Test of a Valid Ordinance Requisites: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
2.2. Principle of Separation of Powers
This principle is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in one person or group of persons that
might lead to irreversible error or abuse. It is intended to secure action, to forestall over action, to prevent
despotism and to obtain efficiency.
Belgica v. Ochoa, citing Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission: refers to the constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of the government. Each department has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. Lack of independence
would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions
of another or others.
2.3. Principle of Checks and Balances
This principle means that every branch of the government does not encroach over the powers of another.
It is intended to secure coordination in the working of the various departments of the government. No
branch of government is clothed with too much power because each branch exercise some “check” over
the three branches. It is created to maintain harmony of the government as a whole.
2.4. Principles of Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances vis-à-vis Principle of Judicial
Independence
In the modern of constitutional State, the principle of an independent Judiciary has its origin in the theory
of separation of powers, whereby the three separate branches of government constitute a system of mutual
checks and balances aimed at preventing abuses of power to the detriment of a free society. This
independence means that both the Judiciary as an institution and also the individual judges deciding
particular cases must be able to exercise their professional responsibilities without being influenced by
the Executive, the Legislature or any other inappropriate sources.
Maglasang v. People: The Supreme Court is supreme --- the third great department of government
entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and
private. No other department or agency may pass upon the judgments or declare them ‘unjust.’
Tests for valid delegation: Both of the following tests are to becomplied with [Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 15 SCRA 569; Tatad v. Secretary of
Energy, supra.]:
iiia) Completeness Test. The law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except to
enforce it. See U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil
iiib) Sufficient standard test. A sufficient standard is intended to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be
pursued and effected. This is intended to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the
legislature to the delegate. The standard is usually indicated in the law delegating legislative power. See
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra.; de la Liana v. Alba, 112
SCRA 294; Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323
Principle of Blending of Powers. Instances when powers are notconfined exclusively within one
department but are assigned to or shared by several departments, e.g., enactment of general appropriations
law.
v) Principle of Checks and Balances. This allows one department to resist encroachments upon its
prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments, e.g., veto power of
the President as check on improvident legislation, etc..
Political and justiciable questions. “A purely justiciable question implies a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and
sanctioned by law for said breach of right” [Casibang v. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642]. In Tatad v. Secretary of
Energy, supra., the Supreme Court ruled that what the petitioners raised were justiciable questions,
considering that the “statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that the petitioners are
assailing R.A. 8180 because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not because the law lacks
wisdom”. In Tanada v. Angara, supra., the petition seeking the nullification of the Senate concurrence of
the President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), was held
to present a justiciable controversy, because where an action is alleged to infringe the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
Permissible delegation: iia) Tariff Powers to the President, as specifically provided in Sec. 28(2), Art. VI:
“The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the Government’.
Emergency Powers to the President, as provided in Sec. 23(2), Art. VI: “In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof’. iib1) An example of this is R.A. 6826, approved on December 20,1989. The
President issued National Emergency Memorandum Orders (NEMOs) in the exercise of delegated
legislative powers. See: Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368; Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil 603
Delegation to the People (Sec. 32, Art. VI; Sec. 10, Art. X; Sec. 2, Art. XVII; Republic Act 6735). See:
People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56, which was decided under the 1935 Constitution, where the Supreme Court
said that courts have sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Under the
1987 Constitution, there are specific provisions where the people have reserved to themselves the
function of legislation. iic1) Referendum vs. Plebiscite. Referendum is the power of the electorate to
approve or reject legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes,
namely: referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part
thereof, passed by Congress; and referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject
a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. Plebiscite is
the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people
[Sec. 2 (c) and (e), Republic Act No. 6735]. iid) Delegation to local government units (See: R.A. 7160).
“Such legislation (by local governments) is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but
rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe local regulations, according to immemorial practice,
subject, of course, to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity” [Peopje v. Vera, supra.]. This
recognizes the fact that local legislatures are more knowledgeable than the national lawmaking body on
matters of purely local concern, and are in a better position to enact appropriate legislative measures
thereon. iie) Delegation to Administrative Bodies “The power of subordinate legislation.” In Conference
of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., v. POEA, 243 SCRA 666, POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 01-
94, increasing and adjusting the rates of compensation and other benefits in the Standard Employment
Contract for Seafarers, was held to be a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority, inasmuch as it
conforms to the sufficient and valid standard of “fair and equitable employment practices” prescribed in
E.O. 797. In Osmena v. Orbos, supra., it was held that there was no undue delegation of legislative
power in the authority granted by legislature to the Energy Regulatory Board to impose additional
amounts to augment the resources of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund. See also: Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152
SCRA 730; Eastern Shipping v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533. But in Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia,
supra., the authority given by LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the
existing authorized fare was held to be illegal for being an undue delegation of power.
In Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569, Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code (authorizing the
President to create municipalities through executive orders) was declared unconstitutional for being an
undue delegation of legislative power However, in Municipality of San Narciso (Quezon) v. Mendez, 239
SCRA 11, E.O 353 creating the Municipal
