Beyond the Election: Overcoming

Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock

Asia Report N°336 | 4 January 2024

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary................................................................................................................... i

I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1

II. Economic Growth, Democratic Decline ........................................................................... 3

A. Establishing a Hold on Power.................................................................................... 3
B. A Secular Strategy? .................................................................................................... 5
C. Crackdowns ................................................................................................................ 7

III. New Challenges ................................................................................................................ 9

A. Economic Crisis ......................................................................................................... 9
B. U.S. Policy Shift ......................................................................................................... 13
C. A Rejuvenated Opposition ......................................................................................... 16

IV. Election Stalemate and Political Showdown .................................................................... 19

A. Opposition Mobilisation and State Responses .......................................................... 19
B. The 28 October “Grand Rally” and Its Aftermath ..................................................... 21
C. Stacking the Field of Candidates ............................................................................... 22

V. Avoiding Bloodshed.......................................................................................................... 26
A. The Risks of a Flawed Election .................................................................................. 26
B. Handling the Poll’s Aftermath ................................................................................... 28
C. International Support ................................................................................................ 30

VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 32

APPENDICES
A. Map of Bangladesh ........................................................................................................... 33
B. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 34
C. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Asia since 2021 .................................................. 35
D. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 37
 Principal Findings
What’s new? The ruling Awami League and opposition Bangladesh National-
ist Party are locked in a struggle over the 7 January general election. Amid
growing discontent at its authoritarianism and economic mismanagement, the
government’s crackdown on mostly peaceful protests and arrest of senior oppo-
sition leaders has inflamed tensions and prompted an opposition boycott.

Why did it happen? Since coming to office in 2009, Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina has worked ruthlessly to maintain her party’s grip on power, overseeing
flawed elections in 2014 and 2018. But an economic crisis, shifting foreign rela-
tions and a reinvigorated opposition have made it harder for the Awami League
to hold another one-sided poll.

Why does it matter? The opposition’s boycott means that voter turnout is
likely to be low. With few credible alternatives at the ballot box, discontented
Bangladeshis are taking to the streets, and the risk of political violence remains
high. Disturbances could also erupt between competing factions within the
Awami League.

What should be done? While it is now too late to delay the January election,
the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party should work after the
vote to de-escalate the country’s political tensions, including through conces-
sions by both sides. Foreign partners should encourage them toward this goal.
International Crisis Group
Asia Report N°336 4 January 2024

Executive Summary
Bangladesh’s Awami League (AL) government and the opposition Bangladesh Nation-
alist Party (BNP) have been locked in a deadly stalemate in the lead-up to a general
election scheduled for 7 January. Against a backdrop of growing discontent with the
incumbent government, the BNP and its allies have announced they will boycott the
vote, after the government resisted their calls for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to
resign and hand power to a caretaker administration to oversee the polls. Instead,
Hasina has used her control of levers of state power – the police, judiciary and civil
service – to undermine opposition attempts to force her from office. Following a ma-
jor rally in Dhaka on 28 October 2023 that descended into violence, the government
detained most senior opposition officials and seems intent on crushing the BNP.
After polls in 2014 and 2018 that lacked credibility, another flawed vote would ratchet
up Bangladesh’s political tensions. While it is now too late to postpone the poll, the
government and opposition should open talks after the vote aimed at resolving the
crisis and preventing further turmoil.
Since coming to office in 2009, Hasina’s AL government has defied its adver-
saries to become Bangladesh’s longest-serving administration, outlasting even the
military regimes of the 1980s. She built her success on personal popularity, in part
due to her legacy as the daughter of the country’s founding father, Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman, and a strong party machinery. Her government has also delivered more
than a decade of robust economic growth, improved health and education outcomes,
and undertaken vital infrastructure projects. On her watch, the security forces large-
ly neutralised jihadist groups that emerged in the 2000s. Foreign support, including
from traditional ally India but also from the U. S. – which considered the AL an im-
portant partner in the “war on terror” and welcomed its decision to accept approxi-
mately 750,000 Rohingya refugees fleeing repression in Myanmar in 2017 – also
helped sustain Hasina’s government.
But the AL’s determination to hold on to power at any cost has corroded democ-
racy in Bangladesh. Over the last decade, Hasina has established a firm grip on the
country’s key institutions, including the bureaucracy, judiciary, security agencies
and electoral authorities, filling them with loyalists. Her government has also perse-
cuted opposition activists, civil society figures and journalists. The security forces
have been implicated in hundreds of forced disappearances and thousands of extra-
judicial killings; many more activists have found themselves tied up in endless court
cases, including under draconian new laws.
Just as important to Hasina’s long rule have been amendments to the constitu-
tion in 2011 that removed provisions requiring that elected party governments stand
aside for a caretaker administration in the run-up to polls. Due to these amendments,
the opposition boycotted the 2014 election, and when it participated in the 2018 vote
it faced a sustained crackdown from the authorities. Amid widespread allegations of
ballot box stuffing, the AL and its allies won 96 per cent of seats. The vote thus con-
solidated the role of parliament, already dominated by the AL after the 2014 opposi-
tion boycott, as a rubber stamp for Hasina’s executive dispatch.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page ii

Since the last election, discontent has been growing, both at home and abroad.
Many Bangladeshis complain that they have not been able to vote in a credible elec-
tion for fifteen years. They are demanding that their voices be heard. Even more
damaging for the government, the gloss has come off the economy; since mid-2022,
it has been grappling with a foreign exchange shortage and high inflation, leaving
many low-income workers struggling to make ends meet. Although caused partly by
external factors, these economic troubles have been exacerbated by corruption and
mismanagement, particularly the adoption of a fixed exchange rate. In Washington,
meanwhile, the Biden administration has enacted sanctions against members of the
Bangladeshi security forces implicated in human rights abuses and threatened to
block visas for officials deemed to be undermining credible elections, as well as their
family members.
These U.S. moves have galvanised the opposition, which since mid-2022 has staged
numerous large demonstrations in Dhaka and other cities – the first in around a
decade. Despite government efforts to thwart them, major rallies in December 2022,
July 2023 and October 2023 attracted hundreds of thousands of supporters. The lat-
est of these gatherings, on 28 October 2023, ended prematurely when police dis-
persed the crowds with tear gas and stun grenades following sporadic clashes. Amid
the street battles, BNP supporters allegedly killed a police officer; the government
responded by arresting most of the party’s senior members and remanding them in
prison.
These events have only intensified antagonism between the two sides. Hasina has
ruled out dialogue with the opposition, while the BNP and its allies have announced
hartals (strikes) and blockades to disrupt the economy and force the government to
accede to their electoral demands. The AL has also sought to split the BNP by luring
senior members to defect, without much success. Instead, the main opposition force
is trying to build a broader anti-government coalition, including parties that it has
not traditionally cooperated with.
Bangladesh is at a critical juncture. The once vibrant, if imperfect democracy will
soon hold a third election without a credible alternative to the incumbent govern-
ment. Hasina’s determination to hold the election on her terms will increase the risk
of violence, both before and after the polls. Given the level of domestic opposition
it is facing, alongside economic and geopolitical headwinds, the AL has reasons to
seek a compromise. While Hasina’s party may hold on to power in the short term,
the opposition is likely to persist with its actions, and political and economic pres-
sures could mount on the AL, with potentially violent repercussions. The two parties
should engage in dialogue to chart a way out of the stalemate. Negotiations to rebuild
relations between the main political forces and put Bangladesh back on to the path
of democracy, peace and stability will require concessions from both sides. The
country’s foreign partners, particularly the U.S. and India, should actively encourage
them in that direction.
Dhaka/Brussels, 4 January 2024
International Crisis Group
Asia Report N°336 4 January 2024

Beyond the Election: Overcoming

Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock

I. Introduction

For most of the time since Bangladesh became independent in 1971, the country’s
politics has been defined by two parties and two families: the Bangladesh Awami
League (AL), synonymous with independence leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and
today headed by his daughter, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina; and the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP), established in 1978 by military ruler Ziaur Rahman and now
led by his wife Khaleda Zia. The BNP won the first election after military rule ended
in 1990, and the two parties took turns in government for the next fifteen years. A
non-partisan caretaker government oversaw each national vote, an arrangement
made formal by a 1996 amendment to the constitution.1
Although power changed hands at each election, political turmoil was common-
place. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, both parties resorted to street protests while
in opposition to pressure the incumbent government to accept its demands regard-
ing the next ballot. Ahead of the 2006 vote, the AL opposition accused the unpopular
BNP administration of trying to manipulate the caretaker system. It launched violent
demonstrations and eventually boycotted the polls. Under pressure from the army to
restore order, the caretaker government declared a state of emergency, in what was,
in effect, a coup. After arresting both Hasina and Zia on corruption charges, with the
aim of barring them from politics, the military-backed interim administration even-
tually allowed them to lead their respective parties in December 2008 polls, which
the AL won handily.2
Hasina has since defied Bangladesh’s anti-incumbency impulse through a combi-
nation of canny coalition building, ruthless suppression of adversaries, miscalcula-
tions by the opposition, and strong domestic and international support. Crucially, in
June 2011 she used her party’s super-majority in parliament to pass an amendment
removing the caretaker government provision from the constitution, giving her gov-
ernment great influence over the way subsequent polls were conducted.3 Hasina has
also worked assiduously to cement control of the levers of power, particularly the
judiciary, security forces and bureaucracy, which play important roles in elections.4
The army, which as an autonomous institution has sometimes been a threat to elected

1
For background, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°264, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis,
9 February 2015.
2
Ibid.
3
Although the Supreme Court had a month earlier ruled the 1996 caretaker government clause un-
constitutional, the AL ignored its recommendation – or instruction, according to some – that the
system be retained for the next two elections. “Misinterpretation of court order on caretaker gov-
ernment”, Prothom Alo, 27 August 2023.
4
Crisis Group interviews, June and October 2023. For a closer examination of political influence on
the judiciary and law enforcement agencies, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°277, Political Conflict,
Extremism and Criminal Justice in Bangladesh, 11 April 2016.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 2

governments, has been largely restrained by state largesse. These moves have helped
Hasina navigate two highly flawed elections, in 2014 and 2018.
Ahead of the 7 January election, Bangladesh is a highly polarised nation. Both ma-
jor parties maintain loyal supporter bases as they push competing narratives about
the country’s past, present and future. Both also bear responsibility for the current
crisis. Many of the allegations that the BNP levels against the AL – of attempting
to manipulate the electoral process, of suppressing civil society and the media, of
engaging in corruption and economic mismanagement, and of using the pillars of
state to hold on to power – could equally be applied to the BNP when it was in office.
Similarly, the BNP is using tactics that the AL deployed while in opposition to force
the government to hold a fair election.
This report looks back at the AL’s legacy of the past fifteen years and examines
why it has faced a much more difficult task in ensuring re-election this time around,
despite having nearly all the organs of state at its disposal. It is based on research in
Bangladesh in June and October 2023, including interviews with officials from the
AL and BNP, civil servants, journalists, civil society leaders, UN officials and diplo-
mats, and independent experts. Less than a quarter of interviewees were women,
reflecting the fact that in Bangladesh men still dominate politics, most parts of gov-
ernment, civil society, the media and academia.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 3

II. Economic Growth, Democratic Decline

Over the past fifteen years, the Awami League has dramatically reshaped Bangladesh,
presiding over one of the fastest-growing economies in the world and lifting millions
of people out of poverty.5 It has also – for the time being, at least – contained the
threat of jihadism, while advancing policies aimed at building a more secular country.6
These achievements have come, however, at the cost of growing authoritarianism,
ranging from silencing of dissent to extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances
by state agencies.

A. Establishing a Hold on Power

The 2014 election was a watershed in Bangladesh, breaking the tradition of a trans-
fer of power every five years and severely damaging the BNP’s strength. The AL won
re-election before a single vote was cast, as the BNP boycotted the poll to protest the
removal of the caretaker government provision. Instead, it tried to disrupt the vote
through violence, leaving AL and allied candidates to run unopposed in more than
half the country’s constituencies.7 The vote ended up being the bloodiest in Bangla-
desh’s history.8 On one side, the opposition resorted to hartals (strikes), protests
and traffic blockades, as well as attacks on AL supporters and officials, while on the
other security forces cracked down, allegedly resorting to torture, illegal detentions
and extrajudicial killings.9 By some counts, at least 400 voters, party activists, observ-
ers and security personnel were reportedly killed in the months before the election
and the weeks afterward.10 Further unrest erupted in January 2015, on the election’s
first anniversary, which the BNP had set as a deadline for a new poll under a care-
taker government.11
Ahead of the 2018 general election, the BNP changed course, pledging to contest
the poll if it was held under a neutral election commission.12 Even so, its candidates
and activists faced sustained harassment from the authorities in the lead-up to the
vote, which was marred by irregularities.13 Local police and administrators were
accused of stuffing ballot boxes ahead of time, while representatives of opposition

5
Thanks to this period of strong economic development, Bangladesh is set to graduate from least-
developed country status in 2026. See “Bangladesh’s Graduation: Challenges and Imperatives to
Continued International Support Measures”, National University of Singapore Institute of South
Asian Studies, 22 July 2021.
6
For background, see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°295, Countering Jihadist Militancy in Bangla-
desh, 28 February 2018; and N°187, The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh, 1 March
2010.
7
“Bangladesh ruling party wins unopposed in one-sided polls”, Anadolu Agency, 5 January 2014.
8
Crisis Group Report, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit.
9
“Democracy in the Crossfire: Opposition Violence and Government Abuses in the 2014 Pre- and
Post-election Period in Bangladesh”, Human Rights Watch, April 2014.
10
“If History is Any Guide, Bangladesh Elections are about to Get Ugly”, U.S. Institute of Peace,
3 December 2018.
11
“Dozens dead, 7,000 arrested as political violence rocks Bangladesh”, CNN, 22 January 2015.
12
Crisis Group Report, Political Conflict, Extremism and Criminal Justice in Bangladesh, op. cit.
13
“‘Creating Panic’: Bangladesh Election Crackdown on Political Opponents and Critics”, Human
Rights Watch, 22 December 2018.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 4

candidates were reportedly denied access to polling stations on election day.14 Al-
though the AL rejected the allegations, Crisis Group spoke to numerous people who
said they turned up to vote only to be told their ballot had already been cast.15 The
fact the AL and its allies gained an improbable 82 per cent of the vote – and 96 per
cent of the seats in parliament – fuelled the widespread perception that the AL had
stolen the election.
Foreign observers criticised the conduct of both the 2014 and 2018 polls, but con-
demnation was subdued.16 The AL had been cultivating new allies, particularly Russia
and China, in an effort to reduce Bangladesh’s traditional dependence on India and
the West. At the same time, the AL government had positioned itself as an important
Western, and in particular U.S., partner in countering jihadism, and suppressed
homegrown militants, particularly after the 2016 attack on the Holey Artisan Bakery
in Dhaka that left 22 people dead, including seventeen foreigners.17 Hasina’s decision
to grant sanctuary in late 2017 to over 750,000 Rohingya refugees fleeing violence in
Myanmar further mellowed the international response to perceived wrongdoing in
the 2018 election. Mutually beneficial business deals, a hardline stance against in-
surgents and actions to protect Hindus in Bangladesh – who have periodically been
the victims of communal violence – helped shore up the relationship with India.
Within Bangladesh, gauging the level of support for the AL government has often
been difficult. For much of the past fifteen years, however, Sheikh Hasina – if not
her party – seems to have remained popular, with her support dipping only recently.
It is quite possible, if not likely, that she would have emerged triumphant in 2014
and 2018 even with opposition participation and a reasonably fair vote.18 A 2019
survey showed that most respondents felt the country was heading in the right direc-
tion, with the caveats that the AL should be more inclusive and that a gap was grow-
ing between the public and political elites. It also found very high approval ratings
for the AL government.19
Much of Hasina’s popularity has been built on economic development.20 The
country has reported strong annual growth of 6 to 7 per cent throughout her time in
office, largely thanks to a booming ready-made garments sector, which accounts for
over 80 per cent of exports. The growth has created a burgeoning middle class and

14
Transparency International Bangladesh found irregularities in 47 of the 50 legislative races it moni-
tored, including stamping ballots the night before the polls. “Polls anomalies in 47 of 50 seats”,
The Daily Star, 16 January 2019. See also “Bangladesh: Election Abuses Need Independent Probe”,
Human Rights Watch, 2 January 2019; and “BNP claims polling agents obstructed in 221 constitu-
encies”, Prothom Alo, 30 December 2018.
15
Crisis Group interviews, June and October 2023. The poll was widely dubbed the “midnight elec-
tion” on social media, because of the perception that all the votes had been cast the night before
polls opened.
16
Mubashar Hasan and Arild Engelsen Ruud, “The Geopolitics of the 2018 Parliamentary Elections
in Bangladesh”, E-International Relations, 6 February 2019.
17
“Dhaka cafe attack ends with 20 hostages among dead”, The Guardian, 3 July 2016. See also “The
Persistent Challenge of Extremism in Bangladesh”, U.S. Institute of Peace, June 2022.
18
Crisis Group interviews, October-November 2023.
19
Geoffrey Macdonald and Vivek Shivaram, “One Year after a Contentious Election, Bangladeshis
are Satisfied with the Country’s Direction”, Asia Unbound (blog), Council on Foreign Relations, 30
January 2020.
20
Ibid.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 5

greatly reduced the ranks of the poor. The country has performed well by a range of
development indicators, from literacy levels to electricity access, and heavy invest-
ment in infrastructure, from megaprojects to local bridges and roads, has helped
improve the daily lives of much of the population, particularly in rural areas.
Meanwhile, the government has largely neutralised the threat posed to civilian
rule by the army, which has a long history of political intervention. In 1975, a group
of disaffected officers killed Hasina’s father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, along with
most of her family, ushering in around fifteen years of military rule. In January 2007,
the military again intervened in politics, pressuring the caretaker government to hand
over power to another interim administration – a military regime in all but name
– that ruled for almost two years. Since taking over again, the AL government
has showered the armed forces with money, in the form of both a lavish state budget
and generous economic privileges, ensuring that the top brass are loyal to Hasina.21
Another factor that discourages the military from political meddling is the need to
maintain its international reputation, particularly as it pertains to UN peacekeeping
operations, to which it is one of the largest contributors.

B. A Secular Strategy?
Hasina has projected an image of her government as more secular, progressive and
competent than the opposition, taking advantage of perceptions both domestically
and abroad of the BNP as unappealing.22 Her government highlighted the BNP’s his-
torical use of violence – including against minorities – as well as its corrupt practices
while previously in office. It also fastened onto the BNP’s alliance with the Islamist
party Jamaat-e-Islami, which had helped the BNP secure power in 2001 but en-
hanced the perception that it was in thrall to fundamentalism, including opponents
of Bangladeshi independence.23 BNP leaders argue Hasina used their party’s rela-
tionship with Jamaat to justify a crackdown on the opposition, pointing out that the
AL had itself aligned with Jamaat to disrupt the 1996 election and force the BNP
to hold a second vote, which saw it cast out of office. “No one in the West raised any
concerns over arrests and widespread human rights abuses”, said a senior BNP offi-
cial. “They bought Hasina’s narrative that the BNP and Jamaat were basically the
same party, and that the BNP has deep Islamist ties”.24

21
“Bangladesh’s government lavishes money on the army”, The Economist, 11 February 2021.
22
Crisis Group interviews, June and September 2023. See also Hasan and Ruud, “The Geopolitics
of the 2018 Parliamentary Elections”, op. cit.
23
Jamaat-e-Islami is Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party. It formed in 1941 in what is now Pakistan,
splitting into Pakistani and Indian wings after the 1947 partition. The East Pakistan branch later
became Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami. It was banned after Bangladesh gained independence in 1971
because it had collaborated with Pakistan in the war for independence, forming paramilitary forces
that committed atrocities. After BNP founder Ziaur Rahman came to power in 1977, he paved the
way for Jamaat to return to politics through the fifth amendment to the constitution, which re-
moved references to secularism and socialism. Since then, the BNP and Jamaat have often been in
alliance (the 2001 BNP government had Jamaat members), but Jamaat has also sometimes worked
with the AL, including in the movements against military rule in the 1980s, and the 1996 campaign
for an election under a caretaker government.
24
Crisis Group interview, senior BNP official, October 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 6

Hasina also sought to neutralise Islamist opponents. In 2010, she fulfilled her
election promise to create an International Crimes Tribunal to try those who alleged-
ly committed war crimes – in many cases Islamists – during the country’s bloody
independence struggle in 1971. The tribunal had strong public support, particularly
among young, secular urbanites, who later staged rallies calling for tougher penalties
for the accused, but experts and rights groups identified serious procedural short-
comings.25 Nine Jamaat leaders were indicted along with two BNP officials; most
were later executed, including Jamaat’s leader. In August 2013, the High Court then
declared Jamaat’s registration as a political party illegal.26 The same year, the AL
government crushed demonstrations by Hefazat-e-Islam, a hardline Islamist move-
ment, with security forces allegedly killing dozens of people.27
To bolster its secular credentials, the AL government has placed a high priority
on gender equality and empowering women in the political, economic and social
spheres.28 It introduced policies to tackle child marriage and domestic violence,
worked to increase participation of girls and women in education and the work force,
and stood up to Islamist protesters opposing secularism and women’s rights.29 The
massive expansion of Bangladesh’s garment industry over the past fifteen years –
export earnings have almost quadrupled, and the country is now the world’s second-
largest garment exporter – has created jobs for millions of women, reshaping tradi-
tional gender relations in which men worked to support the family and women were
confined to domestic duties.30
In politics, the government also introduced or expanded laws and policies to en-
courage women’s political representation.31 Beyond mandatory quotas, however, there
are few women political representatives, and none of the major parties have met quota
requirements for leadership positions.32 Gender norms and the violence in Bangla-

25
See, for example, Sudha Ramachandran, “Flawed justice in Bangladesh”, The Diplomat, 31 Octo-
ber 2013.
26
“Bangladesh court rules top Islamic party illegal”, Reuters, 1 August 2013.
27
“Blood on the Streets: The Use of Excessive Force during Bangladesh Protests”, Human Rights
Watch, 1 August 2013.
28
“The Empowerment of Women in Bangladesh: Not Just Rhetoric”, National University of Singa-
pore Institute of South Asian Studies, 12 August 2020.
29
When Hefazat emerged in 2011, it was to protest a new Women’s Development Policy that pro-
posed equal inheritance rights for women; Hefazat’s 2013 demonstrations were accompanied by
a set of thirteen demands, including gender segregation. “Hefazat-e-Islam and the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism”, op. cit.
30
Mohammed Abdullah Al Mamun and Mohammed Mahmudul Hoque, “The Impact of Paid Em-
ployment on Women’s Empowerment: A Case Study of Female Garment Workers in Bangladesh”,
World Development Sustainability, vol. 1 (2022). Exports rose from $11.9 billion in 2008 to $45.7
billion in 2023. See “Export Performance”, Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters
Association.
31
A total of 50 seats in the national parliament are reserved for women, on top of the 300 elected
posts. Additionally, one third of the seats in municipal and city corporation elections are reserved
for women, and women get three seats in each Union Parishad, the lowest tier of government admin-
istration. “Women’s Reserved Seat Systems in Bangladesh”, International Foundation for Electoral
Systems, July 2016.
32
“Women in Bangladesh still neglected in politics, polls”, New Age, 7 March 2023. The quota sys-
tem is also not without critics, including among women’s rights advocates. The reserved seats are
allocated proportionally to parties based on their share of elected seats; some have instead called
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 7

deshi politics continue to discourage women from participating in political activities.33

Socio-economic indicators show progress during the AL’s tenure, but the country
overall is far from reaching gender equality.34 Despite her avowed secularism and
the government’s crackdowns on not only jihadists but also Islamist political forces,
Hasina has courted conservative Muslims when expedient.35 In November 2018, she
even received an award from Hefazat-e-Islam after acceding to demands such as
amending school textbooks and recognising degrees from unregulated madrassas.36

C. Crackdowns
Despite coming to power promising to end human rights violations, the AL govern-
ment has faced sustained, credible allegations of abuses, often against its political
opponents. Bangladeshi human rights groups say security forces are responsible for
more than 600 “forced disappearances” since Hasina came to power and almost 100
of the victims are still missing.37 Most notoriously, law enforcement agencies such
as the Rapid Action Battalion have allegedly carried out thousands of extrajudicial
killings, presented as the result of “crossfire” or “gunfights”, in the same period.38
Although many occurred as part of a “war on drugs” launched in 2018, political oppo-
nents have also been among the victims.
The government has also used its control of the police and legal system to crack
down on opposition activists, civil society members and journalists, including through
the 2018 Digital Security Act, which introduced heavy prison sentences for defama-
tion on social media.39 These developments have all contributed to creating a climate
of fear, in which self-censorship has become the norm, not just for press outlets but
also for social media users.40 In December 2023, the rights group CIVICUS Monitor
downgraded its assessment of Bangladesh’s civic space to “closed”, ranking it along-
side countries such as China, Myanmar and Russia.41

for direct elections for the reserved seats to increase competition among candidates. Others argue
that reserved seats hinder gender equality, as they mean that fewer women enter parliament by be-
ing elected themselves. Meanwhile, under a 2013 amendment to the Representation of the People
Order, women are to hold at least 33 per cent of all committee positions in political parties. “‘Only
direct election can empower women politically’”, The Daily Star, 10 October 2018.
33
Ruaksana Haque, “Despite a woman at the top, Bangladesh’s politics are still male dominated”,
International Republican Institute, 28 October 2021.
34
“The Paths to Equal: Twin Indices on Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality”, UN Devel-
opment Programme/UN Women, July 2023. Bangladesh fares better on the Global Gender Gap
Report published by the World Economic Forum, but its higher score there is largely due to having
had women prime ministers for most of the time since independence – a feat matched only by Iceland.
See “Global Gender Gap Report”, World Economic Forum, June 2023.
35
Roshni Kapur, “Hefazat-e-Islam and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh”, East
Asia Forum, 16 February 2022.
36
Ibid. See also “PM Sheikh Hasina branded as ‘Mother of Qawmi’”, Dhaka Tribune, 4 November
2018; and “The Persistent Challenge of Extremism in Bangladesh”, op. cit.
37
“Bangladesh: Open Forced Disappearances Inquiry”, Human Rights Watch, 29 August 2023.
38
Brad Adams, “Bangladesh’s ‘crossfire’ culture hits home”, The Diplomat, 4 September 2020.
39
For background, see Ali Riaz, “How Bangladesh’s Digital Security Act is Creating a Culture of
Fear”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 December 2021.
40
Crisis Group interviews, June and October 2023.
41
“CIVICUS Monitor Downgrades Bangladesh’s Civic Space Rating amid Brutal Pre-Election Crack-
down”, CIVICUS Monitor, 6 December 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 8

At the same time, Bangladesh has notched successes in tackling jihadism, which
emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s among Bangladeshis coming home after vol-
unteering to fight the Soviet army in Afghanistan.42 In the early 2000s, the Bangla-
deshi government established several institutions to handle this threat, including the
Rapid Action Battalion. But law enforcement agencies’ focus on quashing political
opposition alongside growing links between local jihadists, including groups such
as Ansar al Islam and Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh, and transnational move-
ments contributed to a resurgence of militancy in the 2010s.43 The 2016 Holey Arti-
san Bakery attack compelled the government to act, and it received substantial foreign
support to this end. Although homegrown jihadism remains a threat, improved law
enforcement and the diminishing influence of transnational militancy has caused a
sharp decline in attacks.44

42
“The Persistent Challenge of Extremism in Bangladesh”, op. cit.
43
Crisis Group Report, Countering Jihadist Militancy in Bangladesh, op. cit.
44
“The Persistent Challenge of Extremism in Bangladesh”, op. cit.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 9

III. New Challenges

In recent years, the AL government has faced growing discontent that could threaten
its hold on power. After the 2018 election, its position seemed assured; whether the
opposition could mount a serious challenge at the next polls was in doubt. But shifts
in the government’s foreign relations and the global economy have combined with
domestic grievances both to damage the AL government’s standing and fuel a resur-
gent opposition. Despite Hasina’s continuing personal popularity, a survey carried
out by the International Republican Institute in 2023 found that only 44 per cent of
respondents felt the country was heading in the right direction, down from 76 per
cent in 2019.45 Rising prices were the primary reason cited for the increase in pessi-
mism, though dissatisfaction with the state of democracy had also climbed. Support
for the opposition increased sharply, from 36 per cent in 2019 to 63 per cent.46 As
a result, the government has found it harder than expected to navigate the present
election cycle.47

A. Economic Crisis
Since mid-2022, the gloss has come off the narrative surrounding Sheikh Hasina’s
“economic miracle”, particularly within Bangladesh.48 A combination of external de-
velopments and domestic policy decisions have caused a severe shock to the Bangla-
deshi economy, driving up inflation.49 The central bank has been forced to sell dollars
to meet market demand, and foreign currency reserves have fallen sharply, prompt-
ing the government to request a $4.7 billion loan from the International Monetary
Fund in July 2022.50 Gross reserves have fallen from $46 billion in February 2022 to
below $25 billion as of November 2023, while net reserves were reportedly below
$16 billion – equivalent to less than three months of imports.51 Although the coun-
try’s long-term economic outlook remains solid, due in large part to the competitive-
ness of its garment sector, declining foreign currency reserves have raised concerns
about a balance of payments crisis. Official data may also not fully reflect the chal-

45
Hasina still has a 70 percent approval rating according to the poll. See “New Survey Research for
Bangladesh Shows Dissatisfaction with Country’s Direction, Support for Prime Minister Hasina,
Calls for Caretaker Government”, International Republican Institute, 8 August 2023.
46
Ibid.
47
An Asia Foundation survey conducted from November 2022 to January 2023 similarly found
“a considerable deterioration of the public perceptions about the country’s future”, particularly on
the political and economic fronts. “The State of Bangladesh’s Political Governance, Development
and Society: According to Its Citizens”, The Asia Foundation, 29 August 2023.
48
For excellent overviews, see “All that went wrong for Bangladesh’s economy”, The Daily Star, 11
September 2023; and “Bangladesh Development Update: New Frontiers in Poverty Reduction”,
World Bank, October 2023.
49
External factors include not only the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which pushed
up commodity prices, but also major price increases for garment sector inputs and rising global in-
terest rates, which have reduced financial flows to Bangladesh.
50
A first tranche of $476 million was disbursed in January 2023. “Bangladesh secures $4.7 bln from
IMF as other South Asian countries see delays”, Reuters, 30 January 2023.
51
Bangladesh Bank’s figures for foreign exchange reserves are available at its website. See also “Forex
reserves in rapid decline with growing import payments”, The Business Post, 10 October 2023; and
“Forex reserves below $20 billion after paying ACU”, The Business Standard, 7 November 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 10

lenges facing the economy, particularly the downturn’s damaging effects on low-
income households.52
The government’s response to what were initially external economic challenges
has made the situation worse. Most damagingly, it has tried to limit inflation by peg-
ging the local currency, the taka, at an artificially high rate. It has devised a complex
system of multiple exchange rates that has in turn created opportunities to turn a
profit for the well-connected and discouraged overseas workers and exporters from
repatriating foreign currency through official channels, putting further pressure on
foreign currency reserves.53 The government has also cracked down on the informal
foreign currency market, where dollars were trading at a premium of more than 10 per
cent, increasing the liquidity challenges for businesses.54
The government has also made a series of missteps on fiscal, monetary and trade
policy. When most countries adopted policies aimed at squeezing money supply, the
central bank kept caps on interest rates that it introduced at the start of the COVID-
19 pandemic to protect the banks from a surge in bad debts. The caps made credit
cheap in a high-inflation environment, increasing money supply and propping up
demand for imports while eroding depositors’ purchasing power.55 To narrow the
trade deficit, the government instead put in place restrictions, which caused short-
ages of key goods – particularly in the energy sector – and created new inflationary
pressures.56 Much of the widening budget deficit in the 2022-2023 fiscal year was
covered through the central bank printing money, which only added to inflation.57
Leading credit rating agencies S&P and Fitch have accordingly downgraded their
outlook for Bangladesh to negative, with the latter citing the government’s “insuffi-
cient” measures to stem the fall in foreign currency reserves.58 Although Moody’s has
maintained a stable outlook, in May 2023 it lowered Bangladesh’s credit rating for
the first time in a decade. “There’s no real reason why Bangladesh should be in an

52
Crisis Group interview, Dhaka-based economist, October 2023. The inflation figure almost cer-
tainly understates the scale of the problem, as the consumer price index “basket” is calculated based
on price caps that the government has set for key commodities, such as eggs, potatoes, onions,
cooking oil, gas cylinders and more, but which it has been unable to enforce. See “The challenge of
measuring inflation”, The Daily Star, 7 November 2023; and “3 essential commodities: Price caps
prove a total failure”, The Daily Star, 12 October 2023.
53
Despite a record number of Bangladeshis heading overseas for work, formal remittances have
declined because workers can get better, market-based exchange rates using informal channels. Re-
ferred to locally as hundi, they are known as informal value transfer systems or informal transfer
systems. See “Big drops in remittance, exports make reserves struggle harsher”, The Business
Standard, 2 October 2023. For an overview on hundi use among Bangladeshi migrant workers, see
Maisha Tabassum Anima et al., “Impact of Informal Remittance Channels in Bangladesh: Under-
standing the Role of Hundi in Financial Crime beyond Economic Aspects”, Journal of Economic
Criminology, no. 2 (2023).
54
“Dollar disappears from kerb market amid central bank-led raids on money exchanges”, The
Business Standard, 3 September 2023.
55
“Taming the inflation monster in Bangladesh”, The Daily Star, 9 October 2023.
56
In the energy sector, the restrictions have led to regular blackouts and fuel shortages. “Bangla-
desh’s worst electricity crisis in a decade”, Reuters, 7 June 2023.
57
“Cenbank keeps printing money amid inflation worries”, The Business Standard, 19 July 2023.
58
“Fitch Revises Outlook on Bangladesh to Negative; Affirms at ‘BB-’”, Fitch Ratings, 25 September
2023.
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Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 11

external balance of payments crisis”, said an economist. “They have strong fundamen-
tals. It’s entirely self-inflicted”.59
Economic decisions by the government have largely been taken for political rea-
sons, often with an eye on the 2024 national polls. A chief concern for the govern-
ment was that allowing the taka to float in line with demand would send its value
plummeting, fuelling even higher inflation and potentially social unrest. Although a
weaker taka would likely have supported exports, particularly in the garment sector,
many garment exporters own conglomerates that also import food, construction ma-
terials, fuel and other goods, and – at least at first – lobbied against allowing the
currency to depreciate sharply and also pushed for interest rate caps. Their apparent
influence over policy reflects in critics’ eyes the AL government’s cultivation of a
crony capitalist class, which it now relies on for advice, making it difficult to carry
out reforms as these individuals have personal interests at stake.60 More than 60 per
cent of the lawmakers now in parliament come from the business sector, most of them
from the garment industry. An important factor in the government’s decision-making
is the need to keep this elite onside.61
Policies aimed at fixing the exchange rate and keeping interest rates low have
largely backfired. Inflation has remained high at around 10 per cent, according to
official figures – in contrast to neighbouring India and Sri Lanka, where it has start-
ed to fall.62 Ordinary Bangladeshis, particularly those with the lowest incomes, have
seen sharp declines in their real wages, and many are struggling to cover even basic
living expenses.63 In one survey, 52 per cent of respondents said they had struggled
to feed themselves or their families within the past year.64 Surveys also indicate that
economic hardship is a major reason for the government’s declining support and
the BNP’s protest movement from mid-2022 onward (see Section IV.A). Meanwhile,
the business class is increasingly concerned about the possibility of a balance of pay-
ments crisis.
Falling purchasing power has already led to industrial unrest. From late October
to mid-November 2023, tens of thousands of garment workers – who had not had
a pay rise since December 2018 – took to the streets demanding a near three-fold
increase in the minimum wage, to the equivalent of around $210 a month. On 7
November, the government announced a 56 per cent hike in the minimum wage, to
around $110, but protests continued.65 Alleging that the BNP was behind the unrest,
Sheikh Hasina reportedly told workers to get back to work or return to being unem-
ployed in their villages.66 By 14 November, the police had largely extinguished the
protests through force, responding to the demonstrations with tear gas, shotgun pel-

59
Crisis Group interview, Dhaka-based economist, October 2023.
60
“Fiscal, monetary reforms not possible even after elections: Ahsan H Mansur”, The Business Stand-
ard, 21 November 2023.
61
“5pc lawmakers politicians, 61pc businesspeople, finds TIB”, New Age, 30 September 2020.
62
“All that went wrong”, op. cit.
63
“High inflation erodes real wages in Bangladesh”, Financial Express, 8 August 2023.
64
“Open Society Barometer: Can Democracy Deliver?”, Open Society Foundations, September 2023.
65
“RMG workers unhappy about wage hike, urge govt for taming inflation, instituting rent control”,
The Business Standard, 7 November 2023.
66
“Bangladesh PM stands firm on pay rise amid deadly garment worker protests”, Agence France-
Presse, 10 November 2023.
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lets and stun grenades; at least four people were killed, and charges have been filed
against 11,000 workers.67 A further round of garment worker-led protests seems un-
likely, due to the government’s repression.
The malaise has highlighted systemic problems that the government has failed to
address during its time in office. Bangladesh’s economy has just two major export
earners – ready-made garments and labour – and is heavily reliant on imports, par-
ticularly for food and energy. Tax collection is the lowest in South Asia as a percent-
age of GDP, and revenues are dependent on trade-related taxes and VAT because
they are easy to collect.68 The country also attracts little foreign investment, due to
protectionist policies and the general complications of doing business in Bangladesh.69
Banks have been particularly affected by chronic mismanagement, with a high (and
growing) non-performing loan ratio of above 10 per cent. Powerful firms have been
allowed to default on loans with impunity, while several banks, in the words of an
economist, have been “looted” by their owners, in part through the issuing of loans
lacking any financial justification.70 “A giant robbery took place in the banking sec-
tor”, said another economist, who is close to the government. “Much of the money
has been siphoned abroad”.71
Macro-economic management has improved to some degree over the past six
months. Partly in response to IMF pressure, the central bank has upped interest rates
and created incentives for overseas workers to send money through formal channels,
while the government has reduced its reliance on money printing to finance the
budget deficit. On 12 December, the IMF Executive Board approved disbursal of a
second tranche of $689 million under the $4.7 billion program, welcoming “recent
implementation of corrective actions and the efforts to push key reforms forward”.72

67
“Bangladesh garment industry wage fight shakes core economic pillar”, Nikkei Asia, 14 Novem-
ber 2023.
68
Just 1.4 per cent of adults submitted a tax return in the 2021-2022 fiscal year. For a discussion of
tax challenges, see “Why does Bangladesh tax so little?”, International Growth Centre, 3 April 2023.
69
Although the garment industry is highly globalised, most factories are run by local firms. Foreign
investment is just 0.4 per cent of GDP, barely a quarter the level of India. For an overview of the
investment environment, see “2023 Investment Climate Statements: Bangladesh”, Bureau of Eco-
nomic and Business Affairs, U.S. State Department.
70
Crisis Group interview, Dhaka-based economist, October 2023. On non-performing loans, which
now account for 10 per cent of total disbursed credits, see “Default loans hit an all-time high”, The
Daily Star, 2 October 2023. On favourable treatment of defaulters, see “Our banking sector, where
no rules apply for vested quarters”, The Daily Star, 25 September 2023.
71
Crisis Group interview, Dhaka-based economist, October 2023. The scale of corruption and mon-
ey laundering, which were always pervasive, has also grown dramatically under the AL government;
the central bank governor recently estimated mis-invoicing of imports alone was costing between
$12 billion and $18 billion a year. Mis-invoicing enables companies to move funds offshore illegally.
For example, a company prices an import worth $200 at $300, and gets a letter of credit through a
local bank for that amount; it then pays the overseas supplier and keeps the extra $100 abroad. See
“Economy likely to bounce back after elections: Cenbank governor”, The Business Standard, 6 No-
vember 2023. Between 2009 and 2015, illicit financial flows, mainly due to trade mis-invoicing, were
estimated to average $8.3 billion a year. See “Trade-Related Illicit Financial Flows in 134 Develop-
ing Countries 2009-2018”, Global Financial Integrity, 16 December 2021.
72
“IMF Executive Board Concludes 2023 Article IV Consultation with Bangladesh and Completes
the First Review Under the Extended Credit Facility, Extended Fund Facility, and Resilience and
Sustainability Facility”, International Monetary Fund, 12 December 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 13

Yet the government missed IMF-mandated targets on foreign exchange reserve

levels and has resisted important reforms. Despite committing to setting a unified,
market-driven exchange rate by June 2023 as part of the IMF loan package, it has
put off this step until after the election.73
Opinions remain divided as to how the economy might evolve over the coming
months. By delaying on exchange rate reform, the government is playing a risky game,
as foreign currency reserves are expected to decline further – by as much as $1 bil-
lion a month. The further they fall, the fewer resources the government will have to
manage a float of the currency after the election.74 “The economy is a mess and won’t
improve any time soon. … Hasina needs to implement shock therapies”, said an econ-
omist close to the government, suggesting a free float of the taka, suspension of all
costly development projects and a 20 per cent pay cut for civil servants. “She needs
a strong economic team. But right now, she doesn’t have it”.75 A senior AL official
echoed these concerns, saying of the economy that the “cancer has set in – we just
don’t know how bad it is”. “We hope [after the election Hasina] will bring in a new
team, who are more up to date, to face the economic challenges”, he added.76
Other officials and businesspeople are more sanguine. The central bank governor
recently remarked that while he had “never witnessed an economic crisis of this mag-
nitude” in his 36 years in public service, he expected the economy to recover after
the election.77 Similarly, a prominent businessman told Crisis Group that he expected
foreign reserves to pick up after January, once the election was completed. “We have
political violence every election”, he said. “It’s like a viral flu that visits us every five
years. We have learned to live with it”.78

B. U.S. Policy Shift

The November 2020 election of President Joe Biden precipitated a shift in relations
between the U.S. and Bangladesh. Shortly after taking office, Biden articulated his
vision for a return to diplomacy “rooted in America’s most cherished democratic
values: defending freedom, championing opportunity, upholding universal rights,
respecting the rule of law and treating every person with dignity”.79 This “values-
based foreign policy” has been applied selectively, but the Biden administration has
made Bangladesh a centrepiece.
In December 2021, the U.S. Treasury announced Magnitsky sanctions – which
Washington imposes on individuals implicated in corruption and human rights abuses
– against six senior officials from Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion, a security
force under the Home Ministry tasked with combating crime and terrorism. The Bat-
talion had been accused of involvement in hundreds of “forced disappearances”,

73
“Bangladesh makes grade for $681m from IMF but tougher tests await”, Nikkei Asia, 19 October
2023.
74
Crisis Group interview, Dhaka-based economist, October 2023.
75
Crisis Group interview, Dhaka-based economist, October 2023.
76
Crisis Group interview, senior Awami League official, November 2023.
77
“Economy likely to bounce back”, op. cit.
78
Crisis Group interview, top garment exporter, November 2023.
79
“Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World”, The White House, 4 February 2021.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 14

as well as thousands of extrajudicial killings.80 Although Dhaka rejected the basis for
the sanctions, and has lobbied hard for their removal, they appeared to have an
almost immediate effect, with extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances declin-
ing sharply.81 Subsequently, the climate of fear that the AL government had created
began to lift, opening space for greater media freedom and political activity, and en-
abling the BNP to resume holding rallies from July 2022.
The U.S. State Department proceeded to announce in May 2023 a visa policy de-
signed to “promote democratic elections” in Bangladesh, under which it could deny
visas to Bangladeshis deemed to be undermining the electoral process.82 It warned
that the policy could target current and former officials, members of major parties,
law enforcement officials, and members of the judiciary and security forces, and would
also apply to their immediate families. The announcement sent shock waves through
Dhaka’s corridors of power, as countless Bangladeshi officials have family and eco-
nomic interests in the U.S., as well as other Western countries.83
In the government’s eyes, these U.S. moves are tantamount to backing the oppo-
sition. Hasina has even publicly accused Washington of trying to bring about regime
change.84 U.S. ambassador Peter Haas – who received Senate confirmation eight days
after the sanctions against the Rapid Action Battalion were announced – has been
vocal about the importance of upholding democracy and human rights, bringing him
into conflict with the government. In December 2022, Haas was forced to cut short a
meeting with a co-founder of Maayer Daak, a platform for relatives of forced disap-
pearance victims, for “security reasons”, after AL supporters surrounded the meeting
venue; in May 2023, the government scaled back the security measures accorded to
him.85 Haas has since said he has concerns for his safety and for that of “everyone
who works at the embassy”. In early November, a local AL politician was arrested
after making death threats against the ambassador.86
Although the U.S. measures have clearly irked the government, they have not
stopped it from clamping down on the opposition in the months prior to the election
(see Section V.B). If anything, they may have aggravated the political confrontation,
as the visa policy emboldened the opposition but did not deter officials from seeking

80
Allegations of corruption and other abuses swirl around two new Rapid Action Battalion units
the government created to police the Rohingya refugee camps in the south. See Crisis Group Asia
Report N°335, Crisis Mounts for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh, 6 December 2023, Section II.
81
Mubashar Hasan, “Sanctions help bring accountability in Bangladesh”, The Interpreter (blog),
Lowy Institute, 26 January 2023. But while extrajudicial killings declined significantly, rights groups
said Bangladeshi authorities responded by retaliating against victims’ relatives. See “Bangladesh:
Stop Reprisals against Victims, Activists”, Human Rights Watch, 7 April 2022.
82
“Announcement of Visa Policy to Promote Democratic Elections in Bangladesh”, U.S. State De-
partment, 24 May 2023.
83
In September, the State Department said it was “taking steps to impose visa restrictions” on un-
named individuals, including “members of law enforcement, the ruling party and the political oppo-
sition”. “Taking Steps to Impose Visa Restrictions on Individuals Involved in Undermining the
Democratic Election Process in Bangladesh”, U.S. State Department, 22 September 2023.
84
“Sheikh Hasina accuses US of seeking regime change in Bangladesh”, Scroll, 11 April 2023.
85
“Bangladesh govt criticizes US envoy for visiting home of missing opposition politician”, Benar
News, 16 December 2022. Five other ambassadors also saw their security details cut back. “Additional
security no longer needed for foreign diplomats: Momen”, The Business Standard, 15 May 2023.
86
“Bangladesh-U.S. election rift widens over visas, envoy safety”, Nikkei Asia, 3 October 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
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to crush the protest movement the BNP has led. Expectations are nevertheless rising
in Bangladesh that the U.S. is preparing sanctions against members of the govern-
ment, especially after authorities rejected the U.S. State Department’s proposal, con-
veyed through the embassy, for unconditional dialogue between the major parties.
On 30 October, a State Department spokesperson said the U.S. would “take actions if
necessary to support democracy in Bangladesh”, without providing detail.87 As yet,
Washington has not announced any further measures.
The U.S. is also at loggerheads with the Bangladeshi government over labour
rights. On 16 November, just days after the authorities forced protesting garment
workers back to their jobs, the White House issued a new global labour directive,
warning it would hold accountable “those who threaten, who intimidate, who attack
union leaders, labor rights defenders, labor organizations” through measures such as
sanctions, trade penalties and visa restrictions. In launching the policy, Secretary
of State Antony Blinken pointedly mentioned Kalpona Akter, a Bangladeshi labour
activist, “who says that she is alive today because the U.S. embassy advocated on her
behalf”.88 Sanctions targeting the garment sector would likely have a huge impact on
the economy and, while seriously hurting the AL government, would also harm the
livelihoods of workers.
The European Union has been less outspoken on the political deadlock, with a
greater focus on bilateral economic relations. As the largest buyer of garments from
Bangladesh, officials from the EU and its member states meet regularly with the
government to discuss labour rights and access to the European market after Bang-
ladesh transitions from least-developed country status in 2026. Protests demanding
a minimum wage hike in November took place just as a visiting EU team said Bang-
ladesh needed to do more on labour and human rights to meet its commitments un-
der the Everything but Arms trade arrangement, which currently grants it tariff-free
access to the European market.89
Washington’s tougher line has been offset by India’s continued support for the
AL. New Delhi has enjoyed close ties to the party, dating back to the 1971 war of
independence. It considers the AL a trusted partner for maintaining stability in its
north-eastern states, which border Bangladesh, and protecting minority Hindus. In
recent months, it has asked the U.S. to ease the pressure on Bangladesh, arguing
that its principled approach risks “strengthening the hand of extremist forces” and
pushing Dhaka closer to Beijing.90 The election of an anti-Indian president in the
Maldives in early October has strengthened India’s resolve to maintain alliances in
its immediate neighbourhood, and the AL is at the top of the list. “Delhi can’t afford
clean elections in Dhaka”, a prominent Indian foreign policy expert told Crisis Group.91

87
“US will take action if necessary to support democracy in Bangladesh: State Department”, The
Business Standard, 31 October 2023.
88
“Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the Rollout of the Presidential Memorandum on Advancing
Worker Empowerment, Rights, and High Labor Standards Globally”, U.S. Department of State, 16
November 2023.
89
“EU EBA monitoring mission Bangladesh 12-16 November 2023”, Delegation of the European
Union to Bangladesh, 15 November 2023.
90
“Pushing Bangladesh may aid extremist forces, India indicates to US”, Hindustan Times, 29
August 2023.
91
Crisis Group interview, Indian foreign policy expert, October 2023.
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The U.S. and India differ over the best course to take with regard to the Bangla-
deshi elections: at the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue on 10 November, Indian and U.S.
officials failed to reach a consensus, with the former insisting the poll was an in-
ternal matter for Dhaka, while implicitly backing the AL by referring to supporting
a “stable, peaceful and progressive” Bangladesh.92 For now, it seems that India’s
position may temper Washington’s willingness to take further action against the AL
government, for fear of antagonising a key ally.

C. A Rejuvenated Opposition
The BNP has capitalised on the weakening economy, as well as the renewed U.S.
focus on democracy and human rights, to harness public resentment toward the
government. This process gained momentum after a Dhaka court jailed BNP leader
Khaleda Zia for ten years for corruption in February 2018 (she has since been hospi-
talised due to ill health).93 Following the decision, her son, Tarique Rahman, began
asserting greater control of the party. He has since become its undisputed leader,
running the party from exile in London while senior officials oversee activities on the
ground in Bangladesh.94
Rahman has endeavoured to reconnect with activists and rebuild the party’s
strength. A mid-level BNP official claimed that he had won grassroots support by
making himself accessible to the point of giving out his WhatsApp number.95 This
step, together with his frequent appearances on Facebook and YouTube, has helped
bridge the physical gap arising from his exile. He has also written letters to activists
at the Union Parishad level, the lowest rung of party administration, boosting his
image as a leader in touch with ground realities. A foreign analyst in Dhaka comment-
ed: “Although intellectuals paint him as a disaster, Tarique Rahman has a following
– we’re not talking small numbers”.96
Zia’s imprisonment has also created the opportunity for reform-minded members
of the BNP Standing Committee to try to reshape the party’s image as liberal and secu-
lar. In July 2023, it announced a 31-point plan of “transformative reform measures”,
including the creation of a “constitutional reforms commission” to review the na-
tional charter, the reintroduction of a neutral caretaker government, the imposition
of measures to strengthen the Election Commission’s independence, the creation of
an upper house of parliament and the establishment of a two-term limit for prime
ministers. Given the BNP’s own history of resisting the caretaker government system
(in 1995-1996) and then attempting to manipulate it (in 2006) in a bid to stay in pow-
er, these pledges should be treated with a dose of scepticism, but they at least offer
the possibility of a much-needed institutional overhaul.

92
“Election is Bangladesh’s internal matter, India tells US”, Prothom Alo, 11 November 2023.
93
“Khaleda Zia jailed for five years in corruption case”, Al Jazeera, 8 February 2018.
94
Crisis Group interviews, October-November 2023. Like his mother and Sheikh Hasina, Tarique
Rahman was arrested for corruption and other alleged offences by the military-backed caretaker
regime in 2007. He was permitted to leave Bangladesh for medical treatment in September 2008 –
shortly before that year’s general election – after promising not to practice politics from abroad. He
has never returned. “Tarique flies into exile in London”, bdnews24.com, 12 September 2008.
95
Crisis Group interview, mid-level BNP activist, November 2023.
96
Crisis Group interview, Dhaka-based analyst, November 2023.
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The BNP has also sought to repair its international image. It has distanced itself
from its ex-partner in the 2001-2006 government, Jamaat-e-Islami. This process
began during the 2018 election, when the BNP allied with centrist and leftist parties
rather than its longstanding Islamist ally. After the vote, the BNP leadership held
lengthy internal discussions about the relationship with Jamaat, and most of the
standing committee advocated severing ties permanently. A mid-level BNP official
said the party’s grassroots had also “overwhelmingly” backed the decision.97 “Our
ties with Jamaat were electoral in nature but they proved to be hugely costly, he
explained. “We have been described as an Islamist and right-wing party. But we are
neither – we are a liberal and centrist party. Yet even today, when Awami League
leaders talk about the BNP, they talk about ‘BNP-Jamaat’”.98 A senior Jamaat official
said he and his party colleagues doubt the BNP would have ended the alliance if
Khaleda Zia was still in charge.99
The party’s international charm offensive has taken other forms as well. To ap-
peal to Western countries, it has pursued a largely non-violent protest movement
over the past eighteen months. It has tried to reach out to New Delhi with the aim of
dispelling perceptions it could be a threat to Indian interests.100 In September 2023,
it organised a seminar on the Rohingya refugee crisis, issuing a sixteen-point policy
broadly in line with what the UN and Western donors have been advocating for –
and which the AL government has resisted. The proposals included allowing refu-
gees to work, improving access to formal education and consulting the Rohingya on
repatriation.101 On 23 October, it released an Indo-Pacific strategy document aimed
at appealing to the West, particularly the U.S.102 “Through these policies we want to
send a message loud and clear that we are a liberal, progressive and democratic party”,
Standing Committee member and foreign policy chief Amir Khosru Mahmud Chow-
dhury told Crisis Group.103
It is unclear if these policies have convinced the public and Bangladesh’s foreign
partners of the BNP’s suitability to rule. Many remember the violence and corrup-
tion of the party’s last term in government, between 2001 and 2006, including an
infamous grenade attack on an AL rally that Hasina only narrowly survived.104 While
Rahman appears to have the loyalty of the BNP grassroots, his image has undoubt-
edly been sullied by criminal convictions in absentia for money laundering, corrup-
tion and orchestrating the 2004 grenade attack.105 Hasina and other AL leaders take

97
Crisis Group interview, BNP official, September 2023. Tarique Rahman personally surveyed dis-
trict committees to gather feedback on whether to continue the partnership with Jamaat.
98
Crisis Group interview, mid-level BNP official, November 2023.
99
Crisis Group interview, Jamaat-e-Islami official, October 2023.
100
Arkoprabho Hazra, “What will India’s changing approach to Bangladesh’s national elections mean
for the Hasina government?”, The Diplomat, 1 September 2023.
101
“Govt failure leads Rohingya issue to obscurity: BNP”, New Age, 3 September 2023; and “Six-
teen BNP proposals for dealing with the Rohingya crisis”, Jagonews24.com, 3 September 2023 [Ben-
gali]. See also Crisis Group Report, Crisis Mounts for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh, op. cit.
102
“A Democratic Future for Bangladesh and the Indo-Pacific Strategy”, Bangladesh Nationalist
Party, 23 October 2023.
103
Crisis Group interview, Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury, October 2023.
104
“Explosions at protest rally in Bangladesh kill 12”, The New York Times, 22 August 2004.
105
“‘State-backed crime’ punished”, The Daily Star, 11 October 2018.
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Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 18

every opportunity to decry his history, and their comments are widely circulated in
the media, most of which backs the AL government. Opposition leaders, however,
insist that they now have the public on their side, while the BNP has shown that it
can rally substantial numbers of supporters.106
Beyond the BNP itself, the AL government is also facing other challenges to its
control of political debate. The massive increase in internet usage in Bangladesh has
stymied its efforts to muzzle the media; many people now get political news and views
from Facebook or YouTube pages, which are beyond state censorship and where some
commentators living in exile have millions of followers. The support that the AL once
enjoyed from civil society, which gravitated toward the party due to its more secular
leanings, has also shrunk over the past decade.

106
Crisis Group interview, November 2023.
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IV. Election Stalemate and Political Showdown

A. Opposition Mobilisation and State Responses

In July 2022, the BNP launched protests over the rise in fuel and commodity prices
and growing power blackouts, criticising the government for its handling of the
economy and failure to protect the poor. The party’s first major rallies in almost a
decade were followed by months of marches throughout the country.107 Although
clashes broke out between BNP supporters, on one side, and security forces and AL
supporters, on the other, with deaths and injuries reported, the security forces showed
restraint, likely due to concern about further U.S. sanctions.108 The movement’s first
phase culminated with a large gathering in Dhaka on 10 December 2022, at which
BNP leaders turned their focus to the forthcoming elections. They issued a list of ten
demands, including that Sheikh Hasina hand power to a caretaker government ahead
of the polls, and said they would boycott the vote if the government did not comply.
Despite harassment and attacks by the police and AL supporters, the BNP man-
aged to continue its activities through 2023, staging hundreds of sit-ins and marches
in various cities. In July, the BNP, along with 36 allied parties, replaced its ten-point
agenda with a single demand – that the AL government resign, paving the way for
elections under a caretaker government.109 On 28 July, the party assembled hun-
dreds of thousands of supporters in Dhaka. Although the demonstration was mostly
peaceful, violence erupted the following day when the police halted the BNP’s attempt
at enforcing a blockade at entrances to the capital.110
Despite mounting pressure in the streets, the AL has consistently rejected the
opposition’s demands for a caretaker government, insisting that it would be uncon-
stitutional in light of the 2011 amendment. Party leaders, including Hasina, have also
impugned the BNP’s credibility by describing it and Jamaat as parties of “terrorists”
and “killers”.111 Hasina has also refused to let her ailing rival Zia travel abroad for
medical treatment, despite a panel of independent doctors warning that she was at
“high risk of death anytime”. Unperturbed, Hasina recently told supporters that “it is
time [for Zia] to die. … There is no point in crying so much”.112
On the ground, the authorities have used violent and non-violent tactics to thwart
BNP rallies. They have routinely set up roadblocks to stop supporters from reaching
protest sites and switched off mobile internet nearby. Officials have also rejected the
BNP’s proposed spots for demonstrations, forcing it to use less propitious locations.
The AL has tried to match the BNP in the streets, by holding counter-protests – which

107
“Government-opposition confrontation looms in Bangladesh”, The Diplomat, 22 November 2022.
108
Crisis Group interviews, October 2023.
109
“BNP declares one-point demand to oust govt, announces countrywide silent march on 18 July”,
The Business Standard, 12 July 2023.
110
“Bangladesh police clash with opposition supporters calling on PM to resign”, Reuters, 30 July
2023.
111
These statements refer to the events of 2013-2016, when the BNP was accused of carrying out
deadly attacks to disrupt the election and undermine the government, and Jamaat staged rallies
against the execution of its senior officials due to war crimes convictions. See “Election in due time,
no dialogue with killers”, Bangladesh Sangbad Sangtha, 31 October 2023.
112
“She’s over 80, her time is up; it’s no use crying”, Desh Rupantor, 3 October 2023 [Bengali].
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
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it calls “peace rallies” – close to opposition gatherings. Its supporters, wielding sticks
and wearing helmets, have regularly clashed with BNP rivals.
Using its control of the security forces and judiciary, the government has arrested
large numbers of BNP supporters, often on seemingly spurious charges.113 While exact
numbers are impossible to verify, the authorities have targeted activists at every level
of the party, from the top to the grassroots; some senior officials are facing hundreds
of charges each. A single violent incident can result in hundreds of people being
charged, in what the opposition has dubbed “ghost” or “fictitious” cases.114 The home
minister has denied the cases are trumped up, but media outlets report that long-
deceased BNP members and others living overseas are routinely named on charge
sheets.115
One objective of this legal onslaught seems to be to tie up BNP officials in costly
court battles, distracting them from political activities.116 As the vote draws closer,
the courts have started working overtime to close cases and sentence BNP officials to
prison, preventing them from contesting races.117 These shenanigans have hurt the
BNP but also steeled party activists’ resolve to defeat the AL government.118
Another major political development has been the return of the Jamaat-e-Islami
to the public sphere. Like the BNP, it had been unable to engage in public activities
for most of the past decade, particularly since the 2013 High Court decision declaring
its registration illegal. But in June 2023, the party suddenly re-emerged, holding a
rally in Dhaka that drew tens of thousands of supporters.119 The party’s resurgence
arguably benefits the AL government, by creating the impression that it has allowed
an open environment for parties to campaign ahead of the elections.120 The AL likely
also hoped that the BNP and Jamaat would rekindle their alliance, deepening sus-
picions about the main opposition party in Western countries and among Bangla-
deshis. But largely for this reason, the BNP has avoided working with Jamaat, even
as they have carried out political activities in service of the same goal: ousting the AL
from power.

113
“Bangladeshi police accused of filing false cases as election nears”, VOA, 26 September 2023.
114
See, for example, “Thousands of BNP men sued, more than 25 arrested over Tuesday’s clashes”,
The Business Standard, 19 July 2023.
115
“Home minister: Cases filed if incidents occur, none is fake”, Dhaka Tribune, 21 October 2023;
and “In Bangladesh, dead political activists return to life in ‘ghost’ cases”, Benar News, 14 Novem-
ber 2023.
116
“Quietly crushing a democracy: millions on trial in Bangladesh”, The New York Times, 3 Septem-
ber 2023. Many cases are constantly adjourned, as prosecution witnesses fail to turn up at hearings.
117
Under section 66(2)(d) of the constitution, anyone who has been sentenced to two years or more
in prison is ineligible to run for election to parliament unless five years have elapsed since their re-
lease. “Cases against BNP-Jamaat leaders: Trials now rolling well into the night”, The Daily Star,
23 October 2023.
118
Crisis Group interviews, October-November 2023.
119
“Jamaat holds rally after a decade”, The Daily Star, 11 June 2023.
120
The law minister said the government had permitted the rally because the party had appealed
the High Court verdict cancelling its registration and no final decision had been reached. “Contempt
rule sought against authorities for allowing Jamaat to hold rally”, New Age, 27 June 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
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B. The 28 October “Grand Rally” and Its Aftermath

In mid-October 2023, the BNP announced plans for a “grand rally” in Dhaka, with
the aim of bringing hundreds of thousands of supporters into the capital’s streets.121
The 28 October rally was widely perceived as a pivotal moment in the year-long bat-
tle between the two parties. With the AL government refusing to consider a caretaker
government, and seemingly no prospect of a negotiated solution regarding the elec-
tions, the BNP felt it had little choice but to intensify pressure on the authorities by
showing that it had much of the public on its side.122 BNP officials said they were not
against an agreement with the AL but had received no indication from the ruling
party that it was willing to engage in talks.123
The grand rally was likely the largest the BNP had mustered since it launched the
protest movement in mid-2022; police said the turnout was over 100,000, but eye-
witnesses put the number far higher.124 As had been feared, BNP supporters, police
and AL members engaged in skirmishes before the rally got under way.125 Police then
moved in to shut down the demonstration while BNP officials were speaking from the
dais, firing tear gas and stun grenades to clear the area. Soon after, street fighting
broke out between BNP supporters and the police, killing a police officer and a BNP
member.126
The authorities soon began rounding up thousands of party members, many of
whom had outstanding charges against them. They detained most of the party’s
leadership, including secretary general Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir – in effect
the BNP head, with Khaleda Zia under house arrest and her son in exile – and his
second-in-command, Standing Committee member and foreign policy chief Amir
Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury, on charges related to the policeman’s death.127 Ac-
cording to the BNP, in the three weeks after its 28 October demonstration, at least
13,210 of its members and supporters were arrested, and fourteen killed; Jamaat
counted 2,317 arrested and three killed in the same period.128 Although these figures
are difficult to verify, official data show the country’s jails are bursting, with prisoner
numbers rising by more than 10,000, or over 14 per cent, between September and
November.129 The AL spokesman has since confirmed that 11,000 BNP members
have been “incarcerated”.130

121
“BNP announces grand rally in Dhaka on 28 Oct”, Prothom Alo, 19 October 2023.
122
“What will happen on October 28?”, The Daily Star, 27 October 2023.
123
Crisis Group interviews, senior BNP official and political analysts, October 2023.
124
Crisis Group interviews, October 2023.
125
The authorities had also arrested as many as 1,200 supporters in the days leading up to the rally,
most of whom were already facing charges.
126
The authorities later accused BNP supporters of attacking the chief justice’s residence and a
police hospital, as well as torching vehicles, including an ambulance. “BNP top brass cannot avoid
responsibility of anarchy: Home minister”, Prothom Alo, 3 November 2023.
127
“Full prisons and false charges: Bangladesh opposition faces pre-election crackdown”, The Guardi-
an, 10 November 2023.
128
Jamaat-e-Islami held a rally in Dhaka the same day, ignoring the police’s decision to deny their
protest application.
129
“Prisons teeming with inmates”, Prothom Alo, 9 November 2023.
130
“Those obstructing polls will face resistance: Quader”, The Business Standard, 19 December 2023.
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The crackdown prompted the opposition to overhaul its approach. Almost imme-
diately after the rally, the party declared a hartal, or general strike, for 29 October,
the first of its kind since 2019. Jamaat called its own hartal for the same day, and
the shutdown was observed throughout the country. Both parties then announced
“blockades” – in which they sought to keep vehicles, particularly buses and trucks,
off the roads – from 31 October to 2 November, and have since kept up the momen-
tum: since early November, they have held two hartals or blockades a week. The goal
of these measures is to make the country ungovernable and increase the pressure on
Hasina to hand power to a neutral government.131 Although the BNP lacks the strength
to enforce the blockades nationwide, drivers’ fear of being caught up in clashes was
sufficiently widespread to ensure their effectiveness, at least in the first weeks; more
than 150 vehicles, mainly buses and trucks, have reportedly been torched, with the
sides blaming each other.132
Escalating violence and growing polarisation have prompted renewed calls for
rapprochement between the country’s two largest parties. On 30 October, seven dip-
lomatic missions issued a statement calling on all sides to show restraint and “work
together to create the conditions for free, fair, participatory and peaceful elections”.133
Following a meeting with the head of the Election Commission on 31 October, U.S.
ambassador Haas also urged the parties to convene for “unconditional dialogue”
to resolve the crisis. Two weeks later, Haas sought meetings with the AL and BNP (as
well as the country’s distant third political force, the Jatiya Party), again encouraging
“all sides to engage in dialogue without preconditions”.134 The BNP and Jatiya Party
agreed to talks, but at a 15 November meeting AL general secretary Obaidul Quader
told Haas there was no time for such discussions.135 The party issued a formal rejection
of talks the same day, claiming it had been open to negotiations “for many months”
but could not join them now because the BNP was demanding Hasina’s resignation.136

C. Stacking the Field of Candidates

On 15 November, the Election Commission announced the schedule for the poll, set-
ting 7 January as voting day and a campaign period stretching from 18 December to
5 January. Candidates had until 30 November to register and could withdraw at any
time before 17 December.
Working on the assumption that the BNP would boycott the polls, the AL has
sought to create the impression of a credible election. AL officials have reportedly
been negotiating deals with token opposition parties by which they will participate on

131
The blockades have most impact outside the capital, with intercity bus travel almost completely
stopped and a large decrease in truck transport. Crisis Group interviews, November 2023.
132
“BNP’s hartal begins”, Somoy News, 19 November 2023.
133
The statement was signed by the embassies or high commissions of Australia, Canada, Japan,
South Korea, Norway, the UK and the U.S.
134
The Jatiya Party was established in 1986 as a vehicle for former military ruler Hussain Moham-
mad Ershad. Since military rule ended, it has struggled to compete with the AL and BNP. Today, its
support is strong only in Ershad’s home region of Rangpur.
135
“The ship has sailed”, he commented. “No scope for dialogue, Quader says after receiving Donald
Lu’s letter for unconditional talks”, The Business Standard, 15 November 2023.
136
Letter from Obaidul Quader to Donald Lu, 15 November 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 23

the understanding that they will be allowed to win seats. The aim is to avoid a rehash
of the widely derided 2014 vote, when the AL and its allies won more than half the
seats uncontested. In the background, officials from security agencies have pressured
recalcitrant minor party leaders to join the vote or offered financial inducements to
encourage participation.137 These tactics have been moderately successful: 29 of 44
registered parties are competing, with around 2,700 aspirants submitting nomina-
tion papers for the 300 elected seats, compared to twelve parties and fewer than
1,000 candidates in 2014.138
The most significant inclusion is the Jatiya Party, which has registered candi-
dates for nearly every constituency. The party’s decision to join the vote is not sur-
prising, given that its popularity has been on the wane for decades. In a reasonably
fair election, the Jatiya Party would likely get just a small share of the vote in most
constituencies and win a tiny number of seats. To secure the Jatiya Party’s participa-
tion and ensure the next parliament has a token opposition in the BNP’s absence, the
AL agreed to withdraw candidates in 26 constituencies, essentially giving these seats
to the Jatiya Party.139
Yet the AL has struggled with another of its tactics: attempts to induce or coerce
BNP leaders to join its ranks, form new parties or run as independents. Several new
parties set up over the past year by former BNP members, including the Trinamool
BNP and Bangladesh Nationalist Movement, have largely failed to attract more BNP
officials to their cause.140 After the registration deadline for the election passed, an
AL spokesperson said fifteen “central leaders” and 30 former lawmakers from the
BNP would participate in the poll.141 Few of them, however, wield much influence in
the party.142 The highest ranking of the turncoats is vice chairman Shahjahan Omar,
who announced he was running as an AL candidate a day after being freed.143 Under-
scoring the existence of a quid pro quo, the courts have rejected bail requests from
all other top BNP officials, including those arrested in relation to the same incident
for which Omar received bail. A government minister later confirmed that jailed BNP
leaders were promised release if they agreed to stand as candidates.144
Likely in response to this failure to split the BNP, the AL took the unusual step of
announcing that its own party members who did not secure pre-selection from party

137
Crisis Group interviews, November 2023. See also “Pressure to pull BNP outcasts into the ‘king’s
party’”, Samakal, 21 November 2023 [Bengali]; and “Why have small parties gained so much im-
portance?”, Prothom Alo, 19 November 2023.
138
“Record 747 independent candidates submit nominations to contest in 12th JS polls”, The Busi-
ness Standard, 1 December 2023.
139
Crisis Group interviews, November 2023. See also “Never-ending drama in JP”, The Daily Star,
5 January 2019; and “AL relinquishes 26 seats to JaPa, 6 to allies”, Prothom Alo, 18 December 2023.
140
At least thirteen former BNP officials have joined Trinamool BNP, and six are running on the
Bangladesh Nationalist Movement ticket. See “33 expelled, former BNP leaders join polls”, Pro-
thom Alo, 2 December 2023.
141
See “BNP’s 15 central leaders, 30 former MPs taking part in election: Quader”, The Business
Standard, 1 December 2023. Other reports put the number at just 33 BNP officials, including only
five lawmakers. See “33 expelled, former BNP leaders join polls”, op. cit.
142
For an overview of AL efforts to entice or coerce BNP officials to run, see “Initiatives to bring BNP
leaders in election individually, not the party”, Prothom Alo, 10 November 2023.
143
“BNP’s Shahjahan gets AL ticket, walks out of jail”, New Age, 30 November 2023.
144
“‘Govt offered BNP leaders release from jail if they join polls’”, Prothom Alo, 17 December 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
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chiefs would be allowed to run as independent candidates – even though this work-
around violates the party charter.145 Addressing the party’s pre-selected contenders,
Hasina described these independents as “dummy candidates” and said they were
needed to create “competition” for the party’s first choices.146 Subsequently, around
440 AL members registered as independents, including dozens of MPs who had failed
to secure nomination.147 Media reports have quoted party insiders as saying the deci-
sion was taken to ensure that AL candidates would not run unopposed – for exam-
ple, if candidates from other parties later withdrew or were barred from standing –
and in hopes of boosting turnout.148
Contrary to expectations, the “dummy candidates” ploy seems to have backfired,
creating consternation with both the party’s official nominees and allied parties. AL
candidates have expressed concern that they might lose to these “dummies”, some of
whom have a strong local following, and clashes have already broken out between
their supporters and those of AL independents running against them.149 A day after
the party said it would carefully review all independents, the state-appointed deputy
commissioners who act as district returning officers during elections found grounds
to disqualify around 200 of them, including some sitting MPs.150 Meanwhile, smaller
members of the AL-led fourteen-party alliance have been perturbed at the lack of a
seat-sharing deal with the AL, which they say is unprecedented.151 The AL eventually
agreed to allocate six seats to its allies.152
Complicating matters further for the AL, a broader movement appears to be com-
ing together to oppose the election. While only a dozen or so registered parties are
boycotting the vote, the BNP the most prominent among them, scores more that the
Election Commission has refused to register say they would have declined to partici-
pate as well.153 This group includes not only the BNP’s more traditional allies, but
also leftist and Islamist parties that have not normally aligned themselves with the
BNP, such as the country’s second-largest Islamist party, Islami Andolan Bangladesh.
The BNP is reportedly considering trying to bring all boycotting parties, both regis-

145
See, for example, “No post for rebels in party”, The Daily Star, 19 September 2021.
146
“PM Hasina directs inclusion of dummy candidates in uncontested seats”, Dhaka Tribune, 26
November 2023.
147
“Over 400 independent candidates from AL”, Prothom Alo, 2 December 2023.
148
“AL candidates upset at party strategy to field independent candidates”, Prothom Alo, 2 Decem-
ber 2023.
149
Ibid.
150
See “AL’s independent candidates: Party to decide their fate on a case-by-case basis”, The Daily
Star, 2 December 2023; and “Many AL nominees, MPs lose candidacy”, New Age, 3 December
2023. The officers also disqualified AL candidates for some seats, seemingly leaving the way open
for the “opposition” to win them. See “AL candidate’s nomination cancelled, nomination of Kalyan
Party’s Ibrahim valid”, Prothom Alo, 3 December 2021.
151
See “AL in chaos over seat sharing, dummies”, New Age, 3 December 2023; and “14-party waits
AL’s decision on seat sharing”, Prothom Alo, 3 December 2023.
152
“AL relinquishes 26 seats”, op. cit.
153
In August, the Election Commission approved two parties linked to ex-BNP members but reject-
ed ten other applications due to “incorrect information”. See “Why are new parties struggling to get
EC registration?”, Dhaka Tribune, 21 August 2023; and “BNP, 62 other parties boycott 12th nat’l
election”, Shampratik Deshkal, 2 December 2023.
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tered and unregistered, into a single platform.154 This task may prove difficult, as some
parties say they will not join a movement alongside Jamaat. But the BNP is likely to
work with at least some of these parties to organise demonstrations and rallies call-
ing for the government’s resignation, while also continuing its blockades.155 On 16
December, the BNP held its largest rally since 28 October. Police said the event drew
tens of thousands of supporters, but a journalist who was present put the number at
300,000.156

154
“BNP plans to bring all opposition to one platform”, Prothom Alo, 3 December 2023.
155
Ibid.
156
Mubashar Hasan, “Crackdown on Bangladesh Nationalist Party hasn’t broken its morale yet”,
The Diplomat, 18 December 2023.
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V. Avoiding Bloodshed

The past few months have left Bangladesh in some peril. The ruling party has sent an
unequivocal message that it has little interest in dialogue, let alone compromise,
ahead of the polls. As a result, one of the country’s two largest political forces will
boycott the election, greatly reducing the legitimacy of the process and increasing
the risk of violence and instability in its aftermath and over time.

A. The Risks of a Flawed Election

To an extent, the events of the past year are not unusual in Bangladeshi politics.
Since the end of military rule in 1990, both the AL and BNP have typically used the
tools at their disposal to cling to office. Meanwhile, whichever of them was in oppo-
sition, along with other smaller parties, has taken to the streets to force the incum-
bent to make a pre-election handover of power to a neutral, caretaker administration,
on the assumption that the opposition would win in a reasonably fair vote. The AL
itself did this twice when in opposition, forcing the BNP to hold a second election in
1996 (which the AL won), and violently opposing a planned January 2007 election
(leading to a military-backed caretaker government). The BNP tried a similar strate-
gy from 2013 to 2015, following Hasina’s amendment of the constitution to remove
the caretaker government provision, but it was unsuccessful.
The present crisis, however, runs deeper. The feud between the two parties – and
their leaders, Hasina and Zia – has always been bitter and personal. But fifteen years
of state repression, with flare-ups of violence on both sides, have raised the antago-
nism to new heights. The government’s decision to break up the “grand rally” on
28 October and prosecute opposition leaders has both confirmed its determination
to stymie its main adversary and increased the opposition’s desperation to see the
AL removed from power. Outbreaks of violence on the sidelines of political rallies in
Bangladesh are, regrettably, commonplace. Sending in the police to disperse such
gatherings with stun grenades and tear gas is unusual. But arresting virtually the
entire leadership of the main opposition party is unprecedented.157 An estimated
20,000 political activists are now in prison and many more on trial, while the BNP,
Jamaat, Islami Andalon Bangladesh, the Democratic Left Alliance and dozens of
other parties (most of which were blocked from even registering) will not take part
in the polls.
While the AL has gone to great lengths to create the impression of a competitive
election, many Bangladeshis will see the poll as a charade. The fact that few BNP
leaders have defected to other parties means that the country’s main opposition force
remains largely intact, even though it is not standing and is calling for a national boy-
cott of the vote.158 Furthermore, turnout is likely to be low, and the AL and local offi-
cials may fall back on ballot box stuffing – not to change the results, but to generate
the sense of a higher participation rate, as occurred in two recent by-elections.159

157
Crisis Group interviews, November 2023.
158
“BNP launches vote boycott campaign”, Prothom Alo, 22 December 2023.
159
The Election Commission suspended the results of the 5 November by-elections after evidence
emerged of ballot box stuffing, including a video in which an AL polling agent stamped dozens of
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Given that the last two national elections were also one-sided affairs, this is likely to
mean that almost an entire generation will have yet to vote in a genuinely competi-
tive contest.160
In these conditions, the dangers of deepening unrest and violence are manifest.
The BNP is likely to continue its blockades, and may also work with leftist, centrist
and Islamist parties to launch a new round of protests after the elections, possibly
provoking a repressive response from security forces and AL supporters. Meanwhile,
the AL’s internal unity, which has already proved hard to maintain over recent years,
is likely to come under even greater strain.161 In May 2023, up to twelve AL support-
ers were killed in intra-party violence in just nine days.162 If the ruling party cannot
manage these competing demands, the polls risk triggering more clashes between
rival party supporters or between AL supporters and “opposition” parties that believe
seat allocation deals are being broken.
Even graver risks could lie in wait. The BNP’s hope was that the AL could be forced
to compromise in the face of a combination of mostly non-violent protests, economic
crisis and external and/or internal interventions – particularly from foreign gov-
ernments and the Bangladeshi army. U.S. policies toward Bangladesh over the past
two years have created space for BNP political activities but have also served to re-
strain the BNP from pursuing the violent tactics it has employed in the past. If the
party’s strategy appears to have failed, however, BNP leaders – many of whom are
now in prison – will face pressure from factions within the party to revert to their old
tactics of more overt violence, possibly by teaming up with Jamaat.163
That would be a mistake. Over the past eighteen months, the BNP has done much
to repair its international image and to show supporters inside Bangladesh that it
is far from a spent force. It should continue to eschew political violence, even as it
maintains its movement against the AL government and efforts to restore democracy.
Although violent protests have worked in the past in Bangladesh to pressure govern-
ments into making concessions, the current level of state repression means it is less
likely to succeed as a tactic. Meanwhile, a strategy of violence plays into the hands of
the AL, providing it with more ammunition to portray the BNP as “terrorists” and
“killers”. As the election approached, Hasina stepped up this rhetoric at campaign

ballots for the ruling party’s candidate. See “EC suspends results of two by elections for irregulari-
ties”, New Age, 7 November 2023.
160
The preliminary report from the 2022 Population and Housing Census suggests that about 25
per cent of the population – or approximately 40 million people – are in the 18-33 age bracket and
have therefore never had the chance to vote in a credible general election. Indeed, many people in
this age cohort have never voted in a general election at all. See “Population & Housing Census
2022 Preliminary Report”, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.
161
Badiul Alam Majumdar, “New Trends in Violence in Bangladesh”, Centre for Governance Stud-
ies, February 2022.
162
“Infighting, killing at grassroots a headache for Awami League”, Prothom Alo, 7 May 2023. Local
elections in 2016 – the first in which political parties were able to nominate candidates – resulted in
scores of deadly clashes, most of them between AL supporters. See “Electoral Violence in South Asia:
Local Elections in West Bengal and Bangladesh”, ACLED, 17 October 2016.
163
Crisis Group interviews, December 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 28

rallies, claiming the BNP has “no right to do politics”, signalling a possible intensifi-
cation of her government’s crackdown on the opposition after the vote.164

B. Handling the Poll’s Aftermath

The window for an agreement between the AL and BNP to ensure a more inclusive
vote on 7 January has almost certainly closed. But the case for resuming dialogue
and improving relations between the two sides is likely to grow even more compel-
ling as the government confronts a host of challenges after the poll.
The election is set to go ahead, but without genuine competition between the
country’s main political forces. Although the AL will almost certainly secure a large
majority, victory under these conditions may not serve the party’s interests. The 2024
elections are taking place in circumstances vastly different to those of 2014 or 2018,
when the AL government was more popular at home and abroad and flawed elec-
toral procedures carried few consequences for its public standing. Nowadays, the
AL has lost much of its support because of the country’s economic malaise and the
government’s repressive behaviour. The crackdown it has mounted against the op-
position has also been harsher than at any time since the return of democracy in
1990-1991. In contrast, the BNP has mainly avoided resorting to the violence it used
between 2013 and 2015 and kept its distance from Jamaat. The U.S. for its part seems
to be more willing to push for fairer electoral conditions and a more inclusive democ-
racy, though how far it can or will go in doing so after the polls is unclear.
Although victory for the AL in the January general election appears inevitable,
the government’s prospects for the month ahead could darken. As noted above, pro-
tests are likely to intensify and could well be met by harsher state crackdowns. A bal-
ance of payments or banking crisis would affect not only the country’s poor, who are
already suffering from high inflation, but also the middle classes and even the wealthy
who have until now tended to back the government. If Washington or other Western
capitals impose further sanctions, that would inflict further damage, both in terms of
their direct economic impact as well as the signal they send about the government.
Although the AL government has reduced the threat posed by the army, it is not
completely out of the question that the military would intervene if it felt the alter-
native was chaos, though it would look for strong and broad international support
before stepping in. As in 2007, it would likely do so only temporarily, yet any seizure
of power could still entail several years of military government.
Even if such dire scenarios do not materialise, the government may well slide
toward more pronounced authoritarian rule. To maintain its grip on power when the
economy is struggling and its support is falling, the AL will likely have to engage
in higher levels of state control and coercion. Comments late in the campaign from
senior officials, including Hasina, suggest that a further clampdown may be planned
after the election. In certain ways, however, the past eighteen months have shown the
limits of such an approach. While controlling the levers of power, the AL’s attempts
to weaken the BNP have not only failed but also catalysed the formation of a broad
opposition front. This outcome would seem very far from the founding ideals of the

164
“‘BNP has no right to do politics’”, The Daily Star, 30 December 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 29

AL, which spearheaded Bangladesh’s independence movement and, in the eyes of its
supporters, best represented the people in their political and economic struggles.165
Bangladesh, in short, appears poised for a period of instability that serves no one’s
interests. Ideally, the general election would be pushed back to create a new oppor-
tunity for dialogue, in which the U.S. and India would work together to encourage a
compromise between the two parties. With only days until the polls, it seems far too
late for a delay. But a flawed election provides only more reason to redouble efforts
to get the AL and its opponents talking again after 7 January.
Dialogue should aim to rebuild a modicum of trust between the two major par-
ties, but its success will depend on concessions from the AL primarily, as well as the
BNP to a lesser extent. The two leading parties should begin by refraining from the
inflammatory rhetoric that has become common in recent months. The AL should
then enable BNP leaders to get bail (by not opposing their applications) in exchange
for the opposition calling off its blockades. It could also take other steps to defuse
tensions – even symbolic ones, such as allowing Khaleda Zia to travel overseas for
medical treatment. It should also take measures to demonstrate its willingness to
open political space, such as further reform of the Cyber Security Act and labour laws.
The BNP, for its part, should relax its hardline position on Hasina’s resignation.
Senior AL figures fear fierce and bloody reprisals from the BNP in the event of a
transfer in power, particularly at the grassroots level where Bangladeshi politics tends
to be most violent. For the AL to agree to a deal, the BNP would need to provide
guarantees that no such payback would occur if government changes hands. Enforc-
ing such an agreement may require the involvement of the army, the country’s only
institution that is not partisan.
One possible outcome of this dialogue might be a second election in which the
BNP and other opposition forces participate. While it is highly improbable that
the AL would consider a rerun, there are precedents for it in Bangladesh, though
admittedly usually only in the face of mass and often violent protests. Under General
Hussain Muhammad Ershad, popular movements brought an early end to parliaments
elected in 1986 and 1988. The most similar recent example came in the mid-1990s,
when the AL and its allies, including Jamaat, forced the ruling BNP to hold a second
election in June 1996, after most parties boycotted a vote in February of that year
that saw dismal turnout. In January 2007, events played out somewhat differently,
with the AL’s boycott of a planned election prompting the military to install an
emergency caretaker government. Although the AL is likely to resist any move toward
a second vote, it may begin to consider the merits of another poll if conditions for
governance deteriorate sharply in the coming months.

165
Aside from this challenge to its identity, the AL also faces the longer-term issue of managing the
succession from its all-powerful leader. Sheikh Hasina is in her mid-70s and, while she appears to
remain in good health, she has no heir apparent. Given the dynastic nature of Bangladesh politics,
most assume that her successor will be a close relative. Yet none of the obvious candidates from her
family have emerged as a clear favourite, and analysts doubt that any of them would have the power
base or experience to maintain party unity in the way that Hasina has done so effectively over the
years. This issue is particularly pressing because of Hasina’s iron grip on the party’s decision-making,
which has inhibited the rise of capable younger leaders.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 30

For the two parties to reach such an agreement will no doubt be challenging and
will likely require support from foreign governments. But for the sake of its 170 mil-
lion citizens, the country should aim to move away from zero-sum politics in which
both major parties view each election as an existential fight that they cannot afford
to lose.

C. International Support
Foreign powers also have an important role to play in shaping Bangladesh’s political
future. Washington’s recent moves have had a decisive impact – not only in terms of
enabling the opposition to resume political activities to some extent, but also in dis-
suading opposition groups from resorting to the violence seen in the past. The U.S.
should continue to press all sides, including the BNP and its allies, to engage in dia-
logue and avoid bloodshed. It should make clear that its actions are aimed at support-
ing the country’s democratic credentials and not to bring a particular party to power.
It is not yet clear whether the U.S. would be ready to enact further sanctions, nor
whether other foreign governments would follow suit. Nor is it evident that further
sanctions would be useful in persuading the AL government to adopt a more prag-
matic approach.166 If sanctions are deployed, they should remain targeted, in order
to not harm ordinary Bangladeshis, and should be accompanied by clear guidance
on the prerequisites for having them lifted. Given their potential impact on the wider
economy and the Bangladeshi people, a better outcome would be to avoid sanctions
entirely by instead nudging both the AL and BNP toward negotiations. As events un-
fold in the months after the election, international partners should try to present polit-
ical off-ramps to the AL government, emphasising the risks of its current intran-
sigence. They could, for example, make the non-application or lifting of sanctions, or
financial support to avert an economic crisis, contingent on progress in talks with
the BNP.
It would also be helpful for India and the U.S., the two foreign powers with the
most influence on Bangladeshi political forces, to reach an agreement on their respec-
tive Bangladesh policies that could enable them to work together to avert violence in
the months ahead. So far, their positions and interventions have served to entrench
both parties: Indian support makes the AL feel secure, while the BNP thinks U.S.
pressure and possible sanctions will force the AL to buckle. Both should push the two
sides to engage in dialogue after the 7 January elections. For New Delhi, in particu-
lar, unfettered support for one party is a risk-laden strategy. Bangladesh is entering
a period of uncertainty, and there is no guarantee that the AL will remain in office
over the long term. Adopting a more balanced position would put India’s relations
with its neighbour on a more sustainable footing.
The EU, for its part, should use its considerable leverage in Bangladesh to press
the government to take steps toward opening political space and entering talks with
its opponents. Bangladesh’s graduation from least-developed country status in 2026
will trigger the removal of automatic tariff-free access to the European market, fol-

166
Some evidence suggests that sanctions on Bangladeshi officials have resulted in behaviour change;
measures such as the visa policy announced in May have had less effect. Crisis Group interviews,
October-November 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 31

lowing a three-year transition period. After that, access will be contingent on com-
plying with benchmarks on human and labour rights. If Bangladesh does not meet
the requirements, its most important industry will likely lose preferential access to
the largest buyer of the country’s garments.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 32

VI. Conclusion

Just a few years ago, the AL’s grip on power in Bangladesh seemed unshakable. But
a sharp economic downturn and readiness at home and abroad to contemplate a
change in government have undermined its public support and reinvigorated the
opposition. A dangerous stalemate has ensued. The AL remains determined to stay
in office and has proven adept at wielding the state machinery against its opponents.
The country’s leading opposition force, the BNP, is determined to force the ruling
party into holding credible elections – which the opposition assumes it would win.
In the absence of conditions needed for a competitive poll, and with thousands of
its leaders and activists in jail, the BNP is set to boycott the 7 January elections. The
deadlock could push the opposition to adopt more violent tactics, while disputes
over seats among AL candidates, internal rivals and the token opposition could also
fuel clashes. Although it may be impossible before polling day, it is incumbent on
both sides to enter talks as early as possible to avoid a lengthy and potentially deadly
political showdown. Foreign governments, for their part, should work together to
cajole the two sides into negotiations aimed at forging a new political settlement.
Although foreign countries play an outsized role in Bangladeshi politics, it will be
up to the people of Bangladesh to determine the country’s future direction. Based on
the decisions that the AL and BNP take in the months ahead, the public will decide
either at the ballot box or on the streets.
Dhaka/Brussels, 4 January 2024
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 33

Appendix A: Map of Bangladesh

Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 34

Appendix B: About the International Crisis Group

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisa-
tion, with some 120 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level
advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or
close by countries or regions at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on
information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommen-
dations targeted at key international, regional and national decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes
CrisisWatch, a monthly early-warning bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in
up to 80 situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group’s reports are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on its website,
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, includ-
ing the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board of Trustees – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplo-
macy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations
to the attention of senior policymakers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by President & CEO
of the Fiore Group and Founder of the Radcliffe Foundation, Frank Giustra, as well as by former Foreign
Minister of Argentina and Chef de Cabinet to the United Nations Secretary-General, Susana Malcorra.

Comfort Ero was appointed Crisis Group’s President & CEO in December 2021. She first joined Crisis
Group as West Africa Project Director in 2001 and later rose to become Africa Program Director in 2011
and then Interim Vice President. In between her two tenures at Crisis Group, she worked for the Interna-
tional Centre for Transitional Justice and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Liberia.

Crisis Group’s international headquarters is in Brussels, and the organisation has offices in seven other
locations: Bogotá, Dakar, Istanbul, Nairobi, London, New York, and Washington, DC. It has presences in
the following locations: Abuja, Addis Ababa, Bahrain, Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Caracas, Gaza City, Gua-
temala City, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Juba, Kabul, Kyiv, Manila, Mexico City, Moscow, Seoul, Tbilisi,
Toronto, Tripoli, Tunis, and Yangon.

Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of governments, foundations, and private
sources. The ideas, opinions and comments expressed by Crisis Group are entirely its own and do not
represent or reflect the views of any donor. Currently Crisis Group holds relationships with the following
governmental departments and agencies: Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Austria
(Austrian Development Agency), Canada (Global Affairs Canada), Denmark (Ministry of Foreign Affairs),
European Union (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, Emergency Trust Fund for Africa), Fin-
land (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), France (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, French Development
Agency), Ireland (Department of Foreign Affairs), Japan (Japan International Cooperation Agency and
Japan External Trade Organization), Principality of Liechtenstein (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Luxembourg
(Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs), The Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), New Zealand
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Norway (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Qatar (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs), Slovenia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Switzerland (Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs), United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), United Kingdom (Foreign,
Commonwealth & Development Office), and the World Bank.

Crisis Group also holds relationships with the following foundations and organisations: Carnegie Corpora-
tion of New York, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Global Challenges Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation, John
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, National Endowment for Democracy, Open Society Founda-
tions, The David and Lucile Packard Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, Robert Bosch Stiftung, Rockefeller
Brothers Fund, Stand Together Trust, Stiftung Mercator, and Wellspring Philanthropic Fund.

January 2024
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 35

Appendix C: Reports and Briefings on Asia since 2021

Special Reports and Briefings South East Asia

Ten Challenges for the UN in 2021-2022, Spe- Responding to the Myanmar Coup, Asia Briefing
cial Briefing N°6, 13 September 2021. N°166, 16 February 2021.
7 Priorities for the G7: Managing the Global The Cost of the Coup: Myanmar Edges Toward
Fallout of Russia’s War on Ukraine, Special State Collapse, Asia Briefing N°167, 1 April
Briefing N°7, 22 June 2022. 2021.
Ten Challenges for the UN in 2022-2023, Spe- Southern Philippines: Keeping Normalisation on
cial Briefing N°8, 14 September 2022. Track in the Bangsamoro, Asia Report N°313,
Seven Priorities for Preserving the OSCE in a 15 April 2021.
Time of War, Special Briefing N°9, 29 Novem- Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Vir-
ber 2022. tual Battlefield, Asia Report N°314, 18 May
Seven Priorities for the G7 in 2023, Special 2021.
Briefing N°10, 15 May 2023. Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw: The New Armed
Ten Challenges for the UN in 2023-2024, Crisis Resistance to Myanmar’s Coup, Asia Briefing
Group Special Briefing N°11, 14 September N°168, 28 June 2021.
2023. Competing Visions of International Order in the
South China Sea, Asia Report N°315, 29 No-
North East Asia vember 2021.

Risky Competition: Strengthening U.S.-China The Philippines’ Dilemma: How to Manage Ten-
Crisis Management, Asia Report N°324, 20 sions in the South China Sea, Asia Report
May 2022. N°316, 2 December 2021.
Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait, Asia Report Vietnam Tacks Between Cooperation and
N°333, 27 October 2023. Struggle in the South China Sea, Asia Report
N°318, 7 December 2021.
Thin Ice in the Himalayas: Handling the India-
China Border Dispute, Asia Report N°334, 14 Myanmar’s Coup Shakes Up Its Ethnic Conflicts,
November 2023. Asia Report N°319, 12 January 2022.
Southern Philippines: Fostering an Inclusive
Bangsamoro, Asia Report N°322, 18 February
South Asia
2022.
What Future for Afghan Peace Talks under a
Addressing Islamist Militancy in the Southern
Biden Administration?, Asia Briefing N°165, 13
Philippines, Asia Report N°323, 18 March
January 2021.
2022.
Pakistan: Shoring Up Afghanistan’s Peace
Resisting the Resistance: Myanmar’s Pro-
Process, Asia Briefing N°169, 30 June 2021.
Military Pyusawhti Militias, Asia Briefing
Beyond Emergency Relief: Averting Afghani- N°171, 6 April 2022.
stan’s Humanitarian Catastrophe, Asia Report
Sustaining the Momentum in Southern Thai-
N°317, 6 December 2021.
land’s Peace Dialogue, Asia Briefing N°172,
Pakistan’s Hard Policy Choices in Afghanistan,
19 April 2022.
Asia Report N°320, 4 February 2022.
Avoiding a Return to War in Myanmar’s Rakhine
Women and Peacebuilding in Pakistan’s North
State, Asia Report N°325, 1 June 2022.
West, Asia Report N°321, 14 February 2022.
Coming to Terms with Myanmar’s Russia Em-
Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the brace, Asia Briefing N°173, 4 August 2022.
Taliban, Asia Report N°326, 12 August 2022
Crowdfunding a War: The Money behind Myan-
(also available in Dari and Pashto).
mar’s Resistance, Asia Report N°328, 20 De-
A New Era of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan,
cember 2022.
Asia Report N°327, 5 September 2022.
Breaking Gender and Age Barriers amid Myan-
Taliban Restrictions on Women’s Rights Deepen
mar’s Spring Revolution, Asia Briefing N°174,
Afghanistan’s Crisis, Asia Report N°329, 23
16 February 2023.
February 2023 (also available in Dari and
A Silent Sangha? Buddhist Monks in Post-coup
Pashto).
Myanmar, Asia Report N°330, 10 March 2023.
Crisis Mounts for Rohingya Refugees in Bangla-
A Road to Nowhere: The Myanmar Regime’s
desh, Asia Report N°335, 6 December 2023.
Stage-managed Elections, Asia Briefing
N°175, 28 March 2023.
Southern Philippines: Making Peace Stick in the
Bangsamoro, Asia Report N°331, 1 May 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 36

Southern Thailand’s Stop-start Peace Dialogue,

Asia Briefing N°176, 25 May 2023 (also avail-
able in Malay and Thai).
Transnational Crime and Geopolitical Contesta-
tion along the Mekong, Asia Report N°332, 18
August 2023.
Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Ex-
pands in Myanmar’s Shan State, Asia Briefing
N°177, 4 September 2023 (also available in
Burmese).
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 37

Appendix D: International Crisis Group Board of Trustees

PRESIDENT & CEO Mo Ibrahim Ayo Obe

Comfort Ero Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Chair of the Board of the Gorée
Former Crisis Group Vice Interim Foundation; Founder, Celtel Institute (Senegal); Legal Practitioner
President and Africa Program Director International (Nigeria)

Mahamadou Issoufou Meghan O'Sullivan

CO-CHAIRS Former President of Niger Former U.S. Deputy National Security
Adviser on Iraq and Afghanistan
Frank Giustra Kyung-wha Kang
President & CEO, Fiore Group; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kerry Propper
Founder, Radcliffe Foundation the Republic of Korea Managing Partner of ATW Partners;
Founder and Chairman of Chardan
Susana Malcorra Wadah Khanfar Capital
Former Foreign Minister of Argentina Co-Founder, Al Sharq Forum; former
Director General, Al Jazeera Network Ahmed Rashid
Author and Foreign Policy Journalist,
OTHER TRUSTEES
Nasser al-Kidwa Pakistan
Fola Adeola Chairman of the Yasser Arafat
Founder and Chairman, FATE Foundation; Former UN Deputy Juan Manuel Santos Calderón
Foundation Mediator on Syria Former President of Colombia; Nobel
Peace Prize Laureate 2016
Abdulaziz Al Sager Bert Koenders
Chairman and founder of the Gulf Former Dutch Minister of Foreign Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
Research Center and president of Affairs and Under-Secretary-General Former President of Liberia
Sager Group Holding of the United Nations
Ine Eriksen Søreide
Hushang Ansary Andrey Kortunov Former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Chairman, Parman Capital Group LLC; Director General of the Russian Former Minister of Defence of Norway,
Former Iranian Ambassador to the International Affairs Council and Chair of the Foreign Affairs and
U.S. and Minister of Finance and Defence Committee
Economic Affairs Ivan Krastev
Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Alexander Soros
Gérard Araud Strategies (Sofia); Founding Board Deputy Chair of the Global Board,
Former Ambassador of France Member of European Council on Open Society Foundations
to the U.S. Foreign Relations
George Soros
Zeinab Badawi Tzipi Livni Founder, Open Society Foundations
President, SOAS University of London Former Foreign Minister and Vice and Chair, Soros Fund Management
Prime Minister of Israel
Carl Bildt Alexander Stubb
Former Prime Minister and Foreign Helge Lund Director of the School of Transnational
Minister of Sweden Chair bp plc (UK) & Novo Nordisk Governance; Former Prime Minister of
(Denmark) Finland
Sandra Breka
Darian Swig
Vice President and Chief Operating Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown
Founder and President, Article 3
Officer, Open Society Foundations Former UN Deputy Secretary-General
Advisors; Co-Founder and Board
and Administrator of the United
Maria Livanos Cattaui Chair, Article3.org
Nations Development Programme
Former Secretary General of the
International Chamber of Commerce William H. McRaven
Retired U.S. Navy Admiral who served
Ahmed Charai as 9th Commander of the U.S. Special
Chairman and CEO of Global Media Operations Command
Holding and publisher of the Moroccan
weekly L’Observateur Shivshankar Menon
Former Foreign Secretary of India;
Nathalie Delapalme former National Security Adviser
Executive Director and Board Member
at the Mo Ibrahim Foundation Naz Modirzadeh
Director of the Harvard Law School
María Fernanda Espinosa Program on International Law and
Former President of UNGA’s 73rd Armed Conflict
session
Federica Mogherini
Miriam Coronel-Ferrer Former High Representative of the
Former Senior Mediation Adviser, UN European Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy
Sigmar Gabriel
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Saad Mohseni
Vice Chancellor of Germany Chairman and CEO of MOBY Group
Rima Khalaf-Hunaidi Nadia Murad
Former UN Undersecretary General President and Chairwoman of Nadia’s
and Executive Secretary of Initiative
UNESCWA
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock
Crisis Group Asia Report N°336, 4 January 2024 Page 38

G L OBA L C OR P O RA TE C O U NC IL
A distinguished circle of Crisis Group supporters drawn from senior executives and private sector firms.

Global Leaders
Aris Mining White & Case LLP
Shearman & Sterling LLP Yamana Gold

Global Partners
(1) Anonymous Eni Sempra Energy
APCO Worldwide Inc. Equinor TikTok
BP GardaWorld TotalEnergies
Chevron META

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A diverse range of philanthropists, prominent business leaders, government officials, lawyers and scholars from
around the world.
Anonymous (several) Geoffrey & Emily Hsu Juan Manuel Santos Calderón
Fola Adeola Mo Ibrahim Carson Seabolt
Chris Bake Gordon Keep Duco Sickinghe
Hakeem Belo-Osagie Wadah Khanfar Bryan Slusarchuk
Mark Bergman Cleopatra Kitti Stichting Giustra International
Stanley, Marion & Ed Bergman Alison Lawton Foundation
Harry Bookey & Pam Bass- Helge Lund Stichting Ochtendstond
Bookey Mark & Trish Malloch-Brown Darian Swig
Peder Bratt Jean Manas Corina Taylor
Maria Livanos Cattaui William H. McRaven Ian Telfer
Ahmed Charai Dennis Miller Steven Urbach
Helima Croft Saad Mohseni Raffi Vartanian
Lara Dauphinee Ayo Obe Marvin F Weissberg Memorial
Herman De Bode Lubna Olayan Fund
Tanaz Eshaghian Steven Oliveira Neil Woodyer & Colleen De
Sigmar Gabriel Thomas R. Pickering Bonis Woodyer
Jonas Grossman Kerry Propper Young Family Foundation
Russell Hardy Quiet Cove Foundation
Houssian Foundation Ahmed Rashid

A M B A S S A D O R C OU N C I L
Young leaders who bring their skills and experiences from diverse backgrounds to support a shared mission:
preventing war and shaping peace.
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Andrei Goldis Federico Firmian Manfredi Yasin Yaqubie

CRISIS GROUP EMERITII

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Founder and Trustee Emeritus Chairman Emeritus President Emeritus

Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown Thomas R. Pickering

Founder and Chairman Emeritus Chairman Emeritus