mr. Debasish Ghosh, Adv., Mr. Ayan Banerjee, Adv., Mr. Arindam
Mondal, Adv., Mr. Satrajit Sinha, Adv., Mr. Saikat Chatterji, Adv., Mr.
Asish Das, Adv.
For the respondent Nos. 2 & 4 : Mr. Kalyan Kr. Bandyopadhyay, Sr.
Adv., Mr. Protik Prokash Banerji, Adv., Mr. Abhratosh Majumdar, Adv.,
Mr. Swagata Datta, Adv., Mr. Sirsanya Bandyopadhyay, Adv.
For the respondent No. 8 : Mr. G.S. Makkar, Adv., Mr. Raj Sekhar
Basu, Adv.
For the respondent Nos. 5, 6 & 7 in W.P. No. 10198(W) of 2011 : Mr.
Asoke Banerjee, Ld. Govt. Pleader, Mr. Subrata Talukdar, Adv.
I.P. MUKERJI, J.
BACKGROUND FACTS:
Two writ applications preferred by Tata Motors Limited (hereinafter
referred to as the “Tatas”) were heard by me between 28th July, 2011
and 16th September, 2011, when hearing was concluded. One
challenges the constitutionality of the Singur Land Rehabilitation and
Development Act, 2011, hereafter “the impugned Act” and the action of
the State thereunder; the other, the Singur Land Rehabilitation and
Development Rules, 2011, framed under it.
The history before institution of this litigation is of paramount
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importance. I will try to recount the events, which finally led to this
contested litigation.
In and around 2006, the Government of West Bengal was trying to
invite the Tatas to set up an establishment for the manufacture of their
conceived ‘small car’ ‘Nano’. The Tatas, it seems to me, were being
similarly entreated by some other states in the country, to set up the
industry there. One of such states was Uttarakhand. It offered them
many incentives and concessions. The Tatas were willing to consider
investment in West Bengal provided its government was able to
outmatch these benefits. I have no doubt, in my mind, that the
government was able to convince them that they would make available
to them comparable if not better incentives, concessions and
exemptions. The Tatas did decide to manufacture this ‘small car’ here.
They announced to the world that the manufactured car would be
cleared from the Singur factory in District Hooghly in October, 2008.
According to records, the government promised them land at this
place for setting up this project. More than 1000 acres of land were
required.
By the end of May, 2006, the government started proceeding in the
most expeditious manner to provide this land. The proposal for
providing this land was approved by the cabinet in its meeting held on
31st May, 2006. By his letter dated 6th July, 2006, the Joint Secretary to
the Government of West Bengal wrote to the West Bengal Industrial
Development Corporation (WBIDC), the fourth respondent, the District
Magistrate being the fifth respondent and the Land and Land Revenue
Department being the third respondent telling them that he was
“directed” to ask them to initiate acquisition proceedings. It appears
that almost immediately the fifth respondent who was also the Collector
issued notices under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. I
have noticed from annexure ‘P2’ that such notice was issued on 13th
July, 2006 and notified in the gazette on 19th July, 2006. There are also
notices issued subsequently and gazetted thereafter. one was issued on
17th July, 2006, and gazetted on 20th July, 2006, another on 21st July,
2006 and gazetted on the same day, yet another on 24th July, 2006 and
gazetted on the same day and so on. I have not been invited to any
notice issued after 24th July, 2006, which makes me believe that the
Section 4 notices were issued and gazetted between 13th July, 2006
and 24th July, 2006, more or less.
Acquisition proceedings were speedily undertaken. 997.11 acres of
land were acquired. On 23rd September, 2006 and 25th Septmeber,
2006 awards of compensation were made by the Collector. On 4th
October, 2006, this land was “handed over” to the fourth respondent. I
am told that it was conveyed to them by the State. This respondent got
its name mutated in the land records. 1.75 acres were set apart for
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setting up a power station and handed over to them on 26th October,

2006. Thereafter, the said respondent applied to the land department
for conversion of land from agricultural land to factory land. It was
decided by the State that 645.67 acres would be leased out to the
Tatas.
On 20th December, 2006, the fourth respondent wrote to the Tatas
asking them to take “permissive possession of 950 acres of land
pending finalization of the lease deed and lease terms and conditions.”
The letter also mentioned that this respondent had ‘acquired land’
measuring 997 acres. They proposed to lease out 950 acres of this land
to the Tatas and its ‘selected vendors’. The persons who, were to set up
auxiliary or ancillary industries around the Tatas factory in Singur were
referred to as the ‘vendors’.
It was recorded in an agreement of 9th March, 2007 between the
Tatas and the government that substantial fiscal benefits were
promised to be provided to the Tatas, by the state, matching the offer
made to them by the State of Uttarakhand. It is very interesting to note
that the agreement provided for 47.11 acres of land to be used for
rehabilitation of “project affected persons”.
According to a counter affidavit affirmed on 24th October, 2008 and
filed on behalf of the state in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 8463 of
2008, which was a petition before the Supreme Court from the
judgment and order of a division bench of this court deciding on the
challenge thrown, inter alia, to the acquisition process, by holding the
acquisition to be lawful, possession of 997.11 acres was taken by the
Collector of Hooghly on 4th October, 2006. It was delivered to the fourth
respondent on the same day. It is said that the total compensation
payable to land owners was Rs. 118.95 crores. The amount of
compensation received by land owners was Rs. 90.87 crores up to 8th
April, 2008. The compensation payable to bargadars was Rs.
56,62,032/- up to 25th April, 2008. The amount of compensation
received by the bargadars was Rs. 43,44,286/- up to 8th April, 2008.
THE LEASE
A formal deed of lease was executed on 15th March, 2007. It was
signed on behalf of the fourth respondent by its Managing Director and
on behalf of Tatas by Amarjit Singh Puri, described as the authorised
signatory. The duration of the lease was ninety years from the date of
execution. The lessee had the obligation to build an automobile plant
and related facilities on the land. No premium was asked for or paid by
the Tatas. The annual rent was rupees one crore per year for the first
five years with a 25% increase on the expiry of the period with similar
increase every five years for a period of thirty years from the date of
execution of the lease. Then there was a provision for further increase.
The rent payable from the 61st year till the end of the term was rupees
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twenty crores annually. As provided in the recital part of the lease

645.67 acres of land were let out. Clause 10 of the covenants
disentitled the lessee to permit any other person to use any part of the
demised land for any purpose apart from the purpose of the lease which
was for setting up of an automobile plant. Clause 13 forbade the lessee
to sublease or assign any part of the lease. However, any company
which was a subsidiary or part of the group of the lessee would be
permitted to enjoy it. The termination clause contained in part VI of the
lease is very significant. Clause 1 of part VI, inter alia, provided that if
the lessee had not utilised the demised land for a period of three years
or more, the lessor had the right to give notice indicating the breach
and if such breach was not rectified within six months from the date of
receipt of the notice, the lessor would have the right to determine the
lease. But such notice of determination could not be exercised unless
another notice of three months was served on the lessee. By clause 2
the lessee had also the right to determine the lease in case of any
breach of covenant by the government upon notice of six months
followed by another three months' notice, similar to the determination
by the government. In case of determination the lessee under clause
1d had one year's time to remove their plant, machinery, equipments
and so on.
TROUBLE POST EXECUTION OF LEASE:
Trouble started not long after execution of the lease.
The letter dated 16th July, 2008 from the Police to the General
Manager of the Tatas at Singur warned them that their employees
should take written permission from the police before going out into the
villages adjacent to the site. The Superintendent of Police wrote on 6th
August, 2008 to the General Manager of the Tatas at Singur that a
decision had been taken to set up 20 camps on an urgent basis within
the project site to guard it. There were complaints by the Tatas that
their employees were being attacked by local people. Wrongful restraint
by the local people, of the employees of Tatas and the vendors, was
reported by them to the police.
There were also allegations of “confrontation and agitation” by local
people. By a letter dated 23rd September, 2008 the Tatas informed the
Officer-in-Charge of Singur police station that they had suspended
construction and commissioning work at the small project site with
effect from 29th August, 2008. Their letter dated 10th October, 2008 to
the Director General of police, West Bengal pointed out that because of
“intimidating circumstances” they were “compelled to suspend the
work”. They stated that because of this they were unable to keep their
commitment to complete the manufacture and effect clearance of
“Nano Cars” from the Singur Plant by October, 2008 which was their
“commitment”. Therefore, they had to relocate the plant. Therefore,
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they had decided to “move out of Singur” and “to withdraw” from the
site. It appears from the annual report of Tata Motors Ltd. from 2008 to
2009 that when shifting started 95% of the work was completed.
Some one and half years later on 22nd June, 2010 the fourth
respondent wrote to the Tatas, citing another letter of the Tatas dated
31st October, 2008 that they needed ten months' time to shift their
things from the site. It was pointed out to them that they were to
utilise the land for manufacture of a small car within three years from
the date of lease. Since the period had expired, an enquiry was made
by this respondent as to whether they wanted to utilise the land for any
other manufacturing activity.
This letter was replied to more than three months later on 28th
September, 2010 by the Managing Director of India Operations of Tatas
as follows:
“We, therefore, concluded that a peaceful environment could
not be created for normal working of the Plant and we had to
take the most painful decision to close the operations on 3rd
October, 2008. Meanwhile, we also took permission from you to
remove our equipment and machinery, which we have now done.
We, therefore, have buildings, sheds and infrastructure left
behind on which we have invested Rs. 440 crores and of course
continue to incur Rs. 1 crore per month towards maintenance.
This is in addition to the investment of about Rs. 171 crores
(inclusive of Rs. 40 crores for land premium charges) done by
our vendors.
We would consider an alternative investment in the premises
only if we were satisfied that a peaceful and normal condition
were to be created for running a manufacturing plant. However,
we feel it is not so at this stage.
We have also had discussions with Hon'ble Industry Minister
as well as with the industry Secretary for finding various
alternative uses for this Plant. In this respect, we would like to
submit that we could also consider the option of moving out
from the premises provided we and our vendors are
compensated for the cost of the buildings, sheds on the premises
and expenses incurred in developing the infrastructure which
remain on the premises.”
It needs to be mentioned that the Tatas removed equipments,
machinery and other things from the site in the ten months from 10th
October, 2008. Records show that the police ensured safe transit of the
items. The “Nano” manufacturing plant was relocated at Sanand,
Gujarat.
THE ACT AND RULES THEREUNDER:
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The Act is entitled the Singur Land Rehabilitation and Development

Act 2011 (hereinafter “the impugned Act”). It has a Preamble. It is in
the following terms:
“An Act to provide for taking over of the land covered by the
lease granted to Tata Motors Limited for the sole purpose of
Small Car Manufacturing project and letters of allotment issued
to the Vendors as recommended by Tata Motors Limited in view
of non-commissioning and abandoning Small Car Project and
ancillary factories with a view to returning such portion of land
to the unwilling owners thereof, who have not accepted
compensation and to utilize the balance portion in public
interest and for the benefit of the State.”
The Preamble is followed by a long title. It is in the following terms:
“WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for taking over of the
land covered by the lease granted to Tata Motors Limited for the
sole purpose of Small Car Manufacturing project and letters of
allotment issued to the Vendors as recommended by Tata Motors
Limited in view of non-commissioning and abandoning Small Car
Project and ancillary factories with a view to returning such
portion of the land to the unwilling owners thereof, who have
not accepted compensation and to utilize the balance portion in
public interest and for the benefit of the State;
The Act has nine sections. It came into force on the day of its
notification in the Official Gazette, on 20th June, 2011, after receiving
the assent of the Governor.
As is usual in enactments Section 2 contains definitions. 2(b)
contains the definition of “land”. It means inter alia, the land leased out
by the fourth respondent to the Tatas. Now this definition of land is
further elucidated in Section 4(1). It includes all “assets, rights,
leaseholds…………all properties movable and immovable ………standing
thereon”. Section 3 is the vesting section under the Act. The land
stands transferred to and vested in the State Government, free of any
lease or “allotment”. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 repeats this with
special regard to the lease and adds that it would also stand inter alia,
discharged of any lease. Section 4(3) of the Act enjoins inter alia, the
Tatas to forthwith restore vacant position of the land in favour of the
District Magistrate, Hooghly. In case of any failure the District
Magistrate or any officer authorised by him in this behalf shall be
entitled to take steps and use force as may be necessary to take
possession of the land. Section 5 deals with compensation. Sub-
sections (2) and (3) of Section 5 are in the following terms:
“(2) For the transfer to and vesting of the land leased to the
Tata Motors Limited, the amount of compensation would be
adjudged and determined by the District Judge, Hooghly on an
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application being made by the Tata Motors Limited in due

compliance with the principles of natural justice and by reasoned
order.
(3) The amount so determined in accordance with the
provisions hereto, shall carry simple interest at the rate of six
per centum per annum from the period commencing on the date
of application made by the claimant and ending on the date of
tender of the amount as may be determined and payable by the
State Government.”
Section 6 amplifies the avowed public purpose in enacting the Act in
the following terms:
“6. The State Government shall return equivalent quantum of
land to unwilling owners, who have not accepted the
compensation from the land described in Part I and Part II to the
Schedule and the rest of the land shall be utilized by the
Government for socio-economic development, employment
generation, industry and for other public purpose of the State.”
A statement of objects and reasons was issued to justify the Act.
Paragraph 2 of this statement is of great importance. It reads as
follows:
“(2) Since the grant of lease to the TML, four years have
passed but no small car production industry has been
commissioned for regular production of small car, which has in
fact been abandoned by the TML as announced by the TML and
reiterated in their letters including the letter dated 28.09.2010
and the TML have already transferred, removed the small car
project and all machinery and equipment from the said land to
another State. So far as letters of allotment issued to the
ancillary industries recommended by TML for the purpose of
setting up of the industry/factory is concerned, the object has
also totally failed. None of those industrial undertakings have
taken any steps for obtaining lease in terms of letters of
allotment or at all have not set up any industry and the land has
been lying unutilized for more than three years. No employment
generation and socioeconomic development has taken place and
people in and around the area have not been benefited in any
manner, whatsoever, although more or less Rs. 137 crore has
been paid by WBIDC as compensation to landowners and the
State Government has spent more than Rs. 76 crore for
construction drainage and other infrastructure. In addition, the
State Government has incurred expenses for providing security
at site.”
Paragraphs 4 and 5 are statements about public purpose and are in
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the following terms:

“(4) Several owners of the land/farmers have protested
against acquisition against their wishes and have not accepted
any compensation and on having realized that there is no scope
of generation of employment have been clamouring for return of
their land and staging agitations in that area endangering safety
and security of the area which unless properly handled urgently,
serious law and order problems is likely to develop. (5) In the
circumstances, the State Government in public interest considers
it necessary to take back the ownership of those plots of land
and to take over possession thereof in view of total frustration
of the object and purpose of allotment/lease of land and for
ameliorating ascending public dissatisfaction and agitation and
to take steps urgently for return of the land to the unwilling
owners of the land who have not accepted any compensation
and to utilize remaining portion of the land in public interest for
benefit and socioeconomic development of the State of West
Bengal.”
In exercise of the power conferred by Section 9 of the said Act, the
Singur Land Rehabilitation and Development Rules, 2011 were framed.
It contains the machinery for allotment and distribution of land to
persons who unwillingly delivered up their land during the acquisition
process of 2006. Although these rules have been challenged, no
substantial arguments were made in this behalf. The attack was
confined to the validity of the Act and the manner of its implementation
for taking possession of the land in occupation of the Tatas.
THE ENACTMENT AND TAKING OF POSSESSION:
On 14th June, 2011, the bill was introduced in the State legislature.
It was passed on the same day. It received the assent of the Governor
which was notified in the Kolkata Gazette Extraordinary on 20th June,
2011. It appears from the submissions made on behalf of the Tatas and
not controverted by the respondents that on 21st June, 2011 at about
6.30 p.m. the Hon'ble Minister for Industry of the State announced in a
press conference which was televised that the Act had received the
assent of Governor. At or about the same time, some government
officials arrived at the gate of the Singur factory. On 21st June, 2011
itself a Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal wrote to the
District Magistrate and Collector asking her to take immediate
possession of the land. However, the letter contained a rider that such
possession was to be taken after serving notice to the Tatas “observing
all the formalities”.
Now, the formalities that were observed are quite extraordinary.
They become extremely relevant and assume utmost importance in this
case. The noting of the District Magistrate dated 21st June, 2011 in an
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order sheet records, first a direction to issue notice to the Tatas to

deliver vacant possession of the land to the District Magistrate,
Hooghly. The second endorsement on the sheet made on the same day
records that such notice had been issued and “service return” were in
the records.
Now the notice stated 21st June, 2011 addressed to the Managing
Director of Tata Motors Ltd. was said to have been posted on 22nd June,
2011 and received by the addressee on 28th June, 2011. However, a
duplicate notice was received by a security officer of the Tatas on 21st
June, 2011 at 8.51 in the evening.
The third recording in the said order of the District Magistrate is also
dated 21st June, 2011. It records “failure” on the part of the Tatas to
restore possession of land.
At about 8.30 p.m. in the evening of the same day the District
Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police arrived at the site.
Now, the letter dated 23rd June, 2011 from the Superintendent of
police, Hooghly, to the District Magistrate refers to two Memoranda
131/C and 132/C of the District Magistrate, Hooghly both received by
the Superintendent at 8.30 hours in the evening of 21st. The Memo
131/C recorded that possession had been taken and made a requisition
for a “huge police arrangement” at the “Singur Site” from the night of
21st June, 2011 while Memo 132 B said that such exercise was
undertaken to keep vacant possession.
It is plain that the State was in possession of the Singur land by
8.30 p.m. in the evening on 21st June, 2011. All the above documents
have been disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition of the District
Magistrate, the fifth respondent affirmed on 7th July, 2011.
This leads very little room for doubt that possession was taken
without any notice.
SUBMISSIONS:
Mr. S. Pal, Sr. Advocate
The case of the Tatas was advanced by Mr. Samaraditya Pal, learned
Senior Advocate.
He began his submissions by citing Joydeep Mukherjee v. State of
West Bengal reported in (2008) 2 CHN 546. This is a Division Bench
judgment of our High Court delivered on 18th January, 2008 by P.C.
Ghose, J. on behalf of the bench. By this judgment the acquisition of
land in Singur in 2006 was upheld. It is submitted that the
party/parties aggrieved preferred a special leave petition before the
Supreme Court, which has been admitted by the Court. The appeal is
pending. No interim order was passed by the Supreme Court while
admitting the Special Leave Petition.
He took me in detail through the provisions of the lease, showing me
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the recitals, representations, warranties as well as the covenants. Such

provisions of the lease are mentioned by me in detail below.
He described in great detail the concept of “eminent domain” as
being an incident of the sovereign power of the State to take private
property and the recognition of that power in the original Article 31 of
the Constitution, relating to acquisition. It was to be exercised for
public purpose and upon payment of compensation. He showed me all
the law on the subject, right from The State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar
Singh reported in (1952) 1 SCC 528 : AIR 1952 SC 252 to the two
latest five Judges' bench decisions of the Supreme Court in Rajiv Sarin
v. State of Uttarakhand and K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, both decided on 9th August, 2011.
Thereafter, he placed Article 245, 246 and 254 of the Constitution of
India together with entry 18 of list II which is the State List which is
part of the seventh schedule of the Constitution and entry 42 of list III
which is in the Concurrent list and part of the same schedule. Placing
Article 245 he contended that parliament may make laws for the whole
or any part of the territory of India, and the legislature of a state may
make laws for the whole or any part of the state. Placing article 254(1)
he said that if any state law was contrary to a law made by parliament
or the law made under the Concurrent list, the law of parliament would
prevail. The law made by the state which was repugnant to the law
made by parliament would be void to the extent of such repugnancy.
However, this was subject to Article 254(2) which stated that if a law
made by the legislature received the assent of the President, it would
prevail despite its repugnancy with a law made by parliament. He cited
the case of Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, reported in (2006) 7 SCC 1.
He remarked after placing paragraph 50, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63 and
64 that the Indian polity was federal but it had strong unitary features.
The judgment of the Supreme Court said that the Indian Constitution
was “more unitary than federal”.
Thereafter, he elaborated on Article 246 which divided the subject
matters within the competence of parliament and the state legislature
into three separate lists. These lists make up the seventh schedule of
the Constitution. List I is called the Union List and contain the subject
matters over which parliament may exclusively legislate. List II refers
to the subject matters over which the state legislature may exclusively
legislate. List III is the concurrent list over which both may legislate.
Then he refers to the subject matters in List II and III relating to land
and acquisition. Mr. Pal also spoke about the history of amendments of
the items in these two lists relating to acquisition.
Entry 33 of List I at the time of enactment of the Constitution related
to acquisition for the purposes of the Union. Entry 36 of the State List
related to similar acquisition by the state, except for the purpose of the
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Union subject to the provision of entry 42 of list III. Entry 42 of List III
empowered the parliament and the state legislature to concurrently
legislate on the principles on which compensation was to be given. By
the seventh Amendment Act, 1956 entry 33 of List I and entry 36 of
List II were deleted. Entry 42 was reanacted by deleting the existing
subject matter and replacing it by the expression acquisition and
requisitioning of property.
Mr. Pal submitted that the state in paragraph 24 and 25 of their
Affidavit-in-opposition had asserted that the subject matter of the
impugned Act fell under entry 18 of list II. This entry is as follows:
“18. Land, that is to say, right in or over land, land tenures
including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection
of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land
improvement and agricultural loans; colonization.”
He cited Rustam Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, reported in 1970
(1) SCC 248 and also reported in AIR 1970 SC 564 for many purposes.
During this stage of the arguments he cited paragraph 38 of that
judgment which stated that after the seventh amendment Act, 1956
the power to legislate for acquisition of property can only be exercised
under entry 42 of List III and not an incident of the power to legislate
over the subject matters covered by the other entries in the three lists.
He argued that this power was not available under entry 18 of List II.
The impugned Act, according to him expropriated property that is the
leasehold interest of the Tatas in Singur. Therefore, the legislation
being expropriation in nature was an exercise of power under entry 42
of List III. This submission was made to advance the argument that if
there was exercise of power under entry 42 of List III, the Act to stand,
had to have the assent of the President. Since, it did not have the
assent of the President it could not be in conflict with any parliamentary
law and to be more specific the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The
impugned Act was absolutely repugnant to the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 and was therefore void.
Next, he cited the case of Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v.
State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (1980) 4 SCC 136, while formulating
the “pith and substance” doctrine. He referred to the portion of the
judgment in paragraph 13 and said that if a legislation was
substantially within one entry but some part of the legislation
incidentally trenched upon any subject matter of another list the Act as
a whole would be valid. He also placed paragraph 18 and argued that
after the 7th Amendment Act, of 1956 relating to Entry No. 33 of list I,
Entry No. 36 of list II and Entry No. 42 of list III the power of
acquisition and requisition of property could not be an incident of any
other power.
Mr. Pal then cited the case of H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra
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reported in (1984) 2 SCC 337, to explain the nature of expropriation,

which according to his submission based on the above judgment was
“acquiring of the entire title of the expropriated owner whatever the
nature and extent of that title may be. The entire bundle of rights
which was vested in the original holder passes on acquisition to the
acquirer leaving nothing to the former.”
Thereafter the learned Counsel placed the provisions of the Act,
namely, Section 3 which provided for vesting of the land and Section 5
which provided for compensation.
Immediately thereafter he placed R.L. Jain (D) By Lrs. v. DDA
reported in (2004) 4 SCC 79 paragraph 11 to submit that
compensation had to be paid immediately after taking of possession by
the government.
Thereafter, the learned Counsel tried to place the parts of the Act
dealing with public purpose. He argued that the public purpose
mentioned in the Act was for return of land to “unwilling owners” of
land which was acquired for the Tatas. He said that there was no public
purpose involved in giving the land to unwilling owners when land was
acquired exercising the power of eminent domain, and when such
acquisition was upheld by the Court. The question of “willingness” was
totally irrelevant in acquisition. Willing or unwilling the owners had to
give up the land. A purpose directed at returning the land acquired
could not be public purpose. He cited Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The
Union of India reported in 1950 SCC 833 : AIR 1951 SC 41 para 48 to
submit that in case of acquisition willingness or unwillingness of the
expropriated owner does not matter.
He next contended that Section 4(3) of the impugned Act directing
the Tatas to forthwith restore vacant possession in favour of the District
Magistrate, Hooghly contained unguided power. He cited State of
Maharashtra v. Mrs. Kamal Sukumar Durgule reported in 1985 SC 119
relating to Maharashtra Vacant Lands (Prohibition of Unauthorised
Occupation and Summary Eviction) Act, 66 of 1975 to submit that such
provision was unconstitutional.
The learned Senior Advocate also submitted that any action of the
government or a statutory authority in undue haste is malice in law and
is presumed to be arbitrary referring to Sarva Shramik Sangh, Bombay
v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. reported in (1993) 2 SCC 386, R.S. Garg
v. State of U.P. reported in (2006) 6 SCC 430, Zenit Mataplast Private
Limited v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2009) 10 SCC 388 and
Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab reported in (2010) 11 SCC 455.
The action of the government in enacting the impugned Act and the
rules thereunder and implementing the Act by taking most expeditious
possession of the land on 21st June, 2011 was on the face of it misuse
of power. He cited Congreve v. Home Office reported in (1976) 1 ALL
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ER 697 and Wheeler v. Leicester City Council reported in (1985) 2 ALL

ER 1106.
Thereafter, Mr. Pal made an endeavour to interpret the word
“forthwith” under Section 4(3) of the Act. The section provided, inter
alia, that the Tatas would forthwith restore vacant possession of the
land in favour of the District Magistrate, Hooghly. According to him,
forthwith did not mean taking possession within a few hours without
giving notice. He drew my attention to Gopal Mondal v. The State of
West Bengal, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1087. In that particular case
according to Mr. Pal, the Supreme Court opined that a reasonable view
has to be taken of the word “forthwith” in the facts and circumstances
of each case. Three days' delay was considered by the Supreme Court
to be forthwith in the facts and circumstances of that particular case.
Therefore, although there is provision for forthwith delivery of
possession in favour of the District Magistrate, Hooghly, nonetheless,
taking of possession within a few hours of notification of the statute
was a most arbitrary act.
He also referred me to State of W.B. v. Vishnunarayan & Associates
(P) Ltd., reported in (2002) 4 Supreme Court Cases 134. He contended
that the Tatas have been evicted from Singur by force and that in
paragraph 17 of that judgment placed by Mr. Pal, the use of force in
taking possession of premises by the State Government was held to be
bad.
The Act was also attacked. It conferred unfettered discretion on the
state administration. The Act was most unreasonable in its conception
and in its application. Two English decisions were cited by Mr. Pal,
Sharpe v. Wakefield, reported in [1886-90] All E.R. 651 and Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, reported in
[1947] 2 All E.R. 680. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal, reported
in AIR 1975 SC 550 (paragraph 16 and 24), The Manager, Govt. Branch
Press v. D.B. Belliappa, reported in AIR 1979 SC 429 were also cited.
Before introducing the topic of eminent domain Mr. Pal took me in
detail through the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, right
from issuance of notice, receiving of objections, making of award,
vesting, principles to be taken into account for computation of
compensation, principles to be disregarded in calculating
compensation, the obligation to tender the awarded sum, upon making
of an award by the collector, reference to the District Judge, payment of
interest under the Act and so on.
Thereafter, he argued that the power to acquire was not an incident
of any other power. It was wholly exercise of powers under list III entry
42. List II entry 18 did not cover acquisition of land. The power of the
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legislature to acquire land was not an incident of any other power. He

cited the case of Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India reported in
AIR 1970 SC 564 and Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of
Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1980) 4 SCC 136.
Then he came to the topic of a single person legislation. He argued
that a single person legislation could not be arbitrary or discriminatory.
If such a law was unjust it was no law at all. He cited four decisions for
this proposition in Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi v. The State of Bihar,
reported in AIR 1953 SC 215, P. Venugopal v. Union of India, reported
in (2008) 5 SCC 1, para 36, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v.
Maddula Ratnavalli, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 81, para 20, State of T.N.
v. Ananthi Ammal, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 519, para 7. After this he
started elucidating his arguments on public purpose. He referred to the
erstwhile Article 31 of the Constitution. He said that acquisition was
exercise of the power of eminent domain. This power could be exercised
for public purpose only and upon payment of compensation. The power
to acquire property and the duty to pay compensation had been deleted
from the part relating to fundamental rights. It was enacted as a
constitutional right in Article 300A. It said that no person would be
deprived of his property save in accordance with law. Now, this
deprivation had to be for public purpose only and upon payment of
reasonable compensation. He cited Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v.
Darius Shapur Chenai, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 627 and Sooraram
Pratap Reddy v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, reported in
(2008) 9 SCC 552, paras 43,44 and 45 and argued that no public
purpose was disclosed in the impugned Act. He said that willingness or
unwillingness of a person was not material in acquisition referring to
the case of Charanjit Lal Chowdhury (Supra).
Therefore, the reference to unwillingness persons did not signify any
public purpose. He cited Gadadhar Ghosh v. State of West Bengal,
reported in AIR 1963 Cal 565 to submit that when a purpose had been
declared the Court could not investigate any undisclosed purpose.
However, he argued that since no purpose had been manifestly
declared by this Act it was invalid. He relied on Smt. Somawanti v. The
State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1963 SC 151, paras 35 and 36 to
argue that such statement of public purpose was justiciable. He also
showed me Munshi Singh v. Union of India, reported in (1973) 2 SCC
337, para 8 to say that a purpose which was vague was not public
purpose at all. He also cited The State of Karnataka v. Shri Ranganatha
Reddy, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 471 to augment his argument
regarding alleged absence of public purpose.
Thereafter, the learned counsel started arguing on the question of
compensation. At the outset he said that Section 5 did not specify the
compensation to be paid. Nor did it specify any principles for the
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calculation or payment of compensation. It only said that the amount of

compensation would be adjudged and determined by the District
Judge, of Hooghly on an application being made by the Tatas, by a
reasoned order, after observing the rules of natural justice. He began
his arguments challenging the compensation claim by placing the case
of Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti v. State of West Bengal,
reported in (1996) 2 CLJ 285.
Thereafter, he recounted the history of the law of acquisition and
payment of compensation by placing the Land Acquisition Act 1894 in
great detail. Thereafter, he placed Section 299 of the Government of
India Act, 1935 which said that no property could be acquired except in
accordance with law and except upon payment of compensation to be
specified in the Act or upon provision of the principles for payment of
compensation, therein. He showed me Article 31 of the Constitution of
India as it was at the time of adoption of the Constitution. He also took
me through the various constitutional amendments amending Article
31, namely, the Fourth Amendment of 1955 which said that the
adequacy of compensation could not be examined by the court. He also
showed me the Twenty Fifth Amendment of 1971 where the word
“compensation” was replaced by the word “amount”. Then he came to
the Fortyfourth amendment of 1978 which deleted Article 31 and
ceased to recognise right to property as a fundamental right. It was
only recognised as a constitutional right by insertion of Article 300A.
This subsection stated that no person would be deprived of his property
save in accordance with law. He cited the case of Rustam Cavasjee
Cooper v. Union of India, reported in 1970 (1) SCC 248 which is a
eleven Judges' bench decision of the Supreme Court.
He made a very significant argument by pointing out the difference
between the word “confiscation” and the word “compensation”. He
argued that when a property was confiscated by the State it was done
as a penalty for some act done by the land owner. When there is
confiscation no compensation is payable. Compensation is the money
awarded for deprivation of property. How the compensation was to be
fixed or calculated was a different matter. But, any expropriation of
property by exercise of the power of eminent domain or acquisition had
to be accompanied by payment of compensation by the state. He cited
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala,
reported in (1973) 4 SCC 225. This was followed by State of
Maharashtra v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan, reported in (1986) 2 SCC
516, para 7, 8, 15, Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti v. State of
West Bengal, reported in 1996 (2) CLJ 285. He also reiterated the case
of Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, reported
in (2005) 7 SCC 627.
He showed me the various lists under the seventh schedule. He
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referred to the history of those lists. He showed entry 18 of list II and

entry 42 of list III. He placed the case of Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v.
State of Gujarat, reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596 to argue that
while legislating for land, land tenure and on other subjects relating to
land the legislature could also make acquisition which fell under entry
42.
Thereafter, he came to the question of abandonment and argued
that there was no abandonment on the part of the Tatas. The word
meant permanently leaving something. There was no permanent
leaving by the Tatas. They had only removed their plant, equipment
and machinery from the site. He relied on Kanhiya Shanker v. Mohabata
Sedhu, reported in AIR 1960 Punjab 494, Bombay Dyeing &
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1958
SC 328, paragraphs 28, 29 and 30, G.T. Lad v. Chemicals and Fibres
India Ltd., reported in AIR 1979 SC 582, paragraph 3.
Next he argued on the question of repugnancy. He argued that since
the impugned Act was without the assent of the President, it was
repugnant to a Central Act, namely, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In
no way could the provisions of the impugned Act be reconciled with the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, the repugnancy was total and
irreconcilable, referring to State of West Bengal v. Union of India,
reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241, paragraph 46, Thakur Amar Singhji v.
State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1955 SC 504, paragraph 27. He
also referred to G.P. Stewart v. Brojendra Kishore Roy Chaudhury,
reported in AIR 1939 Calcutta 628, M.P. Ait Permit Owners Assn. v.
State of M.P., reported in (2004) 1 SCC 320 in support of his
proposition.
Thereafter, he emphasized on the pith and substance theory. The
pith and substance of an Act had to be gone into. He relied on Bondu
Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority, reported in (2010) 7
SCC 129.
He also took me through two recent Supreme Court decisions, each
by a five Judges' bench of the court and each rendered on 9th August,
2011. The first is the case concerning the Kuzarlar Act, the second is
the case of K.T. Plantation Private Limited v. State of Karnataka. Both
are still unreported. Both of them deal with the power of the State to
acquire property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and
recognised the right of the land owner to receive compensation which
was not illusory. He also referred to the case of Bondu Ramaswamy v.
Bangalore Development Authority, reported in (2010) 7 SCC 129, para
89 dealing with Bangalore Development Authority Act. He also referred
to Offshore Holdings Private Limited v. Bangalore Development
Authority, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 139 concerning the same
Bangalore Development Authority Act and Girnar Traders v. State of
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Maharashtra, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 1 concerning a Maharashtra Act.

Submissions of State-respondents:
The submissions on behalf of the State-respondents were made by
the learned Advocate General, Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Senior
Advocate, Mr. Kalyan Bandopadhay, learned Senior Advocate and Mr.
Ashoke Banerjee, learned Senior Advocate.
Mr. Advocate General
The learned Advocate General began his argument by contending
that the definition of compensation was very wide in the impugned Act.
The definition of compensation in the Land Acquisition Act was very
narrow. Then he placed the history of acquisition of this land in 2006.
Thereafter he placed the provisions of the lease agreement. He said
that the purpose was for setting up of an automobile plant. No
premium was paid by the Tatas. The rent was Rs. 1 crore per year. He
submitted that the rent payable to the State was very meagre. He said
that this lease was not assignable. The land could not be sublet. It
could not be used for any purpose other than for manufacture of
automobile. His argument was that the leasehold right had no saleable
interest. He submitted that the operation in the factory was suspended
from 29th August, 2008. He placed great reliance on the use of the
expression by the Tatas in the letter dated 10th October, 2008 to “move
out of Singur” and to “withdraw” from the site. Operations were
formally closed on 3rd October, 2008 referring to the letter dated 28th
September on 2010 of the Tatas at page 297 of the writ petition.
He also relied upon the letter of the Tatas dated 31st October, 2008
which said that they would take ten months' time to move out of
Singur. He then read the letter dated 22nd June, 2010 of the fourth
respondent enquiring from the Tatas whether the site would be used by
them for manufacturing activity. He also read their reply dated 28th
Septemeber, 2010 which inter alia, said that they would consider the
option to move out permanently provided they were suitably
compensated.
He then referred to the case of Tata Power Co. Ltd. v. Reliance
Energy Ltd. reported in 2009 (16) SCC 659 and the case of State of
Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. reported in 1997 (2) SCC 453 which relied
on the case of SEAFORD COURT ESTATES v. ASHER reported in 1949
(2) ALL ER 1955 to submit that there was a presumption of
constitutionality of a statute. The Court should not pick holes in it and
try to interpret the Act so as to support it.
Thereafter, he apprised the Court that the total compensation paid
for the first acquisition was Rs. 137 crores. Rs. 76 crores were
expended for drainage and other infrastructure by the State. In spite of
such investment by them the land was lying idle. Therefore, the State
decided to take it over.
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He tried to justify the impugned Act by drawing its analogy with the
West Bengal Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976. He submitted
that a tenant of government premises could be given a notice of
termination of tenancy and asked to restore possession, taking the help
of force if necessary. There was no question of payment of any
compensation.
Then he tried to distinguish the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the
impugned Act by saying that under the Land Acquisition Act there was
no automatic acquisition. By the impugned Act, the leasehold interest
of the Tatas was automatically extinguished.
He argued that in the impugned Act there could not be any
acquisition because the State could not acquire its own land, citing the
case of Ahad Brothers v. State of M.P. reported in AIR 2005 SC 355.
Thereupon he cited Nader Chand v. State of West Bengal reported in
AIR 1952 CAL 67 paragraph 19 and 20 to contend that payment of
compensation was not a condition precedent to vesting or taking of
possession of land. He relied on by the case of Nader Chand v. State of
West Bengal reported in AIR 1952 CAL 67 to say that the notices were
issued by the district officials after enactment of the impugned Act, “as
a matter of grace” and there was no requirement for issuance of such
notice.
Then he spoke about the law of repugnancy. He said that there was
no repugnancy between any Central Act and the impugned Act. He
argued that the subject matter covered by the impugned Act was
wholly within Entry 18 of List II. The legislation related to land, land
tenure, landlord and tenant. The pith and substance of the legislation
was under entry 18 of List II. Therefore, the said legislature had the
competence to make this legislation.
Thereafter, he cited State of Karnataka v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy
reported in 1977 (4) SCC 471 to emphasize on the public purpose.
Then he argued on the question of compensation, taking note of
Article 31 and its amendments and the various amendments of List II
and List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution, but, particularly
entry 18 of List II and entry 42 of List III. He argued that the law
regarding compensation as laid down by the Supreme Court after
coming into force of the Constitution, has been considerably diluted by
various constitutional amendments. Even the case of Cooper was not
absolutely relevant at this point of time, considering the subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court. The compensation to be awarded was
not to be “absolutely illusory or arbitrary”. Nevertheless, he placed the
concept of compensation as being “equivalent”, citing the case of Md.
MOZIAHARAL AHMAD v. Md. AZIMADDIN reported in AIR 1923 CAL 507
and Rathi Menon v. Union of India reported in 2001 (3) SCC 714.
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Then he made the arguments relating to public purpose. He said that

the need of a section of the people would be termed as public purpose.
In this case the section of people were the “unwilling owners”. He cited
the case of Ratilal Shakarabhai v. The State of Gujarat reported in 1970
(2) SCC 264 and Urmila Roy v. Bengal Peerless Housing Development
Company Ltd. reported in 2009 (5) SCC 242 (paragraph 16).
He said that the Act enjoined forthwith taking of possession of the
property and possession as taken of the property at Singur was valid.
Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, Senior Advocate:
Mr. Mukherjee began his arguments by citing Chiranjit Lal
Choudhury v. Union of India reported in 1950 SCC 833 : AIR 1951 SC
41. He argued that an enactment directed at one person was
constitutional if there was sufficient basis or reasons for it. He referred
to the acquisition of several oil companies like ESSO, Burma Oil
Company and Caltex.
Then he tried to justify the taking of possession. He showed me
Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. He argued that the
Government has the power to take possession of the land upon
“making” of the award. The award need not be published or served
upon the person affected. The award becomes operational upon its
signing and sealing by the collector, citing the case of State of Bihar v.
Samsuz Zoha reported in AIR 1996 SC 61. Therefore, upon making of
the award the Government is entitled to take possession.
He referred to the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition)
Act, 1948 and West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948.
He said that under those Acts no compensation was payable. He cited
West Bengal Housing Board v. Bruendra Prasad Gupta reported in 1997
(6) SCC 207, arguing that the West Bengal Land (Requisition and
Acquisition) Act, 1948 had been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
case.
Thereafter, he proceeded to explain the term “freed of the lease” in
the impugned Act. He explained the nature of a lease by inter alia
placing Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act.
He argued with great fervour as to what happened in the event of
determination or extinguishment of a lease. He referred to an old
decision of this Court in a case in 1897 ILR 24 Cal 440 where it was
said that upon happening of such an event the barrier between the
owner and the land was removed. He said that the lease was
extinguished. He also placed passages from commentaries by Mulla and
by Sir Hari Singh Gour, 8th Edition, 1974. He extended these arguments
by explaining the effect of surrender of a lease. He cited Provident
Investment Co. Ltd. v. Commr. Of Income-tax, Bombay City reported in
AIR 1954 Bombay 95 and H.S. Ramsingh v. Bijoy Singh Surana
reported in 76 CWN 217.
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His next argument was with regard to the exercise of power by the
legislature in enacting the impugned Act. It was not an exercise of the
power of eminent domain but of the power of land reform,
extinguishment of land tenure affecting landlord tenant relationship
under entry 18 of list II. He placed the case of Sooram Pratap Reddy v.
District Collector Ranga reddy District reported in 2008 (9) SCC 552 to
explain the concept of eminent domain together with the case of Anand
Singh v. State of U.P. reported in 2010 (11) SCC 242. In this
connection he also referred to the case of Rakhal Chandra Basak v. The
Secretary of State for Indian Council reported in 33 CWN 669.
He showed me decisions Calcutta Crdit Corporation v. Happy Homes
Ltd. reported in AIR 1968 SC 471 (paragraph 7) and Mira Sen v. Dipak
Kumar Ghosh reported in 82 CWN 177. These landlord tenant cases
were cited so as to show that even if defective notice was accepted by a
tenant it was a good notice, referring to the allegedly defective notice
issued by the District Magistrate to the Tatas on 21st June, 2011.
Then he came to the question of compensation. He cited Yadava
Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2010 (10) SCC 341 (paragraph
70) to argue that compensation was more broad based than damages.
He placed the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949.
He cited two decisions of the Supreme Court relating to taking over
of zamindari, jagir, etc. and argued that this fell under land reforms. He
cited State of Vindhya Pradesh v. Mayadhwaj Singh reported in AIR
1960 SC 796 para 6 and Amarsarjit Singh v. State of Punjab reported
in AIR 1962 SC 1305 para 22.
He cited the case relating to taking over of coffee plantation being
the case of Coffee Board, Karnataka, Bangalore v. Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes, Karnataka reported in AIR 1988 SC 1487 paragraph
28 and 29 and argued that there was no exercise of eminent domain.
The second aspect of his argument was relating to the
constitutionality of the impugned Act. He said that it should always be
the endeavour of the Courts to make a harmonious construction of the
Act. In this regard he cited Harakehand Ratunehand Banthia v. Union of
India reported in AIR 1970 SC 1453 and Ajay Kr. Singh v. State of
Bihar reported in 1994 (4) SCC 401. He argued that the pith and
substance of legislation had to be examined. In an effort to interpret
one entry, another could not be robbed of its entire content. In this
connection he referred to Rajiv Sarin's case and the K.T. Plantation
case.
He relied upon three Acts of West Bengal 1) West Bengal Public Land
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1962, 2) Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and 3) West Bengal
Government Premises (Tenancy and Regulation) Act, 1976, to argue
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that in these Acts the provisions for extinguishment of the interest of

tenants were without any payment of compensation. The last Act had
been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Associated Indem
Mechanical (P) Ltd. v. W.B. Small Industries Development Corporation
Ltd. reported in 2007 (3) SCC 607.
Kalyan Bandopadhay, Senior Advocate:
Mr. Bandopadhay, submitted that the main consideration before the
Court was the competence of the legislature. It had to see whether the
legislature had the competency or not for enacting the impugned Act
under List II entry 18. He argued that it had such competence. There
was no acquisition.
He argued that such kind of law was upheld by the Supreme Court in
the case of Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat reported in
1995 (Supp) I SCC 596 and placed paragraph 48 and 49 thereof.
He argued that by the impugned Act there was extinguishment of
the lease and the resumption of ownership and possessory rights of the
leased land by the State.
He argued that only if exercise of power by the legislature was
pretended, could it be called colourable and could be struck down by
the Court, citing the case of Ashoke Kumar v. Union of India reported in
1991 (3) SCC 498 paragraph 9.
He cited the case of DHARAM DUTT v. UNION OF INDIA reported in
2004 (1) SCC 712 to argue that a single institution could be treated as
a class. He also cited the case of Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice
Tendolkar reported in AIR 1958 SC 538.
He argued that the Court should not seek an unnecessary
confrontation with the government and should interfere with legislation
in an exceptional case as held by the Supreme Court in the case of
Government of A.P. v. P. Laxmi reported in 2008 (4) SCC 720. He also
relied upon the case of State of A.P. v. Mc. Dawell Devi & Co. reported
in 1996 (3) SCC 709 paras 37 and 38 and Glanrock Estate P. Ltd. v.
State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2010 (10) SCC 96.
He cited the case of Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India
reported in 1979 (4) SCC 51 to argue that the provision for
compensation in the statute was adequate.
He also referred to the case of Hoeeshst Pharmacuticals Ltd. v. State
of Bihar reported in 1983 (4) SCC 45 paragraphs 52 and 57.
Mr. Ashoke Banerjee, Senior Advocate:
Mr. Ashoke Banerjee, learned Government Pleader made general
arguments citing points argued by the other three learned counsel, but
from his own perception and with his own ideas of importance.
All the learned Counsel, who argued on behalf of the State were
unanimous in submitting that in the event this Court held that the
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impugned Act involved acquisition, the legislature had kept open the
field for grant of lawful compensation by the District Judge, Hooghly.
They argued that the legislature did not limit the compensation or
enunciate any principles so that the District Judge would be fettered.
Compensation according to the legislation is to be paid accordingly.
At the very close of submissions I asked the learned Advocate
General to take specific instruction, whether the state government
would prefer any appeal, if the Court interpreted the word
“compensation” as embodying the principles enshrined in Sections 23
and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. He replied on the next date
after taking instruction that the State had no objections if those
principles for grant of compensation were deemed to have been
embodied in the impugned Act and were to be considered and applied
by the District Judge, subject to admissibility of any principle, while
awarding compensation. I have taken that statement of the learned
Advocate General to be the stand of the State.
LAND ACQUISITION - CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND
PROVISIONS
On 1st March, 1894, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 came into force.
In Section 3(a) land was defined as including benefits arising out of
land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to
anything attached to the earth. Section 4 says that when it appears to
the appropriate government that land is needed for any public purpose
a notification will be published by the Collector. Then there are various
provisions regarding notification of claims, making of award, vesting of
land and payment of compensation. The principles which are to be
taken into account for payment of compensation are mentioned in
Section 23 of the Act and the principles which are to be disregarded are
mentioned in Section 24.
Sections 23 and 24 are stated hereunder:
“23. Matters to be considered in determining compensation -
(1) determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for
land acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into
consideration-
first, the market value of the land at the date of the publication
of the [notification under section 4, sub-section (1)];
Secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by
reason of the taking of any standing crops or trees which may be
on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession
thereof;
thirdly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person
interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the
land, by reason of severing such land from his other land;
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fourthly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person

interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the
land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other
property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his
earnings;
fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the
Collector, the person interested in compelled to charge his
residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses (if any)
incidental to such change; and
sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from
diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the
publication of the declaration under section 6 and the time of the
Collector's taking possession of the land. …….”
“24. Matters to be neglected in determining compensation -
But the Court shall not take into consideration.
first, the degree of urgency which has led to the acquisition;
secondly, any disinclination of the person interested to part
with the land acquired;
Thirdly, any damage sustained by him which, if caused by a
private person, would not render such person liable to a suit;
fourthly, any damage which is likely to be caused to the land
acquired, after the date of the publication of the declaration
under section 6, by or in consequence of the use to which it will
be put;
fifthly, any increase to the value of the land acquired likely to
accrue from the use to which it will be put when acquired;
sixthly, any increase to the value of the other land of the
person interested likely to accrue from the use to which the land
acquired will be put;
Seventhly any outlay or improvements on, or disposal of, the
land acquired, commenced, made or effected without the
sanction of the Collector sub-section (1) [or]
Eighthly, any increase to the value of the land on account of its
being part to any use which is forbidden by land or opposed to
public policy.”
The Government of India Act came in 1935. Section 299 of the Act
was about compulsory acquisition of land. It is in this Act of 1935 that
this celebrated statement appears “No person shall be deprived of his
property [in British India] save by authority of law”. [Section 299(1)].
Section 299 said that no law for acquisition of any land or any
commercial or industrial undertaking or any interest therein would be
made without providing for payment of compensation in the Act itself
or without specifying the principles for its calculation, in the Act. Now,
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this provision of the Government of India Act, 1935 is not only part of
our constitutional history but is part of the basic constitutional principle
for acquisition of property, which it will be seen, has been modified over
the years.
India became independent. On 26th November, 1949, we adopted,
enacted and gave to ourselves the constitution. By the operation of
Article 394 major provisions of the constitution came into force only on
26th January, 1950.
Article 31 related to right to property. It was part of our fundamental
rights. Sub sections 1 and 2 substantially, if not wholly adopted and
incorporated sections 299(1) and (2) of the Government of India Act,
1935. These sub sections and S.299 of the Government of India Act,
1935 were in the following terms:
“31. (1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.
(2) No property, movable or immovable, including any interest
in, or in company owing, any commercial or industrial
undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public
purposes under any law authorising the taking of such
possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for
compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired
and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the
principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation
is to be determined and given.”
“299.(1) No person shall be deprived of his property in
[British India] save by authority of law.
(2) Neither the Federal nor a Provincial Legislature shall have
power to make any law authorizing the compulsory acquisition
for public purposes of any land, or any commercial or industrial
undertaking, or any interest in, or in any company owning, any
commercial or industrial undertaking, unless the law provides for
the payment of compensation for the property acquired and
either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the
principles on which, and the manner in which, it is to be
determined.”
By the fourth Amendment Act effective from 27th April, 1955 Article
31(2) was amended. The amendment was that no law of acquisition
could be called in question in any court on the ground that the
compensation was not adequate. Further, the 25th Amendment Act,
1971 was made effective from 20th April, 1972. The word
‘compensation’ was deleted and replaced by the word ‘amount’. By the
44th Amendment Act of 1978 right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right. Article 31 was deleted. A provision was added after
Article 300 and numbered as Article 300A. The first sub section of
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Section 31 was transferred to that place. The rest was deleted. Article
300A reads as follows:
“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by
authority of law. - No person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law.”
Connected with this constitutional principle is another constitutional
principle - the competence of Parliament and the state legislature to
enact laws with regard to land acquisition. Part XI Chapter 1 of the
Constitution is entitled ‘legislative relations'. Parliament has the power
to make laws for the entire territory of India. It can also make extra
territorial law. The legislature of the State has power to make laws for
the State. This is a very general power, made subject to the other
provisions of the Constitution (Article 245). Now, this broad and
general power is made more specific by the subsequent articles. List I
of the seventh schedule contains subjects over which Parliament has
exclusive power to make laws. List II contains subjects over which the
State legislature has exclusive power to make laws. List III of it
contains subjects over which both Parliament and State have
concurrent powers to make laws. These three lists are called the Union
list, State list and Concurrent list, respectively. (See article 246).
Now, Article 254 is very important. It enacts that if a state law is
repugnant to a law made by Parliament it is void to the extent of such
repugnancy. However, there is one exception. If the state makes a law
with regard to a subject in the concurrent list and such law has
received the assent of the President, then it is good law although it is
repugnant to the central law. The circumstance when a bill is reserved
for the consideration of the President is mentioned in Article 201. The
President can assent to the bill or withhold his assent. The most
important provision in the article is that when an enactment by the
state legislature, on a subject in the concurrent list without the assent
of the President, is in conflict with a law made by Parliament, that law
will be void or void to the extent of its conflict with any parliamentary
law. [Article 254(2)]
When the Constitution was enacted entry 33 of list I provided for
acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purposes of the Union.
Similarly, entry 36 of list II provided for acquisition or requisitioning of
property except for the purposes of the Union subject to entry 42 of list
III. Entry 42 of list III related to the principles on which compensation
for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or
of a state or for any other public purpose was to be determined and the
form and the manner in which such compensation was to be given. By
the Seventh Amendment Act, 1956, entry 33 of list I was deleted. So
was entry 36 of the State list. Entry 42 of the Concurrent list was
amended by deleting everything it contained and substituting them
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with ‘acquisition and requisitioning of property’.

LAW ON ACQUISITION AND COMPENSATION:
In England all land in the realm is owned by the sovereign. Each
individual holds it of some lord (See Law of Real Property by Megary
and Wade - Seventh Edition). An attribute of sovereign power is
acquisition. The sovereign could acquire or “take over” any private
property if it was needed by him for public use (See Kameshwar Singh
(1952) 1 SCC 528 : AIR 1952 SC 252 judgment of Mahajan J. page
39). Although this power to take land resided absolutely with the
sovereign, nevertheless, it was attached with an obligation to
recompense the land owner for the loss that he suffered. In the
beginning it was a matter of negotiation between the officers of the
sovereign and the landholder. Later this obligation was engrafted in
statutes, first of special pplication and then of general application (See
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh reported in (1952) 1 SCC 528 : AIR
1952 SC 252 judgment of Das J. para 91).
Blackstone the famous English commentator on common law had
spoken about this in his three volumes of Commentaries on the laws of
England published in the 18th Century. According to Blackstone, the
standard of compensation was an equivalent of the property lost.
It is very necessary to set out what Blackstone said as embodied in
paragraph 94 of R.C. Cooper v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 564
(Judgment of J.C. Shah J).
“94. Under the Common Law of England, principles for
payment of compensation for acquisition of property by the
State are stated by Blackstone in his “Commentaries on the Laws
of England”, 4th Edn., Vol.1, at p. 109:
“So great moreover is the regard of the law for private
property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no,
not even for the general good of the whole community. * * *
Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially
interested, than in the protection of every individual's private
rights, as modeled by the municipal law. In this and similar
cases, the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does
interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does
it interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject
of his property in an arbitrary manner; but giving him a full
indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained.
The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an
individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does, is to
oblige the owner to alienate his possession for reasonable
price:* * *
The British Parliament is supreme and its powers are not
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subject to any constitutional limitations. But the British

Parliament has rarely, if at all, exercised power to take property
without payment of the cash value of the property taken. In
Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, 1920 AC 508, the
House of Lords held that the Crown is not entitled as of right
either by virtue of its prerogative or under any statute, to take
possession of the land or building of a subject for administrative
purposes in connection with the defence of the realm, without
compensation for their use and occupation.”
The concept of eminent domain is a continental principle and was
adopted by the United States of America and became part of their
constitutional law. According to this doctrine the State in the exercise
of its sovereign power may take over any private property if it was
needed for public purpose and upon payment of just compensation.
This constitutional principle was embodied in the 5th Amendment to
their Constitution as stated by our Supreme Court in the case of State
of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (Supra) (See J. Mahajan J. para 40 and
S.R. Das J. para 91).
This constitutional principle of acquisition of England and eminent
domain of the United States of America was embodied in our
constitution at the time of its adoption and enforcement as Article 31.
It was not new. It was there, as Section 299 in the Government of
India Act, 1935. This Article recognised the famous doctrine that no
person was to be deprived of his property save in accordance with law.
Upon deprivation of property the person deprived would be provided
“compensation” to be provided in the law making such deprivation or
according to principles for calculation of such compensation to be
provided in that law.
In Kameshwar Singh's and Bella Banerjee's case the Supreme
Court interpreted compensation to mean a just equivalent of what the
holder of the property had been deprived of. In paragraph 41 of
Kameshwar Singh, Mahajan J. pronounced as follows:
“………..I agree with the Learned Attorney General that the
concept of acquisition and that of compensation are two
different notions having their origin in different sources. One is
founded on the sovereign power of the State to take, the other is
based on the natural right of the person who is deprived of
property to be compensated for his loss. One is the power to
take, the other is the condition for the exercise of that power.
Power to take was mentioned in Entry 36, while the condition
for the exercise of that power was embodied in Art. 31(2) and
there was no duty to pay compensation implicit in the content of
the entry itself.”
In paragraph 6 of Bella Banerjee the Suprme Court through
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Patanjali Sastri C.J. opined:

“(6) We are unable to agree with this view. While it is true
that the legislature is given the discretionary power of laying
down the principles which should govern the determination of
the amount to be given to the owner for the property
appropriated, such principles must ensure that what is
determined as payable must be compensation, that is, a just
equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of. Within the
limits of this basic requirement of full indemnification of the
expropriated owner, the Constitution allows free play to the
legislative judgment as to what principles should guide the
determination of the amount payable. Whether such principles
take into account all the elements which make up the true value
of the property appropriated and exclude matters which are to
be neglected, is a justiciable issue to be adjudicated by the
Court. This, indeed, was not disputed”
In 1955 by the Fourth Amendment the Constitution was amended.
The amendment added a rider that the adequacy of the compensation
could not be gone into by the Court. But the Supreme Court continued
to hold that the term compensation imported the principle of “just
equivalent” and that compensation to be provided in the law should be
so. Only the amount of compensation could not be challenged. (See
paragraphs 90 to 100 of R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, reported in AIR
1970 SC 564)
Parliament enacted a further amendment to the Constitution in
1972, called the 25th Amendment. By this amendment the word
“compensation” was deleted and replaced by the word “amount”,
apparently to prevent the courts from construing the meaning or import
of the word “compensation”.
In the case of His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerela
reported in AIR 1973 SC 1461 the Supreme Court held that although
the word “compensation” had been replaced by the word “amount” and
the adequacy of compensation could not be challenged, nevertheless,
the amount awarded could not be arbitrary or illusory and should have
a fair relationship with the value of the property sought to be taken. In
paragraph 759 of the judgment Hegde and Mukherjea JJ inter alia held:
“759……………………………………..
(5)(A) The newly substituted Article 31(2) does not destroy
the right to property because
(i) the fixation of “amount” under that Article should have
reasonable relationship with the value of the property acquired
or requisitioned;
(ii) the principles laid down must be relevant for the purpose
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of arriving at the “amount” payable in respect of the property

acquired or required;
(iii) the “amount” fixed should not be illusory and
(iv) the same should not be fixed arbitrarily.
(5)(B) The question whether the “amount” in question has
been fixed arbitrarily or the same is illusory or the principles laid
down for the determination of the same are relevant to the
subject matter of acquisition or requisition at about the time
when the property in question is acquired or required are open
to judicial review. But it is no more the “amount” fixed or to be
determined on the basis of the principles laid down is adequate”.
Parliament went further. By the 44th Amendment of 1978 it repealed
Section 31 altogether except the first part of Section 31, which
provided that no person would be deprived of his property by the State
without the authority of law, which was retained, not as a fundamental
right but as a constitutional right. A new Article 300-A was inserted. It
is as follows:
“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by
authority of law. - No person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law.”
Let us see what the Supreme Court said post Kesavananda. The
Supreme Court in the case of The State of Karnataka v. Shri
Ranganatha Reddy reported in (1977) 4 SCC 471 in paragraph 15 did
not depart from the basic principle enunciated in the case of
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerela that the amount awarded as
compensation should not be illusory or arbitrary.
While differentiating between acquisition and requisition, in the case
of H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 2 SCC 337 the
Supreme Court said that acquisition meant acquiring the entire title of
the expropriated owner whatever may be the nature and extent of that
title, relying on Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, reported in 1950 SCC
833 : AIR 1951 SC 41.
In the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai reported in (2005) 7 SCC 627, the Supreme Court opined that
reasonable compensation had to be given. (See para 6).
This doctrine of eminent domain was continued to be recognised in
Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District,
reported in (2008) 9 SCC 552 (See paragraphs 43 to 50); Anand Singh
v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2010) 11 SCC 242 (paragraphs
40, 41 and 42))
If property is acquired by the state without compensation it
tantamounts to its confiscation, because in confiscation, the property is
taken by way of penalty levied by the state. (see His Holiness
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Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, reported in

(1973) 4 SCC 225 para 705 = AIR 1973 SC 1461)
Payment of compensation is not a condition precedent to vesting or
taking possession as held in Nader Chand Mallick v. State of West
Bengal, reported in AIR 1952 Cal 67 (paragraph 19 and 20). However,
the language of Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the
judgment of the Supreme Court in R.L. Jain(D) by Lrs. v. DDA, reported
in (2004) 4 SCC 79 from paragraph 11 to 17 tend to suggest that
compensation should be paid more or less contemporaneously with
taking of land.
Now, I come to two latest decisions of the Supreme Court.
This judgment has provided me with the most invaluable guidance
to decide this case. In an appeal before the Supreme Court arising out
of the Kuzalr Act, Rajiv Sarin v. State of Uttarkhand and decided by a
five Judges' bench of it on 9th August, 2011, and so far unreported,
there were “hissedars” of private forests who were not commercially
using them. The Kuzalr Act amongst other forest lands acquired those
forests also. The Act contained principles for computation of
compensation in Sections 18 (cc) and 19(b). Compensation was to be
calculated according to those sections as the product of the average
annual income multiplied by a multiplier. The private forest owners who
were not utilizing the land were not awarded any compensation
because according to the principles mentioned in those sections
compensation was payable only on the basis of annual income. They
had no annual income. They were aggrieved by this determination.
The highest court refused to believe that because these owners had
no income, they could not be compensated for the acquisition of their
forest lands. According to the Supreme Court these forest lands were
valuable or productive assets in a different sense. It provided
guidelines for computation of compensation based on the principles
provided in the statute, for award of compensation to those hissedars
who were commercially using their forest land.
In another so far unreported five Judges' bench of the Supreme
Court delivered on 9th August, 2011, K.T. Plantation v. State of
Karnataka, the Court maintained that Article 300A recognised the
principles of eminent domain to a substantial extent. Acquisition could
be made for public purpose and upon payment of compensation which
was not illusory.
ACQUISITON OR RECLAMATION AND REHABILATION:
What is the nature of the impugned Act? Is it reclamation of land
and rehabilitation as argued by the Learned Counsel for the State.
What is the nature of the impugned Act? The pith and substance of it
is that by its operation the unexpired term of the lease granted to the
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Tatas is extinguished. The result is that the State gets back the land it
had given on long lease to the Tatas.
It is argued on their behalf that the legislature exercised power
exclusively under List II entry no. 18. Let me read this entry:
“18. Land, that is to say, right in or over land, land tenures
including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection
of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land
improvement and agricultural loans; colonization.”
It is said that the legislature was exercising its powers with regard to
land tenure by extinguishing it and was by the Act determining the
relationship between landlord and tenant. The land belonged to the
State. The Tatas were mere lessees. The concept of acquisition was
taking of private property. This property belonged to the State. It could
not take its own property. The Act got rid of the lease by making the
property “free” of it and vesting it in the state, by getting rid of the
lessee.
A four Judges' bench of the Supreme Court has held in the case of
Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri, reported in AIR
1955 SC 298 that a property may have various interests created in it
including lease. When an acquisition is made those interests which are
not owned by the state, are only acquired, as the state may own some
of these interests on the land. Paragraphs 12 to 15 of the report
enunciates the following principles:
““(12) We are unable to accept this contention. When the
Government acquires lands under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, it must be for a public purpose, and with a view
to put them to that purpose, the Government acquires the sum
total of all private interests subsisting in them. If the
Government has itself an interest in the land, it has only to
acquire the other interests outstanding therein, so that it might
be in a position to pass it on absolutely for public user. In - ‘In
the Matter of the Land Acquisition Act : Govt. of Bombay v.
Esufali Salebhai’, 34 Bom 618 at p. 636 (D), Batchelor J.,
observed:
“In other words Government, as it seems to me, are not
debarred from acquiring and paying for the only outstanding
interests merely because the Act, which primarily contemplates
all interests as held outside Government, directs that the entire
compensation based upon the market value of the whole land,
must be distributed among the claimants.”
There, the Government claimed ownership of the land on
which there stood buildings belonging to the claimants, and it
was held that the Government was bound to acquire and pay
only for the superstructure, as it was already the owner of the
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site. Similarly in - ‘Deputy Collector, Calicut Division v. Aiyavu

Pillay’, 9 Ind Cas 341 (Mad)(E), Wallis, J. (as he then was)
observed:
“It is, in my opinion, clear that the Act does not contemplate
or provide for the acquisition of any interest which already
belongs to Government in land which is being acquired under the
Act, but only for the acquisition of such interests in the land as
do not already belong to the Government.”
With these observations, we are in entire agreement. When
Government possesses an interest in land which is the subject of
acquisition under the Act, that interest is itself outside such
acquisition, because there can be no question of Government
acquiring what is its own. An investigation into the nature and
value of that interest will no doubt be necessary for determining
the compensation payable for the interest outstanding in the
claimants, but that would not make it the subject of acquisition.
The language of S. VIII of Act No. 6 of 1857 also supports this
construction.
Under that section, the lands vest in the Government “free
from all ‘other’ estates, rights, titles and interests”, which must
clearly mean other than those possessed by the Government. It
is on this understanding of the section that the award, Ex. P, is
framed. The scheme of it is that the interests of the occupants
are ascertained and valued, and the Government is directed to
pay the compensation fixed for them. There is no valuation of
the right of the Government to levy assessment on the lands,
and there is no award of compensation therefor.
(13) We have so far assumed with the respondents that the
right of the Government to levy assessment is an interest in land
within the meaning of section VIII of Act 6 of 1857. But is this
assumption well-founded? We think not. In its normal
acceptation, “interest” means one or more of those rights which
go to make up “ownership”. It will include for example,
mortgage, lease, charge, easement and the like, but the right to
impose a tax on land is a prerogative right of the Crown,
paramount to the ownership over the land and outside it. Under
the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, what is acquired is only
the ownership over the lands, or the inferior rights comprised
therein. Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act No. I of 1894
defines a “person interested” as including
“all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made
on account of the acquisition of land under this Act, and a person
shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an
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easement affecting the land”.

Section 9 requires that notices should be given to all persons
who are interested in the land. Under S 11, the Collector has to
value the land, and apportion the compensation among the
claimants according to their interest in the land. Under S. 16,
when the Collector makes an award “he may take possession of
the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the
Government free from all encumbrance”. The word
“encumbrance” in this section can only mean interests in respect
of which a compensation was made under S. 11, or could have
been claimed. It cannot include the right of the Government to
levy assessment on the lands. The Government is not a “person
interested” within the definition in S.3 (b), and, as already
stated, the Act does not contemplate its interest being valued or
compensation being awarded therefor.
(14) It is true that there is in Act No. 6 of 1857 nothing
corresponding to S. 3(b) of Act No. 1 of 1894, but an
examination of the provisions of Act No. 6 of 1857 clearly shows
that the subject-matter of acquisition under that Act was only
ownership over the lands or its constituent rights and not the
right of the Government to levy assessment. The provisions
relating to the issue of notices to persons interested and the
appointment of compensation among them are substantially the
same.
Moreover, under S. VIII the Government is to take the lands
free from all other “estates, rights, title and interest”, and
“interest” must, in the context, be construed ‘ejusdem generis’
with “estates” etc., as meaning right over lands, of the character
of, but not amounting to an estate, and cannot include the
prerogative right to assess the lands. It must accordingly be held
that the effect of the land acquisition proceedings was only to
extinguish the rights of the occupants in the lands and to vest
them absolutely in the Government, that the right of the latter to
levy assessment was not the subject-matter of those
proceedings, and that if after the award the lands were not
assessed to revenue, it was because there could be no question
of the Government levying assessment on its own lands.
(15) Then there remains the question whether the sale deed,
Ex. A, imposes any limitation on the right of the Crown to assess
the lands. The deed conveys the lands to the purchasers
absolutely “with all rights, easements and appurtenances
whatsoever” to be held “for ever”. It does not, however, recite
that they are to be held revenue-free. But it is argued for the
respondents that where there is an absolute sale by the Crown
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as here, that necessarily imports that the land is conveyed

revenue-free; and S.3 of the Crown Grants Act No. 15 of 1895
and certain observations in - ‘Dadoba Janardhan v. Collector of
Bombay’, 25 Bom 714 (F) were relied on as supporting this
contention. Section 3 of Act No. 15 of 1895 is as follows:
“All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over
contained in any such grant or transfer as aforesaid shall be valid
and take effect according to their tenor, any rule of law, statute
or enactment of the Legislature to the contrary
notwithstanding”.
The contention is that as the grant is of a free-hold estate
without any reservation it must, to take effect according to its
tenor, be construed as granting exemption from assessment to
revenue. But that will be extending the bounds of S.3 beyond its
contents. The object of the Act as declared in the preamble is to
remove certain doubts “as to the extent and operation of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and, as to the power of the
Crown to impose limitations and restrictions upon grants and
other transfers of land made by it or under its authority”. Section
2 enacts that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act do
not apply to crown grants. Then follows S. 3 with a positive
declaration that “all provisions, restrictions, conditions and
limitations over” shall take effect according to their tenor.
Reading the enactment as a whole, the scope of S.3 is that it
saves “provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over”
which would be bad under the provisions of the Transfer of
Property Act, such as conditions in restraint of alienations or
enjoyment repugnant to the nature of the estate, limitations
offending the rule against perpetuities and the like. But no
question arises here as to the validity of any provision,
restriction, condition, or limitation over, contained in Ex. A on
the ground that it is in contravention of any of the provisions of
the Transfer of Property Act, and there is accordingly nothing on
which S.3 could take effect”.”
Conversely, it is also possible for the state to acquire only the
leasehold interest without acquiring the reversion. (See paragraph 218
of the Judgment of Kameshwar).
So the sum of these principles is that a state may own a property
and lease it out to a private person or a body corporate. To acquire the
property free from the lease it has to acquire the lease hold interest.
Technically, the lease was granted by the fourth respondent. But it
has been held in the division bench judgment of this court upholding
the original acquisition from the individual owners that the fourth
respondent was for all purposes the State. Even if the matter is looked
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into from this technical angle, the Act makes it plain that it was also
taking the land from the fourth respondent by extinguishing the lease.
So, according to the above authorities the logical flow of events is first
acquisition of the ownership of the fourth respondent followed by
acquisition of the leasehold interest of the Tatas, by one enactment.
Now, the Supreme Court has consistently opined that when there is
acquisition there is exercise of power under entry 42 of List III of the
Constitution. Now this power cannot be an incident of any other power.
(See Rustam Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1970
SC 564 and Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh reported in (1980) 4 SCC 136, para 19)
Now I will read the relevant passages from this judgment:
Rustam Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1970 SC
564:
“40. ……..Power to legislate for acquisition of property is
exercisable only under Entry 42 of List III, and not as an incident
of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of
legislation in any of the three lists : Rajahmundry Electric Supply
Corporation Ltd. v. State of Andhra, 1954 SCR 779 at p. 785=
(AIR 1954 SC 251 at p. 253). Under that entry “property” can be
compulsorily acquired. …………………..”
Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported
in (1980) 4 SCC 136:
“19. It thus clearly transpires that the observation in Cooper
case extracted above that power to legislate for acquisition of
property is exercisable only under Entry 42 of List III and not as
an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head
of legislation in any of the three lists, is borne out from
Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation case and
Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh case.”
Yes, there are authorities of the same court which lay down that
while examining a legislation the pith and substance of it has to be
examined. While so enacting if there is incident trenching upon some
subject over which the legislature has no competence, such trenching is
allowed.
While such trenching is allowed, the above authorities regarding the
permissibility to trench upon the field of acquisition while enacting over
other subjects, tell us in clear terms when part of the subject matter of
the legislation is acquisition, it has to be taken as exercise of powers
under entry 42 of List III and is not be taken as permissible incidental
trenching.
It is true that a part of the impugned Act relates to tenure and
landlord tenant relationship, by extinguishing the lease of the Tatas,
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vesting the land in the State by evicting the lessee and further
proposing to allot the land to displaced unwilling owners of the first
acquisition, thereby implying rehabilitation. Whatever may be the
nature of legislation mentioned above, in my judgment the Act also
acquires the remainder of the 90 year old leasehold interest of the
Tatas, by extinguishing the lease. This according to the authorities
above is at least partly an exercise of power under entry 42 of List III of
the Constitution. Hence it is exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Although, great reliance was placed on behalf of the state on the
case of Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1995
Supp (1) SCC 596, I notice that the assent of the President was taken
while enacting the Act in question. Furthermore, it was nobody's case
that the acquisition made was not an exercise of power under entry 18
of list II read with entry 42 of list III.
Since I hold this is the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the
exercise has to satisfy the twin tests of, being for public purpose and
providing an amount of compensation to the deprived leaseholder.
When such is the weight of authority in favour of acquisition, the
authorities cited by the state do not fit into the scheme of things.
PUBLIC PURPOSE:
Now let me see the provisions of the Act regarding public purpose.
First, let me examine the long title. The purpose disclosed here is for
return of a portion of the land to the unwilling owners who had not
accepted compensation (during the first acquisition). The second
purpose is for utilization of the balance portion of the land “in public
interest” and “for the benefit of the State”. Section 6 says that part of
the land will be utilised by the government for socio economic
development, employment generation and so on.
The case of Gadadhar Ghosh v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR
1963 Cal 565 is relied on by Mr. Pal to argue that why when some
public purpose is declared the Court will not investigate into other
undeclared public purposes. When no public purpose is noticeable as
declared, as is the case here, the Court should declare that no public
purpose is disclosed. Hence, the Act is unconstitutional, he submitted.
In any event it is submitted that the public purpose declared is
vague; citing the case of Munshi Singh v. Union of India reported in
(1973) 2 SCC 337. The importance of public purpose is brought out by
placing the case of The State of Karnataka v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy
reported in (1977) 4 SCC 471 paragraphs 6 to 10 and the case of
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai reported in
(2005) 7 SCC 627 (paragraphs 9, 18 to 20).
Now, the public purpose for which the self-same land was acquired
in 2006 was inter alia, to generate employment and socio-economic
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development of the region by setting up of an automobile plant by the

Tatas. This purpose was mentioned in all the section 4 notices under
the Land Acquisition Act 1894, brought on record in this case.
I think that in understanding the meaning of the words used in the
statute the Court is entitled to go into the above part of the history of
this legislation. The Court in my opinion is also entitled to look into the
Statement of objects accompanying the Act. This statement says the
following:
“2. ………………………………. No employment generation and
socio-economic development has taken place and people in and
around the area have not been benefited in any manner
whatsoever, although more or less Rs. 137 crore has been paid
by WBIDC as compensation to landowners and the State
Government has spent more than Rs. 76 crore for construction
drainage and other infrastructure. In addition, the State
Government has incurred expenses for providing security at site.
3. ……………………………………………..
4. Several owners of the land/farmers have protested against
acquisition against their wishes and have not accepted any
compensation and on having realized that there is no scope of
generation of employment have been clamouring for return of
their land and staging agitations in that area endangering safety
and security of the area which unless properly handled urgently,
serious law and order problems is likely to develop.”
Therefore, the kind of socio-economic development envisaged by the
legislature is similar to the one for which the land was initially acquired.
And such acquisition has been upheld by the Division Bench of our
Court in the case of Joydeep Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal,
reported in (2008) 2 CHN 546.
The need of a section of the people can be public purpose, as held by
the Supreme Court in the case of Ratilal Shakarabhai v. The State of
Gujarat reported in 1970 (2) SCC 264 when land was being acquired
for housing purpose. This case was sought to be distinguished by Mr.
Pal on the ground that acquisition of land for housing was described as
being for public purpose in Section 3 (f)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. But, he failed to point out to me sub-section (v) which
specifically provides for land being given to the poor or landless or to
persons displaced by implementation of any scheme. This recognises
the public purpose mentioned in the impugned Act. What is more
important is that land was not being acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, but, under the impugned Act. Therefore, the
public purposes mentioned in the Land Acquisition Act may be
suggestive of public purpose but the categories of public purpose can
never be closed.
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Now, the statement in the objects that because of absence of the

desired socio-economic development in the area the land was being
given back to the unwilling owners, who did not accept the
compensation discloses public purpose in my opinion.
In any event, it is quite well settled that any perception of public
purpose by the legislature is not within the province of the Court to
investigate. See the case of Kameshwar and paragraph 10 of The State
of Karnataka v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 471.
The Court can only decide on its effect when no public purpose is
disclosed or the public purpose disclosed on the face of it does not
disclose that purpose. In my opinion, the scope for enquiry by the
Court is limited. It cannot make any enquiry regarding the actual
correctness of the statements in the Act or the willingness of the
government to fulfill this purpose, on the authority of The State of
Karnataka v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 471.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Somawanti v.
The State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1963 SC 151 was on the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, where a notification had to be issued by the
government, stating the public purpose. This notification is an
administrative Act under the statute. Therefore, it has to strictly
conform with the requirements of the statute regarding enunciation of
public purpose.
The impugned Act discloses public purpose in its body as well as in
the statement of objects quite sufficiently, in my opinion.
COMPENSATION
Section 5(2) of the impugned Act provides for compensation. It
enacts that compensation would be given by the State. The amount of
this compensation would have to be adjudged by the District Judge,
Hooghly.
This provision is allegedly unconstitutional on the ground that the
amount of compensation is not quantified. Neither, are the principles
for its computation provided. This was an absolute requirement and for
the failure of the legislature to provide any of the two things, the Act
must fail.
The Compact Oxford Reference Dictionary defines compensation
as:“Something given to compensate for loss, suffering or injury.”
Black's Law Dictionary defines compensation in the following terms:
“Payment of damages or any other act that a Court orders to be done
by a person who has caused injury to another and must make the other
whole.”
Therefore, compensation is the concept of indemnification.
Compensation, more fully and completely indemnifies a person against
any loss, than damages.[See Yadava Kumar v. Divisional Manager,
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National Insurance Company Limited, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 341

(para 17)].
In paragraph 41 of the case of Kameshwar Singh, Mahajan J. said
that when the State exercised the power of eminent domain the
deprived land owner had a natural right to be compensated for the loss.
In the case of Bela Banerjee, Patanjali Shastri J. in paragraph 6 opined
that this compensation was a “just equivalent” of the loss suffered or
full indemnification for it. Such was also the view of J.C. Shah J. in
paragraph 100 of the judgment in the case of Cooper.
The meaning of compensation as ascribed by our courts in Mahamed
Mozaharal Ahmad v. Mahamed Azimaddin Bhuinya, reported in AIR
1923 Cal 507 and Rathi Menon v. Union of India reported in (2001) 3
SCC 714 para 24 is “equivalent”.
Now, when such is the meaning and interpretation given to the word
compensation, what was the intention of the legislature when it used
the word compensation in the impugned Act?
In my judgment some meaning has to be ascribed to the use of the
word “compensation”, and not the word “amount”, by the legislature in
the impugned Act. Amount appears in the marginal note but when the
enacting part contains the word compensation, the marginal note
should be ignored or to be read as amount of compensation and no
more.
Being deemed to be fully conscious of the legislative and
constitutional history, discussed above the legislature used the word
compensation. Therefore, it is deemed to have been aware of the
meaning and content of the word as judicially decided. Furthermore, it
has used it in that context and with that meaning, in my opinion.
Moreso because it has not used this expression in Section 5(1) relating
to the amount payable to the vendors. But, after compensation it has
said nothing.
Is the provision to be adjudged unconstitutional because the
legislature has said nothing? If the submission of Mr. Pal is to be
accepted, if the legislature had just inserted an “amount” which was
not illusory the defect would have been cured. At the close of his
submission he brought a compilation of central and state statutes,
mostly, if not wholly relating to acquisition of undertakings. It appears
that in most of them there was mentioned an “amount” to represent
compensation.
Just because the legislature did not mention an amount or any
principle for calculation of an amount, is the impugned Act invalid?
My answer in an emphatic “No”.
It is possible, on the basis of the above authorities to also hold that
if a mechanism is provided in the Act for grant of compensation, the
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Court is entitled to examine the mechanism and come to its own

conclusion whether the determination of compensation by that
mechanism is likely to be illusory or arbitrary. It is also entitled to
examine whether the procedure provided for grant of compensation is
arbitrary or is just an illusion, created by the legislature, of granting
compensation, without any real possibility of the deprived land owner
getting compensation in accordance with law.
In the impugned Act compensation is payable to the Tatas.
Therefore, there is the necessary intention to pay compensation which
was held to be important in the case of Rajiv Sarin v. State of
Uttarkhand decided by the Supreme Court on 9th August, 2011 and
which is so far unreported. I have also interpreted the use of the word
compensation by the legislature to mean that there was the intention to
pay compensation according to the judicial interpretation of the word.
There is also a mechanism provided in the Act for determining this
compensation, namely by the District Judge Hooghly on an application
made by the Tatas. I do not think that this mechanism or procedure is
arbitrary or illusory or could result in such kind of a determination But,
there is some vagueness and uncertainty with regard to compensation
receivable which defect I propose to rectify by purposive interpretation
of the provisions of the Act.
I have taken great guidance from the case of SEAFORD COURT
ESTATES, LTD. v. ASHER decided by the Court of Appeal of England
and reported in 1949 (2) ALL. ER. page 155. In that case the Court was
interpreting the meaning of the word “burden” provided in Section 2(3)
of a Rent Act of 1920. It was normally understood to mean “legal
burden”. The issue involved was supply of hot water by a landlord to a
tenant. If it was held to be a burden he could claim an increase of rent.
Providing of water by the landlord to the tenant was not a legal burden
but was a contract. The Court of Appeal comprising of Lord Greene and
Lord Justices Asquith and Denning went to the extent of interpreting
“legal burden” to include contractual obligations, so as to give relief to
the landlord. While interpreting the word “burden” Denning L.J. in his
judgment made very remarkable statements for purposive
interpretation of statutes. This dictum was placed by the learned
Advocate General while citing State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd.,
reported in (1997) 2 SCC 453 (paragraphs 17 to 21). This judgment
pronounced that a statute carried the presumption of constitutionality.
It was only to be struck down when it was not possible to sustain it by
any means. The passage from Lord Justice Denning's (later Lord
Denning) judgment approved by the Supreme Court is below:
“The question for decision in this case is whether we are at
liberty to extend the ordinary meaning of “burden” so as to
include a contingent burden of the kind I have described. Now
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this court has already held in Winchester Court, Ltd. v. Miller (2),
that s.2 (3) of the Act of 1920 is to be liberally construed so as
to give effect to the governing principles embodied in the
legislation, and I think we should do the same. Whenever a
statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that
it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of
facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to
provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English
language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our
literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the
draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly
criticised. A judge, believing himself to be fettered by the
supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing
else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or
that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would
certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were
drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence
of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands
and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the
constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he
must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also
from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to
it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then
he must supplement the written word so as to give “force and
life” to the intention of the legislature. That was clearly laid
down (3 Co. Rep. 7b) by the resolution of the judges [SIR ROGER
MANWOOD, C.B., and the other barons of the Exchequer] in
Heydon's case (4), and it is the safest guide to-day. Good
practical advice on the subject was given about the same time
by PLOWDEN in his note (2 Plowd. 465) to Eyston v. Studd (5).
Put into homely metaphor it is this : A judge should ask himself
the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come
across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have
straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A
judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but
he can and should iron out the creases. Approaching this case in
that way, I cannot help feeling that the legislature had not
specifically in mind a contingent burden such as we have here. If
it had, would it not have put it on the same footing as an actual
burden? I think it would. It would have permitted an increase of
rent when the terms were so changed as to put a positive legal
burden on the landlord. If the parties expressly agreed between
themselves the amount of the increase on that account, the
court would give effect to their agreement, but if, as here, they
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did not direct their minds to the point, the court has itself to
assess the amount of the increase. It has to say how much the
tenant should pay “in respect of” the transfer of this burden to
the landlord. It should do this by asking what a willing tenant
would agree to pay and a willing landlord would agree to accept
in respect of it. Just as, in the earlier cases, the courts were able
to assess the value of the “fair wear and tear” clause and of a
“cooker”, so they can assess the value of the hot water clause
and translate it fairly in terms of rent, and what applies to hot
water applies also to the removal of refuse and so forth. I agree
that the appeal should be allowed, and with the order proposed
by ASQUITH, L.J..”
When the legislature used the word compensation, what was the
amount of compensation it had in its mind? When an intention has
been expressed by the legislature, to pay compensation it is
permissible for the court, using the tools of interpretation as indicated
in the above judgments, to ascertain such intention with some degree
of precision.
It is true, on the basis of my findings above, this law is one
acquiring the leasehold interest of the Tatas. It is exercise of powers
under List III entry 42, along with entry 18 of List II, in my opinion.
The assent of the President was not taken. Therefore, in my further
judgment, this Act according to the doctrine of presumption of
constitutionality could not be contrary to the principles laid down in the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. To be more specific the principles for
determining compensation or the amount of compensation to be
awarded in the mind of the legislature could not be contrary to the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. If it was contrary, the impugned Act would be
void on the ground of repugnancy with the above Act, under Section
254(2) of the Constitution.
In my reading of the principles for award of compensation contained
in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 enshrined in paragraph 23 and 24
thereof, they provide more or less a just equivalent of the loss suffered
by a land loser. The definition of land in section 3(a) includes land, and
things attached to earth or permanently fastened to anything so
attached. Section 23 provides the matters to be considered in
determining compensation and Section 24 provides the matters not to
be considered. Therefore, when the legislature used the word
“compensation”, it intended these principles to be incorporated also.
I consider the age old principle that the constitutionality of an Act is
to be presumed, as it represents the will of the people or at least the
majority of the people expressed through the legislature. Furthermore,
the Act has to be interpreted by the Court so as to uphold it.. When all
attempts to uphold the Act fail should the Court strike it down. (see
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Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Laxmi Devi, reported in (2008) 4

SCC 720 (paragraph 38 onwards)
Therefore, there is no reason for striking down this Act for the reason
that it does not provide the ‘amount’ of compensation or the ‘principles’
for calculation of this amount.
For the above reasons, I would declare that the legislature by using
the word compensation meant compensation based on the principles
mentioned in sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as
applicable.
In view of my findings above, I would only add that reference to land
in Section 23 necessarily refers to land as defined in Section 3(a) of
that Act, inclusive of all interests therein. Date of notification is to be
taken as date of vesting.
I notice that these principles are specifically recognised in earlier
statutes of the same legislature - West Bengal Land (Requisition and
Acquisition) Act, 1948 and West Bengal Land Development and
Planning Act, 1948 for grant of compensation.
Furthermore, to bring the payment of compensation, within the
principles of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the State, should in its
rejoinder to the application claiming compensation under Section 5(2)
of the impugned Act, compute and indicate the compensation,
admitted by it to be payable and offer to pay it to the Tatas
immediately, pending final determination by the District Judge.
The District Judge, it is expected will make a final determination
within six months from the date of filing of an application by the Tatas
before it.
Thus, the argument that the impugned Act is repugnant to the Land
Acquisition Act, and hence, unconstitutional does not stand.
At this stage, a line of submissions by the state has to be disposed
of. Various Acts were placed before me for the state to show that
thereunder there was vesting of tenancy in the government and taking
of possession by them without payment of compensation. I was shown
the West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976
together with the West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1962. These Acts were also shown to convince me that
under it the tenant was required to forthwith restore possession to the
government and so, the impugned Act followed precedent.
I am unable to accept this contention. First of all, there was no
acquisition by the above Acts. The Acts provided for issuance of a
notice after which the tenancy was extinguished. In my opinion this is
quite different from the impugned Act where a ninety years lease is
sought to be extinguished. Secondly, a lease is an estate in land. When
this long estate of ninety years is extinguished as a result of which the
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lessor gets his property, it is quite difficult to think that such an

exercise is not acquisition of a substantial interest in landed property,
as discussed above. This cannot be placed on the same footing as a
monthly tenancy of government premises created by letting them out
to individual persons for primarily residential purposes. Extinguishment
of a monthly tenancy which is of negligible value cannot be equated
with extinguishment of such a long lease.
Next, I was shown the West Bengal Land (Requisition and
Acquisition) Act, 1948. Requisition is a temporary taking over of
possession.
When land was acquired under the West Bengal Land (Requisition
and Acquisition) Act, 1948, compensation was payable under Section 7
thereof, according to the principles of Section 23 and 24 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. I noted the submission made on behalf of the
State-respondents that the validity of this Act was upheld by the
Supreme Court of India.
In the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948
similar principles were to be applied, as provided in Section 8 of the
Act.
I do not know why the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 was cited.
First of all it was a pre Constitution Act. Secondly, it provided for
“incidents” of thika Tenancies, the grounds for eviction, surrender,
abandonment, etc. This Act was nothing but an Act to regulate certain
kinds of private tenancies and no element of acquisition was involved in
the Act.
PARTING OBSERVATION
When the Tatas had stated in their letter dated 28th September,
2010, mentioned in the statement of objects and reasons for the
impugned Act, that they had withdrawn from the project and that they
were considering permanent withdrawal from the site if compensation
was provided, I do not think that acquisition of this land by the State
for the public purpose disclosed in the impugned Act, can be called
arbitrary legislation. More so, when it was stated in the letter that the
Tatas had no activity in contemplation to be undertaken at the site.
Furthermore, for this reason it cannot be said that this legislation was
targeted at a particular person or corporate body to victimise it. A
single person legislation is not unknown in our country. It is permitted
if there is sufficient basis. (see Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of
India, reported in AIR (38) 1951 SC 41 and Dharam Dutt v. Union of
India, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 712). Exercise of the power of eminent
domain, in such a situation cannot be called arbitrary or illegal or
without basis.
CONCLUSIONS
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In view of the discussion above:

(a) The Singur Land Rehabilitation and Development Act, 2011 is
held to be constitutional and valid. The Singur Land Rehabilitation and
Development Rules, 2011 are also held to be constitutional and valid.
So is, any action taken by the state, thereunder.
(b) The above Act was not wholly an exercise of the power of the
state legislature under entry 18 of list II of the seventh schedule to the
Constitution of India, but, was also an exercise of its power under entry
42 of list III. Hence, there was acquisition of land leased out to the
Tatas.
(c) Sufficient public purpose for making such acquisition is made out
in the above Act.
(d) There is a provision in Section 5(2) of the above Act for award of
compensation by the District Judge, Hooghly on an application made by
the Tatas. Although, there is an intention expressed by the legislature,
to pay compensation, the intention expressed is vague and uncertain.
Therefore, this Court has made an interpretation of this provision in the
foregoing part of this judgment. According to the interpretation made
by this Court compensation is to be awarded by applying the principles
for award of compensation enshrined in Sections 23 and 24 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, as applicable, which are deemed to be
incorporated into Section 5(2) of the impugned Act, by reading land as
provided in those sections with the definition section of that Act and by
taking the date of notification provided in the said sections as the date
of notification of the impugned Act. Furthermore, the application has to
be determined by award of compensation by the District Judge,
Hooghly, within six months of making such application by the Tatas.
Furthermore, if the government admits any compensation in its
rejoinder to the application to be filed by the Tatas, the government
should pay that compensation immediately, since it has taken
possession of the land.
(e) The District officials have exceeded their powers in taking
possession of the land without any notice to the Tatas and acting so
hastily as discussed in the foregoing part of this judgment. Therefore,
the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, Hooghly are
appointed and constituted as Joint Special Officers by this Court, in
addition to their official duties, to ensure safe and smooth transition of
this land from the Tatas to the State, by carefully and scrupulously
taking all necessary steps so that the Tatas are allowed to remove their
items if any that remain on the land, after making an inventory thereof
to be signed by them as well as by a representative of the Tatas within
a period of two months from this date, including the period of stay of
this order.
(f) Both the writ applications are disposed of.
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(g) I make it clear that this decision is confined to issues decided

between the parties.
(h) As the issues involved are most contentious between the parties,
I am of the opinion that any aggrieved party should be given a chance
to test this judgment and order in appeal. Moreover, very shortly, the
Puja vacation of this Court will start and this Court will reopen only on
31st October, 2011. Of course, there will be a Vacation Bench. But, I do
note that most of the lawyers utilise this holiday for being on vacation.
Therefore, for the ends of justice I order unconditional stay of this
judgment and order till 2nd November, 2011.
All parties and the District Magistrate, Hooghly and the
Superintendent of Police, Hooghly are to act on an authenticated photo
plain copy of the judgment and order, subject to the undertaking to
apply for and obtain a certified copy or a certified photo copy of this
judgment and order.
Later
I clarify the stay granted by me today by saying that this judgment
and order is not to be construed as a “further order” in terms of the
order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India dated 29th June, 2011 in
SLP (C) No. 16521 of 2011 (Tata Motors Limited v. State of West
Bengal.
———
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