Sakal Papers P LTD and Ors Vs The Union of India Us610090COM726044
Sakal Papers P LTD and Ors Vs The Union of India Us610090COM726044
Equivalent/Neutral Citation: AIR1962SC 305, (1978)1C ompLJ94(SC ), (1978)1C ompLJ94(SC ), 1961 INSC 277, [1962]3SC R842
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6 . We may mention here that in the year 1952 the Government of India appointed a
Press Commission for enquiring into a large number of matters concerning the Press
and one of the recommendations of the Commission was to enact a law such as the one
impugned before us. This law is alleged by the respondent to have been made to give
effect to that recommendation. Both the sides place reliance upon the finding of the
Press Commission and have invited us to accept these findings, though not necessarily
the recommendations.
7. The petitioners point out that since the total number of pages which "Sakal" gives to
its reading public on six days in a week is 34, and that as a result of the impugned
Order they will either have to raise its price from 7 nP. to 8 nP. per day or to reduce the
total number of pages to 24. They further point out that while at present all newspapers
can issued any number of supplements as and when they choose, under the Order they
would be prevented from doing so except with the permission of the Government.
According to them the Order would have the effect of either compelling them to increase
the price or to reduce the number of pages of practically every newspaper in the country
as also of preventing them from publishing supplements without extraneous
restrictions, which they are able to do at present.
8. It is the petitioners' case that the impugned Act and the impugned Order are pieces
of legislation designed to curtail and which would in effect curtail the freedom of the
press and as such are violative of the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution. They point out that if they continue to give in their newspaper the same
number of pages as at present, they would have to increase its selling price and that
this will adversely affect its circulation. If, on the other hand, they reduce the number of
pages in order to conform to the impugned order their right to disseminate news and
views will be directly interfered with. Thus in either event there will be an interference
with their right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
9 . The petitioners point out that the impugned Order reserves to the Central
Government the power to permit issue of supplements, except those on January 26 and
August 15, and that the result of this would be to place them at the mercy of the
Government and thus interfere with their freedom of expression.
10. They further point out that the Act and the Order are violative of the provisions of
Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as their avowed object is to promote arbitrarily
the interests of some newspaper at the expense of others. They contend that inequality
is writ large in the provisions of the Act and of the Order and that there is no
reasonable classification or basis or any rational relationship between the restrictions
imposed and the objects sought to be achieved. According to them, while the
established newspapers will be hardly affected by these provisions those that are
endeavouring to come up will be hampered in their progress.
11. On behalf of the respondent, the Union of India, in the Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, while it is admitted that the object of the Act is to regulate the prices
charged for newspapers in relation to their pages, it is pointed out that this is being
done to prevent unfair competition amongst newspapers as also to prevent the rise of
monopolistic combines so that newspapers may have fair opportunities of freer
discussion. The effect of the provisions of the Act is said to be to provide for the
maximum matter which a newspaper could make available to the public at a certain
price and that this does not in any way restrict the rights of the petitioners to propagate
their ideas. The respondent, while admitting that by the operation of the impugned
Order a limitation is placed on the space which a newspaper would be able to devote to
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the propagation of its ideas and to news, says that it would be open to those
newspapers to increase the space by raising the price. According to the respondent the
circulation of a newspaper will not be adversely affected by raising its price. It is then
contended that even if the circulation is adversely affected thereby the fundamental
rights of the newspaper proprietors guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
will not be infringed. It is also contended that the legislation in question does not
directly or indirectly deal with the subject of freedom of speech and expression and that
consequently no question of the violation of the provisions of Article 19(1)(a) at all
arises. The effect of the Act and the Order, according to the respondent, would be to
promote further the right of newspapers in general to exercise the freedom of speech
and expression. Thus, according to the respondent, neither the intention nor the effect
of the operation of the law is to take away or abridge the freedom of speech and
expression of the petitioners.
12. It is further pointed out that all newspapers publish advertisements and that this is
a trading activity. It is, therefore, necessary to differentiate between this activity and an
activity which would fall under Article 19(1)(a). The impugned Act and the Order,
according to the respondent provide in the public interest for restrictions on the trading
activity of newspapers. It is pointed out that the space allocated to advertisements by
newspapers varies from 46% to 59% and that these advertisements bring in a
substantial revenue which enables the newspapers to be sold at a price below the cost
of production. Placing reliance upon the statement contained in the Report of the Press
Commission it is contended on behalf of the respondent that newspapers of long
standing which have built up a large and stable advertisement revenue being in a more
advantageous position than newcomers in the field of journalism are in a position to
squeeze out such newcomers with the result that they are able to destroy the freedom
of expression of others. A free press, it is said, cannot mean a press composed of a few
powerful combines and that in order to ensure freedom of press it is necessary to
secure full scope for the full development of smaller newspapers.
1 3 . It is further pointed out on behalf of the respondent that the diminution of
advertisement revenue which would result from the operation of the Price Page
Schedule cannot be regarded as an infringement of the right under Article 19(1)(a).
According to the respondent the economies of newspapers and the maximum number of
pages that a paper can give with a reasonable margin for advertisement space was
worked out by the Press Commission which also suggested a tentative Price Page
Schedule. In formulating the schedule the Press Commission took into account various
factors such as cost of (1) newsprint, (2) composing and printing, (3) distribution, (4)
commission payable, (5) editorial and managerial expenses and (6) general overhead
charges. The present Price Page Schedule is said to be base upon the one formulated by
the Press Commission.
1 4 . It is further stated that the present measures have been adopted upon the
recommendation of the Press Commission which after stating that the proper
functioning of democracy requires that every individual should have equal opportunity
to put forward his opinions suggested that measures should be adopted to reduce the
differences due to economic advantages and other causes to enable newcomers to start
with a fair chance of success. It is with this end in view that the present rates are stated
to have been prescribed. The respondent further points out that the bulk of the Indian
language newspapers priced at 7 nP. will not find any difficulty whatsoever in
conforming to the requirements of the order because they give five or less than five
pages on week days. Only a few newspapers will be remotely affected by the order but
in their case the issue of large number of pages is due to factors not connected with the
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functioning of the freedom of speech and expression but for reason connected with their
business activities. Newspapers, according to the respondent, are able to give more
pages because of their large advertisement revenue or because they belong to a group
or chain of newspapers which do not entirely depend upon the individual income of
each newspaper.
15. It is said that the petitioners in particular are able to give additional number of
pages because they devote a larger volume of space to advertisements than others and
that this is not something done in the lawful exercise of their right of freedom of speech
and expression or of the right of dissemination of news and views. It is, however, as
already stated, admitted on behalf of the respondent that a newspaper is a product sold
below the cost of production. The conclusion suggested by the respondent is that it is
only by increasing the revenue from advertisement that a newspaper can increase the
number of its pages.
16. According to the respondent, the true purpose of the impugned legislation being the
prevention of unfair competition which has resulted in denying to others a right of
propagation of ideas by publishing newspapers, this legislation cannot be said to
infringe the right of freedom of expression of a newspaper but on the other hand said to
be one which promotes and encourages healthy journalism. The impugned provisions
will, according to the respondent, affect only those classes of newspapers which
unfairly compete with the smaller one - a kind of competition which is considered by
the Press Commission as unhealthy and against the interests of healthy journalism in a
growing democracy. It is then said that "it is necessary to avoid unfair competition and
even to promote healthy competition that papers have to be put on a criteria of equality
and that this could only be done by directly restricting the publication of large number
of pages as against the price charged. " Then it is contended that what is aimed at by
the impugned legislation is the avoidance of concentration of ownership without
interfering with healthy competition between equals equally situated.
17. It is further stated that not only was the statute enacted on the recommendation of
the Press Commission but that the Price Page Schedule itself was introduced in response
to the demand pressed by the India Language Newspapers Association. It is pointed out
on behalf of the respondent that the quantity of import of newsprint is based on the
average number of pages of newspapers published in 1957 and that, therefore, no
newspaper has the unrestricted right to increase the number of pages over the 1957
figure. It is also pointed out that the draft Price Page Schedule has been approved by
the Indian Language Newspapers Association and that this Association has
recommended that the life of the Price Page Act and Order should be extended by
another five to ten years. It is denied that the provisions of the Act infringe the right
conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution.
18. We have already indicated earlier, briefly, the effect of the impugned Act and the
Order. In order to appreciate fully the contentions raised before us it would be useful to
give in brief a summary of the provisions of the Act and of the impugned Order.
19. First, there is the preamble which says that the object of the Act is to secure to
newspapers fuller opportunities of freedom of expression by preventing unfair
competition. This is sought to be achieved by the regulation of prices charged for
newspapers in relation to their page. In this manner the legislature expects to prevent
unfair competition among newspapers.
20. Sub-section 3 of section 1 provides that the Act shall cease to have effect on the
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expiration of a period of five years from its commencement except as respects things
done or omitted to be done before the expiration. The Act came into force on September
7, 1956 and was thus due to expire on September 6, 1961. The Attorney-General,
however, told us that it was proposed to extend to the life of the Act by a further period
of five years and we understand that its life has now been extended for an indefinite
period. Section 2 defines "daily newspaper" and "newspaper".
2 1 . Section 3 is the most important provision in the Act. It is this provision which
empowers the Central Government to regulate prices and pages of newspapers. Sub-
section (1) of section 3 empowers the Central Government to regulate the prices of
newspapers in relation to their pages and sizes if it is of opinion that it is necessary to
do so for the purpose of preventing unfair competition among newspapers and in
particular those published in Indian languages. It also empowers the Government to
regulate the allocation of space to be allotted for advertising matter. Sub-section (2) of
that section provides for an order under sub-section (1) to be made in relation to
newspapers generally or in relation to any class of newspapers and further provides for
the making of different provisions for daily newspapers and newspapers appearing at
other periodical intervals as well as for different classes of newspapers papers. Sub-
section (3) provides that the Central Government, in making the Order, shall have due
regard to a reasonable flexibility with respect to the fall of news and flow of
advertisements and other matters connected with the normal working of newspapers.
Sub-section (4) makes it obligatory upon the Central Government to consult
associations of publishers and such publishers as are likely to be a affected by the
Order as it may think fit with respect to the action proposed to be taken. Section 4
prohibits publication or sale of newspapers in the territories to which the Act extends in
contravention of any of the provisions of an order made under section 3.
2 2 . Section 5 provides for furnishing returns by newspapers to the Press Registrar.
Sub-section (1) of section 6 provides penalties for publication and sale of newspapers
in contravention of the provisions of section 4. Sub-section (2) of section 6 provides
penalties for some other contraventions with which we are not concerned. Section 7,
which is the last section, prohibits the Court from taking cognizance of offences under
the Act except upon a complaint in writing by the Press Registrar or by an officer
authorised by him.
23. It will thus be seen that the Act can be brought into practical operation only after
the Central Government has taken action under sub-section (1) of section 3 and made
an order regulating any of the matters referred to in that section.
24. On October 24, 1960 in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 the Central
Government, after consultation with the Association of Newspapers and Publishers likely
to be affected thereunder, made the Daily Newspapers (Price and Page) Order, 1960.
This Order came into force on December 12, 1960. It contains a schedule to the Act
which is in two Parts, Part I and Part II. Part I applies to daily newspapers published on
six days in a week and Part II applies to weeklies. Paragraph 3 of the Order provides
that where the price charged for daily newspapers is any of the prices specified in col. 1
of Part I of the Schedule the total number of pages of all the issues of that newspaper
published during six days in a week shall not exceed the maximum number of pages
shown against that price in that part. Paragraph 4 deals with weekly editions of daily
newspapers. Paragraph 5 provides that the total number of pages of all the issues of a
daily newspaper published shall not exceed the maximum number of pages assigned
under paragraphs 3 and 4 or under paragraph 3, according as the newspaper is
published on seven days in a week or on six days. Then there is a proviso to this
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paragraph which runs thus :
"Provided that where there is a weekly edition of any newspaper referred to in
clause (b) and the price charged therefore is different from that charged on
other days, the total number of all the issues of that newspaper published
during a week shall not exceed the maximum number of pages assigned to such
newspaper under paragraph 4 and five-sixth of the maximum number of pages
assigned to it under paragraph 3."
25. Paragraph 6 permits the publication of additional number of pages during the week
not exceeding six. Paragraph 7 permits the publication of supplements on January 26
and August 15 each year and also once in every quarter on such special occasion as the
publisher thinks fit. Paragraph 8 empowers the Central Government to permit the
publication of additional supplements or special editions in excess of those referred to
in paragraph 7 and prescribes the number of pages which could be published.
Paragraph 9 relaxes to a certain extent the rigour of the provisions of paragraphs 4 to 6,
in that it provides that the daily newspaper shall not be deemed to have contravened
the provisions of the Order unless the number of pages of all the issues of that
newspaper published during any period of twelve consecutive weeks exceeds the quota
assigned to such newspaper during that period.
26. A bare perusal of the Act and the Order thus makes it abundantly clear that the
right of a newspaper to publish news and views and to utilise as many pages as it likes
for that purpose is made to depend upon the price charged to the readers. Prior to the
promulgation of the Order every newspaper was free to charge whatever price it chose,
and thus had a right unhampered by State regulation to publish news and views. This
liberty is obviously interfered with by the Order which provides for the maximum
number of pages for the particular price charged. The question is whether this amounts
to any abridgment of the right of a newspaper to freedom of expression. Our
Constitution does not expressly provide for the freedom of press but it has been held by
this Court that this freedom is included in "freedom of speech and expression"
guaranteed by clause (1) (a) of Article 19, vide Brij Bhushan v. The State of Delhi
MANU/SC/0007/1950 : 1950CriL J1525 . This freedom is not absolute for, clause (2) of
Article 19 permits restrictions being placed upon it in certain circumstances. That clause
runs thus :
"Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any
existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law
imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the
said sub-clause in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations
with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. "
2 7 . It is not claimed on behalf of the State that either the Act or the Order made
thereunder can be justified by any of the circumstances set out in this clause. The right
to propagate one's ideas is inherent in the conception of freedom of speech and
expression. For the purpose of propagating his ideas every citizen has a right to publish
the, to disseminate them and to circulate them. He is entitled to do so either by word of
mouth or by writing. The right guaranteed thus extends, subject to any law competent
under Article 19(2), not merely to the matter which he is entitled to circulate, but also
to the volume of circulation. In other words, the citizen is entitled to propagate his
views and reach any class and number of readers as he choses subject of course to the
limitations permissible under a law competent under Article 19(2). It cannot be gainsaid
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that the impugned order seeks to place a restraint on the latter aspect of the right by
prescribing a price page schedule. We may add that the fixation of a minimum price for
the number of pages which a newspaper is entitled to publish is obviously not for
ensuring a reasonable price to the buyers of newspapers but for expressly cutting down
the volume of circulation of some newspapers by making the price so unattractively
high for a class of its readers as is likely to deter it from purchasing such newspapers.
28. It is not disputed that every newspaper evolves a plan of its own for carrying on its
activities. Bearing in mind factors such as the place of publication, the class of the
reading public which may be excepted to subscribe to the paper, the conditions of
labour, the price of material, the availability of advertisements and so on it decides
upon its size, the proportion of different kinds of matter published in the newspaper,
such as news, comments, views of readers, advertisements etc., and the price to be
charged. The plan evolved by it is sought to be rudely shaken if not completely upset by
an order which it is open to the Central Government to make under section 3(1) with a
view to curtailment of circulation of newspapers. No doubt, under section 3(4) the
Government is required to consult associations of publishers. Apart from the fast that
the Government is not bound by the opinion of the associations, the mere circumstance
that consultation with them is made obligatory, the action of the Government in
formulating an order does not cease to be a direct interference with the freedom of
speech and expression of a citizen.
29. After the schedule comes into force it will not be open to a newspaper proprietor to
charge less than a certain minimum price if he wants to give a particular number of
pages in his newspaper. If he should contravene this order he will incur a penalty.
Similarly he cannot publish supplements in excess of four as and when he chooses,
except with the permission of Government. The Order does not indicate the
circumstances which would entitle a newspaper proprietor to secure the special
permission of Government. Apparently, whether to allow an additional supplement or
not would be dependent on the sweet will and pleasure of the Government and this
would necessarily strike at the root of the independence of the press.
30. In Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd., v. The Union of India MANU/SC/0157/1958
: (1961)ILL J339SC , this Court has laid down that while there is no immunity to the
press from the operation of the general laws it would not be legitimate to subject the
press to laws which take away or abridge the freedom of speech and expression or
adopt measures calculated and intended to curtail circulation and thereby narrow the
scope of dissemination of information or fetter its freedom to choose its means of
exercising the right or would undermine its independence by driving it to seek
Government aid. This Court further pointed out that a law which lays upon the Press
excessive and prohibitive burdens which would restrict the circulation of a newspaper
would not be saved by Article 19(2) if the Constitution.
31. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution must be interpreted in a broad way
and not in a narrow and pedantic sense. Certain rights have been enshrined in our
Constitution as fundamental and, therefore, while considering the nature and content of
those rights the Court must not be too astute to interpret the language of the
Constitution in so literal a sense as to whittle them down. On the other hand the Court
must interpret the Constitution in a manner which would enable the citizen to enjoy the
rights guaranteed by it in the fullest measure subject, of course, to permissible
restriction.
Bearing this principle in mind it would be clear that the right to freedom of speech and
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expression carries with it the right to publish and circulate one's ideas, opinions and
views with complete freedom and by resorting to any available means of publication,
subject again to such restrictions as could be legitimately imposed under clause (2) of
Article 19. The first decision of this Court in which this was recognized is Romesh
Thapar v. State of Madras MANU/SC/0006/1950 : 1950CriL J1514 . There, this Court
held that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas
and that this freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation. In that case this Court
has also pointed out that freedom of speech and expression are the foundation of all
democratic organisations and are essential for the proper functioning of the processes
of democracy. These and in other cases this Court pointed out that very narrow and
stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgment of the right of
freedom of speech and expression. In State of Madras v. V. G. Row
MANU/SC/0013/1952 : 1952CriL J966 , the question of the reasonableness of
restrictions which could be imposed upon a fundamental right has been considered.
This Court has pointed out that the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed,
the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and scope of the evil
sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition and the prevailing
conditions at that time should all enter into the judicial verdict. In Dwarkadas Shriniwas
v. The Sholapur Spinning & Wearing Co., Ltd. MANU/SC/0019/1953 : [1954]1SCR674
this Court has pointed out that in construing the Constitution it is the substance and the
practical result of the act of the State the should be considered rather than its purely
legal aspect. The correct approach in such cases should be to enquire as to what in
substance is the loss or injury caused to the citizen and not merely what manner and
method has been adopted by the State in placing the restriction. In Virendra v. The
State of Punjab MANU/SC/0023/1957 : [1958]1SCR308 , this Court has observed at p.
319 as follows :
"It is certainly a serious encroachment on the valuable and cherished right or
freedom of speech and expression if a newspaper is prevented from publishing
its own or the views of its correspondents relating to or concerning what may
be the burning topic of the day".
32. The impugned order requires all newspapers to raise their prices if they want to
maintain the present number of pages. The effect of raising the selling price of
newspaper has been considered by the Press Commission. In Paragraph 164 of the
Report it is observed :
"The selling price of a paper would naturally have an important effect on its
circulation. In this connection we have examined the effect of price-cuts
adopted by two English papers at Bombay on the circulation of those two
papers as well as of the leading paper which did not reduce its price. Prior to
27th October, 1952, Times of India which had the highest circulation at Bombay
was being sold at Rs. 0-2-6 while Free Press Journal and National Standard
which rank next in circulation were being sold for Rs. 0-2-0. On 27th October,
1952, Free Press Journal reduced its price to Rs. 0-1-0 and within a year had
claimed to have doubled its circulation. On 1st July, 1953, the National
Standard was converted into a Bombay edition of Indian Express with a selling
price of Rs. 0-1-6. Within six months it too claimed to have doubled its
circulation... During this period the Times of India which did not reduce its
selling price continued to retain its readership. Thus it would appear that Free
Press Journal and Indian Express by reducing their price have been able to tap
new readership which was latent in the market but which could not pay the
higher prices prevailing earlier".
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33. Then in paragraph 165 it is observed :
"There is another instance illustrating the effect of selling price on the
circulation. The two leading Tamil papers Swadesamitran and Dinamani in
Madras, anticipating towards the end of 1950 a steep rise in the price of
newsprint, came to an understanding and raised the price of their papers from
Rs. 0-1-0 to Rs. 0-1-6. (These papers normally carried 30 to 36 pages per
week). The increase in price from Rs. 0-1-0 per copy to Rs. 0-1-6 was brought
into effect from 1st January, 1951. The result was a drastic fall in circulation in
both their cases. Subsequently in view of this fall in circulation they agreed to
reduce their prices to the old figure. While the original fall in circulation came
about in three months duration one paper took more than 9 months to recover
its old circulation, while the other had not done so........ It may be mentioned
in this connection that the circulation of a competing paper, Thanthi........ did
not rise during the three months when the two leading papers had increased the
price ........ nor did it fall when the prices of the leading papers were lowered
again. The conclusion, therefore, appears to be that over 33,000 readers had
stopped taking any papers because the price had been raised;........ The period
examined coincided with an accentuation of draught conditions in Tamil Nadu;
a certain fall in circulation all round can be attributed to these conditions.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a change in price did have a profound
effect on the circulation of those two papers".
34. Though the prices of newspapers appear to be on the low side it is a fact that even
so many people find it difficult to pay that small price. This is what has been pointed
out by the Press Commission in paragraph 52 of its report. According to it the most
common reason for people in not purchasing newspapers is the cost of the newspaper
and the inability of the household to spare the necessary amount. This conclusion is
based upon the evidence of a very large number of individuals and representatives of
Associations. We would, therefore, be justified in relying upon it and holding that
raising the price of a newspaper even by a small amount such as one nP. in order that
its present size be maintained would adversely affect its circulation.
35. It is, however, said that it is not necessary for newspapers to raise their prices but
that they could reduce their number of pages. For one things, requiring newspapers to
reduce their sizes would be compelling them to restrict the dissemination of news and
views and thus directly affecting their right under Article 19(1)(a). But it is said that the
object could be achieved by reducing the advertisements. That is to say, the
newspapers would be able to devote the same space which they are devoting today to
the publication of news and views by reducing to the necessary extent the space allotted
to advertisements. It is pointed out that newspapers allot a disproportionately large
space to advertisements. It is true that many newspapers do devote very large areas to
advertisements. But then the Act is intended to apply also to newspapers which may
carry no or very few advertisements. Again, after the commencement of the Act and the
coming into force of the Order a newspaper which has a right to publish any number of
pages for carrying its news and views will be restrained from doing so except upon the
condition that it raises the selling price as provided in the schedule to the Order. This
would be the direct and immediate effect of the Order and as such would be violative of
the right of newspapers guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a).
36. Again, section 3(1) of the Act in so far as it permits the allocation of space to
advertisements also directly affects freedom of circulation. If the area for
advertisements is curtailed the price of the newspaper will be forced up. If that
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happens, the circulation will inevitably go down. This would be no remote, but a direct
consequence of curtailment of advertisements.
37. We would consider this matter in another way also. The advertisement revenue of a
newspaper is proportionate to its circulation. Thus the higher the circulation of a
newspaper the larger would be its advertisement revenue. So if a newspaper with a high
circulation were to raise its price its circulation would go down and this in turn would
bring down also the advertisement revenue. That would force the newspaper either to
close down or to raise its price. Raising the price further would affect the circulation
still more and thus a vicious cycle would set in which would ultimately end in the
closure of the newspaper. If, on the other hand, the space for advertisement is reduced
the earnings of a newspaper would go down and it would either have to run at a loss or
close down or raise its price. The object of the Act in regulating the space for
advertisements is stated to be to prevent 'unfair' competition. It is thus directed against
circulation of a newspaper. When a law is intended to bring about this result there
would be a direct interference with the right of freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).
38. Since the very object of the impugned law is to affect the circulation of certain
newspapers which are said to be practising unfair competition it is difficult to appreciate
how it could be sustained. The right to freedom of speech and expression is an
individual right guaranteed to every citizen by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
There is nothing in clause (2) of Article 19 which permits the State to abridge this right
on the ground of conferring benefits upon the public in general or upon a section of the
public. It is not open to the State to curtail or infringe the freedom of speech of one for
promoting the general welfare of a section or a group of people unless its action could
be justified under a law competent under clause (2) of Article 19. It is admitted that the
impugned provisions cannot be justified on the grounds referred to in the aforesaid
clause.
39. It was, however, contended on behalf of the State that there are two aspects of the
activities of newspapers - the dissemination of news and views and the commercial
aspect. These two aspects, it is said are different from one another and under clause (6)
of Article 19 restrictions can be placed on the latter right in the interest of the general
public. So far as it is relevant for the purpose of the argument clause (6) reads thus :
"Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it imposes or prevent the State from making any law
imposing in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause........ "
40. It may well be within the power of the State to place, in the interest of the general
public, restrictions upon the right of a citizen to carry on business but it is not open to
the State to achieve this object by directly and immediately curtailing any other freedom
of that citizen guaranteed by the Constitution and which is not susceptible of
abridgement on the same grounds as are set out in clause (6) of Article 19. Therefore,
the right of freedom of speech cannot be taken away with the object of placing
restrictions on the business activities of a citizen. Freedom of speech can be restricted
only in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State,
public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence. It cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be curtailed
in the interest of the general public. If a law directly affecting it is challenged it is no
answer that the restrictions enacted by it are justifiable under clauses (3) to (6). For,
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the scheme of Article 19 is to enumerate different freedoms separately and then to
specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected and the objects for
securing which this could be done. A citizen is entitled to enjoy each and every one of
the freedom together and clause (1) does not prefer one freedom to another. That is the
plain meaning of this clause. It follows from this that the State cannot make a law
which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another
freedom. All the greater reason, therefore for holding that the State cannot directly
restrict one freedom by placing an otherwise permissible restriction on another
freedom.
41. Viewing the question from this angle it would be seen that the reference to the
Press being a business and to the restriction imposed by the impugned Act being
referable or justified as a proper restriction on the right to carry on the business of
publishing a newspaper would be wholly irrelevant for considering whether the
impugned Act infringes or does not infringe the freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a).
4 2 . The only question that would then remain would be whether the impugned
enactment directly impinges on the guarantee of freedom of speech and expression. It
would directly impinge on this freedom either by placing restraint upon it or by placing
restraint upon something which is an essential part of that freedom. The freedom of a
newspaper to publish any number of pages or to circulated it to any number of persons
is each an integral part of the freedom of speech and expression. A restraint placed
upon either of them would be a direct infringement of the right of freedom of speech
and expression. Perhaps an illustration would make the point clear. Let us suppose that
the enactment had said that newspaper 'A' or newspaper 'B' (ignoring for the moment
the objection to the illustration based upon Article 14 shall not have more than a
specified number of subscribers. Could such a law be valid in the face of the guarantee
under Article 19(1)(a) ? The answer must unhesitatingly be no, because such a law
would be recognized as directly impinging upon the freedom of expression which
encompasses freedom of circulation and to restrain the citizen from propagating his
views to any other beyond the limit or number prescribed by the statute. If this were so,
the fact that the legislation achieves the same result by means of the schedule of rates
makes no difference and the impact on the freedom would still be direct
notwithstanding that it does not appear so on its face.
4 3 . Here the Act by enacting sections 4 and 5 directly prohibits a newspaper from
exercising that right, should the newspaper fail to comply with the requirement of an
order made under section 3. This is a direct invasion of the right under Article 19(1)(a)
and not an incidental or problematic effect thereon as was found in the Express
Newspapers case MANU/SC/0157/1958 : (1961)ILL J339SC . In that case the challenge
to certain provisions of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 on the ground that it infringes the right guaranteed
by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. That challenge failed because the object of that
enactment was to secure the amelioration of the condition of working journalists and
also because the law did not have the effect of directly interfering with the right of the
newspaper proprietors guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The
distinction between direct and indirect effect of a law upon the freedom of press has
been adverted to in that case. At p. 135, Bhagwati, J., who spoke for the Court has said
:
"All the consequences which have been visualised in this behalf by the
petitioners, viz., the tendency to curtail circulation and there by narrow the
scope of dissemination of information, fetters on the petitioners' freedom to
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choose the means of exercising the right, likelihood of the independence of the
press being undermined by having to seek government aid;........ etc. would be
remote and depend upon various factors which may or may not come into play.
Unless these were the direct or inevitable consequences or the measures
enacted in the impugned Act, it would not be possible to strike down the
legislation as having that effect and operation. "
44. That the impugned Act was intended to effect circulation and thus directly affect the
freedom of speech is discernible also from the preamble which we may here quote. It
runs thus :
"An Act to provide for the regulation of the prices charged for newspapers in
relation to their pages and of matters connected therewith for the purpose of
preventing unfair competition among newspapers so that newspapers may have
fuller opportunities of freedom of expression. "
45. Its object thus is to regulate something which, as already stated, is directly related
to the circulation of a newspaper. Since circulation of a newspaper is a part of the right
of freedom of speech the Act must be regarded as one directed against the freedom of
speech. It has selected the fact or thing which is an essential and basic attribute of the
conception of the freedom of speech viz., the right to circulate one's views to all whom
one can reach or care to reach for the imposition of a restriction. It seeks to achieve its
object of enabling what are termed the smaller newspapers to secure larger circulation
by provisions which without disguise are aimed at restricting the circulation of what are
termed the larger papers with better financial strength. The impugned law far from
being one, which merely interferes with the right of freedom of speech incidentally,
does so directly though it seeks to achieve the and by purporting to regulate the
business aspect of a newspaper. Such a course is not permissible and the courts must
be ever vigilant in guarding perhaps the most precious of all the freedoms guaranteed
by our Constitution. The reason for this is obvious. The freedom of speech and
expression of opinion is of paramount importance under a democratic Constitution
which envisages changes in the composition of legislatures and governments and must
be preserved. No doubt, the law in question was made upon the recommendation of the
Press Commission but since its object is to affect directly the right of circulation of
newspapers which would necessarily undermine their power to influence public opinion
it cannot but be regarded as a dangerous weapon which is capable of being used
against democracy itself.
46. In these circumstances the Act and the Order cannot be sustained upon the ground
that it merely implements a recommendation of the Press Commission and was thus not
made with an ulterior object. The decision in Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) v. Union of
India MANU/SC/0016/1959 : 1960CriL J671 , upon which reliance was placed by the
respondent in support of the contention that where an enactment is challenged on the
ground of violation of fundamental rights it is legitimate to take into consideration
several factors including the purpose of the legislation, the mischief intended to be
suppressed, the remedy purposed by the legislature and the true reason for that remedy
does not, therefore, arise for consideration. Similarly, since the Act taken in conjunction
with the order made thereunder operates as a restraint on the freedom of speech and
expression of newspapers the mere fact that its object was to suppress unfair practices
by newspapers would not validate them. Carrying on unfair practices may be a matter
for condemnation. But that would be no ground for placing restrictions on the right of
circulation.
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4 7 . It was argued that the object of the Act was to prevent monopolies and that
monopolies are obnoxious. We will assume that monopolies are always against public
interest and deserve to be suppressed. Even so, upon the view we have taken that the
intendment of the Act and the direct and immediate effect of the Act taken along with
the impugned order was to interfere with the freedom of circulation of newspapers the
circumstance that its object was to suppress monopolies and prevent unfair practices is
of no assistance.
48. The legitimacy of the result intended to be achieved does not necessarily imply that
every means to achieve it is permissible; for even if the end is desirable and
permissible, the means employed must not transgress the limits laid down by the
Constitution, if they directly impinge on any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Constitution it is no answer when the constitutionality of the measure is challenged
the apart from the fundamental right infringed the provision is otherwise legal.
49. Finally it was said that one of its objects is to give some kind of protection to small
or newly started newspapers and, therefore, the Act is good. Such an object may be
desirable but for attaining it the State cannot make inroads on the right of other
newspapers which Article 19(1)(a) guarantees to them. There may be other ways of
help in them and it is for the State to search for them but the one they have chosen falls
foul of the Constitution.
50. To repeat, the only restrictions which may be imposed on the rights of an individual
under Article 19(1)(a) are those which clause (2) of Article 19 permits and no other.
51. Coming to Writ Petitions 67 and 68 of 1961, considering that the relief granted by
us in the main petition will redress the grievance of the petitioners in these two
petitions it will be only of academic interest to decide whether they, as readers of
newspapers, can complain of an interference with their right under Article 19(1)(a). We,
therefore, refrain from making any Order on their petitions.
52. Upon the view we take it would follow that section 3(1) of the Act, which is its
pivotal provision, is unconstitutional and, therefore, the Daily newspaper (Price and
Page) Order, 1960 made thereunder is also unconstitutional. If section 3(1) is struck
down as bad, nothing remains in the Act itself.
53. Accordingly we allow this petition with costs. The petitioners in W. Ps. 67 and 68 of
1961 as well as the interveners will bears their respective costs.
54. Petition allowed.
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