SEMANTIC ASSIGNMENT Semantic volume 1

Arranged by: Riska Alfin Pramita K2208095

ENGLISH DEPARTMENT TEACHER TRAINING AND EDUCATION FACULTY SEBELAS MARET UNIVERSITY SURAKARTA 2011

1 Introduction Some Basic Terms and Concepts

1.1.The Meaning of meaning Semantic is generally defined as the study of meaning. Certain of the meanings (or senses) can be distinguished by the technique of substituting other words in the same context and enquiring whether the resulting sentences are equivalent. Meaning is a word of the ordinary, everyday vocabulary of English. There is a distinction to be drawn between the meaning of a word and the meaning of a (non- idiomatic) phrase or sentence is obvious enough, as also is the fact that the meaning of a phrase or sentence is a product of the meaning of the words of which it is composed. The term meaning itself will be used throughout in what might be called an ordinary- language, or every day, sense; that is to say, in what will be described later as an intuitive, pre- theoretical, sense. 1.2. Use and Mention One of the most characteristic features of natural language is their capacity for referring to, or describing, themselves. One terminological distinction proposed or this purpose and now quite commonly found in the literature is that of use and mention. The distinction between John and John may appear to be, not only rather subtle, but unnecessary, since proper nouns in English are uninflected, except for the possessive form, Johns (and one might inclined to treat Johns, as many linguists do, as an extension of John, that true or underlying form of the name). A single word may have several different forms associated with it and these forms may very well differ with respect to the number of letters in their written representations. What is put between quotation- marks is neither the expression itself nor a representation of one of its properties, but another kind of entity, which is distinct from, but correlated with, the expression of which it is the conventional citation form.

1.3. Object- language and metalanguage The terms object- language and metalanguage are correlative, in the sense that the one depends upon the other. Instead of using a given language, reflexively, in order to describe it, we can employ one language to describe another. The language being described is the object- language and the language which is used to make the descriptive statements is the metalanguage. To restrict the

termmetalanguage to specially constructed and formalized systems; and we will use the term metalanguage throughout in this sense. Expression of the metalanguage which refer to words and phrases of the object- language do so by naming them; and the metalanguage name of an object- language word or phrase is constructed. The term language has been used in the sense in which it is commonly used in formal logic, and ordinary language or natural language has neen used in contrast with constructed language or formal language. 1.4. Type and Token Tokens are unique physical entities, located at a particular place in space or time. They are identified as tokens of the same type by virtue of their similarity with other unique physical entities and by virtue of their conformity to the type that they instantiate. When we say that the same letter occurs twice in a written word or that the same word occurs twice in the same sentence, the kind of identity that is involved is what we are calling type- token identity. The type- token distinction may appear to be quite trivial, if not pointless. The important point is to have grasped the nature of the type-token relationship, to be alive to the possibility of ambiguities which result from it, and to be able to draw upon the terminology when it is helpful to do so.

1.5. Forms, lexemes, and expressions One way defining word for written English might be: a word is any sequence of letters which, in normal typographical practice, is bounded on either side by a space. Words of this kind are forms: more precisely, they are word- forms. Some linguists might wish to impose the condition that forms identified as token of the same type should be forms of the same lexeme. Forms are identified as tokens of

the same type solely on the grounds of their forms, independently of their meaning or their assignment to lexemes. The distinction of lexemes and forms is applicable, not only to words, but also to phrase. A term is required for the linguistic units that serve to identify whatever we are talking about when we make a statement about something. The term that is most commonly used in philosophical semantics for this purpose is referring expression. There are indefinitely many complex expressions, which are clearly not lexemes, but whose meaning is determined by the meaning of their component lexemes and the productive grammatical rules of the language. Some lexemes at least, in English and in other languages, can function as referring or predictive expressions. The relationship might require to be stated somewhat differently for different languages. Indeed, there are languages in the description of which the distinction between forms and lexeme is, arguably, dispensable. 1.6. Theories, models, and data Utterances are unique physical events; as such, they can be referred to in terms of the observational metalanguage of linguists. The linguists however are not generally concerned with utterances as unique observational entities. When we say that two utterances are tokens of the same type, we are implying that they have some structural or functional identity by virtue of which native speaker will recognize their sameness. It should be possible to give a theoretical account of the structural identity of two utterances in terms of an acoustic analysis of two signals; and of their functional identity, or meaning, in terms of a purely behavioral analysis of the two acts of utterances. The relationship between text-sentences and systemsentences, especially in informal or casual speech, may be quite complex; and it has been the subject of considerable theoretical controversy among linguists.

2 COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION 2.1.What is communication? We talk as readily of the communication of filling, moods, and attitude as we do of the communication of factual information. The principle signalingsystems employed a human being for the transmissions of information, though not the only ones, are languages. Communicative means meaningful for the sender. But there is another sense of meaningful; and for this we will reserve the term informative and the cognate expressions information and inform. A signal is informative if it makes the receiver aware of something of which he was not previously aware. Informative therefore means meaningful to the receiver. More important for semantic theory than properties of the channel, are the following possibilities: (i) that two or more signals may be equivalent, each encoding the same message. (ii) that a particular signals may be ambiguous, encoding more than one message. Equivalence and ambiguity of utterances are common phenomena in language. 2.2.The qualification of Information In order to avoid confusion we will draw a terminological distinction between these two senses of information, there are signal-information and semantic information. To summarize: there are two principles of general importance deriving from information-theory. The first is the principle that information content is inversely proportionate to probability of occurrences; the second to which we will return is that a certain amount of redundancy is not only inevitable, but desirable. 2.3.Descriptive, social and expressive information Descriptive information is factual in the sense; it can be explicitly asserted or denied and in the most favourable instances at least, it can be objectively verified. The distinction between expressive and social meaning is far from clearcut and many authors have subsumed both under a single term (emotive, attitudinal, interpersonal, expressive etc). If we define expressive meaning (in a narrower sense than it often bears) to be that aspect of meaning which covaries

with characteristics of the speaker (Brown, 1958 :307) and social meaning to be that aspect which serves to establish and maintain social relations, it is clear that the two are connected.

3 Language as a semiotic system 3.1 Verbal and non-verbal signaling The terms verbal communication and non-verbal communication are quite widely employed to distinguish language from other semiotic system (i.e. system of signalingbehaviour). (i) non-verbal communication is commonly applied to signaling behavior in man and animals of a kind which, though it may be informative, is not necessarily communicative. (ii) verbal communication, in so far as it refers to communication by means of language, might be taken to imply that language-utterances are made up solely of words. We can now make certain generalizations about language on the basis of this classification of the various components of utterances; i. It would probably be agreed by linguists that, although all the components that we have recognized are essential, the verbal component is more central than the nonverbal component and that prosodic features are more central than paralinguistic features; that within the set of prosodic features some, like stress and intonation, are more central other; and that paralinguistic features are more central than voicequality. ii. The second generalization has to do more particularly with the semiotic functions of the different components of languages. It is sometimes suggested that linguistic and non-linguistic signals typically convey two different kinds of semantic information, the former descriptive, and the latter expressive or social.

3.2 Paralinguistic phenomena The study of paralinguistic behavior is part of the study of conversation; the conversational use of spoken language cannot be properly understood unless paralinguistic

elements are taken into account (1968: 55). The function of paralinguistic phenomena in normal-language behavior can be classified two headings: modulation and punctuation. By the modulation of an utterance is meant the superimposing upon the utterance of a particular attitudinal colouring, indicative of the speakers involvement in what he is saying and his desire to impress or convince the hearer. By the punctuation of an utterance is meant the marking of boundaries at the beginning and end of an utterance and at various points within the utterance to emphasizes particular expression, to segment the utterance to manageable information units, to solicit the listeners permission for the utterance to be continued, and so on. 3.3 Language and medium For we must draw a distinction between the language and the medium in which the language is manifest. This concept of medium is related to, but, as we shall see, must be distinguished from the notion of the channel of communication. This implies that sounds and more specifically, phonic sound (i.e. the range of audible sound which can be produced by the human speech organs) is the natural, or basic medium in which the language-system is realizes and that written utterances result from the transference of language from this primary phonic medium to a secondary graphic medium.

3.4 The design features of language The term design features is taken from Hocket and refers to a number of general properties in respect of which languages may be compared with other semiotic systems used by man or animals. Particular importance for the understanding of how language operate as signaling systems; i. Arbitrariness is used, in a somewhat narrow sense, by Hocket to contrast with iconicity. Arbitrariness contributes to the versatility and flexibility of language. ii. Duality is also referred to in the literature by means of the terms double

articulation; and it is generally recognized as one of the universals features of language.

iii.

Productivity is meant that property of the language-system which enables native speakers to construct and understand an indefinitely large number of utterance, including utterances that they have never previously encountered.

iv.

Discreteness applies to the signal-elements of a semiotic system. If the elements are discrete, in the sense that the difference between them is absolute and does not admit of gradation in terms of more or less, the system is said to be discrete; otherwise it is continuous.

v.

Semanticity it would seem to be little short of tautological to say of any semiotic sytem that it has semanticity: i.e. the property of being able to convey meaning.

vi.

Displacement this is the property of language which makes it possible for us to refer to objects and evnts that are remote in time and place from the act of utterance itself.

vii.

Interchangeability is meant that any organism equipped for the transmission of messages in the system is also equipped for the transmission of messages in the same system.

viii.

Complete feedback this property, which is dependent upon interchangeability, has to do with the fact that a speaker hears and is able to monitor his own performance.

ix.

Specialization this is defined in terms of the behaviouristic notion of triggering, which refers to the indirect influence that one organism exerts upon the behavior of another.

x.

Cultural transmission this is opposed to genetic transmission, and it has to do with the fact that the ability to speak a particular language is passed on from one generation to the next by teaching and learning, rather than by instinct.

xi.

Learnability this is the property which makes it possible for any human being of whatever race or ancestry to learn in childhood any language equally well (provided that he is not physically or psychologically defective in some way that would impair the process of language-acquistion and provided that he is exposed to samples of the language in question under the appropriate environmental conditions).

xii.

Reflexivity (referred to by Hockets as reflectiveness) all that needs to be said here is that, as far as we know, no non-human semiotic systems other than languages have this property.

xiii.

Prevarication is meant the possibility of using semiotic systems to deceive or misinform.

3.5. The origin of Language It was the work of Darwin, including his own speculations on the origin of language, that gave particular impetus to the attempt to construct an evolutionary theory of the origin of language at the late nineteenth century. At that time linguistics was very strongly influenced by the theory of evolution. Over the last fifty years or so, however, most linguists have shown little interest in the origin of language. The reason is simply that no sign of evolution from a simpler to a more complex state of development can be found in any of the thousands of languages known to exist or to have existed in the past. There is a more important conclusion to be drawn from our discussion of the evolution of language and our earlier comparison of the verbal and non verbal components of language. This is that the question whether language evolved from some non-verbal signaling-system is not formulated precisely enough to be answered positively or negatively; and it is not just that we lack the evidence which would enable us to answer it.

4 Semiotics 4.1. Signification The meaning of linguistic expressions is commonly described in terms of the notion of significant: that is to say, words and other expressions are held to be signs which, in some sense, signify, or stand for, other things. Many writers, in discussing the notion of signification, have drawn a distinction between signs and symbols, or between signals and symbols, or between symbols and symptoms. Unfortunately, however, there is no consistency in the way in which various authors have defined these terms. There is no single standard interpretation of any one of these various definitions of sign, signal, symbol and symptom in the literature. The term signal has already

been introduced in order to refer to whatever is transmitted along some channel of communication and can be interpreted by the receiver as encoding some message; and we will continue to use it in this sense. As we have seen, language-utterances (that is, the products of acts of utterance) are signals, which may be grouped as tokens of the same type. Accepting for the moment the view that all communication is by means of signs, we can say that the messages are signs, which may or may not be composed of simpler signs. Signals therefore encode signs. Signification is commonly described as a triadic relation, which may be further analyzed into three dyadic relations; two basic and one derivative. This kind of analysis is conveniently illustrated, as it was by Ogden and Richards (1923: 11) and subsequently by many others writing on semantics or communication, by means of diagrammatic representation in the form of a triangle. 4.2. Symbols, icons, indices, and symptoms Symbol. Pierces definition of symbol rests upon the conventionality or arbitrariness of the relationship between the sign and its signification. Icon. Pierces term for non-arbitrary signs is icon. He distinguishes icons from symbols, in one passage, as follows: An icon is a sign which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a geometrical lineA symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being understood to have that significance (1940: 104). Index. Peirces third main category of signs is even more heterogeneous than the other two. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the character which makes it sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant (1940: 104). Symptom. According to which every utterance is a symptom for the receiver of what is in the senders mind. However, there is any point in giving to the expression state of the speaker as general an interpretation as this. The others argue that every utterance is symptomatic of the internal state of the sender in a somewhat different sense: in that it is

determined by a particular neurophysiological program and carries information which can be used to infer the nature of the program. 4.3. Nominalism, Realism, and Conceptualism Nominalism does not necessarily imply subjectivism or scepticism with respect to the possibility of our acquiring knowledge of the external world. According to Ockhams interpretation, therefore, he held that the association between a word and concept was a matter of convention: but that there should be such a concept was not, and all languages would have words for the concepts formed by direct apprehension of objects in the world. Realism. There were two major two major versions of realism in antiquity, the one deriving from Plato, which might be called transcendental or extreme, realism, and the other from Aristotle, which might be called in contrast immanent, or moderate, realism. Conceptualism refers to any theory of semantics which defines the meaning of a word or other expression to be the concept associated with it in the mind of the speaker and hearer. 4.4. Syntactic, Semantics, and Pragmatics It is nowadays customary to recognize three areas within the field of semiotics: syntactic (syntax), semantics and pragmatics. For the term semiotics, the most useful way of defining this is to identify it with the theory, not of signs, but of signaling systems (systems for the transmission of information along some channel).

5 Behaviorist Semantics 5.1. General Attitudes It is worth stressing that the four general features of behaviorism as follows: (1) a distrust of all mentalistic terms like mind, concept, idea, (2) the belief that there is no essential difference between human and animal behavior, (3) its tendency to minimize the role of instinct and other innate drives or faculties and to emphasize the part played by learning in its account of how animals and human beings acquire their behavior patterns,

and soon, (4) to be mentioned at this point is its mechanism or determinism, listed above do not belong indissociably together. 5.2. More Particular Features of Behaviorism The behavior of any organism can be described, according to the behaviorist, in terms of the response which the organism makes to stimuli presented by the environment. Looked at from this point of view, other organisms may be taken as being part of environment. The formula commonly used to symbolize this relationship between stimulus and response is S R The arrow here represents a causal relationship: the stimulus is a cause and the response its effect. The combination of the two is a stimulus-response effect. A behavior-pattern is learned as a chain of stimulus-response reflexes, as may be illustrated by (S1 R1 ) (S2 R2) S3 R3) The causal relationships between the S-R reflexes are built up on the basis of their previous association. Generally, of course, there will be more than one possible transition from one word to the next in a grammatically acceptable utterance, and the strength of the associative bond between a particular word and its possible successor will vary according to the frequency with which they have been associated in the past and their association reinforced. It will be clear that this view of the grammatical structure of utterances lends itself very naturally to further development in terms of information-theory. For statistical probabilities can be assigned to each of the set of possible successors at each point of transition from one S-R reflex to the next. Much of the most recent work in logical semantics, and more especially what is called model- theoretic semantic. If the preposition certain property, (x) refers to an entity, x, and ascribes to x a .S

, the proposition is true if and only if x exists and has the property,

Tarski puts it, his standard example: 1. Snow is white is true if and only if snow is white. At first sight, this example looks singularly unhelpful as the basis upon which to build a formal theory of truth.

The expression Snow is white refers to a preposition expressed by a sentence of the object-language, but it does so by serving as a term in the metalanguage and its function is indicated by the quotation marks. We might equally well use English to formulize the notion of truth for French. 2. La neige est blanche is true if and only if snow is white. Or conversely. 3. Snow is white est vrai si, et seulement si, la neise est blanche. More interestingly, we might use a specially constructed logical calculus with which to formulize the notion of truth for all natural languages; and this is what a number of logicians and linguistics are now trying to do in model-theoritic semantics. 5.3. Behaviorist theories of meaning There are three behaviorists listen in this book. An early formulation of the behaviorist conception of meaning was Watsons: Words function in the matter of calling out responses exactly as did the objects for which the words serve as substitutes. It reflex the word commonly occurs in the presence of a certain object, and the object evokes a particular response; an associate link is established between word and object (as between the food and the ringing of the bell in Pavlovs experiments); and, in the absence of the object the wors acts as a substitute stimulus. Watsons view on this developed by A. P. Weiss (1928) Bloomfields behavioristic analysis of an imaginary speech event rests upon the same notion of words or utterances as substitute stimuli and responses. Bloomfields example of a speech-event is as follow (1935: 23 ff). Skinners own discussion of abstraction and reference, apart from his introduction of the specially behaviorist notion of reinforcement (under conditions of deprivation or aversive stimulation) is strikingly similar to that found in such works as Odgen and Rhicards (1923), which we described above as being itself behavioristic in a broad sense. He use the term abstraction is, in fact, quite traditional: every object is serving as a stimulus will have a set of properties and the response may initially be to the same object or to a class of objects sharing all the same properties or some subset of them; eventually however, by virtue of the communitys reinforcement of the response in the presence of a

stimulus with the property which the community associates with the response and the community failure to reinforce the response in the presence of object lacking the criteria property, the response is appropriately specialized and the property is correctly abstracted from the objects which manifest it. Apart from the postulation of the mechanism of reinforcement by the community, what is said here about abstraction is identical with what many philosophers have said about the way in which so-called universal concepts are formed. 5.4. Evaluation of behaviorist semantics Nor indeed is the stimulus-response account of the association between words and observables quite straightforward as it might appear at first sight. It has been pointed out what we do not normally react to words in the same way as we world react to the things, situations or properties with which they are associated. As Brown puts it: Someone who knows that rain refers to rain does not always react to the word as he world to the thing itself, any more than he says rain whenever he sees, hears or feels it (1958: 96). The question that must be asked in relation to this theory of meaning is what is meant by a disposition to respond. There can be no objection in principle to the notion of dispositional concepts; and the behaviorist is not necessarily committed to the existence of any kind of mental states or entities by his recognition of dispositions to respond as well as of actual responses stimuli. 6 Logical semantics 6.1. The formulation of semantics By logical semantics is here meant the study of meaning with the aid of mathematical logic. The term is commonly used by logicians in a narrower sense than this: to refer to the investigation of the meaning, or interpretation, of expressions in specially constructed logical systems. Logical semantics in the narrower and more technical sense may be referred to, following Carnap (1942, 1946), as pure semantics.

The relationship between the logic and language has long been, and still is, controversial. There are those who maintain that languages are of their nature imperfect and illogical, and therefore totally unsuited to systematic reasoning and scientific discussion: that it is hopeless and wrongheaded to attempt to correct their imperfections and that they should be replaced with logical calculi constructed especially for the purposes. 6.2. Propositional calculus The term proposition, like fact, has been the subject of considerable philosophical controversy. Some authors think of propositions as purely abstract, but in some sense objective, entities; others regard them as subjective or psychological; and there are certain logicians who avoid the term entirely, because they do not wish to adopt either of these alternatives. A proposition is what is expressed by a declarative sentence when that sentence is uttered to make a statement. - Negation. The negative connective is the one by means of which out of any propositions. If p is a proposition, then ~p is also proposition; and if p has the value T then p~ has the value F and conversely. Negation p T F p~ F T

- Conjunctions. In logical terminology it is not the connective itself, but the operation of conjoining and the resultant complex proposition for which term conjunction is employed. Inclusive disjunction pVq Exclusive disjunction pWq

pq

Conjunction p&q

Implication p q

Equivalence p=q

TT TF FT FF

T F F F

T T T F

F T T F

T F T T

T F F T

- Disjunction. There are inclusive and exclusive disjunctions. An inclusive disjunction is defined to be true if p is true, or q is true, or both are true; and otherwise to be false. An exclusive disjunction is true if either p or q is true, and otherwise is false. - Implication (also called conditional). In the implication p q, then p is the antecedent

and q the consequent. The terms imply and implication are used in a variety of distinct senses both in everyday discourse and philosophical usage. The meaning of the connective of material implication is defined as follows: when the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, the implication is false; in all other cases the implication is true. Material implication, defined in this way, should not be confused with the strict implication or entailment. - Equivalent. The definition of material equivalence that has just been given illustrates two points. First, it shows us that propositions of any degree of complexity may be built up by means of the connectives: for a complex proposition can be a component proposition in another complex proposition. Second, it illustrates the way in which other connectives can be introduced and defined in terms of more basic connectives. 6.3 Predicate calculus There are two reasons why at least a general understanding of the basic concepts and notation of predicate calculus should be of interest to the semantics. First, it is the most widely used system for the representation of the logical structure of simple propositions. Second, it has been claimed by certain philosophers in the past (and specially by the logical atomists and other logical empiricists to whom reference was made earlier) that it correctly or accurately portrays the underlying logical form of the sentences of languages

by bringing this into correspondence with the structure of facts and states-of-affairs in the external world. 6.4 The logic of classes By a class, in this context, is meant any collection of individuals regardless of the principle by which they have been brought together for consideration as members of that class. The members of a class may be abstract as well as concrete: for example, we can just readily talk about the class of real numbers as we can about the class of human beings at present living in certain place. 6.5 Time, modality and possible worlds One important terminological point to be noted here is that it is predicates, and not properties, that are said to be predicable of (and, in particular proposition, predicated of) individuals; properties are ascribed to the individuals referred to by the name or names in the propositions. For example, in saying of a particular flower that is red, we ascribe to it the property of redness, but we predicate of it predicate red. 7 RFERENCE, SENSE, AND DENOTATION

RFERENCE The term reference, as we shall define if below, has to do with the relationship stands for on particular occasion of its utterance. As we have seen, Ogden and Richards (1993) employed the term referent for any object or stated- of- affair in the external world that is identified by means of a word or expression (they did not, however, distinguish between forms, lexemes and expression), and reference for the concept which mediates between the word or expression and the referent. This notion of reference is consistent with the philosophical notion of reference which we shall be discussing in the text section, except that philosophers generally use the term reference not for the postulated mediating concept, but for the relationship which holds between the expression and the referent. Ogden and Richards, however, went on to

distinguish the reference of words and expressions from what they called their emotive meaning- their capacity to produce a certain emotional effect upon the hearer or listener. The term connotation can also lead to confusion. As used by philosophers, it is generally opposed to denotation; but the way in which the two terms are contrasted is by no means constant throughout the philosophical literature. It is J.S. Mill (1843). A further terminological difficulty derives from the failure, on the part of many writers, to distinguish clearly between sentences and utterances and from the looseness with which terms like word and expression are commonly employed. It is perhaps for this reason that, although a twofold distinction between sense and reference is common enough (in whatever terms it is drawn), the quite different distinction which we shall make between reference and denotation is only rarely to be met with in the literature. As we shall see, reference (as it will be defined below) is an- utterance- dependent notion.

SENSE Sense is term used by a number of philosophers for what other would describe simply as their meaning, or perhaps more narrowly as their cognitive or descriptive meaning. Freges (1892) classic example, which is frequently used in discussions of sense and reference, is: 1. The morning star is the evening star. As Frege pointed out, the two expressions the morning star and the evening star had the same reference (Bedeutung), since they each referred to the same planet. But they could not be said to have the same sense (sinn). For, if they did, (1) would be tautologous, or analytic, as is (2). 2. The morning star is the morning star. But (1), unlike (2) is (potentially) informative: it can make the hearer aware of some fact of which he was not previously aware and which he could not derive simply from his understanding of the meaning of the sentence. It follows that the morning star and evening star are not synonymous. 3. The morning star is not a star (but a planet)

It is not only not contradictory, but potentially informative. Of course, as a matter of historical fact, it was known to astronomers that neither the morning star nor the evening star were fixed stars, but planets, long before it was discovered that the morning star and the evening star were identical. Freges example has been introduced simply to illustrated in a general way nature of his distinction between sense and reference, expression may differ in sense, but have the same reference; and synonymous means having the same sense, not having the same reference.

DENOTATION It has already been pointed out that the term denotation is employed by many authors for what we are calling reference; conversely reference has frequently been used for what we will in this section distinguish as denotation. How does denotation differ from reference? In the previous section, it was stressed that reference is an utterance- bound relation and does not hold of lexemes as such, but of expressions in context. Denotation, on the other hand, like sense, is a relation that applies in the first instance to lexemes and holds independently of particular occasions of utterance. Consider, for example, a word like cow in English. Phrases like the cow, johns cow, or those three cows over here may be used to refer to individuals, whether singly or in groups, but the word cow cannot alone. To say that there is a distinction between denotation and reference does not imply that they are unconnected. Whatever may be referred to I a given language is generally within the denotation of at least one, and usually several, lexemes in that language. (For example, cows may be referred to in variety of ways; and the various classes to which they belong are denoted, not only by cow, but also by animal, mammal, etc).

NAMING Names, as they are employed in everyday language-behavior, have two characteristics function: referential and vocative. Their referential function has been discussed sufficiently for the present. It is worth pointing out here, however, that names are frequently used simply to draw the hearers attention to the presence of the person

being named or to remind the hearer of the existence or relevance of the person being named. By the vocative function of names is meant their being used to attract the attention of the person being called or summoned.

8 Structural Semantic I: Semantic Fields 8.1. Structuralism Structuralism originated in the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure and the subsequent Prague and Moscow schools of linguistics. Saussure's structuralism considers language as a multitude of signs, where each sign links a phonic sound (the signifier) with an idea (the signified). Whereas the notion of naming things implies a finite number of well defined objects and concepts requiring labels, Saussure's linguistic sign acts as a two-way link between the sound (or more specifically the sound image - the "psychological imprint" of a sound) and the idea. It is bi-directional in the sense that just as the word "red" may evoke notions of red objects, a notion of something red may elicit the sound image "red". A sound is meaningless if it is not so linked to an idea, and likewise for an idea to be coherent one requires the capacity to articulate it. Structuralism recognizes neither ideas nor sounds as having intrinsic or absolute value; both realms are considered as indeterminate and continuous. Just as the notion of "large" has no inherent value, without recognition of at least one other size notion, eg "small", value is perceived only in terms of difference in relation to other ideas and sound. Introducing a third size notion of "tiny" to our idea space alters somewhat the boundaries of large and small, reducing their scope and the distance between them, effectively narrowing their meanings. Similarly, language sounds, or sound images, are perceived largely in terms of their differences from other sounds. For example, an English word spoken at two different frequencies (or two different speeds), is generally perceived as the same word, even though the sounds are clearly different.

8.2. The Saussurean dichotomies Saussure perceived that serious reductions needed to be made. To this end he performed a series of bifurcations on language. After eliminating nonverbal systems (Saussure denigrates writing as derivative of speech-a sign of a sign), he splits verbal language into two components, la langue, the underlying system of conventions which exists in the collective mind of the linguistic community, and la parole, the actual speaking of the language. Since language is constantly changing, in both intelligible (langue) and sensible (parole) form, it is difficult to examine as a system, so la langue is further split into two parts: the synchronic, a linguistic system existing at a particular point in time, and the diachronic, a collection of linguistic elements changing over time. The synchronic system can then be described in terms of two axes: the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic. The paradigmatic is concerned with meaning based on association, and the syntagmatic is based on combination. On the other hand, the syntagmatic is concerned with the 'dynamic', pertaining to meaning conferred by the combination, order and sequence of signs (such as the sequence, or syntagm: "That is a very large bird"-The idea signified by the sound image "bird" is modified by the words preceding it). The relationship between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic is analogous to that between the synchronic and diachronic, in that the former is like a snapshot of related values, where the latter offers a trajectory where value is related to the sequence or progression. The paradigmatic is structuralism's primary concern, being more readily systematisable, although a consideration of both (and the correlations between them) is essential for any structuralist analysis. 8.4. Semantic fields

Semantic field theory, or word-field theory, was introduced on March 12, 1931 by the German linguist Jost Trier. Trier argued that words acquired their meaning through their relationships to other words within the same word-field. An extension of the sense of one word narrows the meaning of neighbouring words, with the words in a field fitting neatly together like a mosaic. If a single word undergoes a semantic change, then the whole structure of the lexical field changes. Trier's theory assumes that semantic fields are easily definable closed sets, with no overlapping meanings or gaps. These assumptions have been questioned and the theory has been modified since its original formulation. For example, lets look at one of Triers own most famous example as a below illustration:

a b c (i)

a b c

a b c (ii)

a b d

a b c (iii)

a b c

a b c (iv)

a b d

a b

b c (v) Figure 6. Various kinds of diachronic change 8.5. Syntagmatic lexical relation

c d

In contrast with Trier, Porzig (1934) developed a notion of semantic fields which was founded upon the relations of sense holding between pairs of syntagmatically connected lexemes. Porzig bases his theory on the relationship holding within bipartite syntagms composed of a noun and verb or a noun and adjective. The two lexemes in each such syntagms are bound together by what he calls an essential meaning relation. There are a number of points that arise in connection with syntagmatically related pairs of lexeme such as lick:tongue, blond:hair, dog:bark, etc. The most obvious point is that lexemes vary enormously with respect to the freedom with which they can be combined in syntagms with other lexemes. 8.6. General evaluation of the theory of semantic field Two further theoretical and methodological points may be emphasized, which have emerged in recent work in field theory semantics and upon which there is fairly widespread agreement. The first is necessity of taking into account the context in which words occur. The second is the impossibility of studying the vocabulary of a language independently of its grammatical structure.

9 Structural Semantics II: Sense Relations 9.1. Opposite and contrast In this chapter, the writer developed and reformulated what seem to be the basic principles of the theory of semantic fields in terms of sense relations. First, we talk about paradigmatic opposition. The standard technical term of oppositeness of meaning between lexemes is antonymy. Whereas lexical opposites are several different kinds: and it is a moot point just how many dichotomous relations should be held to fall within the scope of antonymy. It involves gradable and ungradable opposites.

Grading involves comparison. For example, we might ask is X as hot as Y? the fact that we can say X is hot as Y or X is hotter than Y depends upon the gradibility of hot. Ungradable opposites devide the univers-of-discourse. For example, the preposition X is female implies X is not male

9.2 Directional, orthogonal, and antipodal opposition There is 4 kinds of lexical opposition: 1. 2. 3. 4. Antonymy Complementary Converseness Directional opposition (though it cannot always be distinguished

from these three) Directional opposition is seen most clearly in the relationship which hold between up:down, arrive:depart and come:go. Their typical usage is an implication of motion in one of two opposed direction with them. Based on directionally there is two possible relation of consequence which may distinguished as positive or negative. Positive consequence expressed by X has come/gone to P and the proposition expressed by X is (now) at P. Negative consequence expressed by X has come and gone from P and the proposition expressed by X is not/no longer at P. Let us draw another distinction between orthogonal and antipodal. If we consider the opposition which hold within the set {north, south, east, west} we see that they are of two kinds. Each of four member of the set is opposed orthogonally (i.e pendicularly) to two others (north is opposed to east and west east is opposed to south and north, etc) and antipodally (i.e diametrically) to one other (north is those opposed to south and east to west) When the antipodal opposites are employed as two place predicative expressions they are of course converses. Antipodal opposition is given only partial recognition in the vocabulary of colour, though it may play some role in the acquisition of colour terms by children.

9.3 Non-binary contrasts It seem contrasts, even if many apparently non-binary contrasts (for example, the contrasts which hold between each of the set of colour word and every other member of the set) ultimately prove to be analyzable in terms of several binary distinction. The relationship of sense which hold between lexemes in many member sets such as {Sunday, Monday, . , Saturday} maybe describe as incompatibility. 9.4 Hyponymy The term hyponymy has being gaining currency; and it is would seem to be more appropriate then such alternatives as inclusion or subordination, which which are also used in other sense in linguistic and logic. Let us say, then, that cow is a hyponym of animal, rose is hyponym of flower, and so on. The definition of hyponymy in terms of unilateral implication enables us to define synonymy as bilateral or symmetrical, hyponymy: if x is a hyponym of y and y is hyponym of x are synonymous. If hyponymy is defined as non-symmetrically, then proper hyponymy may be distinguished from synonymy as being asymmetrical. 9.5 Hierarchical structure in the vocabulary Hierarchical structure of the vocabulary as a whole, it seem clear that there will be no lexeme at the point of origin. The fact that lexemes in most language at least, fall into a number of distinct parts of speech would of itself preclude the hierarchical ordering of the vocabulary in term of hyponymy under a single lexeme. For a lexeme belonging to another part of speech. 9.6 Lexical gaps Lexical gaps concerned to the absence of a lexeme denoting an object which happen not to exist in the cultural in which a language operates; still less with the absence of lexemes which would encapsulate the sense of contradictory syntagmatic modifiers. By a lexical gap is here meant what structuralists often describe, metaphorically, as a hole in

the pattern: that is to say, the absence of a lexeme at a particular place in the structure of a lexical field. 9.7 Marked and unmarked term Terms in linguistics which designate a contrasting pair, one possessing a special mark, the other neutral: in play/played, play is unmarked and neutral, and played has the mark -ed. Similarly, host is unmarked, but hostess is morphologically marked for femaleness. The mark is not necessarily visible or audible: in the pair horse/mare, horse is the more general, unmarked term, while mare is marked for femaleness. In the pair cow/bull, cow is unmarked, while bull is marked for maleness. The terms are sometimes extended to wider, typological characteristics of languages, and also to social situations, to distinguish between normal (unmarked) behaviour and a less common variant. 9.8 Part whole relation This is exemplified by arm:body, wheel:bycycle et. In cases like this the distinction between hyponymy and part-whole relation is clear enough. An arm is not a kind of bofy but a part of a body; and phrases like arms and the other kinds of body are nonsensical. Part-whole relation between lexemes are bound up with a particular sub-class of possessive construction. Part whole lexical relations are at least as the various kinds of hyponymy found in language. 9.9 Componential analysis This approach to the description of the meaning of the words and phrases rest upon the thesis that the sense of every lexeme can be analysed in terms of a set of more general sense components (or semantic features), some or all of which will be common to several different lexemes in the vocabulary. In so far as componential analysis as associated with conceptualism. For example, the sense of man (construed as the complimentary of woman) the atomic concept male, adult, and human; and the sense of woman might be held to differ from that of man solely in that it combines female (or not male) rather than male, with adult and human.

Bybliography Lyons, John. 1991. Semantic volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University