Full download ebooks at https://ebookmeta.

com

Astroparticle Physics 2nd Edition Grupen

For dowload this book click link below

https://ebookmeta.com/product/astroparticle-physics-2nd-
edition-grupen/

OR CLICK BUTTON

DOWLOAD NOW
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Handbook of Particle Detection and Imaging Claus Grupen

https://ebookmeta.com/product/handbook-of-particle-detection-and-
imaging-claus-grupen/

Computational Physics 2nd Edition Michael Bestehorn

https://ebookmeta.com/product/computational-physics-2nd-edition-
michael-bestehorn/

Understanding Physics 2nd Edition 2023 ■■■■

https://ebookmeta.com/product/understanding-physics-2nd-
edition-2023-%d8%8c%d8%8c%d8%8c%d8%8c/

Plasma Physics 2nd Edition Richard. Fitzpatrick

https://ebookmeta.com/product/plasma-physics-2nd-edition-richard-
fitzpatrick/
Computational Physics 2nd Edition Darren Walker Phd

https://ebookmeta.com/product/computational-physics-2nd-edition-
darren-walker-phd/

Statistical Physics 2nd Edition Michael V. Sadovskii

https://ebookmeta.com/product/statistical-physics-2nd-edition-
michael-v-sadovskii/

Particle Physics An Introduction 2nd Edition Robert

Purdy

https://ebookmeta.com/product/particle-physics-an-
introduction-2nd-edition-robert-purdy/

Semiconductor Physics 2nd Edition Karl W. Böer

https://ebookmeta.com/product/semiconductor-physics-2nd-edition-
karl-w-boer/

Handbook of Physics 2nd Edition Y Arihant Experts

https://ebookmeta.com/product/handbook-of-physics-2nd-edition-y-
arihant-experts/
Undergraduate Texts in Physics

Claus Grupen

Astroparticle
Physics
Second Edition
Undergraduate Texts in Physics

Series Editors
Kurt H. Becker, NYU Polytechnic School of Engineering, Brooklyn, NY, USA
Jean-Marc Di Meglio, Matière et Systèmes Complexes, Université Paris Diderot,
Bâtiment Condorcet, Paris, France
Sadri D. Hassani, Department of Physics, Loomis Laboratory, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA
Morten Hjorth-Jensen, Department of Physics, Blindern, University of Oslo, Oslo,
Norway
Michael Inglis, Patchogue, NY, USA
Bill Munro, NTT Basic Research Laboratories, Optical Science Laboratories,
Atsugi, Kanagawa, Japan
Susan Scott, Department of Quantum Science, Australian National University,
Acton, ACT, Australia
Martin Stutzmann, Walter Schottky Institute, Technical University of Munich,
Garching, Bayern, Germany
Undergraduate Texts in Physics (UTP) publishes authoritative texts covering topics
encountered in a physics undergraduate syllabus. Each title in the series is suitable
as an adopted text for undergraduate courses, typically containing practice
problems, worked examples, chapter summaries, and suggestions for further
reading. UTP titles should provide an exceptionally clear and concise treatment of a
subject at undergraduate level, usually based on a successful lecture course. Core
and elective subjects are considered for inclusion in UTP.
UTP books will be ideal candidates for course adoption, providing lecturers with
a firm basis for development of lecture series, and students with an essential
reference for their studies and beyond.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/15593

Claus Grupen

Astroparticle Physics
Second Edition

With Contribution by Dr. Tilo Stroh

123
Claus Grupen
Universität Siegen FB Physik
Siegen, Germany

ISSN 2510-411X ISSN 2510-4128 (electronic)

Undergraduate Texts in Physics
ISBN 978-3-030-27341-5 ISBN 978-3-030-27339-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27339-2

1st edition: © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

2nd edition: © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission
or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar
methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from
the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained
herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard
to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: Interaction of an energetic cosmic ray muon in the ALPEH experiment

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Muon shower in the ALEPH experiment at a depth of 125 m underground
Preface to the Present Second English Edition
(2020)

Nothing lasts, nothing is finished, and nothing is perfect.

Alan Saporta

The first English edition of Astroparticle Physics was published in 2005. Even
though the period of 14 years since the first edition of this book is short compared
to the recently determined age of the universe by the Planck satellite, a lot has
happened since 2005. In particular, there are new results in cosmology. The clas-
sical Big Bang model is able to explain the flatness, the horizon, and the monopole
problems. However, what happened in the first fractions of a second is still
unknown. What is bothering us is the still open problem of the dominance of dark
matter and dark energy. CP-violating effects are known in the field of particle
physics, but they are insufficient to explain the disappearance of antimatter. Results
from the satellite experiment PAMELA and the AMS experiment on board the
international space station ISS do find a surprisingly high positron excess at high
energies. But there is also the possibility that these positrons originate from neutron
stars, quasars, or active galactic nuclei.
In particle physics, the discovery of the long-searched-for Higgs boson at the
Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN in 2012 is certainly a highlight. With its
mass of 125 GeV, this boson supports the Standard Model of particle physics. On
the other hand, the non-observation of supersymmetric particles in the mass range
of up to one TeV is somewhat disappointing. Supersymmetric particles were and
still are considered as dark-matter candidates. With gravitational microlensing one
can, however, ‘see’ the effect of dark matter in the Bullet Cluster, but this ‘seeing’ is
a little indirect. So, the search for dark-matter particles still goes on.
A short flicker of hope for the detection of gravitational waves from the Big
Bang came from the BICEP experiment at the South Pole, but it soon crumbled into
dust. The expected gravitational waves should exhibit a fingerprint of the polari-
sation in the primordial cosmic background radiation, for which there seemed some
evidence from BICEP. The polarisation of the cosmic blackbody radiation is,
however, also influenced by cosmic dust, and the Planck satellite could not confirm
BICEP’s result. On the other hand, the LIGO detector with its two Michelson
interferometers was the first to find excellent evidence for gravitational waves in
2015. This represented an unexpected real breakthrough. Up to the time of writing

vii
viii Preface to the Present Second English Edition (2020)

of this book 11 events were found, most of them dominated by mergers of two
black holes, and one by a kilonova caused by a binary-neutron-star merger. The
time structure of the gravitational-wave signals and the coincident measurement
of the signals in two separate stations about 3000 kilometers apart provides
excellent support for the correctness of these findings. This detection of gravita-
tional waves opens up a new window for an astronomy in addition to the obser-
vation of celestial objects by electromagnetic radiation.
In cosmic rays the ICECUBE experiment found evidence for cosmogenic,
high-energy neutrino events in the PeV range since 2013, at least one of them
which possibly correlates with a radiation burst of a blazar residing in a galaxy at a
distance of almost ten billion light-years. Therewith, also the neutrino astronomy
enters the stage of astroparticle physics in the high-energy regime.
Also, new developments in detection techniques might gain additional scientific
knowledge. For example, the radio measurements of high-energy cosmic rays
provide a cost-effective technique for the measurement of primary cosmic rays in
the range beyond 100 PeV in extensive air showers. The radio signal is believed to
originate from geomagnetic synchrotron radiation. The pioneer experiments
LOPES and LOFAR have opened up a new detection window by radio astronomy
in the field of high-energy astroparticle physics. Radio experiments with their 100%
duty time can observe the sky all day, in contrast to fluorescence and Cherenkov
telescopes, which can only operate in cloudless and moonless nights. The Square
Kilometre Array (SKA) presently under construction will be the most sensitive
radio telescope in the future, and could contribute to uncover the origin and
development of our universe.
The Planck satellite with its excellent angular resolution of five arc minutes
(COBE: 7 degrees, WMAP: 13.5 arc minutes) and increased sensitivity has mea-
sured the cosmic background radiation in large detail, and has provided a set of new
important cosmological parameters.
Compared to the first English edition we have added also new sections, like the
one on extrasolar planets, which take into account new developments in astropar-
ticle physics. Naturally, all chapters have been updated so that they present the most
recent knowledge in this field.
The problem sections of the first edition of the book have also been updated and
some problems to new sections have been added.
I thank Prof. Dr. Glen Cowan for his important ideas and suggestions, in par-
ticular, in the field of cosmology and the early universe, and for allowing me to use
these ideas from the first edition of this book. I also acknowledge the numerous
contributions of Dr. Tilo Stroh to the present edition, in particular, his successful
efforts to produce a high-quality appearance of this book.

Siegen, Germany Claus Grupen

September 2019
Preface to the First English Edition (2005)

This book on astroparticle physics is the translation of the book on

‘Astroteilchenphysik’ published in German by Vieweg, Wiesbaden, in the year 2000.
It is not only a translation, however, but also an update. The young field of
astroparticle physics is developing so rapidly, in particular with respect to ‘new
astronomies’ such as neutrino astronomy and the detailed measurements of cosmic
background radiation, that these new experimental results and also new theoretical
insights need to be included.
The details of the creation of the universe are not fully understood yet and it is
still not completely clear how the world will end, but recent results from supernovae
observations and precise measurement of the primordial blackbody radiation seem
to indicate with increasing reliability that we are living in a flat Euclidean universe
which expands in an accelerated fashion.
In the past couple of years, cosmology has matured from a speculative science to
a field of textbook knowledge with precision measurements at the percent level.
The updating process has been advanced mainly by my colleague Dr. Glen
Cowan, who is lecturing on astroparticle physics at Royal Holloway College,
London, and by myself. The chapter on ‘Cosmology’ has been rewritten, and
chapters on ‘The Early Universe’, ‘Big Bang Nucleosynthesis’, ‘The Cosmic
Microwave Background’, and ‘Inflation’ as well as a section on gravitational
astronomy have been added. The old chapter on ‘Unsolved Problems’ chapter on
‘Dark Matter’, and part of it went into chapters on primary and secondary cosmic
rays.
The book has been extended by a large number of problems related to
astroparticle physics. Full solutions to all problems are given. To ease the under-
standing of theoretical aspects and the interpretation of physics data, a mathematical
appendix is offered, where most of the formulae used are presented and/or derived.
In addition, details on the thermodynamics of the early universe have been treated
in a separate appendix.
Professor Dr. Simon Eidelman from the Budker Institute of Nuclear Physics in
Novosibirsk and Dipl.Phys. Tilo Stroh have carefully checked the problems and
proposed new ones. Dr. Ralph Kretschmer contributed some interesting and very

ix
x Preface to the First English Edition (2005)

intricate problems. I have also received many comments from my colleagues and
students in Siegen.
The technical aspects of producing the English version lay in the hands of
Ms. Ute Smolik, Lisa Hoppe, and Ms. Angelika Wied (text), Dipl.Phys. Stefan
Armbrust (updating the figures), Dr. Glen Cowan and Ross Richardson (polished
my own English translation), and M.Sc. Mehmet T. Kurt (helping with the editing).
The final appearance of the book including many comments on the text, the figures,
and the layout was accomplished by Dipl.Phys. Tilo Stroh and M.Sc. Nadir Omar
Hashim.
Without the help of these people, it would have been impossible for me to
complete the translation in any reasonable time, if at all. In particular, I would like
to thank my colleague Prof. Dr. Torsten Fließbach, an expert on Einstein’s theory of
general relativity, for his critical assessment of the chapter on cosmology and for
proposing significant improvements. Also, the contributions by Dr. Glen Cowan on
the new insights into the evolution of the early universe and related subjects are
highly appreciated. Dr. Cowan has really added essential ingredients to the last
chapters of the book. Finally, Prof. Dr. Simon Eidelman, Dr. Armin Böhrer, and
Dipl.Phys. Tilo Stroh read the manuscript with great care and made invaluable
comments. I thank all my friends for their help in creating this English version of
my book.

Siegen, February 2005 Claus Grupen

Preface to the German Edition

The field of astroparticle physics is not really a new one. Up until 1960, the physics
of cosmic rays essentially represented this domain. Elementary particle physics in
accelerators has evolved from the study of elementary particle processes in cosmic
radiation. Among others, the first antiparticles (positrons) and the members of the
second lepton generation (muons) were discovered in cosmic-ray experiments.
The close relationship between cosmology and particle physics was, however,
recognized only relatively recently. Hubble’s discovery of the expanding universe
indicates that the cosmos originally must have had a very small size. At such
primeval times, the universe was a microworld that can only be described by
quantum-theoretical methods of elementary particle physics. Today, particle
physicists try to recreate the conditions that existed in the early universe by using
electron–positron and proton–antiproton collisions at high energies to simulate
‘mini Big Bangs’.
The popular theories of elementary particle physics attempt to unify the various
types of interactions in the Standard Model. The experimental confirmation of the
existence of heavy vector bosons that mediate weak interactions (W þ ; W  ; Z 0 ), and
progress in the theoretical understanding of strong interactions seem to indicate that
one may be able to understand the development of the universe just after the Big
Bang. The high temperatures or energies that existed at the time of the Big Bang
will, however, never be reached in earthbound laboratories. This is why a symbiosis
of particle physics, astronomy, and cosmology is only too natural. Whether this new
field is named astroparticle physics or particle astrophysics is more or less a matter
of taste or the background of the author. This book will deal both with astrophysics
and elementary particle physics aspects. We will equally discuss the concepts of
astrophysics focusing on particles and particle physics using astrophysical methods.
The guiding line is physics with astroparticles. This is why I preferred the term
astroparticle physics over particle astrophysics.
After a relatively detailed historical introduction (Chap. 1) in which the mile-
stones of astroparticle physics are mentioned, the basics of elementary particle
physics (Chap. 2), particle interactions (Chap. 3), and measurement techniques

xi
xii Preface to the German Edition

(Chap. 4) are presented. Astronomical aspects prevail in the discussion of accel-

eration mechanisms (Chap. 5) and primary cosmic rays (Chap. 6). In these fields,
new disciplines such as neutrino and gamma-ray astronomy represent a close link to
particle physics. This aspect is even more pronounced in the presentation of sec-
ondary cosmic rays (Chap. 7). On the one hand, secondary cosmic rays have been a
gold mine for discoveries in elementary particle physics. On the other hand,
however, they sometimes represent an annoying background in astroparticle
observations.
The highlight of astroparticle physics is surely cosmology (Chap. 8) in which the
theory of general relativity, which describes the macrocosm, is united with the
successes of elementary particle physics. Naturally, not all questions have been
answered; therefore a final chapter is devoted to open and unsolved problems in
astroparticle physics (Chap. 9).
The book tries to bridge the gap between popular presentations of astroparticle
physics and textbooks written for advanced students. The necessary basics from
elementary particle physics, quantum physics, and special relativity are carefully
introduced and applied, without rigorous derivation from appropriate mathematical
treatments. It should be possible to understand the calculations presented with the
knowledge of basic A-level mathematics. On top of that, the basic ideas discussed
in this book can be followed without referring to special mathematical derivations.
I owe thanks to many people for their help during the writing of this book.
Dr. Armin Böhrer read the manuscript with great care. Ms. Ute Bender and
Ms. Angelika Wied wrote the text, and Ms. Claudia Hauke prepared the figures that
were finalized by Dipl.Phys. Stefan Armbrust. I owe special thanks to Dr. Klaus
Affholderbach and Dipl.Phys. Olaf Krasel who created the computer layout of the
whole book in the LaTeX style. I am especially indebted to Dipl.Phys. Tilo Stroh for
his constant help, not only as far as physics questions are concerned, but also in
particular for applying the final touch to the manuscript with his inimitable, mas-
terful eye for finding the remaining flaws in the text and the figures. Finally, I owe
many thanks to the Vieweg editors, Ms. Christine Haite and Dipl.Math. Wolfgang
Schwarz.

Geneva, July 2000 Claus Grupen

Contents

1 Historical Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Early Indications of Celestial Phenomena in the Sky . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Discoveries in the 20th Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Discoveries of New Elementary Particles in Cosmic Rays . . . . 10
1.4 Start of the Satellite Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5 Contributions of Accelerators to Cosmic Rays . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.6 Renaissance of Cosmic Rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.7 Open Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.8 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2 The Standard Model of Elementary Particles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.1 Examples of Interaction Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2 Quantum Numbers and Symmetries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3 Unified Theory of Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3 Kinematics and Cross Sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 49
3.1 Threshold Energies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 51
3.2 Examples for the Determination of Center-of-Mass
Energies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Four-Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Examples for the Treatment of Decays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.1 Two-Body Decays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.2 Three-Body Decays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5 Lorentz Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.6 Determination of Cross Sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.7 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4 Physics of Particle and Radiation Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.1 Interactions of Astroparticles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 Interaction Processes Used for Particle Detection . . . . . . . . . . 74

xiii
xiv Contents

4.3 Particle Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

4.4 Principles of the Atmospheric Air Cherenkov Technique . . . . . 80
4.5 Special Aspects of Photon Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.6 Cryogenic Detection Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.7 Propagation and Interactions of Astroparticles in
Galactic and Extragalactic Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 92
4.8 Characteristic Features of Detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 95
4.9 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 96
5 Acceleration Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.1 Cyclotron Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2 Acceleration by Sunspots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3 Shock Acceleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4 Fermi Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.5 Pulsars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.6 Binaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.7 Energy Spectra for Primary Particles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.8 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6 Primary Cosmic Rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.1 Charged Component of Primary Cosmic Rays . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.2 Nature and Origin of the Highest-Energy Cosmic Rays . . . . . . 136
6.3 Neutrino Astronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.3.1 Atmospheric Neutrinos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.3.2 Solar Neutrinos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.3.3 Supernova Neutrinos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.3.4 High-Energy Galactic and Extragalactic Neutrinos . . . 165
6.3.5 Geoneutrinos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.4 Gamma Astronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.4.2 Production Mechanisms for c Rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.4.3 Detection of c Rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.4.4 Observation of c-Ray Point Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
6.4.5 c-Ray Bursters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.5 X-Ray Astronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.5.2 Production Mechanisms for X Rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
6.5.3 Detection of X Rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
6.5.4 Observation of X-Ray Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
6.6 Gravitational-Wave Astronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
6.7 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Contents xv

7 Secondary Cosmic Rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

7.1 Propagation in the Atmosphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
7.2 Cosmic Rays at Sea Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
7.3 Cosmic Rays Underground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
7.4 Extensive Air Showers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
7.5 Radio Measurement of Air Showers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
7.6 Acoustic Detection of Air Showers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
7.7 Some Thoughts on the Highest Energies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
7.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
7.9 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
8 Cosmology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
8.1 The Hubble Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
8.2 The Isotropic and Homogeneous Universe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
8.3 The Friedmann Equation from Newtonian Gravity . . . . . . . . . 300
8.4 The Fluid Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
8.5 The Acceleration Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
8.6 Solution of the Friedmann Equation Without Vacuum
Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
8.7 Experimental Evidence for the Vacuum Energy . . . . . . . . . . . 309
8.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
8.9 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
9 The Early Universe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
9.1 The Planck Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
9.2 Thermodynamics of the Early Universe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
9.3 Equation of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
9.4 Refining the Solution of the Friedmann Equation . . . . . . . . . . 322
9.5 Thermal History of the First Ten Microseconds . . . . . . . . . . . 325
9.6 The Baryon Asymmetry of the Universe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
9.6.1 Experimental Evidence for the Baryon Asymmetry . . . 327
9.6.2 Size of the Baryon Asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
9.6.3 The Sakharov Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
9.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
9.8 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
10 Big Bang Nucleosynthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
10.1 Some Ingredients for the Big Bang Nucleosynthesis . . . . . . . . 340
10.2 Start of the BBQ Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
10.3 The Neutron-to-Proton Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
10.4 Synthesis of Light Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
10.5 Detailed Big Bang Nucleosynthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
own; whereas they that give counsel to the representative person of
a commonwealth, may have, and have often their particular ends
and passions, that render their counsels always suspected, and
many times unfaithful. And therefore we may set down for the first
condition of a good counsellor, that his ends, and interests, be not
inconsistent with the ends and interests of him he counselleth.
Secondly, because the office of a counsellor, when an action
comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it,
in such manner, as he that is counselled may be truly and evidently
informed; he ought to propound his advice, in such form of speech,
as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as
firm ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly,
as the evidence will permit. And therefore rash and unevident
inferences, such as are fetched only from examples, or authority of
books, and are not arguments of what is good, or evil, but witnesses
of fact, or of opinion; obscure, confused, and ambiguous
expressions, also all metaphorical speeches, tending to the stirring
up of passion, (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are
useful only to deceive, or to lead him we counsel towards other ends
than his own) are repugnant to the office of a counsellor.
Thirdly, because the ability of counselling proceedeth from
experience, and long study; and no man is presumed to have
experience in all those things that to the administration of a great
commonwealth are necessary to be known, no man is presumed to
be a good counsellor, but in such business, as he hath not only been
much versed in, but hath also much meditated on, and considered.
For seeing the business of a commonwealth is this, to preserve the
people in peace at home, and defend them against foreign invasion,
we shall find, it requires great knowledge of the disposition of
mankind, of the rights of government, and of the nature of equity,
law, justice, and honour, not to be attained without study; and of the
strength, commodities, places, both of their own country, and their
neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designs of all nations
that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to, without
much experience. Of which things, not only the whole sum, but
every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a
man in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for
counsel, as I have said before (chap. VIII.) is judgment. And the
differences of men in that point come from different education, of
some to one kind of study or business, and of others to another.
When for the doing of any thing, there be infallible rules, as in
engines and edifices, the rules of geometry, all the experience of the
world cannot equal his counsel, that has learnt, or found out the
rule. And when there is no such rule, he that hath most experience
in that particular kind of business, has therein the best judgment,
and is the best counsellor.
Fourthly, to be able to give counsel to a commonwealth, in a
business that hath reference to another commonwealth, it is
necessary to be acquainted with the intelligences, and letters that
come from thence, and with all the records of treaties, and other
transactions of state between them; which none can do, but such as
the representative shall think fit. By which we may see, that they
who are not called to counsel, can have no good counsel in such
cases to obtrude.
Fifthly, supposing the number of counsellors equal, a man is better
counselled by hearing them apart, than in an assembly; and that for
many causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of
every man; but in an assembly many of them deliver their advice
with aye, or no, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own
sense, but by the eloquence of another, or for fear of displeasing
some that have spoken, or the whole assembly, by contradiction; or
for fear of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have
applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an assembly of many,
there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to
that of the public; and these their interests make passionate, and
passion eloquent, and eloquence draws others into the same advice.
For the passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat
of one brand; in an assembly are like many brands, that inflame one
another, especially when they blow one another with orations, to the
setting of the commonwealth on fire, under pretence of counselling
it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine, when
there is need, the truth, or probability of his reasons, and of the
grounds of the advice he gives, by frequent interruptions, and
objections; which cannot be done in an assembly, where, in every
difficult question, a man is rather astonied, and dazzled with the
variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to
take. Besides, there cannot be an assembly of many, called together
for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be
thought eloquent, and also learned in the politics; and give not their
advice with care of the business propounded, but of the applause of
their motley orations, made of the divers coloured threds, or shreads
of authors; which is an impertinence at least, that takes away the
time of serious consultation, and in the secret way of counselling
apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in deliberations that ought to be
kept secret, whereof there be many occasions in public business, the
counsels of many, and especially in assemblies, are dangerous; and
therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit such affairs to
lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in
whose fidelity they have most confidence.
To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of
counsel from a great assembly of counsellors, that wisheth for, or
would accept of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his
children, disposing of his lands, governing his household, or
managing his private estate, especially if there be amongst them
such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his business by the
help of many and prudent counsellors, with every one consulting
apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth able
seconds at tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He does next
best, that useth his own judgment only; as he that has no second at
all. But he that is carried up and down to his business in a framed
counsel, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting
opinions, the execution whereof is commonly, out of envy or
interest, retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and like
one that is carried to the ball, though by good players, yet in a
wheel-barrow, or other frame, heavy of itself, and retarded also by
the inconcurrent judgments, and endeavours of them that drive it;
and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it;
and most of all, when there is one, or more amongst them, that
desire to have him lose. And though it be true, that many eyes see
more than one; yet it is not to be understood of many counsellors;
but then only, when the final resolution is in one man. Otherwise,
because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt
to look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to
miss their mark, though they look about with two eyes, yet they
never aim but with one; and therefore no great popular
commonwealth was ever kept up, but either by a foreign enemy that
united them; or by the reputation of some eminent man amongst
them; or by the secret counsel of a few; or by the mutual fear of
equal factions; and not by the open consultations of the assembly.
And as for very little commonwealths, be they popular, or
monarchical, there is no human wisdom can uphold them, longer
than the jealousy lasteth of their potent neighbours.
 CHAPTER XXVI.

OF CIVIL LAWS.

Civil law By CIVIL LAWS, I understand the laws, that men are
what. therefore bound to observe, because they are
members, not of this, or that commonwealth in particular, but of a
commonwealth. For the knowledge of particular laws belongeth to
them, that profess the study of the laws of their several countries;
but the knowledge of civil law in general, to any man. The ancient
law of Rome was called their civil law, from the word civitas, which
signifies a commonwealth: and those countries, which having been
under the Roman empire, and governed by that law, retain still such
part thereof as they think fit, call that part the civil law, to
distinguish it from the rest of their own civil laws. But that is not it I
intend to speak of here; my design being not to show what is law
here, and there; but what is law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and
divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of
the study of the law.
And first it is manifest, that law in general, is not counsel, but
command; nor a command of any man to any man; but only of him,
whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him.
And as for civil law, it addeth only the name of the person
commanding, which is persona civitatis, the person of the
commonwealth.
Which considered, I define civil law in this manner. Civil law, is to
every subject, those rules, which the commonwealth hath
commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the
will, to make use of, for the distinction of right, and wrong; that is to
say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the rule.
In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight
evident. For every man seeth, that some laws are addressed to all
the subjects in general; some to particular provinces; some to
particular vocations; and some to particular men; and are therefore
laws, to every of those to whom the command is directed, and to
none else. As also, that laws are the rules of just, and unjust;
nothing being reputed unjust, that is not contrary to some law.
Likewise, that none can make laws but the commonwealth; because
our subjection is to the commonwealth only: and that commands,
are to be signified by sufficient signs; because a man knows not
otherwise how to obey them. And therefore, whatsoever can from
this definition by necessary consequence be deduced, ought to be
acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that followeth.
The 1. The legislator in all commonwealths, is only the
sovereign is sovereign, be he one man, as in a monarchy, or one
legislator. assembly of men, as in a democracy, or aristocracy.
For the legislator is he that maketh the law. And the commonwealth
only prescribes, and commandeth the observation of those rules,
which we call law: therefore the commonwealth is the legislator. But
the commonwealth is no person, nor has capacity to do anything,
but by the representative, that is, the sovereign; and therefore the
sovereign is the sole legislator. For the same reason, none can
abrogate a law made, but the sovereign; because a law is not
abrogated, but by another law, that forbiddeth it to be put in
execution.
And not 2. The sovereign of a commonwealth, be it an
subject to assembly, or one man, is not subject to the civil
civil law. laws. For having power to make, and repeal laws,
he may when he pleaseth, free himself from that subjection, by
repealing those laws that trouble him, and making of new; and
consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free
when he will: nor is it possible for any person to be bound to
himself; because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he
that is bound to himself only, is not bound.
Use, a law 3. When long use obtaineth the authority of a
not by virtue law, it is not the length of time that maketh the
of time, but authority, but the will of the sovereign signified by
of the
his silence, for silence is sometimes an argument of
 sovereign’s consent; and it is no longer law, than the sovereign
consent. shall be silent therein. And therefore if the sovereign
shall have a question of right grounded, not upon his present will,
but upon the laws formerly made; the length of time shall bring no
prejudice to his right; but the question shall be judged by equity. For
many unjust actions, and unjust sentences, go uncontrolled a longer
time than any man can remember. And our lawyers account no
customs law, but such as are reasonable, and that evil customs are
to be abolished. But the judgment of what is reasonable, and of
what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the law,
which is the sovereign assembly, or monarch.
The law of 4. The law of nature, and the civil law, contain
nature, and each other, and are of equal extent. For the laws of
the civil law nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude,
contain each
other. and other moral virtues on these depending, in the
condition of mere nature, as I have said before in
the end of the fifteenth chapter, are not properly laws, but qualities
that dispose men to peace and obedience. When a commonwealth is
once settled, then are they actually laws, and not before; as being
then the commands of the commonwealth; and therefore also civil
laws: for it is the sovereign power that obliges men to obey them.
For in the differences of private men, to declare, what is equity, what
is justice, and what is moral virtue, and to make them binding, there
is need of the ordinances of sovereign power, and punishments to be
ordained for such as shall break them; which ordinances are
therefore part of the civil law. The law of nature therefore is a part
of the civil law in all commonwealths of the world. Reciprocally also,
the civil law is a part of the dictates of nature. For justice, that is to
say, performance of covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a
dictate of the law of nature. But every subject in a commonwealth,
hath convenanted to obey the civil law; either one with another, as
when they assemble to make a common representative, or with the
representative itself one by one, when subdued by the sword they
promise obedience, that they may receive life; and therefore
obedience to the civil law is part also of the law of nature. Civil, and
natural law are not different kinds, but different parts of law;
whereof one part being written, is called civil, the other unwritten,
natural. But the right of nature, that is, the natural liberty of man,
may by the civil law be abridged, and restrained: nay, the end of
making laws, is no other, but such restraint; without the which there
cannot possibly be any peace. And law was brought into the world
for nothing else, but to limit the natural liberty of particular men, in
such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and
join together against a common enemy.
Provincial 5. If the sovereign of one commonwealth, subdue
laws are not a people that have lived under other written laws,
made by and afterwards govern them by the same laws, by
custom, but
by the which they were governed before; yet those laws
sovereign are the civil laws of the victor, and not of the
power. vanquished commonwealth. For the legislator is he,
not by whose authority the laws were first made,
but by whose authority they now continue to be laws. And therefore
where there be divers provinces, within the dominion of a
commonwealth, and in those provinces diversity of laws, which
commonly are called the customs of each several province, we are
not to understand that such customs have their force, only from
length of time; but that they were anciently laws written, or
otherwise made known, for the constitutions, and statutes of their
sovereigns; and are now laws, not by virtue of the prescription of
time, but by the constitutions of their present sovereigns. But if an
unwritten law, in all the provinces of a dominion, shall be generally
observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that law can be
no other but a law of nature, equally obliging all mankind.
Some foolish 6. Seeing then all laws, written and unwritten,
opinions of have their authority and force, from the will of the
lawyers commonwealth; that is to say, from the will of the
concerning
the making of representative; which in a monarchy is the monarch,
laws. and in other commonwealths the sovereign
assembly; a man may wonder from whence proceed
such opinions, as are found in the books of lawyers of eminence in
several commonwealths, directly, or by consequence making the
legislative power depend on private men, or subordinate judges. As
for example, that the common law, hath no controller but the
parliament; which is true only where a parliament has the sovereign
power, and cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own
discretion. For if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there
is a right also to control them, and consequently to control their
controllings. And if there be no such right, then the controller of laws
is not parliamentum, but rex in parliamento. And where a parliament
is sovereign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men,
from the countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there
is no man will believe, that such an assembly hath thereby acquired
to themselves a legislative power. Item, that the two arms of a
commonwealth, are force and justice; the first whereof is in the
king; the other deposited in the hands of the parliament. As if a
commonwealth could consist, where the force were in any hand,
which justice had not the authority to command and govern.
Sir Edw. Coke 7. That law can never be against reason, our
upon lawyers are agreed; and that not the letter, that is
Littleton, lib. every construction of it, but that which is according
2, ch. 6, fol.
97, b. to the intention of the legislator, is the law. And it is
true: but the doubt is of whose reason it is, that
shall be received for law. It is not meant of any private reason; for
then there would be as much contradiction in the laws, as there is in
the Schools; nor yet, as Sir Edward Coke makes it, an artificial
perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and
experience, as his was. For it is possible long study may increase,
and confirm erroneous sentences: and where men build on false
grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin: and of those
that study, and observe with equal time and diligence, the reasons
and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore it is
not that juris prudentia, or wisdom of subordinate judges; but the
reason of this our artificial man the commonwealth, and his
command, that maketh law: and the commonwealth being in their
representative but one person, there cannot easily arise any
contradiction in the laws; and when there doth, the same reason is
able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it away. In all courts of
justice, the sovereign, which is the person of the commonwealth, is
he that judgeth: the subordinate judge, ought to have regard to the
reason, which moved his sovereign to make such law, that his
sentence may be according thereunto; which then is his sovereign’s
sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.
Law made, if 8. From this, that the law is a command, and a
not also command consisteth in declaration, or manifestation
made known, of the will of him that commandeth, by voice,
is no law.
writing, or some other sufficient argument of the
same, we may understand, that the command of the commonwealth
is law only to those, that have means to take notice of it. Over
natural fools, children, or madmen, there is no law, no more than
over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust;
because they had never power to make any covenant, or to
understand the consequences thereof; and consequently never took
upon them to authorize the actions of any sovereign, as they must
do that make to themselves a commonwealth. And as those from
whom nature or accident hath taken away the notice of all laws in
general; so also every man, from whom any accident, not
proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take
notice of any particular law, is excused, if he observe it not: and to
speak properly, that law is no law to him. It is therefore necessary,
to consider in this place, what arguments, and signs be sufficient for
the knowledge of what is the law; that is to say, what is the will of
the sovereign, as well in monarchies, as in other forms of
government.
Unwritten And first, if it be a law that obliges all the subjects
laws are all without exception, and is not written, nor otherwise
of them laws published in such places as they may take notice
of nature.
thereof, it is a law of nature. For whatsoever men
are to take knowledge of for law, not upon other men’s words, but
every one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the
reason of all men; which no law can be, but the law of nature. The
laws of nature therefore need not any publishing, nor proclamation;
as being contained in this one sentence, approved by all the world,
Do not that to another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done
by another to thyself.
 Secondly, if it be a law that obliges only some condition of men, or
one particular man, and be not written, nor published by word, then
also it is a law of nature; and known by the same arguments, and
signs, that distinguish those in such a condition, from other subjects.
For whatsoever law is not written, or some way published by him
that makes it law, can be known no way, but by the reason of him
that is to obey it; and is therefore also a law not only civil, but
natural. For example, if the sovereign employ a public minister,
without written instructions what to do; he is obliged to take for
instructions the dictates of reason; as if he make a judge, the judge
is to take notice, that his sentence ought to be according to the
reason of his sovereign, which being always understood to be equity,
he is bound to it by the law of nature: or if an ambassador, he is, in
all things not contained in his written instructions, to take for
instruction that which reason dictates to be most conducing to his
sovereign’s interest; and so of all other ministers of the sovereignty,
public and private. All which instructions of natural reason may be
comprehended under one name of fidelity; which is a branch of
natural justice.
The law of nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all
other laws, to be made known, to every man that shall be obliged to
obey them, either by word, or writing, or some other act, known to
proceed from the sovereign authority. For the will of another cannot
be understood, but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken
from his scope and purpose; which in the person of the
commonwealth, is to be supposed always consonant to equity and
reason. And in ancient time, before letters were in common use, the
laws were many times put into verse; that the rude people taking
pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might the more easily retain
them in memory. And for the same reason Solomon (Prov. vii. 3)
adviseth a man, to bind the ten commandments upon his ten
fingers. And for the law which Moses gave to the people of Israel at
the renewing of the covenant (Deut. xi. 19), he biddeth them to
teach it their children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon
the way; at going to bed, and at rising from bed; and to write it
upon the posts, and doors of their houses; and (Deut. xxxi. 12) to
assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to hear it read.
Nothing is Nor is it enough the law be written, and
law where published; but also that there be manifest signs,
the legislator that it proceedeth from the will of the sovereign. For
cannot be
known. private men, when they have, or think they have
force enough to secure their unjust designs, and
convoy them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish for laws
what they please, without, or against the legislative authority. There
is therefore requisite, not only a declaration of the law, but also
sufficient signs of the author and authority. The author, or legislator
is supposed in every commonwealth to be evident, because he is the
sovereign, who having been constituted by the consent of every one,
is supposed by every one to be sufficiently known. And though the
ignorance and security of men be such, for the most part, as that
when the memory of the first constitution of their commonwealth is
worn out, they do not consider, by whose power they used to be
defended against their enemies, and to have their industry
protected, and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because
no man that considers, can make question of it, no excuse can be
derived from the ignorance of where the sovereignty is placed. And
it is a dictate of natural reason, and consequently an evident law of
nature, that no man ought to weaken that power, the protection
whereof he hath himself demanded, or wittingly received against
others. Therefore of who is sovereign, no man, but by his own fault,
(whatsoever evil men suggest,) can make any doubt. The difficulty
consisteth in the evidence of the authority derived Difference
from him; the removing whereof, dependeth on the between
knowledge of the public registers, public counsels, verifying &
authorizing.
public ministers, and public seals; by which all laws
are sufficiently verified; verified, I say, not authorized: for the
verification, is but the testimony and record, not the authority of the
law; which consisteth in the command of the sovereign only.
The law If therefore a man have a question of injury,
verified by depending on the law of nature; that is to say, on
the common equity; the sentence of the judge, that by
 subordinate commission hath authority to take cognizance of
judge. such causes, is a sufficient verification of the law of
nature in that individual case. For though the advice of one that
professeth the study of the law, be useful for the avoiding of
contention; yet it is but advice: it is the judge must tell men what is
law, upon the hearing of the controversy.
By the public But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon
registers. a written law; every man by recourse to the
registers, by himself or others, may, if he will, be sufficiently
informed, before he do such injury, or commit the crime, whether it
be an injury, or not: nay he ought to do so: for when a man doubts
whether the act he goeth about, be just, or unjust; and may inform
himself, if he will; the doing is unlawful. In like manner, he that
supposeth himself injured, in a case determined by the written law,
which he may, by himself or others, see and consider; if he complain
before he consults with the law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a
disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his own right.
By letters If the question be of obedience to a public officer;
patent and to have seen his commission, with the public seal,
public seal. and heard it read; or to have had the means to be
informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient verification of his
authority. For every man is obliged to do his best endeavour, to
inform himself of all written laws, that may concern his own future
actions.
The The legislator known; and the laws, either by
interpretatio writing, or by the light of nature, sufficiently
n of the law published; there wanteth yet another very material
dependeth on
the sovereign circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not
power. the letter, but the intendment, or meaning, that is to
say, the authentic interpretation of the law (which is
the sense of the legislator), in which the nature of the law
consisteth; and therefore the interpretation of all laws dependeth on
the authority sovereign; and the interpreters can be none but those,
which the sovereign, to whom only the subject oweth obedience,
shall appoint. For else, by the craft of an interpreter, the law may be
made to bear a sense, contrary to that of the sovereign: by which
means the interpreter becomes the legislator.
All laws need All laws, written, and unwritten, have need of
interpretatio interpretation. The unwritten law of nature, though
n. it be easy to such, as without partiality and passion,
make use of their natural reason, and therefore leaves the violators
thereof without excuse; yet considering there be very few, perhaps
none, that in some cases are not blinded by self-love, or some other
passion; it is now become of all laws the most obscure, and has
consequently the greatest need of able interpreters. The written
laws, if they be short, are easily misinterpreted, from the divers
significations of a word, or two: if long, they be more obscure by the
divers significations of many words: insomuch as no written law,
delivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, without a
perfect understanding of the final causes, for which the law was
made; the knowledge of which final causes is in the legislator. To
him therefore there cannot be any knot in the law, insoluble; either
by finding out the ends, to undo it by; or else by making what ends
he will, as Alexander did with his sword in the Gordian knot, by the
legislative power; which no other interpreter can do.
The The interpretation of the laws of nature, in a
authentical commonwealth, dependeth not on the books of
interpretatio moral philosophy. The authority of writers, without
n of law is
not that of the authority of the commonwealth, maketh not
writers. their opinions law, be they never so true. That
which I have written in this treatise, concerning the
moral virtues, and of their necessity for the procuring, and
maintaining peace, though it be evident truth, is not therefore
presently law; but because in all commonwealths in the world, it is
part of the civil law. For though it be naturally reasonable; yet it is
by the sovereign power that it is law: otherwise, it were a great
error, to call the laws of nature unwritten law; whereof we see so
many volumes published, and in them so many contradictions of one
another, and of themselves.
The The interpretation of the law of nature, is the
interpreter of sentence of the judge constituted by the sovereign
 the law is the authority, to hear and determine such controversies,
judge giving as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application
sentence viva
voce in every
of the law to the present case. For in the act of
particular judicature, the judge doth no more but consider,
case. whether the demand of the party, be consonant to
natural reason, and equity; and the sentence he
giveth, is therefore the interpretation of the law of nature; which
interpretation is authentic; not because it is his private sentence; but
because he giveth it by authority of the sovereign, whereby it
becomes the sovereign’s sentence; which is law for that time, to the
parties pleading.
The sentence But because there is no judge subordinate, nor
of a judge sovereign, but may err in a judgment of equity; if
does not bind afterward in another like case he find it more
him, or
another consonant to equity to give a contrary sentence, he
judge to give is obliged to do it. No man’s error becomes his own
like sentence law; nor obliges him to persist in it. Neither, for the
in like cases same reason, becomes it a law to other judges,
ever after. though sworn to follow it. For though a wrong
sentence given by authority of the sovereign, if he know and allow
it, in such laws as are mutable, be a constitution of a new law, in
cases, in which every little circumstance is the same; yet in laws
immutable, such as are the laws of nature, they are no laws to the
same or other judges, in the like cases for ever after. Princes
succeed one another; and one judge passeth, another cometh; nay,
heaven and earth shall pass; but not one tittle of the law of nature
shall pass; for it is the eternal law of God. Therefore all the
sentences of precedent judges that have ever been, cannot
altogether make a law contrary to natural equity: nor any examples
of former judges, can warrant an unreasonable sentence, or
discharge the present judge of the trouble of studying what is
equity, in the case he is to judge, from the principles of his own
natural reason. For example sake, it is against the law of nature, to
punish the innocent; and innocent is he that acquitteth himself
judicially, and is acknowledged for innocent by the judge. Put the
case now, that a man is accused of a capital crime, and seeing the
power and malice of some enemy, and the frequent corruption and
partiality of judges, runneth away for fear of the event, and
afterwards is taken, and brought to a legal trial, and maketh it
sufficiently appear, he was not guilty of the crime, and being thereof
acquitted, is nevertheless condemned to lose his goods; this is a
manifest condemnation of the innocent. I say therefore, that there is
no place in the world, where this can be an interpretation of a law of
nature, or be made a law by the sentences of precedent judges, that
had done the same. For he that judged it first, judged unjustly; and
no injustice can be a pattern of judgment to succeeding judges. A
written law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be
punished for flying: but that flying for fear of injury, should be taken
for presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime
judicially, is contrary to the nature of a presumption, which hath no
place after judgment given. Yet this is set down by a great lawyer
for the common law of England. If a man, saith he, that is innocent,
be accused of felony, and for fear flyeth for the same; albeit he
judicially acquitteth himself of the felony; yet if it be found that he
fled for the felony, he shall notwithstanding his innocency, forfeit all
his goods, chattels, debts, and duties. For as to the forfeiture of
them, the law will admit no proof against the presumption in law,
grounded upon his flight. Here you see, an innocent man judicially
acquitted, notwithstanding his innocency, when no written law
forbad him to fly, after his acquittal, upon a presumption in law,
condemned to lose all the goods he hath. If the law ground upon his
flight a presumption of the fact, which was capital, the sentence
ought to have been capital: if the presumption were not of the fact,
for what then ought he to lose his goods? This therefore is no law of
England; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a presumption of
law, but upon the presumption of the judges. It is also against law,
to say that no proof shall be admitted against a presumption of law.
For all judges, sovereign and subordinate, if they refuse to hear
proof, refuse to do justice: for though the sentence be just, yet the
judges that condemn without hearing the proofs offered, are unjust
judges; and their presumption is but prejudice; which no man ought
to bring with him to the seat of justice, whatsoever precedent
judgments, or examples he shall pretend to follow. There be other
things of this nature, wherein men’s judgments have been
perverted, by trusting to precedents: but this is enough to show,
that though the sentence of the judge, be a law to the party
pleading, yet it is no law to any judge, that shall succeed him in that
office.
In like manner, when question is of the meaning of written laws,
he is not the interpreter of them, that writeth a commentary upon
them. For commentaries are commonly more subject to cavil, than
the text; and therefore need other commentaries; and so there will
be no end of such interpretation. And therefore unless there be an
interpreter authorized by the sovereign, from which the subordinate
judges are not to recede, the interpreter can be no other than the
ordinary judges, in the same manner, as they are in cases of the
unwritten law; and their sentences are to be taken by them that
plead, for laws in that particular case; but not to bind other judges,
in like cases to give like judgments. For a judge may err in the
interpretation even of written laws; but no error of a subordinate
judge, can change the law, which is the general sentence of the
sovereign.
The In written laws, men use to make a difference
difference between the letter, and the sentence of the law: and
between the when by the letter, is meant whatsoever can be
letter and
sentence of gathered from the bare words, it is well
the law. distinguished. For the significations of almost all
words, are either in themselves, or in the
metaphorical use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in
argument, to make many senses; but there is only one sense of the
law. But if by the letter, be meant the literal sense, then the letter,
and the sentence or intention of the law, is all one. For the literal
sense is that, which the legislator intended, should by the letter of
the law be signified. Now the intention of the legislator is always
supposed to be equity: for it were a great contumely for a judge to
think otherwise of the sovereign. He ought therefore, if the word of
the law do not fully authorize a reasonable sentence, to supply it
with the law of nature; or if the case be difficult, to respite judgment
till he have received more ample authority. For example, a written
law ordaineth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force, shall
be restored by force: it happens that a man by negligence leaves his
house empty, and returning is kept out by force, in which case there
is no special law ordained. It is evident that this case is contained in
the same law: for else there is no remedy for him at all; which is to
be supposed against the intention of the legislator. Again, the word
of the law commandeth to judge according to the evidence: a man is
accused falsely of a fact, which the judge himself saw done by
another, and not by him that is accused. In this case neither shall
the letter of the law be followed to the condemnation of the
innocent, nor shall the judge give sentence against the evidence of
the witnesses; because the letter of the law is to the contrary: but
procure of the sovereign that another be made judge, and himself
witness. So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of a
written law, may lead him to the intention of the law, whereby to
interpret the same the better; though no incommodity can warrant a
sentence against the law. For every judge of right, and wrong, is not
judge of what is commodious, or incommodious to the
commonwealth.
The abilities The abilities required in a good interpreter of the
required in a law, that is to say, in a good judge, are not the
judge. same with those of an advocate; namely the study
of the laws. For a judge, as he ought to take notice of the fact, from
none but the witnesses; so also he ought to take notice of the law
from nothing but the statutes, and constitutions of the sovereign,
alleged in the pleading, or declared to him by some that have
authority from the sovereign power to declare them; and need not
take care beforehand, what he shall judge; for it shall be given him
what he shall say concerning the fact, by witnesses; and what he
shall say in point of law, from those that shall in their pleadings
show it, and by authority interpret it upon the place. The Lords of
parliament in England were judges, and most difficult causes have
been heard and determined by them; yet few of them were much
versed in the study of the laws, and fewer had made profession of
them: and though they consulted with lawyers, that were appointed
to be present there for that purpose; yet they alone had the
authority of giving sentence. In like manner, in the ordinary trials of
right, twelve men of the common people, are the judges, and give
sentence, not only of the fact, but of the right; and pronounce
simply for the complainant, or for the defendant; that is to say, are
judges, not only of the fact, but also of the right: and in a question
of crime, not only determine whether done, or not done; but also
whether it be murder, homicide, felony, assault, and the like, which
are determinations of law: but because they are not supposed to
know the law of themselves, there is one that hath authority to
inform them of it, in the particular case they are to judge of. But yet
if they judge not according to that he tells them, they are not
subject thereby to any penalty; unless it be made appear, that they
did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward.
The things that make a good judge, or good interpreter of the
laws, are, first, a right understanding of that principal law of nature
called equity; which depending not on the reading of other men’s
writings, but on the goodness of a man’s own natural reason, and
meditation, is presumed to be in those most, that have had most
leisure, and had the most inclination to meditate thereon. Secondly,
contempt of unnecessary riches, and preferments. Thirdly, to be able
in judgment to divest himself of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and
compassion. Fourthly, and lastly, patience to hear; diligent attention
in hearing; and memory to retain, digest and apply what he hath
heard.
Divisions of The difference and division of the laws, has been
law. made in divers manners, according to the different
methods, of those men that have written of them. For it is a thing
that dependeth not on nature, but on the scope of the writer; and is
subservient to every man’s proper method. In the Institutions of
Justinian, we find seven sorts of civil laws:
1. The edicts, constitutions, and epistles of the prince, that is, of
the emperor; because the whole power of the people was in him.
Like these, are the proclamations of the kings of England.
2. The decrees of the whole people of Rome, comprehending the
senate, when they were put to the question by the senate. These
were laws, at first, by the virtue of the sovereign power residing in
the people; and such of them as by the emperors were not
abrogated, remained laws, by the authority imperial. For all laws that
bind, are understood to be laws by his authority that has power to
repeal them. Somewhat like to these laws, are the acts of parliament
in England.
3. The decrees of the common people, excluding the senate, when
they were put to the question by the tribune of the people. For such
of them as were not abrogated by the emperors, remained laws by
the authority imperial. Like to these, were the orders of the House of
Commons in England.
4. Senatus consulta, the orders of the senate; because when the
people of Rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to
assemble them; it was thought fit by the emperor, that men should
consult the senate, instead of the people; and these have some
resemblance with the acts of council.
5. The edicts of prætors, and in some cases of ædiles: such as are
the chief justices in the courts of England.
6. Responsa prudentum; which were the sentences, and opinion
of those lawyers, to whom the emperor gave authority to interpret
the law, and to give answer to such as in matter of law demanded
their advice; which answers, the judges in giving judgment were
obliged by the constitutions of the emperor to observe: and should
be like the reports of cases judged, if other judges be by the law of
England bound to observe them. For the judges of the common law
of England, are not properly judges, but juris consulti; of whom the
judges, who are either the lords, or twelve men of the country, are
in point of law to ask advice.
7. Also, unwritten customs, which in their own nature are an
imitation of law, by the tacit consent of the emperor, in case they be
not contrary to the law of nature, are very laws.
Another Another division of laws, is into natural and
division of positive. Natural are those which have been laws
law. from all eternity; and are called not only natural, but
also moral laws; consisting in the moral virtues, as justice, equity,
and all habits of the mind that conduce to peace, and charity; of
which I have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth
chapters.
Positive, are those which have not been from eternity; but have
been made laws by the will of those that have had the sovereign
power over others; and are either written, or made known to men,
by some other argument of the will of their legislator.
Again, of positive laws some are human, some divine; and of
human positive laws, some are distributive, some penal. Distributive
are those that determine the rights of the subjects, declaring to
every man what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety
in lands, or goods, and a right or liberty of action: and these speak
to all the subjects. Penal are those, which declare, what penalty shall
be inflicted on those that violate the law; and speak to the ministers
and officers ordained for execution. For though every one ought to
be informed of the punishments ordained beforehand for their
transgression; nevertheless the command is not addressed to the
delinquent, who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himself,
but to public ministers appointed to see the penalty executed. And
these penal laws are for the most part written together with the laws
distributive; and are sometimes called judgments. For all laws are
general judgments, or sentences of the legislator; as also every
particular judgment, is a law to him, whose case is judged.
Divine Divine positive laws (for natural laws being
positive law eternal, and universal, are all divine), are those,
how made which being the commandments of God, not from
known to be
law. all eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but
only to a certain people, or to certain persons, are
declared for such, by those whom God hath authorized to declare
them. But this authority of man to declare what be these positive
laws of God, how can it be known? God may command a man by a
supernatural way, to deliver laws to other men. But because it is of
the essence of law, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the
authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take
notice to be from God, how can a man without supernatural
revelation be assured of the revelation received by the declarer? and
how can he be bound to obey them? For the first question, how a
man can be assured of the revelation of another, without a
revelation particularly to himself, it is evidently impossible. For
though a man may be induced to believe such revelation, from the
miracles they see him do, or from seeing the extraordinary sanctity
of his life, or from seeing the extraordinary wisdom, or extraordinary
felicity of his actions, all which are marks of God’s extraordinary
favour; yet they are not assured evidences of special revelation.
Miracles are marvellous works: but that which is marvellous to one,
may not be so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible
felicities of this world, are most often the work of God by natural,
and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by
natural reason, that another has had a supernatural revelation of
God’s will; but only a belief; every one, as the signs thereof shall
appear greater or lesser, a firmer or a weaker belief.
But for the second, how can he be bound to obey them; it is not
so hard. For if the law declared, be not against the law of nature,
which is undoubtedly God’s law, and he undertake to obey it, he is
bound by his own act; bound I say to obey it, but not bound to
believe it: for men’s belief, and interior cogitations, are not subject to
the commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or
extraordinary. Faith of supernatural law, is not a fulfilling, but only an
assenting to the same; and not a duty that we exhibit to God, but a
gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also unbelief is
not a breach of any of his laws; but a rejection of them all, except
the laws natural. But this that I say, will be made yet clearer, by the
examples and testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture.
The covenant God made with Abraham, in a supernatural manner,
was thus, (Gen. xvii. 10) This is the covenant which thou shalt
observe between me and thee and thy seed after thee. Abraham’s
seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a
party to the covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should
declare to them for God’s law; which they could not be, but in virtue
of the obedience they owed to their parents; who, if they be subject
to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham, have
sovereign power over their children and servants. Again, where God
saith to Abraham, In thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed;
for I know thou wilt command thy children, and thy house after thee
to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe righteousness and
judgment, it is manifest, the obedience of his family, who had no
revelation, depended on their former obligation to obey their
sovereign. At Mount Sinai Moses only went up to God; the people
were forbidden to approach on pain of death; yet they were bound
to obey all that Moses declared to them for God’s law. Upon what
ground, but on this submission of their own, Speak thou to us, and
we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die? By which
two places it sufficiently appeareth, that in a commonwealth, a
subject that has no certain and assured revelation particularly to
himself concerning the will of God, is to obey for such, the command
of the commonwealth: for if men were at liberty, to take for God’s
commandments, their own dreams and fancies, or the dreams and
fancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is
God’s commandment; and yet in respect of them, every man would
despise the commandments of the commonwealth. I conclude
therefore, that in all things not contrary to the moral law, that is to
say, to the law of nature, all subjects are bound to obey that for
divine law, which is declared to be so, by the laws of the
commonwealth. Which also is evident to any man’s reason; for
whatsoever is not against the law of nature, may be made law in the
name of them that have the sovereign power; and there is no
reason men should be the less obliged by it, when it is propounded
in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the world where
men are permitted to pretend other commandments of God, than
are declared for such by the commonwealth. Christian states punish
those that revolt from the Christian religion, and all other states,
those that set up any religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever
is not regulated by the commonwealth, it is equity, which is the law
of nature, and therefore an eternal law of God, that every man
equally enjoy his liberty.
Another There is also another distinction of laws, into
division of fundamental and not fundamental; but I could never
laws. see in any author, what a fundamental law
signifieth. Nevertheless one may very reasonably distinguish laws in
that manner.
A For a fundamental law in every commonwealth is
fundamental that, which being taken away, the commonwealth
law, what. faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building whose
foundation is destroyed. And therefore a fundamental law is that, by
which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to
the sovereign, whether a monarch, or a sovereign assembly, without
which the commonwealth cannot stand; such as is the power of war
and peace, of judicature, of election of officers, and of doing
whatsoever he shall think necessary for the public good. Not
fundamental is that, the abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the
dissolution of the commonwealth; such as are the laws concerning
controversies between subject and subject. Thus much of the
division of laws.
Difference I find the words lex civilis, and jus civile, that is to
between law say law and right civil, promiscuously used for the
and right. same thing, even in the most learned authors;
which nevertheless ought not to be so. For right is liberty, namely
that liberty which the civil law leaves us: but civil law is an
obligation, and takes from us the liberty which the law of nature
gave us. Nature gave a right to every man to secure himself by his
own strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour, by way of
prevention: but the civil law takes away that liberty, in all cases
where the protection of the law may be safely stayed for. Insomuch
as lex and jus, are as different as obligation and liberty.
And between Likewise laws and charters are taken
a law and a promiscuously for the same thing. Yet charters are
charter. donations of the sovereign; and not laws, but
exemptions from law. The phrase of a law is, jubeo, injungo, I
command and enjoin: the phrase of a charter is, dedi, concessi, I
have given, I have granted: but what is given or granted, to a man,
is not forced upon him, by a law. A law may be made to bind all the
subjects of a commonwealth: a liberty, or charter is only to one man,
or some one part of the people. For to say all the people of a
commonwealth, have liberty in any case whatsoever, is to say, that
in such case, there hath been no law made; or else having been
made, is now abrogated.
 CHAPTER XXVII.

OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS.

Sin, what. A SIN, is not only a transgression of a law, but also

any contempt of the legislator. For such contempt, is
a breach of all his laws at once. And therefore may consist, not only
in the commission of a fact, or in speaking of words by the laws
forbidden, or in the omission of what the law commandeth, but also
in the intention, or purpose to transgress. For the purpose to break
the law, is some degree of contempt of him, to whom it belongeth to
see it executed. To be delighted in the imagination only, of being
possessed of another man’s goods, servants, or wife, without any
intention to take them from him by force or fraud, is no breach of
the law, that saith, Thou shalt not covet: nor is the pleasure a man
may have in imagining or dreaming of the death of him, from whose
life he expecteth nothing but damage, and displeasure, a sin; but
the resolving to put some act in execution, that tendeth thereto. For
to be pleased in the fiction of that, which would please a man if it
were real, is a passion so adherent to the nature both of man, and
every other living creature, as to make it a sin, were to make sin of
being a man. The consideration of this, has made me think them too
severe, both to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the first
motions of the mind, though checked with the fear of God, be sins.
But I confess it is safer to err on that hand, than on the other.
A crime, A crime, is a sin, consisting in the committing, by
what. deed or word, of that which the law forbiddeth, or
the omission of what it hath commanded. So that every crime is a
sin; but not every sin a crime. To intend to steal, or kill, is a sin,
though it never appear in word, or fact: for God that seeth the
thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge: but till it appear by
something done, or said, by which the intention may be argued by a
human judge, it hath not the name of crime: which distinction the
Greeks observed, in the word ἁμάρτημα, and ἔγκλημα, or ἀιτία;
whereof the former, which is translated sin, signifieth any swerving
from the law whatsoever; but the two latter, which are translated
crime, signify that sin only, whereof one man may accuse another.
But of intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there is
no place for human accusation. In like manner the Latins by
peccatum, which is sin, signify all manner of deviation from the law;
but by crimen, which word they derive from cerno, which signifies to
perceive, they mean only such sins, as may be made appear before
a judge; and therefore are not mere intentions.
Where no From this relation of sin to the law, and of crime
civil law is, to the civil law, may be inferred, first, that where
there is no law ceaseth, sin ceaseth. But because the law of
crime.
nature is eternal, violation of covenants, ingratitude,
arrogance, and all facts contrary to any moral virtue, can never
cease to be sin. Secondly, that the civil law ceasing, crimes cease:
for there being no other law remaining, but that of nature, there is
no place for accusation; every man being his own judge, and
accused only by his own conscience, and cleared by the uprightness
of his own intention. When therefore his intention is right, his fact is
no sin: if otherwise, his fact is sin; but not crime. Thirdly, that when
the sovereign power ceaseth, crime also ceaseth; for where there is
no such power, there is no protection to be had from the law; and
therefore every one may protect himself by his own power: for no
man in the institution of sovereign power can be supposed to give
away the right of preserving his own body; for the safety whereof all
sovereignty was ordained. But this is to be understood only of those,
that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the
power that protected them; for that was a crime from the beginning.
Ignorance of The source of every crime, is some defect of the
the law of understanding; or some error in reasoning; or some
nature sudden force of the passions. Defect in the
excuseth no
man. understanding, is ignorance; in reasoning,
erroneous opinion. Again, ignorance is of three
sorts; of the law, and of the sovereign, and of the penalty.
Ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man; because every
man that hath attained to the use of reason, is supposed to know,
he ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to
himself. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do
anything contrary to that law, it is a crime. If a man come from the
Indies hither, and persuade men here to receive a new religion, or
teach them anything that tendeth to disobedience of the laws of this
country, though he be never so well persuaded of the truth of what
he teacheth, he commits a crime, and may be justly punished for the
same, not only because his doctrine is false, but also because he
does that which he would not approve in another, namely, that
coming from hence, he should endeavour to alter the religion there.
But ignorance of the civil law, shall excuse a man in a strange
country, till it be declared to him; because, till then no civil law is
binding.
Ignorance of In the like manner, if the civil law of a man’s own
the civil law country, be not so sufficiently declared, as he may
excuseth know it if he will; nor the action against the law of
sometimes.
nature; the ignorance is a good excuse: in other
cases ignorance of the civil law, excuseth not.
Ignorance of Ignorance of the sovereign power, in the place of
the sovereign a man’s ordinary residence, excuseth him not;
excuseth not. because he ought to take notice of the power, by
which he hath been protected there.
Ignorance of Ignorance of the penalty, where the law is
the penalty declared, excuseth no man: for in breaking the law,
excuseth not. which without a fear of penalty to follow, were not a
law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not
what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action,
accepteth all the known consequences of it; but punishment is a
known consequence of the violation of the laws, in every
commonwealth; which punishment, if it be determined already by
the law, he is subject to that; if not, then he is subject to arbitrary
punishment. For it is reason, that he which does injury, without
other limitation than that of his own will, should suffer punishment
without other limitation, than that of his will whose law is thereby
violated.
Punishments But when a penalty, is either annexed to the
declared crime in the law itself, or hath been usually inflicted
before the in the like cases; there the delinquent is excused
fact, excuse
from greater from a greater penalty. For the punishment
punishments foreknown, if not great enough to deter men from
after it. the action, is an invitement to it: because when men
compare the benefit of their injustice, with the harm
of their punishment, by necessity of nature they chuse that which
appeareth best for themselves: and therefore when they are
punished more than the law had formerly determined, or more than
others were punished for the same crime; it is the law that tempted,
and deceiveth them.
Nothing can No law, made after a fact done, can make it a
be made a crime: because if the fact be against the law of
crime by a nature, the law was before the fact; and a positive
law made
after the fact. law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made;
and therefore cannot be obligatory. But when the
law that forbiddeth a fact, is made before the fact be done; yet he
that doth the fact, is liable to the penalty ordained after, in case no
lesser penalty were made known before, neither by writing, nor by
example, for the reason immediately before alleged.
False From defect in reasoning, that is to say, from
principles of error, men are prone to violate the laws, three ways.
right & wrong First, by presumption of false principles: as when
causes of
crime. men, from having observed how in all places, and in
all ages, unjust actions have been authorized, by
the force, and victories of those who have committed them; and that
potent men, breaking through the cobweb laws of their country, the
weaker sort, and those that have failed in their enterprises, have
been esteemed the only criminals; have thereupon taken for
principles, and grounds of their reasoning, that justice is but a vain
word: that whatsoever a man can get by his own industry, and
hazard, is his own: that the practice of all nations cannot be unjust:
that examples of former times are good arguments of doing the like
again; and many more of that kind: which being granted, no act in
itself can be a crime, but must be made so, not by the law, but by
the success of them that commit it; and the same fact be virtuous,
or vicious, as fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a crime,
Sylla shall make meritorious, and Cæsar, the same laws standing,
turn again into a crime, to the perpetual disturbance of the peace of
the commonwealth.
False Secondly, by false teachers, that either
teachers mis- misinterpret the law of nature, making it thereby
interpreting repugnant to the law civil; or by teaching for laws,
the law of
nature. such doctrines of their own, or traditions of former
times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a subject.
And false Thirdly, by erroneous inferences from true
inferences principles; which happens commonly to men that
from true are hasty, and precipitate in concluding, and
principles, by
teachers. resolving what to do; such as are they, that have
both a great opinion of their own understanding,
and believe that things of this nature require not time and study, but
only common experience, and a good natural wit; whereof no man
thinks himself unprovided: whereas the knowledge, of right and
wrong, which is no less difficult, there is no man will pretend to,
without great and long study. And of those defects in reasoning,
there is none that can excuse, though some of them may extenuate,
a crime in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of his own
private business; much less in them that undertake a public charge;
because they pretend to the reason, upon the want whereof they
would ground their excuse.
By their Of the passions that most frequently are the
passions. causes of crime, one, is vain glory, or a foolish
overrating of their own worth; as if difference of worth, were an
effect of their wit, or riches, or blood, or some other natural quality,
not depending on the will of those that have the sovereign authority.
From whence proceedeth a presumption that the punishments
ordained by the laws, and extended generally to all subjects, ought
not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they are inflicted