IBN RUSHD, FASL AL-MAQAL

AND
T H E T H E O R Y OF D O U B L E T R U T H

Dr. FehruIIah TERKAN*

he who does not understand the art

does not understand the product of art,
and he who does not understand the product of art
does not understand the Artisan.

Ibn R u s h d

1
In the aftermath of the translation activities in the 9 and 10 century, the
Muslim East and the West witnessed a great deal of intellectual efforts on the
part of the Muslim philosophers to harmonize the religious teaching and the
1
newfangled line of thinking. There is no doubt that the transmission of Greek
thought brought along certain metaphysical speculations that were apparently
viewed to be at odds with Islamic revelation, which presented its own system of
thought on many intellectual issues. At such an intersection of religious and
philosophical thought begins the struggle of the philosopher in the Muslim
community. And the outcome of this struggle was the considerable high volume
of writings on the part of the philosophically minded in an effort to create a
room for philosophical endeavor in view of the manner in which people
perceived it. Though I do not at all suggest that reconciliatory efforts be viewed
2
in the Straussian sense, but historical facts and the fact that works produced to

* This article is based on ray paper presented at the Medieval Congress in Kalamazoo, M I ,
A B D in 1999.

* Ankara University Faculty of Divinity

1
F o r a general knowledge of such harmonization efforts in Andalus, see A. 'Abd al-Maqsud,
al-TawJiq bayn al-DTn wa al-Falsafah 'inda Falasifa al-lslam fial-Andalits (Cairo, 1993).
2
According to Strauss, in the Muslim world in general, and also in the Jewish world for that
matter, there was no harmony between philosophy and society. ( L . Strauss, Persecution and
the art of Writing (Giencoe, 1952), 18). People's understanding of revelation was very
influential on the mode of (he acceptance and adjustment of philosophy in the Islamic
community and the degree of difficulty for the philosophers to assimilate philosophy in their
society. Christian and islamic-Jewish acceptance and adjustment of philosophy in the
community took place in accordance with their understanding of revelation. That is to say,
while for Christians the understanding of Revelation was dominated by a character of faith,
108 Dr. Fehrullah TERKAN

that effect in fact indicate that there was a tension between those who are into
philosophy and those who are in the receiving position, which was sometimes
3
conveyed through the titles of their books.

When we come to the period in which Ibn Rushd experienced his own
difficulty, and although Ibn Rushd's predecessors had worked on the
harmonization of philosophy and religion in the Muslim East, this did not help
th
him very much in the 12 century due to the debacle of the philosophical
tradition and the intensive orthodox texture of the Muslim community in
4
Andalus in particular. Despite all this, one cannot ignore the very existence of
Muslim philosophers that emerged under such unfavorable circumstances. So
even though the recognition and the legitimacy of philosophy by the community
always raised a problem, this fact only confined the philosophers to intellectual
circles and royal patronage.

for islamic and Jewish thinkers, it was of character of law (Torah, SharT'ah) (Ibid, 9-10). It is
also thought that due to the lack of social recognition of philosophy, the Muslim philosophers
sometimes had to disguise their philosophical conclusions in an Islamic garment, which is
why they tried to avoid exposing their application of philosophy to the tradition or revelation.
On this, Strauss builds his argument of esoteric and exoteric writings of the philosophers. He
thinks that because of potential danger the philosophers employed an exoteric writings in their
works, where they planted their original views that oppose to religious teachings esoterically
(Strauss, 36, 110), which was "the form in which philosophy became visible to the political
community" (Strauss, 18). It was an armor by which philosophers guarded themselves against
the dangers they were in. That is also why, the falâsifah, according to J. Kraemer, when they
were trying to bring philosophy into the Islamic city, employed "rhetorical accommodations"
to the Islamic lexicon by means of a hermeneutic reinterpretation of the root concepts, while
diverging radically from the rslamic doctrine on substantive questions regarding the nature of
the best policy ("The Jihad of the Falasifa," JSA1, v.10 (1987), 291). Especially Ernest Rcnan
suggested that Ibn Rushd hid his real views in his writings in fear of danger (Renan, Averroes
et L'Averro'isme, Paris, 1861).

For W . M . Watt, it is possible to discover how far certain philosophical doctrines of the
philosophers such as Ibn Rushd reflect the social structure of his time in al-Andalus
("Philosophy and Social Structure in Almohad Spain" Islamic Quarterly, v.8, no.1-2 (1964),
46, 50). For example, Ibn Tufayl's Hayy b. Yaqz&n reflects an accord with Almohad rational
theology, while before that, Ibn Bâjjah had turned away from active political life and sought
solitary life (Watt, 48). We can add to that Ibn Rushd's evaluation of some Almoravid rulers
as falling from timocracy into hedonism in his Commentary on Plalo's Republic (trans. R.
Lerner (Ithaca, 1974), 125. Cf. G . F . Hourani's view especially on Fast aUMaqal: the content
shows the prevailing unpopularity of philosophy at the time. See his "Introduction" to his
translation of Fasl al-Maqal in Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy
(London, 1978), 17. Also see Strauss, 30.

Especially for the negative approach of the Malikite jurists; see ' A b d al-Maqsud, 33.
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I B N R U S H D , FASL AL-MAQÂL AND THE THEORY OFDOUBLE TRUTH 109

Ibn Rushd (520/1126-595/1198), or Averroes, lived under the Almohad

ih lh
(al-Muwahhidim) dynasty in Andalus in the 6 / i 2 century. He was appointed a
few times as a judge and could not escape the intellectual conflict in the
community. There seem to have been two intellectual trends in his time: a small
number of people represented the supporters of the fundamentally rationalistic
doctrinal system advocated by Ibn Tfimart, the founder of the Almohad
movement. The other trend was represented to a lesser degree by theologians
5
but mainly by the Muslim orthodox jurists who were following the Malikite
School of jurisprudence, and who were very influential on the public. One
might say that the local settings in general contained a noticeable intellectual
6 7
climate, but it was generally unfavorable to philosophy, except for the efforts
and encouragement of especially two successive Almohad rulers, Abu Ya'qOb
8
Yûsuf (r. 1163-84) and Abu YQsuf Ya'qub (al-Mansur) (r.1184-99). As a result
of'this predominantly Malikite intellectual environment and the tension between
the jurists and the philosophers in addition to the adverse circumstances, not

Cf. Watt, "Structure," 48. For the Zahirites and the Malikites, see O. Leaman, Averroes and
his Philosophy (Oxford, 1988), 2 ff. Also M . Watt, History, esp. p.95-97. F o r an evaluation of
Ibn Rushd's status among the Malikite jurists, see A . M . Turki " L a Place d ' A v e r r o è s Juriste
dans L'Histoire du Malikisme et de L'Espagne Musulmane" in Multiple Averroès (Paris: L .
B . Lettres, 1978), pp.33-49.

During reigns of the Almohad and the Aîmoravid (al-Murâbitım) dynasties the philosophers,
Ibn Masarrâ, Ibn Bâjja, Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Rushd and Musa b. Maymun (Maimonides) enjoyed a
relative freedom and toleration for philosophical interest. For a lengthy description of the
cultural settings in Andalus, see Urvoy Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (London: Routledge, 1991), and
also Leaman Ibn Rushd and his Philosophy, 1-11..

Hourani, "Introduction," 13, 17. In an account related in A. al-Marrâkushï al-Al-Mu'jib fi

Talkhïs Akhbâr al-Maghrib (Eds. M . S. a i - ' A y â n & M . A . al-'Alamî. (Cairo, 1949), 242-3),
Ibn Rushd narrates his first meeting with the ruler Abu Ya'qub Yusuf, which was arranged by
Ibn Tufayi. According to this story, when they meet, the ruler asks Ibn Rushd about the
opinion of the philosophers on the heavens whether they are created or eternal. Tbn Rushd first
fears and hesitates to speak, but when the ruler begins discussing the matter with Ibn Tufayl in
front of him, Ibn Rushd gradually enters the discussion. This story too bears an indication for
the fear of philosophers to reveal their association with philosophy. (The whole narrative is
cited in Hourani, "Introduction," 13-14).

Cf. Hourani. "Introduction," 6. It is possible that they had a personal intellectual attachment to
philosophy and/or they may have employed philosophical method against the Malikite jurist
in order to improve their rational perspective in religious matters. MacClintock speculates that
Ibn Rushd's appointments as judge may have been for the purpose of sustaining scholarship
for philosophical studies ("Averroes" Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( N Y , 1972), 220). F o r the
influence of Almohad doctrines on Ibn Rushd, see D . Urvoy, " L a P e n s é e Almohade dans
L ' œ u v r e d'Averroès" in Multiple Averroès (Paris, 1978), 45-53.

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110 Dr. Fehrullah TERKAN

only was Averroes banished and his doctrine pronounced heretical, but also
edicts ordering that philosophical works be burned and forbidding these studies
9
were issued since they were considered dangerous to religion.
i0
Ibn Rushd wrote a treatise entitled "Fasl al-Maqal," from whose title
and content, it is possible to deduce some insights into what kind of a book it is,
and in what kind of cultural context Ibn Rushd wrote it. Modem scholars have
different comments on the nature of the treatise and the arguments Ibn Rushd
used in it. From the arguments of the book that was presumably written in an
attempt to reconcile philosophy and religion, it was alleged, emerged the so-
Ul
called theory of "double truth" in the Averroistic school of Paris in the 13
century. In this article, I shall first summarize how contemporary scholars view
the content of Fasl al-Maqal, and then examine what Ibn Rushd in fact does in
that work, and finally to argue, following certain scholars, against the alleged
connection of the theory of double truth with Ibn Rushd.

To what end was Fasl ai-Maqal composed?

First of all, it is certain that the author starts with the divine law to infer
11
the legal status of philosophy. That is, the question is formulated as one of
Islamic law. Alain de Libera rightly insists that Ibn Rushd's announcement of
2
purpose clearly indicates the juridical nature of the text.' Even the title of the

R. Arnaldez, "Ibn Rushd" EP, 911, The reason generally accepted for Ibn Rushd's falling in
disgrace İs as follows: because of the enormous influence and authority of the fuqalm' over
the public, although the jurists don't seem to have made any claim to political power, they
managed to remain influential in a way that the rulers had to seek their support at time of
crises, One such incident resulted in the exile of Ibn Rushd to Luccna. Being engaged in Spain
in a war against the Christian forces, Al-Mansür, in order to obtain the support of the
orthodoxy and encourage the enthusiasm for the jihad against the Christians, he ceased to
favor Ibn Rushd. This resulted in Ibn Rushd's trial by Cordovans for his heretical views and
then his exile. For details see Urvoy, Ibn Rushd, 35; also see Arnaldez, 911. Cf. A l -
MarrakushT, 305-307.

Kitab Fasl al-Maqal wa Taqrlr ma bayn al-Shart'ah wa al-Hikmah min at-Ittisal (Ed. George
F. Hourani, Beirut: Catholic Press, 1961); translated by Hourani in Averroes on the Harmony
of Religion and Philosophy, opt. cit. Throughout the paper, the treatise will be referred to as
Fasl al-Maqal and references will be made to this translation; also in the text it will be
referred to as FM İn parentheses.

Cf. M . Mahdi, "Remarks on Averroes' Decisive Treatise," in M . Marmura (ed.) Islamic

Theology and Philosophy (Albany: S U N Y , 1984), 189. Cf. Hourani, "Introduction," 23.

Alan de Libera, "Introduction," in Averroes, Discours décisif (edition and French translation
of Fasl al-Maqal by Marc Geoffroy), (Paris: GF-Flammarion, 1996), 13.

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I B N R U S H D , FASL AL-MAQAL AND THE THEORY OFDOUBLE TRUTH 111

treatise proves that it is not a philosophical work, nor is it theological. For what
the title suggests is that the connection between philosophy and religion is
sought. However, for Libera, a connection is not accord, nor harmony, nor
13
reconciliation. Libera thus claims it to be a fatwa, a legal opinion, formulated
in a religious jurisdiction, given by Ibn Rushd as a qadT in response to the
14
condemnation of philosophy through persuasion by legal arguments. It is not,
therefore, a proclamation of rationalism; it is not an academic work either, for
Libera. It is only a text addressed to the public, that is the people educated in the
15
Malildte juridical tradition. Libera rejects the idea of reconciliation as the
purpose of the treatise, on the ground that its aim was not to 'harmonize'
religion with philosophy (neither visa versa), but to 'legalize' philosophy by
16
determining the connection of the two on juridical grounds. However, it is
clear that the legalization of philosophy does not preclude its harmonization
with religion.

Nevertheless, one should not overlook the fact that in Fad al-Maqal, Ibn
Rushd, apart from the juridical instruments, utilizes certain philosophical
methods rather than the Islamic juridical methods. It appears that as master in
both philosophy and [aw, Ibn Rushd mixed both characters in the Fasl so that he
would satisfy the jurist as much as he could; and further, now that GhazalT had
already divulged philosophical methods to the public (FM, 61-2), he could
introduce to them a taste of philosophical approach as well. Yet this does not
make the work a philosophical one. It stands to reason that Ibn Rushd simply
took advantage of his authority as a skillful and preeminent jurist to show how
close philosophical approach and religious teachings can get through proper
ta'wTl (allegorical interpretation) in terms of providing an explanation for
18
everything in a reduced level.

1 3
Libera, 10.
1 4
Hourani, 17, 19. Cf. Libera, 10 ff.
1 5
Libera, 11 IT, and 67.
1 0
Libera, 67.
1 7
Ibn Rushd in Fasl al-Maqal accuses al-Ghazali, ironically, of disclosing the philosophical
discussions to the public, which was supposed to be protected from the dangerous method, It
seems that after this exposition, Ibn Rushd feels obliged to bridge philosophical and religious
teachings, a task that he would hot have earned out, if it had not been for this mistake al-
Ghazâlî. One may also think that the disclosure of philosophical speculation played a
provoking role in his decision to write the treatise.
1 8
Cf. Urvoy, 76.

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112 Dr. Fehrullah TERKAN

It may be legitimate to ask whether Ibn Rushd's intention was to

conciliate the two perspectives, religious and philosophical, or just to ease up
the public rage and ignorance by giving a few examples of non-contradictory, or
reconcilable, explanations from both sides. On this point, M . Watt is certain
that the whole thing was a reconciliatory effort. Fasl al-Maqal, for him, was a
fait accompli and the intellectual reconciliation of the two sides, which was
19
practiced in his own life as a judge and as a philosopher. T.J. de Boer and T.B.
Irving agree that Ibn Rushd harmonized philosophy and religion, but they
thought he did that by completely separating the two as distinct ways to the
truth. De Boer believes that Ibn Rushd actually saw an agreement between
religion and philosophy "precisely because they are not seeking the same
20
thing. This perspective, that views philosophy and religion as two separate
domains, considering the explicit statements in Fasl al-Maqal that the two ways
lead to the same truth {FM, first chapter), fails to grasp the main argument of
Fasl al-Maqal, and resolves the conflict into the theory of Double truth of the
Latin Averroists, whom we shall touch upon later.

Furthermore, M . Mahdi considers the treatise a work with a character of

between legal and demonstrative on the ground that "statuses regarding
interpretation in the divine Law" do not appear to be exclusively legal
21
statuses." Mahdi is right in claiming that these statuses "in the divine Law" are
not exclusively legal. However, the legality and the methodology offiqh are not
always inferred from the divine Law and not always absolutely agreed upon so
as to strip Ibn Rushd's arguments off its juridical feature. For it is a fact that in
fiqh, there are some principles and methods that are not "legal" in the strict
sense of 'legality' "in the divine Law." Some legal principles are inferred or just
invented by the Muslim jurists, such as the use of qiyas, and ijma'. The fact of
the matter, as far as I can see, is that what Ibn Rushd employs in his expositions
is exactly the legal traditions and principles that arc in use and accepted by the
contemporary jurists. This is in accord with his method of accommodating the
techniques of the Juqahd\

If we accept that his intention was to reconcile philosophy and religion,

then there is still another set of questions to be answered that are crucial with
regard to reconciliation: are the philosophical and religious approaches

1 9
M.VItii, islamic Theology and Philosophy(Edinburgh, 1985), 118.
2 0
T . B . Irving, "The Process of Arab Thought in Spain-II." Islamic Literature, v. 14 (1968), 44;
T. J . de Boer, The History of Philosophy in Islam (London, 1961), 199.
2 1
Mahdi, 189.
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1BN R U S H D , FASL AL-MAQÂL AND THE THEORY OF DOUBLE TRUTH 113

essentially reconcilable? In the treatise, when Ibn Rushd was trying to do the
task, did he believe that religion and philosophy both really have a character
that would produce such a harmony? Or was he abusing his authority as a judge
to impose on people a far-fetched reconcilability of them, believing in private
that they are virtually irreconcilable? These questions also lead one to the point
whether Ibn Rushd was a sincere Muslim, and as Strauss suspects, whether his
works really reflects his original views; or as in Renan's representation of
22
AveiToes, whether he was really hiding behind the religious veil while holding
views opposing religious teachings. A close examination of Fasl al-Maqal
reveals in a fairly clear fashion, i f not explicit, that Ibn Rushd as a philosopher
and a jurist, did not see or admit any opposition between religious teachings and
philosophical conclusions. He believed in a possible harmony, and also there is
nothing in Fasl al-Maqal to raise a doubt about his religiosity. His commitmertt
to the Qur'an and the unity of truth is now appreciated by the scholars after
23
Renan's implication that he was opposed to religion. It is also clear to me that
he preferred demonstrative knowledge for a belief in God. That does not mean
that he dismissed religion. Rather he saw Scripture embracing all kinds of
natural capacities of people. Feeling very confident about his position, Ibn
Rushd only wanted to prove his point to the jurist and the theologians by
utilizing their scriptural and intellectual means. Hence he began with
ascertaining the connection he foresaw, which he suggests at the beginning.

From the purpose of Ibn Rushd stated in Fasl al-Maqal, it is clear that he
initially tries to establish a connection between religion and philosophy. The
inquiry is into finding an answer whether the SharVah allows the study of
philosophy. The treatise appears to be a book intended to persuade the audience
that there was no real contradiction, or opposition, between philosophical
conclusion and religious teachings. Ibn Rushd utilizes the methods of fiqh
together with certain philosophical methods to accomplish this. The problem is
indeed reduced to a juridical issue, probably because the audience consisted of
mainly orthodox jurists, and the public under their influence. However, it is hard
to describe Fasl al-Maqal as a product of a totally juridical process. Nor was it a
result of Ibn Rushd's own concern over whether religion agrees with

Renan, especially 292 ft

Cf. Majid Fakhry, "Philosophy and Scripture in the Theology of Averroes," in his Philosophy,
Dogma and die Impact of Greek Thought in Islam (Voriorum, 1994), article no. X V I , 80;
Strauss, 27. About the debate on Ibn Rushd's being a sincere Muslim, see M . Arkoun
"Actualité d'Ibn Rushd Musulman" (55-56) and Hourani "Averroès Musulman" (21-30) both
articles in Multiple Averroès (Paris, 1978).

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114 Dr. Fehrullah TERKAN

philosophy. Rather, it seems that relying on the different capacities of people, he

believed that religious explanations could be demonstrated philosophically.
Since philosophy does not bear such a purpose as to address all people, only a
small number of people with some certain natural virtues can study it.
Furthermore they are the ones who are allowed to interpret the verses to
discover the real connection (ittisal) of religion with hikmah. Incompetent
people should not attempt to do it. Firstly because, the masses would not
understand it; secondly, i f the dialectical class attempt, even they would not
understand the demonstrative method; they would, and did, confuse people's
mind. Thirdly, and as a result, those people, since they are not qualified for this
job, makes religion look incompatible with philosophical conclusions, even
though they are milk sisters (FM, 70). Therefore, being competent in this realm,
Ibn Rushd felt the necessity to establish such a connection so that people could
change their attitude toward philosophy.

And why would Ibn Rushd bother to make such a connection? The
whole effort that culminated in the treatise, it seems to me, was not made just to
make a mere connection. It was a preliminary stage for a larger plan. It can be a
24
methodological treatise for those who made their aim to reconcile the
assertions of religion and intellect (FM, 51). It could be a reconciliatory effort
with an additional purpose in mind, which was expressed in the observation of
M . Fakhry, which I believe put succinctly the real rationale behind Ibn Rushd's
undertaking this task: "[t]he rehabilitation of philosophy, he felt, could be
achieved only i f it can be demonstrated that no genuine conflict between
philosophy and religion could arise, and that Scripture properly interpreted
25
(italics mine) is in complete harmony with philosophy properly understood."

I B N RUSHD, FASL AL-MAQAL, AND HIS A I M THEREIN

Considering the above-mentioned circumstances under which Ibn Rushd

wrote his theologico-philosophical works, it is relatively easy to understand
what he had in mind. Ibn Rushd was an Aristotelian philosopher, and at the
same time a Muslim, who was aware of the seeming contradictions or
oppositions the fitqahff saw between revelation and philosophy. Fasl al-Maqal
clearly shows that the intended audience of the work was the fuqahâ' who,

Arnaldez, 913.

Fakhry, 85.
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I B N R U S H D , FASL AL-MAQAL AND THE THEORY OF DOUBLE TRUTH 115

together with the theologians to some extent, refused philosophical

interpretation of Scripture as heretical. Under the influence of these orthodox
teachings of the fuqaha', the public, according to some historical narratives,
also appears hostile to philosophy. With the meticulousness of Ibn Rushd about
the secrecy of philosophical discussions and from his explicit statements
regarding this point (FM, 62), it is evident that Fasl al-Maqal was not intended
to be secret; and it is not a theological or philosophical treatise per se.

In Fasl al-Maqal, Ibn Rushd follows certain major steps: a) argument for
the legitimacy of philosophical studies; b) the necessity of intellectual
reasoning; c) recourse to the distinction between the muhkam (clear) and
mutashâbih (equivocal/ambiguous) verses in the Qui'an, which will give rise to
the idea of ta'wil (allegorical interpretation); and based on this, d) argument for
the reconcilability of religious and philosophical teachings; and finally e)
classification of people according to their capacity to assent (tasdiq). In the first
part of Fasl al-Maqal, in which Ibn Rushd tries to prove his thesis of obligation
for philosophical studies, he starts to develop his argument in a methodological
sequence.

Ibn Rushd first expresses his intention in the book as follows:

The purpose of this treatise İs to examine from the standpoint of the study
of the Law, whether the study of philosophy \falsafah] and logic is allowed by
the Law, or prohibited, or commanded-either by way of recommendation or as
obligatory. (FM, 44)

Ibn Rushd expects at the outset a positive answer to his inquiry, without
giving chance to the prohibition of philosophical study, due to the clarity in his
mind that the Law does permit such a study, even commands İt. So he goes on
to determine what kind of command this is: it might be a recommendation
(manditb), or an obligation (wajib).

After framing the puipose of the book, he first presents a definition of

"the activity of philosophy" in a simple reasoning, which constitutes his first
premise: i f the activity of philosophy is nothing more than study of existing
beings and reflection on them as indications of the Artisan (FM, 44). This
premise contains the same hypothetical definition of philosophy as the "study of
existing things and reflection on them." In the second premise: i f the Law
commands such a study, then the Law commands philosophy (FM, 44). The
"study" in the antecedent means the examination of existing things in such a

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 116 Dr. Fehrullah TERKAN

way to find out their being the signs of the existence of God. So through the
second premise, Ibn Rushd links the first premise directly with the Qur'an. For
it is clear that, in accordance with his task, he uses certain Qur'anic verses which
26
read explicitly that every existing thing indicates the Creator, which is the
stipulation of his definition of philosophy. Since God commands this kind of
study, he concludes that the Law commands philosophy.

Ibn Rushd's next move is to show why we should make use of qiyas,
rational reasoning {qiyas 'aqlT). This was the conclusion of his first argument,
claiming that the Law commands philosophical study. He cites five Qur'anic
27
verses among others and deems these citations sufficient for the conclusion
28
that "the Law rendered obligatory the study of beings." He refines this
premise: since reflection is nothing more than inference and drawing out the
unknown from the known, and since this is reasoning or at any rate done by
reasoning, therefore we are under an obligation to carry on our study of beings
by intellectual reasoning. (FM, 45)

Without further discussing the obligation of such study, he proceeds to

argue as to how this study should be carried out. The method he proposes is
called "qiyas" (syllogism or reasoning), which was used by thefitqaha*.Ibn
Rushd mentions certain classes of reasoning apparently derived from Aristotle's
29
Organon. The classification includes demonstrative (burhant), dialectical
(JadalT), rhetorical (khitabt), and finally fallacious (or sophistical = mughaliti)
reasoning, which is not even considered as such. To him, the perfect kind of

2 6
The verses are: 3/191; 6/75; 7/174; 49/2; 88/16.
2 7
Fast al-Maqal, 45: the verses 59/3, 8/185, 7/75, 88/17-18, 3/191. Ibn Rushd also claims in
Manâhij al-Adilla that the whole Qur'an summons to theoretical study, see Hourani,
Harmony, 85, n.20.
2 8
Fast al-Maqal, 45. Ibn Rushd can be critiqued in terms of his conclusion that the study of
philosophy is commanded as an obligation. For the verses he used arc not favorable for such a
conclusion. His inference oiwajib (obligatory) rather than mandiib (recommended) is hard to
understand. It is possible that he went for maximum impact. However, an obligatory
command would require everybody to do such a study, yet it would not make sense in his
view because he himself asserts that those who are capable of understanding philosophy arc
only a small group. Nevertheless, he as a judge may have had in mind the kind of obligation
that is considered fulfilled even if only one part of the community carries it out.
2 9
See Aristotle's Prior Analytics, I, 199; I I , 407 in T . E . Page, E . Capps, W . H . Rause (eds.)
Aristotle: the Organon-l (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1930), and Posterior Analytics, I,
25 ff., and treatise on Dialectics in Topica, 273 ff. in T . E . Page, E . Capps, W . H . Rause, L .
Post, E , Warmington (eds.) Aristotle: Post Analytics and Topica (Cambridge: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1960). Cf. Hourani, Harmony, 85, n.25;
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I B N R U S H D , FASL AL-MAQÁL AND THE THEORY OFDOUBLE TRUTH 117

"qiyds" is the demonstrative one. This kind differs from the others in terms of
the characteristics of its premises. Moreover, since the demonstrative kind of
knowledge is the one that is urged by the Law, one must learn what this
reasoning is (FM, 45). Based on all the above, he concludes that he who
believes in the Law and obeys its command to study beings should gain
knowledge of these kinds of reasoning prior to this study.

In what appeals to be an attempt to make a transition from qiyds shar 'Í

or fiqhi to qiyds 'aqlT (intellectual reasoning), Ibn Rushd next creates another
1
strategic argument out of the practices of the fuqaha . He analogizes his
syllogism for the study of logic and philosophy to the jurists' own legal
syllogisms (qiyds fiqhf) in terms of both the legitimacy and the application of it
in the Islamic law, which is a firm base in the process vis-a-vis the jurists. For
they utilize "qiyds" to infer a new judgment about something on which the Law
is silent from something similar about which the Law contains a prescription.
This is a legal methodological practice that, as Ibn Rushd points out, did not
exist among the first generation of the Muslim community, and it was not
considered to be a heretical innovation by the jurists (FM, 46). This particular
point is very important in the philosopher's argument. That is to say, since
reasoning was widely used by the fuqahd', except for a small group of
'literalists' (al-hashwiyya, FM, 46), then they must have had a legitimate
ground to practice it. Since there is nothing explicit about the use of such a
method in the Law, then they must have inferred it. Ibn Rushd accepts the
validity of this inference for practicing qiyds, because he himself resorts to the
same logic to prove the legitimacy of his inference that to study existing things
indicating God rationally is urged by the Law. As a result, he confidently claims
that acquisition of legal reasoning cannot be objected to on religious grounds
(FM, 46), since he used the same ground as the one the jurists did. Having thus
rested his position on a firm ground, he proceeds to make a new claim, which is
the step toward his main purpose: i f it is fitting for the jurists, he proceeds, to
use reasoning based on opinion (qiyds zannt) to infer simple legal matters, then
it is more fitting for one who would know God demonstratively to infer from it
the obligation to acquire a knowledge of intellectual reasoning (FM, 46). In
other words, compared to simple conclusions of legal syllogisms, the ta'wTl and
syllogism of the philosopher are more strongly entitled to legitimacy, for it
produces an agreement between a text and a certain syllogism (qiyas yaqinx).
This procedure establishes the connection between reason and tradition (al-

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118 Dr. Fehrullah TERK AN

ma'qui and al-manqul). With this simple reasoning, he seeks to gain his
30
demonstrative syllogism legitimacy.

Ibn Rushd then seeks to legitimize studying Greek logic. Having

established the legitimacy of rational speculation, even the obligatory nature of
studying philosophy and intellectual reasoning and its necessity, he proceeds to
claim that " i f none of our predecessors had formerly examined" logic, we ought
to undertake this task from the beginning. Furthermore, each scholar should use
the knowledge of his predecessor in order to complete the study, which cannot
be done by one person. At this point, Ibn Rushd makes a smooth transition from
this conclusion to why the Muslims should study Greek philosophy: "if
someone other than ourselves has already examined that subject" from the
argument above it is clear that "we ought to seek help towards our goal from ...
such a predecessor" (FM, 46-7) regardless of his religion. To be persuaded
about the truth of this statement, we are given a loose analogy:

For when a valid sacrifice is performed with a certain instrument, no

account is taken, in judging the validity of the sacrifice, of whether the
instrument belongs to one who shares our religion or to one who does not, so
long as it fulfills the conditions for validity. (FM, 47)

By those who do not share his religion, he means the Greek philosophers
who studied these matters before Islam. He just makes an analogy between an
instrument of slaughtering a sacrificial animal and an instrument to study
philosophy, i.e. logic invented by the Greek philosophers. So i f this is the case,
he infers, then "we ought to lay hands on their books in order to study'^FM, 47)
the subject, with the proviso that i f there is anything incorrect in it, it should be
brought to the attention of the readers.

Ibn Rushd next runs the same logic for the philosophical matters
specified in his definition of philosophy to illustrate that the Muslims should
reflect "on beings and the indications of art in them." For "he who does not
understand the art does not understand the product of art, and he who does not
understand the product of art does not understand the Artisan" (FM, 47). After
all this, it becomes clear that the Muslims should study beings in a manner of
demonstrative syllogism, which should be done in a chain of research by the
demonstrative class. The study of the books of the ancients is thus also rendered
obligatory for those who combine two qualities: natural intelligence, and

Amaldez, 912.
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religious integrity and moral virtue. Furthermore, Ibn Rushd does not accept the
prohibition of philosophy on the ground that the scholars make mistakes in the
process. That is not a sufficient reason, because the harm that might arise from
it is only accidental, not essential. This case would be analogous to the case
where a man prevents a thirsty person from drinking water just because some
people have choked on it in the past. Here, likewise, "death from water by
choking is an accidental matter, but death from thirst is essential and necessary"
(FM, 49).

His next argument is built to seek the conclusion that religion does not
and cannot conflict with philosophical conclusions. This stage is significant in
terms of the possible interpretation of it as the theory of double truth, which we
shall examine later. He declares that:

Since this religion is true, and summons to the study which leads to
knowledge of the Truth we ... know definitely that demonstrative study does
not lead to [conclusions] conflicting with what Scripture has given us. (FM, 50)

By introducing a new and significant premise in this reasoning, namely

"truth does not oppose truth but accords with it and bears witness to i t " (FM,
50), he concludes that the demonstrative science does not lead to conclusions
conflicting with that which Scripture teaches. He follows these steps:

a) truth does not contradict truth, then

b) truth attained by demonstration cannot contradict the truth that
Scripture gives us;
31
c) therefore, any contradiction between them must be in appearance.

Ibn Rushd is aware that there are contradictions between what he

achieved through demonstration and what he reads in the Qur'ân. However, he
asserts that whenever a statement in Scripture conflicts in its apparent meaning
with a conclusion of demonstration, if Scripture is read carefully and interpreted
as a whole, we will find something that can remove this conflict or alleviate it
(FM, 51). So relying on the conclusion he inferred above, he sets out to show

For an excellent analysis of (lie arguments used in Fast al-Maqàl, see Libera, "Introduction,"
20 ff.

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120 Dr. Fehrullah TERKAN

the reader that these contradictions are only on the surface and can be
eliminated. To do this, Ibn Rushd runs another argument (FM, 50 ff.):

Take any piece of philosophical knowledge =X:

1. X is either mentioned in the Law or not mentioned.

2. I f Scripture does not talk about X, then there is no problem or
contradiction. In this case a jurist would infer it by reasoning.
3. I f Scripture has a statement 'p' on the subject X, then
3-a) the apparent meaning (zahir) of the statement 'p' either accords
with a demonstrative statement 'q' or

3-b) 'p' conflicts with the conclusions of demonstration ' q ' about X .

Now, we have two alternatives:

i) I f 'p' does not conflict with 'q,' but conforms to it, then we have a
perfect agreement.
ii) If 'p' conflicts with 'q,' which results in the conjunction of p&q, an
equivalent of p & -p, then there İs a call for allegorical interpretation
of ' p \ which is called "ta'wll." (FM, 51)
Clearly, it all comes down to saying that i f the apparent meaning conflicts
with demonstration, the zahir meaning has to be interpreted metaphorically. In
other words, the zâhir of 'p' should be interpreted so that it conforms to the
philosophical statement 'q' in order to remove the contradiction. The standpoint
of Ibn Rushd is clearly philosophy and demonstrative knowledge, while
scriptural teachings remain variable and subject to interpretation. They are
variable and subject to interpretation because some parts of Scripture contain
both inner and apparent meanings, which is the result of the fact that people
have different levels of understanding (FM, 51). This dichotomy is employed to
create a ground to claim the necessity of interpreting the verses that can be
interpreted philosophically.

It is obvious that Ibn Rushd wants to place philosophy right here in the
inner meanings of the verses, and looks for a way of connection there. This is
clear because of two things: a) once it is established that some verses in the
Qur'an have esoteric meanings, he can easily move to the necessity of ta'wll,
which gives him an opportunity to interpret a verse of a speculative content in
accordance with philosophical conclusions. So the connection that the title of
the book suggests lies in this domain. Secondly, Ibn Rushd prohibits both the
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I B N R U S H D , FASLAL-MAQAL AND T H E T H E O R Y O F D O U B L E T R U T H 121

teaching of the philosophical conclusions and the esoteric meanings of the

verses to the public for the same reason, namely, the fear that it would destroy
the belief of ordinary people. This view could be rendered as establishing a
parallelism between the content of interpretation and that of philosophical
conclusions This indicates his attempts to search for philosophical explanations
of the revelation in the verses that allow such explanations through ta'wil,
which is defined as "extension of the significance of an expression from real to
metaphorical significance, without forsaking therein the standard metaphorical
practices of Arabic ..." (FM, 50). So the interpretation must observe certain
rules of practicing metaphorical interpretation in the Arabic language. This limit
is to prevent any far-fetched interpretation at the expense of limiting the
interpreter, which indicates that Ibn Rushd was totally dependent upon the
32
scriptural text. This dependence is crucial because it prevents the philosopher
from introducing a new doctrine; so it could go against Ibn Rushd's
philosophical method of ta'wil. Moreover, tcCwll and the inner meaning should
only be taught to those who are well grounded in science (FM, 50-1, 63 ff.), and
should be done only by those who are well versed in this art. They are the ones,
according to Ibn Rushd, who are alluded to in the Qur'an 3:7 by the term al-
rasikhun. This verse is the one that Ibn Rushd invokes to make room for
philosophers and demonstrative knowledge. The last part of the verse can bear
two different meanings depending on how you read it. The first part of the verse
has no problem in terms of interpretation:

It is He who revealed upon you the Book, where there are univocal
verses (mu(kamat), which are the mother of the Book, and the others
equivocal verses (miitashabihat). Those whose hearts incline toward
error follow what is equivocal, desiring dissension by desiring its
interpretation.

The second part can be read in two ways:

A. Traditional reading: "But no one knows its interpretation except God.

Those who are firmly grounded in knowledge say: we believe in it (or
Him), it all comes from our Lord. But only those who have
intelligence would know it."

B. Alternate reading: "But no one knows its interpretation except God

and those who are firmly grounded in knowledge. They say: we

Fakhry, 85.

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believe in it (or Him), it all comes from our Lord. But only those who
have intelligence would know it."

Of course he takes the alternate reading of the verse because of the

conjectural convenience of the muîashâbihâi and the word râsikhiin in a way
pointing to philosophy and demonstration. So even though there are no
indications in the Qur'àn that it is demonstrative knowledge that the râsikhwi
33
are said to have, Ibn Rushd perhaps intentionally assumes that in this verse
philosophers and those who have demonstrative knowledge are alluded to. What
is more, in so doing, Ibn Rushd equalizes divine knowledge to the knowledge
acquired by demonstration since the alternate reading of the verse recognizes
that God as well as the rásikhün know the interpretation of the mutashàbihât.

Ibn Rushd still needs to clear the way toward the end. He knows that in
the fiqh tradition there is a major principle invented by thofuqaha' based on a
prophetic hadJth, which is called ijma', or consensus, which is used to solve
some disputed religious matters by reaching a consensus in the community.
Since the practice of ijma is capable of blocking the way to ta'wtl, Ibn Rushd
dismisses this principle of. So to determine what should be interpreted and what
should be understood literally, Averroes does not have recourse to consensus
{ijma'), on the ground that with the scholars in disagreement, the unanimity on
34
theoretical matters is never determined with certainty (FM, 52-3).

Then Ibn Rushd's classification of people takes stage. On his view, the
existence of inner meaning and hence the necessity of tà'wJl are in accordance
with "the diversity of people's natural capacities and the difference of their
ii ,
innate dispositions with regard to assent," or tasdïq \FM, 51). This step has a
strategic importance in the general composition of Fast al-Maqal. In this step,
Ibn Rushd presents his idea of "the cognitive classification of minds and the
correlative distinctions of the methods" to explain the difference between the
"innate dispositions" and the "mental foundations" of the recipients of the
35
revelation. His reasoning goes as follows: the purpose of Scripture is "to teach
true science and right practice"(FM, 63). Moreover, since Scripture must

Cf. Hourani, "Introduction," 24. H e also questions Ibn Rushd's identification of

demonstrative knowledge with philosophy. F o r Hourani's critique of Ibn Rushd's arguments
and premises, see "Introduction," 20-21 and Harmony, 83, n.7.
3 4
F o r Ibn Rushd's elaborated conception of ijmâ' and td'wTl, see I. A. Bello, The Medieval
Controversy between Philosophy and Orthodoxy: Ijma' and Ta' wll in the conflict between al-
Ghazzâltand Ibn Rushd. (Leiden: E . J . Brill, 1989).
3 5
Libera, 24.
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I B N R U S H D, FASL AL-MAQAL AND THE THEORY O FDOUBLE TRUTH 123

address all kinds of people and summon them to the happiness that consists in
the knowledge of God, this happiness is made attainable for every Muslim by
the method of assent that his temperament and nature require. For the natures of
men are on different levels with respect to their ways to assent. Thus addressing
all human beings, Scripture must have all the methods that would fit in their
natural capacity to understand things in the world. In fact those methods can be
found in the Qur'an according to Ibn Rushd: "... i f the Precious Book is
inspected, there will be found in it three methods that are available for all
people." (FM, 69)

Ibn Rushd proposes three grades of intellect corresponding to the

methods people use according to their natural capacity. These methods are:
demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical, which are all taken from Aristotle's
Organon, rational demonstration, dialectical reasoning, and rhetorical argument.
3 6
According to this scheme, the masses are capable of understanding rhetorical
arguments, while the dialectical level requires a power of theoretical
understanding such as the interpretations of the Ash'arite and Mu'tazilites, the
Mutakallimun, or the dialectical theologians. Due to its content, the scriptural
text contains mostly these two kinds of arguments. Ibn Rushd explains the
predominantly rhetorical and dialectical character of Scripture by the idea that
its purpose simply is to teach all people. Here the conclusion Ibn Rushd reaches
in effect serves to make understandable the position of Scripture versus
philosophy:

Therefore, since the primary purpose of Scripture is to take care of the

majority (without neglecting to arouse the elite), the prevailing methods
of expressions in religion are the common methods by which the majority
comes to form concepts and judgments."(FM, 64)

As for the demonstrative method, it is peculiar to a smaller number of

people. Although, as has been pointed out, for Ibn Rushd, the best kind of
argument, or method, is demonstrative one, it is obvious that not everyone is
able to comprehend demonstration, or even dialectical arguments. He believes
that it is God's grace to His servants who have no access to demonstration due
to their natures, habit, and lack of education that God has coined for them
images and likeness of the things and summoned them to assent to them, which

According to Arnaidez (p. 913), this shows Ibn Rushd's employment of technical vocabulary
and his skillful manipulation of his ideas within a logical framework borrowed from the
Greeks.

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 124 Dr. Fehrullah T ER KAN

denotes the level that contains dialectical and rhetorical indications. It is these
kinds of people to whom the inner meaning of scripture and ta'wTl that cannot
be understood by them should not be exposed, because it could destroy their
assent that they reached through their own ways (FM, 65-6). This kind of
interpretation should not be expressed even in rhetorical and dialectical books.

Accordingly, in the end, people in relation to Scripture fall into three

classes (FM, 65): a) Rhetorical class: those who are not people of interpretation
at all; b) Dialectical class: those who are the people of dialectical method and
interpretation; c) Demonstrative class: those who are the people of certain
37 38
interpretation, who are the rasikhun, including philosophers. Every class has
their own methods, and all methods eventually end up in one truth: true
knowledge of God. Although in the Qur'an there are all three methods, the
variety of the methods does not constitute separate truths. In other words, the
agreement of the ma 'qui and the manqul rather means that different types of
mind can arrive at the same truth; it is the practical agreement of two methods in
order to arrive at a single practical conclusion. For that reason, for example, the
prophet Muhammad accordingly affirmed the faith of a woman who, when
asked, said that God is in the sky. That was because she was not a demonstrative
class, and her assent only comes through the imagination, which is the trait of
rhetorical class of people (FM, 60). On the other hand, one can find no verses
stating that the heavens were created ex nihilo. The theologians, however, using
common knowledge, also interpret some verses in accordance with the
consensus and the beliefs of the community, that is creation ex nihilo. But it is
not stated in the scripture that God was existing with absolutely nothing else; so
the verses in question could very well be interpreted by the demonstrative class
in accordance with philosophical conclusions about the world and God (FM,
57).

AVERROES, AVERROISM, AND THE DOUBLE TRUTH

THEORY

The so-called theory of double truth was conceived of as the

proclamation that the same proposition could have different truth-values in
philosophy and theology and that there was an irreconcilable inconsistency
between philosophy and religious teaching, a theory that was ultimately

1 7
According to Watt, this threefold scheme enabled Ibn Rushd to bring philosophical religion in
relation with popular religion. ("Structure," 50).
3 8
Arnaldez, 912.
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I B N R U S H D , FASL AL-MAQÂL AND THE THEORY OF DOUBLE TRUTH 125

attributed to Ibn Rushd. In fact this theory has been accepted to be a principle of
th
Latin Averroism of 13 century. However, modern scholarship argues against
this idea.
39 th 40
Averroism is a 19 century term and is thought to have arisen with
th
Latin Averroism in the Latin world of the 13 century, which, according to the
recent researches, was born in Paris with Jean of Jandun (d.1328) at the
41
beginning of the same century. Like Jean of Jandun, most of the thinkers
referred to by this term were professors of Arts at the Faculty of Arts at the
42
University of Paris. They studied and taught Aristotelian philosophy through
the translated commentaries of Ibn Rushd on Aristotle's works. Because of his
powerful commentaries on Aristotle's works he came to be known as "the
Commentator" par excellence. Through Ibn Rushd's commentaries, a new set of
ideas was introduced to the Christian Latin circles. Those ideas, which gave rise
to conflict between philosophy and the theological propositions include the
eternity of the world, the negation of individual immortality, which was later
formulated by Leibniz as the theory of Monopsychism, and the psychological

3 9
According to S. MacCiintock, as a term designating a philosophical type or method of
philosophizing, Averroism is difficult to make precise, despite its assured connection with
Latin Aristotelianism ("Averroism," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 225). Arnaidez
claims that the idea that Averroes revealed in Aristotle a rationalist method and doctrine, and
those doctrines were opposed to religious dogmas is a misconception of Renan and the
followers of Averroes in the middles ages ("Ibn Rushd," 911).
4 0 th
According to S. Ebbesen, it was introduced in the 19 century based on Raymond L u l l ' s use
of the term Avcrroist to describe philosophers (who we now call Latin Averroists), because he
saw them as continuators of the ideas condemned by E . Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, in 1270
and 1277, ("Averroism" The Routledge Encyclopedia of Islam, 595). Cf. MacCiintock,
"Averroes," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 220.
4 1
F . van Steenberghen, "L'Averroïsme Latin au X l l l e S i è c l e " in Multiple Averroes, 285. Also
for Jean of Jandun and his Averroism, see MacClintock's book, Perversity and Error
(Bloomington, 1956). Until recent scholarly researches, it used to be thought that the
prominent representative and the leader of the Averroist school was Siger of Brabant.
Especially see P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et L'Averroïsme Latin au XHIme Siècle
(Louvain, 1911). Cl Ebbesen, 595, also Steenberghen, 283; MacCiintock, Perversity, 72,
where the latter two argue against the idea that Siger was an Averroist and holding the idea of
the truth of two contrary propositions. Also, for a well-discussed argument against the
Averroism of Siger, see Gilson's article " L a Doctrine de la Double Vérité" in his Etudes de
Philosophie Médiévale (Strasbourg, 1921), 51-75. According to this article, Siger was labeled
as Averroist by his adversaries, however, Gilson is not sure if Siger was sincere or
dissimulating (p. 62).

4 2
Cf. Gilson, 55.

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126 Dr. Fehrullah TER KAN

determinism. These ideas were very appealing to the thinkers in Paris, and
01 ,h
later certain Christian disciples of Averroes of 13 and 14 centuries who
maintained the fundamental principles of Ibn Rushd came to be called the
44
Averroists.

However, whether the Averroists held such a theory as the double truth is
subject of controversy. Due to the lack of clarity whether any philosophers in
th 45
the 13 century explicitly held such a theory, some scholars tend to exonerate
them from this charge, while at the same time would like to preserve the
possibility of both their maintaining the theory and dissimulation about their
real beliefs. In fact the idea that these masters were holding the double truth
theory was first suggested by St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas, affiiTning the
impossibility for God to reconcile simultaneously two contradictories, mentions
46
the Double Truth, attributing it to the Averroists. However, according to
47
MacCIintock, this does not reflect the truth; because they only hold that the
realm of philosophy and its method and that of faith are to be distinguished as in
the case of Jandun's attitude toward reason and faith, which is the separation of
48
their domains because of their conflict.

For further explanation of the major tenets of Averroes that gave rise to Averroism, cf.
Ebbesen, 596; also Encyclopedia Britannica, "Averroism," 891-892. Cf. Steenberghen, who
tb
claims that one can find an Averroist in the 13 century with respect to the partisan of the idea
of Monopsychism (284-5); and Libera, 59. Also, for insights into the development of
Averroism, see Libera, 30, 56.

Cf. MacCIintock, "Averroism," 223; Ebbesen, 595. Cf. Libera, 30. According to Ebbesen. the
term was originally a term of opprobrium, a derogatory word used to describe the adherents of
the doctrine of Monopsychism. No one called himself Averroist until Jean of Jandun,
followed by Urban of Bologna (1334), and Paul of Venice (d. 1429), p. 595.

MacCIintock, "Averroes," 222. Gilson asserts that none of the thinkers held this theory (pp.
61-62). For a discussion of faith, reason, and the double truth theory, see MacCIintock,
Perversity, esp. pp.69-102.

Libera, 60-61: According to Aquinas, the Averroists cannot hold p against - p without
declaring the falsity of faith, or - p against p without renouncing their own thesis. The only
solution is to sustain p&-p, which is impossible according to the principle of contradiction. So
they end up saying that 'by reason I conclude of necessity that intellect is numerically one, but
I hold firmly the contrary by faith, which is a logical trap, from which one cannot come out
once he has entered. Therefore they negate faith and hide themselves behind a concession on
the surface.

MacCIintock, Perversity, 101.

MacCIintock, Perversity, 90-92. Also Gilson, 63 ff.

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Although the professors of arts represent Latin Aristotelianism that is said

to have
49
included systematic autonomy of natural philosophy, modern
scholarship emphasizes their strong beliefs in Christian faith. They were aware
that Aristotelian philosophy would not fulfill the requirements of Christian
doctrines and that philosophy would have to be transformed to harmonize with
50
the traditional teachings. In other words, these Averroists maintained the
possibility of a purely rational speculation, yet they believed or at least
pretended to believe in the insufficiency of rational speculation to judge of its
51
own truth. In any case, it was difficult for them to articulate whether it is true
52
or not because its truth was in the hands of the Church. The thinkers were
teaching alien Aristotelian philosophy in a Christian society, so they were
caught in the contradiction between reason and faith. After their analysis to
solve the problem where they provided a philosophical solution, they arrived at
conclusions inconsistent with dogma; then they added another truth according to
the truth of faith. They thus introduced the commonplace "secundum fidem et
53
veritaîem," yet credited Christian faith alone with truth to avoid the charge of
54
"double truth." Hence these Averroist philosophers, while proclaiming the
logical and precise validity of Aristotelian arguments, conceded the final
determination to the Christian faith.

This whole development is blamed on the official condemnations of

"unorthodox" doctrines at the University of Paris in 1270 and 1277, executed by
E. Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, including specific injunctions against two
55
standards of truth. Thus the double truth theory is explained as i f it were a

MacClintock, "Avcrroism," 225.

5 0
MacClintock, Perversity, 72.
5 1
Gilson,68.
5 2
Gilson,55.
5 3
Ebbesen,597.
5 4
MacClintock, Perversity, 79-80.
5 5
Cf. MacClintock, "Averroes," 220: Before the 1277 condemnation, Arabic commentary was
forbidden in 1210 and 1215, perrmtting with censoring in 1231 at the University of Paris.
Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, and Bernier of Nivelles were all named in the
condemnation of 1270s (p. 223). Cf. Libera, 30: in 1277, when Tempier condemned as many
as 219 thesis, he introduced the formulation of two contrary verities, which the next centuries
hardened it into the "affirmation of the existence of two contrary truths," which eventually

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 128 Dr. Fehrullah TERK AN

consequence of an unintended attitude, by which the masters of Arts expressed

themselves vis-a-vis the Church. That is to say, what gave rise to the theory lies
in the fact that the philosophers embraced the philosophical conclusions, while
the same masters, who were believers of Christianity, could not simply reject
56
Church doctrine, although they saw the. conflict. They believed in at least the
57
"inadequacy" of philosophical conclusions and they held in this manner that
both philosophical conclusions and the teachings of faith are true, probably in
order to avoid having to choose between them. Latin Averroism actually stands
for a declaration of crisis, Gilson claims, yet it failed to bring solution at the
58
end. In any case, as a consequence of Ibn Rushd's association with the
process, as Libera observes, Ibn Rushd was made "the spokesman of a heretical
59
doctrine under the mask of the double truth."

Did Ibn Rushd really hold such a theory as the double truth?

Scholars' approaches to whether or not he held this theory vary. Some

of them attempted to distinguish between two statements: "there are two truths
contradicting each other, philosophical and religious," and "the same truth could
be presented in various forms." The latter is said to be what Ibn Rushd meant to
say, while the former is the notorious interpretation by the Latin Averroists of
what Ibn Rushd really believed.

The theory of double truth, as presented in the Latin Averroistic form,

would look in a formula like this: We have three propositions:

Proposition A: a philosophical conclusion P is true,

Proposition B: a religious doctrine Q is true,
Proposition C: P and Q contradict each other.

became the definition of "Averroism." At the end, those who held unorthodox views were
called as Averroist in a pejorative way.
5 6
Ebbesen,597.
5 7
MacClintock, Peiversity, 80-81. MacClintock, "Averroism,"225.
5 8
Gilson, 68.
5 9
Libera, 57. According to MacClintock, the dilemma in the Christian speculation was never
resolved by the masters in a proclamation of a logical contradiction between the two domains
but by an absolute accession of truth to faith ("Averroism," 223).
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I B N R U S H D , FASI. AL-MAQÂL AND THE THEORY OFDOUBLE TRUTH 129

First, let us disregard Proposition C. Proposition A and Proposition B

seem to exist separately without having any truth-value relations whatsoever.
However, when Proposition C, which was introduced by the Church, makes its
appearance to declare that Propositions A and B contradict each other, then the
real problem emerges. Due to this contradiction, one of the Propositions A and
B has to be true and the other false. For it is impossible to maintain P as true and
Q as true at the same time. Because i f Q, for example, is contrary to P, then P is
equal to -P, which is other than P, namely (Q = -P). That is to say, one excludes
the other in terms of truth-value. Hence i f you hold both P and Q as true, then it
amounts to the conjunction (P & -P), and this is logically impossible according
to the law of contradiction. Therefore, this conjunction cannot be maintained.
On the other hand, i f you maintain that both religious and philosophical
conclusions P and Q are true without the intervention of Proposition C, then
their conjunction (P & Q) seems plausible provided that you give each of them
its own realm, in which each of them is held true in and of itself. This is the
solution, as we alluded to earlier, that some Averroists came up with, by giving
60
them separate domains.

However, when we examine Fasl al-Maqâl carefully, nowhere can we

find this logical construction. A careful analysis of this treatise creates for us a
firm ground on the basis of the following reasons to claim that the theory in
question cannot be linked with Ibn Rushd views:

a) First of all, Fasl al-Maqâl was not available to the Medieval Latin
61
scholastics, which excludes the possibility of direct influence.
b) No passage in the treatise affirms the impossibility of that which is
true according to faith.
c) Ibn Rushd did not affirm the existence of two contraries.
d) Ibn Rushd never thought that the truths attained by religious and
philosophical methods contradict; on the contrary, he explicitly said
that they agree with each other,
e) Ibn Rushd did not attempt to reconcile between the philosophical and
religious teachings. He does not even call them two truths in Fasl al-

This solution, according to Urvoy, was also that of Ibn Rushd to the problem (Ibn Rushd, 79).

MacClintock, "Averroism," 223. Also see Libera, 63.

Libera, 63.

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130 Dr. Fehrullah TERKAN

Maqál; rather he talks about two different methods of assent

63
(tasdiq ) to attain the same truth.
f) The doctrine of alternative modes of access to truth is nothing similar
64
to the idea of two incompatible truths in disparate domains.
g) The formulation of Double Truth is even incompatible with the
65
objective of Fast al-Maqal.
Therefore, the attribution of double truth to Ibn Rushd cannot be
sustained by any explanations of Ibn Rushd in Fasl al-Maqal. For Ibn Rushd
there is therefore only one truth, the accentuation of which, according to

This term makes the ground for Wolfson's interesting approach to the theory of double truth.
Analyzing Ibn Rushd's idea of tasdiq or assent in an Aristotelian sense, he urges that the
"double truth" theory be distinguished from the "double faith" theory, which represents the
real position of Ibn Rushd. According to Wolfson, the theory has its basis on the Aristotelian
epistemological conception of faith. In Aristotle, the term faith is used as a judgment of the
truth of either immediately known primary premises or of conclusions derived by
demonstration from those premises. So it is important whether faith is used in the religious
sense or in the sense that Aristotle used. Wolfson proposes three possibilities: a) faith with
reference to what is immediately known as true by revelation without any demonstration, b)
faith with reference to something derivatively known by demonstration, i.e., opinion and
scientific knowledge, and c) faith with reference to the idea that the teachings of revelation
could also be demonstrated by reason. So faith can mean a) acceptance of the scriptural
teachings only as a demonstrated truth, which he calls the single faith of rationalist type
represented by the Mutazilites, or b) acceptance of them only as a self evident truth, which he
calls the single faith of authoritarian type represented by the Ash'arites, or c) the acceptance
of teachings of Scripture (i) as a self evident truth and (ii) as a demonstrated truth, which he
calls the double faith theory represented by Ibn Rushd. Therefore, it is imperative that we
distinguish the 'double faith' theory from the 'double truth' theory. In the end there is only
one truth underlying both forms of faith, according to Wolfson, which is the truth of Islamic
revelation, T h e only difference is the method by which different believers reaches that truth, a
conclusion that is in agreement with Ibn Rushd's expositions. Wolfson's approach İs another
subject to be studied, but this paper is not concerned with the term "tasdiq" used by Ibn
Rushd. However, 'tasdiq' had hitherto been used by the jurists and the theologians. It always
appeared in the definition of "îmân" İn the early kalam tradition. So, it is not clear whether
Ibn Rushd used the term 'tasdiq' in the traditional sense or he made an undisclosed
connection with the Aristotelian sense of it. In any case, it seems possible that Ibn Rushd
discerned the link between the two senses and employed the term easily since it was already
very conveniently İn use at the time. See R. Wolfson "The Double Faith Theory in Clement,
Saadİa, Averroes and St. Thomas" Jewish Quarterly Review, 33 (1942-3), 245.

MacClintock, "Averroism," 223.

Libera, 65. According to Watt, the double truth theory is a consequence of the distortion of
Averroes' teachings by the Latin Avcrroists (Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology,
Edinburgh: University Press, 1985, 119).
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I B N R U S H D , FASL AL-MAQÂL AND THE THEORY OF DOUBLE TRUTH 131

Arnaldez, is his original contribution along with the importance of adherence to

66
the truth. The unity of truth is essential part of Ibn Rushd's philosophy, and so
his main effort in Fasl al-Maqal was to establish that there is but one truth, and
to this truth there are several modes of access through a variety of tasdiq. At any
rate, it appears that no solid connection between the double truth theory and Ibn
Rushd can be established directly, and together with some other philosophers,
Averroes himself seems to be the "victim" of the tendency labeled
67
'Averroism.' Perhaps it is best to let Libera make the final remark: "Averroes
08
is not Averroist in the Latin sense of the term."

Arnaldez, 912. According to Hourani, the problem arises because of Ibn Rushd's unitary view
of truth; so there would have been no problem if Ibn Rushd had held such a theory as was
lh
imputed to him in Latin circles in the 1 3 century. He suggests that the Latin Averroistic idea
of separate realms would be a solution, and no contradiction would have arisen between them
("Introduction," 22-23). Cf. Fakhry, 80: Ibn Rushd tacitly recognized the parity of philosophy
and religion.

C . J. Ennatingcr, "Averroism in Early Fourteenth Century Bologna," Medieval Studies, v.16

(1954), 53.

Libera, 64.

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