Defining social identities.
Social identity: collective or group identities applied to important roles. Cultures classify, group and
give meaning to broad identities, such as male or female, that define how men and women are
generally expected to behave.
-next lests look at clsss identies as one of elements constructing social class identities
(a) Class identities
Social class can be difficult to define, but Crompton (2003) suggests that occupation is a good
general indicator that can allow us to define simple class groupings, such as working, middle and
upper class. Occupation can also suggest ways in which class identities develop out of different work-
related experiences.
Lower class
Traditional working-class identities are fixed (or centred) around manual work and the manufacturing
industry. Such jobs were widely available in Britain, even in the later part of the 20 th century.
A further dimension to class identity came from the largely urban and close-knit communities within
which the traditional working class lived. Here, people of a similar class, occupation and general social
outlook had their cultural beliefs continually reinforced through personal experience and socialisation:
the ‘working-class Self’ could be contrasted with the ‘middle-/ upper-class Other’. In such circumstances,
class identity was built not just around what people were or believed themselves to be, but also around
what they were not.
More recently, however, Crompton has suggested changes to the nature of work:
■a decline in traditional manufacturing industries ■a rise of service industries such as banking,
computing and a range of lesser status service jobs. This has led to the emergence of a new working
class. Goldthorpe et al. (1968) argued that this section of the working class developed new forms of
identity:
■privatised or home centred ■instrumental: work was a means to an end and the creation of a
comfortable home and family life rather than an end in itself.
In terms of general class identity, however, Devine (1992) suggests that there were still important
differences between the new working class and the middle classes. The former, for example, retained
a strong sense of ‘being working class’.
Middle class
Middle-class identities are constructed around a range of occupational identities. These include:
■professionals such as doctors, whose identity combines high levels of educational achievement with
personal autonomy (freedom of action) and decision making
■managers involved in the day today running of private and public companies an identity, Brooks
(2006) suggests, that combines career progression, decision making, power and control over others and
the organisation of work routines
■intellectuals, such as university lecturers, who reflect an academic identity dealing with knowledge
and information services
■consultants focused on selling knowledge, information and skills across both national and global
markets
■routine service workers (such as shop assistants), who represent an expanding identity group situated
at the bottom of the middleclass hierarchy; they may have lower earnings and levels of skill than some
higher working class occupations, but they qualify as middle class on the basis of their non manual
work and, in the case of occupations such as nursing, higher levels of social status (a significant factor
in all types of middleclass identity).
Upper class
Upper-class identities are based on two major groupings:
■The landed aristocracy is a relatively small group whose traditional source of power is its historic
ownership of land and its political connections to the monarchy. In the past, this made it the most
significant section of society. Over the course of the 20th century, the economic power and influence of
the aristocracy may have declined, but there remains a significant upper class section of society.
■The business elite now represents a major section of the upper class one characterised by immense
income and wealth based on ownership of significant national, international and global companies.
Self and Zealey (2007) note that:
■21% of the UKís total wealth is owned by the wealthiest 1% of its population
■7% of the national wealth is owned by the least wealthy 50%. In India, a similar pattern of income
equality emerges: ■The top 10% of wage earners earn 12 times more than the bottom 10% ■42% of
India’s 1.2 billion population live on around $1.25 a day. On a global scale, Davies et al. (2008) note that
the world’s richest 1% own 40% of the total global wealth. Of this 1%, 60% live in just two countries:
the USA and Japan.
The blurring of class
Identities Peele (2004) argues that recent global economic changes have resulted in ‘a blurring of
traditional class identities’. We can see this in cultural changes in taste and consumption. In particular,
a convergence of working-class and middleclass tastes makes it increasingly difficult to define class
identity clearly. Distinctive boundary lines between working-, middle- and upper-class identities have
changed dramatically, although they have not disappeared completely.
Prandy and Lambert (2005) suggest that there has been a gradual shift from people ‘seeing
themselves as working class to middle class’, and Savage (2007) argues that although people still use
class categories as a source of identity, the meaning of these categories has changed.
Greater emphasis is placed on individual, rather than collective, experiences. As a result, working-class
identities in particular have become more varied. This reflects the idea that class identity is becoming
increasingly fuid – based on someone’s ability to choose who they are or who they want to be.
Brooks argues that we can push the idea of a ‘coherent, stable and unified’ middle-class identity a little
too far. Higher-level professional workers may have little or nothing in common with lower-level shop
workers. However, it is possible to identify three general cultural themes that contribute to middle-
class identity:
1 Not working class: this reflects the idea that the middle classes occupy an ambivalent and precarious
class position:
■Above the working class and wanting to remain separated from them. As Brooks puts it: The
Construction of middleclass identities has primarily been related to the claim that one is not working
class.
■Below the upper class but aspiring to be like them.
3 Disgusted subjects: Lawler (2005) argues that expressions of disgust at perceived violations of taste
are a consistent and unifying feature of middle class identities. The ownership of taste allows the middle
classes to distinguish themselves from those below and above; the upper class can be categorised in
terms of vulgar and tasteless shows of wealth . As Bourdieu (1984) put it: Social identity lies in
difference, and difference is asserted against what is closest, that which represents the greatest
threat.
Social capital: this refers to how people are connected to networks (who you know) and the value
these have for what Putnam (2000) calls norms of reciprocity : what people are willing to do for each
other.
Catts and Ozga (2005) call this the social glue that holds people together in communities and gives
them a sense of belonging . They argue that the middle classes are in the best position to integrate into
significant social networks, such as those found in schools or the workplace, that reinforce their
sense of identity and difference.
One important aspect of this is what Bourdieu (1986) calls cultural capital. This refers to non
economic resources, such as family and class background, educational qualifications, social skills and
status, that give people advantages and disadvantages over others.
Ethnic identities
When thinking about ethnic identities it is helpful to keep two things in mind:
1 Ethnicity is not the same thing as race. As Ossorio (2003) argues, the simple biological notion of
race is wrong , there is no credible scientific evidence of genetically different racial groups.
2: Avoid thinking about ethnicity in terms of minorities
The Center for Social Welfare Research (1999) states: For all of us, identity is in some sense ethnicity
in that we have diverse origins related to how we are perceived and treated by others. Ethnicity,
therefore, refers to a combination of cultural differences, in areas such as:
■ religion
■family structures
■ beliefs
■ values
■ norms.
Winston (2005) suggests that ethnic identities develop when people ‘see themselves as being distinctive
in some way from others’ because of a shared cultural background and history.
Song (2003) claims that this is expressed in terms of distinctive markers such as a common ancestry
and ‘memories of a shared past’. A sense of ethnic identity is based on ‘symbolic elements … such as
family and kinship, religion, language, territory, nationality or physical appearance’. Ethnic identity
does not necessarily relate to ‘any actual evidence of cultural distinctiveness as a group’. The key
factor is whether people are ‘conscious of belonging to the group’.
Ethnicity as a source of personal and social identity is built on a range of ideas that include referencing:
■country of birth and the sense of a common geographic location ■traditions and customs that
contribute to unique cultural practices that distinguish one ethnic group from another ■shared
histories and experiences as a defining sense of identity, as with victims of slavery in the case of Black
Caribbean and African identities or the Nazi holocaust in the case of Jewish identities ■religious beliefs,
celebrations and traditions that connect people on the basis of shared cultural practices, such as
common forms of worship.
Unlike racial identities, ethnic identities are negotiable. Their nature and meaning can change to
external and internal factors. External factors might include contact with other cultures; internal factors
might be a clash of ideas and experiences between different age, class or gender groups within a
particular ethnic group. For this reason, ethnic identities require constant maintenance through
collective activities, such as festivals, celebrations or religious gatherings, and a variety of material and
symbolic cultural artefacts, such as traditional forms of dress, food and crafts.
Wimmer (2008) argues that an important aspect of ethnic identities is how they are defined in
relation to other ethnic groups by constructing a sense of difference, which establishes boundaries for
a particular identity. Ethnic boundaries may be positive, conferring a sense of belonging to a definable
cultural group, or defensive – a way of fighting racism and discrimination, for example. Boundaries may
also be imposed through cultural stereotypes about ethnic groups and identities. This may in fact
reinforce a stereotyped group’s sense of identity. Another way in which ethnic identities can be
imposed relates to how minority identities can be defined by majority ethnicities in terms of their
‘Otherness’: how ‘ they’ are different from ‘Us’.
While this relationship strengthens both majority and minority ethnic identities, it can also result in
minority ethnicities being portrayed as a threat in two main ways:
■cultural, where minority beliefs and practices are framed as challenges to a particular way of life. -
Physical, where in countries like Britain and the USA, following the 11 September 2001 World Trade
Center attacks, the media framed and referenced this threat in terms of Muslims and terrorism.
While this oppositional dimension is significant – the idea that some ethnic groups partly or wholly
construct their sense of Self through opposition to the Other – a further dimension involves two
types of hybrid ethnic identities:
1 Conventional hybridisation suggests that the mixing of distinctive ethnic styles produces new and
unique identities. This mixing tends to take place on the margins of identity, involving the combination
of specific features of ethnic identities rather than a complete change. Examples include things
such as: ■food, Indian, Chinese and Italian cuisine, for example, have become a key part of British
culture, with subtle changes that give them a unique British identity twist
■clothing, where the American style of jeans and Tshirts has been incorporated into a variety of global
ethnic identities ■music, such as Bhangra, which displays crossover styles to produce unique musical
fusions and genres..
2: Contemporary hybridisation suggests that ethnic identities undergo constant maintenance, change
and development under the influence of two main processes:
■immigration, where different ethnic groups physically meet
■cultural globalisation, where, through agencies such as the internet, ethnic cultures and identities are
increasingly exposed to different cultural influences. Rather than creating new and different hybrid
identities, cultural changes result in gradual alterations to an established identity.
In this way, ethnic identities are constantly drawing on new influences and re-establishing old identities
in the face of new challenges. White English youth identities have, for example, incorporated aspects of
other cultures relating to:
music, such as rock, pop, rap and hiphop
■food, such as hamburgers, Asian cuisine and German beer ■language, especially slang terms
associated with youth cultures and subcultures
■clothing that includes jeans and Tshirts.
While these cultural imports have undoubtedly changed these identities, this involved incorporation and
modification to an existing sense of cultural identity and style, rather than the creation of a new and
unique identity as is seen to happen in the case of conventional hybridisation.
Gender identities
Connell et al (1987) argue that we are not born a ‘man’ or a ‘woman’; we become ‘men’ and ‘women’
through the social construction of gender identities. In other words, while biological sex refers to the
physical characteristics that cause people to be labelled male or female, gender refers to the social
characteristics given to each sex.
Lips (1993) argues that differences in male and female identities do not occur naturally from
biological differences. Gender identities differ historically and cross-culturally, which means that they
are both learnt and relative.
Connell (1995) suggests that there are two forms of dominant gender identities:
1 Hegemonic masculinity, where traditionalí forms of masculinity are based on a variety of physical and
mental characteristics. For example, men are encouraged to adopt a particular body shape that,
ideally, emphasises physical strength and physique. Mental characteristics include ideas about about
men as leaders ,providers, being unemotional, rational, calm, cool, calculating, etc. Connell and
Messerschmidt (2005) argue that even in societies where different masculinities exist, one is always
dominant.
2 Emphasised femininity relates to the idea that female identities were traditionally defined by how
they could accommodate the interests and needs of men. The dominant identity was one that
matched and complemented hegemonic masculinity. Women were regarded as essentially passive,
emotional beings whose identity was expressed in the service of others. Kitchen (2006)
characterises this as a complicit femininity because it is defined by male needs and desires.
Male identities
If one form of masculinity is always dominant, it follows that alternative masculinities exist. Schauer
(2004) suggests these take different forms: ■Subordinate masculinities are generally seen as lesser
forms of masculinity, particularly for men who are unable or unwilling to perform hegemonic
masculinity, such as those with physical disabilities. ■Subversive masculinities involve an alternative
masculinity that challenges and undermines hegemonic masculinity. An example here might be the
serious student who works hard at school rather than being part of a gang that is disruptive in class.
■Complicit masculinities refer to newly feminised masculinities such as the new man; men who
combine paid work with their share of unpaid housework. This type of masculinity sees women ask
equals and occurs, Connell (1995) argues, because as women have become more powerful, male
identities have begun to changeí.
■Marginalised masculinities refer to men who feel they have been pushed to the margins of family
life due to long-term unemployment, for example; they no longer feel able to perform what they see as
the traditional masculine roles of breadwinner and family provider.
Willott and Griffin (1996) noted this type of masculinity developing among the long term unemployed
working class as traditional beliefs about the good family man providing for wife and kids collided with
an inability to provide for their partner and children.
Crisis.
Benyon (2002) argues that contemporary global societies are experiencing a crisis of masculine identity
caused by a combination of:
■long term unemployment .
■the loss of traditional male employment in manufacturing industries.
■lower educational achievement relative to girls.
■the rise of female friendly service industries.
Male identities once focused on traditional ideas such as providing for a family, but this is no longer the
case.
Marginalised masculinities cannot demonstrate traditional male qualities because they no longer
control the economic resources on which such masculinity was based. This male identity crisis has
resulted in the rise of two particular forms of exaggerated masculinity that try to reassert traditional
forms of male identity:
1 Retributive masculinities aim to reclaim traditional masculinity from their emasculated peers.
Typical behaviours include binge drinking, fighting and womanising. These behaviours are based on an
idealised version of a traditional masculinity
When men were men and women were glad of it. This identity is:
■rigidly patriarchal ■aggressive, both physically and verbally ■oppositional, in the sense of rejecting
complicit masculinities ■reclamational as it seeks to reclaim masculinity as an identity.
2: Hyper masculinity is a form that WolfLight (1994) characterises as authoritarian and autocratic,
impersonal, contemptuous and violent the very image of patriarchy . Robinson (2006) argues that this
identity particularly appeals to white, middleclass and middle aged men primarily because of its
ability to provide a degree of certainty about what it means to be a man , a belief in an essential and
unchanging deep masculinity.
Female identities
There three main forms of feminine identity in contemporary societies:
1 : Contingent femininities are framed and shaped by male beliefs, behaviours and demands:
(a): Normalised identities, for example, involve women learning to play a secondary role to men as
mothers, girlfriends, partners and the like. Chambers et al. (2003) argue that such identities continually
struggle with the problem of producing a femininity that will secure male approval.
(b): Sexualised identities are fashioned through male eyes and fantasies. In these types of identity,
women are sexual objects that exist for male gratification.
2: Assertive identities reflect the changing position of women in many societies. They involve women
breaking free from traditional ideas about femininity, but not completely setting themselves apart
from their male counterparts. Froyum (2005) suggests that assertive femininities are adopted to resist
male power without actually threatening to overthrow such powerí . Different types of assertive identity
include:
■Girl power identities. Hollows (2000) suggests that these emphasise sex as fun and the importance of
female friendship. These identities represent a way of coping with masculinity, but older women are
excluded from this identity. ■Modernised femininities that relate to a slightly older age group. These
locate newfound female economic and cultural power within the context of family relationships. The
assertive aspect here is a desire for personal freedom and expression what McRobbie (1996) terms
individualism, liberty and the entitlement to sexual self expression within the context of traditional
gender relationships.
■Ageing femininities, which assert the right of elderly women to be fashionable, active and sexual
beings.
3: Autonomous femininities, which involve competition with men, on female terms. Evans (2006), for
example points to a female individualism as part of a new gender regime that frees women from
traditional constraints , such as pregnancy and childcare.
Autonomous women are likely to be: ■highly educated
■ successful ■professional middle class
■ career focused.
They also tend to form non-committal heterosexual attachments. These may involve marriage but are
unlikely to involve children.
Age identities
Like gender, age is an interesting category because it illustrates the sociological relationship
between an objective characteristic (biological ageing) and the meanings different cultures attach
to this process. Different age groups, for example, reflect different cultural assumptions about
how it is appropriate for people of a particular age to behave and these assumptions reflect back
onto individual identities in two main ways:
Firstly, through a process of identification with people of a similar biological age (involving group
identities such as “child, youth, adult and elderly”). This creates a sense of belonging (social
solidarity) to a specific grouping with its own particular values, norms and forms of behaviour.
Secondly, through pressure to conform to an ascribed age grouping. Children, for example, are
denied some of the opportunities open to adults in our culture while the elderly are similarly
denied opportunities to behave in “age inappropriate” ways (involving sporting activities, sexuality
and so forth). We can use the concept of:
Life-course – the idea we can identify four different phases in our biological development
associated with different cultural meanings and identities – to illustrate age-related identities.
Childhood
For Woodson (2000), childhood “… is the manner in which we understand and articulate the
physical reality of biological immaturity” and, as such, is arguably the first social identity
consciously experienced by “immature humans”; it is during this period we are first exposed to
primary socialising influences from adults (mainly parents) and, increasingly, secondary sources
such as the media. In our society “childhood” is associated with a variety of meanings
(something that supports Jenks’ (1996) argument that “childhood is not a natural but a social
construct”), from the idea of “innocence” to children being in need of adult care, supervision and
protection. Childhood also involves socially constructed ideas about permissions (children are
“allowed” to exhibit behaviours – such as play - discouraged in adults) and denials (children are
not allowed to do a range of things– such as marry – open to adults).
Youths
Like childhood, youth reflects a range of identities such as pre-teens (“teenies”), teens and young
adults that have come into recent existence to reflect social changes in areas like education,
work, and consumption patterns. Hine (2000), for example, argues “teenagers” didn’t make much
of an appearance in Britain until the mid-to-late 1950’s” and their development reflects things
like the extension of education into the teenage years and the development of consumer goods
(music and fashion in particular) aimed at a specific post-child, pre-adult market. Baron et al
(1999) note that (Functionalist) writers such as Parsons (1964) and Eisenstadt (1956) have argued
youth cultures and subcultures (spectacular versions of which include Skinheads, Punks and Goths)
function to provide a “period of transition” between childhood (the narrow family) and adulthood
(the wider workplace). In other words, societies create concepts of “youth” as a way of allowing
young people to move gradually away from childhood identities and into adult identities.
Adulthood
Adult identities are generally constructed around a range of rights and responsibilities that mark
them apart from child and youth identities. Adults are allowed to do certain things (marry, work
full-time, drink and smoke etc.) while also taking on roles (family and work, for example) that
involve care and responsibility for others.
For Magolda (1999), adulthood represents a general identity defined in terms of how individuals
start to construct fully-formed personal identities separate from the controlling identities of their
youth and childhood. Adulthood, in other words, represents a shift in individual identity focus
away from the various forces that shape children and young adults and “what to make of
themselves within the context around them.
Old age
In contemporary societies Longer life expectancy has resulted in changing consumption and leisure
patterns among the elderly. “old age” can be considered as being both separated from general
notions of adulthood (although the old do, of course, retain certain adult identities) and an identity
in its own right– one that is becoming increasingly significant in the UK, for example, with the
twin trends of an ageing society one in which the number of elderly far outnumber the young –
and longer life expectancy, itself a product of improved medical treatment, care and a greater
understanding of the importance of diet, exercise and so forth (an “Affluence Dividend” - as
societies become generally richer life expectancy increases).
Mutran and Burke (1979), for example, note that “old persons have identities which, while
different from middle-aged persons,are similar to young adults: they see themselves as less
usefuland less powerful than middle-age individuals”.
In addition, elderly identities can be:
- Stigmatised in terms of seeing old age as an inevitable process of decline, senility,
helplessness, withdrawal from society and loneliness. The elderly, in other words, are
reconceptualised as a deviant minority group.
Gianoulis (2005) argues that the medicalisation of old age contributes to this process: “Medicine
defines and manages individuals deemed undesirable by the broader culture…and instead of
viewing the disorientations of older people as being the result of personal and social change,
they are viewed as symptoms of ‘senility’”.
Conversely, we could note the contemporary:
Reinvention of elderly identities based around longer life expectancy and more affluent lifestyles.
This involves the fragmentation of elderly identities (distinguishing between the old and the very
old, for example), changing patterns of consumption and leisure (especially among the middle
classes) and different interpretations of the meaning of “being old”, whereby the elderly refuse to
conform to conventional stereotypes and social identities.
Barrett et al (2003), for example, argue different societies produce different subjective experiences
of aging. Americans and Germans, for example, “tend to feel younger than their actual age…but
the bias toward youthful identities is stronger at older ages, particularly among Americans”.
Age identities:
Explanations
The social construction of age can be evidenced by the fact that there is no clear historical or
cross-cultural agreement about the age at which the individual loses one identity and takes on
another (when, for example, does adulthood begin?).
The fuzziness of boundary marking notwithstanding, Settersten (2006) suggests age identities are
significant in contemporary societies for three reasons:
1. Salience: Age identities have a formal, organisational, importance (salience) for societies as a
way of structuring “rights, responsibilities, and entitlements” (between, for example, adults
and children). Informally, individual age identities “shape everyday social interactions” (such as
those between a parent and child) and provide a basic structure to these social exchanges.
2. Anchorage: The passage of biological time is a way of fixing the passage of social time in
that we give certain age-related events (an 18th or 21st birthday, retirement from work and
so forth) a social significance as:
3. Markers – something that denotes the transition from one phase in the life course to
another (such as from child to adult), a process sometimes termed a rite of passage. These
rites take different forms in different cultures – for Aborigines this transition is marked by
“Walkabout” – at 13 the child spends six months in the Australian Bush and on their return
they are accepted into adulthood. For Jews, on the other hand, the transition from childhood
to adulthood can be marked by the Bar mitvah ceremony for boys (at age 13) and the Bat
mitzvah ceremony for girls (at age 12).
There are a range of rites we could note in the contemporary UK – from things like christenings
through marriage ceremonies to funerals (with birthdays also being part and parcel of the ritual
of age).
Significantly, Settersten suggests biological age itself is relatively unimportant here: “What matters
is what the age indexes - the important experiences that happen at those times”.
We can note two further aspects of age identities related to the above:
Mapping: Age identities come bundled with normative expectations (the types of behaviour
expected from different age groups) that we use as a “life map”.
Polkinghorne (1991), for example, suggests ”Individuals construct private and personal stories
linking diverse events of their lives into unified and understandable wholes…They are the basis of
personal identity and they provide answers to the question ‘Who am I?”. In other words we
come to understand something about our self by linking a range of age-related experiences to
create “the story of our life”.
Riach (2007) suggests that by understanding how age identities are organised people can, if they
choose, use this knowledge to both upset normative expectations (of age-appropriate behaviour,
for example) and “pre-empt possible forms of marginalization”. She suggests, for example, that in
situations where ageism is (literally) at work people may take conscious steps to avoid
“embodying the older worker”.
