No.

292 June 2021

Reimagining
Colonel Surjeet Singh Tanwar is an
alumni of RIMC, NDA, Defence Services
Staff College, Wellington and Maneuver

Manoeuvre
Centre of Excellence (MCoE), Fort Benning,
USA. The officer has served in High Altitude
Area along LAC and as part of Indian
Contingent in UN Mission in Congo.

Warfare in the Besides various career courses, the officer

was nominated to attend UN ‘Train the
Trainer’ course at Five Hills Training Centre,

21st Century:
Mongolia under the aegis of US PACOM.
The officer has served as GSO-1 of an
Independent Armoured Brigade. He has

Evolution and
been awarded GOC-in-C Commendation
Card (Gallantry). The Officer Commanded a
Mechanised battalion in Semi- Desert and

Adaptations
Developed Sector. He has also been an
Instructor at Defence Services Staff
College, Wellington.

Introduction Key Points

• Manoeuvre warfare is often

Manoeuvre warfare probably has a long-drawn considered synonymous with terms
history. In 331 BC, Alexander the Great, changed such as mission-type orders,
reconnaissance pull, surfaces & gaps,
the course of history by destroying the ranks of a and Schwerpunkt.
• Two distinct schools of manoeuvre
numerically superior Persian Force under the warfare developed prior to and during
command of Darius III in the plains of Arbela, the Second World War are—the
German School and the Soviet
Iraq. 1 Sun Tzu believed that, “To win hundred School.
• The battlespace of 21st century is
victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of ‘Expanded, Converged and
skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the Compressed’. To execute manoeuvre,
ground forces will be required to
acme of skill”. 2 One of the best examples of operationalise Multi-Domain Battle
(MDB).
manoeuvre warfare in action is found in Genghis
• Proposed Resilient formations should
Khan’s conquest of Transoxiana. 3 Khan overcame be capable of manoeuvring semi-
independently, projecting and
his numerical weakness by increasing velocity. accessing power in all domains and
The most enduring development during the presenting enemy with multiple
dilemmas which is the true essence of
Napoleonic Age was the creation and use of the manoeuvre in the 21st century.
levée en masse. While describing manoeuvre

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 CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS): ISSUE BRIEF

warfare, Ardant du Picq emphasised the morale side of war and remarked “weapons are
effective only insofar as they influence the morale of the enemy”. 4 Similarly, Liddell Hart
emphasised ‘Indirect Approach’ to defeat the enemy. He also propagated a theory on
modern manoeuvre named Man-in-the-Dark Theory. 5

Modern Schools on Manoeuvre Theory

Two distinct (though related) schools on manoeuvre warfare developed prior to and during
the Second World War —the German School and Soviet School. Shocked by the horrors of
the trench warfare during World War I, militaries sought for a solution to this deadlock. The
Allied solution was basically a technological one with ‘Tank’ as the main player, and the
German solution was a doctrinal one that is ‘Infiltration Tactics’. As part of the evolving
concepts on manoeuvre warfare, Germans created the ‘Blitzkrieg or Lightning War’ which is
a combination of successful infiltration tactics involving tank and combat aircraft. The
concept of the ‘Expanding Torrent’ is fundamental to Blitzkrieg Theory”. 6

Evolution of ‘Theory of Manoeuvre Warfare’

Richard Simpkin, a recognised manoeuvre warfare theorist, gave a truly unique perspective
on manoeuvre warfare. According to him, “to achieve requisite penetration of the enemy, the
Fixing (Ordinary) Force should be capable of achieving twice the relative velocity of the
enemy, and the Mobile (Extraordinary) Force should be four times the enemy’s velocity”. 7
Colonel John Boyd developed the ‘Theory of Manoeuvre Warfare’ not on the basis of ground
battles, but on the basis of a study of some mock air-to-air combat exercise (conducted at
Nellis Air Force Base in 1974). This study also led him to analyse the air-to-air combat
during the Korean War where the American aviators were successfully achieved a 10:1 kill
ratio over their North Korean and Chinese opponents. Later Colonel Boyd also studied
ground combat to see if there were situations similar to the air war over Korea. His answer
was what is now called the Boyd Theory, or the original Theory of Manoeuvre Warfare. The
Boyd Theory defines what is meant by the term manoeuvre warfare and seeks to
outmanoeuvre the enemy by being ahead through the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act
(OODA) loop. 8 This theory describes the psychological and temporal aspects of war and
suggests that, victory can be accomplished by tightening friendly OODA loop and loosening
enemy OODA loop.

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Three Filters, Manoeuvre Warfare and Their Applicability

The three filters that are very helpful in manoeuvre warfare are: Mission Type Orders,
Schwerpunkt, and Surfaces & Gaps. 9

• Mission Type Orders and Schwerpunkt. One must remember that manoeuvre
warfare avoids enemy strengths and attacks weaknesses. Thus, a military unit /
formation in conflict should employ maximum effort to identify gaps and constantly
probe for enemy’s weaknesses and thereafter, target the same.
• Surface and Gaps. The term surfaces and gaps has been derived from a German
terms ─Flaechen und Luekentaktik. 10 Surfaces refer to the enemy's strong points and
gaps refer to the weak points. Flaechen und Luekentaktik often referred to this as the
‘Oskar von Hutier Tactics’. 11 At the same time, Basil Liddell Hart called it the
‘Expanding Torrent System Tactics’; 12 if a force is unsuccessful in finding any gaps at
all, it may have to ‘create gaps’ by what is known as ‘Stosstruppentaktik’— it can be
achieved by actions comprising suppression, assault and exploitation. However, a
lesser costly way of creating a gap could be through ‘deception enticing the enemy’
or to draw out its key forces off from another critical point. In this context, the
Germans had also coined a term called ‘Aufrollen’, literally meaning, ‘thrusting upon’
through the gap for a rapid breakthrough. The Russian Fire Sack Defence Concept,
though it may appear as a gap, due to the absence of enemy, but in reality is a
‘surface’— in real sense, it is the hardest spot to crack. 13

Artificial Intelligence Revolution: Impact on Manoeuvre Warfare

Technology intensive operational environment of the 21st Century is adding new dimensions
to manoeuvre warfare─ no one planned on an AI Revolution especially in the military
domain. To begin with, US military stumbled into AI when hundreds of air and ground drones
were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. ‘Democratisation of Artificial Intelligence
Technologies’ 14, across the national boundaries reinforces the fact that, the world is moving
towards an ‘Era of Technological Equivalence’. Leading science and technology luminaries
like Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and many others have spoken out against autonomous
weapon systems assisted by AI warning and clearly highlighted the possibility of a ‘Global AI
Race’. 15 Therefore, in today’s world of digitalisation, it is worth analysing the recent
developments and their concomitant impact on the future of manoeuvre warfare.

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Manoeuvre Warfare and the Emerging Technological Battlespace of the 21st Century

Older operational frameworks led commanders and force developers to visualise the
battlespace ‘compartmentalised in time, over geographic space, and by function or domain’.
However, the new and evolving operational framework of the 21st Century allows
commanders to visualise the posture and convergence of capabilities across domains,
environments, and functions required to manoeuvre. This new technologically driven
battlespace is ‘Expanded, Converged & Compressed’ and will impact the mechanics of
executing manoeuvre warfare to a large extent. 16 The battlespace has ‘expanded
geographically’ because of the effects of space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare (EW),
and even because of conventional weapons with increasing ranges. Today’s battlespace is
converged and involves detailed and consistent integration of reconnaissance,
unconventional warfare, information warfare, and conventional capabilities. The ability of
militaries to both ‘expand the battlespace’ and ‘converge their capabilities’ has compressed
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. This ‘strategic-to-tactical compression’ is
a result of extended sets of conventional, information warfare, and unconventional
capabilities attained through AI Revolution. This has shortened the decision cycle thereby,
helping the commanders to effectively execute manoeuvres at the tactical and operational
levels.

In the 21st Century, world militaries are entering the ‘era of contested equality’ wherein
technology will make ‘unequals, equal’ 17— perhaps this is already happening and impacting
the canvas of manoeuvre warfare. Technological capacities in enabling domains like AI and
cyber will decisively ‘shake’ the military balance and enable militaries to embark on the path
of ‘I’ Combat (Information led combat, the sole mission of which is to take the algorithm
warfare to such a high level so as to win the AI arms race conclusively). Military victories are
likely to be attained through technological prowess in the battlespace. In a 2013 article on
the future of warfare, Russian military Chief of Staff, General Valery Gerasimov 18 wrote,
“While today we have flying drones, tomorrow’s battlefields will be filled with walking,
crawling, jumping, and flying robots. In the near future, it is possible that a fully robotics unit
will be created, capable of independently conducting military operations”. How shall the
world fight this World War ‘R’ (Robots)? 19 What form will manoeuvre warfare have to
assume to be employed against this robotised enemy?

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Re-Imagining Manoeuvre Warfare: Evolution and Adaptations for the Indian Army

“India needs to prepare for the war of the future rather than just for tomorrow”. 20

—General M M Naravane, COAS, Indian Army

The Indian Army needs to carefully analyse the evolving technologically driven operational
environment, and incorporate manoeuvre warfare within the overall framework of conflict as
relevant to the Indian context. In fact, the Indian Army needs to focus and evolve ‘Dynamic
Response’ —actions below the threshold of an all-out war, and develop both kinetic and
non-kinetic responses with an aim to address diverse evolving threats and outmanoeuvre
the enemy at each ladder of escalation. The army has also undertook process of ‘IBG-
isation’ 21 as one of the responses to this changing character of war with an aim to retain the
capability of executing the manoeuvres at both tactical and operational levels, dominate the
escalation matrix and thereby, retain the flexibility of outmanoeuvring the enemy in battle.

Multi -Domain Battle (MDB) Concept: Applicability in the Indian Context

The competitiveness, lethality and complexity of the future battlefield has been well realised
by the Indian Army especially post the surgical strikes (2016) conducted after Uri & Pulwama
attacks and the recent Eastern Ladakh standoff. A threat based analytical approach is
required to address such challenges. Multi-Domain Battle extends the battlespace to
strategic arena for both friendly and enemy forces and expands the targeting landscape
based on extended ranges and lethality. To execute manoeuvres, ground forces
operationalises Multi-Domain Battles with three interrelated components—calibrated force
posture, employment of resilient formations and convergence. 22 This concept demands
employing ‘resilient formations’ that can operate semi-independently in the expanded
operational environment while projecting power into or accessing all domains, and
‘converging capabilities’ with an aim to create windows of advantage at chosen and pre-
defined locations—an essential pre-requisite for manoeuvre warfare. The creation of
Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) as a lean, agile and tailor-made structure, is a right step to
achieve operational objectives and executing manoeuvres at both tactical and operational
levels. Resilient formations envisioned in this concept, remain effective despite multiple
forms of enemy threat and are capable of cross-domain operations. These formations are
capable of ‘manoeuvring semi-independently, without secured flanks, cross-domain capable,
projecting and accessing power in all domains in order to present the enemy with multiple

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dilemmas which is the true essence of manoeuvre’. The intensity of operations and the
enemy’s ability to deny or degrade communication requires these resilient formations to
conduct operations employing the ‘mission command philosophy’. The Indian Army also
needs to adopt the technological changes to leverage the emerging disruptive domains and
evolve a long term roadmap, to shape the battlespace of tomorrow.

Need for Cross -Domain Manoeuvres: Indian Army

Based on the understanding of MDB so far, the Indian Army also needs to develop and
incorporate capabilities to execute Cross-Domain Manoeuvres. It would include employment
of ‘mutually supporting lethal’ and ‘non-lethal capabilities’ of multiple domains to create
conditions designed to generate overmatch, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy, and
enable the force with freedom of movement and action in executing the envisioned
manoeuvres. Cross- domain fires assisting these manoeuvres must aim to integrate the
delivery of lethal and non-lethal fires at the desired point of impact.

Conclusion

Manoeuvre warfare still remains a sound approach to both war and warfare especially in
today’s technology intensive battlespace. It is the collective ability of military strategists to
embrace its ideals, both during peacetime and in war. There is a need to abide by and
execute manoeuvre warfare as the character of warfare changes in the 21st century. To be
sure, modern militaries must aim to exploit the modern evolving technologies but in a way
that enhances their warfighting capabilities and at the same time not depending wholly upon
it.

End Notes

1
S E Garcia, "Alexander the Great: A Strategy Review in the Context of the ACSC Strategy Process
Model",Defense Technical Information Center, 01 March 1984. Accessible at
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a144027.pdf. Accessed on 25 April 2021.
2
Nicola - Ann Hardwick, "Is Clausewitz or Sun Tzu More Relevant to Understanding Contemporary
War?", E-International Relations , 30 March 2011. Accessible at https://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/30/is-
clausewitz-or-sun-tzu-more-relevant-to-understanding-contemporary-war/. Accessed on 25 April
2021.
3
Arshad Islam, "The Mongol Invasions of Central Asia", International Journal of Social Science and
Humanity 6, no. 4, April 2016. Accessible at https://doi.org/10.7763/IJSSH.2016.V6.664. Accessed on
25 April 2021.

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Michael Bonura, "Ardant Du Picq, Charles Jean Jacques Joseph (1819–1870)", The Encyclopedia of
4

War (American Cancer Society), 2011. Accessible at

https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow035. Accessed on 27 April 2021.
5
‘BH Liddell Hart, "The 'Man in the Dark': Theory of Infantry Tactics and the Expanding Current
System of Attack", The Regimental Rogue. Accessible at
http://www.regimentalrogue.com/misc/liddell-hart_man_in_the_dark.html. Accessed on 27 April 2021.
Juha Malkki, "The Quest for Manoeuvre". Accessible at
6

https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/77192/The%20Quest%20for%20Manoeuvre_YEK%20dip
lomityo.pdf?sequence=1. Accessde on 29 April 2021.
Book Review by Henry L Trimble of “RACE TO THE SWIFT: Thoughts on Twenty First Century
7

Warfare", Marine Corps Association, 25 July 2019. Accessible at https://mca-

marines.org/gazette/race-to-the-swift-thoughts-on-twenty-first-century-warfare/. Accessed on 29 April
2021.
Robert B Polk, A Critique of The Boyd Theory - Is It Relevant to the Army?, (Fort Leavenworth:
8

School of Advanced Military Studies: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 15
Dec 1999). Accessible at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA374770.pdf .Accessed on 29 April 2021.
William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Accessible at
9

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326605182_Maneuver_Warfare_Handbook. Accessed on
30 April 2021.
10
“John Boyd, Maneuver Warfare, and MCDP1", Professional Military Education (blog), 29 April 2018.
Accessible at https://www.professionalmilitaryeducation.com/warfightingepisode-12-john-boyd-
maneuver-warfare-and-mcdp1/. Accessed on 01 May 2021.
11
"Infiltration Tactics: History of World I". Accessible at http://www.livingwarbirds.com/infiltration-
tactics.php.Accessed on 01 May 2021.
12
Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Encyclopaedia Britannica. Accessible at
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Basil-Henry-Liddell-Hart. Accessed on 01 May 2021.
13
James F Gebhardt, Soviet Battalion in the Defense,published by Soviet Army Studies Office: 1989 .
14
Anand Rao, "Democratizing Artificial Intelligence Is a Double-Edged Sword", strategy+business, 15
June 2020. Accessible at https://www.strategy-business.com/article/Democratizing-artificial-
intelligence-is-a-double-edged-sword?gko=ffdcd. Accessed on 02 May 2021.
15
Molly Brown, "Hawking, Musk and Wozniak Sign Letter to Ban Autonomous Weapons, Prevent
Global AI Arms Race", GeekWire, 27 July 2015. Accessible at
https://www.geekwire.com/2015/hawking-musk-and-wozniak-sign-letter-to-ban-autonomous-weapons-
prevent-global-ai-arms-race/. Accessed on 02 May 2021.

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16
"MDB Evolution for the 21st Century", US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Accessible at
https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf. Accessed on 03 May
2021.
17
Agencies, "Battle Tanks, Fighter Jets Are Becoming Outdated in Modern Era: Indian Army Chief",
The Economic Times, updated on 06 March 2020. Accessible at
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/battle-tanks-fighter-jets-are-becoming-outdated-
in-modern-era-army-chief/articleshow/74489106.cms. Accessed on 04 May 2021.
18
Merital Staff," Rise of the machines: Pentagon preparing for robotic battlefields", MeriTalk, 14
December 2015.Accessible at https://www.meritalk.com/articles/rise-of-the-machines-pentagon-
preparing-for-robotic-battlefields/?doing_wp_cron=1622456985.6924099922180175781250.
Accessed on 04 May 2021.
19
Samuel Bendett, ‘Battle Robots Rivalry and the Future of War’, Russia in Global Affairs. Accessible
at https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/battle-robots-rivalry-and-the-future-of-war/. Accessed on 04 May
2021.
20
Snehesh Alex Philip, "Gen Naravane’s Chanakya Neeti for Future Wars Will Require India to Spend
Money Smartly", The Print , 06 March 2020. Accessible at https://theprint.in/opinion/brahmastra/gen-
naravanes-chanakya-neeti-for-future-wars-will-require-india-to-spend-money-judiciously/376449/.
Accessed on 05 May 2021.
21
ANI, "Indian Army Determined to Lead and Shape Battle Spaces of Tomorrow: Gen Naravane", ANI
News, 04 March 2020. Accessible at https://www.aninews.in/news/national/general-news/indian-army-
determined-to-lead-and-shape-battle-spaces-of-tomorrow-gen-naravane20200304201712/. Accessed
on 05 May 2021.
22
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The views expressed and suggestions made in the article are solely of the author in his personal capacity and do not have any
official endorsement. Attributability of the contents lies purely with author.

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