0% found this document useful (0 votes)

319 views74 pages

Egypt-Country-Risk-Report 2

Egypt Country risk report

Uploaded by

Mostafa Hassanein

We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.

Available Formats

Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

0% found this document useful (0 votes)

319 views74 pages

Egypt-Country-Risk-Report 2

Egypt Country risk report

Uploaded by

Mostafa Hassanein

We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.

Available Formats

Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

You are on page 1/ 74

Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC.

Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024

Q4 2024
www.fitchsolutions.com/bmi

Egypt
Country Risk R
Report
eport
Includes 10-year forecasts to 2033
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Contents
Executive Summary...................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Key View ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Political Risk Key View................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
Economic SWOT............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
Political SWOT ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9

Economic Outlook.......................................................................................................................................................................10
Geopolitical Risks Could Jeopardise Egypt's Economic Recovery ..........................................................................................................................10
GDP By Expenditure Outlook .................................................................................................................................................................................................14

External Trade And Investment Outlook .............................................................................................................................17

Egypt's Current Account Deficit Will Narrow In FY2024/25, Risks Are To The Downside ............................................................................17

Monetary Policy Outlook...........................................................................................................................................................22

Majority Of North African Markets Will Hold Their Policy Rates In H2 2024 Except For Morocco .............................................................22
Monetary Policy Framework ..................................................................................................................................................................................................27

Fiscal Policy And Public Debt Outlook..................................................................................................................................30

Structural Fiscal Position .........................................................................................................................................................................................................30

Currency Forecast .......................................................................................................................................................................34

Weaker Trading Range For The Egyptian Pound ............................................................................................................................................................34

10-Year Forecasts.........................................................................................................................................................................40
More Reforms Needed Before Long-Term Potential Is Realised in Egypt............................................................................................................40

Political Outlook...........................................................................................................................................................................44
Egypt’s New Cabinet Signals Reform Drive But Difficulties Persist .......................................................................................................................44

Long-Term Political Outlook ....................................................................................................................................................47

Social And Security Factors Are Egypt's Main Long-Term Political Risks .............................................................................................................47

Global Macro Outlook .................................................................................................................................................................50

Watching Out For A Potential Policy Mistake And Election Risks............................................................................................................................50

Index Tables ...................................................................................................................................................................................68

Macroeconomic Forecasts........................................................................................................................................................71

This commentary is published by BMI – A Fitch Solutions Company, and is not a comment on Fitch Ratings' Credit Ratings. Any comments or data included in the report are solely derived from BMI and independent
sources. Fitch Ratings analysts do not share data or information with BMI.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 3
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

© 2024 Fitch Solutions Group Limited. All rights reserved.

All information, analysis, forecasts and data provided by Fitch Solutions Group Limited are for the exclusive use of subscribing persons or organisations (including those
using the service on a trial basis). All such content is copyrighted in the name of Fitch Solutions Group Limited and as such no part of this content may be reproduced,
repackaged, copied or redistributed without the express consent of Fitch Solutions Group Limited.

All content, including forecasts, analysis and opinion, is based on information and sources believed to be accurate and reliable at the time of publishing. Fitch Solutions
Group Limited makes no representation or warranty of any kind as to the accuracy or completeness of any information provided, and accepts no liability whatsoever for
any loss or damage resulting from opinion, errors, inaccuracies or omissions affecting any part of the content.

This report from BMI – A Fitch Solutions Company is a product of Fitch Solutions Group Limited; UK Company registration number 08789939 ('FSG'). FSG is an affiliate of
Fitch Ratings Inc. ('Fitch Ratings'). FSG is solely responsible for the content of this report, without any input from Fitch Ratings.

Copyright © 2024 Fitch Solutions Group Limited.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 4
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Executive Summary
Key View
Core Views

• Egypt’s economic recovery continues. High-frequency data indicate that economic growth bottomed out at 2.2% in Q3
FY2023/24, remittance inflows surged to USD7.5bn in Q4 FY2023/24 and the tourism sector has shown resilience in the face of
elevate geopolitical risks.
• We maintain our view that economic growth will pick up to 4.2% in FY2024/25, driven by higher investment, a recovery in the
manufacturing sector and the expected end of the Gaza war by the end of 2024. The hydrocarbons sector and the elevated cost
of living will weigh on economic growth.
• We expect inflation to remain sticky in H2 2024, averaging 27% y-o-y, due to some weakening of the exchange rate and
increases in administered prices such as electricity and fuel. This will encourage the authorities to keep monetary policy tight for
the rest of 2024.
• Inflation will fall to below 20% by February 2025 due to significant base effects, prompting the authorities to start their monetary
policy easing cycle either immediately before or after February. We see scope for the Central Bank of Egypt to cut by 1,200 basis
points in 2025 as key central banks would also be in easing cycles.
• On the external front, we expect the current account deficit to narrow to 4.2% of GDP (USD13.2bn) in FY2024/25, driven by a
surge in remittances and wider services surplus.
• Higher capital inflows and possible debt issuance will allow the authorities to continue accumulating foreign currency reserves.
FX reserves increased to a record high of USD46.5bn in July 2024, and we expect them to further rise in coming months.
• In terms of the exchange rate, we now forecast a more volatile Egyptian pound, trading within a range of EGP47.90/USD and
EGP49.50/USD over the rest of 2024.
• As we think that the war in Gaza will continue into late 2024, this will keep geopolitical risk in the Middle East and North Africa
elevated, which will feed into more volatile Egyptian pound and will limit the room for the currency to strengthen.
• While the authorities will show a more flexible exchange rate, especially ahead of the upcoming review of the IMF programme in
September 2024, they will continue to intervene to limit large currency fluctuations like they did on August 5 2025.

Key Risks

• The war in Gaza continues to expose Egypt to elevated geopolitical risks, making the economic recovery fragile. We saw a
weakening of the exchange rate and a rise in investor risk perception towards Egypt during the Israel-Iran tensions in April.
• This happened again following the intensification of tensions between Israel and Iran/Hezbollah in late July 2024 when the
Egyptian pound came under pressure, losing 1.3% in the first week of August before stabilising at around EGP49.20/USD, likely
due to intervention by the central bank.
• Geopolitical tensions increased concerns among foreign portfolio investors, who now hold close to half of Egypt’s T-bills with
maturity of up to 12 months. Some reduced their exposure to the Egyptian debt market (we estimate capital outflows above
USD2.0bn in the first week of August), which resulted in lower reserves, or in the case of Egypt lower net foreign asset positions
at banks, and translated into a weaker currency.
• Worsening political risks will weigh on the pound and push it towards EGP55.00/USD. This would re-ignite inflationary pressures
with negative implications on the economy.
• Foreign direct investment would also come to a halt and investors adopt a wait-and-see approach. A weaker exchange rate
would reverse the slowdown in inflation and prompt more monetary policy tightening, weighing on investment and domestic
demand. The tourism sector would also be affected, weighing on tourism receipts.
• On the upside, a ceasefire in Gaza would help to re-normalise navigation in the Red Sea and provide a boost for tourism activity
that would lead the pound to strengthen towards EGP47.50/USD.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 5
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Macr
Macroec
oeconomic
onomic FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2022-2025)
Indicator 2022 2023 2024f 2025f
Nominal GDP
GDP,, USDbn 409.3 331.7 280.3 319.6
Real GDP gr
groowth, % yy-o-y
-o-y 6.7 3.8 3.0 4.2
Consumer pric
pricee inflation, % yy-o-y
-o-y,, eop 21.3 33.7 26.5 15.5
Ex
Exchange
change rrate
ate EEGP
GP per USD, eop 24.69 30.84 48.70 49.67
Budget balanc
balance,
e, % of GDP -6.2 -6.1 -3.7 -6.4
Curr
Current
ent ac
acccount balanc
balance,
e, % of GDP -4.0 -1.4 -7.8 -4.2
f = BMI forecast. Source: CBE, Ministry of Finance, CAPMAS, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 6
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Political Risk Key View

Please Note: BMI is enhancing its risk analysis with a new scoring system following its acquisition of GeoQuant, a market-leading
provider of political risk data. From March 27 2024, risk scores are inverted: zero now represents the lowest risk and 100 represents
the highest risk. This allows for clearer, industry-standard assessments. For further details, please refer to our updated methodology
document.

Core Views

• Political Risk: Egypt's political landscape will continue to be characterised by a firm hold on power by the government and the
military establishment. The military's dominance in politics will continue and the likelihood of a transition toward a more
multiparty system appears minimal. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's re-election for a third term that extends to 2030 (made
possible through constitutional amendments) suggests a continuation of strongman politics, with little space for opposition
movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the civil society over the next 10 years. Overall, Egypt scores a moderate 43.29
out of 100 in our Political Risk Index (higher score means higher risk).
• Governance: The military's entrenched position in the Egyptian economy, with control over significant sectors, presents
institutional and governance challenges. While there are plans to privatise military-owned entities to attract foreign capital, the
military will nonetheless retain considerable economic influence. This could impede efforts toward economic liberalisation and
democratic governance. The government's ability to manage civil-military relations and navigate the complex interplay between
political authority and economic control will be critical. Egypt thus scores 39.29 out of 100 for the Governance sub-component
of our Index.
• Society: High unemployment, poverty and rapid population growth pose significant social challenges for Egypt. The
government faces pressure to provide jobs, housing and infrastructure to accommodate a youthful and increasingly urban
population. Failure to address these issues could lead to political instability, prevent el-Sisi from continuing his term and
potentially create opportunities for democratic or Islamist forces to gain traction. Egypt scores 47.53 out of 100 for the Society
Risk sub-component of our Political Risk Index.
• Security: Egypt's security risks are heightened by regional tensions, particularly the spillover from the Israel-Hamas conflict. The
possibility of Israel expanding military operations into Rafah poses a threat to Egyptian security and could lead to a humanitarian
crisis with displaced Palestinians moving into Sinai. Egypt's response to such scenarios is constrained by its desire to maintain the
peace treaty with Israel and protect its economic and geopolitical interests. Egypt scores 32.05 for the Security Risk sub-
component of our Index.
• Election Watch: President el-Sisi was sworn in for a third term in April 2024, and while cabinet changes may occur in 2024,
policy direction will continue to be heavily influenced by Egypt's commitment to the current IMF programme, including allowing
the exchange rate to absorb shocks, reducing the subsidy bill and scaling back mega projects. El-Sisi's continued leadership will
likely hinge on his administration's success in addressing economic challenges, improving living standards and reducing youth
unemployment. Any significant failure in these areas could lead to social unrest and test the military's resolve to maintain the
current political order.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 7
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Economic SWOT

Strengths Weaknesses

• Low wages in global terms are an advantage for foreign • Egypt still has a large fiscal deficit, which will take time to
investors, particularly for those wishing to use Egypt as a narrow due to high debt-servicing costs.
base for export-oriented manufacturing. • The country has exhausted almost all external funding
• With a population exceeding 100mn, Egypt is the largest options, leaving it vulnerable to shocks.
market in the Arab world. • Manufacturers rely heavily on imported materials and
• Robust support from Saudi Arabia and the UAE has helped generally produce low value-added goods, meaning that
Egypt push through economic difficulty and will remain a non-hydrocarbon net exports are still struggling to take off.
boon to the economy. • Corruption and bureaucracy levels are reportedly still high.
• The large presence of the state and military-linked actors in
the economy will continue to weigh on private sector
development.

Opportunities Threats

• A weak business environment coupled with a large • Sustained increases in food prices or risk of food shortages
population means that structural reforms could unlock vast will intensify social discontent, even though we do not think
untapped economic potential. that this will pose significant risks to political stability.
• The hydrocarbon sector exhibits good potential for • While renewed popular unrest and militant attacks are less
further development. likely now than a few years ago, they would damage the
• Stabilising macroeconomic conditions may increasingly help tourism sector and impact investor confidence.
attract foreign direct investment in the country's non- • Higher geopolitical risks from the Israel-Palestinian conflict
hydrocarbon sectors. could weigh on tourism, investment and exports.
• The privatisation planned, which is currently in discussion,
provide investment opportunities and can pave the way to
an increased role of the private sector in the economy.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 8
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Political SWOT

Strengths Weaknesses

• President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's military background provides • The concentration of authority in the executive presidency
him with a crucial foundation of support, both from has come at the expense of other institutions and could raise
elements of the armed forces as well as the wider the risk of policy missteps should policies not be subject to
population. This bodes well for political stability and sufficient debate, checks and balances.
policymaking in the short term. • Corruption remains a problem for the business environment,
• Egypt is an officially designated 'major non-NATO ally’ of the with Egypt ranked 108th (out of 180 markets) in
US and maintains cordial relations with Russia, Mainland Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in
China, Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council markets. 2023. Its score has seen very limited net increases over the
These relationships greatly reduce external security threats preceding decade and remains well below the global
faced by Egypt and are generally conducive for foreign average.
investment in Egypt’s economy. • The fast pace of population growth and poverty rates
• Egypt’s strategic location at the crossroads of the Eastern increase the pressure on the government to maintain
Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa as well as the elevated growth rates to create jobs and improve standards
presence of the Suez Canal means that global and regional of living.
powers have a strong interest in maintaining friendly • The Israel-Hamas war and the subsequent Red Sea crisis
relations with Cairo. Egypt's geopolitical importance will exposed Egypt's to high geopolitical risks and direct negative
continue to catalyse large foreign support in case of need. economic implications and higher security risks. This
vulnerability will persist as long as the Palestinian issue
remains unresolved.

Opportunities Threats

• Egypt’s Vision 2030 national development plan could boost • Although the official unemployment rate declined from 7.4%
real GDP growth rates and job creation, raising Egypt’s in 2021 to 7.2% in 2022, the youth unemployment rate (ie,
international profile and status among emerging markets. those aged 15-29) remained high at more than double the
• Egypt’s participation in Mainland China’s Belt and Road national rate. This, combined with Egypt’s youthful
Initiative could increase its importance as a major economic demographic profile and elevated poverty rates, raises the
hub and, by extension, raise the amount of foreign direct risk of protests should the economy fail to create enough
investment that it receives. jobs and opportunities for the expanding labour force.
• Egypt - owing to its strategic location, large population and • Although the number of Islamist militant attacks, particularly
armed forces - could become an increasingly active on tourists and key gas infrastructure in the Sinai Peninsula,
geopolitical player in the Arab world and a more effective appears to have fallen in recent years, further incidents
force for regional stability. cannot be ruled out. Egypt's proximity to Israel expose it to
• Egypt's deepening relations with Israel and improving higher geopolitical risk from frequent flare-ups in tensions.
relations with Turkiye increase its trade and investment • Egypt’s relations with neighbouring Ethiopia remain tense as
prospects. Cairo retains concerns that Ethiopia’s gradual filling of the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’s reservoir could interrupt
the flow of the Nile river into Egypt, which has a huge
demand for water. While not our core view, military
confrontation is a low-probability, high-impact risk.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 9
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Economic Outlook
Geopolitical Risks Could Jeopardise Egypt's Economic Recovery
Key View

• We think that economic growth bottomed out at 2.2% in Q3 FY2023/24 and forecast real GDP to grow by 4.2% in FY2024/25
(July 2024–June 2025).
• The pickup in growth will be driven by higher investment, a recovery in the manufacturing sector and the expected end of the
Gaza war by the end of 2024. The hydrocarbons sector and the elevated cost of living will weigh on economic growth.
• Risks are skewed to the downside and include geopolitical tensions and a global economic slowdown.

We expect a pickup in Egypt’s real GDP growth to 4.2% in FY2024/25 (July 2024–June 2024). We think that economic
growth bottomed out at 2.2% y-o-y in Q3 FY2023/24 (see charts below, left) and picked up to about 4.8% in Q4 FY 2023/24,
resulting in full-year growth of 3.0% in FY2023/24. This marks a slight downward revision from our previous estimate of 3.2% for
FY2023/24 after the authorities estimated full-year growth at between 2.9% and 3.0%. Our forecast for FY2024/25 is broadly
aligned with the IMF (4.1%) and is slightly stronger than the 2010-2019 average of 3.8% (see charts below, right).

Growth Has Bottomed Out

Egypt - Contribution To Quarterly GDP, pp (LHC) & Real GDP Growth, % (RHC)

e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: MPED, Haver, BMI

The faster growth is contingent on three main assumptions: higher investment, a recovery in the manufacturing
sector and the end of the war in Gaza by the end of 2024. As the authorities are committed to fiscal consolidation under the
IMF programme, public spending on megaprojects will remain subdued. We expect that the authorities will secure more foreign
investment from strategic partners, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. For instance, the Egyptian and Emirati authorities have
signed a USD3bn agreement to set an oil logistics zone at Al Hamra Port on the Mediterranean coast, with the project starting in H1
2025 (calendar year).

At the same time, we think that the local private sector will be expanding production capacity to increase exports as it seeks to
benefit from the competitiveness gain following the weakening of the currency. This, along with better access to financing in FX for
the import of raw materials, will support the recovery of the manufacturing sector (15% of GDP), which has been contracting since
Q2 FY2022/23 (see charts below, left).

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 10
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Recovery In Manufacturing And The Suez Canal Will Drive Pickup In Growth
Egypt - Key Economic Sectors, % y-o-y (LHC) & Monthly Suez Canal Transit

Source: MPED, Haver, BMI

The war in Gaza will pave the way for a gradual recovery in Suez Canal activity (2.0% of GDP). To put things into perspective, in H1
2024, 6,875 ships crossed the Suez Canal, down by 47.8% y-o-y from 13,161 in H1 2023. Even a gradual recovery will be amplified
by base effects from January 2025 onwards (see charts above). The end of the war will also be positive for consumer and investor
confidence and will provide a boost for the economy.

We expect a slowdown in consumer spending. In Q2 FY2024/23, private consumption grew by 13.2% y-o-y, and we think that
it remained strong in Q3. However, we think that the impact of the increase in social spending in H1 FY2024/24 will have started to
fade by now, especially as the cost of living continues to increase and borrowing costs remain at a record high. As the authorities
continue to raise administered prices, such as fuel and prices, utility bills will eat into household budgets, prompting them to reduce
spending on non-essential goods. Inflation will remain sticky at around 28% in H2 2024. While it will fall to an average of 18.1% in
2025, real wages will continue to contract. The impact of monetary policy easing in early 2025 will be felt in FY 2025/26. Against
this backdrop, and factoring in unfavourable base effects, we expect private consumption growth to slow to 2.8% in FY2024/25.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 11
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Unfavourable Base Effects And Structural Weakness Will Weigh On Consumption

Egypt - Real GDP Growth, % & Components, pp contribution

e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: MPED, BMI

The hydrocarbon sector (9.0% of GDP) will continue to weigh on economic growth. Lower domestic gas production (see
charts below, left) and strong electricity consumption are reducing Egypt’s exports and more recently increasing its imports. Since
2023, Egypt has been suspending LNG exports between May and September to prioritise using gas for domestic electricity
production. This is despite strong imports from Israel (see charts below, right). More recently, the authorities imported LNG to use for
electricity production and avoid load shedding during the hot summer season. We exoect that this is also because some of the LNG
contracts are long term and Egypt needs to fulfil them to avoid paying penalties. Thus, hydrocarbon imports will add to the recovery
in imports after several quarters of squeezing because of FX shortages, which will contain the contribution of net exports to real
GDP growth at 0.3 percentage points (pp) in FY2024/25 after subtracting 0.8pp in FY2023/24.

Hydrocarbon Sector Will Remain A Drag On Exports And Imports

Egypt - Gas Production (LHC) & LNG Pipeline Imports/Exports, mn cu m (RHC)

Source: JODI, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 12
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

We are cautiously optimistic about Egypt’s growth prospects as the economic recovery remains fragile. Indeed, the
recovery will remain dependent on the authorities’ remaining compliant with the IMF programme and on contained geopolitical
risks. Our outlook is subject to an array of downside risks:

1. A prolonged war in Gaza would delay the normalisation of navigation in the Red Sea.
2. A full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon would increase geopolitical risks across the Middle
Eats and North Africa. The risk of a wider war would discourage portfolio investment or even lead to outflows, which
could re-ignite inflationary pressure and further depress domestic demand. Israel could be forced to suspend its gas
exports, which will bring Egypt’s LNG exports to a halt and increase its imports.
3. An increase in the intensity of fighting outside Gaza could compromise the tourism sector that has been so far
resilient. Egypt attracted 7.1mn tourists in H1 2024 (calendar year), nearly unchanged year-on-year. After increasing
by 26.9% to a record high of 14.9mn visitors, our Tourism team is still bullish on the sector, forecasting growth in the
number of arrivals of 6.5% in 2024 and 4.8% in 2025.
4. While a low-probability event, a severe escalation between Israel and Iran would have a detrimental
impact on the Egyptian economy. The immediate impact will translate through a weaker pound beyond our upper
limit of EGP49.0/USD possibly to EGP55.0/USD, which would reverse the recent decline in inflation.
5. A slowdown in the global economy would weigh on Egypt’s non-oil exports. It could also lead to lower global oil
prices that would slow economic activity in the Gulf Cooperation Council markets, where a large number of Egyptian
expats reside, and in turn reduce remittance inflows.

On the upside, a ceasefire in Gaza earlier than we currently expect would result in earlier recovery in Suez Canal activity and
could cause upside risks to our forecast for tourist arrivals and boost to foreign investments.

Egypt Gr
Groowth Outlook
Forecast FY2023/ FY2024/ Notes
24e 25f
Growth will be driven by stronger investment activity, a recovery in the manufacturing sector
Real GDP gr
groowth, % 3.0 4.2 and a rebound in non-oil exports as well as the end of the war in Gaza that would pave the
way for the normalisation of activity through the Suez Canal.
Growth in private consumption will slow due to unfavourable base effects and signs of
Priv
Private
ate cconsumption
onsumption 3.8 2.3 weaknesses from an elevated cost of living and borrowing costs. Strong remittance inflows
and some easing in inflation in 2025 will provide support for consumers.
Go
Govvernment
0.1 0.5 Government consumption will increase on higher social spending.
consumption
Foreign investment from strategic partners will bolster investment activity. We anticipate
Fix
Fixed
ed capital
-0.1 1.1 a moderate increase in local investment as the difficult operating environment begins to
formation
improve, although high borrowing costs will remain a significant obstacle.
In H1 FY2024/25, exports will remain under pressure due to lower activity in the Suez Canal
and declining hydrocarbon exports. However, we expect that activity in the Suez Canal will
Net eexpor
xports
ts -0.8 0.3
start to normalise in H2, and along with stronger non-oil exports, will turn net exports to
positive.

Note: Numbers reflect percentage point contribution to growth unless otherwise stated. e/f = estimate/forecast. Source: BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 13
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

GDP By Expenditure Outlook

Egypt's economic growth will slow and stagnate in the medium term as hydrocarbon exports decrease, in the absence of new
discoveries, while consumption increases. This will be partly offset by the tourism sector, which will continue to attract tourists in
coming years. The government's plans to support the industrial sector will also provide some support to exports, but part of the
additional output will be consumed locally to cover the needs of the large and rising population, limiting the impact on net
exports. Demand for capital inputs will remain elevated given that domestic supply chains are still underdeveloped.

Egypt's rapidly rising external debt will weigh on capital spending and reduce public investment. However, we believe that the
authorities' business-friendly drive to improve the business environment and increase the private sector's participation in the
economy, along with foreign investment from strategic partners, such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, will partly offset slowing
public investment. However, more is needed to be done to attract additional foreign investment, reduce the footprint of the state in
the economy and improve the business environment.

Private consumption will remain the largest contributor to growth, supported by slowing inflation, strong remittances and rising
income levels. We expect that growth will average about 4% in between 2025 and 2033, which is near the growth level needed to
absorb new entrants to the labour market. A higher growth trajectory is contingent on new hydrocarbon discoveries and faster
reform implementation to improve the business environment and promote investment.

GDP Gr
Groowth FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2022-2027)
Indicator 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f
Nominal GDP
GDP,, EEGPbn
GPbn 7,842.5 10,157.4 12,810.4 15,719.4 18,219.0 20,290.3
Real GDP gr
groowth, % yy-o-y
-o-y 6.7 3.8 3.0 4.2 4.7 4.1
GDP per capita, EEGP
GP 70,659.5 90,114.5 111,896.7 135,191.3 154,321.5 169,314.3
f = BMI forecast. Source: CBE, BMI

GDP Gr
Groowth FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2028-2033)
Indicator 2028f 2029f 2030f 2031f 2032f 2033f
Nominal GDP
GDP,, EEGPbn
GPbn 22,605.9 25,195.5 28,091.6 31,330.4 34,952.5 39,003.2
Real GDP gr
groowth, % yy-o-y
-o-y 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2
GDP per capita, EEGP
GP 185,886.5 204,206.8 224,460.1 246,847.7 271,569.3 298,848.1
f = BMI forecast. Source: Central Bank of Egypt, BMI

Private Consumption: The impact of subsidy cuts and austerity measures will begin to wear off over the medium term as the
pace of fiscal consolidation moderates and policy focuses less on subsidy cuts. We expect inflationary pressures to stabilise, which
will allow the Central Bank of Egypt to loosen monetary policy and provide support for private consumption growth. This will be
reinforced by healthy population growth and a large youth population with a greater proclivity to spend. We highlight downside risks
to this view, most notably that high private consumption growth will largely depend on the economy's ability to absorb the large
youth population and create high-paying jobs in order to fuel consumption growth. Unemployment gains in recent years have been
strongly driven by falling labour force participation rates, while large portions of the population remain employed in the insecure
and poorly paid informal sector.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 14
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Priv
Private
ate Consumption FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2022-2027)
Indicator 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f
Priv
Private
ate final cconsumption,
onsumption, EEGPbn
GPbn 6,471.8 8,387.5 11,308.8 13,723.0 15,841.8 17,628.8
Priv
Private
ate final cconsumption,
onsumption, % of GDP 82.5 82.6 88.3 87.3 87.0 86.9
Priv
Private
ate final cconsumption,
onsumption, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y 3.8 3.8 4.6 2.8 4.0 4.0
e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: Central Bank of Egypt, BMI

Priv
Private
ate Consumption FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2028-2033)
Indicator 2028f 2029f 2030f 2031f 2032f 2033f
Priv
Private
ate final cconsumption,
onsumption, EEGPbn
GPbn 19,617.3 21,830.1 24,292.6 27,032.8 30,082.1 33,475.3
Priv
Private
ate final cconsumption,
onsumption, % of GDP 86.8 86.6 86.5 86.3 86.1 85.8
Priv
Private
ate final cconsumption,
onsumption, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
f = BMI forecast. Source: Central Bank of Egypt, BMI

Government Consumption: Government consumption as a share of GDP will likely decline over the long term. The government
under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has shown a strong commitment to reducing the fiscal deficit and we believe he will likely
remain in power for the foreseeable future. Egypt's high debt load necessitates continuous reductions in expenditure. Even though
social spending has increased, government consumption has been falling over the past few years and will remain subdued in the
foreseeable future. The new IMF programme will further guide towards lower government consumption to improve public finances,
especially to lower the government's debt level.

Go
Govvernment Consumption FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2022-2027)
Indicator 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f
Go
Govvernment final cconsumption,
onsumption, EEGPbn
GPbn 570.0 689.4 897.5 1,133.1 1,295.5 1,427.8
Go
Govvernment final cconsumption,
onsumption, % of GDP 7.3 6.8 7.0 7.2 7.1 7.0
Go
Govvernment final cconsumption,
onsumption, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y -17.3 -2.8 1.0 6.9 3.0 3.0
e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: Central Bank of Egypt, BMI

Go
Govvernment Consumption FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2028-2033)
Indicator 2028f 2029f 2030f 2031f 2032f 2033f
Go
Govvernment final cconsumption,
onsumption, EEGPbn
GPbn 1,573.5 1,734.2 1,911.2 2,106.4 2,321.5 2,558.5
Go
Govvernment final cconsumption,
onsumption, % of GDP 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.6
Go
Govvernment final cconsumption,
onsumption, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
f = BMI forecast. Source: Central Bank of Egypt, BMI

Gross Fixed Capital Formation: We expect moderate growth in fixed capital formation in Egypt over the coming few years. The
rapid rise in external debt, which was mostly used to finance large infrastructure projects, will weigh on capital spending and slow
public investment. However, we believe that the authorities' recent efforts to improve the business business environment and
increase the private sector's participation in the economy will help attract foreign investment outside of the hydrocarbon sector. We
expect more than USD25.0bn in investment pledges by the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (made in March 2022) to materialise over
the coming few years, partly offsetting the slowdown in public investment. Overall, we believe that capital formation will be a key
driver of growth in Egypt over the next decade, second only to private consumption. The military's strong influence in the el-
Sisi government will imply a central role for its vast network of business interests, which may run the risk of stymieing competition.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 15
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

This will pose a threat to Egypt's ability to attract foreign investment to non-hydrocarbon sectors.

Fix
Fixed
ed Inv
Investment
estment FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2022-2027)
Indicator 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f
Fix
Fixed
ed capital fformation,
ormation, EEGPbn
GPbn 1,334.7 1,307.8 1,558.4 1,814.2 2,057.7 2,333.8
Fix
Fixed
ed capital fformation,
ormation, % of GDP 17.0 12.9 12.2 11.5 11.3 11.5
Fix
Fixed
ed capital fformation,
ormation, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y 30.5 -21.6 -0.7 8.8 6.0 6.0
f = BMI forecast. Source: CBE, BMI

Fix
Fixed
ed Inv
Investment
estment FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2028-2033)
Indicator 2028f 2029f 2030f 2031f 2032f 2033f
Fix
Fixed
ed capital fformation,
ormation, EEGPbn
GPbn 2,647.0 3,002.2 3,405.1 3,862.1 4,380.4 4,968.2
Fix
Fixed
ed capital fformation,
ormation, % of GDP 11.7 11.9 12.1 12.3 12.5 12.7
Fix
Fixed
ed capital fformation,
ormation, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
f = BMI forecast. Source: Central Bank of Egypt, BMI

Net Exports: Egypt's net exports outlook will be mixed over the next decade. Production of natural gas ramped up over the
2017-2018 period, helping to raise exports and also reduce the country's fuel imports. Fast-rising domestic gas consumption will
reduce the amount available for export, as production gains start to moderate from 2023 onwards. Overall, the net outcome will
depend on the rate of new discoveries, posing an upside risk to our forecasts. We also expect non-gas imports to grow at a fast pace
over the medium term as large-scale infrastructure programmes keep demand for capital inputs elevated and given that domestic
supply chains are still underdeveloped. Our Tourism team is bullish on Egypt's tourism sector, which will support services exports. We
expect a slightly negative contribution of net exports to real GDP growth over the next decade.

Net Expor
Exports
ts FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2022-2027)
Indicator 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f
Net eexpor
xports
ts of goods and ser
servic
vices,
es, EEGPbn
GPbn -534.0 -227.3 -954.3 -950.9 -975.9 -1,100.1
Net eexpor
xports
ts of goods and ser
servic
vices,
es, % of GDP -6.8 -2.2 -7.4 -6.0 -5.4 -5.4
Net eexpor
xports
ts of goods and ser
servic
vices,
es, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y -9.6 -65.9 36.6 -12.5 -17.7 7.0
e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: Central Bank of Egypt, BMI

Net Expor
Exports
ts FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2028-2033)
Indicator 2028f 2029f 2030f 2031f 2032f 2033f
Net eexpor
xports
ts of goods and ser
servic
vices,
es, EEGPbn
GPbn -1,232.0 -1,371.1 -1,517.4 -1,670.9 -1,831.5 -1,998.8
Net eexpor
xports
ts of goods and ser
servic
vices,
es, % of GDP -5.4 -5.4 -5.4 -5.3 -5.2 -5.1
Net eexpor
xports
ts of goods and ser
servic
vices,
es, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y 5.3 14.0 11.7 9.8 8.2 6.9
f = BMI forecast. Source: Central Bank of Egypt, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 16
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

External Trade And Investment Outlook

Egypt's Current Account Deficit Will Narrow In FY2024/25, Risks Are To The
Downside
Key View

• We expect that Egypt's current account deficit will narrow from an estimated 7.8% of GDP (USD21.7bn) in FY2023/24 to 4.2% of
GDP (USD13.2bn) in FY2024/25.
• A recovery in remittances and Suez Canal receipts will drive the narrowing of the deficit in nominal terms. This will be offset by a
wider deficit in the goods trade balance because of higher imports and wider oil trade deficit.
• We expect Egypt’s FX reserves to increase to USD 41.7bn by June 2025, providing some buffer against short-term shocks, but the
country will remain vulnerable to significant geopolitical risks.

We maintain our view that Egypt’s current account deficit will narrow to 4.2% of GDP (USD13.2bn) in FY2024/25 (July
2024–June 2025). This will mark a significant narrowing from our estimate of 7.8% of GDP (USD21.7bn) in FY2023/24. We now
expect a wider deficit in FY2023/24, having previously projected it at 5.3% of GDP (USD15.5bn), but Q3 data showed a significantly
narrower services surplus as a result of higher services payments. The narrowing of the deficit in nominal terms will come
from higher remittances and surplus in the services balances.

First, we expect that remittance inflows (secondary income) will rise by 31% y-o-y in FY2024/25 to USD28.9bn (9.1%
of GDP). In Q4 FY2023/24, remittances increased from an average of USD4.8bn in the preceding quarters to USD7.5bn (see chart
below) due to the unification of the exchange rates that made it easier and profitable for senders to remit money through the
official channels. We expect that this trend will persist and will be amplified by strong growth prospects for Gulf Cooperation Council
countries, where a large share of Egyptian expatriates reside.

Remittance Inflows Will Continue To Rise

Egypt - Remittance Inflows, USDbn

Source: Haver, CBE, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 17
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Second, we expect that the services surplus will increase from USD15.1bn (5.4%) in FY2023/24 to USD17.8bn (5.6%
of GDP) in FY2024/25. Our forecast factors in a gradual recovery in Suez Canal receipts from January 2025 onwards (see chart
below) as the Israel-Hamas war comes to an end, which would put total receipts in FY2024/25 on par with FY2023/24 at about
USD11.7bn. We also expect a 5.0% increase in tourism receipts to USD15.1bn in FY2024/25. Our Tourism team remains bullish
about the Egyptian market due to the authorities’ efforts to attract tourists from diverse markets and as the number of visitors from
Russia continues to increase. On the services payment side, we anticipate a normalisation of payments in FY2024/25 and consider
the 25% increase in services payments in FY2023/24 a one-off event, triggered by costs related to the Olympic Games or the
settlement of overdue payments.

Red Sea Crisis Will Last Into December 2024

Egypt - Suez Canal Receipts, USDbn

Source: CBE, Haver, BMI

Relative to GDP, we expect the deficit in the goods trade balance to narrow from 14.3% in FY2023/24 to 12.5% in
FY2024/25. The smaller ratio reflects a near 15% y-o-y increase in nominal GDP in USD in FY2024/25 due to a smaller
depreciation of the average exchange rate (7.6% in 2025 against 49.2% in 2024) along with a growing economy and an average
inflation rate of 18.1% in 2025.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 18
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Narrower Current Account Deficit Ahead

Egypt - Current Account Balance & Components, % of GDP

e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: CBE, BMI

However, the smaller ratio masks a 2.0% y-o-y rise in the nominal value of the deficit to USD40.0bn in FY2024/25. This will result
largely from higher imports. Imports will increase as a result of imported raw materials as manufacturers seek to benefit from the
competitive gains because of the weaker currency. They will also increase because of hydrocarbon imports as well as higher
commodity prices such as corn and wheat. Non-oil goods exports will pick up due to competitiveness gains, the normalisation of
manufacturing activity and broadly strong demand in key export markets. Nonetheless, the impact of higher non-oil exports on total
exports will be capped by declining hydrocarbon exports, which will continue to struggle because of falling gas production and
strong domestic demand.

Similarly, the primary income deficit will fall from 6.8% of GDP in FY2023/24 to 6.0% in FY2024/25. This is despite the
fact that in nominal terms the primary income will rise by 2.0% in FY2024/25 to USD19.4bn. The rise is very modest compared with
the double-digit increases over the past three years. This is because we expect a slightly lower interest rate environment that will
reduce interest payments, and we assume that foreigners holding domestic T-bills will reinvest some of their earnings rather than
repatriate them.

Despite the wide current account deficit in FY2023/24, Egypt’s net international reserves increased from USD34.8bn (3.9 months of
imports) at the end of June 2023 to USD46.4bn (5.0 months of imports) at the end of June 2024. This was mostly due to the
USD34.0bn investment deal with the UAE that resulted in the disbursement of USD24bn between March and May, along with about
USD22.0bn in portfolio investment inflows. At the same time, the financial sector's net foreign asset position shifted from negative
to positive in May 2024 for the first time since January 2022, mostly because of higher foreign assets (see charts below). By June
2025, we expect Egypt’s FX reserves to increase to USD41.7bn, or 5.6 months of imports, supported by foreign
investment (equity and portfolio) as well as possible debt issuance in 2025. Portfolio investments will be volatile in the
short term because of elevated geopolitical risks, but from February 2025 (when base effects push inflation below 20%), they will
benefit from elevated real policy rates that will support the accumulation of reserves.

While Egypt has accumulated record high FX reserves, this will only provide it with the ability to deal with short-lived
modest shocks. In addition to the USD13.2bn current account deficit, Egypt needs to settle a similar amount in external debt
payments due in FY2024/25.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 19
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Reserves Can Weather A Modest Shock

Egypt - FX Reserves, USDbn (LHC) & Net Foreign Asset Position, USDbn (RHC)

Source: Haver, CBE, BMI

Portfolio investment remains a key vulnerability. In late July 2024, global market volatility and heightened geopolitical risks
spooked portfolio investors (see charts below), triggered capital flight and weighed on the Egyptian pound.

Portfolio Investment Will Continue To React To Geopolitical Risks

Egypt - T-Bills Held By Foreigners (LHC) & 5-Year CDS

Source: Haver, Bloomberg, BMI

While global markets have calmed down since then, heightened geopolitical risks have prevented the normalisation of risks. As long
as the war in Gaza continues, flare-ups in geopolitical risks will happen, which will fuel investors’ concerns and result in currency
fluctuations. In the event of a significant spike in risks, such as a war between Israel and Hezbollah (45%) or in the less likely scenario
(5%) of a war between Israel and Iran, then portfolio investments will leave the country at a rapid pace, resulting in significant
pressure on the currency and a reduction in FX available for the economy in the official market. In that case, we think that the
authorities would compress imports, and non-oil exports will also take a hit.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 20
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

There is also the risk of a smaller services surplus if the war in Gaza drags on beyond December 2024, delaying the recovery in Suez
Canal receipts and causing the tourism sector to lose its momentum. In the event that services payments do not normalise, the
surplus in the services balance would be smaller. We think that these risks are manageable provided that they do not last over
several quarters.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 21
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Monetary Policy Outlook

Majority Of North African Markets Will Hold Their Policy Rates In H2 2024 Except For
Morocco
Key View

• We forecast that monetary authorities in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia will hold their policy rates in H2 2024 as inflation will remain
elevated. Morocco will diverge from the regional trend, cutting its key rate by 50bps.
• In 2025, lower inflation and country-specific factors will encourage the Central Bank of Egypt and the Bank Al Maghrib to cut
their policy rates, while above-average inflation in Algeria and Tunisia will prompt the authorities to keep monetary policy
unchanged in 2025.
• Risks to our policy rate forecasts are skewed towards earlier monetary easing in Egypt, and higher policy rates in Morocco and
Algeria should inflation spike, Risks are balanced in Tunisia.

We anticipate that monetary policy will diverge across North African markets over the remainder of 2024 and in
2025. H1 2024 saw Algeria and Tunisia maintain their policy rates at 3.00% and 8.00% respectively, the levels at which they ended
2023. The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) implemented a hike of 600 basis points (bps) on March 6 on top of a 200bps increase in
February 2024, putting the overnight lending rate at 28.25% and the overnight deposit rate at 27.25%, their all-time high. On June
25 2024, Bank Al Maghrib (BAM) cut the key rate by 25bps to 2.75% as inflation declined significantly to 1.8% y-o-y in June 2024
from double digits in the prior year (see chart below).

Mixed Monetary Policy Outlook

Selected North African Markets – Policy Rate, %

f = BMI forecast. Source: National sources, BMI

In H2 2024, we expect that decelerating yet sticky inflation will encourage the central banks of Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia to hold
rates at the current levels through to the end of 2024, while low inflation will provide impetus for BAM to cut the rate by an
additional 50bps (see chart above). In Q1 2025, Egypt will join Morocco and start its monetary easing cycle, while Algeria and Tunisia
will see no change on the monetary policy front.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 22
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Morocco Will Proceed With Rate Cuts

We forecast that the BAM will cut its policy rate in another two steps of 25bps in September and December 2024 to
2.25% by the end of 2024 as inflation will remain below 2% in H2 2024 despite a reduction in subsidies on butane gas. In 2025,
several factors will provide impetus for the BAM to cut its policy rate by another 25bps to 2.00% early in the year. These
include a low inflation (forecast: 1.9% in 2025) along with the need to boost employment, stimulate economic growth, reduce
government borrowing costs, and ensure a low differential with both the European Central Bank and US Federal Reserve policy rates
given its managed currency peg.

BAM Will Ease Policy In H2 2024 And 2025

Morocco - Headline Inflation, % y-o-y & Policy Rate, %

Source: National sources, BMI

Egypt Will Start Easing Cycle In Q1 2025

In its latest meeting on July 18 2024, the CBE held its policy rates at their current level for the second consecutive time since March
2024, in line with our expectations. We expect that still elevated inflation and the need to support the Egyptian pound will
incentivise the CBE to keep policy rates unchanged over the remainder of 2024.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 23
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Monetary Policy Will Remain On Hold In H2 2024, Ease In Q1 2025

Egypt – Inflation, % y-o-y & Policy Rate, %

Source: National sources, BMI

Although we expect that average inflation will decline from 31.2% y-o-y in H1 2024 to 27.0% in H2 2024, it will remain significantly
above the CBE’s upper inflation target range of 9.0%. We expect that seasonal factors and increases in administered prices, such as
fuel and electricity, will keep price pressures elevated in Egypt in the coming months. In addition, we think that the authorities will
seek to strengthen confidence in the exchange rate and achieve a positive real interest rate, discouraging an easing in monetary
policy this year.

In 2025, we foresee that the CBE will likely cut its rates by a cumulative 1,200bps as the massive favourable statistical
base effects will see inflation fall below 20% despite the expected increases in administered prices. This will prompt the CBE to ease
monetary policy next year.

Algeria And Tunisia Will Continue To Hold

We anticipate that Banque d'Algérie will hold its reserve requirement ratio (its main policy tool) and its discount rate
at their current levels (3.00% for both) until the end of 2025 as inflation will remain contained with the intention of
supporting economic growth. Algeria’s inflation has slowed significantly to 2.8% y-o-y, according to of the latest available data for
May 2024, from double-digit annual growth in 2023. We think that an elevated energy price environment will allow the authorities
to limit any downside pressure on the dinar, thus keeping inflation stable at around 4.8% in 2024 and 5.3% in 2025. This will reduce
the need for monetary policy intervention to control domestic inflation, with the central bank likely to keep financial conditions in
their current state to support economic activity. That said, given that the current policy rates are already at all-time lows, inflation
remains slightly above the 2015-2019 average and real rates are negative, we rule out any monetary easing by the authorities in
2024 and in 2025.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 24
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

No Change To Policy Rates In Algeria In H2 2024 And 2025

Algeria - Headline Inflation, % y-o-y & Policy Rate, % (2010-2025)

Source: National sources, BMI

Similarly, we expect that sticky inflation will prompt the Central Bank of Tunisia (CBT) to hold its key rate at 8.00%
until the end of 2025. In its meeting on June 20, the CBT kept its key rate unchanged at the highest rate since 2006 for the ninth
consecutive meeting. Despite easing from an average of 10.0% y-o-y in H1 2023 to 7.4% y-o-y in H1 2024, we expect that price
growth will stabilise around 7.2% in H2 2024 and tick up to an average of 7.6% in 2025. Despite lower Brent prices in 2025, we
expect that higher wheat and water prices, ongoing shortages of goods in the domestic market, and depreciatory pressures on the
dinar in H1 2025 will keep inflation in Tunisia above the 2015-2019 average of 5.6%. This will discourage the CBT from following the
regional and global trend by easing monetary policy.

CBT Will Hold Rate Until End 2025 As Inflation Will Remain Contained
Tunisia - Headline Inflation, % y-o-y & Policy Rate, %

Source: National sources, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 25
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

We do not think that the CBT will hike rates in order to avoid exacerbating fiscal pressures through higher interest payments given
that the government is increasingly relying on domestic banks and the CBT itself to finance its fiscal and current account deficits. In
addition, concerns about further choking economic activity after the economy posted growth of only 0.4% in 2023 and 0.2% y-o-y
in Q1 2024 will disincentivise tighter monetary policy.

Risks TTo
o Our FFor
orecast
ecast
Country End-2024f Rate End-2025f Rate Risks Analysis
Egypt 28.25 16.25 Downside The CBE could prioritise supporting economic activity and/or
reducing debt servicing costs, cutting the rate earlier than we
expect.
Mor
Moroc
occco 2.25 2.00 Upside More persistent inflation resulting from the reduction of subsidies
on butane gas or a spike in global commodity prices due to higher
geopolitical risks could see Bank Al Maghrib possibly delay rate cuts.
Algeria 3.00 3.00 Upside A resurgence in inflation in the event the Bank of Algeria is not able
to use the currency to control domestic prices could prompt the
bank to use interest rates as its main tool for fighting inflation. This
could possibly be triggered by a significant drop in oil prices due
to a sharper-than-expected global slowdown, which would constrain
Algeria's ability to pile up FX reserves and in turn support the dinar.
Tunisia 8.00 8.00 Balanced A marked fall in inflation should the dinar perform better than we
assume and/or availability of goods in the market improves would
encourage the CBT to cut earlier than we expect. The opposite will
drive the CBT to hike to contain higher inflation.

f = BMI forecast. Source: National sources, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 26
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Monetary Policy Framework

Inflationary pressures have increased due to the rally in commodity prices after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the Central Bank of
Egypt (CBE)'s decision to allow the currency to weaken by around 14.0% on March 21 2022 and by more than 24.0% in October
2022. The currency lost a further 20.0% of its value in January 2023, as the authorities attempted to address imbalances in the
currency market. This, along with seasonal factors, increases in administered prices and supply bottlenecks, pushed inflation to a
new high of 38.0% y-o-y in September 2023. In 2023, inflation averaged 33.9%, up from an average of 13.9% in 2022. The Egyptian
pound has lost about 37% of its value in the year to August 12 2024, but we believe the worst has past in terms of price pressure as
the current exchange rate is stronger than the parallel market rate to which a large number of goods were prices. We thus expect
inflation will continue to slow, ending the year around 27%. Even so, inflation remains significantly above the CBE's inflation target of
5.0%-9.0%.

Inflationary Trends: Consumer price inflation will remain well above the CBE's upper target band of 7.0% (±2.0 percentage points)
over the coming quarters, due to slightly weaker exchange rate and increases in administered prices, such as fuel and electricity.
After fuel prices were raised in August 2024, we assume a quarterly adjustment in prices through the end of 2025 to fully eliminate
the fuel subsidy. Similarly, we expect annual increases in electricity tariffs with the aim to reduce the subsidy bill. We now forecast
that inflation will average 18.1% in 2025, up from our previous forecast of about 12%.

Over the medium term, we expect that price growth will decelerate as the currency market stabilises, the supply chain bottlenecks
worldwide ease, production capacity in the country expands and the cuts in subsidies are finalised. Oil prices will remain broadly flat
over the coming years, limiting growth in transport and input costs. Overall, we forecast average inflation at 29.0% in 2024 and
11.8% in 2025 before converging to an average of 7.0% y-o-y between 2026 and 2033, compared to a peak around 38.0% in
September 2023 and a low of 5.1% in 2020.

Declining From Post-Devaluation Peak

Egypt - Consumer Price Inflation (2015-2033)

f = BMI forecast. Source: CBE, BMI

Even though we expect somewhat lower inflation than in previous years over the medium term, price growth will remain high on a
global comparison. This is due to structural factors such as a growing population and supply pressures over the next decade. The
Egyptian pound will also most likely depreciate slightly in the long term due to elevated external financing needs and government

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 27
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

debt level that will keep foreign investors cautious towards the pound. Financial inclusion is also likely to increase from its currently
low base, implying potential for strong credit - and, by extension, monetary base - growth.

The Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics adjusted its consumer price basket in the September 2019 inflation
release, basing it on the 2017/2018 Household Expenditure Survey. The main change is that food has been afforded a lower weight
in the index at 32.7%, from 39.9% previously, which means that food prices will have a smaller impact on headline inflation. The
subtracted weight has been redistributed relatively evenly over the remaining categories.

Food And Housing Dominate Consumers' Basket

Egypt - Consumer Price Index Component Weights, %

Note: Other includes miscellaneous goods and services (4.4%), housing goods (3.9%), and recreation/culture (2.2%). Source: CBE, BMI

Monetary Policy Regime: The CBE is entrusted with the formulation and implementation of monetary policy, with price stability
being the primary and overriding objective. The CBE is committed to achieving low rates of inflation over the medium term, which it
believes are essential for maintaining confidence and for sustaining high rates of investment and economic growth. Key functions
include issuing and managing the currency in order to support economic growth, and supervising the stability of the financial
system, which is crucial given the importance of the banking sector for the economy.

At present, the monetary authorities use a number of instruments to guide market conditions, including reserve requirements, and
an interest rate corridor (standing lending and deposit facilities), weekly refinancing operations and outright open market
operations. Monetary policy has been largely focused on containing inflation, which remains the CBE's main objective. In order to
strengthen the transmission channels of its policy tools, the bank is seeking to improve the quality of liquidity forecasts, deepen the
interbank market and reduce the risks from refinancing operations.

To counter the recent inflationary pressures, the CBE hiked its benchmark interest rates by a total of 800 basis points (bps) in 2022,
300bps in 2023, 200bps on February 1 2024 and 600bps on March 6 2024. It also increased the reserve requirement ratio by
400bps to 18.0% in September 2022. We believe that easing inflation will allow the CBE to start its loosening cycle in 2025, and we
expect total cuts of 1,200bps in 2025. Moreover, the CBE has committed to a durable flexible exchange rate under the new IMF
programme, which will allow fluctuations in the currency, whether to the upside or the downside. An acute increase in geopolitical
risks could lead to a significant weakening in the exchange rate and re-ignite inflationary pressures.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 28
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Monetar
Monetaryy P
Policy
olicy FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2022-2027)
Indicator 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f
Consumer pric
pricee inflation, % yy-o-y
-o-y,, eop 21.3 33.7 26.5 15.5 8.9 6.5
M2, EEGPbn
GPbn 7,402.7 8,877.6 8,967.3 11,003.6 12,753.3 14,203.2
M2, % yy-o-y
-o-y 27.1 19.9 1.0 22.7 15.9 11.4
Centr
Central
al bank policy rrate,
ate, % eop 17.25 20.25 28.25 16.25 8.25 8.25
e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: CBE, BMI

Monetar
Monetaryy P
Policy
olicy FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2028-2033)
Indicator 2028f 2029f 2030f 2031f 2032f 2033f
Consumer pric
pricee inflation, % yy-o-y
-o-y,, eop 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
M2, EEGPbn
GPbn 15,824.1 17,636.8 19,664.1 21,931.3 24,466.7 27,302.2
M2, % yy-o-y
-o-y 11.4 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.6 11.6
Centr
Central
al bank policy rrate,
ate, % eop 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25
f = BMI forecast. Source: CBE, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 29
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Fiscal Policy And Public Debt Outlook

Structural Fiscal Position
Egypt's fiscal deficit significantly narrowed from 6.1% of GDP in FY2022/23 to 3.7% of GDP in FY2023/24 due to one-off revenue
from the Ras el-Hekma deal. In FY2024/25, we expect the fiscal deficit will widen to 6.4% of GDP due to the normalisation of
revenue and despite a small decline in the share of spending relative to GDP. Fiscal restraints under the IMF programme will keep
capital spending subdued and will help decrease the subsidy bill. The IMF seems to want to see reforms and fiscal measures ahead
of every review, as seen July 2024 when the IMF delayed the review to allow for the authorities to raise fuel prices. At the same time,
interest payments will start to decline due to a lower interest rate environment, which will ease the pressure on public spending.
Over the medium term, we expect the deficit to gradually narrow but to remain around 4.5% of GDP due to sticky spending profile.
Our forecast assumes that the elimination of fuel and electricity subsidies will take longer than the government's plan. The
authorities plan to eliminate the fuel subsidy by 2025 and the electricity subsidy by 2026 and shift to a targeted subsidy system by
FY2025/26.

Fiscal Framework

Egypt does not have a multi-year fiscal framework in place at present. It has a medium-term debt framework, but this does not
specify any particular expenditure or revenue targets that must be met. Many of the measures introduced as part of the
government's wider Medium-Term Economic Framework have had a significant impact on the country's fiscal position, including the
following:

• Subsidy Cuts: Cuts to subsidies on energy, electricity and transport over the past four years, ultimately aiming to bring prices in
line with international levels.
• VAT Introduction: A fully fledged VAT system implemented for the first time in 2016 with an initial rate of 13.0%, replacing the
former sales tax of 10.0% and then hiked to 14.0% in mid-2017.
• Public Sector Wage Restraint: More moderate wage increases and tighter control over new hiring as part of the
modernisation of the public employment framework and in line with the new civil service law.

In the coming years, under the new IMF programme, we expect further reforms, including the introduction of a medium-term fiscal
framework. Details surrounding this planned framework are scarce, but we believe it is likely to involve multi-year expenditure
ceilings, which should help to control spending by different ministries. The government has set up a sovereign wealth fund, the
Egyptian Fund, to help manage state assets, and has announced an ambitious privatisation plan. The authorities plan to privatise 32
state- and army-owned companies by listing them on the Egyptian stock exchange or through direct sale to strategic partners. This
falls in line with the authorities' efforts to boost state finances and their commitment towards reducing the state footprint in the
economy under the new IMF programme. Such reforms, if fully implemented, will help reduce the role of the public sector in favour
of private sector-led growth.

Revenue: Sharp macroeconomic readjustments made by Egypt in connection to its 2016 IMF deal highlighted two weaknesses
within the country's tax system - that of a low overall tax revenue to GDP ratio compared with other Middle East and North Africa
markets and a heavy reliance on revenue from indirect taxes. Egypt relies heavily on value-added tax (VAT) (a form of indirect
taxation), which accounted for 33.7% of total revenues in FY2021/22 (before the introduction of VAT in 2016, the sales tax played a
similar function). Although reliance on indirect taxes reduces risks relating to collection, it presents other fiscal challenges in terms
of its impact on the lower income proportion of the population, which is substantial in Egypt. This suggests a potential ceiling to the
government's ability to raise tax revenue unless it improves its capacity to increase direct taxation receipts. That would require
formalising a greater share of the economy; the ILO estimates that around half of the workforce is informal.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 30
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Heavy Reliance On Indirect Tax Revenues

Egypt – Tax Revenues By Category, % total

Source: Ministry of Finance, BMI

Expenditure: Interest payments account for the largest share of the government's spending, followed by compensation of public
sector employees and subsidies, grants and social benefits. Recent reform efforts have made progress in cutting subsides as their
share of total spending. Under the Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework, the government cut subsidy spending on energy,
electricity and transportation, ultimately aiming to bring prices in line with international levels. In July 2019, the government mostly
eliminated fuel subsidies on most energy products, bringing domestic fuel prices in line with global ones. However, the subsidy bill
increased in FY2021/22, reflecting the increase in global commodity prices, and further increased in FY2022/23 as the authorities
have been reluctant in cutting subsidies starting to avoid exacerbating social discontent, especially as inflation reached record
highs. The government's plan to phase out electricity subsidies by 2025 was derailed first because of the Covid-19 pandemic and a
second time because of the inflationary pressures from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The authorities refrained from increasing
electricity tariffs in July 2023 and did not set a date for this measure to take place.

Other spending needs have arisen in the form of capital projects and demand for wage hikes. The government boosted public
sector salaries in early 2019, another time during the pandemic period and several times since then, while investment spending has
been on a sharp uptrend. Given the anticipated aggressive monetary tightening, and the expansion of the subsidy bill and social
safety nets following the rally in commodity prices after Russia invaded Ukraine, we believe that authorities will be forced to cut
capital spending to keep the fiscal deficit in check. This has been reflected in the budget for FY2022/23 and more recently in the
government's stated plans to reduce mega-infrastructure projects.

The phasing out of some subsidies, especially bread, could trigger some potential pushback from some the poorer segments of the
population at a time when inflation exceeds 30%. We suspect that the authorities are unlikely to increase bread prices in the short
term. Protests in September 2019, while limited in size, showed that these risks have not dissipated.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 31
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Government's Share Of GDP On The Decline

Egypt - Government Spending & Revenue (2015-2033)

f = BMI forecast. Source: Ministry of Finance, BMI

Debt Sustainability: Egypt's total public debt-to-GDP has risen sharply over the last decade, and the impact of the 2016 exchange
rate devaluation served to push the ratio close to 100%. The Covid-19 pandemic derailed the government's plan to reduce the debt
level to 80.0% of GDP by 2022. We think the the debt load decreased to about 88% of GDP in June 2024, due to the one-off
payment of the Ras el-Hekma deal, and will hover around 75% over the medium term before falling to 67.0% of GDP by 2033.

The government benefits from relatively limited currency risk, with three-quarters of the total public debt denominated in Egyptian
pounds. Moreover, nearly 70% of external debt is bilateral or multilateral (concessional). This is important for the overall debt picture
given concessional debt attracts a below-market interest rate and can have an extended grace period for repayment. Another
positive dynamic is the government's efforts to improve the profile of the commercial debt through longer maturities and adequate
repayment schedule. The central bank's foreign exchange reserves allow it to cover its short-term foreign currency payments if
there were to be pressure on the exchange rate.

Rollover risk remains a concern, given the rapid rise in short-term treasury bills since 2016. At the onset of the pandemic, more than
USD15bn in portfolio investment exited Egypt. While these flows recovered shortly after, the recent risk aversion towards emerging
markets after Russia's invasion of Ukraine resulted in USD25.0bn in outflows, prompting authorities to devalue the currency and
approach the IMF for funding. Following the March 6 2024 currency adjustment, the overshooting that followed and Egypt's
attractive yields, more than USD22bn in portfolio investment entered Egypt. Foreigners hold about 50% of T-bills with maturity up to
12 months, equivalent to about 90% of FX reserves. This means that any large shock or an intensification in geopolitical risks could
lead to the reversal of these flows.

Interest expense remains severely elevated. According to the government’s fiscal accounts, interest expense accounted for 58.3%
of total revenues in FY2019/20, well above the 48.0% recorded in FY2016/17. While this share declined to 43.4% in FY2021/22
due to a faster rise in revenues than interest payment, it reverted back to about 55.0% of revenues in FY2022/23 due to the
aggressive monetary tightening that increased the borrowing cost. In our view, the new IMF programme and the backing of regional
heavyweights, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, will shore up investor confidence and support Egypt's access to the international
debt market.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 32
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Fiscal And Public Debt FFor

orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2022-2027)
Indicator 2022e 2023e 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f
Total rreevenue, EEGPbn
GPbn 1,347.2 1,563.9 2,502.3 2,552.3 2,935.2 3,258.0
Total rreevenue, EEGP
GP,, % yy-o-y
-o-y 21.5 16.1 60.0 2.0 15.0 11.0
Total eexpenditur
xpenditure,
e, EEGPbn
GPbn 1,831.0 2,184.6 2,973.3 3,557.9 3,886.7 4,248.4
Total eexpenditur
xpenditure,
e, EEGP
GP,, % yy-o-y
-o-y 16.0 19.3 36.1 19.7 9.2 9.3
Budget balanc
balance,
e, EEGPbn
GPbn -483.8 -620.7 -471.0 -1,005.5 -951.5 -990.4
Budget balanc
balance,
e, % of GDP -6.2 -6.1 -3.7 -6.4 -5.2 -4.9
Total go
govvernment debt, USDbn 299.5 309.5 245.1 266.2 285.8 301.7
Total go
govvernment debt, % of GDP 94.3 94.0 93.2 84.1 79.5 76.8
e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: Ministry of Finance, BMI

Fiscal And Public Debt FFor

orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2028-2033)
Indicator 2028f 2029f 2030f 2031f 2032f 2033f
Total rreevenue, EEGPbn
GPbn 3,616.4 4,014.2 4,475.9 4,990.6 5,589.5 6,288.1
Total rreevenue, EEGP
GP,, % yy-o-y
-o-y 11.0 11.0 11.5 11.5 12.0 12.5
Total eexpenditur
xpenditure,
e, EEGPbn
GPbn 4,709.8 5,228.5 5,812.3 6,470.3 7,212.4 8,050.5
Total eexpenditur
xpenditure,
e, EEGP
GP,, % yy-o-y
-o-y 10.9 11.0 11.2 11.3 11.5 11.6
Budget balanc
balance,
e, EEGPbn
GPbn -1,093.3 -1,214.2 -1,336.5 -1,479.7 -1,623.0 -1,762.4
Budget balanc
balance,
e, % of GDP -4.8 -4.8 -4.8 -4.7 -4.6 -4.5
Total go
govvernment debt, USDbn 324.2 346.7 368.8 392.7 418.5 446.3
Total go
govvernment debt, % of GDP 75.6 74.0 72.0 70.1 68.3 66.6
f = BMI forecast. Source: Ministry of Finance, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 33
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Currency Forecast
Weaker Trading Range For The Egyptian Pound
BMI Egypt Curr
Currency
ency FFor
orecast
ecast
Spot 2021 2022 2023 2024f 2025f
EGP per USD, av
avee 49.28 15.64 19.16 30.63 45.70 49.19
EGP per EUR, av
avee 53.86 18.52 20.12 33.22 49.68 54.60
CBE lending rrate,
ate, %
28.25 9.25 17.25 20.25 28.25 16.25
eop

Source: CBE, BMI. Last updated: August 8 2024

Key View

• We expect that the Egyptian pound will become more volatile over the rest of 2024, trading within a range of EGP47.90/USD and
EGP49.50/USD.
• While the pound recouped its losses after previous bouts of risk flare-ups, we do not think that this will be the case now because
elevated geopolitical risks will limit the room for the currency to strengthen beyond the July 30 level of EGP48.00/USD.
• Risks to the short-term outlook are balanced. A ceasefire in Gaza would help to re-normalise navigation in the Red Sea and
provide a boost for tourism activity that would lead the pound to strengthen towards EGP47.50/USD. By contrast, worsening
political risks will weigh on the pound and push it towards EGP55.00/USD.

We now expect a more volatile Egyptian pound over the rest of 2024, with the currency trading within a range of
EGP47.90/USD and EGP49.50/USD. This is a revision from our previous long-held view that the pound would trade sideways
around EGP47.50/USD within a range of EGP46.50/USD and EGP48.50/USD (see chart below). While temporary breaches are
possible because of the prevailing geopolitical risk, we think that the authorities will intervene to support the currency and prevent
large fluctuations.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 34
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Geological Risk Push Pound To New Trading Range

Exchange Rate, EGP per USD (daily official rate)

Source: Haver, BMI

We think that it will be difficult for the pound to recoup its losses in the short term as geopolitical risks will remain
elevated, limiting the room for the currency to strengthen. Since the July 30-31 dual Israeli attack on Beirut and Tehran, risks
of a wider war in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have increased to their highest level since October 2023. This has
weakened the pound by 2.0% from EGP48.33/USD on July 29 to EGP49.28/USD on August 8. Granted, the current round of
tensions happened in the context of global market volatility that weighed on the Egyptian pound through portfolio outflows. While
the 5-year CDS and non-deliverable forwards have slightly improved (see charts below) and will likely continue to do so in the short
term, elevated geopolitical risk will prevent risk perception from normalising and the currency from strengthening beyond the pre-
July 30 levels.

Some Reversal In Risk Perception But Not Normalised Yet

Egypt - 5-Year CDS (LHC) & Non-Deliverable Forwards, EGP per USD (RHC)

Source: Bloomberg, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 35
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

We maintain our view that the war in Gaza, which borders Egypt, and subsequent Red Sea disruptions and fighting with Hezbollah
on the Israel/Lebanon border will continue in H2 2024, which exposes the region to bouts of acute flare-ups in risk. Geopolitical
risk raises concerns among portfolio investors about spillovers to Egypt and a broader war in MENA. As of April 2024,
foreigners’ holdings of Egyptian T-bills denominated in local currency with maximum maturity dates of 12 months reached
USD35.6bn, accounting for 47.5% of total T-bills and equivalent to 91.2% of Egypt’s FX reserves of USD46.5bn as of July 2024 (see
charts below, left). In addition, using the spot rate, about USD4.5bn worth of T-bills (held by locals and foreigners) mature every
month between August and December 2024 (see charts below, right). This exposes Egypt to significant rollover risk and capital
flight.

Portfolio Investments Will React To Geopolitical Risk

Egypt - T-Bills Held By Foreigners (LHC) & Monthly T-Bills Maturity (RHC)

Source: CBE, Haver, BMI

The latest available data show that foreigners’ holdings of T-bills increased by USD19.0bn in March and USD2.8bn in April, and we
think that they increased in May, encouraged by Egypt receiving USD14bn through the second tranche of the Ras el-Hekmah deal.
However, in June (when risk of war between Israel and Hezbollah increased significantly) we estimate that they declined by about
USD4.0bn. The net foreign asset position of banks fell by USD1.6bn in June (see chart below) even though remittance inflows
reached USD2.6bn. Portfolio outflows in the first week of August possibly exceeded this amount given the steep weakening of the
exchange rate.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 36
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

NFA Posted First Decline In June

Egypt - Net Foreign Asset Position, USDbn

Source: Haver, BMI

We also see limited upside for the Egyptian pound as long as the war in Gaza and Red Sea disruption continue. Egypt
has lost at least USD400mn per month in Suez Canal receipts since navigation disruption in the Red Sea started in December 2023.
Its tourism sector has struggled due to tensions around the Gaza/Egyptian border. The limited upside on the currency and the
existing geopolitical risk will discourage portfolio investors from buying Egyptian T-bills and will also require the authorities to
increase the yields on new issuance as we have seen in recent months. This will have negative implications on the fiscal position
and debt levels.

Additionally, we think that the Egyptian authorities are keen to allow the exchange rate to fluctuate as this was a
requirement of their IMF programme (which is up for review in mid-September). Even so, we believe that the authorities
will continue to intervene to prevent sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate (see charts below, left) as we expect they did on April
15 (first round of Iran-Israel tensions) and August 5 (second round of Iran-Israel tensions) when the exchange rate weakened by
between 1-3% intraday. We also expect that the authorities’ support has kept the exchange rate broadly stable at around
USD49.20/USD between August 5 and August 8 (time of writing) and will remain stable until more clarity about the direction of the
current round of tensions emerges. Our view is reinforced by a wider spread with the parallel market rate that has reached about
EGP50/USD at the time of writing (see charts below, right). We think that the authorities can support the currency in the event of
short-lived moderate shocks as FX reserves reached a record high of USD46.5bn in July 2024, covering about 7.5 months of
imports.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 37
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

More Volatile Pound But Authorities Will Prevent Large Fluctuations

Egypt - Official Exchange Rate, EGP per USD (LHC) & Parallel Market Rate, EGP per USD (RHC)

Source: Bloomberg, Markets, BMI

In 2025, we think that the exchange rate will weaken by 2.0% to EGP49.67/USD by the end of the year. The weaker
currency will mainly reflect Egypt’s large external financing needs, including a wide trade deficit and elevated debt repayment bills.
The country’s weak fundamentals, such as a wider fiscal deficit and elevated debt level, will also weigh on the currency. These
factors will more than offset the impact of positive real policy rates and yields, and the higher real interest rate differential with the
US (see charts below).

Positives Rates Will Provide Some Support In 2025

Egypt - Real Policy Rate, % (LHC) & Real Interest Rates Differential, % (RHC)

Source: Haver, BMI

Given the volatile security conditions in the region, we have provided two alternative scenarios for the Egyptian
pound.

Optimistic Scenario: A rapid de-escalation, such as a ceasefire in Gaza, would cause a positive shock for the Egyptian pound by
paving the way for the (gradual) normalisation of navigation in the Red Sea and create upside for the tourism sector. This would
cause the Egyptian pound to strengthen towards our prior trading range of EGP46.50/USD to EGP48.50/USD. We think that the
authorities would avoid further strengthening and would prioritise the accumulation of FX given Egypt’s large import bill and debt

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 38
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

repayment.

Pessimistic Scenario: If the current tensions between Israel and the Axis of Resistance escalates, then the Egyptian pound will
weaken beyond EGP49.50/USD, possibly reaching EGP55.00/USD over the short term. Portfolio outflows would cause the net
foreign asset position of banks to revert to negative and FX reserves would decline. In this case, activity on the parallel market would
significantly increase, and we would expect to see a widening gap between the official and parallel market exchange rates.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 39
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

10-Year Forecasts
More Reforms Needed Before Long-Term Potential Is Realised in Egypt
Key View

• Egypt has many inherent advantages that make its long-term growth environment compelling.
• These include a strategic and cultural position in the world, a large and growing population, and underdeveloped private and
financial sectors which provide ample room for expansion.
• However, Egypt's recurrent economic challenges will continue to prevent the economy from reaching its long-term potential. In
periods of stability, the authorities' actions have been geared towards crisis prevention. In periods of stress, they are
geared towards crisis management.

The Egyptian economy enjoys inherent advantages, such as a large and growing population, vast hydrocarbon resources and a
strategic geographical location. However, we believe that the country's successive economic shocks have prevented the economy
from reaching its long-term potential, more recently as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, the fallout of Russia's invasion of Ukraine
and the Israel-Hamas war, including the Red Sea crisis. During the period of stability over the past decade, the authorities' actions
have been geared towards crisis prevention. In period of stress, they have been geared towards crisis management. While
we forecast that real GDP growth will average 4.1% y-o-y between 2025 and 2033, compared with 3.8% over the 2010-2019 period,
on the back of expanding private consumption, rising foreign direct investment and strong tourism activity, the higher average
growth rates masks a slowdown in activity over the next next five years. We forecast that growth will decelerate from 6.7% in
FY2021/2022 (July 2021-June 2022) to 3.8% by FY2022/23 and 3.0% in in FY2023/24 before rebounding to 4.2% in FY2024/25.

We believe that the economy will continue to face numerous structural obstacles. The state (not least military-linked actors) still has
a large presence in the Egyptian economy, limiting space for the private sector to expand, thus weighing on competitiveness. While
privatisation was a key component of the government's 2016 IMF programme and subsequent programmes, progress on this front
has been slow and has proven to be challenging due to vested interests push back. While we believe the authorities will make
progress in coming quarters to raise foreign funding, advancement will continue to be slow for the same reasons. Egypt's
exceptionally low financial inclusion will take time to increase, meaning that limited credit availability will continue to hamper
economic expansion, particularly in small- and medium-sized enterprises and consumer segments.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 40
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

More Reform Needed To Boost Long-Term Growth Prospects

Egypt - Nominal GDP & Real Growth, USDbn & % y-o-y (2018-2033)

e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: Central Bank of Egypt, BMI

In Egypt's business environment, there is also much room for improvement. Although the government has undertaken major
regulatory reforms in the last couple of years, more reform is needed to increase investment, business operations and labour
market frameworks in line with international standards. Similarly, while the government is investing heavily in capital projects,
Egypt's infrastructure deficit will take time to close.

There are substantial risks to Egypt's long-term economic trajectory on the political side. Rising costs of living following four
currency adjustments since November 2016 as well as political repression are bound to fuel discontent within certain population
segments. While not our core view, we cannot rule out a scenario in which this eventually sparks popular unrest. This would be a
particular risk if economic conditions do not remain strong enough over the medium term to absorb the fast-growing youth
population, in turn causing already elevated youth unemployment to increase. Such an event, if serious enough, would likely
dampen Egypt's growth outlook, particularly in the form of weaker tourism revenue, less capital and financial inflows, and higher
government borrowing costs.

Egypt's geographic location, bordering Israel and Gaza, has brought forward Egypt's exposure to geopolitical risk. If the period
following the Israel-Hamas war keeps geopolitical risk elevated, then this would also weigh on Egypt's long-term growth.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 41
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Long-T
ong-Term
erm Macr
Macroec
oeconomic
onomic FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2024-2033)
Indicator 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 2029f 2030f 2031f 2032f 2033f
Nominal GDP
GDP,, USDbn 280.3 319.6 363.1 396.5 433.1 473.2 517.3 565.6 618.6 676.8
Real GDP gr
groowth, % yy-o-y
-o-y 3.0 4.2 4.7 4.1 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2
GDP per capita, USD 2,448 2,748 3,075 3,308 3,561 3,835 4,133 4,456 4,806 5,185
Population, mn 114.48 116.28 118.06 119.84 121.61 123.38 125.15 126.92 128.71 130.51
Consumer pric
pricee inflation, % yy-o-y
-o-y,, av
avee 28.9 18.1 11.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Ex
Exchange
change rrate
ate EEGP
GP per USD, av
avee 45.70 49.19 50.17 51.17 52.20 53.24 54.31 55.39 56.50 57.63
Curr
Current
ent ac
acccount balanc
balance,
e, % of GDP -7.8 -4.2 -3.6 -3.9 -4.1 -4.2 -4.3 -4.3 -4.3 -4.3
f = BMI forecast. Source: Central Bank of Egypt, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 42
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Disclaimer

Our long-t
long-term
erm macr
macroec
oeconomic
onomic ffor orecasts
ecasts ar
aree based on a vvariety
ariety of quantitativ
quantitativee and qualitativ
qualitativee ffact
actor
ors.
s. Our 10-y
10-year
ear ffor
orecasts
ecasts assume in most cases
that gr
groowth eevventually cconv
onvererges
ges ttoo a long-t
long-term
erm trtrend,
end, with ec
economic
onomic pot potential
ential being det determined
ermined by ffactactor
orss such as capital inv
investment,
estment,
demogr
demographics
aphics and pr productivity
oductivity gr groowth. Because quantitativ
quantitativee fr
framew
ameworks
orks oft
often
en ffail
ail ttoo captur
capturee kkey
ey dynamics behind long-t long-term
erm gr groowth
det
determinants,
erminants, our ffor orecasts
ecasts also rreflect
eflect analy
analysts’
sts’ in-depth kno
knowledge
wledge of subjectiv
subjectivee ffact
actor
orss such as institutional str strength
ength and political stability
stability.. W
Wee
assess trtrends
ends in the ccomposition
omposition of the ec economy
onomy on a GDP by eexpenditur
xpendituree basis in or order
der ttoo det
determine
ermine the degr
degreeee ttoo which priv
privat atee and
go
govvernment cconsumption,
onsumption, fix
fixed
ed invinvestment
estment and the eexporxportt sect
sectoror will driv
drivee gr
groowth in the futurfuture.
e. TTak
aken
en ttogether
ogether,, these ffact
actor
orss ffeed
eed int
intoo our
pr
projections
ojections ffor
or eexxchange rrat
ates,
es, eext
xternal
ernal ac
acccount balanc
balanceses and int
inter
erest
est rrat
ates.
es.

Source: BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 43
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Political Outlook
Egypt’s New Cabinet Signals Reform Drive But Difficulties Persist
Key View

• We think that Egypt's new cabinet, led by Prime Minister Madbouly and featuring 13 new ministers, signals a push for economic
reform, with key changes in finance, economy and several other ministries.
• The reshuffle has been positively received by markets, as indicated by the appreciation of the Egyptian pound and the rise in
eurobond prices. This is because of some optimism about Egypt’s ability to secure sustainable sources of FX, especially from
foreign direct investment and exports of goods and services.
• Despite these changes, we maintain our view that policy direction will remain aligned with the IMF programme. We also remain
cautious about the prospects of deep reforms, particularly in reducing the role of the state and thr army in the economy,
prompting us to leaving our macroeconomic forecasts unchanged.

We think that Egypt’s new cabinet aims to signal to the market and investors a desire for a stronger momentum for
reforms that would put Egypt’s economic recovery on a sustainable path. On July 3 2024, the new cabinet, headed by
Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly, was sworn in. Thirteen new ministers were introduced to the cabinet, replacing previous
members, and some ministries have been merged. The most prominent change came in the Ministry of Finance with Mohamed
Maait, in post since 2018, replaced by his deputy Ahmed Kouchouk (a former World Bank economist and a key player in Egypt’s
negotiations with the IMF over funding programmes). The Ministry of Planning and Economic Development was merged with the
Ministry of International Cooperation and is now headed by Rania al-Mashat. The ministries of tourism and antiquities, foreign affairs
and immigration, supply and internal trade, petroleum and mineral resources, and electricity and renewable energy have also seen
changes in leadership.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 44
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

New FFac
aces,
es, Busy Agenda
Name Ministry Priorities
Ahmed K
Kouchouk
ouchouk Finance Fiscal consolidation, slow infrastructure spending, adequate social spending, debt
management.
Badr Abdel Aaty Foreign affairs and Increase diplomatic efforts to address the filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
immigration Damn, avert spillovers from Libya and Sudan, navigate tensions from the war in Gaza.
Karim Badawi Petroleum and mineral Advance exploration work to offset the decline in gas production from the Zohr Field
resources in order to increase exports and have enough supply for electricity production.
Oversee the elimination of fuel subsidies by 2025.
Mahmoud Esmat Electricity and renewable Eliminate daily power cuts and oversee the elimination of electricity subsidies by
energy 2028.
Sherif A
Attia
ttia Tourism and antiquities Diversify source marketa and develop tourism infrastructure.
Sherif Moustaf
Moustafaa Supply and internal trade Oversee the increases in administered prices and the shift towards a cash-based/
target subsidy system by F2025/26. Reduce supply bottlenecks to curb inflation.
Rania al Mashat Planning, economic Mainly to develop the private sector and key economic sectors., as well as expand
development Egypt’s international partners to allow it to meet Sustainable Development Goals.
andiInternational
cooperation
Hassan el-Khatib Investment and foreign Increase foreign investment (such as by selling stakes in state-owned entities to
trade foreign investors) and widen the export base.

Source: Presidency, BMI

Markets have recated positively to Egypt’s major reshuffling. On July 4 2024, the Egyptian pound non-deliverable for 12 and
nine months appreciated by about EGP1/USD, while the price of long-dated eurobonds has increased (see charts above). At the
same time, the parallel market rate has from about EGP48.20/USD on July 2 to EGP47.50/USD at the time of writing, while the
official rate strengthened from EGP48.20/USD to EGP48.01/USD. This is likely because of higher optimism about Egypt’s ability to
secure sustainable sources of FX inflows, such as through foreign direct investment and exports of goods and services, and better
prospects for the country’s private sector. Egypt has secured enough foreign funding to cover its short-term financing needs but
has yet to show the ability to attract sustainable sources of FX inflows and a significant improvement to the operating environment
in the country.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 45
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Positive Market Reaction To New Cabinet

Egypt - Non-Deliverable Forwards, EGP per USD (LHC) & Government Bonds, Prices USD (RHC)

Note: Data as of July 4. Source: Bloomberg, BMI

We have long argued that a new government will have limited impact on policy direction in Egypt, which will continue to be guided
by the IMF programme. While the magnitude of the ministerial changes exceeded our initial expectations, we think that this aims to
increase confidence in the implementation of economic and structural reforms. However, even though we think that this
change will boost confidence in the near term, it is unlikely to lead to deep and comprehensive structural
reforms. This is especially regarding reducing the role of the state and army in the economy. We have thus maintained our
macroeconomic forecasts for Egypt.

In parallel, the authorities have changed the governors of 16 out of the country's 27 governorates, with the majority of the
appointees having a military background. We think that this aims to ensure the administration's grip on power at a time when social
discontent is high because of the erosion of purchasing power, increases in administered prices, and daily electricity cuts.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 46
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Long-Term Political Outlook

Social And Security Factors Are Egypt's Main Long-Term Political Risks
Please Note: BMI is enhancing its risk analysis with a new scoring system following its acquisition of GeoQuant, a market-leading
provider of political risk data. From March 27 2024, risk scores are inverted: zero now represents the lowest risk and 100 represents
the highest risk. This allows for clearer, industry-standard assessments. For further details, please refer to our updated methodology
document.

We expect Egypt's government to retain a strong grip on power over the coming decade and anticipate only minimal movements
towards democratic rule. The Egyptian military will play a key role in the political system over our forecast period and beyond,
remaining the country's most influential political actor. Although Egypt's nominal political transition was furthered by parliamentary
elections in 2015, the potential for government to reflect the wishes of the broad population, or for the Muslim Brotherhood to be
involved in the political process is minimal. A referendum in April 2019 extended the president's term from four to six years and
allowed him to run for a third one, meaning that the current president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, will remain in power until 2030.
Additionally, the referendum expanded the president's powers over the judiciary. This is reflective of the el-Sisi government's, and
the wider military establishment's, unwillingness to relinquish power, which could herald another era of strongman politics in the
country.

Key Challenges And Threats To Stability

Future Role Of The Military: The military will remain the key political actor for at least the next decade. The armed forces first took
power in 1952 and subsequently formed the backbone of former president Hosni Mubarak's National Democratic Party, albeit
without running Egypt directly. As a result of its decades in the establishment, the military accumulated vast business interests, with
estimates suggesting that it controls up to 30% of the economy. The army subsequently played a pivotal role in removing Egypt's
first Islamist president Mohammed Morsi in July 2013 following mass protests. Although the army potentially does not wish to
govern Egypt directly, it will seek to retain considerable political and economic influence, potentially impeding the transition to
democracy and a more liberalised economy. Civil-military tensions will, thus, be a key feature of Egypt's political framework.
However, following pressure on Egypt's external finances after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the country's large financing needs,
the authorities announced plans to privatise or list on the stock exchange entities owned by the Egyptian army in an attempt to
raise foreign capital. Unfavourable valuations of the companies offered for sale because of the FX imbalances over 2022-March
2024 have resulted in delays in the privatisation programme. While Egypt's ability to secure large foreign funding, such as the
USD34bn investment deal with the UAE, could reduce the urgency to make progress on the divestment programme, we think that
the authorities will start making modest progress to remain compliant with the IMF programme. This will be the first time that the
army will see its footprint in the economy decrease rather than expand; however, the country is still far away from reducing the role
of the military in the economy.

Unemployment, Poverty And Demography: Although Egypt's economic growth is recovering and investment is ticking up,
rates of unemployment and poverty remain relatively high - a challenge compounded by rapid population growth and urbanisation.
According to UN forecasts, Egypt's population will rise to 127mn by 2031, some 18mn people more than in 2021. Meanwhile,
around 50% of Egyptians are aged below 25, and although this figure is forecast to gradually decline, it will remain very high for the
next decade. Egypt's urbanisation rate is expected to increase to more than 45% by 2031, meaning greater demand for urban jobs,
housing and infrastructure, and social services. These dynamics mean that future Egyptian governments will need to provide even
more to its citizens or enable the private sector to pick up some of the slack. A failure to achieve this would keep unemployment
high and leave many trapped in poverty. Such an outcome would mean that the country would remain vulnerable to political
instability. If secular authoritarian governments cannot improve the livelihoods of ordinary Egyptians, this could pave the way for
democratic or Islamist political forces to gain influence once again.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 47
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Long-Term Political Risk

If any or both of the above two risks materialise, we see two potential scenarios for political change:

Best-Case Scenario

Competitive Democratic System Emerges: In this scenario, Egypt develops a competitive democratic political system in the
next five to 10 years. The 'Turkish model' is often cited, where the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) has
proved popular. The AKP has enacted many economic reforms to make Turkiye more appealing to foreign investors and has sought
to bring Turkiye's system of governance in line with EU norms. At the moment, it is unclear what any democratic polity would look
like. A hardline Islamist party could emerge as the Islamic civil society is the most developed especially among the lowest income
segments of the society. At the same, the secular civil society remains active and has a base among the youth, which can tip the
balance in its favour under a democratic rule. Either way, the military establishment will likely remain influential and will try to
channel this influence through the democratic system.

Most Probable Scenario

Continuation Of Quasi-Military Rule: The army remains the most powerful institution in the country and has the ability and
occasional willingness to remove those elected from office. Another military coup in response to either popular opposition to the
government or a perceived encroachment by the state on its interests is not unlikely in the next decade. While the inner workings of
the army are very opaque, there appears to be significant discontent over the lack of a notable improvement in the economic
situation in the country. However, given the perceived stability the military brings to the country, a military-run Egypt would still
benefit from the support of the West, Israel, Mainland China and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Overall, the above scenarios represent a general guideline of what Egypt may face over the coming decade, and they are not
mutually exclusive.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 48
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Egypt - P
Political
olitical Ov
Over
erview
view

System of go
govvernment Semi-presidential
Unicameral House of Representatives (Majlis an-Nowwab): 596 seats. Of these, 448 are elected on an
individual basis, 120 through a winner-takes-all list system. A further 28 members can be appointed by
the president. According to the April 2019 referendum results, the House of Representatives will have
its seats reduced to 450, and an upper house (Senate) will be established with 180 members. A third of
these will be appointed by the president, with the rest directly elected.
Head of state President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
Head of go
govvernment Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly
Last election Presidential: December 2023
Parliamentary: October-November 2020
House of Representatives: 2020
Key cabinet figur
figures
es Minister of Finance: Ahmed Kouchouk
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration: Badr Abdel Aaty
Minister of Interior: Mahmoud Tawfik
Minister of Defence: Abdel Mageed Saqr
Main political par
parties
ties Free Egyptians Party: Centre-right liberal electoral coalition. Loyal to President el-Sisi
Nation's Future Party: Central coalition. Loyal to President el-Sisi
Al-Wafd: Centre-right party. Loyal to President el-Sisi
Homeland Defenders Party: Left-wing party. Loyal to President el-Sisi
Ne
Next
xt election Presidential: December 2030
Political Risk Inde
Indexx 43.3

Source: BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 49
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Global Macro Outlook

Watching Out For A Potential Policy Mistake And Election Risks
Editor's Note: This article was first published on July 15 2024, before US President Joe Biden withdrew his candidacy for the
upcoming election in November. The article reflects our views at the time. To view our latest analysis, please see the BMI website.

We have kept our forecast for global growth unchanged this month and expect the global economy to expand by 2.5% in 2024 and
to remain fairly stable at 2.5% in 2025. However, the forecast for 2025 disguises some key changes in the growth profile across
major economies. For example, from 2024 to 2025 we expect the US, Mainland China and emerging European economies to slow,
but this will broadly be offset by an acceleration the eurozone as well as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) regions.

Global Growth To Remain Resilient Into 2025

Global - Evolution Of 2024 Real GDP Growth Forecasts, % (LHC) & Growth (RHC)

Source: Bloomberg, BMI

Despite our forecasts pointing to relative stability in global growth, we see the rising chance of a policy mistake from a monetary
policy perspective in both the US and the eurozone, which could see a sharper-than-expected slowdown in global growth in H2
2024 and early 2025. Comments by US Federal Reserve (Fed) Chair Jerome Powell in recent weeks pointed to the fact that the
central bank remains cautious and is waiting for more evidence that inflation is easing further before embarking on a cutting cycle.
The good news is that in Powell’s testimony to Congress on July 9, he struck a slightly more dovish tone. Furthermore, inflation came
in negative at -0.1% m-o-m (3.0% y-o-y) in June, down from 0.0% (3.3%) in May and below the market forecast of 0.1%. This means
that we are still on track for a cumulative 50 basis points (bps) of cuts before the en dof 2024, starting in September, which could
potentially mean an additional cut as well. However, in the event that the Fed cuts interest rates at a slower pace than we expect,
financial conditions might remain too tight at a time when the US and the global economy are both at a mid-to-late stage of the
economic cycle and are already starting to experience some signs of weakness.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 50
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Policy Remains Tight

Global - Real Policy Rates, % (LHC) & Probability of December Cuts By The Federal Reserve (RHC)

Source: Haver, CME, BMI

The real policy interest rate (adjusted for inflation) remains elevated at about 2% both in the US and the eurozone and is higher than
what was seen in the pre-pandemic era. Nominal GDP growth is now lower than the policy rate. While this does not necessarily
imply an impending recession as the so-called neutral rate - or r-star - might be higher than before, it reflects the relative tightness
of financial conditions vis-à-vis growth rates in the economy. Historically, this has coincided with a slowdown in economic activity, as
was seen in the late 1980s and the mid 2000s, although it was not the case in mid-1990s when the US achieved a soft landing.

Economy Getting To A Mid-To-Late Stage Of The Cycle

US - BMI Economic Cycle Index (LHS) & Business Cycle Table (RHS)

Source: Haver, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 51
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

While we do not expect a recession in 2024 or 2025, relatively tight financial conditions are occurring at a time when the US
economy is in the middle-to-late stages of the business cycle (see charts above), which points to the potential for downside risks to
growth. While the labour market remains tight – which is normally positive for growth - from a business cycle perspective, turning
points typically happen after the unemployment rate comes off its lows, which it now has. When unemployment moves higher, it
usually does so quickly, which weighs heavily on the economy.

US Election Volatility To Remain Elevated

US - Betting Odd On Nomination (LHC) & Election Results, % (RHC)

Source: Predictit, Bloomberg, BMI

The other risk to consider is political uncertainty ahead of the US elections, which could also soften investor and consumer
sentiment over the coming months. First, Joe Biden’s poor performance during the first presidential debate on June 27 has put
pressure on him to step down. While Biden has refused to do so, uncertainty as to whether he ultimately will step down has injected
additional volatility into the election, which could weigh on growth. Second, the attack on Donald Trump at a rally in Pennsylvania
points to the risk of increased electoral violence as well. Currently, these two factors have increased the odds of a Trump win in
November, as according to betting odds, there is only a 57% chance that Biden will be the Democratic candidate, and this has
lowered the probability of him winning the presidency to 24% currently from around 50% in April. By contrast, there is now about a
15% chance that Kamala Harris wins the election and a 66% chance that Trump wins.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 52
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Global - Macr
Macroec
oeconomic
onomic FFor
orecasts
ecasts (2021-2028)
2021 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f
Real GDP Growth (%)
US 5.8 1.9 2.5 2.1 1.4 2.5 1.9 1.7
Eurozone 6.0 3.4 0.5 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7
Japan 2.6 1.0 1.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
China (Mainland) 8.1 3.0 5.2 4.7 4.4 4.2 3.9 3.7
World 6.1 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.7 2.6

Consumer Inflation (avg)

US 4.7 8.0 4.2 2.9 1.8 2.3 2.5 2.5
Eurozone 2.6 8.4 5.5 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
Japan -0.3 2.5 3.3 2.3 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.0
China (Mainland) 0.9 2.0 0.2 0.0 1.5 1.3 1.0 1.0
World 4.5 8.0 6.0 5.0 3.4 2.7 2.6 2.6

Interest Rates (eop)

Fed funds rate 0.25 4.50 5.50 5.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
ECB refinancing
-0.50 2.00 4.00 3.25 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.00
rate
Japan overnight call
-0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
rate

Exchange Rates (avg)

USD per EUR 1.18 1.05 1.08 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.12
JPY per USD 110 131 140 152 138 130 125 120
CNY per USD 6.45 6.74 7.08 7.17 7.15 7.13 7.17 7.18

Oil Prices (avg)

OPEC basket (USD/
69.89 101.17 82.95 84.00 81.00 80.00 80.00 80.00
bbl)
Brent crude (USD/
70.95 99.04 82.18 85.00 82.00 81.00 81.00 81.00
bbl)

Note: May include territories, special administrative regions, provinces and autonomous regions. f = BMI forecast. Source: Bloomberg, local sources, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 53
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Global And R
Regional
egional - R
Real
eal GDP Gr
Groowth, % Chg Y
Y-o-y
-o-y,, And Ex
Exchange
change Rates (2021-2028)
2021 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f
World 6.1 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.7 2.6
De
Devveloped Mark
Markets
ets 5.5 2.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.7
Emer
Emerging
ging Mark
Markets
ets 6.9 3.7 4.1 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.8
Asia (e
(exxcluding Japan) 7.5 4.0 5.5 5.1 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.4
Latin America 6.8 3.8 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.7 2.6 2.5
Emer
Emerging
ging EEur
urope
ope 7.5 1.9 3.3 3.1 2.2 3.0 3.0 3.0
Sub-Sahar
Sub-Saharan
an Africa 4.2 3.5 2.4 3.2 3.6 3.7 3.6 4.0
Middle East And Nor
North
th Africa 5.1 5.2 2.1 2.4 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.4

Developed Market Exchange Rates (avg)

2021 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f
Eur
uroozone USD per EUR 1.18 1.05 1.08 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.12
Japan JPY per USD 110 131 140 152 138 130 125 120
Switz
witzerland
erland CHF per USD 0.91 0.95 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.98
UK USD per GBP 1.38 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.25 1.22 1.20 1.18

Emerging Market Exchange Rates (avg)

2021 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f
China (Mainland) CNY per USD 6.4 6.7 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.2
South K
Kor
orea
ea KRW per USD 1,144 1,291 1,306 1,305 1,290 1,180 1,100 1,100
India INR per USD 73.9 78.6 82.6 82.0 81.5 83.5 85.2 86.9
Br
Brazil
azil BRL per USD 5.39 5.16 4.99 5.20 4.90 5.05 5.10 5.15
Me
Mexic
xico
o MXN per USD 20.3 20.1 17.8 17.9 19.5 18.8 18.5 18.5
Russia RUB per USD 73.7 68.5 85.2 93.1 97.3 97.0 96.4 96.9
Turkiy
urkiyee TRY per USD 8.9 16.5 23.7 34.1 41.3 47.3 52.0 57.2
South Africa ZAR per USD 14.8 16.4 18.5 18.6 19.2 19.6 20.0 20.4

Note: May include territories, special administrative regions, provinces and autonomous regions. f = BMI forecast. Source: Bloomberg, local sources, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 54
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Developed Markets: Momentum Holds But Slowdown Ahead

In July, we have maintained our 2024 forecast for developed market (DM) growth at 1.5%. Although this projection indicates a
modest slowdown in growth relative to 2023, when DMs expanded by 1.6%, it reflects stronger resilience to headwinds than we
anticipated in early 2024 (see chart below). A more hawkish stance by the US Fed, however, keeps risks to our growth outlook
weighted to the downside. Such risks are amplified by the possibility that other central banks might delay their own rate cuts in
response to a more hawkish Fed.

Momentum Holding Up
DMs – Real GDP Growth, % (2015-2024)

f = BMI forecast. Source: Haver, BMI

We expect that almost all of the DMs we track will experience growth in 2024, with the exceptions being Finland (-0.3%) and Estonia
(-0.8%) (see chart below). Our outlook for the largest economies has not changed from June. We forecast a modest recovery
in Germany, with growth rebounding to 0.3% in 2024 after a 0.2% contraction in 2023. For France and Italy we forecast growth of
0.9%, while we project Spain to expand by 2.2%. Outside Europe, we forecast growth of 0.9% in Japan, 1.5% in Australia, 2.1% in
the US and 0.9% in Canada.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 55
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Mostly Growing
Real GDP Growth In Selected DM Economies (2024f), %

Note: Note: May include territories, special administrative regions, provinces and autonomous regions. f = BMI forecast. Source: BMI

In June, the composite purchasing managers' index (PMI) remained in expansion territory in most of the largest DMs,
particularly in the US (54.8) and Spain (55.8). France and Japan were exceptions, with their PMIs falling below 50. Overall, the
manufacturing sector continued to weigh on growth in most of the tracked economies, including Canada, Italy, France, Germany
and Australia. Only Japan, the UK and the US saw a modest expansion in manufacturing, with Spain experiencing a more significant
uptick. The services sector expanded across all the largest DMs, except for France and Japan.

Private Sector Activity Continued To Expand

Selected DMs – Composite PMI, index (2020-2024)

Source: Haver, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 56
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Labour market conditions remained tight across the largest DMs in May, although unemployment rose slightly in
France, Canada, the UK and the US. In May, the unemployment rate edged up by 0.1 percentage points (pp) to 7.4% in France;
was stable in Spain, Italy, Germany and Japan; and declined by 0.1pp to 4.0% in Australia (see chart below). In June, unemployment
rose marginally in Canada (0.2pp to 6.4%) and the US (0.1pp to 4.1%).

Labour Markets Remain Resilient

Selected DMs – Unemployment Rate, %

Note: ‘Latest’ shows June for the US and Canada, April for the UK, and May for the remaining economies. Source: Haver, BMI

Significant Political Shifts in the UK and France Following Elections

While the UK's Labour party won a strong majority in the July 4 election, we do not expect that the new government will be able to
fully implement its economic plans. The UK's fiscal deficit is near 5% of GDP and the public debt just above 100%. Moreover, the
party's large parliamentary majority (412 out of 650) seats may reflect voters' dissatisfaction with the outgoing conservative
government rather than enthusiasm for Labour's manifesto. The Tories' share of the vote fell by 19.9pp as their voters deserted
them for smaller parties on the left and right. By contrast, Labour's share only rose by just 1.6pp. Given a low turnout (60%, down
from 67%) the party received fewer votes than it did in 2019.

The leftwing New Popular Front (NFP) winning the most seats in French legislative elections on July 7 suggests that risks to our
forecast that the country's budget deficit will decline from 5.5% of GDP in 2023 to 4.9% in 2024 and 4.4% in 2025 are now
weighted towards a slower pace of fiscal consolidation. Local pacts between the NFP and President Emmanuel Macron's centrist
bloc resulted in a hung parliament in which the far-right - which had been widely predicted to win the poll - was pushed into third
place. Neither the leftist nor centrist alliances have enough seats to form a government by themselves, and they have both ruled
out a coalition. The centrist prime minister will remain in office until a new government can be formed, which may have to be a
temporary technocratic administration. Since any government will depend on the NFP for at least some votes, the president will
almost certainly have to water down (or even walk back) some of his pro-business reforms.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 57
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

De
Devveloped Mark
Markets
ets - R
Real
eal GDP Gr
Groowth FFor
orecasts,
ecasts, % Y
Y-o-y
-o-y (2021-2028)
2021 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f
Developed Market Aggregate Growth 5.5 2.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.7

G7 5.4 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.9 1.6 1.5

Eur
uroozone 6.0 3.4 0.5 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7
EU-27 6.0 3.4 0.5 1.1 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8

Selected Developed Markets

Austr
Australia
alia 4.9 3.8 1.9 1.5 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.6
Austria 4.2 4.8 -0.8 0.4 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.6
Belgium 6.9 3.0 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.0
Canada 5.3 3.8 1.2 0.9 1.2 2.5 2.2 1.9
Cz
Czech
ech R
Republic
epublic 3.6 2.4 -0.3 1.6 2.5 3.8 3.7 2.8
Denmark 6.8 2.7 1.9 1.6 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0
Finland 2.8 1.3 -1.0 -0.3 1.6 1.0 1.1 1.2
Fr
Franc
ancee 6.4 2.5 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.2
Germany 3.2 1.8 -0.2 0.3 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Hong K
Kong,
ong, China 6.5 -3.7 3.2 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
Ir
Ireland
eland 15.1 9.4 -3.2 2.3 3.2 3.9 3.9 3.9
Isr
Israel
ael 9.7 6.4 1.9 1.2 4.1 3.4 3.8 3.7
Italy 8.3 4.0 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.3
Japan 2.6 1.0 1.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
Netherlands 6.2 4.4 0.1 0.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4
Nor
Norway
way 3.9 3.3 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.8 1.8 1.8
Por
ortugal
tugal 5.7 6.8 2.3 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2
Singapor
Singaporee 9.7 3.8 1.1 2.0 2.4 2.9 2.9 2.9
South K
Kor
orea
ea 4.1 2.6 1.4 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7
Spain 6.4 5.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0
Sweden 5.9 1.2 -0.2 0.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Switz
witzerland
erland 5.1 2.5 1.3 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.4
Taiwan, China 6.6 2.5 1.4 3.5 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6
UK 8.7 4.3 0.1 0.8 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.7
US 5.8 1.9 2.5 2.1 1.4 2.5 1.9 1.7

Note: May include territories, special administrative regions, provinces and autonomous regions. f = BMI forecast. Source: Local sources, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 58
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Emerging Markets: Solid Growth In Q2

We have made very few revisions to our key emerging market (EM) forecasts in June and July 2024 and expect that
growth will remain fairly stable in 2024 and 2025. In aggregate, we expect economic expansion to slow slightly from 4.1% in
2023 to 3.9% in 2024 and 2025 (see left-hand side chart below). This would be essentially in line with the aggregate EM growth rate
recorded between 2015 and 2019. While EM growth has returned to trend, unlike DMs most EMs have not recovered to their pre-
Covid economic trajectory. The crisis seems to have contributed to a permanent loss of potential EM output (see right-hand side
chart below).

Strong Growth, But Economies Not Back To Trend

EMs – Real GDP Growth, % (LHS) & Real GDP Index, 100 = 2019 (RHS)

Source: BMI

However, the latest data suggest that the momentum that EMs built up in Q1 was probably sustained in Q2 20244.
Surveys painted a mixed picture, but PMIs in the larger EMs picked up in June, causing our GDP-weighted index to rise from 52.1 to
52.3, well above the 50 that divides expansion from contraction. If we exclude Mainland China – where activity is currently subdued
– the measure is even more positive (see chart below, left). Consumer sentiment indicators in most major EMs also picked up in Q2
2024, even if many remained below their long-term averages. Reduced consumer pessimism in China was a particularly positive
sign, since the consumer sector dragged on growth there in the first quarter (see chart below, right).

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 59
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Surveys Point To Strong Q2

EMs – GDP-Weighted PMI (LHS) & Consumer Confidence Measures (RHS)

Note: Consumer confidence indices normalised around long-term average. Source: Haver, BMI

Recent currency moves have underlined the key risk that the US election poses for EMs, particularly those in Latin
America. Despite EM exports picking up in May and June, many EM currencies have fallen. This may be partly due to slower capital
inflows. However, we also suspect that it reflects increased investor worries that Donald Trump will win the US presidential election
in November, which would probably usher in a wave of protectionist measures that would hurt EM exporters. The Mexican peso fell
sharply on June 27 following a poor debate performance by US President Joe Biden.

US Election Worries Hit EM Currencies

Selected EMs – Exchange Rate vs US Dollar, % chg since June 1

*Parallel rate. **Official rate. Source: Haver, BMI

The South African rand has jumped following the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU). We doubt that this
arrangement will last more than 18 months and expect that divisions within the coalition will cause the rand to give up its gains
before the end of 2024.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 60
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Weaker currencies have added to the reasons why we think that EM inflation will struggle to soften over the
remainder of 2024. We think that the median rate of inflation among major EMs will tick up from 4.2% in May to 4.5% in
December. Price growth will, however, remain far weaker than it has been over the past 18 months (see chart below, left). While the
US Fed’s loosening cycle will be more gradual than we had originally thought (we now expect just two cuts in 2024), we retain the
view that EM policymakers will continue their own loosening cycles, most of which began in 2023 (see chart below, right).

Inflation Stabilising, Interest Rate Cuts Will Continue

EMs – Median Inflation, % y-o-y (LHS) & GDP-Weighted Policy Rates, % (RHS)

Note: Median inflation covers 40 major EMs, policy rate index excludes Argentina, Egypt and Turkiye. Source: Haver, BMI

EM Asia: Best Regional Performer

We kept our key forecasts for EM Asia unchanged in June and July and expect that the region will see aggregate
growth of 5.1%. This will be the best performance of any EM region. We expect that five of the seven fastest-growing large EMs will
be Asian economies (see chart below).

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 61
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Asian Economies Outperforming

EMs – Real GDP Growth Forecast, % (2024)

Source: BMI

Growth in China will, at 4.7%, be slower than in 2023, but we expect that the world’s largest EM will remain a strong performer.
Problems in the property sector will continue to drag on growth, but we think that policymakers – who intervened in the bond
market in early July – will succeed in avoiding an acute crisis. However, the fastest-growing economy willbe India. While we have
some concerns about the quality of India’s recent official GDP data, we do not doubt that the country is experiencing a sharp rise in
economic output.

SSA: Medium-Term Challenges In Key Economies

We left our key short-term economic forecasts for SSA unchanged in June and July and expect growth of 3.2% in
2024. While protests in Kenya have dominated news headlines, we do not expect that they will meaningfully disrupt economic
activity in the country, which we think will remain one of the fastest growing in the EM world in 2024 at 5.5% (see chart above). A
weaker outlook for crude production growth (1.5%) in 2024, led us to cut our long-term forecasts for growth in Nigeria from 3.5% to
3.3%. The country, which was until 2021 Africa’s largest in US dollar terms, is struggling to sustain growth in the face of stagnating oil
production, entrenched inflation and weak productivity.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 62
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Bleak Oil Outlook Caps Growth in Nigeria

Nigeria – Real GDP Growth, % (2015-2028)

Source: BMI

We left our key forecasts for South Africa unchanged, although we expect a slight acceleration in growth from 1.0% in 2024 to 1.4%
in 2025. The GNU will push forward with welcome reforms to state-owned enterprises, but we doubt that it will survive the full term.

EM Europe: Upward Revisions In Poland, Hungary

We made slight upward revisions to our forecasts in EM Europe, where we expect that growth across the region will
come in at 3.1% in 2024. The largest revision was in Hungary, where a strong performance in Q1 2024 led us to shift our 2024
growth forecast from 1.6% to 2.1%. While growth probably slowed slightly in Q2 2024, we think that private consumption will
strengthen over the course of 2024. Even so, the country will be an underperformer in the region (see chart below).

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 63
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Upward Revisions In Central And Eastern Europe

EM Europe – Real GDP Growth Forecast, % (2024)

Source: BMI

We raised our Poland forecast from 2.6% to 2.7% after a strong Q1 growth print, and improving consumer confidence figures
suggest that consumer spending will be stronger than we previously expected. We left our 2024 forecasts for Russia (3.4%) and
Turkiye (2.7%) unchanged. Both economies have held up better than we and most analysts expected in recent months, but we
think that both will slow sharply in 2025. We expect growth of just 2.1% in Russia and think that Turkiye’s economy will stagnate.

MENA: Stable Outlook But Oil Production Key

After revising our key forecasts in line with new OPEC production guidance in early June, we left our views
unchanged in the middle of the year. We expect aggregate growth of 2.4% in 2024 across MENA. MENA is the only region of
the EM world where we expect substantially faster growth in 2025 than in 2024. We think that elevated oil prices, rising production
in Saudi Arabia and a recovery in Israel will push regional growth to 4.0% (see chart below).

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 64
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

MENA Set For Acceleration

EMs – Regional GDP Growth Forecasts, % (2024 & 2025)

Source: BMI

Attention in July focused on Iran, where voters elected Masoud Pezeshkian as president on July 5. While the election of a less overtly
anti-Western president will slow the depreciation of Iran’s currency, we think that the US election will have a bigger impact on Iran’s
economic prospects. A win for the US Republican party would almost certainly lead to tighter sanctions and more pressure on the
Iranian economy.

Latin America: Argentina Drags On Region

We left our key Latin America forecasts unchanged in June and July and expect that the region will post growth of
just 1.7% in 2024. This would be the worst performance of any part of the EM world (see chart above). The region is being held
back by Argentina, where we expect that economic output will fall by 3.8% in 2024, the biggest decline we forecast for any large
economy. We think that growth will only pick up slightly in 2025 because improved conditions in Argentina will be largely
outweighed by slower growth in Brazil (2.1% to 1.8%) and – more significantly – Mexico (2.3% to 1.2%). The latter country’s
economy is hugely dependent on the US, where we expect that growth will slow from 2.1% to 1.4% in 2025.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 65
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Mexico Highly Exposed To US

EMs – Exports To US, % of GDP

Note: Latest figure available. Source: BMI

Risks are, if anything, weighted to the downside. If a victory for Donald Trump in November’s US election prompts a move towards
protectionist policymaking, this would have a very painful effect on Mexico’s export-orientated manufacturing sector. This is one
reason why we think that the Mexican peso, which has performed poorly in 2024, will remain under pressure.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 66
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Emer
Emerging
ging Mark
Markets
ets - R
Real
eal GDP Gr
Groowth FFor
orecasts,
ecasts, % Y
Y-o-y
-o-y (2021-2028)
2021 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f
Emerging Market Aggregate Growth 6.9 3.7 4.1 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.8

Latin America 6.8 3.8 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.7 2.6 2.5
Ar
Argentina
gentina 10.7 5.0 -1.6 -3.8 2.5 1.5 2.3 2.6
Br
Brazil
azil 4.8 3.0 2.9 2.1 1.8 2.5 2.4 2.4
Chile 11.3 2.1 0.2 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.7 2.6
Colombia 10.8 7.3 0.6 1.3 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5
Me
Mexic
xico
o 5.7 3.9 3.2 2.3 1.2 3.4 2.7 2.6

Middle East And North Africa* 5.1 5.2 2.1 2.4 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.4
Saudi Ar
Arabia
abia 5.1 7.5 -0.8 0.7 5.0 3.6 4.1 3.6
UAE 3.8 7.9 3.6 3.8 6.7 7.4 5.2 4.7
Ir
Iran**
an** 4.7 3.8 4.3 4.0 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0
Algeria 3.4 3.1 3.6 2.8 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.2
Egypt*** 3.3 6.7 3.8 3.2 4.2 4.4 4.1 4.1

Sub-Saharan Africa 4.2 3.5 2.4 3.2 3.6 3.7 3.6 4.0
South Africa 4.8 1.9 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.4
Keny
enyaa 7.6 4.8 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.5
Ethiopia 5.6 5.3 6.0 6.8 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.2
Nigeria 3.6 3.3 2.9 3.0 3.5 3.2 3.0 3.9

Emerging Asia 7.5 4.0 5.5 5.1 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.4
China (Mainland) 8.1 3.0 5.2 4.7 4.4 4.2 3.9 3.7
India** 9.7 7.0 8.2 7.0 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.4
Indonesia 3.7 5.3 5.0 5.1 5.7 5.3 5.3 5.2
Malay
Malaysia
sia 3.3 8.7 3.7 4.4 4.5 4.0 3.9 4.0
Philippines 5.7 7.6 5.6 6.2 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.7
Thailand 1.5 2.6 1.9 2.8 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.6

Emerging Europe 7.5 1.9 3.3 3.1 2.2 3.0 3.0 3.0
Russia 5.9 -1.2 3.6 3.4 2.1 1.8 0.8 0.8
Turkiy
urkiyee 11.4 5.5 4.5 2.7 0.1 3.0 4.3 3.9
Hungar
Hungaryy 7.1 4.6 -0.9 2.1 3.2 3.3 2.9 2.8
Romania 5.7 4.1 2.1 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.7 4.0
Poland 6.9 5.3 0.2 2.7 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.7

Note: *MENA aggregate excludes Libya, Syria and Yemen. **Fiscal years ending March 31 (2024 = 2024/25). ***Fiscal years ending June 31 (2024=2023/24). May include
territories, special administrative regions, provinces and autonomous regions. f = forecast. Source: BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 67
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Index Tables
Please Note: BMI is enhancing its risk analysis with a new scoring system following its acquisition of GeoQuant, a market-leading
provider of political risk data. From March 27 2024, risk scores are inverted: zero now represents the lowest risk and 100 represents
the highest risk. This allows for clearer, industry-standard assessments. For further details, please refer to our updated methodology
document.

Political Risk Inde

Indexx
Political Risk Security Regional Global
Governance Social Risk Trend
Score Risk Rank Rank
Qatar 28.5 23.6 19.9 34.8 - 1 30
UAE 33.5 26.4 30.9 35.7 - 2 41
Kuwait 36.0 33.6 28.9 35.1 - 3 49
Saudi Ar
Arabia
abia 36.0 34.5 16.8 44.0 - 4 49
Oman 36.4 35.5 28.5 34.4 + 5 52
Jor
ordan
dan 37.6 32.0 38.4 33.5 - 6 61
Tunisia 39.7 39.1 33.5 34.5 - 7 71
Bahr
Bahrain
ain 39.9 32.5 25.6 49.1 - 8 72
Mor
Moroc
occco 41.3 37.5 47.5 29.0 - 9 77
Egypt 43.3 39.3 47.5 32.1 + 10 86
Algeria 46.4 51.5 38.8 32.8 - 11 97
Ir
Iran
an 63.9 55.7 63.5 52.7 - 12 147
Lebanon 64.6 55.2 52.4 64.0 - 13 152
Ir
Iraq
aq 71.0 64.5 59.6 63.8 + 14 163
Liby
Libyaa 72.7 68.6 41.8 77.8 + 15 170
Yemen 75.0 58.7 61.4 79.1 + 16 175
Syria 77.6 66.0 61.5 77.4 - 17 178
West Bank and Gaza 81.6 66.8 69.7 79.9 = 18 182
Regional av
aver
erage
age 51.4/Global av
aver
erage
age 47.7/Emer
47.7/Emerging
ging Mark
Markets
ets av
aver
erage
age 53.1

Note: May include territories, special administrative regions, provinces and autonomous regions. Scores out of 100; 0 = lowest risk; 100 = highest risk. Source: BMI Country Risk
Index

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 68
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Shor
Short-T
t-Term
erm EEcconomic Risk Inde
Indexx
Score Trend Regional Rank Global Rank
Saudi Ar
Arabia
abia 23.3 = 1 6
Oman 29.8 = 2 24
UAE 30.4 - 3 28
Qatar 38.3 = 4 58
Kuwait 39.4 + 5 61
Algeria 42.1 - 6 70
Ir
Iraq
aq 42.3 = 7 71
Mor
Moroc
occco 48.8 + 8 95
Ir
Iran
an 50.8 = 9 102
Liby
Libyaa 53.8 + 10 118
Bahr
Bahrain
ain 56.7 + 11 134
Egypt 58.5 + 12 142
Tunisia 67.3 + 13 173
Jor
ordan
dan 67.5 + 14 174
West Bank and Gaza 73.8 + 15 181
Yemen 77.9 - 16 183
Lebanon 84.0 + 17 185
Syria 84.2 = 18 186
Regional av
aver
erage
age 53.8/Global av
aver
erage
age 47.3/Emer
47.3/Emerging
ging Mark
Markets
ets av
aver
erage
age 51.4

Note: May include territories, special administrative regions, provinces and autonomous regions. Scores out of 100; 0 = lowest risk; 100 = highest risk. Source: BMI Country Risk
Index

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 69
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Long-T
ong-Term
erm EEcconomic Risk Inde
Indexx
Score Trend Regional Rank Global Rank
Saudi Ar
Arabia
abia 29.2 - 1 27
UAE 31.2 - 2 37
Qatar 37.0 + 3 56
Oman 37.7 - 4 57
Kuwait 40.2 + 5 64
Egypt 46.6 + 6 88
Algeria 46.9 - 7 91
Mor
Moroc
occco 47.6 = 8 95
Bahr
Bahrain
ain 49.3 + 9 100
Ir
Iran
an 53.2 = 10 120
Ir
Iraq
aq 54.4 = 11 129
Jor
ordan
dan 56.2 = 12 135
Tunisia 59.0 = 13 156
Liby
Libyaa 59.8 + 14 161
West Bank and Gaza 67.6 - 15 176
Lebanon 67.8 + 16 177
Yemen 74.7 = 17 182
Syria 76.9 - 18 186
Regional av
aver
erage
age 52.0/Global av
aver
erage
age 46.2/Emer
46.2/Emerging
ging Mark
Markets
ets av
aver
erage
age 50.6

Note: May include territories, special administrative regions, provinces and autonomous regions. Scores out of 100; 0 = lowest risk; 100 = highest risk. Source: BMI Country Risk
Index

Note: Our BMI indices are updated frequently; as a result, the scores in this section may not match those in other sections of the
report.

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 70
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Macroeconomic Forecasts
Macr
Macroec
oeconomic
onomic FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2023-2028)
Indicator 2023e 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f
Nominal GDP
GDP,, USDbn 331.7 280.3 319.6 363.1 396.5 433.1
Nominal GDP
GDP,, EURbn 306.7 257.9 287.9 324.2 354.0 386.7
Real GDP gr
groowth, % yy-o-y
-o-y 3.8 3.0 4.2 4.7 4.1 4.2
GDP per capita, USD 2,942 2,448 2,748 3,075 3,308 3,561
GDP per capita, EUR 2,720 2,252 2,476 2,746 2,954 3,179
Population, mn 112.72 114.48 116.28 118.06 119.84 121.61
Unemplo
Unemployment,
yment, % of labour ffor
orcce, eop 7.3 7.2 7.0 6.8 6.6 6.4
Consumer pric
pricee inflation, % yy-o-y
-o-y,, av
avee 33.9 28.9 18.1 11.0 7.0 7.0
Lending rrate,
ate, %, av
avee 18.8 24.3 22.3 12.3 8.3 8.3
Centr
Central
al bank policy rrate,
ate, % eop 20.25 28.25 16.25 8.25 8.25 8.25
Priv
Private
ate final cconsumption,
onsumption, % of GDP 82.6 88.3 87.3 87.0 86.9 86.8
Priv
Private
ate final cconsumption,
onsumption, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y 3.8 4.6 2.8 4.0 4.0 4.0
Go
Govvernment final cconsumption,
onsumption, % of GDP 6.8 7.0 7.2 7.1 7.0 7.0
Go
Govvernment final cconsumption,
onsumption, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y -2.8 1.0 6.9 3.0 3.0 3.0
Fix
Fixed
ed capital fformation,
ormation, % of GDP 12.9 12.2 11.5 11.3 11.5 11.7
Fix
Fixed
ed capital fformation,
ormation, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y -21.6 -0.7 8.8 6.0 6.0 6.0
Ex
Exchange
change rrate
ate EEGP
GP per USD, av
avee 30.63 45.70 49.19 50.17 51.17 52.20
Ex
Exchange
change rrate
ate EEGP
GP per EUR, av
avee 33.12 49.68 54.60 56.19 57.32 58.46
Budget balanc
balance,
e, USDbn -20.3 -10.3 -20.4 -19.0 -19.4 -20.9
Budget balanc
balance,
e, % of GDP -6.1 -3.7 -6.4 -5.2 -4.9 -4.8
Goods and ser
servic
vices
es eexpor
xports,
ts, USDbn 74.2 63.0 66.9 72.4 76.1 80.2
Goods and ser
servic
vices
es impor
imports,
ts, USDbn 83.4 88.1 90.1 95.8 102.0 108.5
Balanc
Balancee of tr
trade
ade in goods and ser
servic
vices,
es, USDbn -9.2 -25.0 -23.2 -23.4 -25.8 -28.3
Balanc
Balancee of tr
trade
ade in goods and ser
servic
vices,
es, % of GDP -2.8 -8.9 -7.3 -6.4 -6.5 -6.5
Curr
Current
ent ac
acccount balanc
balance,
e, USDbn -4.7 -21.8 -13.3 -13.2 -15.4 -17.6
Curr
Current
ent ac
acccount balanc
balance,
e, % of GDP -1.4 -7.8 -4.2 -3.6 -3.9 -4.1
For
oreign
eign rreser
eservves eexx gold, USDbn 27.1 36.9 41.7 44.2 46.8 48.7
Impor
Importt cco
over
er,, months 3.9 5.0 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.4
e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: National sources, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 71
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

Macr
Macroec
oeconomic
onomic FFor
orecasts
ecasts (Egypt 2029-2033)
Indicator 2029f 2030f 2031f 2032f 2033f
Nominal GDP
GDP,, USDbn 473.2 517.3 565.6 618.6 676.8
Nominal GDP
GDP,, EURbn 422.5 461.9 505.0 552.3 604.3
Real GDP gr
groowth, % yy-o-y
-o-y 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2
GDP per capita, USD 3,835 4,133 4,456 4,806 5,185
GDP per capita, EUR 3,424 3,690 3,978 4,291 4,629
Population, mn 123.38 125.15 126.92 128.71 130.51
Unemplo
Unemployment,
yment, % of labour ffor
orcce, eop 6.2 6.0 5.9 5.7 5.7
Consumer pric
pricee inflation, % yy-o-y
-o-y,, av
avee 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Lending rrate,
ate, %, av
avee 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3
Centr
Central
al bank policy rrate,
ate, % eop 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25
Priv
Private
ate final cconsumption,
onsumption, % of GDP 86.6 86.5 86.3 86.1 85.8
Priv
Private
ate final cconsumption,
onsumption, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Go
Govvernment final cconsumption,
onsumption, % of GDP 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.6
Go
Govvernment final cconsumption,
onsumption, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Fix
Fixed
ed capital fformation,
ormation, % of GDP 11.9 12.1 12.3 12.5 12.7
Fix
Fixed
ed capital fformation,
ormation, rreal
eal gr
groowth % yy-o-y
-o-y 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Ex
Exchange
change rrate
ate EEGP
GP per USD, av
avee 53.24 54.31 55.39 56.50 57.63
Ex
Exchange
change rrate
ate EEGP
GP per EUR, av
avee 59.63 60.82 62.04 63.28 64.55
Budget balanc
balance,
e, USDbn -22.8 -24.6 -26.7 -28.7 -30.6
Budget balanc
balance,
e, % of GDP -4.8 -4.8 -4.7 -4.6 -4.5
Goods and ser
servic
vices
es eexpor
xports,
ts, USDbn 84.6 89.4 94.7 100.5 106.8
Goods and ser
servic
vices
es impor
imports,
ts, USDbn 115.5 122.9 130.9 139.3 148.4
Balanc
Balancee of tr
trade
ade in goods and ser
servic
vices,
es, USDbn -30.9 -33.5 -36.2 -38.9 -41.6
Balanc
Balancee of tr
trade
ade in goods and ser
servic
vices,
es, % of GDP -6.5 -6.5 -6.4 -6.3 -6.1
Curr
Current
ent ac
acccount balanc
balance,
e, USDbn -19.8 -22.2 -24.5 -26.9 -29.3
Curr
Current
ent ac
acccount balanc
balance,
e, % of GDP -4.2 -4.3 -4.3 -4.3 -4.3
For
oreign
eign rreser
eservves eexx gold, USDbn 50.7 52.7 54.8 57.0 59.3
Impor
Importt cco
over
er,, months 5.3 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.8
f = BMI forecast. Source: National sources, BMI

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 72
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024
Egypt Country Risk Report | Q4 2024

fitchsolutions.com/bmi 73
Exclusively for the use of Farid Christensen at Bunge Latin America LLC. Downloaded: 30-Aug-2024

30 North CColonnade
olonnade,, Canary W
Wharf
harf,, L
London,
ondon, E14 5GN, UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 7248 0468
Fax: +44 (0)20 7248 0467
Web: www.fitchsolutions.com/bmi

IS
ISSN:
SN: 2057-9683
Cop
opy
y Deadline: August 2024

All content, including forecasts, analysis and opinion, is based on information and sources believed to be accurate and reliable at the time of publishing. Fitch Solutions
Group Limited makes no representation or warranty of any kind as to the accuracy or completeness of any information provided, and accepts no liability whatsoever for any
loss or damage resulting from opinion, errors, inaccuracies or omissions affecting any part of the content.

Egypt Pharmaceuticals & Healthcare Report Q2 2024
No ratings yet
Egypt Pharmaceuticals & Healthcare Report Q2 2024
58 pages
IAM Asset Management Maturity Scale and Guidance
100% (4)
IAM Asset Management Maturity Scale and Guidance
100 pages
Egypt Country-Risk Q1 2025
No ratings yet
Egypt Country-Risk Q1 2025
81 pages
Norsok Z-008
83% (6)
Norsok Z-008
64 pages
07.IAM SSG - Reliability - Engineering - v1.1 - 16
100% (7)
07.IAM SSG - Reliability - Engineering - v1.1 - 16
76 pages
Egypt Food & Drink Report
100% (1)
Egypt Food & Drink Report
81 pages
Fitch Egypt Real Estate Report - 2023-11-21
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Real Estate Report - 2023-11-21
46 pages
Fitch Egypt Consumer & Retail Report - Q4 2023
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Consumer & Retail Report - Q4 2023
47 pages
API 580 Training
100% (22)
API 580 Training
168 pages
API 581 Application Example
100% (7)
API 581 Application Example
40 pages
Energy Institute Guidelines On The Corrosion Management of Offshore
100% (5)
Energy Institute Guidelines On The Corrosion Management of Offshore
88 pages
Fitch Egypt Infrastructure Report - 2022-12-20
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Infrastructure Report - 2022-12-20
53 pages
Practical Root Cause Failure Analysis
100% (10)
Practical Root Cause Failure Analysis
169 pages
ISO55001:2014 Asset Management System
89% (9)
ISO55001:2014 Asset Management System
73 pages
Asset Management
90% (10)
Asset Management
16 pages
Process Piping Inspection Procedure Rev.2 PDF
100% (10)
Process Piping Inspection Procedure Rev.2 PDF
34 pages
Fitch Egypt Consumer & Retail Report - 2023-06-01 2
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Consumer & Retail Report - 2023-06-01 2
47 pages
Cphi Pharma Insights Mea - Final
0% (1)
Cphi Pharma Insights Mea - Final
9 pages
Asset Integrity Management Handbook
95% (22)
Asset Integrity Management Handbook
107 pages
Reliability and Safety Engineering 2nd Ed (2015)
100% (24)
Reliability and Safety Engineering 2nd Ed (2015)
583 pages
PESTLE Analysis
No ratings yet
PESTLE Analysis
19 pages
Meridium Mechanical Integrity Standard Practice 2013 Rev 4
100% (4)
Meridium Mechanical Integrity Standard Practice 2013 Rev 4
400 pages
Country Risk Analysis Egypt Information 1
No ratings yet
Country Risk Analysis Egypt Information 1
46 pages
AIM - Asset Integrity Management Engineering
80% (5)
AIM - Asset Integrity Management Engineering
18 pages
02961E00 - Eni Guidelines On Risk-Based Inspections
100% (7)
02961E00 - Eni Guidelines On Risk-Based Inspections
54 pages
20602e00 Corrosion Integrity Management
83% (6)
20602e00 Corrosion Integrity Management
32 pages
Value Based and Intelligent Asset Management - Mastering The Asset Management Transformation in Industrial Plants and Infrastructures-Springe
100% (6)
Value Based and Intelligent Asset Management - Mastering The Asset Management Transformation in Industrial Plants and Infrastructures-Springe
409 pages
Risk Based Inspection RBI 580
100% (3)
Risk Based Inspection RBI 580
627 pages
Applied Reliability Centered Maintenance
92% (12)
Applied Reliability Centered Maintenance
526 pages
Quick Guide To ISO 55001 Requirements Fo
100% (2)
Quick Guide To ISO 55001 Requirements Fo
49 pages
GUNAWAN George Patrick
No ratings yet
GUNAWAN George Patrick
3 pages
Egypt-Country-Risk-Report Q2-2025
No ratings yet
Egypt-Country-Risk-Report Q2-2025
83 pages
Egypt Food & Drink Report
No ratings yet
Egypt Food & Drink Report
84 pages
Fitch Egypt Logistics & Freight Transport Report - 2023-07-04
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Logistics & Freight Transport Report - 2023-07-04
62 pages
Fitch Egypt Consumer & Retail Report - 2024-03-01
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Consumer & Retail Report - 2024-03-01
62 pages
Pharmaceutical Industry in Egypt PDF
0% (3)
Pharmaceutical Industry in Egypt PDF
17 pages
Egypt Healthcare Report Q12025
No ratings yet
Egypt Healthcare Report Q12025
47 pages
Pharmacy Market in Egypt
0% (1)
Pharmacy Market in Egypt
4 pages
Jamjoom Final Delivery
100% (1)
Jamjoom Final Delivery
24 pages
India Consumer - Enjoying A Slice of Luxury.248.175.146
No ratings yet
India Consumer - Enjoying A Slice of Luxury.248.175.146
60 pages
Egypt Connected Healthcare Market Analysis
No ratings yet
Egypt Connected Healthcare Market Analysis
12 pages
Egypte Food Drink Survey
No ratings yet
Egypte Food Drink Survey
71 pages
Uae Health Sector Pulse q1 2021 Final
100% (1)
Uae Health Sector Pulse q1 2021 Final
25 pages
Packaged Food - Saudi Arabia
No ratings yet
Packaged Food - Saudi Arabia
44 pages
China Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare Report Q2 2019 PDF
No ratings yet
China Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare Report Q2 2019 PDF
96 pages
Sample - Global Deodorants Market (2023-2028) - Mordor Intelligence
100% (1)
Sample - Global Deodorants Market (2023-2028) - Mordor Intelligence
47 pages
Generics Opportunities & Challenges in The MENA Region
No ratings yet
Generics Opportunities & Challenges in The MENA Region
20 pages
Philippines Pharmaceuticals & Healthcare Report - Q1 2021
No ratings yet
Philippines Pharmaceuticals & Healthcare Report - Q1 2021
63 pages
Spiro
No ratings yet
Spiro
3 pages
Fitch Solutions BMI Egypt Country Risk Report Q4 2024 1743098192
No ratings yet
Fitch Solutions BMI Egypt Country Risk Report Q4 2024 1743098192
74 pages
Egypt Country Risk Report - 2024Q2
No ratings yet
Egypt Country Risk Report - 2024Q2
74 pages
Algeria Country Risk Report August 2024
No ratings yet
Algeria Country Risk Report August 2024
61 pages
Fitch Egypt Banking & Financial Services Report - 2023-12-14
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Banking & Financial Services Report - 2023-12-14
61 pages
Egypt Insurance Report Q12025
No ratings yet
Egypt Insurance Report Q12025
49 pages
Egypt Country Risk: Executive Summary
No ratings yet
Egypt Country Risk: Executive Summary
6 pages
Egypt Best's Country Risk Report - 28 Aug 2021
No ratings yet
Egypt Best's Country Risk Report - 28 Aug 2021
2 pages
Fitch Egypt Banking & Financial Services Report - 2020-03-09
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Banking & Financial Services Report - 2020-03-09
49 pages
Egypt Real Estate Report - Q3
No ratings yet
Egypt Real Estate Report - Q3
45 pages
Fitch Egypt Logistics & Freight Transport Report - 2024-03-26
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Logistics & Freight Transport Report - 2024-03-26
63 pages
Fitch - Jordan - Outlook & Risks
No ratings yet
Fitch - Jordan - Outlook & Risks
89 pages
C Colombia Olombia: C Country Risk R Ountry Risk Report Eport
No ratings yet
C Colombia Olombia: C Country Risk R Ountry Risk Report Eport
88 pages
Fitch Egypt Country Risk Report - 2023-05-24
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Country Risk Report - 2023-05-24
55 pages
Transition Report 2024 25 Egypt
No ratings yet
Transition Report 2024 25 Egypt
3 pages
Egypt Infrastructure Report Q12025
No ratings yet
Egypt Infrastructure Report Q12025
81 pages
Fitch Ratings Report Nov, 2024 - Egypt
No ratings yet
Fitch Ratings Report Nov, 2024 - Egypt
23 pages
Egypt's Real GDP Growth To Slow To 3% in 2023 As Higher Inflation Looms - Fitch Solutions - Economy - Business - Ahram Online
No ratings yet
Egypt's Real GDP Growth To Slow To 3% in 2023 As Higher Inflation Looms - Fitch Solutions - Economy - Business - Ahram Online
6 pages
Fitch Egypt Power Report - 2024-02-09
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Power Report - 2024-02-09
30 pages
Albania Albania: C Country Risk R Ountry Risk Report Eport
No ratings yet
Albania Albania: C Country Risk R Ountry Risk Report Eport
68 pages
Fitch Egypt Food & Drink Report - 2024-03-19
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Food & Drink Report - 2024-03-19
66 pages
Fitch Egypt Infrastructure Report - 2022-09-27
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Infrastructure Report - 2022-09-27
53 pages
Fitch Egypt Medical Devices Report - 2024-02-29
No ratings yet
Fitch Egypt Medical Devices Report - 2024-02-29
72 pages
MENA Mining Report - Q1 2023
100% (1)
MENA Mining Report - Q1 2023
60 pages
Middle East and North Africa at An Economic Crossroads - Global Finance Magazine
No ratings yet
Middle East and North Africa at An Economic Crossroads - Global Finance Magazine
6 pages
Egypt Logistics & Freight Transport Report Q12025
No ratings yet
Egypt Logistics & Freight Transport Report Q12025
65 pages
Fitch Brazils Economic Outperformance Does Not Ease Fiscal Uncertainty
No ratings yet
Fitch Brazils Economic Outperformance Does Not Ease Fiscal Uncertainty
6 pages
Pakistan Country Risk Report
No ratings yet
Pakistan Country Risk Report
75 pages
Egypt Agribusiness Report - Q1 2021
No ratings yet
Egypt Agribusiness Report - Q1 2021
78 pages
Camer Cameroon Oon: C Country Risk R Ountry Risk Report Eport
No ratings yet
Camer Cameroon Oon: C Country Risk R Ountry Risk Report Eport
60 pages
The Economist No Return To Cheap Money 2023
No ratings yet
The Economist No Return To Cheap Money 2023
10 pages
Regional Conflicts - BOP
No ratings yet
Regional Conflicts - BOP
9 pages
Bản đồ rủi ro 2024
No ratings yet
Bản đồ rủi ro 2024
179 pages
Az Azerbaijan Erbaijan: C Country Risk R Ountry Risk Report Eport
No ratings yet
Az Azerbaijan Erbaijan: C Country Risk R Ountry Risk Report Eport
46 pages
Risk Based Inspection RBI 581
100% (10)
Risk Based Inspection RBI 581
583 pages
Handbook of Reliability Prediction Procedures For Mechanical Equipment NSWC-11 PDF
100% (6)
Handbook of Reliability Prediction Procedures For Mechanical Equipment NSWC-11 PDF
522 pages
ISO55001 Logic Maps v5 MUY Bueno para Plan Estrategico
100% (6)
ISO55001 Logic Maps v5 MUY Bueno para Plan Estrategico
3 pages
Quick Guide ISO 55000
100% (4)
Quick Guide ISO 55000
36 pages
Integrity Management With S-RBI: Using The w-IMS Tool
100% (3)
Integrity Management With S-RBI: Using The w-IMS Tool
28 pages
Reliability Engineering - Prob Models and Maintenance Methods PDF
100% (7)
Reliability Engineering - Prob Models and Maintenance Methods PDF
395 pages
2 Asset Integrity Management and RBI
100% (3)
2 Asset Integrity Management and RBI
57 pages
Chevron Maintenance & Inspection Procedures
100% (5)
Chevron Maintenance & Inspection Procedures
40 pages
Keynote ISO 55000 The IAM Perspective
100% (2)
Keynote ISO 55000 The IAM Perspective
66 pages
Corrosion Threats Handbook
100% (2)
Corrosion Threats Handbook
28 pages
The Diaspora Remittances Survey December, 2021: Central Bank of Kenya
No ratings yet
The Diaspora Remittances Survey December, 2021: Central Bank of Kenya
56 pages
ICPR Saudi Arabia Full Report
No ratings yet
ICPR Saudi Arabia Full Report
56 pages
Some Aspects of The Economic Drain From India During The British Rule
No ratings yet
Some Aspects of The Economic Drain From India During The British Rule
10 pages
FM302 Week 6, Tutorial 5 Questions
No ratings yet
FM302 Week 6, Tutorial 5 Questions
3 pages
Migration Nurse Diaspora Migration Development Caribbean September 2004 FPP-04-6
No ratings yet
Migration Nurse Diaspora Migration Development Caribbean September 2004 FPP-04-6
12 pages
Q1 Economic Performance Bulletin 2023 F
No ratings yet
Q1 Economic Performance Bulletin 2023 F
26 pages
MIS Term Paper
No ratings yet
MIS Term Paper
18 pages
Cambodia (Lease Law)
No ratings yet
Cambodia (Lease Law)
5 pages
CashEx Pitch Deck April 2022
No ratings yet
CashEx Pitch Deck April 2022
14 pages
Iom Kyrgyzstan Country Strategy - Final
No ratings yet
Iom Kyrgyzstan Country Strategy - Final
34 pages
The Impact of Remittances On Entrepreneurial Behavior in The Place of Origin
No ratings yet
The Impact of Remittances On Entrepreneurial Behavior in The Place of Origin
10 pages
Internship Report On Dhaka Bank
No ratings yet
Internship Report On Dhaka Bank
78 pages
Migrantremittancesand Economic Growthof Nigeria
No ratings yet
Migrantremittancesand Economic Growthof Nigeria
12 pages
Instructions
No ratings yet
Instructions
4 pages
Circular No. 447 - Guidelines On The Penalty Condonation Program On Mandatory MS Remittance Due To COVID-19 Pandemic
No ratings yet
Circular No. 447 - Guidelines On The Penalty Condonation Program On Mandatory MS Remittance Due To COVID-19 Pandemic
3 pages
Kerala Return Emigrant Survey 2021
No ratings yet
Kerala Return Emigrant Survey 2021
53 pages
GFS Essay
No ratings yet
GFS Essay
12 pages
Goa Migration Study 2008
100% (6)
Goa Migration Study 2008
179 pages
Application Cum Form A2 For Outward Remittance
No ratings yet
Application Cum Form A2 For Outward Remittance
5 pages
The State of Digital Payments in The Philippines-Feb20 PDF
100% (1)
The State of Digital Payments in The Philippines-Feb20 PDF
96 pages
Test 6 - Road To IELTS
No ratings yet
Test 6 - Road To IELTS
20 pages
Assignment Comtempoarary
No ratings yet
Assignment Comtempoarary
17 pages
December
No ratings yet
December
102 pages
Memorandum of Agreement: Philippine Public School Taechers Association
No ratings yet
Memorandum of Agreement: Philippine Public School Taechers Association
4 pages
Migration in Myanmar-Perspectives From Current Research 1
No ratings yet
Migration in Myanmar-Perspectives From Current Research 1
136 pages
Mint Delhi 12-06-2025
No ratings yet
Mint Delhi 12-06-2025
18 pages
Covering Letter
No ratings yet
Covering Letter
2 pages
BFP MC 2020 033 Guidelines On Entry Into Agreement by The Municipalitycity Fire Marshals With T
0% (1)
BFP MC 2020 033 Guidelines On Entry Into Agreement by The Municipalitycity Fire Marshals With T
8 pages