THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 197293. April 21, 2014.]

ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS,

INC., respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J : p

While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of the
prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if,
upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.

This is a petition for review on certiorari [1] assailing the Court of Appeals' decision [2] dated January
14, 2011, which reversed the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the complaint against petitioner Alfredo C.
Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.

This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C.
Evangelista, on January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa against Alfredo. [3]

In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used
Car Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit of
the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without Rolando's or
the finance manager's permission. [4]

The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit
the payments totalling P886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars under Alfredo's
custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of
a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the unremitted
amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of P1,046,000.00 to its
prejudice and damage. [5]

In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars' supposed failure to prove
ownership over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted payments. Hence,
it could not have suffered damage. [6]

On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a resolution [7] finding probable
cause and recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.

Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. [8] He then filed a petition for review
with the Department of Justice on May 16, 2008. [9]
 While Alfredo's motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft [10] and estafa [11] were filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of
probable cause [12] before the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.

Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted. [13] On February 4, 2009, the
parties agreed to submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory hearing, for resolution. [14]

On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an order
[15] dismissing the complaint, stating that:

After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on record which includes

the assailed Resolution dated 04 March 2008, the court holds that the evidence adduced does
not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. ....[16]

Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on July 3, 2009. [17] CDAHIT

Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
complaint. It argued that "the determination of probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a
criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor." [18]

On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, [19] reversed the trial court, and
reinstated the case. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public prosecutor's findings of probable cause with her own findings of
insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause." [20]

Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this court. In essence, he argued
that the trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable cause as shown by the evidence on
record. He argued that "judicial determination of probable cause is broader than [the] executive
determination of probable cause" [21] and that "[i]t is not correct to say that the determination of probable
cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor . . . ." [22]

In its comment, [23] Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented questions, issues, and arguments that
were a mere rehash of those already considered and passed upon by the appellate court.

The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its comment [24] that the
appellate court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings of probable cause against Alfredo.
Since there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado, the trial
court should respect his determination of probable cause.

In his reply, [25] Alfredo reiterated that "judicial determination of probable cause[,] while not a
superior faculty[,] covers a broader encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue on the
existence of probable cause." [26] He argued that the findings of the trial court should be accorded greater
weight than the appellate court's. It merely reviewed the findings of the trial court.

The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on
the basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.
 Time and again, this court has been confronted with the issue of the difference between the
determination of probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the determination of probable cause by
the judge on the other. We examine these two concepts again.

Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft [27] and estafa under Article 315, fourth
paragraph, no. 3 (c) [28] of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, a preliminary investigation must first be conducted "to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial," in accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the
existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor. [29] If upon evaluation of
the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the
filing of the information with the court.

Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence" [30] to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant
of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.

In People v. Castillo and Mejia, [31] this court has stated:

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a
function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such
official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed
in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor,
i.e.,whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a
case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge
must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. [32]

The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether
there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable
cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In People v. Inting: [33]
ESCacI

...Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released.
Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
 should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper — whether
or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors
and embarrassment of trial — is the function of the Prosecutor.[34] (Emphasis supplied)

While it is within the trial court's discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on
hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does
not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination
of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the
prosecutor's finding.

People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo [35] discussed the rationale. In that case, Jonathan
Cerbo allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo. An information for murder was
filed against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as private complainant, executed a complaint-
affidavit charging Billy Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a motion to amend the information,
which was granted by the court. The information was then amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of the
accused, and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.

Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing that it was issued without probable cause.
The trial court granted this motion, recalled the warrant, and dismissed the case against him. The Court of
Appeals affirmed this dismissal. This court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered the
reinstatement of the amended information against Billy Cerbo, stating that:

In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or innocence
of Private Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the
information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of
discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it
for 'want of evidence,' because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard
during the trial.The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the
proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.

The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of
government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. But
just as we recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise be
accorded due process.Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest
error in the performance of a public prosecutor's duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering
with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.

In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public
prosecutor's finding of probable cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice
secretary and move for the deferment or suspension of the proceedings until such appeal is
resolved. [36] (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found that the facts
and evidence were "sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner] . . . ." [37] There was nothing in his
resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion granted to him by law and jurisprudence.
 While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had the
discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and
proceed with trial.

Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this, the court
cannot hold the accused for arraignment and trial.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge has
not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase "upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce" allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte.

For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates
the judge to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable cause."
Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 reads:

Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within
ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has
already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7
of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must
be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.

In People v. Hon. Yadao: [38]

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the
filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to
the existence of probable cause.

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory.
The court's first option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the situation here:
 the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents. [39]
(Emphasis supplied)
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case,
whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of
the court." [40]

In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on record and
concluded that "the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of
qualified theft and estafa." [41] Specifically, she found that Juno Cars "failed to prove by competent
evidence" [42] that the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned
by them, or that these vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified
theft. She also found that the complaint "[did] not state with particularity the exact value of the alleged office
files or their valuation purportedly have been removed, concealed or destroyed by the accused," [43] which
she found crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3 (c) of
the Revised Penal Code. She also noted that:
...As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this case be set for clarificatory
hearing to clear out essential matters pertinent to the offense charged and even directed the
private complainant to bring documents relative to the same/payment as well as affidavit of
witnesses/buyers with the end view of satisfying itself that indeed probable cause exists to
commit the present case which private complainant failed to do. [44]

Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly
dismissed the case against Alfredo.

Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in
dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it.
It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable
cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she
must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.

WHEREFORE,the petition is GRANTED.The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05
against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr.,Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo,pp. 3-31.

2. Id. at 33-44.

3. Id. at 80.
4. Id.

5. Id. at 81-82.

6. Id. at 82.

7. Id. at 60-64.

8. Id. at 35.

9. Id.

10. Id. at 65-67.

11. Id. at 68-69.

12. Id. at 70-79.

13. Id. at 35.

14. Id. at 35-36.

15. Id. at 80-85.

16. Id. at 84.

17. Id. at 87.

18. Id. at 36.

19. Id. at 33-44, Court of Appeals' decision, per Tenth Division, penned by J. Hakim S. Abdulwahid and
concurred in by J. Ricardo R. Rosario and J. Samuel H. Gaerlan.

20. Id. at 44.

21. Id. at 15.

22. Id.

23. Id. at 130-136.

24. Id. at 146-161.

25. Id. at 163-166.

26. Id. at 163.

27. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 310. Qualified Theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher in degree than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if
committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is large
cattle or consists of coconuts, or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery.
28. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 315. Swindling (Estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned herein below shall be punished by:

xxx xxx xxx

4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed 200
pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following
means:

xxx xxx xxx

3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office files, document
or any other papers.

29. See Leviste v. Alameda,G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 575, 598 [Per J. Carpio-
Morales, Third Division].

30. RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 112, sec. 6.

31. 607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

32. Id. at 764-765, citing Paderanga v. Drilon,273 Phil. 290, 296 (1991) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc];
Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,324 Phil. 568, 620-621 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr.,En Banc]; Ho v.
People,345 Phil. 597, 611 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

33. G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 788 [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr.,En Banc].

34. Id. at 792-793.

35. 361 Phil. 401 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

36. Id. at 420-421.

37. Rollo,p. 62.

38. G.R. Nos. 162144-54, November 13, 2012, 685 SCRA 264 [Per J. Abad, En Banc].

39. Id. at 287-288.

40. Leviste v. Alameda,G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 575, 598 [Per J. Carpio-Morales,
Third Division], citing Galvez v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 114046, October 24, 1994, 237 SCRA 685
[Per J. Regalado, Second Division].

41. Rollo,p. 84.

42. Id.
43. Id.

44. Id. at 84-85.