Article

Journal of Eurasian Studies

2022, Vol. 13(2) 156–171
Open government and citizen © The Author(s) 2022
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empowerment in authoritarian states sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/18793665221104118
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Bakhytzhan Kurmanov1  and Colin Knox2 

Abstract
The introduction of open government has been used in many countries to improve the transparency, accountability of the
state, and promote participation by citizens in collaborative governance. Its potential for public services improvement,
citizen empowerment, and a positive impact on reducing corruption have attracted scholarly attention. Set alongside this,
open government initiatives have facilitated greater access to information which can be used to hold governments to
account and, in so doing, build trust between citizens and the state. While open government principles sit easily in
democratic systems, some authoritarian states have also adopted this concept. This raises two questions. First, is there
evidence that open collaboration, as the most developed form of open government, has empowered citizens in autocracies?
Second, and more generally, why would authoritarian regimes seek to adopt open government when the concepts of
autocracy and openness are antithetical? This paper attempts to address these questions using three case study countries in
Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan which adopted open government policies. It finds evidence of co-
optation, network authoritarianism, and state unresponsiveness/resistance to citizens’ inputs.

Keywords
Open government, citizens’ empowerment, authoritarianism, Central Asia

Revised 10 April 2022; Accepted 4 May 2022

Introduction Open Government has long been promoted as a tool for

development. Looking specifically at Open Government in
The term ‘Open Government’ in the academic literature is developing countries, the OECD offered the following
most closely associated with freedom of information, an- definition:
ticorruption, and transparency (Nam, 2012). In the popular
mind it is synonymous with former US President Obama’s Open Government initiatives are a driver of inclusive growth as
Open Government Directive in 2009 which focused on they form the foundation for inclusive institutions that offer
how, via three principles, Open Government should work broad citizen participation, plurality and a system of checks and
(Thorhildur et al., 2013). Obama elaborated in the fol-
lowing way. First, using new technologies government
should be more transparent and provide information to
1
citizens on what they are doing. Second, government International School of Economics, M. Narikbayev KazGUU University,
should be participatory by engaging with citizens and, as a Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan
2
Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University, Nur-Sultan,
result, promote government effectiveness and improvement
Kazakhstan
in the quality of the decision making process. Third,
government should collaborate across all levels of gov- Corresponding author:
ernment and with non-profits and business (Wirtz & Colin Knox, Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University, 53,
Birkmeyer, 2015). Kabanbay Batyr Avenue, Nur-Sultan 010000, Kazakhstan.
Email: [email protected]

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Kurmanov and Knox 157

balance which, in turn, provide better access to services of e-participation and deliberative governance. Open
(OECD, 2017, p. 42). government is therefore seen as progressive model that
starts with open data and proceeds through open partici-
Based on this definition the OECD suggests four core pation to collaborative governance (De Blasio & Selva,
principles which should underpin the growth in Open 2016; Gil-Garcia et al., 2020; Wirtz & Birkmeyer, 2015).
Government: citizen engagement; transparency; account- Government at the first stage provides quality information
ability; and, integrity. These core principles of open gov- about its activities to citizens. At the second stage, citizens
ernment do not resonate well with authoritarian states, yet participate (including using ICT) in decision-making and
we see evidence of autocratic countries embracing the public policy formulation. At the final stage, citizens,
concept. The aim of this paper is therefore to investigate the activists and civil society organizations collaborate in the
impact of open government policies on the empowerment of development and design of public services and functions.
citizens living in authoritarian countries. Open government can therefore be conceptualized as the
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we locate state responding progressively towards great inclusivity of
our area of research in the wider literature on open gov- citizens starting with open data, through open participa-
ernment. Second, using three case studies of autocratic tion, and finally open collaboration. This framework is
states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyr- depicted in Table 1. In short, greater access to information
gyzstan) we investigate, using primary data from 47 in- via open government should improve government trans-
terviewees, open government initiatives. Finally, we discuss parency, enable more effective citizen participation, em-
our findings based on five key themes which emerge from power the public, and build trust between the state and
the research and consider the wider implications of adopting citizens.
open government in authoritarian states. Although much of the scholarship on open government
derives from the developed world, there has been a no-
ticeable increase in studies which compare autocratic re-
Open government
gimes with democracies (Fu & Distelhorst, 2020; Guriev &
Open government as a concept is about providing access to Treisman, 2019; Harrison & Sayogo, 2014; Pirannejad
public sector information or data which allows citizens to et al., 2019). E-participation, open data, and open gov-
hold government to account, the benefits of which are ernment reforms have emerged to encourage interaction
increased citizen trust, enhanced citizen-government between citizens and the state (Alstrom et al., 2012; Martin,
communication, and improved government effectiveness 2014; Piscopo, et al., 2017). Some scholars have questioned
(Wirtz et al., 2017, 2018). The overall idea is that state whether this has resulted in increased collaboration and
bodies become more responsive to the needs of citizens by accountability in non-democracies (Kalathil & Boas, 2010;
the active use of new information and communication Wirtz & Birkmeyer, 2015). In an interesting experiment on
technologies (Gil-Garcia et al., 2018; Gobel, 2013; the use of internet voting in Russia (stage one in our
Greitens, 2013). Hence, open government has become an framework), researchers concluded that the ruling elite
integral element of a wider public administration reform deployed the tool to disempower opposition activists and
agenda (Clarke & Margetts, 2014; Kassen, 2014; Mensah, create the façade of transparent, accountable, and respon-
2020). Open government is a natural extension of e- sive government (Toepfl, 2018).
government where technology is used to share informa- Hence, the literature has focused on how authoritarian
tion through policies or laws leading to the broader notion regimes used new technologies, e-participation, and

Table 1. Open government framework.

Component Open data (Stage 1) Open participation (Stage 2) open collaboration (Stage 3)

Focus Dissemination of transparent and easy-to- Participation of citizens in policy Deeper collaboration with activists
use information to citizens regarding formulation and public services and civil society in the design of
policies and work of government. engagement public services and functions
Sub- Transparency, Access to Information, Participation, e-participation, online Collaborative governance, Co-
concepts Quality of information citizen engagement in policy and production
decision-making
Specific Access to open data portal, Government Town-hall meetings, community Working groups with inclusion of
tools bills and legislation open to public, e- engagement, online chat rooms, civil society activists, Expert
government and open government virtual front-office and interactive meetings, Virtual platforms,
websites feedback forms. councils

Source: Compiled by the authors based on: Reddick & Ganapati, 2011; Lee & Kwak, 2012; Bates, 2013; and, Gil-Garcia et al., 2020.
158 Journal of Eurasian Studies 13(2)

e-government, as tools to either promote economic devel- north and China to the south-east. The population of Central
opment and modernization (Altayar, 2018; Linde & Asia is 72.8 m people, with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan the
Karlsson, 2013), or to oppress, manipulate citizens, and larger countries (32.8 m and 18.6 m people respectively).
legitimize autocracy (Gerschewski, 2013, 2018; Guriev & Kazakhstan is the most developed in the region, now
Treisman, 2019; Kendall-Taylor et al., 2020; classified as a middle-income country with a GDP per capita
Kudaibergenova, 2018; Marechal, 2017; Omelicheva, of 9731 current US$ and Tajikistan the poorest (GDP 874
2016; O’Connor et al., 2019). As an example of the lat- US$) (World Bank, 2021). Since their independence from
ter, open government can be used to legitimize autocratic the Soviet Union in 1991, each of the Central Asian
regimes by allowing citizens to freely express their opinions countries has followed different economic and political
about social problems and injustices on-line while at the trajectories. All five Central Asian countries are classified as
same time violating the human rights of those who appear to ‘consolidated authoritarian regimes’ by Freedom House
threaten the regime, described as “networked authoritari- (see Table 2).
anism” (Kim et al., 2021; Li et al., 2016; MacKinnon, 2011; We select Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as our
Maerz, 2016, 2020; Pearse & Kendzior, 2012; Tsai, 2016). three case studies for a number of reasons. First, all three
On the wider question as to whether open government has countries make overtures to greater openness, transparency
facilitated citizen empowerment, the limited evidence and citizen engagement through open government initia-
available to date is mixed. An empirical study in Bangla- tives. Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev promoted the mantra
desh concluded that open government data initiatives en- of ‘a listening state’; Kyrgyzstan was known at one point as
hanced the citizen empowerment process and “ensured their an “island of democracy”; and, Uzbekistan’s President
involvement in government policymaking process by en- Mirziyoyev extolled the virtues of a citizen-centric state
abling collaboration with government” (Hossain et al., through initiatives such as the “Year of Dialogue” where he
2018, p. 674). By contrast, researchers found that the use pledged greater engagement with the public. Turkmenistan
of open government budgetary data in Brazil did not in- is essentially a closed country and aside from entry prob-
fluence the construction of the policy agenda (Craveiro lems, officials would have been highly unlikely to partic-
et al., 2016). Bangladesh is a parliamentary republic and ipate in interviews. Case study selection is therefore based
Brazil a federal presidential republic and these findings may on the “most similar” approach. We have chosen countries
not read-across to autocracies. where we compare very similar cases on the independent
Extant research on open government is therefore focused variables (open government policies, authoritarian states,
largely on the developed world but with an increasing post-Soviet countries) which only differ on the dependent
emphasis on how it might be used to empower citizens in variable (empowering citizens). Second, the three selected
autocratic countries (Knox, 2019; Knox & Janenova, 2019). case study countries perform highest in the region in terms
Authoritarianism offers fertile ground for the adoption of of government effectiveness, as measured by the World
open government but, to date, research has tended to focus Bank governance indicators. One element of this metric is
on the “softer” side of this initiative: open data and open the quality of public services, presumably improved as a
participation (stage 1 and 2 in our framework). This paper result of enhanced citizen-state engagement in an open
attempts to fill a gap in scholarship by examining case government context. Third, Tajikistan is the poorest country
studies in open collaboration as the most developed form of in Central Asia (GDP per capita, current US$ 874 in 2019)
open government in three authoritarian states: Kazakhstan, and has not performed well in the UN’s e-participation
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. We are therefore interested in index (Table 3) which is a useful proxy for open govern-
two broad research questions. First, is there evidence that ment, measured by three dimensions: information sharing
open collaboration has empowered citizens in autocracies? between governments and citizens; consultation with citi-
Second, and more generally, why would authoritarian re- zens; and, citizens’ engagement in decision-making pro-
gimes seek to adopt open government when the concepts of cesses (UN, 2020).
autocracy and openness are antithetical? Open collaboration Fourth, the focus is on examples where the government
with citizens and civil society is at odds with top-down in each case study country initiated top-down open gov-
autocratic style leadership. ernment initiatives and therefore, prime facie, is interested
in engaging citizens. There are alternative examples of
bottom-up schemes which may attract resistance from
Methodology government and had the potential to fail. The selection of
To explore our research questions, we use Central Asia as case studies was therefore judicious in the sense that we
the site of enquiry. Central Asia comprises the five post- were interested in tracking cases with the best chances of
Soviet countries of: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, success given their top-down origin.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Geographically the region is There are however limitations to the case study ap-
bordered by the large geo-political countries of Russia to the proach. The first limitation relates to external validity. These
Kurmanov and Knox 159

Table 2. Autocracies in Central Asia.

Democracy Democracy score (out of 7, Democracy Government Effectiveness (scale 2.5 to

percentage (%) where 0 = least democratic) classification +2.5: higher values = better governance)

Kazakhstan 5.36 1.32 Consolidated 0.16

authoritarian
regime
Kyrgyzstan 16.07 1.96 Consolidated 0.54
authoritarian
regime
Tajikistan 1.79 1.11 Consolidated 0.71
authoritarian
regime
Turkmenistan 0 1.0 Consolidated 1.16
authoritarian
regime
Uzbekistan 4.17 1.25 Consolidated 0.51
authoritarian
regime
Sources: Freedom House Nations in Transit (2020); Worldwide Governance Indicators (2021).

Table 3. E-Participation index in Central Asia.

Country Rank in 2003 (from 193 countries) Rank in 2020 (from 193 countries) Change between year 2003 and 2020

Kazakhstan 69 26 +43
Kyrgyz Republic 102 66 +36
Tajikistan 151 146 +5
Turkmenistan 123 179 56
Uzbekistan 151 46 +105

Table 4. Open Government Interviewees by Country. civil society activists directly involved in the case studies
who could offer an alternative perspective as users of open
Civil Society Activists State Officials Total
government platforms. As one might expect in authoritarian
Kazakhstan 10 9 19 regimes, state officials were the most difficult to access and
Kyrgyz Republic 8 7 15 secure agreement to participate. There is therefore a marginal
Uzbekistan 8 5 13 imbalance in favor of civil society participants. All inter-
viewees provided informed consent, an approach which is
consistent with the scholarly research on open government
are small N case studies and hence it is implausible to make (Altayar, 2018; Dawes et al., 2016; Halonen, 2012). Inter-
a broad generalization with regards to other authoritarian views were conducted in Russian and almost all the state
countries. Second, as with all case studies, the issue of officials and some civil society activists refused to allow
omitted variable bias could pose a risk – in our research, recording. In the former, officials were concerned that any
things like internet literacy or the digital divide in each case negativity or criticism expressed might have repercussions
study country may impact on the findings. Governments for their jobs. In the latter, some activists felt they could
could argue that they are well intentioned to move through articulate constructive comments and/or criticism more
the various stages of open government (Table 1) but are freely if interviews were not recorded. Data were coded and
hampered by the technology and IT capacity of their analyzed simultaneously using (a) a thematic analysis which
citizens. allows the researcher to have themes informed by the
Primary data gathering was based on 47 semi-structured literature – deductive and (b) themes emerging from the data
interviews through purposive sampling (see Table 4). In- itself, inductive. NVivo 12 was used in the process of coding
terviewees were selected using two main criteria: govern- data and data analysis. Five themes emerged (see Appendix
ment officials with experience in the design and A) and are discussed later. To improve inter-coder reliability,
implementation of the open government reform agenda; and each researcher cross-checked themes from interview notes
160 Journal of Eurasian Studies 13(2)

Table 5. National council for public trust in Kazakhstan.

Goal and main functions The main goal of the National Council is to develop proposals and recommendations on pressing public
policy issues based on a wide discussion with representatives of the public, political parties, the business
sector, and civil society.
Date of creation, June 2019.
representation and One national body.
meetings Irregular bi-monthly meetings.
Composition of members Members of the Council are appointed by the Presidential Administration of Kazakhstan.
The Chair of the Council is the President of Kazakhstan.

or transcripts of the other. We now consider the three case “significant strategic issues” taking into account the views
study examples in detail. of the public and civil society. The Council is also tasked to
ensure dialog between state bodies and civil society.
The first meeting of the Council, chaired by the
Kazakhstan: National Council for
President, took place on 6 September 2019 and there have
Public Trust been 14 meetings at the time of writing (March 2022).
In March 2019 Kassym-Jomart Tokayev succeeded First Agenda items are eclectic and controlled by presidential
President Nursultan Nazabayev in a political transition of advisors. Topics have included: the development of civil
power. Presidential elections followed (June 2019) and society, foreign migrants, gender equality, modernization
resulted in large public protests across the country with of state bodies, and the prevention of fake news. In-
more than 4000 people detained. The new President faced a creasingly though, the meetings are used to hear progress
public outcry regarding the arrests of protestors who reports from Ministers on their work. These are delivered
claimed lack of political choice in the elections and a rigged in the form of ‘speeches’ with no opportunity for en-
outcome. As a result, Tokayev announced the creation of the gagement. One senior official acknowledged the forum as
National Council for Public Trust and launched the concept a form of co-optation
called the “listening state” (see Table 5). At his inauguration
the President noted: “It is time to give an impulse to political National Council is a tool. Its goal is collaboration, as well as
competition, to expand real participation of citizens in the communication of key information to the public. The creation of
political life of the country, and to promote the development the Council is an attempt to institutionalize dialogue with the
of a multi-party system. The government is obliged to listen public. There are also other feedback tools, such as public
to its citizens and, most importantly, to hear them” councils, social monitoring networks, and acceptance of ap-
(Tukpieyv, 2019). peals (Kazakh State Official #4, 10.12.2019).
The composition of the National Council is prescribed by
its Chair, the President of Kazakhstan. The first list of The President has also used the forum to promote his
Council members comprises 44 state officials and civil reform agenda on peaceful protests and the need to preserve
society representatives, including some notable activists. the stability and sovereignty of Kazakhstan. Contemporary
According to interviewees, the key decision on the mem- public policy issues facing Kazakhstani citizens, particu-
bership of the National Council was made by high-level larly during a pandemic period (significant deficiencies in
officials in the Presidential Administration based on their the health care system, lack of social welfare for vulnerable
potential influence in society and social media (Kazakh people) have not featured on the agenda. A secondary
State Official #1, 25.10.2019). The selection process and analysis of proceedings from the meetings shows the
composition of the Council were criticized by activists as dominance of the state narrative embellished with state
follows: officials’ perpetual praise for the government’s efforts in
establishing interaction with citizens on public services
It is possible to gather people, but whether it is representative is (Zhulmukhametova & Adilbekov, 2019). Umarova, a
another question. The Council tries to replace Parliament. leading journalist and Kazakh activist, raised the issue of
What are the criteria for selecting members of the Council? press freedom in Kazakhstan to limited effect (Auespekova,
(Kazakh Activist#1, 30.10.2019). 2020). The meetings are broadcast via Facebook and the
official website of the President (Akorda) and are strictly
The Council is a recommending body and cannot de- choreographed. In its relatively short life span, several vocal
velop legislation or monitor the work of state bodies. Its critics have been removed from its membership under the
primary function is to conduct a public examination of draft guise of “the need for rotation” of participants (“Changes in
legal concepts, state programs and regulation, and the Council”, 2020).
Kurmanov and Knox 161

Several motivations and themes have been uncovered to forestall public protest which could not become an ef-
during our research into the work of the National Council. fective institution to represent various groups that comprise
Interviewees highlighted how the Council has been used to the population. Instead, it was being used as a source of
institutionalize and co-opt citizen participation with malign legitimization and co-optation to strengthen the rule of
intent: to impose government control and induce citizen President Tokayev.
engagement for tokenistic reasons. Overtly, the Council
responds to the needs of the population and active en- Tokayev uses the Council to endorse and legitimize his deci-
gagement of civil society but, in reality, it merely incor- sions. He wants to seem like a liberal to Western countries and
porates them in the status quo—it institutionalizes their the world (Kazakh Activist #1, 30.10.2019).
participation. One government official described it in this
way: Three working groups of the National Council were set
up to examine economic, political, and social issues. Their
Society groups are involved through the Council to work out aim was to collaborate with state bodies and develop policy
solutions on key issues. There is a structuring [in- solutions. However, activists claim the groups were inef-
stitutionalization] process through business groups and society fective since state bodies showed an unwillingness to co-
associations (Kazakh State Official #5, 13.02.2020). operate on the concrete policy areas, simply “going through
the motions” (Kazakh Activist #1, 30.10.2019).
The National Council has become an integral part of the
“listening state” concept—a mantra coined by President Working groups have low efficiency. It is only possible to in-
Tokayev and linked to the expansion of information and volve certain experts in decision-making, if they are paid for
social media. There was however a grudging acceptance their involvement (Kazakh Activist #1, 30.10.2019).
that times had changed and the state needed to react to the
voice of citizens and respond to their needs. The President’s official representative on the National
Council, Yerlan Karin, claimed that seven bills were signed
Only closed countries can afford not to have an open gov- based on the deliberations of the Council (Yergaliyev,
ernment. Kazakhstan does not belong to such closed countries. 2020). It is however difficult to establish a clear causal
Citizens can easily receive information from social networks. In link between the work of the National Council and this
the old days the state used to have a monopoly on information, legislation. Overall, the evidence points to the National
now there is no such monopoly. Now citizens have requested Council being used as a state legitimization tool through
changes (Kazakh State Official #1, 25.10.2019). government-controlled citizen participation which offers a
veneer of respectability to external investors and foreign
However, other interviewees doubted the potential for observers.
citizen engagement through such institutions as the National
Council. Officials claimed that citizens could not be in-
corporated directly into decision making because it would
Uzbekistan: Citizens’ virtual receptions
embed populism (Kazakh State Official #5, 13.02.2020). Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s election in
The National Council therefore relied to a much greater 2016 heralded a new era of reform following the legacy of
extent on the knowledge of “experts” rather than citizens, his hard-line predecessor. He began his presidency with a
still less young people (Arynov, 2021). Even when citizens direct pledge to the Uzbek population to improve public
coalesced around pressing social issues to articulate societal services and enhance the responsiveness of state bodies to
views to the National Council, their efforts were rebuffed. its citizens. The President announced that 2017 year would
State officials denounced the ability of citizen activists to be called the “Year of Dialogue.” He said at the time: “The
provide effective inputs for the purposes of policy change. authorities must meet the aspirations of the people, know
their pressing problems, and have close contact with the
You can attract citizens, but it has limited effectiveness. There is population,” (Mirziyoyev and the Year of Dialogue, 2016).
an issue of quantity versus quality. Surveys of the population The Uzbek President introduced open government reforms
cannot help decision making. This is populism. Another thing is broadly categorized in three main areas: promotion of
the use of experts (people who are paid money for their advice). transparency and the creation of citizen interaction plat-
This is much more effective (Kazakh State Official #5, forms; opening up internet and social media outlets; and,
13.02.2020). public services optimization.
The example chosen here is a citizen interaction platform
Activists highlighted the weakness of the National initiated by the President entitled Citizens’ Virtual Recep-
Council in a non-democratic setting. They argued that the tions, the purpose of which was to demonstrate to Uzbek
Council was an “artificial” and “compensatory” instrument citizens that the President was serious in his intentions to
162 Journal of Eurasian Studies 13(2)

promote openness and responsiveness (Uzbek Activist #5, local heads of administration and middle-level officials,
22.12.2020). ostensibly based on complaints from citizens received
through virtual receptions. However, it is not clear how
The virtual reception was a large distribution hub where state often this happened or whether virtual receptions were used
officials distributed requests from citizens, as well as monitored as a ruse to oust officials who attracted the displeasure of the
their execution and kept statistics. There was a special de- President for reasons other than those linked to complaints
partment in the presidential administration that analyzed all about public services within their remit.
statements as big data. The administration tried to learn trends
about population through the activity of citizens (Uzbek State If the President received a high number of complaints from a
official #3, 05.02.2020) specific region or rayon, the Uzbek Presidential administration
would fire the key members of the local administration: khokim
Three major aspects of virtual receptions are examined [governor], prosecutor and head of local Ministry of Interior
here: their outworking, impact on the responsiveness of Affairs [police] (Uzbek activist #4, 10.08.2020).
state bodies, and key motivations for their work.
Virtual receptions were quickly implemented and be- As time passed, however, state bodies which initially
came popular among Uzbek citizens who used them as a responded well to citizens’ demands regressed to erst-
mechanism to complain about public services delivered by while bureaucratic habits of procrastination, tokenistic
local and central state agencies. One Uzbek activist de- engagement, and outright resistance to the process of
scribed the fora in this way: being held to account. One official flagged some of the
limitations:
Previously Uzbek citizens needed to go to the authorities with a
piece of paper begging for change and expressing their con- Open government measures in Uzbekistan are aimed at re-
cerns. Now they started to write their appeals, complaints, and ducing corruption and improving the efficiency of government
proposals online, which was easy. Some 3.7 million appeals agencies. The focus is on promoting open data, but not all data
have been submitted as of today. Gradually, the population is are disclosed. The process of openness and involvement of
getting used to the fact that government agencies are no longer officials takes place mainly in large cities (Uzbek State official
such remote organizations, but they can be contacted online #2, 05.02.2020)
(Uzbek Activist #6, 23.12.2020).
Many Uzbek state officials and street-level bureaucrats
Initially, state bodies were responsive to the wave of are an integral part of a patrimonial and patronage system
citizen complaints. Citizens, in turn, experienced for the first which characterized the former Karimov era. Virtual re-
time a level of state accountability for poor public services. ceptions had a superficial appeal under a “new broom” but
when reality dawned and the real potential to upset their
The virtual reception for citizens is working effectively. Gov- involvement in nepotism, rent seeking, and unethical be-
ernment agencies now operate with an eye to this tool and how havior emerged, state officials pulled back. One activist
citizens can react to their decisions. Citizens are experiencing noted the following:
real benefits from the virtual receptions (Uzbek Activist #6
23.12.2020). There is a growing problem with the virtual reception - citizen
requests and appeals are often sent to the state body that the
The government deployed a team of IT experts and state population complains about. As a result, formal rather than
officials who used big data techniques to analyze complaints substantive responses [otpiska] come back (Uzbek Activist #5,
coming from a range of electronic platforms (Uzbek activist 22.12.2020).
#4, 10.08.2020).
Another issue with the virtual reception is that it failed to
Our goal is to help other state bodies introduce new tech- reach its potential as a mechanism to discuss serious policy
nologies aimed at improving transparency. We also provide issues or to initiate significant political and economic reforms.
assistance to the special center created at the Ministry of According to field data, the platform has become a tool for the
Finance that is tasked with enhancing Uzbekistan’s ranking in resolution of citizens’ mundane issues, some of which were
global indexes including the UN E-government index, similar not related to the area or functions of state bodies.
Open Data index (Uzbek state official #4, 07.02.2020)
There were many calls of a stupid nature (like: help me find a
Citizens’ inputs were then used to adjust or significantly husband). People did not quite understand why the virtual
amend some public policies. Such was the state’s respon- reception is needed. No serious topics were raised (Uzbek
siveness that the Uzbek President occasionally removed Activist #5, 22.12.2020).
Kurmanov and Knox 163

Activists also noted that the virtual reception transformed international initiative established in 2011 to promote ac-
from a tool of responsiveness and open participation into a countable, responsive, and inclusive governance. Seventy-
formalized communication channel for state bodies. A top- eight countries and a growing number of local
down focus on public services modernization and economic governments—representing more than two billion people—
development became the dominant purpose for state offi- along with thousands of civil society organizations are
cials who discarded the original conceptions of bottom-up members of the OGP (Open Government Partnership,
accountability and transparency (Uzbek Activist #4, 2020). One of the key principles of the OGP is the estab-
10.08.2020). lishment of partnership and cooperation between the civil
society sector and state.
In the first year virtual receptions worked effectively. Officials Joining the OGP was an important milestone for Kyr-
monitored issues and made decisions based on citizens’ re- gyzstan. One interviewee (Kyrgyz Activist #2, 08.01.2020)
quests. However, then everything changed - a year later. Now noted: “the fact that the Kyrgyz Republic was the first
they just give replies. These interactive tools are used simply as Central Asian country to join the Open Government part-
a communication channel with government agencies (Uzbek nership was hugely significant to both state and civil society
Activist #4, 10.08.2020). organizations.” NGOs pressed the government for OGP
membership to promote open data and optimization of
The virtual reception became a popular tool for citizens’ public services (Kyrgyz Activist#1, 08.01.2020). The Prime
grievances in Uzbekistan from 2017. However, their full Minister’s Office supported the initiative as a means of
potential has not been realized. Serious public policy issues public sector reform and reducing corruption rather than to
are not being discussed at the platform, while responses to explicitly promote open collaboration with citizens.
citizens sometimes turn into an exercise of bureaucratic Another important factor that informed the decision of
formalism and tokenism (otpiska). Officials blamed lack of Kyrgyzstan to join the OGP was the influence of foreign
involvement by citizens: donors and international organizations. The local UNDP
office in the Kyrgyz Republic provided funding for an
Government agencies need to develop a culture of interaction initiative on Open Parliament. The OSCE financially
because citizens are not willing to engage in dialogue. How- supported work of the Secretariat and National Forum of the
ever, we are working to involve people in the discussion of bills OGP (Kyrgyz Activist #1, 08.01.2020). The World Bank
and try to respond to the opinions of citizens (Uzbek State funded capacity building on openness in public procure-
official #1, 07.02.2020) ment. Significant foreign donor funding became conditional
on the Kyrgyz Republic “abiding by international standards
In short, after a promising start, virtual receptions lost to satisfy the requirements of membership of the Open
their original appeal and purpose and were diverted by state Government Partnership” (Kyrgyz Activist #2,
officials from their key objective of citizens holding gov- 08.01.2020).
ernment to account. The key mechanism for the implementation of OGP was
the creation of the Open Government National Forum. The
Forum comprises 38 representatives from civil society and
Kyrgyz Republic: Open government state authorities on an equal basis. It was established to
partnership select initiatives that would constitute a country-specific
open government agenda. The first meeting of the Forum
The Kyrgyz Republic has arguably achieved more progress in the was held in June 2018 at which the National Action Plan
transition toward democratic institutions than its authoritarian (NAP) began to emerge. This developed into a 2-year
neighbors in the Central Asian region. However, political in- National Plan of Action (2018–2020) for the Kyrgyz Re-
stability has not led to the formation of robust democratic public to build open government which was subsequently
practices and institutions. The country has a vibrant civil society approved by the Decree of the Government of the Kyrgyz
sector and it has oscillated between a parliamentary republic and Republic in October 2018.
autocracy. As a result of these political developments, Kyrgyzstan The Forum evolved through an incremental process. At
has a relatively free media, and the government affords citizens the first stage, all citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic can
significant openness on the internet and in social media activism. provide their ideas and suggestions on open government
All of this suggests a propensity for open government development in the country. Citizens can also monitor the
and access to information which would allow citizens to work of the Forum through the official website. At the
hold government to account. The Kyrgyz civil society sector second stage, various civil society organizations and citizen
was one of the driving forces that influenced the Prime activists are invited to become active members of the
Minister’s office to join the Open Government Partnership National Forum on the basis of specific proposals they
(OGP) in 2017. The Open Government Partnership is an outline. However, the realization of such proposals (also
164 Journal of Eurasian Studies 13(2)

called commitments) is subject to an agreement between consider it important to be responsive or transparent to

both state and civil society organizations. Hence, civil citizens and open government as a concept is widely
society organizations cannot start open government com- misunderstood by officials. Several interviewees high-
mitments without the consent of their respective state lighted lack of comprehension on the key open government
bodies. premise—why do we need it?
The activism of civil society organizations has driven the
inner workings of the Forum. According to one Kyrgyz The enthusiasm coming from the government was only intended
Activist #3 (10.01.2020), “civil society organizations have a for political purposes. There was a lot of hype and promise, but
strong influence over the agenda of the National Forum and there was no work. The real attitude of government officials for
its commitments.” More than 80% of the commitments in open government is weak (Kyrgyz Activist #7, 25.10.2020).
the National Action Plan 2018–2020 were proposed by civil
society organizations; state bodies suggested only two Second, there was bureaucratic resistance by state offi-
commitments while the remaining 20 were proposed by cials in the realization of OGP commitments. “Civil ser-
civil society organizations. Civil society organizations and vants and officials do not like to take on extra work and
activists came with the ideas they wanted to implement responsibility” (Kyrgyz State Official #5, 30.10.2020). The
within the Open Government Partnership (Kyrgyz Activist implementation of open government commitments was
#6, 22.10.2020). Most of the work on the realization of OGP considered as something additional to the current workload
commitments was conducted by the civil society organi- of state officials. Hence, there was an ongoing problem of
zations and activists (Kyrgyz State official #2, 05.10.2020). assigning a responsible/accountable person at the state
The commitments in the National Plan which originated agency level to realize open government commitments. This
from civil society organizations included: open data policies problem was exacerbated by the lack of competent public
in various public services such as education and health; servants and staff to implement the initiative. The low level
inclusion of citizens in the discussion of draft laws; an of average salaries in Kyrgyz public service is a serious
auditing system with public participation; involving civil concern. Hence, without the effective capacity of state
society in the fight against corruption in the state bodies; bodies, it became impossible to implement or promote open
and, the disclosure of information about state and municipal data and open collaboration initiatives with citizens.
property. The focus of open government commitments was
therefore quite broad, varied and, to some extent, un- The low efficiency in fulfilling commitment [of open govern-
structured. Many of the initiatives were aimed at providing ment] is caused by the low level of expertise among government
open data and information to citizens. Some focused on agencies and the limited time frame. Staff turnover reduces
parliament and anti-corruption activities yet overlooked efficiency. Capacity is extremely low, and the Kyrgyz state
executive state bodies. Almost all the initiatives involve the bodies do not attract competent experts (Kyrgyz Activist #4,
inclusion of civil society organizations rather than citizens 09.01.2020).
directly which reflects the specific Kyrgyz institutional
context. As the result of bureaucratic reticence, a formal but
The research interviews revealed several problems that superficial approach to the implementation of open gov-
were associated with the outworking of the National Forum. ernment initiatives became evident. Interviewees noted that
“The implementation of obligations under open government state officials publicly embrace the concept but take little
is roughly 20%” (Kyrgyz Activist #5, 09.01.2020). Only responsibility for its realization. They prefer the im-
one commitment was fully completed in November 2020 plementation of events (“meropriyatiya”) that are linked to
while other commitments were partially or not completed at commitments, without paying attention to substantive
all (Kyrgyz State official #2, 05.10.2020). As key inter- outcomes. Political support of heads of specific state
viewees noted, the state bodies resisted the implementation agencies was critical to the effectiveness of implementation
of open government. This lack of strong support by the (Kyrgyz Activist #6, 22.10.2020; Kyrgyz State Official #6,
government bodies was also mentioned by a small number 09.11.2020; Kyrgyz Activist #8, 17.11.2020). However,
of state officials (Kyrgyz State official #3, 07.10.2020; most state bodies did not show the political will to promote
Kyrgyz State Official #5, 30.10.2020). Three major themes/ commitments (Kyrgyz State official #2, 05.10.2020).
motivations were uncovered in interviews that potentially Third, there was a major issue relating to the high
explain this phenomenon: lack of direct benefits and hence turnover levels of state officials responsible for im-
low motivation, bureaucratic resistance, and a high turnover plementing OGP commitments. In October 2020, only three
of state officials. First, state officials did not actively par- state officials on the National Forum stayed in their posi-
ticipate in the OGP commitments since they did not see tions. Meanwhile, around 15 state representatives left
direct career benefits (Kyrgyz State Official #4, without providing a replacement in the Forum (Kyrgyz
27.10.2020). Civil servants in the Kyrgyz Republic do not State official #2, 05.10.2020). Since the start of the
Kurmanov and Knox 165

initiative, numerous cadre changes have affected the

ability of state officials to coordinate a unified policy. A
good example of this problem is the work of the State
Committee for Information Communications and Tech-
nology. The Committee should be responsible for the
incorporation of digital technologies in the delivery of Figure 1. Items clustered by coding similarity.
public services and the implementation of e-government
in the country (Kyrgyz Activist #1, 08.01.2020). How-
ever, the Committee has failed so far to introduce any strength of the NGO sector. Notwithstanding this context,
significant changes. Political instability and corruption the state has been able to thwart the best intentions of the
have led to a high level of turnover of state officials which Open Government Partnership while, at the same time,
has resulted in unfulfilled commitments in the Open collaborating at face value with activists. Though Kyrgyz
Government Partnership. civil society organizations managed to influence the se-
lection of the Open Government commitments, im-
plementation stalled through bureaucratic resistance. The
Discussion Open Government Partnership has failed to produce any
All three country case studies above point to significant meaningful outcomes for openness and responsiveness,
limitations associated with the introduction of open gov- while the political regime in Bishkek used it for co-
ernment policies in Central Asia. So why are authoritarian optation purposes. Open government reform has become
states motivated to pursue open government? The National vacuous in Kyrgyz Republic. In short, Central Asian
Council for Public Trust in Kazakhstan served as means of consolidated authoritarian regimes have learned to in-
internal co-optation of President Tokayev’s regime. The corporate open government in the face of greater social
Council was intended as a mechanism for open participation media activism but used the mechanism to control and
and collaboration in the country. However, it became a tool reinforce the state narrative. One way in which they have
for the Kazakh regime to reinforce its image as an open and done this is to co-opt activists or repress those who pro-
‘listening state’ when, in reality, it compounds the status mote an alternative state perspective. Co-optation writ
quo. In the face of an increasingly vocal citizenry, the state large. Figure 1 distils the key themes from our qualitative
has (ab)used open government to control citizen partici- data analysis using NVivo.
pation, masquerading as an open government reform. It has
done this by engaging in isomorphic mimicry of Western
Conclusions
open government practices but with the intention of con-
trolling and forging a government narrative. Both these To conclude we return to our two research questions. First,
motivations are interconnected. is there evidence that open collaboration, as the most de-
The Uzbekistan case reveals several similarities with veloped form of open government, has empowered citizens
Kazakhstan despite different public sector development in autocracies? Second, and more generally, why would
trajectories. The Uzbek state has facilitated the creation of authoritarian regimes seek to adopt open government when
a relatively free digital space and a seemingly responsive the concepts of autocracy and openness are antithetical?
platform for citizens to hold state bodies to account for the Clearly we cannot speak to all autocratic states but evidence
provision of public services. However, once citizens from our case studies would suggest that open government
started to articulate their needs on social media and organic in Central Asia has not moved beyond stage 1 in our open
citizen engagement evolved, the Uzbek authorities pulled government framework (open data—see Table 1 above).
back as these became threatening to the status quo—the One should not diminish the value of this achievement. Our
“genie was out of the bottle.” The state’s response was to qualitative data analysis highlighted the benefits of digi-
control and impose government-induced forms of open talization and how it has transformed the way in which
participation in virtual space and circumscribe the role and multiple public services are delivered. Open data channels
impact of activists. As in Kazakhstan, open government (e-government) have also limited the opportunities for face-
tools have allowed the Uzbek authorities to monitor the to-face interactions between citizens and state officials
public discussions of political and public policy issues where corruption is rampant. However, electronic delivery
while maintaining the state narrative, a form of information of public services is one thing, participating and collabo-
autocracy. rating (stages 2 and 3—Table 1 above) in government
The Kyrgyz Republic offers a more nuanced form of policies is another, and remains a step too far for Central
control given its history of political activism and the Asia at this point. This research has demonstrated that non-
166 Journal of Eurasian Studies 13(2)

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Thorhildur, J., Avital, M., & Bjorn-Andersen, N. (2013). The Data Collection and Interview Questions
generative mechanisms of open government data. Edited by
Copenhagen Business School. The number of interviewees conducted was based on the-
Tsai, W-H. (2016). How ‘Networked Authoritarianism’ was op- oretical saturation (Creswell, 2008). Hennink et al. (2017)
erationalised in China: Methods and procedures of public noted that code saturation was reached at nine or more
opinion control. Journal of Contemporary China, 25(101), interviews (to conduct thematic analysis), while full un-
731–744. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1160506 derstanding (meaning saturation) is achieved at 16 or more
Tukpieyv, Z. h. (2019, September 6). The best ideas will find their interviews. The estimation is that for each country case, the
application - Tokayev on the work of the National Council for number of interviews should not be less than 10. This
Public Trust [Luchshiye idei naydut svoye primeneniye – Tokayev number of interviews is sufficient to reach saturation for
o rabote Natssoveta obshchestvennogo doveriya]. KazPravda. thematic analysis in this article. The exact location, date and
https://www.kazpravda.kz/news/prezident2/luchshie-idei-naidut- the profile of interviewees is provided below.
Kurmanov and Knox 169

Conducted interviews in Kazakhstan. (*-conducted virtually).

# Profile/Affiliation Code NVivo Date Place

1 Central State Body/The Presidential Administration of Kazakhstan Kazakh State Official #1 KSO1 25.10.2019 Nur-Sultan
2 Civil Society Activist/Private Sector Think Tank Kazakh Activist #1 KCS1 30.10.2019 Nur-Sultan
3 Civil Society Activist/Non-Governmental Organization Kazakh Activist #2 KCS2 24.11.2019 Almaty
4 Local executive body/Almaty City Administration Kazakh State Official #2 KSO2 25.11.2019 Almaty
5 Civil Society Activist/Think Tank Kazakh Activist #3 KCS3 25.11.2019 Almaty
6 Local executive body/Almaty City Quasi-State Agency Kazakh State Official #3 KSO3 25.11.2019 Almaty
7 Civil Society Activist/Private Sector Kazakh Activist #4 KCS4 26.11.2019 Almaty
8 Civil Society Activist/Non-Governmental Organization Kazakh Activist #5 KCS5 26.11.2019 Almaty
9 Civil Society Activist/Think Tank Kazakh Activist #6 KCS6 27.11.2019 Almaty
10 Central State Body/The Presidential Administration of Kazakhstan Kazakh State Official #4 KSO4 10.12.2019 Nur-Sultan
11 Central State Body/Government Think Tank Kazakh State Official #5 KSO5 13.02.2020 Nur-Sultan
12 Civil Society Activist/Private Sector Kazakh Activist #7 KCS7 12.03.2020 Almaty*
13 Civil Society Activist/Think Tank Kazakh Activist #8 KCS8 28.06.2020 Nur-Sultan*
14 Central State Body/Government Think Tank Kazakh State Official #6 KSO6 09.12.2020 Nur-Sultan*
15 Central State Body/Government Agency Kazakh State Official #7 KSO7 05.10.2020 Nur-Sultan*
16 Civil Society Activist/Think-Tank Kazakh Activist #9 KCS9 20.10.2020 Nur-Sultan*
17 Local executive body/Astana City Quasi-state Agency Kazakh State Official #8 KSO8 17.12.2020 Nur-Sultan*
18 Civil Society Activist/Non-governmental Organization Kazakh Activist #10 KCS10 20.12.2020 Almaty*
19 Central state body/Government Think Tank Kazakh State Official #9 KSO9 22.02.2021 Nur-Sultan*

Conducted interviews in Uzbekistan. (*-interviews conducted virtually).

# Profile/Affiliation Code NVivo Date Place

1 Civil Society Activist/Private Sector Consultancy Uzbek Activist #1 UZCS1 05.02.2020 Tashkent
2 Civil Society Activist/Non-governmental Organization Uzbek Activist #2 UZCS2 07.02.2020 Tashkent
3 Civil Society Activist/Private Sector Think Aank Uzbek Activist #3 UZCS3 06.02.2020 Tashkent
4 Central State Body/Quasi-State Agency Uzbek State Official #1 UZSO1 07.02.2020 Tashkent
5 Central State Body/Quasi-State Agency Uzbek State Official #2 UZSO2 05.02.2020 Tashkent
6 Central State Body/The Presidential Administration of Uzbekistan Uzbek State Official #3 UZSO3 05.02.2020 Tashkent
7 Central State Body/Quasi-State Agency Uzbek State Official #4 UZSO4 07.02.2020 Tashkent
8 Central State Body/Quasi-State Agency Uzbek State Official #5 UZSO5 07.02.2020 Tashkent
9 Civil Society Activist/Higher Education Institution Uzbek Activist #4 UZCS4 10.08.2020 Tashkent*
10 Civil Society Activist/Journalist Uzbek Activist #5 UZCS5 22.12.2020 Tashkent*
11 Civil Society Activist/Non-governmental Organization Uzbek Activist #6 UZCS6 23.12.2020 Tashkent*
12 Civil Society Activist/Private Sector Think Tank Uzbek Activist #7 UZCS7 10.03.2021 Tashkent*
13 Civil Society Activist/Non-governmental Organization Uzbek Activist #8 UZCS8 11.03.2021 Tashkent*

Conducted interviews in the Kyrgyz Republic. (*-interviews conducted virtually).

# Profile/Affiliation Code NVivo Date Place

1 Central State Body/Quasi-State Agency Kyrgyz State Official #1 KGSO1 08.01.2020 Bishkek
2 Civil Society Activist/Non-governmental organization Kyrgyz Activist #1 KGCS1 08.01.2020 Bishkek
3 Civil Society Activist/Journalist Kyrgyz Activist #2 KGCS2 09.01.2020 Bishkek
4 Civil Society Activist/Non-governmental Organization Kyrgyz Activist #3 KGCS3 09.01.2020 Bishkek
5 Civil Society Activist/Think Tank at Higher Education Institution Kyrgyz Activist #4 KGCS4 10.01.2020 Bishkek
6 Civil Society Activist/Private Sector Think Tank Kyrgyz Activist #5 KGCS5 10.01.2020 Bishkek
7 Central State Body/Open Government Forum Secretariat Kyrgyz State Official #2 KGSO2 05.10.2020 Bishkek*
8 State Official/Government Think Tank Kyrgyz State Official #3 KGSO3 07.10.2020 Bishkek*
9 Civil Society Activist/Non-governmental Organization Kyrgyz Activist #6 KGCS6 22.10.2020 Bishkek*
10 Civil Society Activist/Private Sector Think Tank Kyrgyz Activist #7 KGCS7 25.10.2020 Bishkek*
11 Central State Body/Prime Minister Office Kyrgyz State Official #4 KGSO4 27.10.2020 Bishkek*
12 Central State Body/Government Think Tank and Contractor Kyrgyz State Official #5 KGSO5 30.10.2020 Bishkek*
13 Central State Body/State Agency Kyrgyz State Official #6 KGSO6 09.11.2020 Bishkek*
14 Central State Body/State Committee Kyrgyz State Official #7 KGSO7 17.11.2020 Bishkek*
15 Civil Society Activist/Private Sector Kyrgyz Activist #8 KGCS8 17.11.2020 Bishkek*
170 Journal of Eurasian Studies 13(2)

The researchers attempted to conduct all in-depth inter- Data Analysis: This article used the thematic analysis
views in person. The qualitative approach aims to understand approach (Robson & McCartan, 2016) to analyze the
research issues in depth rather than breadth and is achieved by qualitative data collected through semi-structured inter-
using in-depth interviews with people involved with Open views. A six-phase approach developed by Braun and
Government adoption (Altayar, 2018; Creswell, 2008). The Clarke (2006) was adopted as the protocol in analyzing
purpose of an interview is to uncover beliefs, understanding, the data. Thematic analysis is based on looking for repeated
and rationales used for the behavior of individuals, here, public patterns of meaning that emerge in a data set. The analysis is
officials and other Open Government participants and experts based on generating or finding themes through “careful
(Creswell, 2008). The structured interview as a main method reading and re-reading data” (Rice & Ezzy, 1999, p. 258).
of primary data aims to uncover themes. The interview The thematic analysis is useful for the analysis of qualitative
adopted a semi-structured format with open-ended questions data as it distills primary data to produce verified conclu-
that allowed some flexibility in engaging interviewees. The sions (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Thematic analysis may be
interview questions also included personal factual questions used to generate themes in two major ways. A deductive
and questions about values and knowledge. Since this study thematic analysis allows the researcher to have themes
aimed to understand the adoption of Open Government de- informed by the literature (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This
velopment, the interview questions cover key topics such as approach generates fewer rich data and usually focuses on
introducing Open Government reforms, motivations and ra- several predetermined themes connected to the research
tionales for implementing them, and the factors that influenced question. The inductive approach to thematic analysis
the adoption process. involves finding themes emerging from the data itself

Sample In-depth Interview Questions

Groups State Officials Civil Society Activists

Sample How do you understand Open Government? How do you understand Open Government?
Questions What is the importance of open collaboration and What is the importance of open collaboration and
participation components? participation components?
What is the main motivation to pursue Open How do you assess the responsiveness of the state bodies to
Government? bottom-up initiatives?
What is the current stage of Open Government reform Do you think state bodies prefer to cooperate with civil
in your country? society organizations on important public policy issues?
Does your government agency seek to engage external Are government/state bodies accountable to the population? If
and international partners in Open Government so, in what ways? If not, why not?
reform?
Do you believe that citizen engagement can improve What have you envisaged when you participated in the (social)
policy improvement and if so, how? movement related to the incident?
Do you believe that citizen activism/engagement should Did state bodies cooperate with you/your movement?
be encouraged in policy design/implementing public
policy?
Did you consider including participation of citizens in the Do you think that government would incorporate your
related policy issue? proposals into the policy? What were the results of your
civil activism?
What do you expect to gain from citizen activism/
engagement through civil society on specific policy
issues?
Why did you pursue inclusion of citizen’s input in the
policy issue?
When the incident happened how did you respond to
the critical commentaries on social media?
What was your strategy to address criticisms by citizens?
Kurmanov and Knox 171

(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Following the approach adopted by open participation and collaboration potential were not fully
Braun and Clarke (2006), data were coded using both de- realized. The imitation of open government reform (iso-
ductive and inductive approaches simultaneously. A deductive morphic mimicry) is predominant.
approach was applied to code across three components of
Open Government (open data, open participation and open References
collaboration) and broader motivations for adoption of the Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psy-
reform. Several key themes emerged without grouping into chology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101,
components of open government or pre-defined frameworks https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa
based on inductive approach. NVivo 12, a computer program Creswell, J. (2008). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative,
for qualitative data analysis, was used in the process of coding and mixed methods approaches. Sage.
data and the data analysis stage. Hennink, M. M., Kaiser, B. N., & Marconi, V. C. (2017). Code
Discussion: Based on thematic analysis, five themes saturation versus meaning Ssaturation: How many interviews
(above) emerged from the data: Institutionalization and co- are enough? Qualitative Health Research, 27(4), 591–608.
optation of citizen activism, resistance of state to be re- https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732316665344
sponsive to citizens, networked authoritarianism, imitation Miles, M., & Huberman, A. (1994). Qualitative data analysis (2nd
of open government reform and economic development, ed.). Sage.
digitalization, and public services. These themes support the
Rice, P., & Ezzy, D. (1999). Qualitative research methods: A
main argument of the article that the open government
health focus. Oxford University Press.
reform was used by Central Asian regimes to achieve co-
optation of citizen activism and to adopt networked au- Robson, C., & McCartan, K. (2016). Real world research: A
thoritarianism. Furthermore, this rich data also indicates that resource for users of social research methods in applied
states generally struggled to be responsive to citizens while settings (4th ed.). John Wiley.