Case No. 1 People vs.

Santiago 43 Phil124 (1922)

TOPIC: DEFINITION AND SOURCES OF CRIMINAL LAW

Facts:
The accused, Gregorio Santiago, was driving an automobile wherein he had to pass a narrow
space where there were two young boys. The apellant/accused did not take the precaution
required by the circumstances by slowing his machine. His automobile ran over the 7-year old
boy who was instantly killed as the result of the incident.

Santiago was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence.

However, the accused argues that the trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the
fact that he was being prosecuted in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine
Legislature and that the Act is unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.

He further contends that the amendments that the Philippine legislature introduces in General
Orders No. 58, the defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not
authorized to amend General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof
because its provisions have the character of constitutional law. Hence, the Act is
unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.

“General Orders No. 58 was amended by Act No. 2886, by virtue of which the
People of the Philippine Island is made the plaintiff in this information.”

Issue:
WON the legislature has the power to define and punish crimes.

Ruling:
YES.

The territorial legislatures have the power to define and punish crimes, a power also
possessed by the Philippine Legislature by virtue of the provisions of sections 7 of the Jones
Law. These territorial governments are local agencies of the Federal Government, wherein
sovereignty resides; and when the territorial government of the Philippines prosecutes and
punishes public crimes it does so by virtue of the authority delegated to it by the supreme
power of the Nation.

The procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the Constitutions

of the States, but is left in the hand of the legislatures.

We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Act
No. 2886, do not partake of the same character as the provisions of a constitution; that
the said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any constitutional provisions and that the
court a quo did not commit any of the errors assigned.
Case No. 2 U.S. vs. Pablo,35 Phil94 (1916)
TOPIC: DEFINITION AND SOURCES OF CRIMINAL LAW

FACTS:
Andres Pablo, a policeman of the municipality of Balanga, went by order of his chief to the
barrio of Tuyo to raid a jueteng game. Before the said officer arrived there, the players,
perhaps advised of his approach by a spy, left and ran away. However, upon his arrival he
found Francisco Dato and, at a short distance, a receptacle and 37 balls. The officer had seen
a certain Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo leave the said lot, to which he refrained from
arresting, and only arrested Francisco Daro who had remained there.

In view of this testimony by the police officer Andres Pablo who made the arrest and of the
other evidence adduced at the trial the court acquitted the defendants Antonio Rodrigo and
Maximo Malicsi and sentenced only Francisco Dato, as a gambler.

However, it was found that Pablo was not telling the truth and was false to the oath he had
taken, and he did so willfully and deliberately on account of his agreement with the men,
Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in consideration of a bribe of P15 which he had received in payment
for his false testimony he afterwards gave. Therefore, Andres Pablo was charged with the
crime of perjury and was afterwards convicted under Act No. 1697, which (according to
the principle laid down by this court in various decisions that are already well-settled rules of
law) repealed the provisions contained in articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code relative
to false testimony.

However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false testimony has been
punished under the said articles of the said Code, which as we have already said, have not
been specifically repealed by the said Act No. 1697, but since its enactment, have not been
applied, by the mere interpretation given to them by this court in its decisions.

ISSUE
WON the articles of the Penal Code can be applied in this case

RULING
YES

This manner of understanding and construing the statutes applicable to the crime of false
testimony or perjury is in harmony with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the
Novisima Recopilacion which says: “All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly
repealed by other subsequent laws, must be literally obeyed and the excuse that
they are not in use cannot avail”

It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are in force and are
properly applicable to crimes of false testimony.
Case No. 3 Oh vs.Court of Appeals,403 SCRA 300(2003)
Case Digest by: Sam Marlowe Alberca
Overview: This involves the conviction of herein petitioner Elvira Yu Oh by the RTC for
violation of BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law

Facts:
Petitioner, Oh, purchased pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders, Inc.

Due to her failure to pay the purchase price, Solid Gold filed civil cases against her before the
RTC. Subsequently, petitioner and Solid Gold, thru their general manager Joaquin Novales III,
entered into a compromise agreement to settle the said cases to which it requires Oh to issue
99-post dated checks of P50k each.

Petitioner Oh issued 10 checks amounting to 500k which were dishonored by Equitable Bank
Corporation (EBC) for the reason “Account Closed.”

Because of this, Novales filed ten separate Informations charging petitioner with violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

Lower Court Decisions

RTC - guilty
CA - affirmed the decision of the RTC

Oh argues that the CA erred to give retroactive application to R.A. 7691 which is a violation of
Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “penal laws” shall have retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony.

Issue:
WON the RA 7691 is a penal law that merits retroactive application in view of Art. 22 of the
RPC

Ruling:
NO.

A penal law, is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts and establishes penalties for
R.A.
its violations. It also defines crime, treats of its nature and provides for its punishment.
No. 7691 does not prohibit certain acts or provides penalties for its
violation; neither does it treat of the nature of crimes and its
punishment. Consequently, R.A. No. 7691 is not a penal law, and therefore, Art. 22 of
the RPC does not apply in the present case.
Case No. 4 Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison Muntinlupa City vs. DeLima,G.R. No. 212719,
June 25, 2019

Facts:
President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No. 10592, amending Articles 29, 94,
97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by respondents Department of
Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. De Lima and Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II.

Petitioners and intervenors assail the validity of its Section 4, Rule 1 that
directs the prospective application mainly on the ground that it violates
Article 22 of the RPC.

They contend that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in nature and beneficial to the
inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC.

Issue:
WON Sec. 4, Rule 1 of RA 10592 is a penal law which should be given retroactive application
under Article 22 of the RPC

Ruling:
YES

While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a penalty
as it addresses the rehabilitation component of our correctional system, its provisions
have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the
crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is beneficial
to the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article 22
of the RPC.
Case No. 5 PESIGAN VS ANGELES GR # 64279, APRIL 30, 1984

Case Digest by: TOMADA

Facts:
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck
in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur to Padre
Garcia in Batangas, as the destination.

In spite of the permit to transport and the four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud,
Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station
commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was based on the
Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao … shall be transported from one
province to another.

The carabaos in violation of this Executive Order shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government to be distributed to deserving farmers.

Issue:
Whether or not the executive order should be enforced against the Pesigans?

Ruling:
No. The executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as
already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette
dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil
Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which
prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations
and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

The ruling applies a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture
provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be
informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive
order can be bound thereby.

CASE NO. 6 U.S. vs. Sweet,1Phil18(1901)

CASE DIGEST BY:
FACTS: Sweet was an employee of the U.S. Army in the Philippines. He assaulted a prisoner of war
for which he was charged with the crime of physical injuries. Sweet interposed the defense that the
fact that he was an employee of the US military authorities deprived the court of the jurisdiction to try
and punish him.

Setting aside the claim that the appellant was "acting in the line of duty" at the time the alleged
offense was committed, which is not supported by the findings or by any evidence which appears in
the record

ISSUE: WON THE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES MILITARY DEPRIVED THE
COURT JURISDICTION.

RULING: NO, it does not deprive the court of its jurisdiction penal laws are obligatory to military men
residing or sojourning in the philippine territory. The court has jurisdiction to try the offender charged
with violation of the penal laws.

The case is open to the application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil
tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of the person brought before
them for trial, unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary.
CASE NO. 7 ROBERTO BENEDICTO VS. CA 416 Phil. 722 GR NO. 125359,2001-09-04
Case Digest by: Nerissa C. Dogma

Facts:
On December 27, 1991 Mrs. Imelda Marcos and petitioners, Messrs. Benedicto andRivera, were
indicted for a criminal offense before the Regional Trial Court ofManila for willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously failing to submit reports or register with the Foreign Exchange Department
of the Central Bank as required by Section10 Central Bank Circular No. 960.

After the RTC’s denial of Motions to Quash, the Information’s of twenty-five (25)criminal cases,
petitioners took the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). However,(CA) concurred and affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.Hence, the petitioners appealed to the Supreme
Court. It contended that the repeal of Circular No. 960 by Circular No. 1353 and
Republic Act No. 7653 extinguishes the right to prosecute or punish the offense and that RA 7653
is an ex-post facto law as it increased the penalty for violations.

Issues:
1. WON the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic ActNo. 265 by Circular No.
1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners.
2. WON Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto legislation

Ruling:
1. NO. The Court finds that Circular No. 1353 did not extinguish the criminal liability of the
petitioners. Under the Civil Code, where a clause or provision or a statute is simultaneously
repealed and reenacted, there is no effect upon the rights and liabilities which gave
accrued under the original statue, since the reenactment, in effect neutralizes the repeal and
continues the law in force without interruption. In this case, while Section 34 of the RA 265
was repealed, it was simultaneously reenacted in Sec. 36 of RA No. 7653
2. NO. The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution is:
Does the law sought to be applied retroactively take "from an accused any right that was
regarded at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and
liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against
him."

Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining
offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively.38 Penal laws
cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused.39 Nowhere
in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular Section 36, is there any indication that the
increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate retroactively. There is,
therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.

CASE NO. 8: U.S. vs. Conde(February 14,1922)

Case Digest by: Lamela, Davelaine
Facts:

Dec. 30, 1915, complainants Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco entered into a contract of the
defendants concerning a debt of 300 pesos. Oliveros and Co were obligated to pay the 5% interest
per month within the first 10 days of every month.

February 24, 1916, Act No. 2655: AN ACT FIXING RATES OF INTEREST UPON LOANS AND
DECLARING THE EFFECT OF RECEIVING OR TAKING UNSURIOUS RATES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES was enacted.

On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde were charged of violating the
Usury Law in the court of first instance of the city of Manila. They were found guilty, sentenced to pay
a fine of P120 and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the
provisions of law. The court stated that the time of the execution and delivery of the said
contract there was no law enforced in the Philippine Islands punishing usury; but, in as much
as the defendants had collected usurious rate of interest after the adoption of Usury Law, they were
guilty of violation of the law and should be punished in accordance with its provisions.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants commit a crime under Act no. 2655: Usury Law?

Ruling:
NO.

The acts complained did not constitute a crime at the time they were committed, and therefore the
sentence of the lower court is hereby ordered and decreed that the complaint be dismissed, and that
the defendants be discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

That the acts complained of in the present case were legal at the time of their occurrence, they
cannot be made criminal by any subsequent or ex post facto legislation.
CASE NO. 9: Jeffrey Liang vs. People of the Philippines G.R.No.125865
Case Digest by: Taal, Keziah

FACTS:

The petitioner, Jeffrey Liang, an economist working at the Asian Development Bank was charged
before Metropolitan Trial Court with two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against fellow employee, Joyce Cabal.

After setting Jeffrey Liang’s bail at ₱2,400.00, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) released him to the
custody of the security officer of ADB.

The next day, MeTC judge received an ‘office of protocol’ from the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) stating that Jeffrey Liang is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the
Agreement between ADB and the Philippine Government.

Based on the communication, the MeTC judge dismissed the two criminal cases without notifying the
prosecution.

The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied prompting them to file a petition for
certiorari and mandamus at the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

The RTC set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered them to enforce a warrant of arrest they earlier
issued. Jeffrey Liang filed for reconsideration which was denied, he then elevated the case to the
Supreme Court arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, Jeffrey Liang, is covered by immunity under the agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government.

RULING: No, the petitioner Jeffrey Liang is not covered by immunity under the agreement between
ADB and the Philippine Government.

Under section 45 of the Agreement, Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of
this article experts and consultants performing missions for the bank shall enjoy the following
privileges and immunities:
a. Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity
except when the bank waives immunity.

The immunity mentioned is not absolute and restricted only to ‘official capacity’. Slandering a
person is not considered an act performed in an official capacity and our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime such as defamation in the name of official duty.

Therefore, the Supreme Court denied the petition.

Case No. 10: G.R. No. L-13005 U.S. vs. Ah Sing 36 Phil 978 (October 10, 1917)
Case Digest by: Praise Huevos
TOPIC: GENERALITY

Facts: Ah Sing, the defendant, who is a subject of China, is a fireman on the steamship that arrived
at the port of Cebu from Saigon. Authorities found eight cans of opium that the defendant confessed
as the owner.

CFI of Cebu: Ah Sing guilty in violation of the Opium Law

Issue: Whether or not the defendant, Ah Sing, should be held liable for the possession of opium?

Ruling: YES. The mere possession of opium which is a substance of prohibited use in the Philippine
Islands, is landed from a foreign vessel upon Philippine soil committing an open violation of the laws
of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place has complete jurisdiction in the
absence of agreement under international treaty.

However, it is noted under Sec. 4 of Act. No. 2381 states, “Any person who shall unlawfully
import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands”. There is no question, on the
importation of opium, it is sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the
Philippine Islands on a vessel destined to a Philippine port which is anchored in a port of the
Philippine Islands with an intent to discharge its cargo.

The appeal is denied as the defendant is proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violation of Sec. 4
of Act. 2381 and is sentenced to two years of imprisonment, a fine of Php 300 or to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and pay the costs.

Case No. 11 Gumabon vs Director of Prisons 37 SCRA 420 1971

Facts:
Mario Gumabon et al were charged with rebellion punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Their offense was complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping. They were all
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Their sentence had become final and executory when the Hernandez Doctrine was promulgated by
the Supreme Court.

The Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder cannot be complexed with rebellion
because murder, a regular crime, is necessarily absorbed by rebellion. Hence, without such
complexion, the penalty must be lower than reclusion perpetua.

Gumabon asserted that a non-application of the Hernandez Doctrine will lead to a deprivation of a
constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal protection.

Gumabon et al, nonetheless, were convicted by Court of First Instance but they were convicted for
the very same rebellion for which Hernandez and others were convicted – (The law under which they
[Gumabon et al] were convicted is the very same law under which the latter [Hernandez et al] were
convicted.) It had not and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law,
how can the SC, in conscience, allow Gumabon et al to suffer life imprisonment, while others can
suffer only prision mayor?

Issue: WON Gumabon et al is entitled to tzhe Hernandez Doctrine and/or Art. 22 of the RPC which
gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is applicable in this case?

Ruling: Yes. The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. Judicial decisions favorable to the accused
must be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who is not a habitual criminal. The
Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of
our legal system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection, given that
Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they have, though their sentences were
lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a
favorable decision.

Theories of Criminal Law

G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA,
appellant.

By: Patricia Isabelle Arrieta

Facts:

Marivic Genosa was convicted of the crime of parricide for killing her abusive husband. Genosa claimed that
she acted in self-defense and that her actions were a response to the long history of physical abuse she
suffered from her husband. The trial court, however, found her guilty of parricide, ruling that her act did not fall
under the legal definition of self-defense.

Issue:

Whether the classical theory was used as the basis of criminal liability on Genosa’s act of killing her husband

Ruling:

The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and the context of Genosa’s actions. The Court acknowledged that
the claim of self-defense must meet certain criteria: unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming
self-defense.

The Court found that while Genosa's husband had a history of abuse, the immediate threat of aggression was
not sufficiently demonstrated at the time of the killing. The means employed by Genosa (killing her husband)
were not deemed necessary given the circumstances.

Genosa’s act of killing her husband was deemed not to fall under self-defense but rather constituted
parricide. The Court upheld the conviction, affirming that the requirements for self-defense were not satisfied
by the appellant's actions. The conviction of Marivic Genosa for parricide was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

"The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony
committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based,
the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with
an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious
or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e.,
with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired."

In the instant case, it is equally important to determine whether Appellant Genosa had
acted freely, intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her spouse.Genosa’s act of
killing her husband was deemed not to fall under self-defense but rather constituted
parricide.

Case No. 13 De Joya vs. Jail Warden of Batangas, G.R. No. 159418-19, December 10, 2003,
Second Division, J. Callejo Sr.
By: Rene’ Khalela De Guzman

Facts:

Petitioner, Norma De Joya was charged to two separate violations of BP Blg.22 when the
above-named accused, well-knowing that she does not have fund in or credit with the Security Bank
and Trust Company, issued a post-dated check amounting to 225,000 which was dishonored by the
drawee bank. During the arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by a counsel, pleaded not guilty.
Despite due notice, the petitioner and her counsel failed to appear during the promulgation of the
cases by the MTC and no appeal was filed from any of the said decisions.

When the petitioner was finally arrested after five long years, she filed an urgent motion before the
MTC asking the court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code, and to order her release from detention. The trial court denied the
motion on three grounds: (a) its decision convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had long
become final and executory; hence, could no longer be amended to change the penalty imposed
therein; (b) the SC Circular should be applied prospectively; and (c) the SC Circular did not amend
B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but merely encourages trial court judges to have a uniform imposition
of fine. Hence, the petition at bar.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled for the writ of habeas corpus?

Ruling:

No. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ of habeas corpus is
not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. In this
case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court of Batangas City, convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably then, the petitioner is
not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should
benefit her has no basis.

First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and
not to cases already terminated by final judgment.

Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular
No.12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of
B.P. Blg.22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin.
Circular No.12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but
also the circumstances of the accused - whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact
without taint of negligence - and such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court
believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed. The Court thus emphasized that:

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as
an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided
for in B.P. Blg. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of
B.P.Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive
penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of
both fine and imprisonment.

In this case, even if the Court applies SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000, as revised, retroactively, the
petition must nevertheless be dismissed. The petitioner did not offer any evidence during trial. The
judgment of the court became final and executor upon her failure to appeal therefrom. Worse, the
petitioner remained at large for five long years. Were it not for her attempt to secure an NBI
clearance, she would have been able to elude the long arm of law.

AS TO THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW

In imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in mind that Philippine penal law is based on
the Spanish penal code and has adopted features of the positivist theory of criminal law. The
positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total of the social and
economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed.
Based on this, the petitioner did not offer any evidence during trial. The judgment of the court
became final and executory upon her failure to appeal therefrom. Worse, the petitioner
remained at large for five long years. Were it not for her attempt to secure an NBI clearance,
she would have been able to elude the long arm of the law.

Case No. 14: Vergara vs. People, G.R.No.163028

Case Digest By: JEOS EARL CASILAC

FACTS:

● On June 1988, LIVECOR granted PERPETUAL a continuing credit line amounting to 750,000
PHP
● Parties Agreed that for each availment of credit, PERPETUAL would execute a promissory
note and issue Post Dated Checks corresponding to the amount of the loan.
 ● VERGARA is the Vice President of PERPETUAL and represents, signs all agreements and all
checks.
● A check amounting to 150,000 PHP was DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS
(Bounced) on December 1988
● In April 1991, 2 years after the check bounced, LIVECOR charged the petitioner with violation
of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg 22. Claimed that VERGARA willfully, feloniously made a check
for LIVECOR.
● According to LIVECOR they have informed VERGARA that the check bounced and have made
multiple demands to VERGARA to settle it. However, these notices were all verbal.
● Vergara argued that PERPETUAL had made payments to LIVECOR, covering the full amount
of the dishonored check.

ISSUE:

Whether or not VERGARA should be convicted in violation of Batas Pambansa Blg 22

RULING:
NO

The SC held that “under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law affirms that the
primary function of punishment is the protection of the society against actual and potential wrong
doers.”

In the case at bar, petitioner could hardly be classified as a menace against whom the society
should be protected. The records show that from December 1988 when petitioner was informed of
the dishonor, to the filing of the information on April 1, 1991, she paid P423,354.00 to LIVECOR.

Although petitioner has not yet fully paid the loan, it cannot be denied that the
previous payments fully covered the value of the dishonored check. It would be
unjust to penalize her for the issuance of said check which has been satisfied 2 years prior to the
filing of the criminal charge against her.

Characteristics of Criminal Law

Case No. 15: Orlando L. Salvador vs. Placido L. Mapa, et.al., G.R. No. 135080
Digest by: Josie Jean Olivar

FACTS:
Then-President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 on October 8, 1992, creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans to investigate and recover
non-performing loans granted by government-owned banks to cronies of the previous administration.
Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria
to be utilized as a frame of reference in determining behest loans.The Committee identified several
loans as behest loans, including transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now
Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI), and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) because the
stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then President Ferdinand Marcos; PEMI
was granted a foreign currency loan of $19,680,267.00 or ₱146,601,979.00, and it was released
despite non-compliance with the conditions imposed by DBP, the loan had no sufficient collaterals
and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted.The petitioner, Atty. Orlando L.
Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and representing the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for
violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, against the respondents Placido I. Mapa, Jr., Rafael A. Sison; Rolando M. Zosa; Cesar C.
Zalamea; Benjamin Barot, Casimiro Tanedo, J.V. de Ocampo, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr., Francis B.
Banes, Ernesto M. Caringal, Romeo V. Jacinto, Manuel D. Tanglao and Alicia Ll. Reyes.The
Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, stating that the offenses had been prescribed and that the
administrative and memorandum orders issued were ex post facto laws. The Ombudsman also
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto
laws.

RULING:
No, the Court held that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post
facto laws. An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before
the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b)
which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to
convict the defendant.This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to
regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which
when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal,
or a proclamation of amnesty.The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally
prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their
nature, and provide for their punishment. The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly
do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It
does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely
provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative
Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There
is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum
orders are ex post facto.

Case no. 16 Suzette Nicolas Y Sombilon vs. Alberto Romulo, etc. and L/Cpl. Daniel Smith (G.R
No. 175888, February 11, 2009)
Digest by: Mary Crystel Isais-Abrenica

FACTS:

Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces.
He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on
November 1, 2005.

Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, the United States, at its request, was granted
custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.United States Government faithfully complied
with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required.
RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial, rendered its decision, finding defendant Smith guilty.

As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati jail until further orders. Smith was
taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly acting
under orders of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, and brought to a facility for
detention under the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements
between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement. In
accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance Corporal
Daniel J.Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S. Embassy
in Manila.

He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police and jail
authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) will have access to the place of detention to ensure the United States is in
compliance with the terms of the VFA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine court had primary right for jurisdiction over the case, given that the
alleged crime was committed by a member of the US Military within Philippine territory under the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).

RULING:

No, the Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the case. Article 2 of the Penal code says that the
provision of this Code shall be enforced within the Philippine archipelago,”except as provided in the
treaties and laws of preferential application”. Under the agreement between the United States of
America and the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Treatment of United Armed Forces
Visiting the Philippines which was signed on Feb 10, 1998 (“RP-US Visiting Forces Accord”), the
Philippines agreed that:
(a) US Military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all criminal and
disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the US personnel in RP
(b) US Authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over US Personnel with respect to offenses,
including offenses relating to the security of the US Punishable under the law of the US, but
not under the laws of RP
(c) US Military authorities shall have the primary right to excercise jurisdiction over US Personnel
subject to the military law of the US in relation to: (1) Offenses solely against the property or
security of the US or offenses solely against the property or person of US personnel and (2)
offenses arising out of any act or omission done in official duty.
Therefore, the exemption of this treaty applies.

Case No. 17 Bayan Muna VS. Alberto Romulo (G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011)
Case Digest by: Acosta, Beverly B.

Facts:

● The case "Bayan Muna v. Romulo" (G.R. No. 159618) was decided on February 1, 2011, by
the Philippine Supreme Court.
● Petitioners: Bayan Muna, represented by Representatives Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, and
Liza L. Maza.
● Respondents: Alberto Romulo (Executive Secretary) and Blas F. Ople (Secretary of Foreign
Affairs).
● The dispute centered on the Non-Surrender Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) and the United States of America (USA).
● The agreement, concluded via diplomatic notes on May 13, 2003, aimed to protect officials,
employees, and military personnel from being surrendered to international tribunals without
their government's consent.
● Petitioners argued the agreement violated the Philippine Constitution and the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court (ICC), which the Philippines had signed but not ratified.
● The lower court had not ruled on the matter, prompting the petitioners to seek a direct ruling
from the Supreme Court.
Issue:
● Did the RP President and the DFA Secretary gravely abuse their discretion in concluding the
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement, given that the Philippines had already signed the Rome
Statute of the ICC, pending Senate ratification?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court ruled that the
Non-Surrender Agreement was valid and did not contravene the Rome Statute. The Court also
held that the agreement did not require Senate concurrence to be effective.

The Court first addressed the issue of locus standi, affirming that the petitioners had standing
to sue as concerned citizens raising issues of transcendental importance. The Court then
examined the validity of the Non-Surrender Agreement, noting that it was concluded through
an exchange of diplomatic notes, a recognized form of international agreement under
international law. The Court cited the doctrine of incorporation, which integrates generally
accepted principles of international law into Philippine law, and found that the agreement did
not require Senate concurrence as it was an executive agreement, not a treaty.

The Court further held that the Non-Surrender Agreement did not undermine the Rome
Statute. The Rome Statute itself recognizes the primary jurisdiction of national courts over
international crimes, with the ICC's jurisdiction being complementary. The agreement merely
reinforced the primacy of national jurisdiction and did not preclude the Philippines from
prosecuting crimes under its national laws. The Court also noted that the Philippines was only
a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party, as the Senate had not ratified it.
Therefore, the Philippines was only obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object
and purpose of the Rome Statute.

Case No. 18 Schneckenburger vs. Moran (G.R.No.44896, July 31, 1936)

Case digest by: Geli, Regine B.

Facts:

The petitioner, Rodolfo A. Scheneckenburger, an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine

Islands on June 11, 1934. He was charged with the crime falsification of a private document before
the Court of First Instance of Manila. He raised an objection to the court’s jurisdiction, citing that both
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines prohibited the Court of
First Instance from trying him. Despite his objection being overruled, he proceeded to file a petition for
a writ of prohibition to stop the Court of First Instance of Manila from proceeding with the criminal
action against him.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner can be tried by the Court of First Instance of Manila
Ruling:

This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is established that a consul does not have
the same privileges and immunities as an ambassador or minister, and is required to comply with the
laws and regulations of the host country. A consul can be prosecuted for criminal offenses under the
laws of the country where they are stationed.

When carrying out its powers and authority, this court must abide by the rules of the Constitution. The
Constitution states that this court’s original jurisdiction “shall encompass all cases involving
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.” When deciding this case, this court is not
permitted to exceed this constitutional provision.

The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, as it existed during the Constitution’s adoption, was not
exclusive but concurrent with that of the CFI. This original jurisdiction, which encompasses cases
involving ambassadors, other public ministers, and consul as mandated by the Constitution, signifies
that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over such cases is not exclusive.

The Court of First Instance Manila indeed has the authority to hear the petitioner’s cases.
Consequently, the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied.

Case No. 19: Minucher v. CA (February 11, 2003)

Digest by: Kobayashi, Reina N.
FACTS:
Petitioner Khosrow Minucher was an Iranian national staying in the Philippines and was selling caviar,
Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products after becoming a refugee of the United
Nations. On May 1986, a violation against Section 4 of RA 6425, otherwise known as the “Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972” was filed against him and one Abbas Torabian, following a “buy-bust operation”
conducted by the Philippine narcotic agents accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo. The
respondent became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution, which resulted to the acquittal
of both Minucher and Torabian.

On August 3, 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the RTC, Branch 19 of Manila, for
damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made
by Arthur Scalzo. In the onset of the trial, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint after
disputing that he acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice, and that he was entitled to
diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the US Embassy dated 29
May 1990, addressed to the DFA of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna
Woodward dated 11 June 1990, certifying that the note is true and faithful copy of the original. In an
order of 25 June 1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari asking that the complaint in the aforementioned civil case be
dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals and on 31 October 1990, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the
dismissal of the complaint against him.

Minucher filed for a petition for review with the Supreme Court appealing the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. SC reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the lower court
for trial. Manila RTC continued with the hearings of the case. Despite giving credence to the claim of
Calzo that he was a diplomatic agent, the court ruled in favor of Minucher, stating that Calzo,
nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts committed outside his official duties. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of
Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity and thereby immune from the
criminal and civil jurisdiction of the Philippines pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Hence, this recourse by Municher.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Arthur Scalzo was entitled to immunity from suit

RULING:
Yes, Scalzo is entitled to defense of state immunity from suit.

The diplomatic immunity of Scalzo remain contentious. It is to be noted that while the respondent
would assert his status as a diplomatic agent through the Diplomatic Notes presented as evidence
before the court, the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose issuance is even suspect has not been
proven authentic. Moreover, Scalzo’s assertion on his status as a diplomatic agent through his role as
an Assistant Attache of the United States is also questionable considering that these officials are not
generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as
having diplomatic rank.

Despite questions being raised on Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity, it was sufficiently established that,
indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct
surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country. Following the precept that the State
cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state which is also binding to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties, a foreign
agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be
established the he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The official exchanges of
communication between the agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from
officials of both the Philippines DFA and the US Embassy, as well as the participation of the Philippine
Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest
of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but may give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. Scalzo
hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

With this, the respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency
allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem
on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.

Rules of Interpretation of Criminal Law and Strict Construction against State

Case No. 20: People vs. Abilong (82Phil172),G.R.No.L-1960, November 26,1948 J. Montemayor

Case digest by: Morteza Al-Hassan A. Sinarimbo

Facts:

Florentino Abilong was charged with evasion of service of sentence for attempting robbery in Manila.
He was sentenced to destierro, banning him from entering Manila within 100 kilometers, after which,
he evaded his sentence by willfully going beyond the limits made against him. He was penalized for
prision correctional, but he appealed on the grounds that evading a sentence of destierro is not
criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said
Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal
institution and completely deprived of their liberty.

Issue:

Whether or not he evaded his sentence of destierro as provided by art 157 of the Revised Penal
Code
Ruling:

Yes, he committed evasion of service. The Court upheld the conviction, stating that destierro
constitutes a deprivation of liberty and not imprisonment. The Spanish text of the law prevails, using
"privacion de libertad'' which translates to imprisonment. Therefore, Abilong's entry into Manila during
destierro constituted evasion, leading to his guilty verdict. The Court affirmed the decision.

Case No. 21 People vs. Mangulabnan (99 Phil 992), G.R. No. L-8919. September 28, 1956., J.
Felix

Case Digest by: Mercado, Marc Ryan R.

Facts:

At about 11:00 o’clock in the evening of November 5, 1953, the reports of gunfire awaked the
spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana Tadeo, the 4 minor children and Cipriana’s mother, Monica del
Mundo, in their house at barrio Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Whereupon, Vicente Pacson crossed
the room and shouted to one Tata Pisio that persons were going up their house and then hid himself
inside the ceiling.

xxxxx The intruder who was armed with a hunting knife was recognized by Cipriana Tadeo to be
Agustin Mangulabnan, who was previously known to her. Agustin removed the iron bar from the door
leading to the balcony and after opening said door, 2 persons whose identity has not been
ascertained entered. Agustin then approached Cipriana Tadeo and snatched from her neck one
necklace valued P50 and also took from her person P50 in the paper bills and P20 in silver coins.
Meanwhile, one of the two unidentified marauders searched the person of Monica del Mundo and
took from her P200 in cash and in gold necklace valued at P200. xxxxx At this juncture, the second
unidentified individual put his companion aside the climbing on the table, fired his gun at the ceiling.

After they were gone, Cipriana Tadeo called to her husband Vicente Pacson, and receiving no answer
she climbed the ceiling and she found him lying face downward already dead.

Issue:

WON the Crime of Robbery with Homicide exists in the present case.

Ruling:

that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a
homicide would result by reason of on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo’s Penal Code, p. 267 and
259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances
leading to the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident (Decision of September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917),
provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is
only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration (Decision
of January 12, 1889 — see Cuello Calon’s Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).

The crime committed in the case at bar, of which appellant Agustin Mangulabnan is a co-participant,
is the crime of robbery with homicide covered by Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code and
punished with reclusion perpetua to death.

Case No. 22: People vs. Federico Geronimo, No.L-8936 October 23,1956, J.JBL Reyes
Digest by: RONALD ALLAN V. BARIL

FACTS:
 · In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the Provincial Fiscal in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, appellant Federico Geronimo and many others were charged
with complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies and kidnapping.
· Federico Geronimo being the ranking officers and/or member of or affiliated with
Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan
(HMB) or otherwise known as Hukbalahaps (HUKS) having come to an agreement and
decide to commit the crime of Rebellion, mutually helping one another, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, help, support, promote, maintain, direct and/or command the HUKS to rise
public and take arms against the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
· Accused Federico first entered a plea of not guilty but when the case was called for trial on
Oct. 12, 1954, however, substituted his original plea with one of guilty. The Fiscal
recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be imposed upon the accused.
Geronimo’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that the penalty imposable upon the
accused was only prision mayor. For that reason, there is no such complex crime such as
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings.
· The crime of murders, robberies and kidnappings are the natural consequences of the
crime of rebellion. Hence, the crime charged to the accused should be considered only as
simple rebellion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Federico Geronimo has committed a complex crime of Rebellion with Murder,
Robbery and Kidnapping

RULING:

NO.

Rule of lenity
Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. It is the doctrine that “a
court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments,
should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.”

Geronimo only admitted committing them in fact “as a necessary mean:”, “in connection and in
furtherance of the rebellion”, as expressly alleged by the prosecution.. This is not only because the
information expressly alleged the necessary connection between the overt acts and the political ends
pursued by the accused, but in addition, it failed to charge that the appellant was impelled by a
private motives. Wherefore, such overt acts must be taken as essential ingredients of the single crime
of rebellion, and the accused pleaded guilty to this crime alone. Hence, there being no complex
crime, the appellant can only be sentenced for the lone crime of rebellion.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the
simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the
crime of the murderer; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-appellant
Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of
P10,000 (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion;
and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than
10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more thatn 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify
the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum P6,000; and to pay the cost.

Case No. 23 Nestor A. Bernardino vs. People, G.R.No.170453, October30,2006, First Division,
J. Ynares-Santiago

Case Digest by: Marian L. Ambrocio

Facts:
 ● Nestor A. Bernardino: Former Municipal Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija and Chairman of the
Pre-Qualification Bid and Awards Committee (PBAC)
● Celedonia N. Tomas: Acting Secretary of the PBAC
● Eugelio G. Barawid: Municipal Treasurer and member of the PBAC
● Nestor A. Bernardino and other PBAC members are accused of falsifying documents to
make it appear that a public bidding was conducted on December 8, 1997.
● The PBAC, during Bernardino’s time as mayor, claimed they conducted a public bidding and
then awarded the project to Mascom Design and Engineering International (MASCOM).
● However, when the new mayor of Guimba, Jose Dizon, was elected, he conducted another
public bidding and thereafter awarded the project to KYRO Builder.
● MASCOM filed a complaint against Mayor Dizon which was dismissed after Dizon claimed that
there was in fact, no competitive public bidding held to award MASCOM the said project.
● This was further backed by witnesses who testified that they did not attend any public
bidding on December 8, 1997 and that they signed the documents related to the bidding upon
the representation of MASCOM's representative that the documents were necessary for a loan
application.
● The Sandiganbayan found the members guilty of falsification of public documents
based on the affidavits of PBAC members stating that they did not attend any public
bidding.

Issue: Are the affidavits given by the PBAC members stating that they did not attend any public
bidding enough to be considered proof beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the decision and acquitted Bernardino and Barawid because
the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court stated that the
affidavits stating that no bidding occurred were simply expressions of opinion and not a fact.

Since the affiants were not in the place where the bidding was allegedly held, they are not in the
position to declare with moral certainty that no such bidding in fact, occurred.

The law, to guard against injustice, requires that the offense be established by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt. In Dela Cruz vs. People, the Court ruled, “It is a serious matter, not only
to a party, but to the State as well, to take a person from the ordinary avocations of life. Brand him a
felon, and deprive him of his liberty, appropriate his labor, and cast a cloud upon his future, and
humiliate his relatives and friends.”

Case No. 24 Pascual vs. Board of Examiners, 28SCRA 344(1969)

CASE DIGEST BY: SINARIMBO MUHAMMAD ALI SHARIATI AL-HUSSIENI A.

FACTS:

● An administrative case for malpractice filed by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton
to Arsenio Pascual Jr. before the board of Medical Examiners
● During the initial hearing, the counsel of Salvador and Enriqueta Gatbonton requested Pascual
to take the witness stand as their first witness
● Pascual, through counsel, objected. Invoking his right to not to be a witness against himself.
● The Board of Medical Examiners decided that for Pascual to be exempt from testifying against
himself at the next scheduled hearing unless he could secure a restraining order from a
competent authority.
ISSUE/S:

Can the Board of Medical Examiners compel Pascual to be a witness against himself during an
administrative proceeding without his consent?

RULING:

NO, the Board of Medical Examiners may compel Pascual to be a witness against himself. Although
as a general rule, the right against self incrimination is available only in criminal proceedings and the
accused may not be compelled to be a witness against himself, the same right may be invoked by a
respondent in an administrative proceeding where the penalty that may be imposed far exceeds that
of a penalty in administrative proceeding. In this case, the penalty may result in loss of his license to
practice his profession and eventually of his livelihood.
One argument for the Board of Medical Examiners is that Pascual can invoke his right against
self-incrimination by being silent while taking the witness stand. They assumed that the right against
self-incrimination is only limited in answering questions that could potentially penalize the accused.
The Supreme Court stood by in accordance with a well-established principle that “the accused in a
criminal case may refuse not only to answer incriminatory questions but also to take the witness
stand.”

RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF CRIMINAL LAW AND STRICT CONSTRUCTION AGAINST

STATE

CASE NO 25 GAANAN VS IAC GR # 69809 OCTOBER 16, 1986

CASE DIGEST BY: TOMADA

FACTS:

Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against
Leonardo Laconico.

Laconico telephoned the appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a
business trip.

The appellant went to the office of Laconico.

When the complainant called up, Laconico requested the appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement.

Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for
direct assault.

Twenty minutes later, the complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions.

Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver
the money.

Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the
then Department of Public Highways.
Laconico, who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the
Philippine Constabulary, insisted that the complainant himself should receive the money.

When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, the complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant
to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against the complainant.

Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan
and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to
one (1) year imprisonment with costs.

Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition of Atty. Edgardo A. Gaanan, the petitioner to the SC should be granted.

RULING:

Yes.
The Supreme Court held that the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Therefore, the petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the
Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating the
message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction
between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same
purpose.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.
Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in
the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an
extension telephone.

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such
as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to
gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over
the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable, must strictly
be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the
view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.