213

Blast loading and building robustness

P D Smith and TA Rose
Cran¢eld University, UK

Summary
An overview of methods of blast load quanti¢cation most important factor in reducing the blast load
and aspects of building design intended to reduce experienced by the building. Methods of achieving
the damaging e¡ects of explosions by increasing stand-o¡ in building design are discussed.The
robustness is presented. Possible blast loading creation of adequate stand-o¡ may often not be
scenarios range from simple free-air bursts, possible, and the need for robust glazing systems is
loading essentially isolated buildings, to complex also essential if blast is to be keep out of buildings
urban environments, with road junctions and side and contamination of the work-place by broken
streets, etc., where buildings have varying amounts glass is to be prevented.The use of laminated
of frangible facade.The blast loads resulting in these glass, anti-shatter ¢lm and other measures is
scenarios are radically di¡erent, with di¡erent discussed.
aspects of the pressure load dominating the type Existing buildings pose particular problems to
and extent of building damage. Means of calculating engineers concerned with their protection.
these time-varying pressure loads are described. Several methods of strengthening or increasing
Achieving stand-o¡ between a vulnerable the e¡ective mass of existing buildings are
building and the source of an explosion is the single described.

Key words: blast; explosion; protection; facade; robustness; strengthening

Prog. Struct. Engng Mater. 2002; 4: 213^223 (DOI: 10.1002/pse.95)

Introduction described as a free-air burst. Similarly, a hemisphere of

explosive detonated on a rigid surface, with no other
There is a danger to buildings from explosive storage reflecting bodies nearby, is termed a hemispherical
and transportation accidents and deliberate acts of surface burst. These two types of explosion are
disruption. Identification of buildings subject to the particularly important, because they give rise to so-
threat of blast loading is relatively straightforward. called ideal blast waves, which have been described
Protection of buildings and their occupants, however, and quantified in great detail[1,2].
is more difficult to achieve, because the blast loads Key blast wave parameters associated with ideal
experienced by a building, arising from any given blast waves are peak positive overpressure, peak
situation, are hard to establish, and an appropriate negative underpressure, dynamic pressure, positive
level of protection}and ultimately, expenditure}is and negative phase durations, and positive and
difficult to justify to building owners and their tenants. negative phase impulses (integrals with respect to
This overview contains a description of the time of the respective pressures). Important quantities
difficulties associated with the quantification of the are illustrated in Fig. 1, which shows the pressure
time-varying pressure loads which impinge on history of a typical ideal free-air blast wave at a point
buildings when a high explosive is detonated in the in space. Pressures measured at a point in space, as
vicinity. There is also a discussion of the various opposed to those on a reflecting surface (unless the
measures which can be taken to improve the whole of the flow is tangential to the surface), are
performance of buildings subjected to such an attack. referred to as side-on pressures.
Blast parameters such as arrival time, shock front
velocity and Mach number are also sometimes
Quanti¢cation of blast loads quoted, but these are seldom needed for
structural response calculations or hazard
SPHERICAL FREE-AIR AND HEMISPHERICAL assessments and may be considered as being of lesser
SURFACE BURSTS importance.
When a sphere of explosive is detonated in air, remote Scaled blast parameters provide a means of
from the ground (or any other reflecting surface), it is calculating blast wave characteristics at a specified
Published online 8 May 2002
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214 STRUCTURAL SAFETYAND RELIABILITY

1.200
Peak pressure

1.000

800
Pressure (kPa)

600

Positive impulse
400

200 Positive phase Negative impulse

duration

Arrival time Negative phase duration

-200
0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 3.2

Time (msec)
Fig. 1 Typical ideal free-air blast wave

distance from an explosive source for which an explosive to that of TNT. This is termed the source
equivalent TNT charge mass can be established. The energy equivalence[4], although it should be
most commonly quoted source of scaled blast recognised that more sophisticated approaches also
parameters is Kingery & Bulmash[2], which also exist[8,9].
provides the basis of the air blast calculations in the
computer program ConWep[3]. Discussion of scaling
laws and graphical representations of scaled blast BLAST WAVE REFLECTIONON AN INFINITE FACADE
parameters can be found in Baker et al.[4], and Smith & When a blast wave impinges on an infinitely large
Hetherington[5]. Other graphical sources of scaled rigid surface at zero angle of incidence the flow
blast parameters, including negative phase direction of the air in the blast wave is progressively
parameters, are the US Department of the Army reversed and the static pressure on the surface
Technical Manual TM5-1300[6] and the Protective increases to the reflected pressure. This is called face-on
Structures Automated Design System (PSADS)[7]. loading. The importance of reflected pressures in blast
A graphical representation of the three most load calculations is paramount, because the reflected
important free-air blast parameters for a 1 kg TNT pressure can be anywhere between 2 and 20 times the
spherical charge is given in Fig. 2. incident pressure, depending on the magnitude of the
In theory, if the reflecting surface under a incident pressure. When the reflection process is
hemispherical charge is perfectly rigid, the resulting complete, the reflected wave propagates away in the
blast will be identical to a free-air blast from twice the opposite direction from which it came.
quantity of explosive. In practice, however, the Reflection at zero angle of incidence rarely occurs in
devastating effect of an in-contact charge usually practice. It is much more usual for buildings to be
causes loss of energy, as the material beneath the oblique to the incident blast wave and, depending on
charge is displaced in the formation of a crater. the angle of incidence, two distinct situations can
Spherical and hemispherical scaled blast parameters result. At shallow angles (aI 5408) regular reflection
are, therefore, slightly different. takes place, and the incident wave remains ahead of
Before the blast parameters from a given explosion the wave reflected from the surface. At larger angles
can be established, an appropriate TNT equivalent of incidence, however, the reflected wave coalesces
mass is required. There are several different with the incident wave and a Mach stem is formed.
approaches to establishing TNT equivalence, but Mach reflection is important because the coalesced
perhaps the simplest is to base the TNT equivalence wave can have a peak pressure and associated
on the ratio of the mass-specific energy of the actual impulse which exceeds}in some cases

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 BLAST LOADING AND BUILDING ROBUSTNESS 215

Pressure (kPa), Impulse (kPa-msec), Arrival time (msec)

10.000

Pressure
Arrival time
1.000 Impulse

100

10

0.1
0.05
0.2 0.5 1 5 10 50
Distance (m)

Fig. 2 Free-air blast parameters for 1kgTNT (from ConWep[3])

Fig. 3 Mach stem development from a height of burst explosion[5]

considerably}the incident value. Mach reflection wave parameters, including procedures for dealing
occurs in almost every blast loading situation. with oblique waves, can be found in the sources
The most commonly quoted scenario in which mentioned above[1–8].
Mach reflection is evident is the so-called height of
burst (HOB), where a charge is detonated a distance
above the ground. This is shown schematically in BLAST WAVE INTERACTION WITH
Fig. 3, where the incident and reflected waves SOLITARY BUILDINGS
(labelled I and R, respectively) are indicated and Probably the simplest blast loading scenario of
formation of a Mach stem is illustrated. A second, practical importance is the example of a solitary
more practical, example is the detonation of a device building (or collection of buildings with large
in a city street, bordered by large buildings. Clearly, separation distances), oriented in the direction of the
the portion of building facades loaded at zero angle of blast, and loaded by an ideal blast wave (Fig. 4). In
incidence will be small compared with the majority this situation, the face-on pressure which occurs on
which is loaded at an oblique angle. Reflected blast the front surface of the building is relieved by

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216 STRUCTURAL SAFETYAND RELIABILITY

Blast wave

Building

Explosive
detonation

Ground

Fig. 4 An example of face-on loading

150

125
Finite building
Infinite building
100
Pressure (kPa)

75

50
Clearing time

25

-25
25 27.5 30 32.5 35 37.5 40 42.5 45

Time (msec)
Fig. 5 Pressure histories on front face of large and small buildings

expansion waves which propagate inwards from the on solitary structures are contained in[1] and[4–8] and in
regions of side-on pressure at the edges. These a more recent approach by Rose & Smith[10].
expansion waves relieve the face-on pressure The governing factors which define the clearing
completely at the clearing time, which can be time, and hence the extent to which the face-on
considerably less than the positive phase duration of pressures are reduced on solitary buildings, are the
the incident wave. The result of this complex wave mass of the charge, the stand-off distance of the
interaction is that the total front face load on the charge from the building and the front face building
structure (the impulse) is reduced to a value below the dimensions. Fig. 5 shows two pressure–time histories
face-on, but above the side-on value. Means of calculated by the Air3d code[11] at the front–centre of a
calculating the clearing time and the front face loads cuboid building. One is the face-on pressure–time

Copyright & 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Prog. Struct. Engng Mater. 2002; 4:213^223
 BLAST LOADING AND BUILDING ROBUSTNESS 217

load on an infinite facade; the second is measured at response time of elements loaded in the building.
the same central location on a finite building. The For this reason it is referred to as quasi-static gas
difference between the two pressure histories is pressure.
evident in Fig. 5, and the clearing time is indicated. A thorough description of internal explosions is
available elsewhere[4,5], and a typical internal blast
pressure history (produced by the Air3d code), with
BLAST AND GAS PRESSURE LOADS ARISING FROM the shock and gas pressures identified, is shown in
CHARGES DETONATED INSIDE BUILDINGS
Fig. 6.
When an explosion occurs inside a building the
presence of the walls and ceiling greatly increases the
number of blast wave–structure interactions. Multiple
reflections take place, and many waves coalesce to THE EFFECT ON BLAST RESULTANTS OF THE
produce enhancements in corners and other local CONFINEMENT PROVIDED BY URBAN SETTINGS
constrictions. The biggest difference between internal Some aspects of the blast environment which results
and external explosions, however, is the presence of from an explosion in an urban setting can be broadly
the quasi-static gas pressure. Condensed explosives are quantified from the principal parameters which
approximately a thousand times more dense than air. describe the charge and the street layout. These are
The detonation of an explosive in a building will the charge mass, the street width and the height of the
introduce a quantity of hot gas into the building, as buildings. Other factors, such as the proximity of
well as the shock waves mentioned above. Depending junctions, side streets, alleyways, and so on, can have
on the relative magnitudes of the mass of the a considerable effect on the resulting loads and
explosive and the volume of the building, the gas greatly complicate the quantification procedure.
pressure may be the dominant loading mechanism on These, more complicated, scenarios can be treated
the building elements. thoroughly only by the methods described in the
Because normal buildings (as opposed to following section.
containment buildings) have doors, windows, heating Information is available to enable the establishment
ducts, etc., which allow the gas to vent into adjacent of positive and negative phase impulses at ground
rooms or the outside world, the gas pressure does not level in straight city streets[12,13], together with
persist. The decay of the pressure, however, takes information concerning the most important
place in a time-scale much longer than the duration of geometrical parameters which define maximum
the individual shock reflections, and the overall impulses and whether or not the multiple blast wave
duration is typically much longer than the structural reflections coalesce.

1.500

1.250

1.000
Pressure (kPa)

Multiple shocks
750

Gas pressure
500

Venting time
250

-250
0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Time (msec)
Fig. 6 Internal pressure history at a location in a building

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218 STRUCTURAL SAFETYAND RELIABILITY

An important fact to arise from an investigation by THE EVALUATIONOF BLAST RESULTANTS IN

Rose & Smith[13] is that positive phase blast wave COMPLEXGEOMETRIES BYCOMPUTATIONALTOOLS
impulses can be enhanced by a factor of five or more There are a number of PC-based, semiempirical tools
in narrow city streets, compared with side-on values in existence for the prediction of blast effects in an
at equivalent distances. It was also noted that, the urban setting. AT Planner (Antiterrorist Planner[14]) is
negative phase impulse becomes increasingly a software program which uses scaled blast
important in an urban setting, because of the large parameters together with a number of empirical
expansion which occurs when a blast wave shielding algorithms to provide stand-off distance
reaches the top of a building or the end of evaluations, structural damage, window and
the street (opening onto a junction or plaza). This personnel hazard calculations. The High Explosive
expansion propagates back through the space Damage Assessment Model (HEXDAM) was used to
between the buildings, and it is this which accounts recreate the blast effects of the Oklahoma City
for much of the anecdotal evidence that glazing explosion on various structures in the vicinity of the
damage which occurs in city streets after an explosive Murrah Federal Building[15]. Eblast[16] is described as
incident often results in the broken elements ending an expert system to assist those who must take action
up in the street. in emergencies involving explosive hazards. Eblast
Fig. 7 shows a pressure–time history measured in a uses the results of numerical simulations to determine
small-scale city street experiment[13]. The model street the influence of various urban environments on blast
was very narrow, and the buildings were high. It is wave properties as functions of distance.
clear from Fig. 7 that the reflections have coalesced, As indicated in the previous section, there is a limit
and a large negative phase is evident, due to the to the usefulness of information which can be derived
expansion from the top of the model buildings. This is from empirical sources. Most situations encountered
in marked contrast to the ideal blast wave shown in in building design or hazard assessment do not
Fig. 1. Fig. 8 shows a second pressure–time correspond exactly to the small set of scenarios for
history[13] measured at the same distance along the which empirical data exists. In all other situations, the
street and arising from the same charge mass, particular problem which is presented can be treated
but this is for a wide street, again with high thoroughly only by experiment–often at small scale–
buildings. It is clear from this second figure that many or by numerical simulation.
of the individual reflections have remained In recent years, numerical simulation has become
distinct. increasingly important as a means of investigating the

60

45

30
Pressure (kPa)

15

-15

-30

-45
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Time (msec)
Fig. 7 Pressure record from a narrow street[13]

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 BLAST LOADING AND BUILDING ROBUSTNESS 219

40

32

24
Pressure (kPa)

16

-8

-16
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Time (msec)
Fig. 8 Pressure record from a wide street[13]

blast environment in complex geometries. Many little severe structural damage. The effects of the
investigators world-wide have published material bomb in Bishopsgate in the City of London in April
demonstrating the efficacy of the approach, and 1993 were widespread but, with the exception of the
numerous examples of computer programs used for stone-built mediaeval St Agnes Church which was at
blast–structure interaction can be found in the a very close range to the blast, no buildings were
literature. damaged sufficiently to be beyond repair. As another
The SHAMRC computer code has been used for the example, the bomb in London’s Docklands in January
calculation of loads on a full-scale office building[17] 1996 demolished only the building adjacent to the
and for eccentric internal room detonations[18]; explosion, while the high-rise modern office buildings
FEFLO98 has been used for the calculation of shock in the vicinity suffered relatively little structural
diffraction over protective blast walls[19] and for post- damage. Finally, in the bombing in Manchester city
event analysis of actual incidents[20]; AUTODYN3D centre in June 1996 only one building very close to the
has been used for the treatment of debris throw from explosion was deemed to have been damaged
detonations in masonry structures[21] and street- sufficiently severely for it subsequently to be
channelled blast[22]; the OURANOS code has been demolished.
used for loads on solitary buildings and internal The common feature in all of these cases, however,
detonations[23]; the Air3d code[11] has been used to was that there was extensive damage to all the
calculate the blast in city streets arising from buildings’ facades, particularly glazed areas. As a
buildings with failed facades[24]. Many other examples consequence of windows failing, the blast entered
could also be quoted. buildings, causing relatively superficial structural
damage, but great disruption to the working
environment and the building services sustaining that
The need for building facade protection: environment. Office fixtures and fittings were
use of robust glazing systems destroyed or damaged, computer screens were
smashed, documents were scattered or destroyed, and
As described above, terrorist bombs in urban settings suspended ceilings and partitions were disturbed.
produce complex blast environments. However, even Broken glass was projected everywhere, with
in situations where a building is subjected to very particularly severe consequences for air conditioning
intense blast loading, it has been found that reinforced systems which ‘ingested’ glass particles, rendering
concrete or steel-framed buildings designed to them, in some cases, impossible to clean and in need
modern standards have generally suffered relatively of replacement.

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220 STRUCTURAL SAFETYAND RELIABILITY

The cost of such an attack to building owners is moving vehicle from getting close to the building. Fig.
considerable. There will, of course, be costs associated 9 shows a schematic layout of a site for protection
with structure and facade repair and reinstatement of against vehicle bombs[5].
the working environment, but the major cost is likely In urban environments, it may not always be
to be the loss of the ability to do business. For this possible to achieve significant stand-off. In such
reason it is evident that, if a blast can be prevented circumstances, and if the sensitivity of the building to
from entering a building via a failed facade, the be protected merits it, there may be a case for the
consequences for the commercial operations - centred construction of a ‘blast wall’ around the building.
on the building are likely to be much less severe. Blast walls and other similar barriers, when
A well-established approach to enhancing the appropriately located, can provide effective reduction
resilience of glazing involves the use of anti-shatter of blast wave peak overpressure and impulse. The
film (ASF) applied to the inside surface of glazed barrier will achieve this by causing the incident blast
elements in conjunction with bomb blast net curtains wave to be partially reflected back towards the
(BBNC) to arrest glass fragments, should the window explosive source, and the remainder of the wave
fail. Such measures, though not keeping the blast out, being diffracted over the barrier. The overpressure
inhibit the ability of broken glass to contaminate the and impulse in the diffracted part of the wave will be
working space. significantly reduced for some distance behind the
Significant enhancement in window strength can be barrier.
obtained by the use of laminated glazing systems. The design and construction of blast walls has
These comprise two, three or more sheets of glass, received a lot of attention in recent years. For
bonded together with tough plastic interlayers, example, Rose et al.[29] give information about
usually made of polyvinyl butyral. The laminated experiments conducted at one-tenth scale on plane
panes are fixed into robust framing systems that rigid walls. They report significant reduction in peak
retain the glass, even when the glazing has undergone pressure and impulse behind these walls out to
considerable distortion. The Glazing Hazard Guide[25] between three and six wall heights. Beyond this
provides information about the performance of a range, although reduction is still evident, it becomes
range of glazing systems. It is worth noting that such less marked. As reported by Rose et al.[30], the
systems can provide defence against ballistic attack, investigation led to the development of design charts
particularly when two laminated glass elements are which allows the performance of a proposed wall
installed with an air gap separating them[26]. design to be assessed. This investigation was
If blast loading is sufficiently intense to cause even extended to include blast walls with canopies that
a laminated system to fail, and glass starts to move were either horizontal or inclined at 458. Rose et al.[31]
with a high velocity, ‘catching’ systems can arrest the report that a canopied wall of the same height as a
motion. Such systems involve the use of plane wall resulted in pressures behind the wall that
bars}structural members placed behind the were less than for the plane wall. In a further series of
laminated pane}or cables attached between the experiments designed to investigate whether a blast
ceiling and floor behind the glass, which may have wall need always be in the form of a strong and heavy
the benefit of being aesthetically more acceptable in permanent structure, Rose et al.[32] concluded that
the working environment[27]. some blast pressure and impulse reduction could be
Mays & Smith[28] provide a simplified design provided by barriers of limited robustness which
procedure for determining the appropriate level of failed when loaded, provided they survived
glazing protection against a range of bomb threats. sufficiently long to interact fully with the incident
blast.
The results of these and a number of other
General design features to improve building investigations, both at full size and to scale, on blast
robustness walls and revetments are presented in summary form
in PSADS[7], where it is seen that walls and other
One of the simplest and most effective ways of barriers which present a plane face to the blast
providing protection to an existing building is to keep produce greatest mitigation.
the source of the blast loading at as long a range as If stand-off cannot be achieved in either of the ways
possible. Creation of even a modest stand-off distance noted above, a building might incorporate stand-off
will mean that blast loading on the building is much into its design by the use of ‘sacrificial’ elements.
reduced in comparison with a close-in blast, because Fig. 10 shows a schematic view of a building with a
blast resultants decrease rapidly with increased range sacrificial roof which would cause, say, a mortar bomb
(Fig. 2). Stand-off can be achieved by locating the aimed at the building to detonate and absorb energy
building remote from property boundaries, and which would then not be available to load the
stand-off can be maintained by denying access to occupied part of the building[5]. The air space around
potential vehicle bombs by the use of robust bollards the inner walls of the building serves a similar
or ‘planters’’ capable of stopping even a fairly fast- function for, say, car bomb attack.

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 BLAST LOADING AND BUILDING ROBUSTNESS 221

Fig. 9 Schematic layout of site for protection against vehicle bombs[5]

Fig. 10 Schematic layout of building with sacri¢cial roof and walls[5]

It is also worth mentioning that structures which of reinforced concrete frame construction. The inertia
provide good resistance against blast loading are of such a building can contribute significantly to the
likely to be relatively heavy. For example, they may be building’s resistance. In addition, the use of ductile

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222 STRUCTURAL SAFETYAND RELIABILITY

construction materials}reinforced concrete or For steel columns, the use of additional bracing
structural steel}render the structure capable of elements can provide improved attack resilience. The
absorbing blast energy by acquiring elastic and plastic strengthening or reinforcing of beam/column
strain energy. This ability to deform (without connections will also increase robustness. Hollow
catastrophic failure) again contributes significantly to steel columns can be filled with concrete to increase
the building’s overall resistance. their resistance by increasing their inertia and
A particular feature of the design of structures reducing the tendency to buckle. As an alternative,
likely to be subjected to blast loading is attention to steel columns can be clad with concrete[27]. In the case
the detailing of connections between members. For of concrete columns, use of Kevlar, glass fibre or
example, in TM5-1300[6] particular attention is given carbon fibre as a form of jacketing will increase the
to the design of chamfered connections between member stiffness, improve its strength and enhance
reinforced concrete wall and floor slabs, and beams its survivability. Full-scale trials of such systems have
and columns to reduce stress concentrations at these indicated their effectiveness[35].
locations. If a blast does manage to enter a structure, External doors often open inwards. Significant
the situation will arise where structural elements such hardening may be achieved by re-hanging them so
as floor slabs, designed to carry downward loads, will that they open outwards. If, in addition, the door-
experience intense loading in exactly the opposite jamb is strengthened the door will bear hard on the
direction. Such members should be capable of jamb, and the risk of the door ‘blowing in’ will be
sustaining such load reversal. reduced[27].
The general aim of any blast-resistant design is that
the robustness and integrity of the structure should be
maintained at all times, and removal of key elements Summary and conclusions
will not lead to progressive collapse, as occurred in
the case of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City[33]. The foregoing has sought to indicate means of
quantifying blast waves produced from a variety of
explosive sources, and the loads that buildings will
Methods of strengthening existing buildings experience when these blast waves interact with them.
to enhance robustness Consideration is given both to a building that is
relatively far from other buildings, and when it is part
The following strengthening measures, although of an array of buildings in an urban environment. The
initially developed for buildings that might be problems peculiar to the detonation of a high-
associated with military operations, are nevertheless explosive device inside a building are also discussed.
equally applicable to providing enhanced robustness It is evident that, when blast wave–building
for civilian buildings. interaction occurs in a complex geometry situation,
The walls of buildings}particularly those made of although empirical rules may sometimes allow
concrete}can be strengthened by bonding an extra reasonable estimation of resultant loads,
thickness of concrete to the inside surface, thus computational tools may be required. Given that
increasing inertial resistance. As an alternative, the buildings of modern construction are inherently
use of strong aramid material, such as Kevlar, bonded robust, the key to improved building performance
to the inside face of a wall can increase the resistance against blast is seated in the need to keep the blast
to attack by increasing its flexural strength. This latter from entering the building. This can be achieved by
approach can also be effective for block walls[27]. means of a strong building facade, based on the use of
Walls can also be strengthened using the Blastec laminated glazing assemblies. Performance can
system[34] which involves drilling holes through, and further be enhanced by the creation of stand-off
parallel with, the faces of masonry walls and between the source of the blast and the building. The
introducing steel bars surrounded by fabric ‘socks’. effect of increased stand-off may also be developed
Cementitious grout is pumped into the socks to fill the where space is limited by the use of blast walls or
holes, and the bars are anchored at the edges of the inclusion of sacrificial elements in the building
wall. Experimental evidence suggests the approach is design. Even with the use of stand-off it may be that a
effective against high-intensity blast loading. building could benefit from the strengthening of some
Walls and ceilings can also be temporarily or all of its structural members, and a range of
strengthened. For example, installation of pilasters, techniques are reported.
spanning from floor to ceiling in contact with the All of these measures are designed to improve the
internal surface of a masonry wall, has been effective building’s chance of surviving bomb blast. More
at reducing deflection from a blast by up to 75%. importantly, however, is the need to protect the
Strengthening of existing roof structures may be occupants of the building. The measures outlined will
achieved by propping, using the commercially go a long way to achieving that aim, but it is important,
available Acrow system or by means of ad hoc timber- finally, to note that there should be some zone
based methods[27]. provided within a building to which occupants can

Copyright & 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Prog. Struct. Engng Mater. 2002; 4:213^223
 BLAST LOADING AND BUILDING ROBUSTNESS 223

move in order to remove themselves from particularly [15] http://www.mindspring.com/eai/index.html (Accessed 8 November 2001).
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Shock, Oxford, 2000: 65^72.
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greater difficulty, incorporated into an existing scale o⁄ce building. Proceedings ofthe16th International Symposium on Military Aspects of
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associated with a bomb threat are summarized in[28] [18] B.ucking P & Mayrhofer C. Numerical investigation of eccentric internal
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Cran¢eld University, Royal Military College of Science,
Swindon, Wiltshire, SN6 8LA, UK
E-mail: [email protected]¢eld.ac.uk

P D Smith
Engineering Systems Department,
Cran¢eld University, Royal Military College of Science,
Swindon, Wiltshire SN6 8LA, UK

Copyright & 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Prog. Struct. Engng Mater. 2002; 4:213^223