3aepublic of tlje flljilippfnes

i5iuprtmt QI:ourt
:fflanila

FIRST DIVISION

THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF G.R. No. 240255

CALOOCAN,
Petitioner, Present:-

GESMUNDO, CJ,
Chairperson,
HERNANDO,
- versus - ZALAMEDA,
ROSARIO,* and
MARQUEZ,JJ

CARMEL DEVELOPMENT Promulgated:

INC., jAN 2 5 2023
Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1;- - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court of the October 20, 2017 Decision2 and the June 20, 2018 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 147019, which partially granted
the Petition for Certiorari4 filed by respondent Carmel Development, Inc.
(CDI). The CA declared the April 25, 2016 5 Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 123, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-24255 null and void,
lifted the writ of preliminary injunction issued in favor of petitioner City of

On official leave.
1
Rollo, pp. 9-3 L
2 Id. at 32-41. Penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales and concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B.
Dimaarnpao (now a Member of this Court) and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of this Court).
3
Id. at 42-43.
4
CA rollo, pp. 3-26.
5
Rollo, pp. 137-142. Penned by Judge Remigio M. Escalada, Jr.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 240255

Caloocan (the City), and set aside the June 6, 2016 RTC Order6 insofar as it
concerned the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

The Antecedents

Since October 27, 1958, CDI (then Carmel Farms, Inc.) has been the
registered owner of three parcels ofland with an aggregate area of 156 hectares
in North Caloocan City. Siti.iated here are Barangays 181 and 182, more
commonly known as "Pangari\p Village," which has a population of around
7 .
31,538 people. .

On September 14, 1973, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in exercise

of his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. (PD) 293 8 with
immediate effect. PD 293 declared CDI's titles to the land comprising Pangarap
Village and all those derived therefrom null and void and declared the lots open
for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacafiang Homeowners
Association, Inc. (MHAI), the alleged bona fide occupants thereof.

Pursuant to the foregoing decree, the subject properties were purchased by

and awarded to MHAI members, who were awarded certificates of title thereto
and built their houses on the land. As the population in Pangarap Village grew,
the national and local governments established public schools, health centers,
and a police station, in addition to other essential and typical services provided
by local governments (e.g., garbage collection, fumigation, and grass cutting
services). 9

On January 29, 1988, nearly 15 years after the enactment of PD 293, the
Court promulgated an en bane Decision in the case of Tuason v. Register of
Deeds (Tuason case), 10 where: PD 293 was declared unconstitutional and void
ab initio in all its parts. Th~ Tuason case had the effect of restoring full
ownership over the subject lahds to CDI and all those who derived their title
from CDI. 11

i
6 Id. at 161-168. Penned by Judge Remlgio M. Escalada, Jr.
7 See the Philippine Statistics Authority! 2020 Census of Population .and Housing.
Entitled "CANCELLING THE SALE CERTIFICATES AND/OR TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLES NUMBERS
62603, 62604, AND 62605, COVERING LOTS I, 2, AND 3, RESPECTIVELY, PCS-4383, ALL IN THE NAME OF
CARMEL FARMS, ]NC., WHICH IS A CONSOLIDATION AND SUBDIVISION OF LOTS 979,981,982,985,988,
989,990, 991-NEW, 1226, 1228, ]230i AND 980-C-2 (LRC PSD-1730), ALL OF TALA ESTATE, CALOOCAN
CITY AND DECLARING THE SAME OPEN FOR DISPOSITION . TO THE MALACANANG HOMEOWERS
ASS;CIATION, INC., THE PRESENT od:uPANTS, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
'
NUMBER 32, As AMENDED.". Signed: September 14, I 973 ..
9
Id.
10
241 Phil. 650 (1988).
11
ld.at663.
 Decision 3 G.R. No. 240255

Fallowing the restoration of its title to the land where Pangarap Village is
located, CDI has taken steps to reinforce its ownership and to prevent the entry
of third persons and informal settlers by installing security measures, such as
security booms and road blockades along Gregorio Araneta Avenue, a privately-
owned major thoroughfare that is a crucial linkage within and in the immediate
peripheries of Pangarap Village. 12

On January 6, 2016, the City, pursuant to Article 701 of the New Civil
Code (the Civil Code), filed a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance, with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 13
in connection with the security measures installed and operated by CDI at the
entrance of and along Gregorio Araneta Avenue. The City filed an Amended
Complaint 14 dated January 22, 2016 to submit Sangguniang Panlungsod
Resolution No. 2429, series of 2016, authorizing the Honorable Mayor of
Caloocan to file the abatement of nuisance case. 15

In its Amended Complaint, the City claimed that the road blockades were
public nuisances under Art. 694 of the Civil Code, because such blockades
endanger the life, health, safety, and welfare of the Pangarap Village residents, 16
and they have hampered the delivery of basic services and facilities to the
residents of Pangarap Village. 17 Further to its complaint for the abatement of
nuisance, the City prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin CDI from closing
Gregorio Araneta Avenue to the public and restricting or regulating access to
Quirino Avenue through Gregorio Araneta Avenue. 18

In its Answer, 19 CDI prayed for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint
and, in support thereof, raised the following affirmative defenses: (1) CDI is the
lawful and rightful owner of Gregorio Araneta Avenue, a private road which
forms part of the 19,712-square meter lot covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 62606 (15632) registered in the name of CDI, and CDI
therefore has a right to exercise acts of ownership thereon, including the right
to install security measures to protect its property from third persons; 20 (2) the
City has no cause of action against CDI, because the actions sought to be
enjoined are a valid exercise of CDI's right of ownership over the subject

12
Rollo, pp. 138-139.
13
CA ro/lo, pp. 84-100.
14 Rollo, pp. 44-60.
15 Id. at 52-58.
16
Id. at 53.
17 Id. at 46.
18 Id. at 58.
19
Id. at I 00-136.
20
Id. at 110; 113-115.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 240255

property; 21 (3) the instant case is barred by litis pendentia and res judicata; 22
and (4) anent the prayer for a T]:lO/writ of preliminary injunction, the City failed
to present proof of any clear :and positive right it has over Gregorio Araneta
Avenue. 23 By way of counterclaim, CDI sought payment of damages and
attorney's fees. 24 ·

'
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Order dated April 25, 2016, 25 the RTC granted the City's application
for a writ of preliminary injunction:

WHEREFORE, in the [sic] light of the foregoing, a writ of preliminary

injunction is hereby ISSUED, enjoining defendant Carmel Development, Inc., its
subordinates, agents, represe~tatives, and any and all persons acting in its behalf,
during the pendency of the main action, from closing and restricting free access
to and from Gregorio Araneta Avenue to and from Quirino Avenue to plaintiff
and its representatives, functionaries, agents, employees, and any and all persons
acting in its behalf, including ~ervice and utility providers to its service units duly
authorized by plaintiff, and vehicles and other conveyances used by them, to
enable the national and city governments to service the needs of its constituents
in the area, upon posting by the plaintiff of a bond in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (PI00,000.0:0), to answer for damages that defendant Carmel
Development, Inc. may sustain by reason of the injunctive relief granted should
it subsequently be determined that plaintiff was not entitled thereto.

SO ORDERED. 26

Following the conclusioiii of the hearings on t.1-ie City's application for a

writ of preliminary injunction; the RTC found that the City presented sufficient
evidence to show that its government mandate to serve its constituents was
severely hampered by CDI's ~oad blockades. The City's evidence showed that
(1) its fire truck was not allowed to immediately respond to a crisis and was
made to wait for around 15 to 20 minutes before the CDI security guards secured
approval for its entry; (2) due ~b entry restrictions, the delivery of health services
and medicine is delayed and is further aggravated by CDI' s refusal to allow
i

water and electrical utilities p;oviders to conduct maintenance and repair works
inside Pangarap Village; and: (3) timely police _assistance and intervention in
27
case of crime is also impeded:by the road blockades.

21 Id.atll0-111.
22 Id. at 123.
23
Id. at 126.
24
Jd. at 133.
25
Jd. at 137-142.
26 Id. at 142.
27 Id. at I40.
 Decision 5 G.R. No. 240255

Even though CDI recovered its title to the subject property, the RTC ruled
that it was estopped from denying the possession of and access for the national
and city governments, because it did not move to oust them from its property
despite the lapse of almost 3 0 years from the promulgation of Tuason. 28 The
RTC deemed this inaction as acquiescence on the part of CDI of the presence
of the frontline units of the national and city governments, which constitlites a
self-limitation by CDI on its ownership rights over the property. 29

Consequently, the RTC found that the City had shown sufficient evidence
ofits clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the locations ofits service
units in Pangarap Village, including the right to unhampered access to these
units to enable the City to properly serve its constituents and that there was a
paramount necessity to protect such right and prevent serious damage. 30 Thus,
the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of the City.

Aggrieved, CDI filed a Manifestation with Very Urgent Omnibus Motion

for Clarification and Reconsideration31 dated May 6, 2016. CDI sought the
reconsideration of the RTC's April 26, 2016 Order issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of the City. CDI argued that there was a
procedural irregularity when the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction
without granting the preliminary injunction, subject to the City's compliance
with the requirement of posting a bond. 32 Further, CDI insisted that both the
posting of a bond and the disbursement of public funds in connection with the
bond should be authorized pursuant to appropriate resolutions from the
Sangguniang Panlungsod. 33 Absent such resolutions, CDI argued that the City
has not complied with the bond requirements. 34

In connection with the substantive aspect of the RTC Order, CDI took
exception to the RTC's statement that CDI never moved against the national or
local government in recovering and safeguarding its interests in Pangarap
Village. 35 To support its position, CDI enumerated several cases, the majority
of which involved CDI as a party, wherein the courts affirmed CDI's ownership
over the subject property or upheld CDI's actions to exclude other parties from
its property as a valid exercise of dominion. 36 Accordingly, CDI argued that
there was no basis to the RTC's ruling that CDI was estopped from unilaterally
cutting off access and possession to the City's government facilities in Pangarap
Village. 37
28
Id.
29
Id. at 140-141.
30
Id. at 141.
31
Id. at 143-160.
32
Id. at 150-151.
33
Id.atl51.
'' Id.
35
Id. at 152-155.
36
Id. at 152-154.
37
Id. at 155.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 240255

Further, CDI assailed thl RTC's finding that the City has a clear and
unmistakable· right to be protected to justify the issuance of the writ of
I

preliminary injunction. 38 The <[.:ity invoked its duty as a local government unit
(LGU) to provide basic services and facilities to constituents under Section 17
of Republic Act No. 7160 or 14e "Local Government Code" 39 as legal basis for
its right to be allowed free access to Gregorio Araneta Avenue. 4 CDI posited °
that the fulfillment of the iCity's mandate to deliver basic services is
circumscribed by the parameters set by law, thus prohibiting the City from
imposing its authority upon any private property. 41 According to CDI, such
imposition amounted to a taking of private property without due process of law
I
which is an invasion of the corlstitutional guarantee. 42 Accordingly, CDI argued
that between the City's duty ak an LGU to deliver basic facilities and services
and CDI's constitutional right ~o enjoy its property without undue governmental
interference, the latter must ;prevail. 43 With the City having no clear and
unmistakable right to be protected, CDI prayed that the RTC set aside its April
26, 2016 Order and that it dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction. 44

The RTC issued its OrcJ:er dated June 6, 2016,45 where it resolved the
affinnative defenses CDI raised in its Answer and its motion for
reconsideration. The dispositiie portion of the foregoing reads:
I
WHEREFORE, in the qsic) light of the foregoing, the affirmative defenses
of lack of cause of action and 1itis pendentia or res judicata, alleged by defendant
Carmel Development, Inc. in: its Answer (with Omnibus Motion), dated March
JO, 2016, are hereby DENIEf·
I

Further, the Very U~gent Omnibus Motions for Clarification and

Reconsideration, dated May ;6, 2016, and the prayer therein for the recall and
setting aside of the Order ~ated April 25, 2016, as well as the prayer for
dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued thereunder and to allow
defendant Carmel Developl ent, Inc. to post a· counter bond, are likewise
1

DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 46 .

38 Id
s9 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities.~
· (a) Local government units shal\ endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers
and discharoino the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions
and respon:ibITities of national agefci~s and offices devolved to t~em pursuant to this Cod_e. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers a~d discharge ~uch o~e: funct10ns an.cl
responsibilities as are necessary, apprbpriate, or incidental to efficient and effective prov1s10ns of the baste
services and facilities enumerated her~in.
40 Rollo, p. 55. ,'
41 Id. 1
42 CONSTITUTJON, Art. III, Sec. I.
43 Rollo, p. 155.
44
Id. at 158.
45 Id. at 161-168.
46
Id. at 168.
 Decision 7 G.R. No. 240255

In denying the motions for dissolution of the preliminary injunction and

allowance to file a counterbond, the RTC found that CDI failed to comply with
the requisites of Rule 58, Section 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
dissolution of an injunction-namely, that such motion be accompanied by the
affidavit/s of the party or person enjoined containing any allegation that the
injunction "would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined
while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may
47
suffer." The RTC did not consider CDI's other arguments, as these pertained
to the merits of the main action. 48

CDI elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari49 under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision dated October 20, 2017, 50 the CA partially granted the

Petition for Certiorari:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED. The

April 25, 2016 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 123, Caloocan City in
Civil Case No. C-24255 is declared NULL and VOID and the writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of the City of Caloocan is LIFTED. The June 6, 2016 Order
is likewise ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as the issuance of said writ of
preliminary injunction is concerned.

so ORDERED. 51
The CA did not dwell on the propriety of the RTC's failure to dismiss the
complaint on the basis of CDI's affirmative defense, due to CDI's failure to
move for the reconsideration of the RTC's order denying said defenses. 52 CDI
sought reconsideration only of the April 25, 2016 Order granting the City's
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. 53 The settled rule is that a
motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition
for certiorari, because its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court that
issued the assailed ruling to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it
by reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. 54 The
requirement may only be dispensed with for concrete, compelling, and valid
reasons, which CDI neglected to provide. Consequently, the CA did not rule on
this issue.

47 2019 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 58, Section 6.

48
Rollo, p. 168.
49 CA rollo, pp. 3-26.
50
Rollo, pp. 32-4 I.
51
ld. at 40.
52 Id. at 37.
53 Id.
54
Republicv. Bayao, 710 Phil. 276,287 (2013).
Decision 8 G.R. No. 240255
I

J
However, the CA ruled CDI's favor when it found that the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction by the RTC was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack o~ excess of jurisdiction, because the City's right
to use privately-owned Gr~gorio Araneta Avenue was not clear and
unmistakable. Being an extrao dinary and peremptory remedy that must be used
1
with extreme caution, affecting as it does the respective rights of the parties, 55
the CA emphasized that a writ of preliminary injunction may only issue when
the reason and necessity therbfore are clearly established, and only in cases
reasonably free of doubt. 56 As ~he City's right to use a portion of CDI's property
is the subject of the abatement :case, the CA found that the very existence of the
City's right is disputable. 57 Thps, in the absence of a clear legal right or a right
in esse to be protected, the <CA ruled that the issuance by the RTC of the
I

injunctive writ was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 58

!

Further, the CA determi~ed that the acts the City sought to enjoin had
already become fait accompN and that the status quo could no longer be
restored, because CDI had alrJady consummated the acts complained of when
it installed the road blockades to close off Gregorio Araneta Avenue. 59 Thus, the
relief sought by the City could no longer be granted. 60
I
'

For the foregoing reaso~s, the CA partly granted CDI's Petition for
Certiorari and lifted the writ ~f preliminary injunction granted in favor of the
City.
'

The City sought reconsideration of the CA Decision, but the CA affirmed

61
its ruling and denied the mot\on for reconsideration in its Resolution dated
June 20, 2018 after determining that the motion raised arguments that were
already considered and resolved in its earlier Decision.
I
' .

Hence, this Petition !or ~~V:ie~ on Certiorari. The City cited the following
grounds as the bases for its petition:
- I - -

THE COURT OF AP~EALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE

QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 20 OCTOBER 2017 AND THE
RESOLUTION DATED 20 JUNE 2018, AND IN SO DOING,
DEPARTED FROM EfTABLISHED RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE,
CONSIDERING THAI:

55 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hontanosas, Jr., 737 Phil 38, 53 (2014).
56
Rollo, p. 3 8.
57
Id. at_38-39.
58
Id. at 39.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 42-43.
 Decision 9 G.R. No. 240255

I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION INFA VOR OF THE CITY.

IL THE CITY'S POSSESSION OVER A PORTION OF PANGARAP

VILLAGE PRECEDED THE RAMON TUASON CASE WHICH
RESTORED CDI'S OWNERSHIP THERETO, A FACT ADMITTED BY
NO LESS THAN CDT.

III. THE ACTS SOUGHT TO BE ENJOINED BY THE CITY ARE NOT

FAIT ACCOMPLI, BUT ARE MERELY BUT THREATHENED [sic]
AND IMPERMANENT. THEREFORE, THESE CAN BE RESTRAINED
BY INJUNCTION. 62

The issue at the crux of this case is whether the CA erred in dissolving the
writ of preliminary injunction issued in favor of the City.

Our Ruling

We resolve to deny the Petition.

The Court defined a writ of preliminary injunction in Bureau of Customs

v. Court ofAppeals-Cagayan de Oro Station: 63

A writ of preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection

of substantial rights and interests. It is not a cause of action itself, but a mere
provisional remedy adjunct to a main suit. It is granted at any stage of an action
or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts; it may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a
preliminary mandatory injunction. It may be granted by the court where the
action or proceeding is pending. The purpose of injunction is to prevent
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can
be thoroughly studied, and its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the
merits of the case are fully heard. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
is governed by Rule 5 8 of the Rules of Court. 64

The essential requisites for the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction are
the following:

(1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected,
that is, a right in esse;

(2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;

62 Id. at 15-16.
63 G.R.Nos.192809, 193588, !93590-l,and201650,April26,2021.
64 Id., citing Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office v. TMA Group of Companies Pty Ltd., G.R. Nos. 212143,
225457, & 236888, August 28, Wl9.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 240255

(3) there is an urgent nded for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and I

(4) no other ordinary, sbeedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury. 65

Injunctive relief is only available when there is a pressing necessity to

avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
I

pecuniary compensation. 66 It must be proven that the violation sought to be

prevented would result in an iiremediable injustice. 67

The grant or denial of a 'fvrit of preliminary injunction rests on the sound

discretion of the court taking cpgnizance over the case since the assessment and
evaluation of evidence towardi that end involve findings of fact left to the said
court for its conclusive det¢rmination. 68 Hence, the exercise of judicial
discretion by a court in injun~tive matters must not be interfered with except
when there is grave abuse of dlscretion. 69
!

Grave abuse of discretiotj involves a capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic man~er by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
aversion an1ounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or tc act at all in contemplation oflaw. 70
'
Upon review of the rec;ords, the Comt holds that the appellate court
committed no reversible err01f and sustains its ruling that the issuance by the
RTC of the writ ofpreliminad, injunction in fa·~or of the City was tainted with
2-rave abuse of discretion, bec~use the City was not entitled to injunctive relief.
o I •

i
The City does not have a lc1ear
and unmistakable right that!must
be protected against a material
and substantial invasion :

First and foremost of the evidentiary hurdles that an applicant for a writ of
preliminary injunction must overcome is to establish the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right to be pr! tected. This is because injunction, which is

65 Bicol Medical Center v. Bator, 819 Phil. 447, 458 (2017), citing St. James College of Paraiiaque v.
Equitable PC! Bank, 641 Phil. 452, 4; 6 (2010). ..
66 Transfield Philippines. Inc. v. Luzon lclydro Corporation, 485 Phil. 699, 726 (2004).
67 s;col A1eakal Center v. Botor; supr~ at A57, citing Philippine Nutional Bank v. Castallcy Technology
Corporation, 684 Phil. 438,445 (2011')- __ . .,
" Cahambing v. Espinosa, 804 Phil. 4n, 420-421 (2017), c1tmg Cortez-Estrada v. He1rs ofSamut, 491 Phi,.
458, 473-474 (2005). I· ,
H ~ . .
7° Chua v. People, 821 Phil. 271, 279-280 (2017), citing Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, 667 Phil. 474,481 •482 (2011 ).
I
I
 Decision 11 G.R. No. 240255

characterized as "an extraordinary event, one deemed as a strong arm of equity

or a transcendent remedy," 71 will not issue to protect or enforce contingent,
abstract, or future rights. 72 Injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse
and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a
cause of action. 73 Thus, before the courts may issue a writ of preliminary
injunction, it is essential that the party seeking its issuance must establish the
existence of the right to be protected and that such right is actual, clear, and
74
existing. Further, the invasion of that clear and unmistakable right must be
material and substantial. 75

The quantum of evidence that the applicant must present to prove the
existence of such a right is merely prima facie evidence, or such evidence as, in
the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or
chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which, if not rebutted
or contradicted, will remain sufficient. 76 Such evidence must clearly show that
the applicant's right exists and that no doubt lingers as to the existence of said
right. 77

Guided by the foregoing standards, the Court rules that the City's right to
be protected from a material and substantial violation by injunction was not
sufficiently shown to exist.

The City does not dispute CDI' s claim of ownership over Gregorio Araneta
Avenue and the property on which Pangarap Village is situated. That the City
lodged the instant abatement of nuisance case is itself an acknowledgement of
CDI's dominion over the subject property. Thus, the City does not base its
alleged entitlement to a writ of preliminary injunction on a claim of ownership,
but on (1) its right of possession over the government buildings located in
Pangarap Village, and (2) its duty pursuant to the General Welfare Clause
enshrined in Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, to wit:

Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well. as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the gene~al
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government umts
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of

11 Sumifru (Philippines) Corp. v. Spouses Cereno, 825 Phil. 743, 750 (2018), citing Liberty Broadcasting
Network, Inc. v. Atlocom Wireless System, Inc., 762 Phil. 210, 226_(2015).
72 Lerias v. Court ofAppeals, 900 Phil. 289,299 (2019).
73 Id.
74 Bureau of Customs v. Court ofAppeals-Cagayan de Oro Station, supra.
75 Id.
76 Lerias v. Court ofAppeals, supra at 299, citing Bica/ Medical Center v. Botor, supra note 65, at 459.
77
Id. at 299-300.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 240255

culture, promote health and sefety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and supp~rt the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and tec!mological i capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and sodial justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and: order, and preserve the comfort and convenience
of their inhabitants. 78 •
i
I'

The City claims that the restrictions imposed by CDI on its ingress and
egress through Gregorio Ar!neta Avenue have unduly and unreasonably
hampered the City's access ito Pangarap Village, thus depriving it of its
possession of the government offices and facilities located there and preventing
it from exercising its police 'powers and accomplishing its duty under the
General Welfare Clause. 79 i

CDI maintains that the! City's pos1t1on that it has been deprived of
possessory rights over the government offices and facilities is a new concoction
that the City raised for the first time in its Motion for Reconsideration before
°
the CA. 8 CDI argues that the,City's claim of possession is incompatible with
its original cause of action, 81 which was abatement of nuisance, and, in any case,
can no longer be raised at this late stage of the proceedings. 82 Despite
i

maintaining this position, CDX addresses the substantive aspect of the City's
arguments by pointing out thit the General Welfare Clause does not give the
LGU unbridled discretion on how to fulfill this mandate and that the City
remains bound by the parameters set by law. 83 Thus, CDI argues that any
attempts by the City to unilat~rally impose its will and authority on privately
owned property amounts to al taking of property without due process of law,
which is prohibited under the Constitution. 84 ·
!

Preliminarily, although t!e issue of possession was not raised by the City
in its Complaint, the RTC diJcussed and ruled upon this matter in its Orders
dated June 6, 2016 85 and Aptp 25, 2016. 86 Once a court acq_uires jurisdiction
over a case, it has wide disqetion to look upon matters which, although not
87
raised as an issue, would givejlife and meani_ng ~o the law. Consequently, CDI
cannot claim that the City's claim of possess10n 1s a new matter brought up only
I
on appeal. -

78 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 16.

79 Rollo, p. 359.
80 Id. at 325-326.
81 Id. at 326-328.
82
Id. at 327-328.
83
Id. at I28.
" Id. . . i
85
Id. at 16I-168. . I
86 Id. at 137-142.
87 Logronio v. Taleseo, 370 Phil. 907, 9p-918 (1999).
!
 Decision 13 G.R. No. 240255

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with CDI on the substantive aspects of the
issues raised.

On the basis of the Court's ruling in Malonesio v. Jizmundo, 88 as cited by

the City, the property on which the government facilities have been erected has
been devoted to public use, thus preventing CDI from recovering possession of
the same and entitling it only to just compensation for the value thereo£ 89
However, while the City does have the right to possess the government facilities
and structures in Pangarap Village, it has failed to prove that it has been unduly
deprived of possession by CDI, because it has been shown that there are other
access routes leading to Pangarap Village. 90 While Gregorio Araneta Avenue is
the most convenient and direct route to Pangarap Village, both the City and CDI
have acknowledged the existence of backroads and other points of ingress to
and egress from Pangarap Village. 91

Further, CDI has averred that it has not prevented the City from performing
its duties within the subject property, as it has allowed the entry of the police
and fire personnel and other government vehicles after the latter have secured
permission or clearance from CDI. 92 This is supported by the allegations of the
City in its Complaint and the statements ofits witnesses provided as evidence. 93
In its Petition for Review, the City even admits that "CDI has not totally
prevented the City access inside Pangarap Village, but merely threatened to
limit, restrain or regulate the City's access in and to Pangarap Village." 94 That
CDI has also granted access to the City was also admitted in the Petition for
Review, though the City described such access regulation as "intermitted (sic)
rigid, restrictive, and inconvenient. " 95

Thus, despite the relative inconvenience to the City and its representatives
in accessing Pangarap Village, the City cannot claim that there has been a
material and substantial invasion of its right to possess the government facilities
and buildings located in Pangarap Village, as it has not been unduly and
unreasonably deprived of the means to access the same. It must be emphasized
that the City has no right to access or possess Gregorio Araneta Avenue itself,
as the same remains a private road, which, despite the use of the general public
permitted by CDI, is not stripped of its private character and converted into
public property. 96

88
793 Phil. 723 (20 I 6).
89
Id. at 733.
90
See rollo, p. 82.
91 Id. at 46, 328.
92
Id. at 130.
93
See id. at 26, 47, 50, 85, 119,352.
94
Id. at 26.
95
Id.
96 Woodridge School, Inc. v. ARB Construction Co., Inc., 545 Phil. 83, 89 (2007).
Decision 14 G.R. No. 240255

_ Anont th, City's invo,_Jn of th, Gea,ral Wdfitr, Clause to justify tho
1s_suance of a wnt of prehmmfc}ry mJunct10n, We deem the same to be without
merit. I

First, the General Welfare Clause, being a delegation in statutory form of

the police power of the State to 1[,GUs,97 is exercised by the LGU mainly through
its legislative body through the enactment of ordinances. 98 The General Welfare
Clause has two branches: first,lknown as the "general legislative power," is the
authority to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may
be necessary to carry into effedt and discharge the powers and duties conferred
upon the municipal council By law; 99 second, known as the "police power
proper," is the authority to enaft ordinances as may be necessary and proper for
the health and safety, prosp~rity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipallty and its inhabitants, and for the protection of
their property. 100

Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of the case at bar, the City's
basis for its invocation of the General Welfare Clause is doubtful at best. There
is no ordinance, regulation, otj other issuance from the City's legislative body
involved, or, indeed, any exercise of legislative power by the LGU. The City
cannot claim that it has been pr~vented from fulfilling its duty under the General
Welfare Clause when it has no~ exercised its power to enact ordinances pursuant
to such duty. This ruling is in abcordance with the principle that, since the police
power of the local governmen:t units flows from the express delegation of the
power by Congress, its exerci~e is to be construed in strictissimijuris, thus any
doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting the power should
be construed against the local legislative units. 101
I
I

Consequently, the City's lrgument that it is entitled to a writ of preliminary

injunction on the basis of itsl mandate under the General Welfare Clause is
without merit, as the applicabtlity of the General Welfare Clause to the case at
bar is not clear and unmistakable.

Second, even assuming lat the General Welfare Clause may be invoked
even without the issuance of dn ordinance or other regulation, the power of the
local government under the beneral Welfare Clause is not meant to be an
"invincible authority." 102 Th~ General Welfare Clause is not available as a
source of power for the taking of private property in this case because it refers

97 Batangas CATV. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 482 Phil. 544,561 (2004), citing VSv. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102,
109 (191s). I
98 Cruzv. Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc:, V76 P~il. 336,_348 (2016). 0
99 Rural Bank of Makati Inc. v. Mumc1palzty OJ Makat,, 477 Phil. 425, 4,8 (2004).
I
100Id. . I
101Mosqueda v. Filipino Banana Grower, & ·Exporters Association, Inc., 793 Phil. 17, 85 (2016).
w2 Id. .
 Decision 15 G.R. No. 240255

to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property." 103

While the City has a duty to its inhabitants under the General Welfare
Clause, it does not have carte blanche to fulfill its mandate in a manner that
violates the parameters set by law, which include the rights of private property
owners. The City cannot, under the guise of performing its duty, disregard
CDI's rights over its property, which include the right to regulate and restrict
entry and access thereto and the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof. 104

In the case of Abellana, Sr. v. Court ofAppeals, 105 the Court emphasized
that road lots of a private subdivision are private property, and that the LGU
must first acquire such road lots by donation, purchase, or expropriation before
the same can be used as a public road. 106 While the property owned by CDI is
not a subdivision, the Court applies the foregoing ruling to the instant case by
analogy. Accordingly, while Gregorio Araneta Avenue may have been
previously open for public use, the same remains a private road under the
ownership and control of CDI, unless and until the same has been validly
acquired by the LGU. Any other conclusion would amount to an encroachment
ofCDI's ownership and serves as an undue limitation on CDI's exercise of the
concomitant rights that arise as an attribute of such ownership, including the
right to exclude persons from the subject property. Thus, the City may not
compel CDI to grant free access to the City's officials and representatives absent
a clear and unmistakable right thereto, which, as previously discussed, the City
failed to establish.

The RTC's grant of the writ of

preliminary injunction exceeds
the scope of the remedy as it does
not preserve the status quo and
changes the relations between the
City and CDI

Preliminary injunction, being a preservative remedy, should not create new

relations between the parties, but must only maintain the status quo until the
merits of the case are fully heard. 107 Status quo is defined as "the last actual,

'°3 City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, 207 Phil. 648, 652 (J 983).
104 CIVIL CODE, Article 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary
to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
105
284 Phil. 449 (1992).
106
Id. at 453.
107 Spouses Laus v. Optimum Security Services, Inc., 780 Phil. 412, 421 (2016), citing Los Banos Rural Bank,
Inc. v. Africa, 433 Phil. 930, 945 (2002).
Decision 16 G.R. No. 240255

pc=ablc, Md =contested ,J,

which pccccdcd the ~tual con!rovffSy, o, tUat
existing at the time of the filing of the case." 108 In Spouses Laus v. Optimum
Lnc., 109 the 'fourt
S . 0erv1ces,
. ~curz~ " . ,.J, c1early defined the scope of a preliminary
lllJUilCtIOn: :
!

[T]he Court has repeatedly held that when the act sought to be enjoined has
become fait accompli, the pra\yer for preliminary injunction should be denied.
Indeed, when the events sougb:t to be prevented by injunction or prohibition had
already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited. An injunction
will not issue to restrain the peiformance of an act already done. 110
'
'
'

In this case, at the time of;the filing of the Complaint on January 6, 2016,
CDI had already long since established and manned the road blockade along
Gregorio Araneta Avenue. In f4ct, the City aileged that the road blockade was
established as early as 2000. 11 \ With an intervening period of more than two
decades since the dispute began, it is evident that the situation can no longer be
restored to the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested situation, and that the
status quo in this case is that existing at the time the case was filed. Thus, rather
than preserving the status quo, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
by the RTC would instead have the effect of altering the relations between t.1-ie
City and CDI and prohibiting 'acts that have long since been consummated,
which exceeds the purpose of ai preliminary injunction.
!

In conclusion, the CA did Not commit any reversible error when it reversed
the RTC's Order granting th~ City's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, becausd (1) the City failed to establish the requisites of
a writ of preliminary injunct~on, particularly the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right to be protepted and the material and substantial invasi?n
thereof; and (2) the grant of the preliminary injunction prayed for by the City
exceeds the scope of a preliniinary injunction, because it has the effect of
changing the status quo insteadlof preserving it.

WHEREFORE, petition r City Government of Caloocan's Petition for

Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' October 20, 2017
Decision and the June 20, 20]8 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP. No. 147019 are
AFFIRMED.. I

'°' Sumifru (Philippines) Corp. v. SpousJ Cerefio, supra note 71 at 752, citing Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration v. Atty. Chavez, 551 Phi'. 890, 911-912 (2007).
109
780 Phil. 412 (2016).
1
io Id. at 421. Citations omitted.
11 ' Rollo,p.13.
Decision 17 G.R. No. 240255

SO ORDERED.

ERNANDO

\VE CONCUR:

On official leave.
EDA RICARDO R. ROSARIO
Associate Justice

:
JO~MARQUEZ
~
"Jissociate Justice
Decision 18 G.R. No. 240255

CERITIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
I

case was assigned to the writei of the opinion of the Court's Division.