No.

24-

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

RAHUL MANCHANDA,

Petitioner,

v.

ABIGAIL REARDON, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Rahul Manchanda, Esq.

Counsel of Record
125 Park Avenue, 25th Floor
New York, New York 10017
(212) 986-8600
[email protected]

Counsel for Petitioner

332683

A
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
 i

I. QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether it is “racist,” “antisemitic,” or “offensive” for

a relatively new racial, ethnic, religious minority (Indian-
American U.S. Citizen) to file civil rights lawsuits and
law enforcement complaints alleging discrimination or
bias by more powerful, more established, more politically
connected ethnic, religious, or racial groups (African-
American and Jewish) in New York City when fighting to
see or speak to your own children after 8 years of being
illegally denied by these dominant groups for retaliatory
reasons?
 ii

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on

the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the
court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as
follows: Abigail Reardon, Attorney Grievance Committee
Chief; Remi Shea, Staff Attorney; Jorge Dopico, Chief
Counsel; Ronald Acosta, Judge; Federal Bureau of
Investigation, New York City Field Office; New York City
Police Department.
 iii

RELATED CASES

Manchanda v. Shi Shi Wang, No. 23-CV-9403, U.S.

District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Judgment entered on Dec. 11, 2023.

In the Matter of Rahul Manchanda, No. 2023-05258,

Appellate Division for the Supreme Court of New York.

Judgment entered on April 18, 2024.

Manchanda v Lane et al., No. 24-395, U.S. Court of

Appeals, Second Circuit. Judgment entered on February
6, 2024.

Rahul Manchanda v Sharie Maes Kruzic Manon O’Buck,

No 49367, New York County Family Court.

Rahul Manchanda v Sharie Maes Kruzic Manon O’Buck,

No 176272, Westchester NY Family Court.
 iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

LIST OF PARTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

RELATED CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

II. TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

III. TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

V. OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

VI. JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

1. Procedural Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2. Direct Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

IX. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT . . . . . . 3

1. There is an arguable basis in law or in fact. . . . 3

 v

Table of Contents
Page
2. It is inappropr iate for the Court to
sanction a Lawyer for these reasons . . . . . . . . . . 4

3. The Petitoner’s Civil Right’s Claims

are not vexatious or clearly meritless
a nd do not cont a i n u nnecessa r y
antisemitic or racist statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

X. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
 vi

TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — ORDER OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT, FILED AUGUST 14, 2024 . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,
FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5a

APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,
FILED DECEMBER 22, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43a
 vii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page
CASES

Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396,
18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,

434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694,
54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

DR Distribs., LLC v. 21 Century Smoking, Inc.,

513 F. Supp. 3d 839 (N.D. Ill. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Mallard v. United States Dist. Court,

490 U.S. 296, 109 S.Ct. 1814,
104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

STATUTES AND RULES

28 U.S.C. § 1257 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. amend I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

U.S. Const. amend XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 1

V. OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

appears at Appendix A to the petition beginning on page
1a and is not yet reported.

The Opinion of the United States District Court dated

February 1, 2024, appears at Appendix B to the petition
beginning on page 5a and is not yet reported.

The Opinion of the United States District Court dated

December 23, 2023, appears at Appendix C to the petition
beginning on page 43a and is not yet reported.

VI. JURISDICTION

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals

decided my case was August 14, 2024, and no petition for
rehearing was timely filed in my case. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, having
timely filed this petition for a writ of certiorari within
ninety days of the Judgment.

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides, in relevant part: “Congress shall make no law.
. . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the
people to peaceably assemble.” U.S. Const. amend I.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides, in relevant part: “[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . ..” U.S. Const. amend XIV.
 2

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Procedural Background

Petitioner brought a complaint that alleged nine

causes of action related to the continued harassment,
abuse of process, litigation, judicial corruption, and
various other civil rights violations committed jointly by
the Respondents. On December 22, 2023, the Court sua
sponte dismissed the claims by the Petitioner that sought
to initiate criminal prosecution and all claims against
the United States. On January 2, 2024, the Court issued
another order requesting the Petitioner to file a response
outlining how the claims against the United States were
legally viable, which was done. Petitioner included with his
second response a judicial misconduct complaint against
Judge John P. Cronan and requested recusal. Ultimately,
the Court dismissed all the Petitoner’s claims, both State
and Federal, and denied the Petitioner leave to amend his
Amended Complaint.

2. Direct Appeal

In an Appeal dated April 16, 2024, the Petitioner

appealed the Judgment of the District Court and
requested either a finding in favor of the Petitioner or
for the Court to remand the case for a fair and impartial
trial. The appeal outlined five separate issues presented
for review. On August 14, 2024, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the Petitioner’s
appeal, claiming that is “lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact.”
 3

IX. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. There is an arguable basis in law or in fact.

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

indicated that the Petitioner’s appeal “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” (See Appendix A, page 2a).

“An appeal on a matter of law is frivolous where [none]

of the legal points [are] arguable on their merits.” Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d
493 (1967). Further, a complaint, containing as it does
both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous
where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss a claim filed
in forma pauperis “if the allegation of poverty is untrue,
or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.” The
Supreme Court has held that “Section 1915(d) ... authorizes
courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’ action, but there
is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the
absence of this statutory provision.” Mallard v. United
States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307–08, 109 S.Ct. 1814,
1821, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989).

Merely pointing out the facts observed firsthand

through direct observation does not lack an arguable
basis in either law or fact. Petitioner has over 25 years of
experience as a litigant and a lawyer and has personally
observed civil rights and human liberties violations by
99% predominantly certain dominant ethnic/religious/
racial groups in New York City against less powerful, less
politically connected, and less established racial, ethnic,
or religious minorities in New York City. The complaint
 4

outlined the specific targeting the Petitioner faced

throughout his time practicing law by a variety of people
in the legal community to include Judges, Magistrates,
CPS workers, and other court personnel, all of whom
had Jewish supervisors or bosses. It also outlined the
frequent retaliation faced after the Petitioner made TV
appearances, put on presentations, or at any point became
vocal about his beliefs and opinions on foreign policy. This
in itself presents an arguable basis in law and in fact.
Additionally, the US Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit provided no actual reason or basis for its claim
that the appeal lacked an arguable basis in law or in fact,
thus abusing its discretion.

2. It is inappropriate for the Court to sanction a

Lawyer for these reasons.

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

indicated that the imposition of sanctions might be
appropriate based on the Petitioner’s litigation history
(See Appendix A, page 2a).

The Court outlined their procedure for imposing leave-

to-file sanctions in three stages. The first stage is when the
Court notifies the litigant that the filing of future frivolous
appeals, motions, or other papers could result in sanctions
(See Appendix A, page 2a). Here, the Court has completed
that notification; however, it is important to point out that
the prior appeals, motions, and other papers that were
filed were not in fact filed by the Petitioner himself, but
many of them were filed by Petitioner’s prior counsel,
former employees, and retained counsel. The second
stage is if the litigant continues to file frivolous appeals,
motions or other papers, the Court orders the litigant to
 5

show cause why a leave-to-file sanction order should not

issue (See Appendix A, Page 2a). Here, there was not an
additional frivolous appeal, motion, or other paper. There
was a motion filed which outlined a serious of civil rights
violation and a pattern of targeting that this Petitioner
has experienced over the last few decades. Additionally,
the Petitioner did provide a letter to the Court outlining
the reasons that sanctions would not be appropriate. The
third stage outlined by the Court is if the litigant fails to
show why sanctions are not appropriate, the Court issues
a sanctions order (See Appendix A, Page 2a). This is not
applicable here as the Petitioner did effectively explain to
the Court why sanctions were not appropriate.

It is inappropriate and improper to sanction a lawyer/

litigant who merely points out the obvious facts seen
directly over 25 years of the state and federal courts
discriminating and destroying Plaintiff-Appellant,
his children, and his family by those 2 same dominant
ethnic/racial groups in NYC, and for wanting Discovery
thereon to prove his case. The Petitioner continuously gets
summarily dismissed or threatened, mocked, humiliated,
and intimidated for seeking out justice for himself, his
children, and his family destroyed by these listed people
and defendants. There is no legal basis for imposing
sanctions on a lawyer and litigant who is attempting
to shine a light on these issues, especially when those
decisions are being made by the very same members
of those oppressive groups. Additionally, when seeking
justice in a civil rights case, the Petitioner must name
the oppressive racial, ethnic, or religious makeup of the
group and in this case, the mere act of doing so does not
consist of making racist nor antisemitic comments as the
Court indicates.
 6

3. The Petitoner’s Civil Right’s Claims are not

vexatious or clearly meritless and do not contain
unnecessary antisemitic or racist statements.

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

outlined a history of decisions that have instructed the
Petitioner to not file vexatious or clearly meritless appeals
(See Appendix A, Page 3a).

The Court has previously pointed out that “the term

“meritless” is to be understood as meaning groundless or
without foundation, rather than simply that the plaintiff
has ultimately lost his case, and that the term “vexatious”
in no way implies that the plaintiff’s subjective bad faith
is a necessary prerequisite to a fee award against him.”
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC , 434 U.S. 412, 422,
98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). To warrant sanctions
for unreasonably protracting litigation, an attorney’s
actions must be both unreasonable and “vexatious,”
meaning without reasonable or probable cause or excuse,
harassing, or annoying. DR Distribs., LLC v. 21 Century
Smoking, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 3d 839, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2021).

The Petitioner fundamentally disagree with this court

and prior courts that Plaintiff-Appellant’s civil rights
claims defending himself, his children, and his family are
somehow “vexatious or clearly meritless” simply because
this court and previous ones have never allowed Plaintiff-
Appellant to either receive an Answer to his claims, or
Discovery thereon. Seeking justice in a civil rights case
wherein one MUST name the oppressive racial, ethnic,
or religious makeup is NOT “vexatious or meritless.”
Additionally, as outlined above, the claims in the original
complaint brought by this Respondent were not without
foundation or groundless.
 7

The Court further indicated that they believed the

current appeal to be frivolous and containing numerous
anti-Semitic and racist statements, against their
warnings (See Appendix A, Page 3a). It is not “racist”
or “antisemitic” to point out the FACTS that 99% of
Plaintiff-Appellant’s oppressors in the family, state, and
federal courts against his children, himself, and his family
against him have either been Black or Jewish, usually with
Jewish supervisors. The only legal and factual point of
contention on the appeal heard by the US Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit was whether or not the court has
jurisdiction, which is a material dispute of fact and law
and should be litigated, not met with threats, harassment,
intimidation, sanctions, mockery, humiliation, abuse, or
insults. Again, seeking justice or litigating civil rights
claims against more powerful, established, politically
connected ethnic, racial or religious minorities in New
York City is NOT “racist,” “antisemitic,” or “frivolous,”
simply because the judges who hail from those oppressive
groups feel that way - otherwise there would be NO
PROGRESS in this country when it comes to fighting
or vindicating ones’ own civil rights, human rights, for
himself and his children.
 8

X. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully request

that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to review the
Judgement of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,
RAHUL MANCHANDA, ESQ.
Counsel of Record
125 Park Avenue, 25th Floor
New York, New York 10017
(212) 986-8600
[email protected]

Counsel for Petitioner

September 10, 2024
APPENDIX
 i

TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — ORDER OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT, FILED AUGUST 14, 2024 . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,
FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5a

APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,
FILED DECEMBER 22, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43a
 1a

Appendix
APPENDIX A — ORDER A UNITED STATES
OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT,
FILED AUGUST 14, 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
24-392

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City
of New York, on the 14th day of August, two thousand
twenty-four.

Present:
Raymond J. Lohier, Jr.,
Joseph F. Bianco,
Alison J. Nathan,
Circuit Judges.

RAHUL DEV MANCHANDA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ABIGAIL REARDON, ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE

COMMITTEE CHIEF, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.
 2a

Appendix A

Appellant, a lawyer acting pro se, moves to stay “lower

court” proceedings and to file a sur-reply. Appellee the
Federal Bureau of investigation moves to dismiss or for
summary affirmance. Upon due consideration, it is hereby
ORDERED that the appeal is DISMISSED because it
“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Pillay v.
INS, 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that
this Court has “inherent authority” to dismiss an appeal
that lacks an arguable basis in law or fact). The motions
are DENIED as moot.

We conclude that the imposition of sanctions, including

leave-to-file or monetary sanctions, might be appropriate,
in light of Appellant’s litigation history. This Court’s
procedure for imposing leave-to-file sanctions involves
three stages: (1) the Court notifies the litigant that the
filing of future frivolous appeals, motions, or other papers
could result in sanctions, see Sassower v. Sansverie, 885
F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1989); (2) if the litigant continues to
file frivolous appeals, motions or other papers, the Court
orders the litigant to show cause why a leave-to-file
sanction order should not issue, see In re Martin-Trigona,
9 F.3d 226, 229 (2d Cir. 1993); and (3) if the litigant fails to
show why sanctions are not appropriate, the Court issues
a sanctions order, see Gallop v. Cheney, 667 F.3d 226, 227
(2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

In March 2022, a panel of this Court dismissed

Appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and warned
Appellant that “the continued filing of duplicative,
vexatious, or clearly meritless appeals, motions, or other
 3a

Appendix A

papers in this Court could result in the imposition of

sanctions, including a leave-to-file sanction that would
require Appellant to obtain permission from this Court
prior to filing any further submissions in this Court.”
Manchanda v. Senderoff, No. 21-1909, 2022 WL 1667261,
at * 1 (2d Cir. Mar. 24, 2022) (unpublished). In that order,
the Court also noted that his “pro se pleading in this
appeal ... contains racist and anti-Semitic comments.” The
Court “condemn[ed] Appellant’s comments and warn[ed]
him that the use of any similar language in future filings
in this Court will result in sanctions, regardless of whether
the filing is otherwise duplicative, vexatious, or meritless.”
Id.

In April 2023, a panel of this Court dismissed

another of Appellant’s appeals for lack of jurisdiction and
additionally noted that Appellant “has brought eight other
appeals to this Court in the last ten years, all of which
were dismissed or denied.” 2d Cir. 23-61 , doc. 42. The
panel reasoned that his litigation history was “particularly
troubling in light of his status as an attorney” and again
warned him that “further filing of duplicative, vexatious,
or clearly meritless appeals, motions, or other papers in
this Court will likely result in a leave-to-file sanction,
barring any further submissions in this Court without
permission.” Id

These warnings do not appear to have been effective—

since the entry of those orders, Appellant has filed
the instant frivolous appeal, which includes numerous
anti-Semitic and racist statements, directly against
our warnings. We, again, condemn these comments.
 4a

Appendix A

Accordingly, Appellant is hereby ORDERED to file a

response within 30 days of the entry of this order why
a leave-to-file and a monetary sanction should not be
imposed.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
/s/ Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe
 5a

APPENDIX BAppendix B
— OPINION OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,
FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2024

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

23 Civ. 9292 (JPC) (KHP)

RAHUL MANCHANDA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

CHIEF ABIGAIL REARDON, STAFF ATTORNEY
REMI SHEA, CHIEF COUNSEL JORGE DOPICO,
JUDGE ROLANDO ACOSTA, NYPD,
AND FBI NYC FIELD OFFICE,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN P. CRONAN, United States District Judge:

On December 22, 2023, the Court sua sponte

dismissed any claims by Plaintiff Rahul Manchanda that
seek to initiate a criminal prosecution and against the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) or the United
States other than under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671-80,
 6a

Appendix B

ordered Plaintiff to show cause why any claims under the

FTCA should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust, and
further provided him with notice of the Court’s intent
to dismiss any remaining federal claims, to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law
claims, and to deny leave to amend. See Manchanda v.
Reardon (“Manchanda I”), No. 23 Civ. 9292 (JPC), 2023
WL 8879226 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2023). Plaintiff responded
on December 23, 2023 by, among other things, attaching
exhibits which he maintained demonstrate his compliance
with the FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement.
After reviewing those materials, the Court advised
Plaintiff on January 2, 2024 that it appeared that he lacks
a viable cause of action against the United States—both
for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies and for
failing to state a claim—and provided notice of its intent
to dismiss any FTCA claims. See Manchanda v. Reardon
(“Manchanda II”), No. 23 Civ. 9292 (JPC), 2024 WL
259776 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2024). Plaintiff responded later
that day, defending his claims in this action and requesting
the undersigned’s recusal, and again on January 3, 2024,
providing more materials trying to show his exhaustion
under the FTCA.

Having considered the allegations in the Amended

Complaint and all of Plaintiff’s submissions following the
Court’s Orders of December 22, 2023 and January 2, 2024,
the Court denies Plaintiff’s recusal application, dismisses
his federal claims, declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his state law claims, and denies him leave
to amend on futility grounds.
 7a

Appendix B

I. Procedural History

A. The Amended Complaint

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings nine

causes of action under federal and state law: (1) violations of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights under color of law,
Dkt. 15 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 21-22; (2) violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ee-1(e) for retaliation, id. ¶¶ 23-24; (3) violations of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”),
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523, id. ¶¶ 25-26; (4) violations of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030, id. ¶¶ 27-28; (5) abuse of process, id. ¶¶ 29-30; (6)
malicious prosecution, id. ¶¶ 31-32; (7) computer trespass,
id. ¶¶ 33-34; (8) conversion of computer data, id. ¶¶ 35-
36; and (9) judicial bias and prejudice, id. ¶¶ 37-38.1 For
each cause of action, Plaintiff seeks “actual and punitive
damages in the amount of $20,000,000.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 24,

1. The A mended Compla int also has a section titled

“CRIMINAL ACTS” where Plaintiff alleges violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 242, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-15, and he alleges elsewhere violations of
various statutes that allow for criminal liability, id. ¶¶ 3, 5-6, 27-28.
In the December 22, 2023 Order, the Court dismissed any claims
seeking the criminal prosecution of others for lack of standing.
Manchanda I, 2023 WL 8879226, at *4. In his responses to the
Court’s December 22, 2023 and January 2, 2024 Orders, Plaintiff
now disavows seeking to cause the criminal prosecution of others
through this lawsuit. See Dkt. 53 (“Dec. 23, 2023 Response”) at 2
(“None of our civil lawsuit complaint claims seek to cause a criminal
prosecution, they are simply background information . . . .”); Dkt. 57
(“Jan. 2, 2024 Response”) at 1 (“[W]e have told this court countless
times that we did not make any claims seeking criminal prosecution,
but the court ignores this.”).
 8a

Appendix B

26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38. Plaintiff names as Defendants
Abigail Reardon, Esq., the Chairwoman of the Attorney
Grievance Committee of the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, First Department (the “First
Department”); Remi Shea, Esq., an attorney with the
First Department; Jorge Dopico, Esq., the Chief Attorney
of the First Department’s Attorney Grievance Committee;
Justice Rolando Acosta, the Presiding Justice of the First
Department (Reardon, Shea, Dopico, and Justice Acosta,
collectively, the “Individual Defendants”); the New York
City Police Department (“NYPD”); and the “NYC Field
Office” of the FBI, id. at 1. 2

As discussed in the Court’s December 22, 2023 Order,

the claims in the Amended Complaint appear to arise
from Plaintiff’s disciplinary proceedings before the First
Department’s Grievance Committee. Manchanda I, 2023
WL 8879226, at *2. He alleges such acts as “non-stop
malicious prosecution, aggravated harassment, abuse
of process, vexatious litigation, forum shopping, judicial
corruption, judicial bias, civil and criminal RICO, judicial
misconduct, public corruption, unlawful trespassing
into computer networks, conversion/theft of computer
data, illegal electronic surveillance and wiretapping,
committed jointly by codefendants,” Am. Compl. ¶ 3,
although he provides scant factual allegations to support
these accusations, see generally id. He further alleges,
again without any allegations to lend factual support, that
Defendants

2. The Amended Complaint does not specify which causes of

action are brought against which Defendants, so the Court assumes
for purposes of this Opinion and Order that Plaintiff brings each
cause of action against all Defendants.
 9a

Appendix B

are weaponizing the judicial and legal system,

abusing their position and power to remove
Plaintiff’s law license of 21 years, “soft kill”
the plaintiff on behalf of Jewish Organized
Crime, Extremist Jewish Zionist donors,
financial contributors, oligarchs, within their
orbit and sphere of influence, simply for Plaintiff
expressing his political views that go against
hardcore extremist Jewish and Zionist domestic
and foreign policy.

Id. ¶ 4. With respect to the Individual Defendants, he

alleges misconduct arising from Reardon “going after . . .
[Plaintiff] and [his] law license and law firm,” id. ¶ 19, with
the others “aiding and abetting” those efforts, id. ¶ 20.
Plaintiff’s allegations against the FBI and the NYPD arise
from their alleged failure to investigate and prosecute
criminal acts against him. Id. ¶¶ 20a-20c.

B. The December 22, 2023 Order

On December 22, 2023, the Court sua sponte dismissed

any claims by Plaintiff that seek to initiate a criminal
prosecution of others, as well as any claims against the
United States, including the FBI, on sovereign immunity
grounds, other than claims brought against the United
States under the FTCA. Manchanda I, 2023 WL 8879226,
at *4-5. The Court further ordered Plaintiff to show
cause why he has complied with the FTCA’s mandatory
exhaustion requirement. Id. at *5. The Court also gave
Plaintiff notice of its intent to dismiss his remaining federal
claims, as none of them appeared to be legally viable, and
 10a

Appendix B

provided him an opportunity to be heard on those matters

as well. Id. at *4-8. The Court also provided Plaintiff
notice, as well as an opportunity to be heard, of its intent
not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state
law claims and to deny him leave to amend. Id. at *9. The
Court allowed Plaintiff to file a response addressing these
issues within fourteen days of the Order, i.e., by January
6, 2024. Id at *10.

C. Plaintiff’s December 23, 2023 Response

Plaintiff filed his response the next day, December 23,

2023. In it, Plaintiff maintained that he had “more than
complied with the FTCA requirements of filing claims
addressing any and all issues with a relevant government
agency,” Dec. 23, 2023 Response at 1, and attached exhibits
that he maintained demonstrated his exhaustion, Dkt. 53-
1. The December 23, 2023 Response further addressed
some of the issues raised in the December 22, 2023 Order,
arguing that “there is no judicial or quasi-judicial immunity
for intentional torts or criminal acts proximately resulting
in serious personal injury, as is the case here.” Dec. 23,
2023 Response at 2; accord id. at 4. Plaintiff’s Response
additionally sought to defend the viability of his state law
claims, id. at 2-3, although he did not address whether the
Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them
if his federal claims are dismissed, see generally id. He
also appeared to acknowledge that his claim under 42
U.S.C. § 2000ee-1 is not viable, further stating that he
“is willing to forego this as a formal claim.” Id. at 3. And
Plaintiff contended that he “allege[s] (with evidence) that
the FBI, NYPD, and [the Attorney Grievance Committee]
 11a

Appendix B

worked in tandem, together, to send dangerous and

mentally unstable undercovers and informants who
committed crimes and intentional torts against plaintiff.”
Id. Similarly, Plaintiff asserted that “this Court can not
[sic] dismiss our claims against co-defendant NYPD when
it worked together in tandem with the FBI, [the Attorney
Grievance Committee], and enjoyed its federal funding,
which is alleged in this lawsuit.” Id. at 4.

D. The January 2, 2024 Order

After reviewing Plaintiff ’s December 23, 2023

Response, the Court issued an additional Order on
January 2, 2024. Manchanda II, 2024 WL 259776. In
the Order, the Court advised Plaintiff of its intent to
dismiss any FTCA claims as it appears from his December
23, 2023 Response that he had not satisfied the FTCA’s
administrative exhaustion requirement. Id. at *1; see 28
U.S.C. § 2675(a); 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a). The Court further
advised Plaintiff that, even had he exhausted, he would
not appear to have a viable cause of action against the
United States because the decisions of a federal law
enforcement agency to investigate and respond to reports
of criminal activity are discretionary acts for which a
cause of action for monetary relief under the FTCA does
not lie. Manchanda II, 2024 WL 259776, at *2; see 28
U.S.C. § 2680(a). The Court therefore ordered Plaintiff
to show cause within fourteen days, i.e., by January 16,
2024, why any claims against the United States are legally
viable and should not be dismissed and, assuming he seeks
to replead such claims, why leave to amend should not be
denied. Manchanda II, 2024 WL 259776, at *2.
 12a

Appendix B

E. Plaintiff’s January 2 and January 3, 2024 Responses

Plaintiff promptly filed two more responses. First,

later in the day on January 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a
submission that primarily continued to maintain that he
had satisfied the FTCA’s exhaustion requirement. He
argued that he had “provided the court with no less than
20 FTCA or equivalent Form 95s which went unanswered
for 6 months or more to the Defendants since 2/2021,
enclosed in the Exhibits section of our Response Letter
dated December 23, 2023.” Jan. 2, 2024 Response at 1.
Among other arguments, Plaintiff contended that “the
court misinterprets emails as the claims/complaints,
rather than what they actually were – proof of claims/
complaints that were then forwarded to multiple other
local, state and federal investigative/law enforcement
agencies to also investigate side by side.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff
also maintained that “the court ignores that we also allege
intentional torts causing personal injury, not just failure to
investigate, as well as sending undercovers and informants
who committed intentional torts/criminal acts against us,
causing substantial personal injury, not just that the FBI/
NYPD refused to investigate crime against us.” Id. Lastly,
explaining that “it appears that Judge John P. Cronan is
committing gross judicial misconduct,” id. at 2, Plaintiff
enclosed a judicial misconduct complaint purportedly
filed against the undersigned, Dkt. 57-1. Plaintiff further
requested that his submission “be construed as a formal
Letter of Recusal from this case for bias, incompetence,
public corruption, judicial misconduct, etc.” Jan. 2, 2024
Response at 2.
 13a

Appendix B

Then, on January 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed another

response to the January 2, 2024 Order. Dkt. 58 (“Jan. 3,
2024 Response,” along with the Dec. 23, 2023 Response
and the Jan. 2, 2024 Response, the “Responses”).
Explaining that he had conducted “another ‘deep dive,’”
Plaintiff submitted what he maintained are “additional
complaints which are either Form 95 or equivalent in order
to give adequate notice of the targeted parties/agencies
about the allegations/subject matter contained therein.”
Id.; see Dkt. 58-1.

II. Judicial Recusal

As noted, Plaintiff attached to his January 2,

2024 Response a judicial misconduct complaint that he
purportedly filed against the undersigned, Dkt. 57-1, and
requested that his filing “be construed as a formal Letter
of Recusal from this case.” Jan. 2, 2024 Response at 2.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge shall disqualify

himself or herself “in any proceeding in which [the
judge’s] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28
U.S.C. § 455(a). “This provision governs circumstances
that constitute an appearance of partiality, even though
actual partiality has not been shown.” Chase Manhattan
Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir.
2003). “The determination of whether such an appearance
has been created is an objective one based on what a
reasonable person knowing all the facts would conclude.”
Id. In addition, under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), a judge shall
disqualify himself or herself where the judge “has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
 14a

Appendix B

knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding.”

Recusal is not warranted here. A litigant cannot force

a judge’s recusal merely by filing a judicial misconduct
complaint. See United States v. Martin-Trigona, 759 F.2d
1017, 1020-21 (2d Cir. 1985) (explaining after a litigant
initiated a new lawsuit against the presiding judge and
his wife in state court and then moved to recuse the
judge, the judge “properly refus[ed] to recuse himself,”
as “to permit a litigant to obtain disqualification, without
reasonable grounds, of successive judges in a case would
interfere with the administration of justice and that
[the plaintiff]’s allegations afforded no basis for an
inference that the judge’s remaining in the case would
create even an appearance of impropriety”); Kampfer
v. Gokey, 175 F.3d 1008, 1999 WL 97234, at *1 (2d Cir.
1999) (unpublished) (affirming the district judge’s denial
of the plaintiffs’ motion to recuse because, inter alia,
the “plaintiffs had filed a judicial misconduct complaint
against him,” explaining that a litigant cannot “force a
judge’s recusal merely by filing suit against him or her”
(citing Martin-Trigona, 759 F.2d at 1020-21)); Penn v. City
of New York, No. 19 Civ. 2106 (JMF), 2019 WL 2085135,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2019) (“It is well settled that a
party may not procure a judge’s recusal merely by suing
the judge.”). Nor has Plaintiff provided any basis for
the undersigned to recuse from presiding over this case.
Pointing out possible deficiencies in a pleading that may
require dismissal, and giving a party the opportunity
to address those issues, hardly reflects a judge’s “bias,
incompetence, [or] public corruption,” or otherwise
 15a

Appendix B

amounts to “judicial misconduct.” Jan. 2, 2024 Response

at 2; see also LoCascio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493,
495 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”
(citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).

III. Dismissal

A. Applicable Law

A district judge has the authority to dismiss a

complaint sua sponte, even when, as here, the plaintiff
has paid the filing fees, if it determines that the action is
frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221
F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay
v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding
that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss a
frivolous appeal)), or that subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,
583-84 (1999). A district judge additionally “has the power
to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state a
claim,” Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 609 n.11
(2d Cir. 1980), so long as—as occurred here—the plaintiff
is given notice and “an opportunity to be heard,” Thomas
v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam).

To adequately state a claim, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
 16a

Appendix B

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint’s
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555. In making this determination, the Court must
“accept[] as true the factual allegations in the complaint
and draw[] all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,” Biro v.
Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 2015), but it need
not “accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations,” LaFaro v. N.Y. Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC,
570 F.3d 471, 475-76 (2d Cir. 2009). “A court may dismiss a
claim as ‘factually frivolous’ if the sufficiently well-pleaded
facts are ‘clearly baseless’—that is, if they are ‘fanciful,’
‘fantastic[,]’ or ‘delusional.’” Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d
364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)).

Normally, a district court must afford special

solicitude to a pro se litigant; this special solicitude “most
often consists of liberal construction of pleadings, motion
papers, and appellate briefs,” as well as a “relaxation of
the limitations on the amendment of pleadings.” Tracy
v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010). But “the
degree of solicitude may be lessened where the particular
pro se litigant is experienced in litigation and familiar
with the procedural setting presented. The ultimate
extension of this reasoning is that a lawyer representing
himself ordinarily receives no such solicitude at all.” Id.
at 102 (citation omitted); see Ye v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections,
No. 20 Civ. 11072 (JPC), 2021 WL 37575, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 5, 2021). Plaintiff alleges that he is an attorney in
New York City. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1 (“Plaintiff, at
 17a

Appendix B

all times relevant hereto, works and owns Manchanda

Law Office PLLC, located at 30 Wall Street, 8th Floor,
New York, NY 10005.”), 19 (alleging that Reardon “is
abusing her position . . . by going after lawyers who
criticize or file lawsuits against her Jewish billionaire
oligarch cronies and business contacts, or criticize U.S.
foreign policy blindly supporting Israel’s human rights
violations against Palestinians and other Muslims/Arabs,
such as undersigned lawyer Rahul Manchanda and
[his] law license and law firm” (emphasis added)); see also
https://manchanda-law.com/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2024).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s pleadings are entitled to no special
solicitude.

B. Discussion

For reasons that follow, the Court concludes that

dismissal is required for each of Plaintiff’s federal causes
of action. The Court starts with Plaintiff’s second cause
of action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1, for which
there is no private right of action. The Court then turns
to Plaintiff’s other claims against each of the Defendants:
the FBI (construed to include the United States), the
Individual Defendants, and the NYPD (construed to
include the City of New York).

1. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1

The second cause of action alleges that Defendants

violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24, and
the Amended Complaint also has another paragraph
that quotes Section 2000ee-1, with a heading, “42 U.S.
 18a

Appendix B

CODE § 2000EE-1. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

OFFICERS,” id. ¶ 16. In the December 22, 2023 Order,
the Court gave Plaintiff notice of its intent to dismiss
the second cause of action for failure to state a claim.
Manchanda I, 2023 WL 8879226, at *4. In his December
23, 2023 Response, Plaintiff seems to concede that he
does not have a viable claim under Section 2000ee-1 and
withdraws the second cause of action. See Dec. 23, 2023
Response at 3 (“Regarding the claim mentioning 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ee-1, we recognize that recently the statute was
clarified to not provide a right to private action, however
we only focused on the ‘retaliation’ aspect of this statute
for filing civil rights complaints with ICE/DHS, which
we did here, and also experienced from the defendants . . .
and plaintiff is willing to forgo this as a formal claim[.]”).

Indeed, as Plaintiff has been made aware by another

judge in this District, there is no private right of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1. See Manchanda v. Lewis,
No. 20 Civ. 1773 (GBD) (RWL), 2021 WL 746212, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2021), report & recommendation
adopted by 2021 WL 1192083 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021),
aff’d, No. 21-1088-cv, 2021 WL 5986877 (2d Cir. Dec. 17,
2021) (summary order), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 96 (2022);
see Muzumala v. Mayorkas, No. 22 Civ. 3789 (JGK), 2022
WL 2916610, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2022). The second
cause of action is therefore dismissed.

2. Claims Against the FBI and the United States

of America

In the Court’s December 22, 2023 Order, the Court

dismissed all claims against the FBI, because to the extent
 19a

Appendix B

the FTCA’s wavier of sovereign immunity might apply

in this case, the proper defendant would be the United
States, not the FBI. Manchanda I, 2023 WL 8879226,
at *4; see Robinson v. Overseas Mil. Sales Corp., 21 F.3d
502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994); Mignogna v. Sair Aviation, Inc., 937
F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1991). Further, the Court explained
that sovereign immunity bars Plaintif f from proceeding
against the United States under the federal statutes that
he has pleaded, specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (first cause
of action), the EPCA (third cause of action), and the CFAA
(fourth cause of action). Manchanda I, 2023 WL 8879226,
at *5. 3 And to the extent the Amended Complaint’s citation
to civil RICO provisions, Am. Compl. ¶ 3, suggest that he
seeks to proceed under that statute, Congress also has
not waived sovereign immunity there either. Manchanda
I, 2023 WL 8879226, at *5. The Court therefore also
dismissed all such claims against the United States. Id.

As the Court explained in the December 22, 2023

Order, to the extent Plaintiff’s reliance on Section 1983
and state tort law suggests that he seeks to bring tort
claims against the United States, such claims may only
be potentially viable under the FTCA’s partial waiver of
sovereign immunity. Id. A jurisdictional condition of the
FTCA’s waiver is administrative exhaustion: a plaintiff
must “have first presented the claim to the appropriate
Federal agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). This requires a
plaintiff to have submitted “an executed Standard Form

3. Further, as noted at supra III.B.1, there is no private

right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1 (second cause of action), so
that statute necessarily does not waive the United States’s sovereign
immunity.
 20a

Appendix B

95 or other written notification of an incident, accompanied

by a claim for money damages in a sum certain for injury
to or loss of property, personal injury, or death alleged
to have occurred by reason of the incident.” 28 C.F.R.
§ 14.2(a). Only after the agency denies that claim, or fails
to respond within six months, may a plaintiff initiate a
federal action under the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see
Celestine v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health Ctr.,
403 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The FTCA requires that a
claimant exhaust all administrative remedies before filing
a complaint in federal district court. This requirement
is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.” (citing McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993))); accord Rivera v.
Morris Heights Health Ctr., No. 05 Civ. 10154 (SHS), 2006
WL 345855, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006); Matthias v.
United States, 475 F. Supp. 3d 125, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).
Moreover, even if administrative exhaustion is satisfied,
the FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that
does not extend to all possible torts that a plaintiff may
bring. See Cangemi v. United States, 13 F.4th 115, 130
(2d Cir. 2021) (“But the FTCA is limited by a number of
exceptions, including the so-called ‘discretionary function
exception,’ which bars ‘[a]ny claim . . . based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part
of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.’”
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)) (alterations in original)).

The Court advised in its December 22, 2023 Order that

Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege exhaustion and gave
Plaintiff the opportunity to address that issue. Manchanda
 21a

Appendix B

I, 2023 WL 8879226, at *5. Plaintiff’s December 23, 2023

Response did not cure this deficiency. He attached two
copies of a Standard Form 95, which lists Plaintiff as
the claimant and the FBI as the federal agency, is dated
November 3, 2023, and alleges an injury that occurred on
that same date. Dkt. 53-1 at 1-2; id. at 74-75 (same). But this
action had been commenced two weeks earlier on October
21, 2023. Dkt. 1. “Because the exhaustion requirement
is jurisdictional, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
where a suit is initiated on a FTCA claim before the
agency makes a final determination on the claim.” Pryce
v. United States, No. 21 Civ. 1698 (KPF), 2022 WL 3155842,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2022) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a);
McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113). Similarly, Plaintiff provided
what appear to be complaints he filed with the Department
of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”)
against the “NYC FBI FIELD OFFICE,” which alleges
an incident occurring on November 3, 2023, Dkt 53-1 at
59-63, and against an FBI agent, which alleges ties of a
matrimonial judge to another attorney “based on local
Jewish Organized Crime,” resulting in an injury occurring
on December 11, 2023, id. at 64-66. In addition to the fact
that these OPR complaints apparently were filed after the
commencement of this action, neither complaint amounts
to a “written notification of an incident, accompanied by
a claim for money damages in a sum certain.” 28 C.F.R.
§ 14.2(a). The latter in fact appears to have nothing at all to
do with this case. Plaintiff additionally included numerous
emails apparently addressed to various government
agencies, including emails to accounts ending in “fbi.
gov” and others that appear to be addressed to state
and city agencies, with many making allegations about
 22a

Appendix B

certain Defendants in this case, e.g., Dkt. 53-1 at 3-54; a

personal injury claim apparently filed with the New York
City Comptroller alleging injury because the FBI did
not assist when he was a crime victim, id. at 67-73; and
other complaints apparently filed with OPR regarding an
FBI agent for targeting him, id. at 51-54, and regarding
an attorney for the United States, id. at 55-58. These
communications also do not amount to “written notification
of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages
in a sum certain” received by “a Federal agency.” 28
C.F.R. § 14.2(a).

After the Court gave Plaintiff notice in the January

2, 2024 Order that the materials he provided did not
seem to establish exhaustion under the FTCA, Plaintiff
provided additional submissions on January 3, 2024 after
doing “another ‘deep dive.’” Jan. 3, 2024 Response. The
additional submissions also do not establish that he has
exhausted his administrative remedies under the FTCA
with respect to his claims brought in this case; indeed,
many of the attachments are not even filings with the
federal government. He attached four complaints that
filed with the United Nations Human Rights Council, Dkt.
58-1 at 18-27, 45-50, and an “Employment Discrimination
Complaint” filed with the New York State Division of
Human Rights, id. at 33-41. Plaintiff also included more
emails sent to addresses that would seem consistent
with accounts at the FBI, the NYPD, and the New York
Attorney General’s Office, in which he complains of
cyberstalking, id. at 3-4, and requests an investigation of
the First Department’s Attorney Grievance Committee,
id. at 13-17. He attached complaints filed with the
 23a

Appendix B

Department of Justice, to include a Civilian Complaint

filed with the United States Attorney’s Office naming
Dopico and accusing the First Department’s Attorney
Grievance Committee of improperly investigating and
harassing him, id. at 1-2, and a report to the Department
of Justice’s Civil Rights Division naming the New York
County Lawyers Association’s Fee Dispute Committee
and alleging “an institutionally racist and discriminatory
environment for minority attorneys,” id. at 42-44. And
while Plaintiff attached copies of four additional Form 95s,
none of them concern allegations relating to claims against
the federal government in the Amended Complaint, i.e., an
alleged failure to investigate criminal activity. Rather,
those Form 95s concern the rejection of Plaintiff’s judicial
complaints, id. at 5-8, his complaints about not receiving a
fair hearing apparently because of the constitution of the
panel for a Second Circuit appeal, id. at 9-10, his allegations
of statements made by an FBI agent who called Plaintiff
in connection with an investigation, id. at 11-12, and
his allegations of misconduct and behavior by someone,
including accusations that Plaintiff was targeted by
Jewish organized crime, and request for an investigation,
id. at 28-32. None of these submissions satisfy the FTCA’s
exhaustion requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and 28
C.F.R. § 14.2(a) with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against
the federal government in the Amended Complaint.

But even if Plaintiff were to satisfy the FTCA’s

exhaustion requirement, he lacks a viable cause of action
against the United States. In the Standard Form 95,
attached to the December 23, 2023 Response, Plaintiff
wrote:
 24a

Appendix B

As I have reported in other state and federal

lawsuits, as well as current SDNY lawsuit case
index no 23-CV-9292, for the past 21 years, the
FBI NYC Field Office or FBI IC3 has virtually
never provided assistance, protection, or
guidance to undersigned when he was a victim
of serious crime, including but not limited to
death threats, extortion, blackmail, aggravated
harassment, and other crimes by organized
crime or individual criminals, most notably
[J]ewish organized crime, that is the subject of
this lawsuit. In fact most times the NYC Field
Office and NYPD First Precinct would turn on
undersigned when he (see attached)[.]4

Dkt. 53-1 at 1. Plaintiff’s allegations in the Amended

Complaint similarly appear to be based on the FBI’s
supposed failure to investigate criminal activity and to
protect him from harm. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20a-20f. Yet
a federal law enforcement agency’s decision to conduct an
investigation in response to reports of criminal activity
is a discretionary function that is not cognizable under
the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (excluding from the
FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity “[a]ny claim based

4. In Plaintiff’s December 23, 2023 Response, it was not clear

what if anything was “attached” to the Standard Form 95. Another
document attached to Plaintiff’s December 23, 2023 Response was
an OPR complaint against the “NYC FBI FIELD OFFICE,” which
contained largely identical language, stating that “most times
the NYC FBI Field Office and NYPD First Precinct would turn
on undersigned when he reported crime, rather than go after the
criminals themselves.” Dkt. 53-1 at 62.
 25a

Appendix B

upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,

exercising due care, . . . based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused”); Valdez v. United
States, No. 08 Civ. 4424 (RPP), 2009 WL 2365549, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2009) (concluding that “decisions about
how to conduct investigations fall squarely within the
discretionary function exception” to the FTCA); see also
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court
has recognized on several occasions over many years that
an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether
through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally
committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”).

In his December 23, 2023 Response, Plaintiff

contended that he has alleged that the FBI (along with
the NYPD and the Attorney Grievance Committee) had
undercover agents and informants harm him: “The Court
should also be reminded that we allege (with evidence) that
the FBI, NYPD, and [the Attorney Grievance Committee]
worked in tandem, together, to send dangerous and
mentally unstable undercovers and informants who
committed crimes and intentional torts against plaintiff[.]”
Dec. 23, 2023 Response at 3. And then in his January
2, 2024 Response, Plaintiff similarly contended that
“the court ignores that we also allege intentional torts
causing personal injury, not just failures to investigate,
as well as sending undercovers and informants who
committed intentional torts/criminal acts against us,
causing substantial personal injury, not just that the FBI/
 26a

Appendix B

NYPD refused to investigate crime against us.” Jan. 2,

2024 Response at 2. These allegations are nowhere to
be found in the Amended Complaint. See generally Am.
Compl.; see, e.g., Campbell v. Columbia Univ., No. 22 Civ.
10164 (VSB), 2023 WL 6038024, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15,
2023) (“The Court is limited to consideration of the facts
as stated in the complaint, any documents which are
attached to the complaint, and any documents which are
incorporated by reference into the complaint.” (quotation
omitted)). But regardless, the Court need not give weight
to such speculative allegations, which, notwithstanding
his suggestion that the allegation was “with evidence,”
have no factual support in Plaintiff’s allegations. See
Gallop, 642 F.3d at 368 (“While, as a general matter, [the
plaintiff] or any other plaintiff certainly may allege that
the most senior members of the United States government
conspired to commit acts of terrorism against the United
States, the courts have no obligation to entertain pure
speculation and conjecture.”).

For all these reasons, subject matter jurisdiction

is lacking over any FTCA claims because Plaintiff has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and, even
were Plaintiff to exhaust them, he does not have a viable
cause of action against the United States under the FTCA
based on the allegations against the federal government
in the Amended Complaint. Any claims under the FTCA
therefore are dismissed.
 27a

Appendix B

3. Federal Claims Against Reardon, Shea, Dopico,

and Justice Acosta

Plaintiff seeks $20 million in damages from the four

Individual Defendants—Reardon as the Chairwoman of
the First Department’s Attorney Grievance Committee,
Shea as an attorney with the First Department, Dopico
as the Chief Attorney of the First Department’s Attorney
Grievance Committee, and Justice Acosta as the Presiding
Justice of the First Department—arising from attorney
disciplinary proceedings in the First Department. E.g.
Am. Compl. ¶ 4 (“As this lawsuit demonstrates, defendants
are weaponizing the judicial and legal system, abusing
their position and power to remove Plaintiff’s law license
of 21 years, ‘soft kill’ the plaintiff on behalf of Jewish
Organized Crime, Extremist Jewish Zionist donors,
financial contributors, oligarchs, within their orbit and
sphere of influence . . . .”). He accuses Reardon of “going
after . . . [Plaintiff] and [his] law license and law firm,”
id. ¶ 19, and alleges that Shea, Dopico, and Justice Acosta
“have been actively aiding and abetting Abigail Reardon’s
crazed and ruthless crusade against . . . Plaintiff for many
years, breaking numerous laws and ethics along the way,”
id. ¶ 20. There is no allegation of conduct taken by any
of these Defendants outside of the scope of their official
responsibilities. In the December 22, 2023 Order, the
Court provided Plaintiff notice of its intent to dismiss his
claims against each of these Individual Defendants on
absolute judicial and quasi- judicial immunity. Manchanda
I, 2023 WL 8879226, at *7. Plaintiff has not provided any
basis to establish that any of these individuals can face
liability for violations of federal law in this case, citing
 28a

Appendix B

instead to fanciful allegations of corruption, criminal acts,

and tortious conduct that are bereft of any allegations in
support. See, e.g., Dec. 23, 2023 Response at 2, 3.

Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages

for actions taken within the scope of their judicial capacity,
provided the actions are not taken “in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
11-12 (1991) (citations omitted). Generally, “acts arising
out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are
considered judicial in nature,” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d
204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009), and in regards to such acts, “even
allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial
immunity,” id. at 209. This is because, “[w]ithout insulation
from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and
intimidation.” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994).
“[T]he scope of [a] judge’s jurisdiction must be construed
broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.”
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).

Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint,

this immunity extends to each of the Individual Defendants.
Plaintiff sues Justice Acosta for damages in connection
with his acts when presiding over Plaintiff’s attorney
disciplinary proceedings. New York State judges who
preside over attorney disciplinary proceedings have
absolute immunity from suits for damages arising out of
judicial acts performed in their judicial capacities. See,
e.g., McNamara v. Kaye, No. 06 Civ. 5169 (DLI), 2008
WL 3836024, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2008) (“A number
of plaintiff’s claims are directed at the . . . Chief Judge
of New York State, the . . . Presiding Justice of the
 29a

Appendix B

Second Department, and the other judicial officers of the

Court of Appeals and the Second Department who were
involved in plaintiff’s disciplinary proceedings. . . . It is
well-settled that judges have absolute immunity from
suits for damages arising out of judicial acts performed
in their judicial capacities.”), aff’d, 360 F. App’x 177 (2d
Cir. 2009) (summary order); Bernstein v. New York, 591
F. Supp. 2d 448, 463 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008) (“Attorney
disciplinary proceedings are ‘judicial in nature,’ so the
presiding officers are protected by absolute immunity.”
(footnote omitted)); Sassower v. Mangano, 927 F. Supp.
113, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“As a result, Sassower has
alleged no basis upon which a fact finder could rationally
infer that defendant Judge Mangano and the associate
justices of the Second Department acted outside their
proper jurisdictional capacities in adjudicating Sassower’s
disciplinary petition and claims raised in relation thereto,
let alone that they acted in the ‘clear absence of all
jurisdiction.’” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 122 F.3d 1057 (2d
Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion).

Turning to the remaining Individual Defendants,

Plaintiff seeks damages from Reardon, Shea, and Dopico
arising from their efforts to investigate him in connection
with attorney disciplinary charges and/or with respect to
efforts to prosecute him concerning those charges before
the First Department. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19,20. Staff
members of state court attorney grievance committees,
including those serving in such roles as these three
individuals, are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. See
e.g., Neroni v. Coccoma, 591 F. App’x 28, 30 (2d Cir.
2015) (summary order) (citing Anonymous v. Ass’n of
 30a

Appendix B

the Bar of the City of New York, 515 F.2d 427, 433 (2d
Cir. 1975)); McKeown v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Jud.
Conduct, 377 F. App’x 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary
order) (“Prosecutors, hearing examiners, and law clerks
are eligible for absolute immunity, and those involved in
preparing and adjudicating attorney discipline proceedings
share analogous roles.” (citing, inter alia, Oliva v. Heller,
839 F.2d 37, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1988))); Napolitano v. Saltzman,
315 F. App’x 351, 351-52 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order)
(“Saltzman enjoys absolute immunity for his actions as
counsel to the Grievance Committee, which are ‘quasi-
public adjudicatory [or] prosecutorial’ in nature. In
receiving the complaints about [an attorney], investigating
them, and making recommendations to the Appellate
Division, Saltzman was clearly acting within the scope of
his jurisdiction. The allegation that he may have violated
procedural or ethical rules is irrelevant, as it is the nature
of the act and not the impropriety of the act that matters.”
(citations omitted)); Feng Li v. Rabner, No. 15 Civ. 2484
(KBF), 2015 WL 1822795, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2015)
(“Because a state grievance committee acts ‘as a quasi-
judicial body,’ its members are entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity. Insofar as [the plaintiff] names [grievance
committee staff members] for their involvement in the
disbarment action, they are entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity.” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 643 F. App’x 57 (2d
Cir. 2016) (summary order); Finn v. Anderson, No. 12
Civ. 5742 (VB), 2013 WL 12085092, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
6, 2013) (“[P]ersons working for Grievance Committees,
conducting investigations and proceedings, act in a quasi-
judicial capacity. Indeed, . . . counsel to New York State
Grievance Committees are included among the others who
 31a

Appendix B

are afforded absolute quasi-judicial immunity.”), aff’d, 592

F. App’x 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (“This Court
has consistently extended such ‘quasijudicial’ immunity to
investigators with attorney grievance committees . . . .”);
Weissbrod v. Gonzalez, No. 13 Civ. 2565 (JMF), 2013 WL
12084506, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2013) (“[B]ecause state
bar disciplinary proceedings are clearly judicial in nature,
quasi-judicial immunity bars Plaintiff[’]s claims against
these members of the First Departmental Disciplinary
Committee.” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 576 F. App’x 18 (2d
Cir. 2014) (summary order); Thaler v. Casella, 960 F. Supp.
691, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[M]embers of bar association
disciplinary committees are absolutely immune from suit
for damages in their individual capacity, since they act in
a ‘quasi-public adjudicatory or prosecutorial capacity’. . . .
It goes almost without saying that if . . . [the] Chief
Counsel to the Grievance Committee is absolutely immune,
his law clerk . . . is likewise immune.” (citations omitted));
Sassower, 927 F. Supp. at 120-21 (“[B]ecause state bar
disciplinary proceedings are clearly judicial in nature,
quasi-judicial immunity bars claims against state bar
disciplinary committee members . . . and the members
of the Grievance Committee.” (footnote and citations
omitted)).

The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff has suggested

that these Individual Defendants engaged in conduct
that is not protected by immunity: “Plaintiff would like
to remind this court, that there is no judicial or quasi-
judicial immunity for intentional torts or criminal acts
proximately resulting in serious personal injury, as is the
case here[.]” Dec. 23, 2023 Response at 2; accord id. at
 32a

Appendix B

4 (similar). He further contended in his Responses that

the Attorney Grievance Committee (and presumably the
Individual Defendants) “worked in tandem” with the FBI
and the NYPD “to send dangerous and mentally unstable
undercovers and informants who committed crimes and
intentional torts against plaintiff,” id. at 3; accord id.
at 4 (similar), an allegation that is not in the Amended
Complaint, see generally Am. Compl. The Amended
Complaint does allege, however, that Reardon “is abusing
her position by going after lawyers,” like Plaintiff,
“who criticize or file lawsuits against her Jewish billionaire
oligarch cronies and business contacts, or criticize U.S.
foreign policy” as to Israel, and suggests that she is doing
so because these unspecified “wealthy Jewish billionaire
oligarchs” had “bail[ed] her out financially.” Id. ¶ 19. And
as to the other three Individual Defendants, he alleges,
without any specific factual allegations, that they “have
been actively aiding and abetting Abigail Reardon’s crazed
and ruthless crusade against undesigned Plaintiff for
many years, breaking numerous laws and ethics along the
way.” Id. ¶ 20. Here too, the Court does not give weight
to such fanciful and speculative allegations, which find no
support in the Amended Complaint’s factual allegations.
See Gallop, 642 F.3d at 368.

In sum, because Plaintiff has not made any plausible

allegation suggesting that any of these individuals acted
outside their judicial or quasi-judicial capacity or lacked
jurisdiction when they acted, all federal claims against
the Individual Defendants are dismissed as frivolous
pursuant to doctrines of absolute judicial and quasi-
judicial immunity. See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757,
 33a

Appendix B

760 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A complaint will be dismissed as

‘frivolous’ when ‘it is clear that the defendants are immune
from suit.’” (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
327 (1989))); see also Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177
(2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of
absolute judicial immunity is ‘frivolous’ for purposes of
[the in forma pauperis statute].”).

4. Federal Claims Against the NYPD and the City

of New York

In the December 23, 2023 Order, the Court gave

Plaintiff notice of its intent to dismiss any claims against
the NYPD because, as an agency of the City of New
York, the NYPD is not a separate entity that can be sued.
Manchanda I, 2023 WL 8879226, at *7; see N.Y. City
Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for
the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall
be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in
that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by
law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19
(2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York,
740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff
is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”).
In his Responses, Plaintiff offers no argument for why
the NYPD is a proper defendant in this case. The Court
therefore dismisses his federal claims against the NYPD.

To the extent Plaintiff actually intends to sue the

City of New York—which potentially could be a proper
defendant—such federal claims are not viable. See
Manchanda I, 2023 WL 8879226, at *7-8. Liberally
 34a

Appendix B

construing the Amended Complaint, the Court presumes

that Plaintiff’s primary theory for the City’s liability falls
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the statute pleaded in the
first cause of action, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22, and concerns
the alleged failure of the NYPD to investigate crimes
committed against him and to protect him from harm,
see id. ¶¶ 20a- 20d. Section 1983 provides, in relevant
part, that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “A municipality or
other local government may be liable under this section
[1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to
a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’
to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,
60 (2011) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333
(2d Cir. 2011). In Monell, the Supreme Court recognized
such municipal liability when “the action that is alleged
to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially
adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell,
436 U.S. at 690; see id. at 694 (“[I]t is when execution of
a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”). A
plaintiff may plead facts of a policy or custom by alleging
one of the following:
 35a

Appendix B

(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the

municipality; (2) actions taken by governmental
officials responsible for establishing the
municipal policies that caused the particular
deprivation in question; (3) a practice so
consistent and widespread that, although not
expressly authorized, constitutes a custom
or usage of which a supervising policymaker
must have been aware; or (4) a failure by
policymakers to provide adequate training or
supervision to subordinates to such an extent
that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the
rights of those who come into contact with the
municipal employees.

Jones v. Westchester Cnty., 182 F. Supp. 3d 134, 158

(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Brandon v. City of New York,
705 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). “Absent such
a custom, policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be held
liable on a respondeat superior basis for the tort of its
employee.” Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d
Cir. 2012). Further, if there is no underlying constitutional
violation, any claim of municipal liability under Section
1983 must fail. See Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d
207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006).

The Amended Complaint not only is devoid of any

allegations to establish the existence of an unconstitutional
municipal policy or custom that caused Plaintiff’s injuries,
it even lacks allegations that he suffered any violation of
a constitutional right. As Plaintiff seems to concede, see
 36a

Appendix B

Am. Compl. ¶ 20d, 5 there is no federal constitutional duty

for a government official to investigate criminal activity
or to protect an individual from harm. See Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 755-56 (2005); DeShaney
v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195-96 (1989); Gagliardi v. Vill. of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188,
193 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Baltas v. Jones, No. 3:21-CV-
469 (MPS), 2021 WL 6125643, at *14 (D. Conn. Dec. 27,
2021) (“[The plaintiff] has no ‘constitutional right to
an investigation of any kind by government officials.’”
(citation omitted)); Buari v. City of New York, 530 F. Supp.
3d 356, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“[T]here is no constitutional
right to an adequate investigation . . . . Accordingly, a
failure to investigate is not independently cognizable
as a stand-alone claim under Section 1983.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Two recognized
exceptions exist to this general rule: (1) “when the State
takes a person into its custody and holds him there against
his will, the Constitution imposes upon [the state actor]
a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for
his safety and general well-being,” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at
199-200; and (2) when a state actor affirmatively creates
or increases a danger to the plaintiff, see, e.g., Matican v.
City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2008). Even if a
plaintiff can plead a Section 1983 claim that falls within one
of these exceptions, the plaintiff must further show that the
state actor’s “behavior was ‘so egregious, so outrageous,
that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary
conscience.’” Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges no

5. Plaintiff “understand[s] and acknowledges that per several

United States Supreme Court decisions, that the NYPD and FBI
have ‘no duty to protect’” him. Am. Compl. ¶ 20d.
 37a

Appendix B

facts suggesting that either of these two exceptions would

apply. See generally Am. Compl.

The Court also notes, as it did with respect to the

claims against the other Defendants, see supra III.B.2,
III.B.3, that Plaintiff has contended in his Responses
that the NYPD—along with the FBI and the Attorney
Grievance Committee—sent “dangerous and mentally
unstable undercovers and informants who committed
crimes and intentional torts against” him. Dec. 23, 2023
Response at 3; accord Jan. 2, 2024 Response at 2 (similar).
As noted above, such allegations are nowhere to be found
in the Amended Complaint. See generally Am. Compl.
And here too, the Court need not give weight to such
speculative allegations, which lack factual support in
Plaintiff’s allegations. See Gallop, 642 F.3d at 368.

The Court therefore dismisses, for failure to state a

claim, any Section 1983 claim Plaintiff intends to bring
against the City of New York. Further, as the Court also
previewed in its December 22, 2023 Order, the Amended
Complaint contains no allegations that would establish
the City’s liability under the ECPA, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-26,
or the CFAA, id. ¶¶ 27-28. See Manchanda I, 2023 WL
8879226, at *8. Thus, Plaintiff’s federal claims against the
NYPD and, to the extent he seeks to bring them, against
the City are dismissed.

IV. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Having dismissed all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the

Court turns to whether it should exercise supplemental
 38a

Appendix B

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 6 A

district court “may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over [a pendent state law claim] if . . . the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The statute
does not create a “mandatory rule to be applied inflexibly
in all cases.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.
343, 350 n.7 (1988). Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has
held that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims
are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be
considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . .
will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over
the remaining state-law claims.” Kelsey v. City of New
York, 306 F. App’x 700, 703 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Valencia
ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003)); see
also Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 123
(2d Cir. 2006) (reversing a district court decision to retain
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after
dismissal of the federal claim, citing “the absence of a
clearly articulated federal interest”); Anderson v. Nat’l
Grid, PLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 120, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“In
the interest of comity, the Second Circuit instructs that
absent exceptional circumstances, where federal claims
can be disposed of pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or summary
judgment grounds, courts should abstain from exercising
pendent jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

6. The Amended Complaint does not allege diversity of

citizenship for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, see Am. Compl.
¶¶ 1-2, so the Court assumes that Plaintiff is relying on
supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) for his
state law claims.
 39a

Appendix B

In its December 22, 2023 Order, the Court also put

Plaintiff on notice of its intent to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims in the
event his federal claims are dismissed. Manchanda I, 2023
WL 8879226, at *9. Plaintiff has provided no compelling
argument for why the Court should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his state law claims upon dismissal of the
federal claims. Rather, the relevant considerations point
strongly in favor of declining supplemental jurisdiction.
The case is still in the early stages of litigation, without
discovery having yet commenced, and comity dictates that
Plaintiff’s state law causes of action are better suited for
resolution in state court. See Cedar Swamp Holdings,
Inc. v. Zaman, 487 F. Supp. 2d 444, 453 n.63 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (“[A]t early stages in the proceedings, . . . little is
to be gained by way of judicial economy from retaining
jurisdiction.”).

The Court thus concludes that the balance of the

relevant factors points toward declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims
now that his federal claims are dismissed. Accordingly,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Causes
of Action, and dismisses them as well.

V. Leave to Amend

Lastly, although Plaintiff has not sought leave to

amend in the event of dismissal, the Court declines to
sua sponte grant Plaintiff leave to replead his claims.
Plaintiff has amended his Complaint once as a matter
 40a

Appendix B

of course, pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1)(A) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, adding the FBI and the NYPD
as Defendants. Rule 15(a)(2) therefore would apply to
any further amendment of his Complaint. Under Rule
15(a)(2), a court “should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). When deciding whether
to sua sponte grant leave to amend, “courts will consider
many factors, including undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, and futility.” Morales v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 18 Civ. 7401 (NSR), 2020 WL
2766050, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020).

In the December 22, 2023 Order, the Court additionally

provided Plaintiff with notice of its intent to decline
to grant leave to amend the Amended Complaint in
the event it dismisses his federal claims and declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Manchanda I,
2023 WL 8879226, at *9. Plaintiff has not responded by
requesting leave to amend his pleadings, let alone has he
provided any arguments for why he should be allowed
to do so. Rather, and for reasons discussed above, the
Court is of the view that Plaintiff’s federal claims are
clearly without merit as they lack any basis in the law. The
Court therefore denies him leave to replead these claims
on futility grounds. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116,
123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Lucente v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp.,
310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222
F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Panther Partners
Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir.
2012) (“Futility is a determination, as a matter of law, that
proposed amendments would fail to cure prior deficiencies
 41a

Appendix B

or to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.”). And without federal claims in this
case, there would be no basis for this Court to exercise
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims, see supra IV, so
repleading them too would be futile.

VI. Conclusion

As another judge in this District recently observed,

“Manchanda is not a stranger to this court.” Manchanda
v. Att’y Grievance Comm. for First Jud. Dep’t, No. 23
Civ. 3356 (JLR), 2023 WL 3091787, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
26, 2023). From ECF, it appears that, since 2012, he has
filed, as a pro se plaintiff, at least fifteen civil actions in
this District. One judge of this District warned Plaintiff,
almost nine years ago, “that the continued filing of
frivolous or meritless lawsuits will result in an order
barring Plaintiff from filing any new action in this
Court without prior permission.” Manchanda v. Bose,
No. 15 Civ. 2313 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2014), Dkt. 3 at
8- 9 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651). Less than two years ago, the
Second Circuit similarly warned Plaintiff, when he “filed
a pro se pleading in [an] appeal that contain[ed] racist and
anti-Semitic comments” after “ha[ving] done so in the
past,” “that the use of any similar language in future
filings in this Court will result in sanctions, regardless of
whether the filing is otherwise duplicative, vexatious, or
meritless.” Manchanda v. Senderoff, No. 21-1909, 2022
WL 167261, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 24, 2022) (unpublished).
Once again, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in this case
was not only patently without merit, but also contained
offensive and anti-Semitic accusations. This case
 42a

Appendix B

unfortunately demonstrates that the actions of Plaintiff—

an attorney who certainly should know to conduct himself
better—have not improved.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court dismisses

sua sponte Plaintiff’s federal claims (i.e., the First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action)—without
prejudice only to the extent that the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, as detailed above, see supra III.B.2—
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his
state law claims (i.e., the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Causes of Action) and dismisses those claims, and
denies Plaintiff leave to amend his Amended Complaint.
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants and to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 1, 2024

New York, New York

/s/ John P. Cronan

JOHN P. CRONAN
United States District Judge
 43a

APPENDIX C —Appendix
ORDER OFC THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,
FILED DECEMBER 22, 2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

23 Civ. 9292 (JPC) (KHP)

RAHUL MANCHANDA,

Plaintiff,

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

CHIEF ABIGAIL REARDON, STAFF ATTORNEY
REMI SHEA, CHIEF COUNSEL JORGE DOPICO,
JUDGE ROLANDO ACOSTA, NYPD, AND
FBI NYC FIELD OFFICE,

Defendants.

December 22, 2023, Decided

ORDER

JOHN P. CRONAN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Rahul Manchanda, an attorney who is

admitted to practice in this Court and the courts of the
State of New York, brings this pro se action against Abigail
 44a

Appendix C

Reardon, Esq., the Chairwoman of the Attorney Grievance

Committee of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, First Department (“First Department”); Remi
Shea, Esq., an attorney with the First Department; Jorge
Dopico, Esq., the Chief Attorney of the First Department’s
Attorney Gr ievance Committee; Justice Rolando
Acosta, the Presiding Justice of the First Department
(Reardon, Shea, Dopico, and Justice Acosta, collectively,
the “Individual Defendants”); the New York City Police
Department (“NYPD”); and the “NYC Field Office”1 of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). Dkt. 15 (“Am.
Compl.”). While hardly clear, Plaintiff appears to allege
violations of federal and state law arising from actions
taken by the First Department’s Attorney Grievance
Committee, presumably in proceedings concerning
attorney disciplinary charges against him.

For the reasons that follow, the Court sua sponte

dismisses any claims that seek to initiate a criminal
prosecution of Defendants or others, as a private citizen
lacks standing to cause a criminal prosecution. The Court
also sua sponte dismisses claims against the United States
of America—including the FBI—on sovereign immunity

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation does not appear to

have a field office specifically for New York City, but rather a New
York Field Office, located in New York City, that “[c]overs the five
boroughs of New York City, eight counties in New York state, and La
Guardia Airport and John F. Kennedy International Airport.” FBI,
Contact Us: Field Offices, available at https://www.fbi.gov/contact-
us/field-offices/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2023). In any event, the Court
assumes that Plaintiff intends to bring claims against the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
 45a

Appendix C

grounds, other than any claims brought against the United

States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671-80. To the extent
Plaintiff seeks to assert any claims against the United
States under the FTCA, he is ordered to show cause in
writing within fourteen days of this Order that he has
complied with the administrative exhaustion requirements
of the FTCA and further is on notice that his failure to do
so will result in dismissal of such claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.

The Court similarly puts Plaintiff on notice of its

intent to sua sponte dismiss any claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ee-1, because that statute lacks a private right of
action, as well as any claims for damages against the
Individual Defendants under federal law because they
appear to be entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity
based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint. The
Court also puts Plaintiff on notice that it intends to dismiss
any federal claims against the NYPD, as that agency is
not a separate entity that can be sued, and against the
City of New York, because it appears Plaintiff has not
stated a legally cognizable claim for municipal liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor has he articulated any basis
for the City’s liability under the other federal causes of
action pleaded in the Amended Complaint. The Court also
provides notice that it, in the event all federal claims are
dismissed, it does not intend to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any remaining state claims, including
any state claims against the City. The Court will afford
Plaintiff the opportunity to address the viability of his
Section 2000ee-1 claims and of any of his federal causes
 46a

Appendix C

of action against the Individual Defendants, the NYPD,

and the City of New York. No later than fourteen days
from the date of this Order, Plaintiff must show cause in
writing why any of these claims should not be dismissed.
Similarly, by that date, Plaintiff also must show cause
in writing why the Court should not decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state claims
in the event the federal claims are dismissed.

Lastly, the Court also gives Plaintiff notice that it

intends to deny him leave to replead any of the claims
that are the subject of this Order for futility reasons. He
too may address in writing within fourteen days of this
Order why he disagrees with that assessment and believes
he should be granted leave to replead.

I. Background

The nine causes of action listed in the Amended

Complaint cover a broad range of alleged violations of
federal and state law. The first cause of action alleges
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights
under color of law, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22; the second
cause of action purports to allege violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ee-1(e) for retaliation, id. ¶¶ 23-24; the third cause of
action alleges violations of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523, id. ¶¶ 25-
26; the fourth cause of action alleges violations of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030, id. ¶¶ 27-28; the fifth cause of action alleges abuse
of process, id. ¶¶ 29-30; the sixth cause of action alleges
malicious prosecution, id. ¶¶ 31-32; the seventh cause of
 47a

Appendix C

action alleges computer trespass, id. ¶¶ 33-34; the eighth

cause of action alleges conversion of computer data, id.
¶¶ 35-36; and the ninth cause of action alleges judicial
bias and prejudice, id. In 37-38. For each cause of action,
Plaintiff seeks “actual and punitive damages in the amount
of $20,000,000.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38.
Plaintiff additionally may be seeking to hold Defendants
criminally liable, as the Amended Complaint has a section
titled “CRIMINAL ACTS” and alleges violations of 18
U.S.C. § 242, id. ¶¶ 10-15, and further alleges violations of
“civil and criminal RICO,” i.e., the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968,
Am. Compl. ¶ 3, as well as other statutes that allow for
criminal liability, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3121, id. ¶ 5,
the ECPA, id. ¶¶ 5, 25-26, and the CFAA, id. ¶¶ 6, 27-28.

The factual underpinnings of Plaintiff ’s claims

are rather unclear, but appear to relate to attorney
disciplinary proceedings before the First Department’s
Grievance Committee. He summarizes that his case

concerns the non-stop malicious prosecution,

aggravated harassment, abuse of process,
vexatious litigation, forum shopping, judicial
corruption, judicial bias, civil and criminal
RICO, judicial misconduct, public corruption,
unlawful trespassing into computer networks,
conversion/theft of computer data, illegal
electronic sur veillance and w iretapping,
committed jointly by codefendants since at least
2021 all the way to the present day, directly
and proximately contributing to and causing
 48a

Appendix C

Plaintiff Rahul Manchanda’s heart attack

and cardiovascular problems, as well as now
his spouse[’s] . . . colloidal cyst/brain tumor
problems, further bankrupting plaintiffi] by
co-defendants[’] coordinated legal onslaught
going on many years now, with no basis in fact,
evidence, or substantiation of claims.

Id. ¶ 3. He further alleges that Defendants

are weaponizing the judicial and legal system,

abusing their position and power to remove
Plaintiff’s law license of 21 years, “soft kill”
the plaintiff on behalf of Jewish Organized
Crime, Extremist Jewish Zionist donors,
financial contributors, oligarchs, within their
orbit and sphere of influence, simply for Plaintiff
expressing his political views that go against
hardcore extremist Jewish and Zionist domestic
and foreign policy.

Id. 4.

Plaintiff proceeds to allege corruption on the part of

Reardon, the Chairwoman of the First Department’s
Attorney Grievance Committee, that resulted in her
“going after . . . [Plaintiff] and [his] law license and law
firm.” Id. ¶ 19. And he alleges that Shea, Dopico, and
Justice Acosta “have been actively aiding and abetting
Abigail Reardon’s crazed and ruthless crusade against . . .
Plaintiff for many years, breaking numerous laws and
ethics along the way.” Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff’s allegations
 49a

Appendix C

also reach law enforcement. He contends that the FBI

has “virtually never provided assistance, protection, or
guidance to [Plaintiff] when he was a victim of serious
crime, including but not limited to death threats,
extortion, blackmail, aggravated harassment, and other
crimes by organized crime or individual criminals, most
notably [J]ewish organized crime, that is the subject of
this lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 20a. As to both the FBI and the NYPD,
he alleges that “most times[,] . . . [they] would turn on . . .
[Plaintiff] when he reported crime, rather than go after
the criminals themselves,” id. ¶ 20b, and that the agencies
have a policy of “allowing criminals to attack, terrorize,
threaten, harass, and otherwise victimize [him],” id. ¶ 20c.

II. Applicable Law

A district judge has the authority to dismiss a

complaint sua sponte, even when, as here, the plaintiff
has paid the filing fees, if it determines that the action
is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants
Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per
curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent
authority to dismiss a frivolous appeal)), or that subject
matter jurisdiction is lacking, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S. Ct. 1563, 143 L. Ed. 2d
760 (1999). A district judge additionally “has the power
to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state
a claim,” Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 609
n.11 (2d Cir. 1980), so long as the plaintiff is given notice
and “an opportunity to be heard,” Thomas v. Scully, 943
F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam). To adequately
 50a

Appendix C

state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). A claim is plausible
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint’s
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555. In making this determination, the Court must
“accept[] as true the factual allegations in the complaint
and draw[] all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,” Biro v.
Condé Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 2015), but it need
not “accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations,” LaFaro v. N.Y. Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC,
570 F.3d 471, 475-76 (2d Cir. 2009).

Normally, a district court must afford special

solicitude to a pro se litigant; this special solicitude
includes “liberal construction of pleadings, motion
papers, and appellate briefs,” as well as “relaxation of
the limitations on the amendment of pleadings.” Tracy
v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010). But “the
degree of solicitude may be lessened where the particular
pro se litigant is experienced in litigation and familiar with
the procedural setting presented. The ultimate extension
of this reasoning is that a lawyer representing himself
ordinarily receives no such solicitude at all.” Id. at 102
(citation omitted); see Ye v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections, No. 20
Civ. 11072 (JPC), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1177, 2021 WL
37575, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2021).
 51a

Appendix C

III. Discussion

A. Claims Seeking Criminal Prosecution

Although not among the nine enumerated causes

of action, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-38, Plaintiff suggests
throughout the Amended Complaint that he is requesting
the criminal prosecution of the Individual Defendants.
As noted, the Amended Complaint includes a section
titled, “CRIMINAL ACTS,” id. ¶¶ 10-15, and Plaintiff
identifies criminal statutes which he seems to contend that
Defendants violated, to include “criminal RICO,” id. ¶ 3,
and 18 U.S.C. § 242, id. ¶¶ 10-15. He also alleges violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 3121, id. ¶ 5, the ECPA, id. ¶¶ 5, 25-26,
and the CFAA, id. ¶¶ 6, 27-28, all of which have criminal
provisions. “[T]he decision to prosecute is solely within
the discretion of the prosecutor,” Leeke v. Timmerman,
454 U.S. 83, 86-87, 102 S. Ct. 69, 70 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1981),
who is “immune from control or interference by citizen
or court,” Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating
Co., 457 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1972). Because Plaintiff lacks
standing to initiate a criminal prosecution, see Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618-19, 93 S. Ct. 1146,
35 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1973), any claims seeking the criminal
prosecution of the Individual Defendants or anyone else
are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See
Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“If [a] plaintiff[] lack[s] Article III standing, a [federal]
court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear [his]
claim.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
 52a

Appendix C

B. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1

The second cause of action in the Amended Complaint

alleges that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1,
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24, and the Amended Complaint also
has another paragraph that quotes Section 2000ee-1,
with a heading, “42 U.S. CODE § 2000EE-1. PRIVACY
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS,” id. ¶ 16. There
is no private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-
1, as Plaintiff recently was advised in another case he
brought in this District. See Manchanda v. Lewis, No.
20 Civ. 1773 (GBD) (RWL), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38361,
2021 WL 746212, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2021), report &
recommendation adopted, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60899,
2021 WL 1192083 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-
1088-cv, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 37362, 2021 WL 5986877
(2d Cir. Dec. 17, 2021) (summary order), cert. denied, 143 S.
Ct. 96 (2022); see Muzumala v. Mayorkas, No. 22 Civ. 3789
(JGK), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131093, 2022 WL 2916610,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2022). The Court accordingly gives
Plaintiff notice of its intent to dismiss the second cause of
action for failure to state a claim. The Court will provide
Plaintiff with an opportunity to be heard as to the viability
of this cause of action. Plaintiff is ordered to show cause,
in writing, within fourteen days of this Order why any
Section 2000ee-1 claims should not be dismissed as not
legally cognizable.

C. Claims Against the FBI and the United States of

America

The United States of America is immune from suit, and

“hence may be sued only to the extent that it has waived
 53a

Appendix C

sovereign immunity by enacting a statute consenting to

suit.” Davis v. Garcia, No. 07 Civ. 9897 (CLB), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 82204, 2008 WL 2229811, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
May 27, 2008); see United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584, 586, 61 S. Ct. 767, 85 L. Ed. 1058 (1941). Federal
courts therefore are barred from hearing all suits against
the federal government, including suits against any part
of the federal government, such as the FBI, except where
sovereign immunity has been waived. United States v.
Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S. Ct. 1349, 63 L. Ed. 2d
607 (1980) (quoting Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586); Robinson
v. Overseas Mil. Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir.
1994) (“Because an action against a federal agency . . .
is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits
are . . . barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
unless such immunity is waived.”). Relatedly, to the extent
the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity might apply,
the suit may only be brought against the United States,
not an individual federal agency. See Mignogna v. Sair
Aviation, Inc., 937 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1991); Holliday v.
Augustine, No. 3:14-CV-855 (SRU), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2391, 2015 WL 136545, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 2015). All
claims against the FBI are therefore dismissed.

The Court assumes that Plaintiff wishes to name the

United States as the proper federal government defendant
instead. But even so, sovereign immunity precludes
reliance on many of the federal statutes that Plaintiff
cites. Sovereign immunity bars claims against the United
States under the CFAA, see Garland-Sash v. Lewis, No.
05 Civ. 6827 (WHP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20909, 2007
WL 935013, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007), aff’d in part,
 54a

Appendix C

vacated in part on other grounds, 348 F. App’x 639 (2d

Cir. 2009) (summary order); the ECPA, a statute which
even expressly excludes the United States among those
who may be sued, see 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a); and the civil
provision of RICO, see Fallica v. United States, No. 08
Civ. 5071 (JFB) (AKT), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153792,
2010 WL 11530507, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010); Spinale
v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 1704 (KMW) (JCF), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 238, 2004 WL 50873, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 9, 2004), report & recommendation adopted, Dkt.
26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2004). Similarly, as Plaintiff was
recently advised by another judge in this District, “it
is well established that § 1983 does not apply to actions
against the federal government or its officers acting under
color of federal law.” Manchanda, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
38361, 2021 WL 746212, at *5; accord United States v.
Acosta, 502 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 2007). Any claims against
the United States under the CFAA, the ECPA, RICO, and
Section 1983 are therefore dismissed.

To the extent Plaintiff’s allegations of violations of

Section 1983 and state tort law in his causes of action
suggest that he seeks to assert tort claims against the
United States, such claims could only potentially be viable
under the FTCA pursuant that statute’s partial waiver
of sovereign immunity for the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b)(1), 2680; see Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d
78, 85 (2d Cir. 2012). As a condition of the FTCA’s waiver
of sovereign immunity, and therefore as a prerequisite
for this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, a plaintiff must
first present a claim to the appropriate federal agency.
See Celestine v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health Ctr,
 55a

Appendix C

403 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The FTCA requires that a
claimant exhaust all administrative remedies before filing
a complaint in federal district court. This requirement
is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.” (citing McNeil
v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S. Ct. 1980, 124
L. Ed. 2d 21 (1993))); accord Rivera v. Morris Heights
Health Ctr., No. 05 Civ. 10154 (SHS), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 40244, 2006 WL 345855, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14,
2006); Matthias v. United States, 475 F. Supp. 3d 125, 135
(E.D.N.Y. 2020). The mandatory exhaustion language of
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) is clear. An action under the FTCA
may not be instituted against the United States “unless
the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the
appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have
been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by
certified or registered mail.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Only
after the agency denies the claim or fails to respond within
six months may a plaintiff file an action under the FTCA
in federal court. See id.

Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that

he filed an administrative claim under the FTCA with a
federal governmental entity for damages and received a
final written determination or a lack of response within
six months from that governmental entity before bringing
this action. Plaintiff therefore is ordered to show cause,
in writing and within fourteen days of this Order, why
any claims against the United States pursuant to the
FTCA should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction on account of his failure to exhaust the FTCA’s
administrative remedies.
 56a

Appendix C

D. Claims Against the Individual Defendants

As noted, each of the nine causes of action seeks “actual

and punitive damages in the amount of $20,000,000.” Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38. To reiterate,
the Individual Defendants consist of Reardon who is
the Chairwoman of the First Department’s Attorney
Grievance Committee, Shea who is an attorney with the
First Department, Dopico who is the Chief Attorney of the
First Department’s Attorney Grievance Committee, and
Justice Acosta who is the Presiding Justice of the First
Department. Each of these four Individual Defendants
appears to be immune from suit for damages based on
the allegations of the Amended Complaint.

Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages

for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial
responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-12, 112 S.
Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991). Generally, “acts arising
out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge
are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579
F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “[E]ven allegations of bad
faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. at
209. This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability,
judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation.”
Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). Judicial
immunity does not, however, apply when a judge takes
action “outside” his or her judicial capacity, or when the
judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is
taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-
12; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions
that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge’s
 57a

Appendix C

jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue

is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 356, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978). This
immunity extends to New York State judges who preside
over attorney disciplinary proceedings, 2 and members
of the staffs of the attorney grievance committees of the
state courts are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. 3
2. See, e.g., McNamara v. Kaye, No. 06 Civ. 5169 (DLI), 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62568, 2008 WL 3836024, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
13, 2008) (“A number of plaintiff’s claims are directed at the . . .
Chief Judge of New York State, the . . . Presiding Justice of the
Second Department, and the other judicial officers of the Court of
Appeals and the Second Department who were involved in plaintiff’s
disciplinary proceedings . . . . It is well-settled that judges have
absolute immunity from suits for damages arising out of judicial acts
performed in their judicial capacities.”), aff’d, 360 F. App’x 177 (2d
Cir. 2009) (summary order); Bernstein v. New York, 591 F. Supp. 2d
448, 463 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008) (“Attorney disciplinary proceedings
are ‘judicial in nature,’ so the presiding officers are protected by
absolute immunity.” (footnote omitted)); Sassower v. Mangano,
927 F. Supp. 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“As a result, Sassower has
alleged no basis upon which a fact finder could rationally infer that
defendant Judge Mangano and the associate justices of the Second
Department acted outside their proper jurisdictional capacities in
adjudicating Sassower’s disciplinary petition and claims raised in
relation thereto, let alone that they acted in the ‘clear absence of all
jurisdiction.’” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 122 F.3d 1057 (2d Cir. 1997)
(unpublished opinion).

3. See e.g., Neroni v. Coccoma, 591 F. App’x 28, 30 (2d Cir.

2015) (summary order) (citing Anonymous v. Ass’n of the Bar of the
City of New York, 515 F.2d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 1975)); McKeown v. N.Y.
State Comm’n on Jud. Conduct, 377 F. App’x 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2010)
(summary order) (“Prosecutors, hearing examiners, and law clerks
are eligible for absolute immunity, and those involved in preparing
and adjudicating attorney discipline proceedings share analogous
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Appendix C

roles.” (citing, inter alia, Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 39-40 (2d
Cir. 1988))); Napolitano v. Saltzman, 315 F. App’x 351, 351-52 (2d
Cir. 2009) (summary order) (“Saltzman enjoys absolute immunity
for his actions as counsel to the Grievance Committee, which are
‘quasi-public adjudicatory [or] prosecutorial’ in nature. In receiving
the complaints about [an attorney], investigating them, and making
recommendations to the Appellate Division, Saltzman was clearly
acting within the scope of his jurisdiction. The allegation that he may
have violated procedural or ethical rules is irrelevant, as it is the
nature of the act and not the impropriety of the act that matters.”
(citations omitted)); Feng Li v. Rabner, No. 15 Civ. 2484 (KBF), 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52234, 2015 WL 1822795, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22,
2015) (“Because a state grievance committee acts ‘as a quasi-judicial
body,’ its members are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Insofar as
[the plaintiff] names [grievance committee staff members] for their
involvement in the disbarment action, they are entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity.” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 643 F. App’x 57 (2d Cir.
2016) (summary order); Finn v. Anderson, No. 12 Civ. 5742 (VB), 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191828, 2013 WL 12085092, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
6, 2013) (“[P]ersons working for Grievance Committees, conducting
investigations and proceedings, act in a quasi-judicial capacity.
Indeed, . . . counsel to New York State Grievance Committees are
included among the others who are afforded absolute quasi-judicial
immunity.”), aff’d, 592 F. App’x 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order)
(“This Court has consistently extended such ‘quasijudicial’ immunity
to investigators with attorney grievance committees . . . .”);
Weissbrod v. Gonzalez, No. 13 Civ. 2565 (JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 201755, 2013 WL 12084506, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2013)
(“[B]ecause state bar disciplinary proceedings are clearly judicial
in nature, quasi-judicial immunity bars Plaintiff[’]s claims against
these members of the First Departmental Disciplinary Committee.”
(citations omitted)), aff’d, 576 F. App’x 18 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary
order); Thaler v. Casella, 960 F. Supp. 691, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[M]
embers of bar association disciplinary committees are absolutely
immune from suit for damages in their individual capacity, since
they act in a ‘quasi-public adjudicatory or prosecutorial capacity’ . . . .
 59a

Appendix C

Plaintiff appears to seek damages from Reardon,

Shea, and Dopico arising from their efforts to investigate
him in connection with attorney disciplinary charges and/
or with respect to efforts to prosecute him concerning
those charges before the First Department. Plaintiff
also appears to sue Justice Acosta for damages in
connection with his acts when presiding over Plaintiff’s
attorney disciplinary proceedings. Plaintiff has not made
any plausible allegation suggesting that any of these
individuals was lacking jurisdiction or acted outside
their judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. Accordingly, the
Court provides Plaintiff with notice of its intent to dismiss
his claims against these four Individual Defendants as
frivolous pursuant to doctrines of absolute judicial and
quasi-judicial immunity. See Montero v Travis, 171 F.3d
757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A complaint will be dismissed
as ‘frivolous’ when ‘it is clear that the defendants are
immune from suit.’” (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989)));
see also Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial
immunity is ‘frivolous’ for purposes of [the in forma
pauperis statute].”). Plaintiff is ordered to show cause,
in writing, within fourteen days this Order addressing
why his federal claims against the Individual Defendants
should not be dismissed.

It goes almost without saying that if . . . [the] Chief Counsel to the

Grievance Committee is absolutely immune, his law clerk . . . is
likewise immune.” (citations omitted)); Sassower, 927 F. Supp. at 120-
21 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[B]ecause state bar disciplinary proceedings are
clearly judicial in nature, quasi-judicial immunity bars claims against
state bar disciplinary committee members . . . and the members of
the Grievance Committee.” (footnote and citations omitted)).
 60a

Appendix C

E. Claims Against the NYPD and the City of New York

As an agency of the City of New York, the NYPD is not

a separate entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch.
17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of
penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the
name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency,
except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v.
City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see
also Emerson v. City ofNew York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385,
395 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited
from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court therefore also
gives notice to Plaintiff of its intent to dismiss his federal
claims against the NYPD.

To the extent that Plaintiff actually intends to sue the

City of New York, such claims also do not appear to be
viable. The Court presumes that Plaintiff’s theory for the
NYPD’s liability is premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
is the statute pleaded in the first cause of action, Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 21-22, and concerns the agency’s alleged failure
to investigate criminal activity against him and failure to
protect him from harm, see id. ¶¶ 20a-20d.4 Section 1983
provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4. The Amended Complaint, liberally construed, alleges no
other facts or theory that could give rise to liability for the City. See
generally Am. Compl.
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To the extent that Plaintiff actually intends to sue

the City of New York under Section 1983 under a failure
to prosecute or failure to protect theory, such a claim
also does not appear to be viable. When a plaintiff sues
a municipality under Section 1983, the plaintiff must
show that the municipality itself caused the violation
of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51, 60, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011) (“A
municipality or other local government may be liable under
this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’
a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to
be subjected’ to such deprivation.” (quoting Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed.
2d 611 (1978))); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d
Cir. 2011). In Monell, the Supreme Court recognized that
a municipality can be liable under Section 1983 when “the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements
or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Put simply, “a
municipality can be held liable under Section 1983 if the
deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights under federal law is
caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the
municipality.” Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72,
80 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694
(“[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts
the injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under § 1983.”). A plaintiff may plead facts of a policy or
custom by alleging one of the following:
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Appendix C

(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the

municipality; (2) actions taken by governmental
officials responsible for establishing the
municipal policies that caused the particular
deprivation in question; (3) a practice so
consistent and widespread that, although not
expressly authorized, constitutes a custom
or usage of which a supervising policymaker
must have been aware; or (4) a failure by
policymakers to provide adequate training or
supervision to subordinates to such an extent
that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the
rights of those who come into contact with the
municipal employees.

Jones v. Westchester Cnty., 182 F. Supp. 3d 134, 158

(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Brandon v. City of New York,
705 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). “Absent such
a custom, policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be held
liable on a respondeat superior basis for the tort of its
employee.” Jones, 691 F.3d at 80. Further, if there is no
underlying constitutional violation, any claim of municipal
liability under Section 1983 must fail. See Segal v. City of
New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006).

The Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations

to establish the existence of an unconstitutional municipal
policy or custom that caused Plaintiff’s injuries, or even
that he suffered any violation of a constitutional right.
As Plaintiff seems to concede, see Am. Compl. ¶ 20d,
there is no federal constitutional duty for a government
official to investigate criminal activity or to protect
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Appendix C

an individual from harm. See Town of Castle Rock v.

Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 755-56, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 162 L.
Ed. 2d 658 (2005); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96, 109 S. Ct. 998, 103 L.
Ed. 2d 249 (1989); Gagliardi v. Vill. of Pawling, 18 F.3d
188, 193 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Baltas v. Jones, No. 3:21-
CV-469 (MPS), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 245532, 2021 WL
6125643, at *14 (D. Conn. Dec. 27, 2021) (“[The plaintiff]
has no ‘constitutional right to an investigation of any
kind by government officials.’” (citation omitted)); Buari
v. City of New York, 530 F. Supp. 3d 356, 389 (S.D.N.Y.
2021) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to an adequate
investigation . . . . Accordingly, a failure to investigate is
not independently cognizable as a stand-alone claim under
Section 1983.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). Two recognized exceptions exist to this general
rule: (1) “when the State takes a person into its custody
and holds him there against his will, the Constitution
imposes upon [the state actor] a corresponding duty to
assume some responsibility for his safety and general
well-being,” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200; and (2) when
a state actor affirmatively creates or increases a danger
to the plaintiff, see, e.g., Matican v. City of New York,
524 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2008). Even if a plaintiff can
plead a Section 1983 claim that falls within one of these
exceptions, the plaintiff must further show that the state
actor’s “behavior was ‘so egregious, so outrageous, that it
may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’”
Id. (citation omitted). To the extent that Plaintiff asserts
that the City of New York failed to investigate criminal
activity against him or failed to protect him from harm,
he does not allege any facts suggesting that either of these
two exceptions would apply.
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Appendix C

The Court therefore gives Plaintiff notice of its intent

to dismiss, for failure to state a claim, his Section 1983
claim against the NYPD and, to the extent he intends
to bring one, against the City of New York. Further, the
Amended Complaint contains no allegations that would
establish the City’s liability under any of the other federal
causes of action, which allege violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ee01, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24; see supra III.B, the
ECPA, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-26, and the CFAA, id. ¶¶ 27-28.
And, as noted in the next section, see infra III.F, the Court
intends to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over any remaining state law claims, including any
remaining state law claims against the City, in the event
all federal claims are dismissed. Plaintiff is afforded the
opportunity to respond should he oppose dismissal as to
the NYPD and/or the City of New York. He is ordered to
show cause in writing within fourteen days of this Order
why these claims too should not be dismissed.

F. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Given that, after receiving any response from Plaintiff,

the Court may dismiss all of his federal claims, the Court
considers now whether it should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 5 A
district court “may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over [a pendent state law claim] if . . . the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

5. The Amended Complaint does not allege diversity of

citizenship for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2,
so the Court assumes that Plaintiff is relying on supplemental
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) for his state law claims.
 65a

Appendix C

original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The statute does

not create a “mandatory rule to be applied inflexibly in all
cases.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
n.7, 108 S. Ct. 614, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1988). Nevertheless,
the Second Circuit has held that “in the usual case in
which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial,
the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to
exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”
Kelsey v. City of New York, 306 F. App’x 700, 703 (2d Cir.
2009) (quoting Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299,
305 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Kolari v. N.Y-Presbyterian
Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversing a district
court decision to retain supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims after dismissal of the federal claim, citing
“the absence of a clearly articulated federal interest”);
Anderson v. Nat’l Grid, PLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 120, 147
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“In the interest of comity, the Second
Circuit instructs that absent exceptional circumstances,
where federal claims can be disposed of pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) or summary judgment grounds, courts should
abstain from exercising pendent jurisdiction.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

Here, the case is still in the early stages of litigation,

without discovery having yet commenced. See Cedar
Swamp Holdings, Inc. v. Zaman, 487 F. Supp. 2d 444,
453 n.63 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[A]t early stages in the
proceedings, . . . little is to be gained by way of judicial
economy from retaining jurisdiction.”). Further, comity
dictates that Plaintiff’s state law causes of action are
better suited for resolution in state court. The Court
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Appendix C

thus intends to conclude that the balance of factors to be

considered—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity—point toward declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction in the event that Plaintiff’s federal claims are
dismissed. Here too, Plaintiff must show cause in writing
within fourteen days of this Order why the Court should
not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
those claims.

G. Leave to Amend

The Court further gives notice that it intends to

deny Plaintiff leave to replead any of his claims, because
granting such leave would be futile. Plaintiff has amended
his Complaint once as a matter of course, pursuant to
Rule 15(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
adding the FBI and the NYPD as Defendants. Rule 15(a)
(2) therefore would apply to any further amendment of
his Complaint. Under Rule 15(a)(2), a court “should freely
give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)
(2). When deciding whether to sua sponte grant leave
to amend, “courts will consider many factors, including
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure
to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the opposing party,
and futility.” Morales v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 18
Civ. 7401 (NSR), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93307, 2020 WL
2766050, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020). In this case, for
reasons discussed above, the Court is of the view that
the claims discussed in this Order are clearly without
merit and lack any basis in law—assuming, with respect
to any claims against the United States, he has failed to
administratively exhaust—and therefore intends to deny
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Appendix C

leave to replead these claims on futility grounds. See Hill

v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Lucente
v. Int 1 Bus. Mach. Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002);
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see
also Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681
F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Futility is a determination, as
a matter of law, that proposed amendments would fail to
cure prior deficiencies or to state a claim under Rule 12(b)
(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). Plaintiff may
offer his views on this issue as well. Within fourteen days
of this Order, he also may address in writing why leave
to amend should not be denied with respect to any of the
claims that are dismissed pursuant to this Order or for
which the Court has stated its intent to dismiss.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court dismisses

sua sponte the following claims in the Amended Complaint
for lack of jurisdiction: (1) any claims seeking to initiate
criminal prosecution; (2) any claims against the FBI;
and (3) any claims against the United States of America
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1, the CFAA,
the EPCA, RICO, and state law. To the extent Plaintiff
intends to pursue any claims against the United States
under the FTCA, he is ordered to show cause in writing
within fourteen days of this Order why such claims should
not be dismissed because of his failure to comply with the
FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirements; failure
to show cause will result the Court dismissing all claims
against the United States for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court also provides notice to Plaintiff of
its intent to sua sponte dismiss any other claims under 42
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Appendix C

U.S.C. § 2000ee-1, all federal claims against the Individual

Defendants, all federal claims against the NYPD, and
all federal claims against the City. Plaintiff is ordered to
show cause in writing within fourteen days of this Order
why these claims are legally viable and should not be
dismissed. The Court also gives notice that, in the event
all federal claims are dismissed, it intends to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining
state law claims. Plaintiff also is ordered to show cause
in writing within fourteen days why the Court should not
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such
claims. Lastly, the Court provides notice of its intent not to
grant Plaintiff leave to replead his claims. Should Plaintiff
oppose the denial of repleading his claims, Plaintiff must
make a written submission addressing that issue as well
within fourteen days of this Order.

In light of this Order, all deadlines for Defendants to

respond to the Amended Complaint are adjourned sine
die.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 22, 2023

New York, New York

/s/ John P. Cronan

JOHN P. CRONAN
United States District Judge