_ Middle East Review —

_ Special Studies
‘No. 3, 1983

The Political Geography

of Palestine:
_aHistory and Definition

By Susan Hattis Rolef

Statement of Purpose
THE AMERICAN ACADEMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
consisting of academicians teaching in colleges and universities throughout the United
States, was founded to study the Middle East situation in all its aspects. The purpose
of the Association is to utilize the special skills and talents of the academic commu-
nity to elicit new ideas and approaches for the solution of the Arab-Israel conflict and
to reach a just and lasting peace in the region.
George Cohen Michael Curtis, Chairman
National Director Board of Directors

Middle East Review—Special Studies are designed to provide a venue for longer
research papers, prepared by scholars in the internatianal community, which provide
important insights into the complexities of the Arab-Israel conflict.
Fred M. Gottheil
Special Editor

The opinions expressed in Middle East Review—Special Studies do not necessarily reflect
the opinions of the American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East.

Editorial Board DAVID GUTMANN,

WILLIAM M. BRINNER, Chairman, Northwestern University
University of California, Berkeley JOE HEUMANN,
IRWIN COTLER, McGill University Eastern Illinois University
MICHAEL CURTIS, Rutgers University H. STUART HUGHES, University of
ALAN DOWTY, University of Notre Dame California, San Diego
FRED M. GOTTHEIL, University of THOMAS A. IDINOPULOS,
iinoieibana Miami University, Ohio
BEN HALPERN, Brandeis University SIMON KUZNETS, Harvard University

JOSEPH NEYER, Rutgers University SANFORD LAKOFF, University of

ALLEN POLLACK, Yeshiva University California, San Diego
PHILIP SIEGELMAN, San Francisco DAVID S. LANDES, Harvard University
State University SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET,
STEVEN L. SPIEGEL, Stanford University
University of California, Los Angeles JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD,
MARIE SYRKIN, Brandeis University,
Sinaritis
Columbia University
PAUL SEABURY, University of California,
Berkeley
Editorial Advisory Committee
CHAIM |. WAXMAN, Rutgers University
KENNETH J. ARROW, Stanford University
STANLEY WOLPERT, University of
R. HRAIR DEKMEJIAN, State University of
California, Los Angeles
New York, Binghamton
DANIEL J. ELAZAR, Temple University .
NATHAN GLAZER, Harvard University ANNE SINAI, Editor

American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East

330 Seventh Avenue (Suite 606), New York, N.Y. 10001

© 1983
The Political Geography
of Palestine:
a History and Definition
 About the Author

Susan Hattis Rolef has lectured in

international relations at the Hebrew Univer-
sity of Jerusalem. She is currently engaged in
research at the Leonard Davis Institute of Inter-
national Relations of the Hebrew University.
 The Political Geography of Palestine:
A History and Definition

Contents

AN esUC
iin seit eee eee Tene EY eee mri Oe TS8 elt PAS Me 5

PRONE Ol carers SVM ote sh ees os hae CEN ke ee eee oL

NacCwavang Eoucies: During tie Bitish Mandate: so... co... 2s aes ec erase 10

PPE eric tee eA AICSUNG eyo cctae < cer one tes 4 98 3 uk corWeny kel baie aye18

ine Palestinians and Jordan’ 2s. ie. PS 2. RE eR cr Ny Behagetire hats RS 26

Bee CRON ere heer aah Mutat Tee aire, ad otis pals ag on 32

Appendices

Maps:

Proposal D: Plan for the Partition of the Ottoman Empire............... 35

Proposed Palestine Frontier NOT SPN eeAEE fier Nera te Rens tonce ers 36

The Claims of the Zionist Movement at the

RE Aes OCC CC lo 1 Oe eer ek AMM ho isc ea Buia oeSh ge arte See a7

Peles ticLOl enr ee eee ethers AS SOs CR Rs ea et 38

Palestine tee ae Me ee Se ee SUES Se sw UE Sie aire Se Sg 39

G.M. ELLIOTT LIBRARY

Cincinnati Christian University
We acknowledge with gratitude
the help of
Arlene and Joseph Strelitz.
 Introduction

There are conflicting views about whether the relationship between the West
and East Banks of the Jordan River is a natural one or not, and these derive from
conflicting political objectives. One view seeks to prove that the two banks are
part of a single, inseparable territorial unit. Another seeks to prove that the two
banks are completely separate territorial units. A third view holds that there are
no natural divisions, and that separateness or unity is man-made and always will
be: therefore, for the sake of a permanent peace—which will include security for
Israel and a resolution of all aspects of the Palestinian problem—the territory which
was originally included in the British Mandate and which comprised both West
Palestine and East Palestine (Transjordan) must contain only two states—one Arab
and one Jewish.
The state called Jordan has existed only sinée 1949°>)From 1922 to 1949 the ter-
ritory east of the Jordan River was known a sjordan. Prior to 1918, under
Ottoman rule, this area was part of the Vilayet (province) of Syria, which was made
up of the Strut istic) ofWawra andlMaa Underthe Ottomans, the ter-
ritory west of the Jordan River was divided into the Sanjaks of Acre and Nablus
and, together with the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem, formed part of the Vilayet
of Beirut. Only after World War I, when it was ruled by Britain, the mandatory
power, se The name Palaestina was first used
by the Romans, replacing the na ea after the suppression of the last Jewish
rebellion of 132-135 A.D. |Under Roman-Byzantine rule, the area was divided
into three administrative units: Palaestina Prima, which included Judea, Samaria
and the southern part of the eastern Jordan valley; Palaestina Secunda, embrac-
ing the Valley of Jezreel, central and eastern Galilee, the Golan and the northern
part of the Eastern Jordan Valley; and Palaestina Tertia, which included southern
Transjordan, the Negev, and the Sinai Desert.
Under Arab Muslim rule, this administrative division was basically preserved.
Palaestina Prima became, more or less, Jund Filastin. Palaestina Secunda and
the Western Galilee became Jund Urdun. Jund Filastin existed until the Mongol
invasion, although in the tenth century its territory increased, extending to
Amman in the east and the Gulf of Aqaba in the south. In the course of the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries, the term Filastin went out of use.' The term Palestine,
however, was used in the nineteenth century in Europe in reference to the Holy
Land, and applied to both the West and East Banks of the Jordan River. Thus the
Palestine Exploration Fund was established in 1865 to explore both the East and
6 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
— SPECIAL STUDIES

West Banks, and in the late nineteenth century published its findings in a volume
titled Western Palestine and Eastern Palestine.
Until 1918, the term Palestinian was not used in reference to any specific popula-
tion. If pad atasr NES esa by placing the
east bank o under a separate administration within the mandate for
Palestine;the-population of Transjordan and the population living west of the Jor-
“dan River (today the State offsraetanid the West Bank) would all Got called
Palestinians. In other words, the term Palestinian as used today(s of 1920 vin-
itis false to claim that the West Bankers and East Bankers have been
te people from time immemorial. If in the nineteenth century any sense of
belonging to some distinct national entity existed among the Arab population of
the west and east banks of the Jordan River, it was that of belonging to Islam,
_or to the population of Greater Synia.
From time to time, there have been periods when both banks of the Jordan River
did in fact form one state, or part of a single administrative entity. For example,
when the twelve tribes of Israel settled in the region, three of them—Menashe,
Gad, and Reuven—settled on the East Bank. The Kingdoms of David (1013-973
B.C.) and Solomon (973-933 B.C.) included not only the west and east banks of
the Jordan River but also large sections of present-day Lebanon and Syria. In 76
B.C. the (Jewish) realm of King Alexander Janneus included wide areas east of
the Jordan River, as did the Roman kingdom of:Herod (37 to 4 B.C.) and, as has
been pointed out, under both the Byzantines and the Arabs (seventh to tenth cen-
turies) administrative areas cut across the Jordan River. Although, under the
Ottoman Empire, the Vilayet of Syria was separated from the Vilayer of Beirut
by the Jordan River, there were periods when this administrative division was not
strictly observed. In the nineteenth century for example, al-Balga, an area on the
east bank, was annexed to the Vilayet of Nablus, which is on the West Bank.”

FOOTNOTES

1. Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929, Tel-Aviv,
Am Oved, second edition, 1976, (Hebrew), p. 4.
2. P.J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan, Frank Cass, 1967, London, p. 35.
 CHAPTER I

The Concept of Greater Syria

During the nineteenth century, various European powers laid claim to interests
in the Holy Land which were of a political and diplomatic nature. However, the
name Palestine was rarely, if ever, used in this context. On the other hand, the
term Syria was frequently used, and until World War I was usually taken to
include Palestine.'
The name Syria is Hellenistic in origin and was used by the Arab Muslim con-
querors of the Middle East only briefly, in the early seventh century. The name
Balad el-Sham or Dar el-Sham was subsequently used by the Caliphs of the House
of Umayya (661-750 A.D.) for the territorial unit which covered the area from
the Taurus Mountains (in modern-day North Syria) in the north to Hedjaz (now
part of Saudi Arabia), the Gulf of Aqaba and the Sinai Peninsula in the south,
and the land of the Euphrates and the Tigris (roughly modern-day Iraq) in the east
and the land to the Mediterranean (modern-day Syria) in the west.JThe administrative
unit of Bilad el-Sham, whose capital was Damascus, was maintained by the
Abbasid Caliphs (750-1258) and reunited by the Mamluks (1258-1517) into a larger
administrative unit made up of various subdistricts.’
In the Acte Separee of the London Convention of 1840, at least part of Palestine
was included in what was known as Southern Syria.’ Again, in October 1914,
George Leygues (who, in 1920, became Premier of France) stated in a lecture
delivered to the French Geographical Society that
the Mediterranean will not be free for us...unless Syria remains in our
sphere of influence. By Syria must be understood, not a Syria mutilated
and discrowned but Syria in its entirety, that which extends from el
Arish [in the Sinai] to the Taurus.*
In a similar vein, a British Foreign Office handbook, Syria and Palestine,
lished on the eve of World War I, stated
in modern usage the expression ‘Palestine’ has no precise meaning
but is taken as being equivalent to Southern Syria.”
From 1831 to 1840, Syria and Palestine were briefly under the rule of Ibrahim .
Pasha of Egypt. This experience undoubtedly contributed to the development of
the Natural Syria or Greater Syria concept.° From the 1860s, the concept of
Greater Syria (a concept which included both the west and east banks of the Jordan
as its south) began to be aired, especially by Christian intellectuals.’ Khalil el-
Khouri, one of the Christian intellectuals advocating the Greater Syria idea, in 1866
defined the borders of Syria as running ‘‘from the Euphrates in the east to the
8 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
— SPECIAL STUDIES

Mediterranean in the west, and from the Arabian Desert in the south to Anatolia
in the north.’’® During the period October 1918 to July 1920 a group of Arab
nationalists attempted to create the core of a Greater Syrian State by crowning Feisal,
third son of the Hashemite Sherif Hussein Emir of Mecca and a leader of the British-
sponsored Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire, King of Syria on March 8,
1920. (It is interesting to note here that many of the leaders of the nascent Arab
nationalist movement in western Palestine in the early 1920s also favored the Greater
Syria idea.”) Britain was inclined to agree to the creation of such a State which
would include Transjordan, though not West Palestine (in the area promised by
the Balfour Declaration as a Jewish National Home). However, the French, who
controlled the area of Syria, opposed the idea and ousted Feisal, whom they found
troublesome, in July 1920. France received the mandate over this area from the
League of Nations in July 1922.
Nevertheless, the concept of Greater Syria did not die. Thus, a Constitutional
Assembly established in Mandatory Syria in 1928 declared that the Syrian territories
detached from the former Ottoman Empire were ‘‘an indivisible political unit.’’!®
Various Arab leaders as well as Syrian political parties throughout the 1930s and
1940s advocated pan-Arabism and the Greater Syria idea."fin Lebanon in 1934
the Syrian Social Nationalist Party advanced this idea.'* Feisal, crowned King 0
Iraq under British auspices after he was expelled from Syria, and also his son and
grandson, advocated an Iraqi-Syrian union which gradually evolved into a plan
for an Arab Federation embracing Iraq and Greater Syria—the latter to include Syria,
Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine. However, it was the Emir Abdallah of Trans-
jordan (second son of the Sherif of Mecca) who was, throughout his thirty-year
reign, the most persistent advocate of Greater Syria.
Although the idea of Greater Syria almost disappeared after World War II, it
was revived by Syrian President Hafez al-Assad on March 8, 1974. In comment-
ing on a declaration by Israel’s Prime Minister Golda Meir that Israel would never
give up the Golan Heights, he stated,
Palestine is not merely part of the Arab homeland but is the main part
of Southern Syria."
At a solidarity meeting with the Palestinian people in Damascus on May 24,
1978, a close advisor of Assad declared,
the citizen of Syria regards Palestine as southern Syria and the Palestin-
ian citizen regards Syria as northern Palestine...One cannot consent
to continue with the frontiers traced by the Sykes-Picot Agreement.'*
The Political Geography of Palestine

FOOTNOTES

. Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929, second edi-
tion (Hebrew), Am Oved, 1976, Tel Aviv, p. 4.
. P.J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan, Frank Cass, 1967, London, p. 35.
. Yehoshua Porath, op. cit., p. 58.
. Yehoshua Porath, **The Transformation of the Greater Syria Idea,’’ in Eitan Gilboa and Mordechai Naor,
eds., The Arab-Israeli Conflict, (Hebrew), Ministry of Defense Publications, Israel, 1981, p. 126.
. J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Princeton University Press, 1956, pp. 118-119.
. Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration, Vallentine Mitchell, 1961, p. 53.
. Ibid., p. 45.
. Moshe Maoz, *‘Greater Syria: Will and Capability,’’ Cathedra, (Hebrew) April 1978, p. 109.
. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford,
1962, pp. 274-6.
. Moshe Maoz, **Attempts at Creating a Political Community in Modern Syria,’’ Middle East Journal,
Autumn, 1972, p. 391.
. Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929, (Hebrew),
pp. 56-90.
. Itamar Rabinovich, *‘The Greater Syrian Plan and the Palestine Question,’’ (Hebrew), ‘“Historical Roots,
1918-1939,”’ Cathedra, Vol. 7, April 1978, pp. 99-108.
. Ibid., pp. 106-8, and Amnon Cohen, *‘Greater Syria—Gaining Control Over Eretz Israel,’’ (Hebrew),
Cathedra, Vol. 7, April 1978, pp. 113-15.
. L.Z. Yamak, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Cambridge, Mass., 1966. The Sykes-Picot Agree-
ment, which was signed by Britain and France in 1916, divided the Middle East into British and French
spheres of interest. ‘‘Northem Syria”’ was in the French sphere, and *‘Southern Syria’’ (with the excep-
tion of part of western Palestine, which was to have a special international regime in which both Britain
and France were to be involved) was in the British sphere.
ee Daniel Dishon, ‘‘Inter-Arab Relations since the Yom Kippur War,’’ (Hebrew), in Eitan Gilboa and
Mordechai Naor, op. cit., p. 111.
16. Aryeh Y. Yodfat and Yuval Amon-Ohanna, PLO Strategy and Tactics, Croom Helm, London, 1981, p. 38.
10

CHAPTER If

Views and Policies

During the British Mandate
s

At the San Remo Peace Conference of April 1920, Palestine was assigned to
Great Britain as a Mandate under the League of Nations. However, its boundaries
were not delineated. By the time the Mandate was approved (on July 24, 1922),
Britain had decided that Transjordan should have a separate administration—but
the High Commissioner for Palestine was also to be High Commissioner for Trans-
jordan. Article 25 of the Mandate gave legal sanction to this arrangement while
recognizing that Transjordan was still part of Palestine. It read:
In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary
of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled,
with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone
or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may
consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions...'
How did this separation come about? It certainly had little to do with the fact
that the Ottoman administrative divisions had mun across the Jordan River—although,
when General Allenby divided the Occupied Enemy Terntory Administration
(OETA) into three sections—north, south, and east—in October 1918, he kept to
these sivisons_ The Jordan River separated OETA South from OETA East. The
latter was administered from Damascus. Allenby maintained that the division had
been made tg facilitate the creation of a smooth-running administration with minimal
upheaval.*/Allenby might or might not also have had other considerations in mind
when he set up the military administration and, inter alia, kept the east and west
banks of the Jordan River separate. British policy-makers, on the other hand, cer-
tainly did have other considerations which led them to institutionalize this separa-
tion. The first consideration was that all the places holy to Christianity in Palestine
were situated west of the Jordan River. When, in fulfillment of the British under-
taking given by MacMahon to Sherif Hussein of Mecca in correspondence during
1915-16, the idea of establishing an independent Arab state was seriously con-
sidered, it was felt that the Holy Lan ich were not solely sacred to
Islam should be excluded from this Arab state,* The Sykes-Picot Agreement of
1916leftthatpaitofwesreni Palestine which included the places holy to Judaism,
Christianity and Islam outside both the British and the French spheres of exclusive
influence and reserved it for an international regime of some sort.
The Political Geography of Palestine 1]

Britain’s second consideration concerned the aspirations of Zionism. When Lord

Balfour made his well-known declaration concerning a Jewish National Home in
Palestine, the actual boundaries of Palestine were not defined—nor was it made
clear whether or not the whole of Palestine was to form the Jewish National Home.
In later years, Balfour himself stated that certain territories east of the Jordan River
should form part of Palestine.
Those who had to implement this policy, however, soon realized that there was
widespread Arab opposition to the Zionist enterprise and their conclusion (or at
least that of those who regarded Britain’s Zionist policy as ill-considered) was that
it would be wise to limit the territory in which Jewish settlement and development
would be permitted, and thus reduce to a minimum the number of Arabs directly
affected. Since early Zionist endeavors were, with very few exceptions, concen-
trated in Western Palestine* it seemed perfectly reasonable (from a British point
of view) to prohibit Jewish settlement on the East Bank.°
Another consideration was Britain’s wish to avoid a clash between its Hashemite
protégé, the Emir Abdallah, and the French in Syria. Abdallah had based himself
on the East Bank with his followers, a motley force of anti-French Syrian nationalists
and brigands. To prevent Abdallah from attacking Syria, Winston Churchill, then
Colonial Secretary, in 1921 created the Emirate of Transjordan and made him its
ruler.
The arguments in favor of separating Transjordan from West Palestine finally
prevailed, but it would be inaccurate to state that there were no British interests
working against such a separation.
The first Middle East map of World War I vintage, one of the four maps drawn
up by the de-Bunsen Committee in 1915* shows Palestine as a separate political
entity in territory more or less equivalent to that eventually covered by the British
Mandate for Palestine. Palestine, thus drawn, had a common border with
Mesopotamia (now Iraq). Since Britain was granted only two mandates in the Middle
East, one over Palestine and the other over Mesopotamia, the area stretching from
the Jordan River to Mesopotamia had to be included in one of the Mandates in
order to make the territory under British control contiguous. Although it was argued
that ‘‘if we suggest one Palestinian-Mesopotamian frontier, we shall stretch the
meaning of these names beyond reason,’’® this primarily political-strategic con-
sideration was what finally ensured Transjordan’s inclusion within the Mandate
for Palestine.

*The de-Bunsen Committee was appointed as an interdepartmental Committee in April 1915 to formu-
late Britain’s demands in the Middle East after the Allied victory. The Committee published its recom-
mendations on June 30, 1915.
 1 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
— SPECIAL STUDIES

Thus, Transjordan, embracing the territory of present-day BOLE was MPs

Wes ast Palestiné as-a-u ; however, nue serious considera-

Wesan Pest the two should not be the Jordan River but a
line drawn east of the river and west of the Hedjaz railway, which had been con-
structed to convey Muslim pilgrims between Turkey and Mecca. On August 16,
1918, W.G.A. Ormsby Gore,* in a talk given in London to a group of prominent
toy on the future of Palestine, included this narrow strip of the Jordan River
tory within the boundaries of Palestine.’
A t about the same time, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen** drew a similar line,
Meewhich appeared on several official maps. Meinertzhagen described this line as pass-
ing ‘‘some 25-30 kilometers west of the Hedjaz railway and east of the Dead Sea
and thence to a point on the Gulf of Aqaba just east of Aqaba town.’’* Sir Mark
Sykes,*** who was generally considered one of the initiators of the severing of
the East Bank from the West Bank, expressed his willingness to consider the
Meinertzhagen line after visiting the Middle East in November 1918.’ Amold
Toynbee,**** commenting on a communication from Sykes to the Foreign Of-
fice on Palestine’s eastern boundary, argued, in a Minute dated 2 December, that
‘‘the Jordan forms a good natural frontier,’’ but added,
It might be equitable, however, to include in Palestine that part of the
Arabah or Jordan trough—between the lower end of the Sea of Galilee
and the upper end of the Dead Sea—which lies east of the Jordan
Stream. The Arabah is a sub-tropical district at present desolate, but
capable of supporting a large population if irrigated and cultivated
scientifically. The Zionists have as much right to this no-man’s land
as the Arabs, or more.'°
Toynbee demonstrated his limitations as a geographer in this Minute, confusing
the eastern Jordan Valley with the Arava (desert) which lies south of the Dead
Sea, but there is no doubt that he was referring to the eastern Jordan Valley.
One of the maps brought by the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference
in May 1919 (but not officially presented) showed a line running slightly further
west of the Meinertzhagen line but east of the Jordan River.'' Lord Balfour
himself wrote, ina memorandum dated 11 August 1919, that Palestine’s economy
should be bolstered so as to facilitate absorption of mass Jewish immigration, and
that for this reason
Palestine should extend into the lands lying east of the Jordan. It should

*A Conservative M.P. who, in 1922, became Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies.

**Chief Political Officer in Palestine and Syria at the time.

***Advisor to the Foreign Office on Middle Eastern Policy during World War I.
“The world-renowned historian who was the Director of Studies at Chatham House (The Royal
Institute of International Affairs), 1925 to 1955, and highly influential in shaping British foreign policy
on Palestine.
The Political Geography of Palestine 13

not, however, be allowed to include the Hedjaz railway, which is too

distinctly bound up with exclusively Arab interests."
On September 29, 1920 Balfour repeated this argument to Lord Harding:*
The question offrontiers is really vital, because it affects the economic
possibilities of developing Palestine, and on these economic possibilities
depends the success or failure of Zionism."
The economic argument was repeated again and again. Thus, in a Minute dated
15 August 1920, H.W. Young** argued
The Meinertzhagen line... has not been finally accepted by anyone, least
of all the French, but it represents fairly accurately the minimum
extension east of the Jordan which will eventually be necessary for the
prosperity of Palestine..."
The Zionists were less modest in their demands. A map drawn up by Samuel
Tolkowsky, who was involved in the political work of the Zionist Organization
during the War and in the period leading up to the Paris Peace Conference, shows
the desired eastern boundary of Palestine as lying well to the east of the Hedjaz
railway.’ A memorandum submitted by the Zionist Executive to the Peace Con-
ference proposed that the eastern boundary of Palestine should run ‘‘close to and
west of the Hedjaz railway.’’ (Previous Zionist proposals had been rejected by
Britain, while this one was unofficially approved by British leaders for presenta-
tion to the Conference.)'® In a later version of the memorandum, ‘‘close to and
west of the Hedjaz railway’’ was replaced by the phrase, ‘“‘close to the desert.’”"”
The Meinertzhagen line was the closest Britain ever got to the eastern boundaries~
claimed by the Zionists at this time, and Sir Herbert Samuel, the first British High
Commissioner in Palestine (appointed in 1920), was an ardent and vocal supporter
of the Meinertzhagen line.
Samuel was appointed High Commissioner one month before the French ousted
Feisal from Damascus, and now the problem of what to do about Transjordan (which
many British policy makers had felt, until July 1920, should form part of a Syrian
Arab state) became a pressing one. Samuel pressed for British occupation of Trans- |
jordan to prevent the French from occupying it and to avoid anarchy if neither
European power occupied it. He also argued that the Jordan River should not con-
stitute the eastern border of Palestine since he felt it was ‘‘a bad frontier strategically,
economically and politically.’’ Although the territory should constitute part of
Palestine, Samuel argued, the part lying east of the Jordan River but west of the
Hedjaz railway should be governed ‘‘through tribal organization, supervised by
two British District Governors,’’'* while the Hedjaz railway and the areas lying
east of it should be placed under the control of Sherif Hussein of Mecca, who
declared himself king of the Hedjaz.

*Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 1916-20.

**Foreign Office representative in the Middle East at the time.
 14 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
— SPECIAL STUDIES

The Foreign Office objected to sending British troops into Transjordan, since
the French had given assurances that they had no intention of occupying Trans-
jordan, and the expense of sending a garrison into the area was considered too
great. The Foreign Office also objected to the immediate inclusion of Transjordan
into the Palestine administration, even with the special provisions suggested by
Samuel. In a cable sent to Samuel on 11 August 1920, the position of the Foreign
Office was put in the following words:
We fear that the immediate inclusion under the Palestine administra’
tion as such of Transjordania, even within the Meinertzhagen line, might
give a handle to nationalist agitators and result in a change of senti-
ment on the part of those who now express a wish for our advice and
assistance...The first step should be to send a few suitable political
officers... The duties of these officers should be confined to encourage
local self-government and to giving such advice as is asked for by the
people. They should...lose no opportunity of encouraging trade with
Palestine and of emphasizing the fact that Palestine is the natural outlet
for Transjordania. The inclusion of Transjordanian districts in the
administration of Palestine will be more easily affected when the peo-
ple have had a better opportunity of expressing a definite and final desire
to accept not only the advantages but also the obligation of British
rule.'” :
In other words, it was decided to establish a separate administration on the East
Bank, yet to leave open its possible union with the West Bank at a later date.
When Abdallah entered Transjordan at the beginning of 1921, ostensibly enroute
to Syria to seize the throne, this interfered with the plan Britain had for Trans-
jordan. Abdallah rapidly established his authority and, at the Cairo Conference
of March ee ee to be aided by a British
Resident in Amman and subject to the authority of the High Commissioner in
eet
—— Jerusalem>Economically, Transjordan was closely tied to Palestine and was allot-
ted a certain portion of the income from customs duties levied in Palestine’s ports.
The administrative separation of Transjordan from West Palestine was effected
in March 1921. Despite this fact, Winston Churchill, who was Colonial Secretary
at the time, emphasized, during a discussion held in Jerusalem during that month,
that Transjordan must remain attached” to Palestine “séoeraphically and
economically.”” Between 1922 and 1927 the precise boundaries were fixed be-
tween Palestine and Transjordan and the Hedjaz.”'

This first partition of Palestine was not, however, considered by any of the
parties involved to be final and irreversible. The Zionists, who had rather reluc-
tantly accepted the 1921 partition, reawoke to the settlement opportunities offered
by the sparsely populated, under-developed and under-utilized expanses of Trans-
jordan after the 1930 Hope-Simpson Report’s pessimistic estimation conceming
The Political Geography of Palestine < 15

the amount of land still available for Jewish settlement west of the Jordan River.
It was, however, the Emir Abdallah who became the main spokesman for reuniting 4 _”
Transjordan and Palestine. He saw himself as ruler of the union, which he viewed M4;
as the core of a future Greater Syria.
One of the solutions to resolve the Arab-Jewish conflict proposed in Britain at
various times during the Mandate period was to abandon the concept of the Jor-
dan River as a permanent border between Palestine and Transjordan. Another sug-
gestion included both territories within a broader federation or confederation. Sir
Herbert Samuel, both while he was High Commissioner (1920-1925) and throughout
the 1930s and 1940s, was a proponent of the latter idea. He was convinced that
the solution to the Palestine problem lay in pan-Arabism,” that in a broad,
predominantly Arab confederation, under an Arab monarch, the Arabs would lose
their fear of possible Jewish domination, while Jews and Arabs would cooperate
‘“‘as they did in the great days of Arab civilization, when Jewish statesmen,
philosophers and scientists helped the Arabs to keep alight the torch of
knowledge.’’”’ For twenty-eight years Samuel advocated this idea but found little
support for it.
In 1935, Archer Cust, who was, at the time, Assistant District Commissioner
in Nazareth, sent the Colonial Office a memorandum which proposed the cantoniza-
tion of Palestine and “‘the abolition of the unnatural and unnecessary Jordan fron-
tiers, and the linking up of the Arab areas of the west side of the river with the
Arab state that now comprises the eastern segment of the Mandate territory...’’”
Though Cust’s cantonization proposal was not adopted, Sir Cosmo Parkinson
(Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office) commented that “‘these can-
tonization proposals may ultimately—form a basis of a solution of our

The Peel Commission Report of 1937 offefed another solution. This suggested
repaititioni origi e Mandate for Palestine into a Jewish State
and an Arab State, with the border between them to be west of the Jordan River.
Accordingly, (y )
6. Treaties of Alliance should be negotiated by the Mandatory with the i
¢ Government of Trans-Jordan and representatives of the Arabs of on
Palestine on the one hand and with the Zionist Organization on the f
other. These Treaties would declare that, within as short a period as ( ‘
may be convenient, two sovereign, independent States would be
established—the one an Arab State, consisting of Transjordan united Prati
with that part of Palestine which lies to the east and south of a fron-
tier such as we suggest in Section 3 below, the other a Jewish State ‘ My pa
consisting of that part of Palestine which lies to the north and west J
of that frontier.”°
In 1944, Lord Moyne, Minister Resident in the Middle East, drew up a new
partition plan for Palestine at Churchill’s request and after extensive consultations.
The gist of the plan, presented in April 1944, was that the solution of the Palestine
problem should be implemented in two stages. In the first stage, Transjordan should

G.M. ELLIOTT LIBRARY

Cincinnati Christian University
 16 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
— SPECIAL STUDIES

‘‘expand’’ westwards, across the Jordan River to the mountains of Judea and
Samaria; the Arab part of the Galilee should be annexed to Syria and the Jews
should be allowed to realize their sovereignty in the areas in which they were settled.
In the second stage, Greater Syria, comprising Syria, Transjordan and Palestine,
should be created.*”? Churchill himself is reported to have commented on this
plan: ‘‘I once partitioned Palestine—I shall reunite and then repartition it.”’* This
plan was abandoned after the assassination of Lord Moyne in November 1944 by
the Lehi (Stern Gang) Palestinian Jewish underground organization.

However, a new idea involving the abolition of the border along the Jordan River
was raised in the Foreign Office toward the end of 1945. This time it was sug-
gested that Palestine and Transjordan be united in a federal union under an Arab
monarch. On 7 November 1945, at a joint meeting of Foreign Office and
Colonial Office officials chaired by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, the idea was
discussed but rejected because, it was argued, neither the other Arab states nor
the Zionists were likely to accept the extension of Emir Abdallah’s rule to include
Palestine. According to the Minutes of this meeting, Bevin was not so easily con-
vinced to give up the idea of uniting the two territories:
The Secretary of State concluded that the monarchical solution was
ruled out, but still felt that a union of the two together would form a
good training ground for British forces, a view with which Lord Gort
The High Commissioner of Palestine at the time agreed... (The Secretary
of State) would regret the final rejection of the plan for a federal union
of Palestine and Transjordan.”
It has been suggested that Bevin believed that this plan would appeal to the
Americans,” but despite his insistence the idea was finally rejected by the British
Cabinet.

FOOTNOTES

. Walter Laqueur, ed. The Israel-Arab Reader, Bantam Books, 1969. p. 41.
. Avraham P. Alsberg, *‘Delimitation of the Eastern Border of Palestine,’* Zionism, April 1981, p. 87.
. The MacMahon-Hussein correspondence itself was not absolutely clear on this point and refers to ‘‘por-
Wn

tions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo’’ which should
be excluded from the Arab state. For an excellent analysis of the correspondence, see Elie Kedourie,
~~ In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
4. For a map of Jewish settlements east of the Jordan River, see Yitzhak Gil-Har ‘‘The Separation of Trans-
Jordan from Palestine’’ in The Jerusalem Cathedra (English), 1981, p. 305.
5. See, for example, a paper submitted by Toynbee to the (British) Political Intelligence Department on
October 28, 1918, PRO FO 371/4368, quoted in Gil-Har op. cit. p. 290.
6. Minute by H.W. Young dated August 9, 1920, PRO FO 371/5121 E9599.
The Political Geography of Palestine 17

. Samuel Tolkowsky, Zionist Political Diary, London, 1915-16, Jerusalem, The Zionist Library, 1981,
p. 370.
. Richard Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, Grosset Press, London, 1959, p. 62.
. Communication from Sykes to Ormsby Gore, 18.11.18 PROF FO 371/3398/190447.
. Ibid.
RO FO 608/98/8858
. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, first series 4:347, quoted in Alsberg op. cit. p. 88.
. Max Egremont, Balfour, Collins, London, 1980, p. 313.
. PRO FO 371/5121/E9599.
. Samuel Tolkowsky, op. cit., p. 250 and p. 406.
. Herbert Samuel papers, ISA 100/5.
- Quoted in Alsberg, op. cit. p. 88.
. Cable sent by Samuel to the Foreign Office dated 7.8.20, PRO FO371/5121/E9542.
. PRO FO 371/5121/E9524,
. PRO FO 371/6343 quoted in Gil-Har. op. cit., p. 303.
. Alsberg, op. cit. pp. 94-6; Gideon Biger, ‘The Fixing of the Eastern Border of Mandatory Palestine,”’
(Hebrew) Cathedra, July 1981, pp. 203-6.
. See Elie Kedourie, *‘Samuel and the Government of Palestine,’’ in The Chatham House Versions and
Other Middle Eastern Studies, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1970, pp. 52-81.
. House of Lords Debates, Vol. 106, 20.7.37, Col. 642.
. PRO CO/733/283/75288
. PRO CO/733/302/75288
. Palestine Royal Commission Report, London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1937, Cmd 5479, p. 381.
. Shmuel Dothan, The Struggle for Eretz Israel, Tel Aviv, The Ministry of Defense Publishing House,
1981, p. 254 (Hebrew).
. The Zionist Archives, $25/206.
. PRO FO 371/45379/E6955
. Shmuel Dothan, op. cit., p. 298.
 CHAPTER Ii

The Hashemites and Palestine

The most persistent advocate of the idea of reuniting Palestine was the Emir
Abdallah, who dreamed of ruling over such a union. During conversations with
‘ Churchill in Jerusalem in March 1921, Abdallah, on at least three occasions, had
> raised the issue of making what had become Palestine and Transjordan a single
administrative unit under his own rule.' Abdallah was serious enough about his
plan to have tried to reach an agreement, toward the end of 1922, with Chaim
Weizmann, whereby the Zionists would support his appointment as Emir over all
of Palestine in return for his acquiescence to the Zionist endeavor.’ Britain,
__howé€ver, was unwilling to give its blessing to such an agreement.”
In January 1923, and again in January 1934,* rumours about talks between
Abdallah and the Colonial Office, although rife, were apparently without founda-
tion. However, when some unrest was felt within the Arab community in Palestine
in 1934 as Jewish immigration reached unprecendented peaks. *‘Abdullah laid claims
first to the religious and then to the political leadership of the Arabs in
Palestine.’”
=— Although Abdallah had not given up his ambition to expand his rule across the
Jordan River, political developments within Transjordan pointed toward the develop-
ment of a separate Transjordanian national identity. This was encouraged by the
promulgation of an Organic Law in 1928 and the creation of a Legislative Council—
limited though its powers may have been.°
The Peel Commission’s proposal to create an Arab state consisting of Trans-
jordan and part of West Palestine for a brief time gave Abdallah some hope of
gaining control over at least part of the West Bank,’ but the plan was vehemently
opposed by the Arab Higher Committee in Palestine and by the rulers of the other
Arab states, who were suspicious of Abdallah’s ambitions. When the Woodhead
Commission of 1938 began its investigations concerning the details of the parti-
tion plan for Palestine (which was ultimately rejected), Abdallah sent the Com-
mission a detailed plan of his own, which called for the establishment of a single
Transjordanian-Palestinian state under an Arab monarch, and in which the Jews
would enjoy full autonomy in certain regions.’ The Woodhead Commission
replied that such a plan was outside its frame of reference, which covered western
Palestine only, and the Palestine press attacked the plan vehemently.’
During the course of the Second World War, with his eyes set on the possible
shape of a postwar peace settlement, Abdallah reverted to the Greater Syria idea.'°
And Abdallah was not the only Arab leader to advocate Fertile Crescent unity.
Nuri-es-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq, was another advocate though, naturally, he
The Political Geography of Palestine 19

envisioned Iraq, not Jordan, as the rule of the new entity. Although Britain encour-
aged Arab unity after the war and in 1945 was instrumental in establishing the
Arab League, neither the Iraqi nor the Jordanian plan was taken too seriously, and
Abdallah was apparently informed by Britain, at the beginning of 1946, that his
Greater Syria plan had been rejected.'' Abdallah did not abandon his dream,
however, and at the beginning of 1947 appeared to have begun concentrating on
the possibility of annexing those parts of Palestine which in a U.N. partition of
the country might be allotted to the Arabs.’” One of the arguments in favor of
such an arrangement put forward by Abdallah and his entourage in private was
that unless Arab Palestine were united with Transjordan, an additional Arab state—
hostilé to the Jews, to the British and to himself—would be established in the Middle
East.;On 1 October 1947, Abdallah is reported to have stated to a close friend
who was a Palestinian Arab:
The Mufti* and Kuwatly** want to set up an independent Arab state =
in Palestine with the Mufti at its head. If that were to happen I would
be encircled on almost all sides by enemies. This compels me to take
measures to anticipate their plans. My forces will therefore occupy every
place evacuated by the British."”
Abdallah’s moves were dictated by dreams of a Greater Syria and by self-
interest rather than by any deep concern for the fate of the Palestinians themselves
(for whom he apparently had little respect).'* Nevertheless, for practical purposes,
Abdallah was in close contact with various Arab nationalist circles in Palestine
and is known to have given financial and other support to several groups.’” All
these activities were meant to prepare the ground for the possible annexation of
part of western Palestine. In fact, Abdallah had some genuine support in the West
Bank—especially firNablus andinHebron, where the mayor, Sheik Muhammed
his Staunch supporters.'° Once the United
eneral Assembly had approved the Partition Plan (on 29 November 1947),
Abdallah began planning his occupation of the areas designated for the Arab state.
There is a good deal of evidence to the effect that Britain not only knew of Ab-
dallah’s plans and approved of them, but that the British actually encouraged him
to occupy some territories which the Partition Plan proposed to hand over to the
Jewish state, but in which Britain had a special interest--such as the city of |,
Haifa."”
In public statements during this period, Abdallah argued that Transjordan needed
the Mediterranean ports of (West) Palestine and that Transjordan would be unable ic
to survive without Palestine. Abdallah was even quoted as saying that Transjordan
and Palestine were really a single state. Thus, at a meeting with King Farouk of (iP
Egypt on 12 April 1948, Abdallah is reported to have said, (4
Palestine and Transjordan are one, for Palestine is the coastline and ys
Transjordan the hinterland of the same country." t/)

*Hajj Amin al-Hussein, British-appointed Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, a swom enemy of Abdallah and a
vehement opponent of the Zionist enterprise.
**Shukri al-Kuwatly, then President of Syria.
20 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
— SPECIAL STUDIES

On 24 April 1948, the Transjordan parliament resolved to send the Arab Legion
into Palestine as soon as Britain evacuated the area. However, even before the
British evacuation in May 1948, the Legion, led by its British commander, Glubb
Pasha*, was stationed in various locations on the West Bank. Although Abdallah
spoke,-atthis time, of the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination,”
his army was actually encouraging the Palestinian Arab population in those areas
under its control to support him and not the Arab Higher Committee** and the
exiled Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin el-Husseini. After 15 May 1948, most of
the territories allotted to the Arabs by the United Nations Partition Plan, with the
exception of the Galilee and Gaza, were held either by the Arab Legion or the
Iraqi army. An administration under Transjordanian auspices was established in
all the areas in which the Arab Legion was in control, ‘and one of the tasks of the
Transjordanian forces was to prevent the Arab Higher Committee from establishing
its own administration\ At least until the Arab Legion was forced out of the Arab-
populated towns ofLydda andRamleh (nowinIsrael) bytheHaganah in the Arab-
Israeli War of 1948/9, Abdallah presented himself, and was apparently viewed
cana aac paiiacrasre ee aes ade But
even after the abandonment of the two Arab towns in the center of West Palestine,
the Arab Legion was, in fact, the only effective force to which the Palestinian Arab
masses could turn for protection.
On 4 July 1948, during the course of the first ceasefire in the 1948/49 Arab-
Israeli war, United Nations mediator Count Folke Bernadotte published several
proposals, the first article of which laid down that
Palestine, as defined by the 1922 Mandate for Palestine, including
Transjordan, should constitute a union made up of two sections: one
Jewish and one Arab with the boundaries between the two to be deter-
mined by the two sides.°°
Officially the Government of Transjordan rejected the notion that Transjordan
had been part of Palestine since it gained independence in 1946. Unofficially,
however, there is evidence that Abdallah was pleased with Bernadotte’s proposals.
In September 1948, a new Arab Higher Committee (appointed by the Arab League
in 1946) announced the establishment of an ‘‘all Palestinian Government’’ with
its seat in Gaza. This ‘‘Government’’ declared its sovereignty over the whole of
Palestine within the boundaries existing on the date when the British Mandate came
to an end. This ‘“‘Government’’ also had no forces or clear authority, and was re-
jected out of hand by Abdallah, who would not let it exert any authority within
the “‘security areas of the Transjordanian Government.’’*' It was also rejected
at the meeting of the First Palestinian Congress in Amman on 1 October 1948,

*Lieutenant General John Bagot Glubb served as commanding officer of the Arab Legion from 1938
until his dismissal by King Hussein in 1956.
*¥Formed i 1936s this Commitice was composed of leaders of rival political factions under the leader-
ship of Hajj Amin al-Husseini. The Committee directed the Arab riots and strikes in Palestine of that
year and was active until disbanded by the government in 1937.
The Political Geography of Palestine
2|

where it was declared to be premature, and where it was resolved that an Arab
government in Palestine should be set up only after the country’s liberation, and
should be elected by the people. There followed a ‘‘spontaneous”’ flow to Am-
man of delegations from most of the towns and villages under the occupation of
the Arab Legion. These delegations called upon Abdallah to solve the problem
of Palestine ‘‘as he saw fit.’’*’ In November 1948, Abdallah visited Jerusalem,
and in the course of his visit,was crowned King of Jerus:
of Jerusalem. Radio Ramallah, which was controlled by Transjordan, made a special
“eff ortthe impression that there was a spontaneous popular movement
to Convey
in western Palestine to recognize Abdallah as King. A second Palestinian Con-
gress met in Jericho in December 1948, and although not all its participants were
willing to give Abdallah carte blanche with regard to western Palestine, the Con-
gress called for ‘‘the union of Palestine with Transjordan as an opening and first
step toward the...Arab Union, "and recognized His Majesty King Abdallah as
King over all of Palestine.*’ Abdallah had hoped for stronger resolutions, and
such resolutions were, in fact, published in the name of the Congress, although
the Congress itself never approved them. On the basis of the new resolutions, Ab-
dallah annexed the West Bank in April of 1950.
Although neither the two Palestinian congresses nor Abdallah’s moves can be
regarded as truly ‘‘democratic,’’ or expressing the true will of anyone (except Ab-
dallah), there is no denying that Abdallah controlled the West Bank, and that there
was no other effective force among the Palestinian Arabs at the time. These were
the only facts on the terrain, and *‘Central Palestine,’’ as the West Bank was oc-
casionally referred to, rapidly merged with the East Bank.™*

Part of Abdallah’s effort to integrate the Palestinians into Jordan was concen-
trated on erasing the sense of a separate Palestinian identity”—an effort continued
by his grandson, King Hussein of Jordan. One of the steps taken to implement
this policy was the Nationality Law of February 1954, which offered Jordanian
citizenship to
any Arab person born in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or in the
occupied part of Palestine and emigrated from the country or left—
including the children of this emigrant wherever they were born—who
would submit a written application and renounce their former
nationality. ”°
Palestinian Arabs were rapidly integrated into the country’s political and economic
life, and even into the Arab Legion. Thus, of twenty Jordanian prime ministers
who have served since 1950, ten have been of Palestinian origin, and as of February
9, 1982 four members of the Jordanian government, including Prime Minister Mud-
dar Badran, are sons of West Palestinian families, and four were born west of the
Jordan River, including one born in Safad, Israel. A high percentage of Palesti-
nian Arabs also serve in the Jordanian Senate, the National Advisory Council, and
the diplomatic service. In addition to these efforts to eliminate the idea of a separate
DD MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
— SPECIAL STUDIES

Palestinian identity, there has been great sensitivity concerning any movement for
separatism.”” Yet, ‘‘despite the Government’s attempts to integrate the refugees,
there was a degree of antagonism (by the Transjordanians) which did not permit
a smooth process of political and social absorption.’’* Furthermore, neither Ab-
dallah (who was assassinated by a Palestinian Arab in Jerusalem in July 1951)
nor Hussein could ever be completely free of fears that the Palestinians might seek
to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy, or to ‘Palestinize’ Jordan rather than be
‘Jordanized’ themselves. King Hussein has followed in the footsteps of his grand-
father, for whom he had a profound admiration,” expressing the view that the
Jordanians and the Palestinians are one people and that the East and West Banks
of the Jordan River are part of one land. Many of his statements of this nature
have been recorded. :
On 15 March 1972, the King presented a plan for “‘A United Arab Kingdom’’
in which he declared, inter alia:
The primary fact the unity of the two banks represented day after day
has been that the people in both banks are one and not two peoples.
This fact was manifested for the first time in the reunion of the sons
of the East Bank with their emigrant brothers, the sons of the Palestine
areas occupied in 1948. It was manifested when the former shared with
the latter food and shelter and the sweetness and bitterness of life. This
fact became more salient and took deeper roots with every step the state
took. The unity of blood and destiny reached its greatest significance
in 1967 when the sons of the two banks stood together on the West
Bank as they have been doing for 20 years and jointly sacrificed their
blood on its pure soil. But the struggle was too great for them and
its conditions and complexities were too much for their valour. The
catastrophe occurred and what happened did happen...*°
The plan proposed that,
1) The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will become a united Arab
Kingdom and will bear this name;
2) The United Arab Kingdom will consist of two regions:
(a) the Palestine region which will consist of the West Bank and any
other Palestinian territories which are liberated and whose inhabitants
desire to join it;
(b) the Jordan region which will consist of the East Bank.*'
It concludes,
This Arab country belongs to all, Jordanians and Palestinians alike.”
On numerous occasions, in speeches, in interviews with the Arab and foreign
press, and in addresses to his people over the radio and on television, following
the 1972 proposal, Hussein expressed himself in favor of a united Kingdom em-
bracing the East and West Banks of the Jordan River and proclaimed the unity
of the Jordanian and Palestinian people.
The PLO has been rather ambivalent on the issue of the indivisibility of the two
banks and the two peoples, but it has clearly been unwilling to let the King speak
The Political Geography of Palestine 23

in din winning recggnition as th

sole representative and spokesman of the Palestinian Arab peop
has tried to fight this trend. After the Algiers Arab Summit of 26-28 November
1973, at which the PLO was recognized in a secret resolution as sole represen-
tative of the Palestinian people, and the Arab states undertook to struggle for the
“restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people in a manner decided
by the Palestine Liberation Organization’’ (a resolution about which the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan expressed reservations) *’ Hussein, stated in an interview to
Le Monde:
Why should the body of the Arab nation be cut up into small states,
lacking any economic base, in a manner which causes great sorrow,
while this nation is looking forward to full unity?...How can the two
banks be separated from each other? **
However, the Rabat Summit of October 1974 resolved that ‘‘any Palestinian ter-
ritory liberated through struggle in any form shall revert to its legitimate Palesti-
nian ownership under the leadership of the PLO.’’*
Hussein had to change his position. The Summit barred him from having any
say on the future of the West Bank andalsoprevented aJordanian-Istag disensage
ment agreement along the lines of those signed by Egypt and Syria with Israel
in that year. The Jordanian-Israeli agreement was based on the Jericho Plan, which
would have given back to Hussein a ‘‘slice’’ of the West Bank in return fora “‘slice”’
of peace.”
Nevertheless, Hussein continued to express his deep-seated belief on the issue,
although now there was a chord of resignation and disillusionment in his statements.
Thus, in bestowing his credentials on Zeid al-Rifai as prime minister on 23
November 1974, he declared:
If the political unity of the two banks is influenced by the development
of events, the unity of blood and fate between the two peoples is the
solid eternal truth.

y Hussein has spoken again and again of the Jordanians and Palestinians as a single\
family, and of the possibility, and even inevitability, of a federation or confedera-
tion of the two banks. By August 1980 he had reinterpreted the Rabat resolution
to mean that ‘‘Jordan has an obligation to regain the Jordanian territory which is
occupied today, for the Palestinians.’’”’
And in an interview in Al-Ahram (Cairo) on May 6, 1982, he declared:
We and the Palestinians have been a single people in the past and the
present... If the Arab land were to be returned, we would say that it
should be handed over to international supervision with the goal of
granting the Palestinian people the right to determine its own future.
This future may be realized in a declaration of a federation (union)
between the West Bank and Jordan on the basis of Jordanian and
Palestinian choice.
 24 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
— SPECIAL STUDIES

A recent study by Aaron Klieman reached the following conclusion:

Those pledged to reinstitute Jordan’s control over the West Bank still
represent the most influential group in Amman. Their ranks include
the King himself, and their perspectives of necessity and advantage.
For them the almost mythical belief in the integral unity of the two banks
also becomes an economic and political imperative. They are among
the most bitter opponents of Palestinian self-determination, viewing
with trepidation the creation of a third state and convinced that sooner
rather than later such a West Bank state would endanger Jordan’s
security.”
This study acknowledges that there is in the royal court a second school of thought,
of those who are considered ‘‘minimalists,’’ who ate supported by Crown Prince
Hassan, the King’s brother. Klieman writes,
The argument of the minimalists stresses that the West Bank can only
be a liability for Jordan. In the first case it is probably irretrievable
and, ifpossessed, ungovernable... At present, however, the dominant
Jordanian position still inclines towards the maximalists, although not
__ without serious reservations.
—_——-
The desires, plans, activities and declarations of the Hashemite monarchs can-
not, of course, be taken to express the wishes of the inhabitants of the East Bank
or the citizens of Jordan. However, since the Kingdom of Jordan is not a democratic
state, and since no public opinion polls are held on such sensitive issues, we do
not know how the general public feels about the essence of Jordanian-Palestinian
relations. We do know, however, that the two populations have not been com-
pletely integrated and that mutual suspicions exist. (Mutual suspicions also exist
between the Palestinian Arabs living in Israel and those living on the West Bank.
These suspicions do not, however, exclude their being part of one people.) We
do not know how much intermarriage there is between Jordanians of East Bank
origin and Jordanians of the West Bank (taking this latter term in the broadest
sense—meaning the whole of western Palestine). We do know that Palestinian Arabs
of West Bank origin form well over 50 percent of the population of the East Bank.
We also know that between 1948 and 1967 approximately 400,000 Palestinians
migrated from the West Bank to the East Bank and settled there.”

FOOTNOTES

. PRO FO 371/6343 quoted in Joseph Nevo, Abdullah and the Arabs ofPalestine, Tel Aviv, Shiloah In-
stitute, 1975, p. 12 (Hebrew).
. Yehoshua Porath, op. cit., p. 207.
. Moshe Medzini, Ten Years of Palestinian Diplomacy, Tel Aviv, 1928, p. 234 (Hebrew).
. Joseph Nevo, op. cit., pp. 13-15.
. A. Huder Hasan Abidi, Jordan—A Political Study 1948-57, London, Asia Publishing House, 1965, p.
nAfbwWhP

20, based on a letter from Abdallah to High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope, dated 25.7.34.
lon. P.J. Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 48.
The Political Geography of Palestine aS

. PRO FO 371/21885/E3866.
. Joseph Nevo, op. cit., p. 17.
. Majid Khaddar, **The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity. A Study in Inter-Arab Relations,’’ in R.N.
Frye, ed. The Near East and the Great Powers, Harvard University Press. 1951, p. 141.
. Jon Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars, London, Secker & Warburg, 1950, p. 81.
. Joseph Nevo, op. cit., pp. 38 and 40.
. Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill, London, Secker and Warburg, 1960, p. 59.
. Joseph Nevo, op. cit., p. 51.
. Ibid., p. 48.
ibid sap. 1
. Ibid., pp. 62-64.
. Jon and David Kimche, op. cit., p. 108. There are many other sources for similar statements. See Joseph
Nevo op. cit., p. 81, f.n.24.
. Joseph Nevo, op. cit., p. 71.
. Count Folke Bemadotte, 7o Jerusalem, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1951, p. 129.
. Joseph Nevo, op. cit., p. 100.
. Ibid., p. 110.
. Joseph Nevo, op. cit., p. 114.
. See P.J. Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 51.
. Avi Plascov, The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan 1948-57, London, Frank Case, 1981, p. 29.
. lbid., p. 47.
. Eliezer Been, **Separatist Trends,”’ in The Palestinians under Jordanian Rule, Jerusalem, The Magnes
Press, 1978, pp. 28-51 (Hebrew).
. Avi Plascov, op. cit., p. 35.
. King Hussein of Jordan, Uneasy Lies the Head, London, Heinemann, 1962.
. Aryeh Y. Yodfat and Yuval Amon-Ohana, op. cit., p. 159.
bid ops 162.
. Ibid., p. 163.
. lbid., p. 166.
. Le Monde, 10.12. 1973.
. Aryeh Y. Yodfat and Yuval Amon-Ohanna, op. cit., p. 180.
. Unpublished manuscript by the late Yigal Allon (Foreign Minister of Israel, 1974-77), dictated to one
of the authors in 1980.
. Der Spiegel, 31.8.1980.
. Aaron S. Klieman, /srael, Jordan, Palestine: the Search for a Durable Peace, Beverly Hills, Sage Publica-
tions, The Washington Papers No. 83, 1981, pp. 15-17.
U.O. Schmelz, Hamizrach Hechadash, Jerusalem, 23, 1973, pp. 29-45 (Hebrew).
 26

CHAPTER IV

The Palestinians and Jordan

The majority of the citizens of Jordan are, thus, Palestinian Arabs. In addition,
most of the Palestinian Arabs (using the broad definition given in the Palestinian
Covenant! can be said to be citizens of Jordan. Thus, Adnan Abu Odeh stated
that ‘
‘ more than half of the Palestinian people, including the inhabitants of
the West Bank, are Jordanian passport holders and as such their legal
status is internationally recognized...”
It is true that people can be citizens of a state and yet see themselves as belong-
ing to another nation. But what happens in a state in which the majority regards
itself as belonging to another nation? The rational conclusion, if democratic prin-
ciples are to prevail, is that either the state ought to be declared a bi-national state
(in which case the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would be a Jordanian-Palestinian
State), or that it would evolve into the state of the majority (in the present case
a Palestinian State with irredentist claims vis-a-vis Israel and territories presently
|administered by Israel in the West Bank and Gaza). However, a more concrete
Tiscion Convers how ie Paes Meee regard their relationship
with the east bank of the Jordan River.
In his extremely well-documented study of the Palestinian Arab national move-
ment during the Mandate,’ Yehoshua Porath points out that from November 1918
when it looked as though an independent Syrian state would come into being, un-
til July 1920, when Feisal was ousted from Damascus by the French, the inclina-
tion of many politically active Palestinian Arabs was to regard Palestine as part
wt of southern Syria, extending to both banks of the Jordan River.* Only after a
My separate administration was set up in Transjordan did an exclusively Palestinian
Arab national movement begin to develop, influenced by the unique circumstances
under which the Palestinian Arabs living west of the Jordan River found
themselves—they were under a British Mandatory Administration committed to
assisiin the development of a Jewish National Home, and in the midst of a grow-
i ing’Jewish population driven by fervent national sentiments.
After Transjordan was finally given a separate administration, at least one at-
tempt was made to associate the inhabitants of the East Bank with the Palestinian
Arab national movement. Thus, the organizers of the Fifth Palestinian Congress
invited extremist circles from Transjordan and the heads of the Transjordan tribes
to participate in the Congress which met in Nablus on 22 August 1922.5 This ef-
fort failed, but the feelings of affinity with Transjordan did not die.
p In the early 1920s the Palestinian Arab nationalists were, in general, favorably
inclined towards the Hashemites. After 1930, the main Arab party in Palestine,
 The Political Geography of Palestine pal

headed by the Husseini family, drew progressively further away from and more
hostile towards Abdallah, while the opposition Nashashibi family drew closer to
him. One of the leading figures in the 1936 disturbances in Palestine was Fawzi
el Kawukji, a Pan-Arab Syrian who set up the ‘General Command of the Rebellion
in Southem Syria (Palestine)’’ in the Jenin region, and enjoyed widespread popularity,
among the local population.° In 1948 this same Kawukji became commander o
the *‘Palestine Liberation Army.”’
When the 1937 Peel Commission Report proposing the creation of an Arab state
in part of Palestine attached to Transjordan was first published, the Nashashibis
reacted favorably’ although under the pressure of general Palestinian Arab opposi-
tion to that partition plan, they soon changed their position. In the course of the
1920s and 1930s quite a few Palestinian Arabs had settled in Amman and elsewhere
on the East Bank, becoming senior civil servants and ministers, or engaging in
trade. Prior to 1948 some 10,000 Palestinian Arabs, mainly from Safad, Acre and
Haifa, had settled in Amman.*
Abdallah’s systematic occupation of the West Bank during the 1948-49 Arab-
Israeli war, and its annexation in 1950, was vehemently opposed by the Husseini-
controlled Arab Higher Committee in exile. This opposition was, however, primarily
vocal and could stop neither Abdallah’s designs nor the stream of Palestinian Arab
refugees who, voting with their feet, fled to Transjordan itself and the West Bank
territories controlled by the Arab Legion, and showed no inclination to follow the
Palestinian ‘“‘Government’’ which had been established,in September 1948 in Gaza.
Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator in Palestine, commented
in his book Jo Jerusalem:
The Palestinian Arabs have at present no will of their own. Neither
have they ever developed any specifically Palestinian nationalism. The
demand for a separate Arab state in Palestine is consequently relatively
weak. It would seem as though in existing circumstances most of the
Palestinian Arabs would be quite content to be incorporated into
Transjordan.”
VAUntil 1967, although the integration of the West Bank into the Jordanian ue
was never fully implemented, and the Jordanization of the Palestinian Arabs also
remained incomplete, Palestinian separatism in Jordan was never widespread; in
the years 1952-59 it was totally dormant." Popular aspirations were directed less
towards separation, which seemed hopeless and adventurous, and more towards
reform—equality for the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank, greater development
efforts, and a strengthening of the connection between the two banks. A typical
manifestation of the prevalent feelings can be found in the words of Ishaq el-Dazdar,
a candidate for the House of Representatives who, during the election campaign
in 1962, stated:
It is said that we joined the East Bank, but the truth is that it is the
East Bank which has joined us. We are Palestinians and the Jorda-
nian is Palestinian whether he likes it or not."'
There is, however, another aspect, and this concerns the apparent inner conflict
 28 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
— SPECIAL STUDIES

experienced by the Palestinian Arab refugees living in Jordan (not including the
original Arab inhabitants of the West Bank), between their desire to play an active
part in Jordan’s political, social and economic life, and their aspiration to return
to the homes left behind in the State of Israel. This dilemma manifested itself in
its most acute form when the Palestinian Arabs were given the right to vote dur-
ing the elections in 1950 for the Jordanian House of Representatives. In fact, there
was a massive participation of Palestinian Arab refugees and residents in these
and subsequent elections. Furthermore, with the passage of time fewer candidates
were elected who ran on a refugee ticket, and more candidates were elected who
represented parties which were not exclusively Palestinian.'*
None of this, certainly, excludes the possibility that if given a choice, many
West Palestinian Arabs would prefer to be citizens ef a Palestinian state rather than
of a Jordanian state. Most West Palestinian Arabs living outside of Israel have
maintained Jordanian citizenship, while relatively few have become actively in-
volved in the activities of the PLO, which advocates the establishment of a separate
Palestinian state. Several glaring facts should be taken account of in this context,
for they certainly have an effect on people’s feelings and attitudes. Thus,
Consider, for example, that the Jordanian dinar serves as legal tender
in the administered territories; the inhabitants continue to hold their
Jordanian citizenship; and the ‘open bridges’ policy makes the East
Bank the major outlet for West Bank agricultural products. In addi-
tion, Amman pays the salaries of public officials, approves school cur-
ricula and textbooks, and passes upon municipal budgets of West Bank
towns. Early in 1980 Jordan increased its activity—sponsoring a cen-
sus, granting funds for such new projects ashospital construction in
RHEE and Nablus, and opening passport offices in eight West Bank
~ towns. |
/ Given the attitude of the PLO concerning Jordanian-Palestinian relations and
the scope of its own territorial ambitions, it is difficult to imagine the PLO rejec-
ting an offer of control ever Jordan morder more effectively to carry out its strug-
gle against Israe¥In September 1980, King Hussein ejected the PLO from Jordan
precisely becaus © over Jordan. At the begin-
ning of December 1981, a much-publicized document allegedly originating with
the PLO argued that the PLO had to reestablish a territorial foothold in Jordan
in order to carry out military activities against Israel."
Using Jordan as a military base is different fronf viewing it as part of the
““homeland.’” The idea of overthrowing the regime in Jordan and considering its
territory as part of liberated Palestine is not foreign to PLO thinking. In 1974 Arafat
explained that
Jordan is ours, Palestine is ours, and we shall build our national en-
tity on the whole of this land after having freed it of both the Zionist
presence and the reactionary traitor’s (i.e., King Hussein) presence.'”
Again, in September 1975, an article appeared in Shu’un Filastiniyya stating
that it is necessary to overthrow Jordan’s regime
 The Political Geography of Palestine 29

to change the entity of Jordan. ..to cancel the Jordanian entity and to
establish as a substitute an entity of the revolution. ..the basis of Palesti-
nian East Jordan is the building of a base toward the Great Palestine,
a step that will enable Palestinians that are on the fringe of the land
that has to be liberated to spread from there to the west of the river
Jordan..."°
Article 2 of the Palestinian Covenant speaks of Palestine’s boundaries but does
not specifically define them. ‘‘Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the
British Mandate,’’ Article 2 declares, ‘‘is an indivisible territorial unit.’’ Yehoshafat
Harkabi has analyzed this Article at great length in his book The Palestinian Cove-
nant and its Meaning'’, and concludes that there is much ambivalence on this
question. When the first version of the Palestinian Covenant was published in 1964,
Harkabi argues, the PLO contended that Jordan was not part of Palestine. The
emblem of the PLO and the maps it published restricted Palestine to west of the
Jordan River. This, however, changed after the 1967 Six Day War and at least
some PLO maps of Palestine have actually shown parts of the East Bank as part
of Palestine.
a_

The basic dilemma according to Harkabi is as follows:

This article contains a time-bomb for the Palestinians and their political
future, bound up with the problem of their link to Jordan. This prob-
lem has been on the PLO’s agenda since its inception. The Palesti-
nians on the East Bank constitute a large group...of whom a part, and
perhaps the majority, have been integrated in Jordan, assumed Jor-
danian citizenship and regard Jordan in a large measure as their home.
The problem of the identity of the Palestinians in Jordan constitutes
a difficulty that rules out a compromise between the PLO and Jordan.
The PLO cannot allow itself to lose them, because they are the second
largest Palestinian segment after the Palestinians of the West Bank.
The Palestinians in Judea and Samaria are precluded from acquiesc-
ing in a situation under which their brethren in Jordan would be isolated
Nore lia allow the Palesti-
ni mT tiniry to owe allegiance to a political entity, probably
hostile, outside its territory. This is a basic complication in which the
whole Palestinian issue is enmeshed. There are two possible ways of
solving the problem: either by Jordan absorbing Palestine (the West
Bank) thus transforming the Palestinians (as the Jordanian establish-
ment hoped in claiming that Jordan was the successor of Palestine),
or the absorption of Jordan by Palestine and its transformation into
a part of Palestine. These two contradictory trends symbolize the basic
contradiction between Hashemite Jordan and the PLO, but both are
identical in regarding Jordan and Arab Palestine as one unit."
30 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW— SPECIAL STUDIES

But if the Palestinian Covenant is vague on the question of Jordan, the 8th Palesti-
nian National Congress which met in February-March 1971 was not, as evidenced
by the following resolution:
Jordan is linked to Palestine by a national relationship and a national
unity forged by history and culture from the earliest times. The crea-
tion of one political entity in Transjordan and another in Palestine would
have no basis either in legality or as to the elements universally ac-
cepted as fundamental to a political entity. It would be a continuation
of the operation of fragmentation by which colonialism shattered the
unity of our Arab nation and the unity of our Arab homeland after the
First World War.
But this fragmentation has not prevented thé masses, either west or
east of the River Jordan, from feeling that they are one people, or from
remaining united against the conspiracy of imperialism and Zionism.
In raising the slogan of the liberation of Palestine and presenting the
problem of the Palestine revolution, it was not the intention of the
Palestine revolution to separate the east of the River from the west,
nor did it believe that the struggle of the Palestinian people can be
separated from the struggle of the masses in Jordan. It acted in con-
formity with the exigencies of a specific historical stage, with the ob-
ject of concentrating on the direction of all forces towards Palestine
so as to give prominence to our cause on Palestinian, Arab and inter-
national levels.’°

Palestinian-Jordanian unity, not emphasized in the resolutions of subsequent

Palestinian Congresses, was replaced with the term ‘‘Jordanian-Palestinian front,”’
an idea which has hardly been bore out by Jordanian-PLO relations since September
| .|Harkabi suggests the PLO leadership understands that circumstances faVor
a *‘Jordanian solution,’’ and concludes that “‘since the Palestinians will have a
majority in such a union they may eventually stamp their character on it,’’?°
which is a subtle way of saying that it will probably be the Palestinians who will
control Jordan.
In addition, within the PLO, there are proponents of the idea that Palestine forms
part of a larger Arab territorial entity. Thus, the leader of Al-Saiga, the second
largest organization in the PLO, Zuhayr Muhsin, said in an interview in 1977:
Actually there are no differences between Jordanians, Palestinians,
Syrians and Lebanese. We all constitute a part of one people. We speak
about a Palestinian identity only for political reasons because Arabs’
national interest is to encourage the existence of a separate existence
of Palestinians...Jordan, having fixed frontiers, cannot for tactical
reasons Claim to have rights to Haifa or Jaffa, but I, as a Palestinian,
can claim Haifa, Jaffa, Beersheba and Jerusalem. ..*!
Syrian President Hafez al-Assad gave this line of thought encouragement when
in 1974 he stated that Palestine was actually part of southern Syria.”
The Political Geography of Palestine 31

FOOTNOTES

“The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who until 1947 normally resided in Palestine, regardless
of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born after that date of a Palestinian
Jather—whether inside Palestine or outside it—is also a Palestinian. ’’ Article 5 of the Covenant, see
Yehoshafat Harkabi, The Palestinian Covenant and its Meaning, London, Vallentine Mitchell, p. 42.
Jordan Times, 9.5.1981.
Yehoshua Porath, Vol. I: The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929, Tel
.Aviv, Am Oved, second edition 1976, and Vol. II: From Riots to Rebellion, The Palestinian-Arab National
Movement, The Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1929-1939 Tel Aviv, Am Oved, 1978 (Hebrew).
Ibid. Vol. I. pp 64-81.
Ibid. p. 120.
Shmuel Dothan, op cit. p. 108.
Yehoshua Porath, Vol. II, op. cit. p. 273.
Avi Plascov, op. cit. p. 33.
Folke Bemadotte, op. cit. p. 113.
Eliezer Been, op. cit. p. 43.
Ibid. p. S1.
Avi Plascov, op. cit. p. 107, and Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Hashemite
Regime, Jerusalem, the Magnes Press, 1980 (Hebrew).
Aaron S. Klieman, op. cit. pp. 31-32.
See article by Colin Legum in the Jerusalem Post, December 13, 1981.
Yasser Arafat, **A Lettertothe Jordanian Student Congress in Baghdad”’ as reported in The Washington
Post, November 12, 1974.
Quoted in Aryeh Y. Yodfat and Yuval Amon-Ohana, op. cit. p. 42.
Yehoshafat Harkabi, op. cit. pp. 34-39.
Ibid. pp. 34-35.
Anne Zahlan, International Documents on Palestine 1971, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1974,
p. 398.
Yehoshafat Harkabi, op. cit. p. 39.
Trouw (Amsterdam) 3.4.1977.
Aryeh Y. Yodfat and Yuval Amon-Ohana, op. cit. p. 38.
 Conclusion
Little mention has been made of how Israel views the “‘natural’’ relationship
between the west and east banks of the Jordan River. For many Jews, Israel (the
land of Israel), has traditionally meant biblical Israel, the borders of which were
not stable, but which included both banks of the Jordan River. This was the percep-
tion of the first Zionist pioneers arriving in Palestine in 1881. When the borders
of Mandatory Palestine were being drawn up, the Zionists took it for granted that
the Jewish National Home would be allowed to develop on both banks of the Jor-
dan River. However, the Zionist movement reluctantly settled for the first de fac-
6 to partition of Palestine in 1920, just as later it acquiesced to the sécomd-partition
: ofwesterir Patestine-as approved on 29 November, 1947, by the United Nations
General Assembly.
However, as has been shown, it was not only the Jews who viewed the west
and east Banks as part of the same land, but so did Britain when it was in control
of the area (1918-1948), and the rulers of Transjordan (and, later, in that area’s
incarnation as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), and also the Palestinian Arabs
themselves. Each party, t s Own reasons and from its own point of view, has
accepted the premise that the west and east banks of the Jordan River are not two
separate lands, foreign to each other, but one. Since 1920, all concepts about par-
titioning this territorial unit have been based on the need to let the Jews and the
| Arabs have their own separate territories—given the fact that Jews and Arabs are
two separate peoples. That the 1947 UN Partition Plan implied that there should
be three states in the territory of Mandatory Palestine resulted from the fact that
one portion-of Palestine (comprising 74 percent ofits territory—J ordan) had already
gained
independence
in 1946, and that the United Nations had been left to decide
the fate of the remaining 26 percent. It was never suggested that the Arabs on either
side of the Jordan River were two different peoples—ethnically, demographically,
op in religion.
a Israel maintains that there should be only two states in the territory of Mandatory
Palestine—one Jewish and one Arab. (Both main political blocs in Israel, the Likud
and the Labor Alignment, agree on this point—they disagree on where the boundary
between these two states should lie.) Israel argues that there is no need for two Palestin-
ian Arab states, and that the existence of an additional state would only increase
instability in the area and endanger the security of other states and Israel and Jordan.
In light of Palestinian Arab and Jordanian history, it would appear that many Jordan-
ian and Palestinian leaders share this concept albeit from their own very different
perspectives, and that the question they must ask themselves is what shape the Arab
state should take, and who should rule it.
Appendices
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36 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
— SPECIAL STUDIES

PROPOSED PALESTINE FRONTIER 1918

;
Haifa Sefof
Galilee

eAmman

Jordan
Va/ley
e

Jerusalem

eoeersheba

eft Tafil

— Proposal of British
delegation to Paris Peace
a \ Conference
Ge) » 300 metre contour line
= \ ° (above Mediterranean Sea
a level)
| weeee Suggested extension of
railway line
0 25 50
E=
= km
© Carta, JERUSALEM
The Political Geography of Palestine Si.

HE CLAIMS OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMEN

T THE PEACE CONFERENCE 1919
Sidon nal Damascus,
——_———T7 oS
5 e
Rashaya -
=~ ine
oehen.

eQuneitra /

Shechem
e

® Tel Avivé,
» Jaffa
Jericho,
Jerusalem,
Bethlehem®
“Hebron

\ :
\ ue
sae
[J] Proposal of the Zionist Movement
The frontier according to the
Sykes-Picot proposal (May 1916)

© Carta, JERUSALEM
 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW
— SPECIAL STUDIES

PALESTINE, 1920

Sey JIRA
(French Mandate)
@Damascus
The Political Geography of Palestine 39

PALESTINE, 1922

Sa5vi RA A
/( French Mandate)

@Damascus

ene 2 aS,

TRANS JORDAN ~~
fae \

*Amman ca > a
 DATE DUE

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Demco, ° Inc.= ce} 38-293
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956.9404 R745p 1983

Rolef, Susan Hattis.
The politi cal geography of
Palestine
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