A Virtuous Circle?

The Impact of Political Communications in Post-Industrial Democracies (*)

Pippa Norris

John F. Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
[email protected]
www.Pippanorris.com

Paper for the Annual Meeting of the Political Studies Association of the UK, London
School of Economics and Political Science, 10-13th April 2000. Panel on Political
Communications II Monday 10th April 16.00-17.30.

Abstract

During the last decade a rising tide of political communications by the news
voices on both sides of the Atlantic has media and by parties is not responsible
blamed the news media for growing for civic disengagement.
public disengagement, ignorance of
Part I summarizes the core assumptions
civic affairs, and mistrust of government.
in different theories of media malaise.
This idea has developed into something
Part II examines some of the key
of an unquestioned orthodoxy in the
structural trends in the news industry
popular literature in the United States. A
that many believe are responsible for
related viewpoint more common in
media malaise. Part III examines
Europe regards the growth of
evidence for the impact of attention to
professional political marketing by
the news media on selected indicators
parties, including the mélange of spin,
of civic engagement.
packaging and pollsters, as also
contributing towards public cynicism. The conclusion develops the theory of ‘a
virtuous circle’to explain the pattern we
But is the conventional wisdom correct?
find. Rather than mistakenly ‘blaming
This paper, based on a systematic
the messenger’, the study concludes
examination of the role of political
that we need to understand and confront
communications in post-industrial
more deep-rooted flaws in systems of
societies, argues that the process of
representative government.
Recent years have seen growing impact is in a negative direction. The
tensions between the ideals and the core analytic model is outlined
perceived performance of democratic schematically in Figure 1.
institutions1. While there is no 'crisis of
(Figure 1 about here)
democracy', many believe that all is not
well with the body politic. Concern in There is nothing particularly novel about
the United States has focused on these claims. Many critics expressed
widespread cynicism about political concern about the effects of the popular
institutions and leaders, fuelling fears press on moral decline throughout the
about civic disengagement and a half- nineteenth century as newspapers
empty ballot box2. The common view is became more widely available6. The
that the American public turns off, phenomenon of the ‘yellow press’in the
knows little, cares less and stays home. 1890s caused worry about its possible
dangers for public affairs. In the 1920s
Similar worries echo in Europe.
and 1930s, the earliest theories of mass
Commentators have noted a crisis of
propaganda were based on the
legitimacy following the steady
assumption that authoritarian regimes
expansion in the power and scope of the
could dupe and choreograph the public
European Union despite public
by manipulating radio bulletins and
disengagement from critical policy
newsreels7.
choices3. The growth of critical citizens
is open to many explanations, explored Recent decades have seen multiple
in a previous study4. crusades against the supposed
pernicious influence of the mass media,
One of the most popular accounts
whether directed against violence in
attributes public disengagement to
movies, the ‘wasteland’of television, the
political communications. The political
impact on civic engagement of watching
science literature on ‘media malaise’or
TV entertainment, the dangers of
‘videomalaise’ originated in the 1960s,
tobacco advertising, or the supposedly
developed in a series of scholarly
pernicious effects of pop music8.
articles in the post-Watergate 1970s,
and rippled out to become the While hardly new, what is different today
conventional wisdom in the popular is the widespread orthodoxy that has
culture of journalism and politics developed around this theory. Let us
following a flood of books in the 1990s. first outline the American and European
The chorus of critics is loudest in the accounts of media malaise and then
United States but similar echoes can be consider some evidence surrounding
heard in Europe. this thesis.
These accounts claim that common I. Theories of Media Malaise
practices by the news media and by
American theories of ‘media malaise’
party campaigns hinder civic emerged in the political science
engagement, meaning learning about literature in the 1960s. Kurt and Gladys
public affairs, trust in government, and Lang were the first to connect the rise of
political activism5. Media malaise
network news with broader feelings of
theories share two core assumptions: (i) disenchantment with American politics.
that the process of political TV broadcasts, they argued, fuelled
communications has a significant impact
public cynicism by over-emphasizing
upon civic engagement; and, (ii) that this political conflict and downplaying routine
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policymaking in DC. This process, they leaving too much of the American public
suggested, had most impact on the ignorant and disconnected from
‘inadvertent audience’, who encountered politics14. For Neil Postman the major
politics because they happened to be networks, driven by their hemorrhage of
watching TV when the news was shown, viewers to cable, have substituted
but who lacked much interest in, or prior tabloid television for serious political
knowledge about, public affairs9. The coverage15. For Roderick Hart, television
Langs proved an isolated voice at the produces an illusion of political
time, in large part because the participation, while encouraging
consensus in political communications passivity, thereby seducing America16.
stressed the minimal effects of the mass Neil Gabler argues that the political
media on public opinion. process has been repackaged into show
business.17.
The idea gained currency in the mid-
1970s since it seemed to provide a Larry Sabato warns of the dangers of
plausible reason for growing public pack journalism producing a 'feeding
alienation in the post-Vietnam and post- frenzy'18. For Thomas Patterson, the
Watergate era. Michael Robinson first press, in its role as election gatekeeper,
popularized the term ‘videomalaise’ to has become a 'miscast' institution, out of
describe the link between reliance upon order in the political system19. Cappella
American television journalism and and Jamieson stress that strategic news
feelings of political cynicism, social frames of politics activate cynicism
mistrust, and lack of political efficacy. about public policy20. Dautrich and
Greater exposure to television news, he Hartley conclude that the news media
argued, with its high 'negativism', ‘fail American voters’21.
conflictual frames, and anti-institutional
James Fallows is concerned that down-
themes, generated political disaffection,
market trends have produced the
frustration, cynicism, self-doubt and
relentless pursuit of sensational,
malaise.10 For Robinson this process
superficial, and populist22. All this
was most critical during election
breathless flim-flam, Schudson argues,
campaigns, where viewers were turned
comes at the expense of detailed and
off, he argued, by TV’s focus on the
informed debate about policy issues23.
‘horse-race’ at the expense of issues,
Hachten complains that public affairs
analysis rather than factual information,
journalism has been trivialized and
and excessive ‘bad news’ about the
corrupted24. The role of public television
candidates11.
in the US, long under-funded as a poor
Many others echoed these claims over cousin, has been unable to compensate
the years12. According to Samuel for the relentless drive for ratings of
Huntington, in a widely influential report network and cable TV25.
for the Trilateral Commission, the news
The list of complaints go on and on and
media had eroded respect for
on. The news media – particularly TV
government authority in many post-
news - is blamed for a host of political
industrial societies, contributing towards
ills. Criticisms have moved well beyond
a widespread ‘crisis’ of democracy
the halls of academe: many U.S.
evident on the streets of Washington
journalists share the belief that
DC, Paris and Tokyo13.
something is badly wrong with their
During the 1990s the trickle of profession26 and the Committee of
complaints about the news media Concerned Journalists, led by Tom
became a popular deluge. For Entman, Rosensteil and Bill Kovach, has debated
the free press falls far short of its ideals, potential reforms to the profession27.

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In Europe similar voices can be heard Lewinsky in America34. This coverage is

although these accounts emphasize believed to corrode the forms of trust
structural developments in the news underpinning social relations and
industry and in party campaigning. Jay political authority). The process of
Blumler suggests that a 'crisis of civic ‘tabloidization’may have gone further in
communication' has afflicted Western Europe than in the American or
Europe28. Many fear that growing Japanese press, with papers like The
competition from commercial channels Sun or Der Bild leading the pack, each
has undermined the quality and diversity with many millions of readers. But
of public service television29. Dahlgren similar phenomenon are evident in the
argues that the displacement of public chase for ratings in local TV news and
service television by commercial ‘all talk, all the time’ cable news
channels has impoverished the public magazines in the U.S.
sphere30. During the 1980s, the public
Many hope that the Internet can escape
sector experienced a massive program
these problems, but others fear that this
of privatization throughout Western
media may reinforce political cynicism.
Europe. During the same era, the
Owen and Davis conclude that the
growth of alternative commercial
Internet provides new sources of
channels, breaking down the monopoly
information for the politically interested,
of public service broadcasting,
but given uneven levels of access there
undermined the rationale for subsidizing
are good grounds to be skeptical about
television through state resources.
its transformative potential for
Schulz argues that in Germany the
democratic participation35. Murdock and
decline of public service broadcasting
Golding36 argue that the new medium
and the rise of commercial channels, the
may merely reproduce, or even
latter emphasizing the more sensational
exacerbate, existing social biases in
and negative aspects of political news,
conventional political participation. Hill
may have increased public cynicism31.
and Hughes believe that the Internet
Kaase fears that these developments
does not change people; it simply allows
may produce audiences segmented
them to do the same things in a different
according to the amount of political
way37. Moreover the pace of breaking
information to which they are exposed,
headlines on the net may in turn
possibly reinforcing a ‘knowledge gap’32.
undermine journalistic standards in the
In the print sector, there is widespread old media, like the way The Drudge
concern that increased competition for Report on the web scooped Newsweek
readers has increased the pressure on in breaking the first Lewinsky story. The
traditional standards of news, leading to net also provides a platform that may
‘tabloidization’ or ‘infotainment’. ‘Yellow exaggerate the voice of those well
journalism’ in the 1890s routinely outside mainstream democratic politics,
highlighted the moral peccadilloes and from white supremacy racists to bomb-
sexual proclivities of the rich and making terrorists.
famous. Sensationalism, crime and
A related stream of commentators
scandal in newspapers are hardly new,
attributes the problems of political
providing a popular alternative to the
communications primarily to the practice
dull business of politics.33 But today
of professional marketing. One of the
routine and daily front-page news about
most striking developments in many
government scandals appears greater
countries has been the declining
than in previous decades - whether
importance of the 'pre-modern'
sleaze in Britain, Tagentopoli in Italy,
campaign involving local party meetings,
Recruit and Sagawa in Japan, or l'affaire
door-to-door canvassing and direct

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voter-candidate contact. The rise of the more adversarial news culture following
'modern' campaign is characterized by Vietnam and Watergate.
the widespread adoption of the
Campaign accounts focus on the growth
techniques of political marketing38.
of political marketing with its attendant
Strategic communications is part of the
coterie of spin-doctors, advertising
'professionalization' of campaigning,
consultants and pollsters, reducing the
giving a greater role to technical experts
personal connections between citizens
in public relations, news management,
and representatives.
advertising, speech-writing and market
research39. Multiple interpretations therefore cluster
within this perspective. Irrespective of
The rise of political marketing has been
these important differences, what all
widely blamed for growing public
these accounts share, by definition, is
cynicism about political leaders and
the belief that public disenchantment
institutions. The central concern is that
with the political process is due, at least
the techniques of 'spin', selling and
in part, to the process of political
persuasion may have undermined the
communications.
credibility of political leaders40. If
everything in politics is designed for Of course there are counterclaims in the
popular appeal then it may become literature and the number of skeptics
harder to trust the messages or questioning the evidence media malaise
messenger. Although lacking direct has been growing in recent years.
evidence of public opinion, Bob Franklin Earlier studies by the author found that,
provides one of the clearest statements contrary to media malaise, although TV
of this thesis, decrying the 'packaging of watching was related to some signs of
politics'41. Many others have expressed apathy, attention to the news media was
concern about the 'Americanization' of associated with positive indicators of
election campaigning, in Britain, civic engagement, in the United States
Germany and Scandinavia, and the and Britain, as well as other countries44.
possible impact this may have had upon Kenneth Newton showed that reading a
public confidence in political parties42. broadsheet newspaper in Britain, and
The use of ‘negative’ or attack watching a lot of television news, was
advertising by parties and candidates associated with greater political
has also raised anxieties that this knowledge, interest, and understanding
practice may demobilize the of politics45. Christina Holtz-Bacha
electorate43. demonstrated similar patterns
associated with attention to the news
Therefore, to summarize, American and
media in Germany46, while Curtice,
European accounts differ in the reasons
Schmitt-Beck and Schrott reported
given for media malaise.
similarly positive findings in a five-nation
Structural perspectives emphasize study from elections in the early
institutional developments common to 1990s47. The most recent examination of
many post-industrial societies, such as the American NES evidence, by
economic pressures moving the news Stephen Earl Bennett and his
industry down-market, the erosion of colleagues, found that trust in politics
public service broadcasting, and the and trust in the news media went hand-
emergence of a more fragmented, multi- in-hand, with no evidence that use of the
channel television environment. news media was related to political
cynicism48.
Cultural accounts stress historical
events specific to journalism in the So far, however, counterclaims have
United States, notably the growth of a been published in scattered scholarly

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studies, and thereby drowned out by the satellite, digital and broadband
Greek chorus of popular lament for the television channels. Since the mid-
state of modern journalism. 1990s, the explosion of the Internet has
challenged the predominance of
Before we all jump on the media
television, a pattern most advanced in
malaise bandwagon, what is the solid
Scandinavia and North America.
evidence supporting this thesis? Here
we can briefly outline two sources of (Figure 2 about here)
data that throw skeptical light on some
The net result of these developments is
of the core claims, namely aggregate
greater fragmentation and diversification
indicators of the major structural trends
of formats, levels and audiences in the
affecting the news media’s political
available news outlets. The available
coverage in the post-war era, and
comparative evidence suggests five
survey evidence about the individual-
important trends, each with important
level impact of attention to the news
implications for structural claims of
media on civic engagement.
media malaise.
Part II: Trends in the News Industry:
First, overall news consumption is up.
In examining the evidence for media During the last three decades the
malaise we need to distinguish between proportion of Europeans reading a
the production, contents and effects of newspaper everyday almost doubled,
political communications (as shown in and the proportion watching television
Figure 1). While the production process news everyday rose from one half in
has undoubtedly been transformed 1970 to almost three quarters in 1999
during the last fifty years, the impact of (see Table 1). Social trends, including
this upon the contents has not been well patterns of higher literacy, affluence,
established, still less the influence upon and leisure, have probably contributed
the general public. towards these developments.
(Figure 1 about here) (Table 1 about here)
The news industry has certainly Second, the structure of the news
changed in response to major industry varies widely across OECD
technological, socio-economic and states and TV has not necessarily
political developments in the post-war displaced newspapers as an important
era. Since the 1950s, the printed press source of news in many societies. We
has seen greater concentration of often generalize based on the American
ownership and a reduction in the literature but compared with other post-
number of available independent industrial societies, the U.S. proves
outlets. At the same time, however, exceptionally low in consumption of
many media malaise accounts fear that newspapers and TV news (see Figure 3
newspaper sales have declined in and Table 2). Other countries like
postindustrial societies and this is not Sweden, Austria and Germany are far
the case. As shown in Figure 2, in the heavier users of the press while there
post-war era TV viewing surged but at are far higher users of both newspapers
the same time newspaper sales across and TV news in Finland, the
OECD countries have remained stable. Netherlands, and to a lesser extent the
During the 1980s public television, UK.
which had enjoyed a state monopoly
(Table 2 and Fig.3 about here)
throughout much of Western Europe,
faced increased competition from the Moreover news formats and outlets
proliferation of new terrestrial, cable, have diversified. In the 1960s viewers

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normally got the news from the standard expressed concern about a decline in
flagship evening news programs and long-term 'hard' news, such as coverage
current affairs programs. Today these of international affairs, public policy
have been supplemented by 24-hour issues, and parliamentary debates. In its
rolling news, on-the-hour radio place, many suggest, news has
headlines, TV magazines and talk 'dumbed down' to become 'infotainment',
shows, as well as the panoply of online focusing on human-interest stories
news sources. Access to the Internet about scandal, celebrities and sex.
has been exploding in many post- 'Tabloid' papers in Britain, the 'boulevard
industrial societies. By the late-1990s, press' in Germany, and local television
about a fifth of all Europeans, and half of news in the US, share many common
all Americans and Scandinavians, surf characteristics.
online. Getting news is one of the most
Rather than an inexorable downwards
popular uses of the Internet in the US
erosion in the standards of serious
and Europe. As a result of all these
journalism, it seems more accurate to
developments in the news environment
understand trends during the 1980s and
it has become easier to bump into the
1990s as representing a diversification
news, almost accidentally, than ever
of the marketplace in terms of levels,
before.
formats and topics. Soft news and
In part as a result, recent decades have ‘infotainment’has undoubtedly grown in
broadened the social background of the some sectors of the market, but serious
news audience, especially for the press. coverage of political events,
Tables 3 and 4 show regression models international affairs, and financial news
predicting the social background of has also steadily expanded in
regular newspaper readers and TV availability elsewhere. Endless Senate
news viewers, using Eurobarometer debates shown on C-Span coexist today
surveys in five countries in 1970 and with endless debates about sex and
1999. The results of the standardized personal relationships on the Jerry
coefficients show that readership has Springer Show. The Sun sits on the
widened in terms of education, gender same newsstands as The Economist.
and class, with no shift in the age profile News.bbc.co.uk is as easily available as
of readers. Amsterdam pornography sites.
(Tables 3 and 4 about here) Diversification does not mean that the
whole of society is being progressively
Lastly, the new information environment
‘dumbed down’ by trends in the news
has greatly expanded the opportunities
media. By focusing only on excesses in
to learn about public affairs in different
the popular end of the market, such as
channels, programs, formats and levels.
the wasteland of endless punditry on
Since the 1970s, the amount of news
American cable TV talk shows or ‘if it
and current affairs broadcast on public
bleeds it leads’ on local American TV
service television in OECD countries
news, we overlook dramatic changes
more than tripled (see Table 5). And of
such as the ability to watch live
course this does not count the
legislative debates, to witness natural
development of new commercial 24-
disasters like Mozambique floods in real
hour news services like Sky and CNN.
time, or to find online information about
(Table 5 about here) local government services. Potentially
diversification may lead to another
But have structural trends eroded
traditional standards of political danger, namely greater divisions
coverage? Many commentators have between the information haves and
have-nots. But as we have seen the

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audience for news has greatly expanded America, traditional forms of grassroots
in size and broadened socially during voter contact have been maintained, for
the last quarter-century, not narrowed. example in New Hampshire, alongside
newer forms of campaign
The evidence for other assumed long-
communications like web sites.
term changes in the news culture
remains limited we need more Rather than decrying the ‘black arts of
systematic data to establish whether, for spin doctors’, the professionalization of
example, there actually has been a political communications can be
growth in negative coverage of regarded as an extension of the
politicians during election campaigns, or democratic process if these techniques
whether a more adversarial relationship bind parties more closely with the
has developed between journalists and concerns of the electorate. The key
governments. The available studies, issue is less the increased deployment
however, strongly suggest that of marketing techniques per se, which is
developments in political coverage not in dispute, than their effects upon
observed in particular countries are politicians and voters, which is52.
often highly particularistic and
III: The Impact on Civic Engagement
contextual, rather than representing
trends common across post-industrial This brings us to the issue at the heart
societies49. For example, the most of the debate: whether there is solid
comprehensive comparison of news evidence that changes in political
cultures in twenty-one countries, based communications have contributed
on surveys of journalists, found almost towards civic disengagement. Theories
no consensus about professional roles, of media malaise argue that exposure to
ethnical values and journalistic norms50. the news media discourages learning
Rather than the emergence of a single about politics, erodes trust in political
prevalent model of journalism, based on leaders and government institutions,
American norms, this suggests and dampens political mobilization. The
considerable diversity worldwide. net result, it is argued by proponents,
has been a decline in active democratic
In the same way, without being able to
citizenship.
discuss this in detail in this paper, there
is little doubt that political campaigns Extensive evidence cannot be
have been transformed by the presented within the space of a brief
diversification in the news industry and paper, but other work by the author
also by the widespread adoption of (Norris 2000) demonstrates that there is
political marketing techniques. Countries extensive evidence from a battery of
have not simply imported American surveys in Europe and the United
campaigning practices lock, stock and States, as well as experiments in Britain,
barrel but politicians in states like Israel, that cast strong doubt upon these
Argentina and Britain seem to be paying claims.
more attention to formal feedback The results of the analysis show that,
mechanisms like polls and focus groups, contrary to the media malaise
with an expanding role for campaign hypothesis, use of the news media is
professionals from marketing and public
positively associated with a wide range
relations. Comparative surveys have of indicators of political knowledge, trust,
found that in a ‘shopping’model, parties and mobilization.
adopt whatever techniques seem well
suited for their particular environment, People who watch more TV news, read
supplementing but not discarding older more newspapers, surf the net, and pay
forms of electioneering51. Even in attention to campaigns, are consistently

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more knowledgeable, trusting of IV: Conclusions: A Virtuous Circle?

government, and participatory.
Why should we find a positive link
This relationship remains significant between civic engagement and attention
even after introducing a battery of to the news media? There are three
controls in multivariate regression possible answers, which cannot be
models. For example, Table 6 shows resolved here.
the model predicting campaign activism
One interpretation is selection effects. In
in the US, based on the 1998 NES. The
this explanation, those who are most
results confirm that attention to
predisposed to participate politically (for
newspapers, network TV news, and
whatever reason) could well be more
campaign news on the Internet is
interested in keeping up with current
significantly associated with campaign
affairs in the news, so the direction of
activism even after controlling for social
causation could be one-way, from prior
background. Similar positive
attitudes to use of the news media. This
relationships are evident in Europe and
view is consistent with the ‘uses and
the US using multiple indicators of civic
gratification’ literature, which suggests
knowledge and political trust (for full
that mass media habits reflect prior
details see Norris 2000).
predispositions in the audience: people
(Table 6 about here) who love football turn to the sports
results, people who invest in Wall Street
Far from a case of ‘American
check the business pages, and people
exceptionalism’, this pattern is found in
interested in politics read editorials
Europe and the United States.
about government and public policy53.
Repeated tests using different datasets,
But if we assume a purely one-way
in different countries, across different
selection effect, this implies that despite
time-periods during the last half-century,
repeatedly turning to the news about
confirm this positive relationship, even
public affairs, we learn nothing whatever
after controlling for factors that
from the process, a proposition that
characterize the news audience like
seems inherently implausible.
their education and prior political
interest. Another answer could be media effects.
In this explanation, the process of
The evidence strongly suggests that the
watching or reading about public affairs
public is not simply passively
(for whatever reason) can be expected
responding to political communications
to increase our interest in, and
being presented to them, in a naive
knowledge about, government and
‘stimulus-response’model, instead they
politics, thereby facilitating political
are critically and actively sifting,
participation. The more we watch or
discarding and interpreting the available
read, in this interpretation, the more we
information. A more educated and
learn. News habits can be caused by
literate public is capable of using the
many factors such as leisure patterns
more complex range of news sources
and broadcasting schedules: people
and party messages to find the
may catch the news because it comes
information they need to make practical
on after a popular sit-com, or because
political choices. The survey evidence
radio stations air headline news
shows that news exposure was not
between music clips, or because the
associated with civic disengagement in
household subscribes to home delivery
America and Europe.
of a newspaper. In this view, the
direction of causality would again be
one-way, but in this case running from

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prior news habits to our subsequent theories of media malaise, but it does
political attitudes. provide a plausible and coherent
interpretation of the different pieces of
Both these views could logically make
the puzzle found in this study.
sense of the associations we establish.
One or the other could be true. It is not Claims of media malaise are
possible for us, any more than for methodologically flawed so that they are
others, to resolve the direction of at best unproven, to use the Scottish
causality from cross-sectional polls of verdict, or at worse false. As a result too
public opinion taken at one point in time. often we are ‘blaming the messenger’
for more deep-rooted ills of the body
But it seems more plausible and
politic. This matters, not just because
convincing to assume a two way-
we need to understand the real causes
interactive process or a virtuous circle.
of civic disengagement to advance our
In the long-term through repeated
knowledge, but also because the correct
exposure, like the socialization process
diagnosis has serious implications for
in the family or workplace, there may
public policy choices. This is especially
well be a ‘virtuous circle’ where the
important in newer democracies
news media and party campaigns serve
struggling to institutionalize a free press
to activate the active. Those most
in the transition from authoritarian rule.
interested and knowledgeable pay most
‘Blaming the messenger’ can prove a
attention to political news. Learning
deeply conservative strategy, blocking
more about public affairs (the policy
effective institutional reforms, especially
stances of the candidates and parties,
in cultures that idealize protection of the
the record of the government, the
press from public regulation.
severity of social and economic
problems facing the nation) reduces the This paper does not seek to claim that
barriers to further civic engagement. In all is for the best in the best of all
this interpretation, the ratchet of possible political worlds. If not ‘broken’,
reinforcement thereby moves in a there are many deep-rooted flaws
direction that is healthy for democratic embedded in the core institutions of
participation. representative democracy; we are not
seeking to present a Panglossian view.
In contrast, the news media has far less
The important point for this argument is
power to reinforce the disengagement of
that many failings have deep-seated
the disengaged, because, given the
structural causes, whether the flood of
easy availability of the multiple
dollars and lack of viable third parties in
alternatives now available, and minimal
American elections, the wasteland of
political interest, when presented with
corruption and malfeasance in Russia,
news about politics and current affairs
or the lack of transparency and
this group is habitually more likely to
accountability in Brussels. If we stopped
turn over, turn off, or surf to another web
blaming the news media’s coverage of
page. If the disengaged do catch the
politics, and directed attention to the
news, they are likely to pay little
problems themselves, perhaps effective
attention. And if they do pay attention,
remedies would be more forthcoming.
they are more likely to mistrust media
sources of information. Repeatedly
tuning out political messages inoculates
against their potential impact. This
theory cannot be proved conclusively
from the available cross-sectional
survey evidence, any more than can

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Figure 1

Political
Social, Learning
Party Newspapers
Economic Messages TV News Political Trust
and Political Internet
Conditions Political
Mobilization

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Figure 2

Trends in Newspapers and Television:

1950s to mid-1990s

600

500
481
419
400
Number

334
300 294 295 290
271 262 263
200 187
153 160 149 149 136 130
100
58
0 8
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1996
Source: UNESCO

N. of Newspapers Circulation of Newspapers per 1000 N. of TVs per 1000

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Figure 3

News Use, EU15+US 1999

80
High News Users
Finl
70
Ger
Neth
60 Swe
Den
Austria
% Read Paper Everyday

Lux
UK
50
Ire

40
US
Belg Italy
30 Fr
Spain

20 Port Gre

10 Low News Users

0
50 60 70 80 90

% Watch TV News Everyday

13
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Table 1: The Growth in the Size of the News Audience, EU-5

% Everyday 1970 1999 Difference

Read newspaper 27 45 +18
Watch TV News 49 72 +23
Listen to radio news 44 46 +2
Note: For consistent comparison over time media use is compared only in Belgium,
France, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany. Media use in all EU-15 member states in
1999 was about 5-8 percentage points higher than these figures.
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1970, 1999.

Table 2: Variations in Regular Sources of News, Europe & the US, 1999

Country Regular Regular TV Regular Radio Online Users

Newspaper (% News News (% (% With
‘read (% Watch Listen access)
everyday’) ‘everyday) ‘everyday’)
Austria 54 63 67 11
Belgium 30 66 42 11
Denmark 56 76 65 44
Finland 69 82 49 39
France 26 58 37 9
Germany 63 68 56 8
Greece 17 80 19 7
Ireland 44 66 64 14
Italy 29 82 23 14
Luxembourg 53 71 60 22
Netherlands 61 76 56 32
Portugal 16 62 27 5
Spain 27 70 32 8
Sweden 58 63 47 61
UK 49 71 45 22
US 34 53 29 49
Northern Europe 60 71 57 48
Western Europe 48 70 52 17
Southern Europe 22 74 25 9
EU15 45 71 47 20
Notes: Regular newspaper readers: Reads the news in daily papers ‘everyday’. Regular
television news: Watches the news on television ‘everyday’. Regular radio news: Listens
to the news on the radio ‘everyday’.Northern Europe: Denmark, Finland and Sweden
Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, and UK Southern Europe: Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
Sources: EuroBarometer 51.0 Spring 1999; American National Election Study, 1998.

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Table 3: Models Predicting Readership of Newspapers in 1970, 1980 and 1999, EU5

Predictors of Sig. Predictors of Sig. Predictors of Sig.

Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper
Readership Readership Readership
1970 1980 1999
DEMOGRAPHICS
Education .16 ** .16 ** .04 *
Gender: Male .25 ** .15 ** .08 **
Age (years) .16 ** .13 ** .15 **
Left-Right Ideology -.04 ** -.04 ** .01
SES .08 ** .04 ** .08 **
Household Income .09 ** .10 ** .12 **
Urbanization .02 .10 ** .01
USE OF NEWS
TV News Use .11 ** .19 ** .18 **
Radio News Use .15 ** .12 ** .16 **
NATION
Belgium -.17 ** -.07 ** -.21 **
France -.12 ** -.25 ** -.23 **
Italy -.14 ** -.27 -.16 **
Netherlands -.01 ** -.01 ** -.05 *
Constant .56 .63 .74
R2 .22 .24 .25
N. 8567 6521 6218

Notes: The table reports the standardized beta coefficients predicting frequency of
reading newspapers based on ordinary least squared regression models. The
dependent variables are the 5 point scales measuring frequency of use of newspaper
and television news, where 5 = ‘everyday use’and 1 = ‘never use’. Sig. P. **>.01 *>.05
The German dummy variable is excluded as a predictor in these models.
Education: Age finished full-time education
L-R Ideology Scale: Coded from left (1) to right (10)
SES: Manual (0) or Non-Manual HoH
Urbanization: Rural (1), Small town (2), Large Town/City (3)
TV News and Radio News: Frequency of use on 5-point scales
Sources: European Community Study 1970; EuroBarometer 13.0 April 1980 weighted
for EU6; EuroBarometer 50.1 Mar-Apr 1999 weighted for EU6.

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Table 4: Models Predicting TV News Viewership in 1970, 1980 and 1999, EU5
Predictors Sig. Predictors Sig. Predictors of Sig.
of TV News of TV News TV News
Viewership Viewership Viewership
1970 1980 1999
DEMOGRAPHICS
Education -.07 ** -.03 ** -.03
Gender .04 ** .01 * .00
Age .16 ** .09 ** .14 **
Left-Right Ideology -.01 .05 ** .04 *
SES .01 -.05 ** .01
Household Income .08 ** .01 ** .01
USE OF MEDIA
Newspaper Use .13 ** .21 ** .21 **
Radio News Use .01 .16 ** .08 **
NATION
Belgium -.13 ** -.02 * .01
France -.11 ** -.06 ** -.04 *
Italy -.18 ** .15 ** .12 **
Netherlands .01 -.03 * .05 *
Constant 3.3 3.25 3.65
R2 .08 .12 .11
N. 8567 8827 6218

Notes: The table reports the standardized beta coefficients predicting frequency of
reading newspapers based on ordinary least squared regression models. The
dependent variables are the 5 point scales measuring frequency of use of newspaper
and television news, where 5 = ‘everyday use’and 1 = ‘never use’. Sig. P. **>.01 *>.05
The German dummy variable is excluded as a predictor in these models. For details of
coding see Table 3.
Source: European Community Study 1970; EuroBarometer 13.0 April 1980 weighted for
EU6; EuroBarometer 50.1 Apr-Mar 1999 weighted for EU6.

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Table 5 The Expansion in the News Broadcast on Public TV, 1971-96

Country Change in the Number of Change in the Number of

Hours of News and Current Hours of Entertainment
Affairs Broadcasting 1971-96 Broadcasting 1971-96
Australia +931 +42
Austria +2489 +5105
Belgium -507 +2321
Czech Rep +2648 +5848
Denmark +21 +1391
Finland +1051 +2474
France -464 +6448
Greece +2709 +5324
Hungary +3412 +2296
Ireland +592 +4655
Italy +7300 +12945
Korea, S. +2751 +5195
Netherlands +963 +2243
Norway -115 +1342
Poland +4195 +3698
Portugal +2634 +12051
Spain -238 +2469
Sweden -1069 +992
Switzerland +4251 +8315
Turkey +7259 +14699
EU15 +1290 +4868
OECD Total +2041 +4992
Note: For the full range of categories see Norris (2000)
Source: Calculated from UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks (Paris, UNESCO) 1971-1998.

17
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Table 6: Predictors of Campaign Activism, US 1998

Campaign Sig Campaign Sig
Activism Activism (ii)
(i)

STRUCTURAL
Education .13 ** .04
Gender: Male .09 ** .04
Age .08 * .03
Household Income .08 * .15 **
ATTITUDINAL
Political discussion .12 ** .11 **
Lib-Con Ideology .01 .06
USE OF NEWS MEDIA
Media News Use .13 **
Newspaper .08 *
National TV News .11 *
Local TV News -.01
Radio News .05
Net Campaign News .12 *
Constant -.82 -1.01
R2 .10 .08
Notes: Columns report the standardized beta coefficients predicting campaign activism
based on ordinary least squared regression models. The participation variable is the 6-
point scale measuring attending a candidate meeting, working for a candidate or party,
donating money to a candidate or party, displaying a campaign button, and talking to
others for or against a candidate. Use of news sources are measured using 7 point
scales. The overall Media Use index is a 29-point scale based on use of TV news +
paper + radio news Sig. P. **>.01 *>.05 For other details see Norris (2000) Table 13.5.
Source: American NES 1998 N.1,281

18
* It should be noted that this paper is drawn from a new book Pippa Norris A Virtuous Circle: Political
Communications in Post-Industrial Democracies forthcoming with Cambridge University Press, NY, Fall
2000. Full details about the book can be found at www.pippanorris.com.
1
See Pippa Norris. 1999. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford
University Press; Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Eds. 2000. Disaffected Democrats: What's
Troubling the Trilateral Countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2
Joseph Nye, Jr, Philip Zelikow and David King. 1997. Why People Don't Trust Government. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press; Everett Carll Ladd and Karlyn H. Bowman. 1998. What's Wrong? A Survey
of American Satisfaction and Complaint. Washington, DC: AEI Press; Robert D. Putnam. 2000. Bowling
Alone. New York: Simon & Schuster.
3
Jack Hayward. 1995. The Crisis of Representation in Europe. London: Frank Cass; Svein S. Andersen
and Kjell A. Eliassen. 1996. The European Union: How Democratic is It? London: Sage.
4
See Pippa Norris, ed. Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
5
This study focuses on the effects of news journalism and therefore excludes sociological theories that
are concerned primarily with the impact of watching television entertainment on matters like social trust,
community engagement and voluntary activism. For a discussion see Robert Putnam. 1995. 'Tuning In,
Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America'. PS: Political Science and Politics.
28(December): 664-83.
6
James Curran and Jean Seaton. 1991. Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in
Britain. London: Routledge.
7
See Shearon A. Lowery and Melvin L. DeFleur. 1995. Milestones in Mass Communication Research.
New York: Longman.
8
Steven Starker. 1991. Evil Empires: Crusading Against the Mass Media. London: Transaction.
9
Kurt Lang and Gladys Lang. 1966. 'The Mass Media and Voting'. In Reader in Public Opinion and
Communication edited by Bernard Berelson and M. Janowitz. New York: Free Press. According to the
Langs: “Television’s style in chronicling political events can affect the fundamental orientation of the voter
towards his government… The media, we contend, can stir up in individuals defensive reactions by their
emphasis on crisis and conflict in lieu of clarifying normal decision-making processes.”
10
Michael Robinson. 1976. 'Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "the
Selling of the President".' American Political Science Review. 70(3): 409-32 P.425.
11
Michael J. Robinson and Margaret A. Sheehan. 1983. Over the Wire and on TV: CBS and UPI in
Campaign ’80. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
12
Lee Becker, Idowu A. Sobowale and William Casey, Jr. 1979. 'Newspaper and Television
Dependencies: Effects on Evaluations of Public Officials.' Journal of Broadcasting. 23(4): 465-75; Lee
Becker, and D. Charles Whitney. 1980. 'Effects of Media Dependencies: Audience Assessment of
Government.' Communication Research. 7(1):95-120; Jack McLeod, Jane D. Brown, Lee B. Becker, and
Dean A. Ziemke. 1977. ‘Decline and fall at the White House: A Longitudinal Analysis of Communication
Effects.’ Communication Research. 4:3-22; Arthur Miller, Edie H. Goldenberg, and Lutz Erbring. 1979.
‘Set-type Politics: The Impact of Newspapers on Public Confidence.’American Political Science Review.
73: 67-84.
13
Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuki. 1975. The Crisis of Democracy. New York:
New York University Press.
14
Robert Entman. 1989. Democracy without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
15
Neil Postman. 1985. Entertaining Ourselves to Death. New York: Viking.
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16
Roderick Hart. 1994. Seducing America. New York: Oxford University Press; Roderick Hart. 1996.
‘Easy Citizenship: Television’s Curious Legacy’. In The Media and Politics, edited by Kathleen Hall
Jamieson. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Volume 546.
17
Neil Gabler. 1998. Life the Movie. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
18
Larry Sabato. 1988. Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism has Transformed American Politics. New
York: Free Press.
19
Thomas E. Patterson. 1993. Out of Order. New York: Vintage; Thomas E. Patterson. 1996. ‘Bad News,
Bad Governance’. In The Media and Politics, edited by Kathleen Hall Jamieson. The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science. Volume 546.
20
Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen H. Jamieson. 1996. ‘News Frames, Political Cynicism and Media
Cynicism’. In The Media and Politics, edited by Kathleen Hall Jamieson. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science. Volume 546; Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen H. Jamieson.
1997. Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good. New York: Oxford University Press.
21
Kenneth Dautrich and Thomas H. Hartley. How the News Media Fail American Voters: Causes,
Consequences and Remedies. New York: Columbia University Press.
22
James Fallows. 1996. Breaking the News. New York: Pantheon Books.
23
Michael Schudson. 1995. The Power of News. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
24
William A. Hachten. 1998. The Troubles of Journalism. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
25
William F. Baker and George Dessart. 1998. Down the Tube. New York: Basic Books.
26
Striking the Balance: Audience Interests, Business Pressures and Journalists’ Values. 1999.
Washington, DC: The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.
27
Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel. 1999. Warp Speed. NY: The Century Foundation Press.
28
Jay G. Blumler and Michael Gurevitch. 1995. The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Longman.
See also Jay Blumler. 1990. ‘Elections, the Media and the Modern Publicity Process’. In Public
Communication: The New Imperatives edited by M. Ferguson. London: Sage; Jay G. Blumler. 1997.
‘Origins of the Crisis of Communication for Citizenship'. Political Communication, 14(4): 395-404.
29
Y. Achille and J. I. Bueno. 1994. Les televisions publiques en quete d’avenir. Grenoble: Presses
Universitaires de Grenoble.
30
Jurgen Habermas. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action. London: Heinemann; Jurgen
Habermas. 1998. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Peter
Dahlgren and Colin Sparks. 1995. Communication and Citizenship. London: Routledge; Peter Dahlgren.
1995. Television and the Public Sphere. London: Sage; Tony Weymouth and Bernard Lamizet. 1996.
Markets and Myths: Forces for Change in European Media. London: Longman.
31
Winfried Schulz. 1997. ‘Changes of Mass Media and the Public Sphere’. Javost - The Public. 4(2): 57-
90; Winfried Schulz. 1998. ‘Media Change and the Political Effects of Television: Americanization of the
Political Culture?’Communications 23(4):527-543.
32
Max Kaase. 2000. ‘Germany’. In Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective, Eds. Richard
Gunther and Anthony Mughan. New York: Cambridge University Press.
33
Neil Gabler. 1998. Life the Movie. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. P.61.
34
James Lull and Stephen Hinerman. 1997. Media Scandals. Oxford: Polity Press.
35
Diane Owen and Richard Davis. 1998. New Media and American Politics. New York: Oxford University
Press. P.185.
36
Graham Murdock and Peter Golding. 1989. ‘Information Poverty and Political Inequality: Citizenship in
the Age of Privatised Communications.’Journal of Communication. 39: 180-193.

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Kevin A. Hill and John E. Hughes.1998. Cyberpolitics. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. P.44.
38
David Swanson and Paolo Mancini. 1996. Politics, Media and Modern Democracy. New York: Praeger;
David Butler and Austin Ranney. 1992. Electioneering. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Shaun Bowler and
David Farrell. 1992. Electoral Strategies and Political Marketing. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
39
For a study of this process in Britain see Pippa Norris, John Curtice, David Sanders, Margaret
Scammell and Holli A. Semetko. 1999. On Message: Communicating the Campaign. London: Sage;
Pippa Norris. 1997. ‘Political Communications.’ In Developments in British Politics 5 edited by Patrick
Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele. Basingtoke: Macmillan.
40
See, for example, Nicholas Jones. 1995. Soundbites and Spin Doctors. London: Cassell; Martin
Rosenbaum. 1997. From Soapbox to Soundbite: Party Political Campaigning since 1945. London:
Macmillan.
41
Bob Franklin. 1994. Packaging Politics. London: Edward Arnold.
42
Barbara Pfetsch. 1996. ‘Convergence through privatization? Changing Media Environments and
Televised politics in Germany.’European Journal of Communication. 8(3): 425-50; Karen Siune. 1998. ‘Is
Broadcasting Policy Becoming Redundant?’In The Media in Question edited by K. Brants, J. Hermes and
Lizbet van Zoonen. London: Sage; Ralph Negrine and Stylianos Papathanassoloulos. 1996. ‘The
“Americanization of Political Communication: A Critique.’ The Harvard International Journal of
Press/Politics. 1(2): 45-62.
43
Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar. 1995. Going Negative: How Political Advertisments Shrink
and Polarize the Electorate. New York: Free Press; Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha. 1995.
Political Advertising in Western Democracies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Kathleen H. Jamieson. 1992.
Dirty Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Kathleen H. Jamieson. 1984. Packaging the Presidency: A
History and Criticism of Presidential Advertising. New York: Oxford University Press; Karen S. Johnson-
Cartee and Gary A. Copeland. 1991. Negative Political Advertising: Coming of Age. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
44
Pippa Norris. 1996. 'Does Television Erode Social Capital? A Reply to Putnam.' P.S.: Political Science
and Politics XXIX(3); Pippa Norris. 1997. Electoral Change since 1945. Oxford: Blackwell; Pippa Norris.
2000. 'Television and Civic Malaise.' In What's Troubling the Trilateral Democracies, eds. Susan J. Pharr
and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Pippa Norris, John Curtice, David
Sanders, Margaret Scammell and Holli Semetko. 1999. On Message. London: Sage.
45
Kenneth Newton. 1997. 'Politics and the News Media: Mobilisation or Videomalaise?' In British Social
Attitudes: the 14th Report, 1997/8, eds. Roger Jowell, John Curtice, Alison Park, Katarina Thomson and
Lindsay Brook. Aldershot: Ashgate; Kenneth Newton. 1999. ‘Mass Media Effects: Mobilization or Media
Malaise?’British Journal of Political Science. 29: 577-599.
46
Christina Holtz-Bacha. 1990. ‘Videomalaise Revisited: Media Exposure and Political Alienation in West
Germany.’European Journal of Communication. 5: 73-85.
47
John Curtice, Rudiger Schmitt-Beck and Peter Schrott. 1998. ‘Do the Media Matter?’Paper presented
at the Annual Meeting of the Mid-West Political Science Association, Chicago. The study found that those
most attentive to TV news or newspapers proved more likely to be politically interested and engaged in
Britain, Germany, Japan Spain and the US.
48
See Stephen Earl Bennett, Staci L. Rhine, Richard S. Flickinger and Linda L.M. Bennett. 1999.
‘Videomalaise Revisited: Reconsidering the relation between the public’s view of the media and trust in
government.’The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 4(4): 8-23.
49
See, for example, Frank Esser. ‘Tabloidization of News: A Comparative Analysis of Anglo-American
and German Press Journalism.’European Journal of Communication. 14(3): 291-324.
50
The surveys of journalists found no consensus about the relative importance of providing analytical
coverage, acting as government watchdogs, serving public entertainment, and reporting accurately or
objectively. For example, the proportion of journalists who thought that their role as watchdog of

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government was ‘very’or ‘extremely’important ranged from 33% in Germany, and 67% in the US, to 88%
in Britain. See David H. Weaver. 1998. The Global Journalist: News People Around the World. Cresskill,
NJ: Hampton Press. Pp.466-7.
51
Fritz Plassner, Christian Scheucher and Christian Senft. 1999. ‘Is There a European Style of Political
Marketing?’ In The Handbook of Political Marketing, edited by Bruce I. Newman. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
52
For a fuller discussion see Pippa Norris, John Curtice, David Sanders, Margaret Scammell and Holli
Semetko. 1999. On Message. London: Sage.
53
Jay G. Blumler and Elihu Katz. Eds. 1974. The Uses of Mass Communications: Current Perspectives
on Gratifications Research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

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