BRENDA B. MARCOS vs. WILSON G.

MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000

Nature of the Case:

A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

FACTS:

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was
transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee
Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force
in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an
escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was
still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider.
Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence,
he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he
chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992,
they were already living separately.

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was
still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang.
When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she
became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel.
As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day,
when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent,
inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October
17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical
Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the
reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Parañaque,
while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as
cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation
(Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards appellee and their children, x x x."3

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of
the evidence presented.

Issues:

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial
Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.

II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be
the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."7

Ruling:

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to
determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have
been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests
himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no
choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of
psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were laid down by this Court as
follows:

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the
foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.

xxx xxx xxx

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."10

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court
of Appeals:11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case --
including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker --
was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality
of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now
that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.1âwphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.12 At best, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that
the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability;
and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring
personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No
costs.