Schreiber Diss - PDF Jsessionid
Schreiber Diss - PDF Jsessionid
A Dissertation
by
Second Examiner
Associate Professor
Stellenbosch University
1
Contents
Contents 2
Acknowledgements 7
List of Figures 10
List of Tables 12
Abbreviations 14
1 Introduction 19
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2
2.3.1 Labour Protection and Social Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3 Literature Review 42
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4 Research Design 60
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3
5.4 Comparing Social Assistance Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.2.2 The Legal Codification of Social Assistance Norms in South Africa . . . . . . 124
4
7.2.2 The Legal Codification of Social Assistance Norms in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . 174
5
9 Concluding Remarks 237
Bibliography 245
Abstract 293
Zusammenfassung 295
Biography 300
6
Acknowledgements
The completion of this project was only made possible through the generous support of a whole host
of individuals and institutions. Although I am sincerely thankful for having come to know so many
wonderful people all over the world during this journey of academic and personal development, I wish
to take this opportunity to thank a number of them in particular. My initial word of appreciation
goes to Professor Susanne Lütz at the Freie Universität Berlin for her unwavering commitment
in guiding my academic development throughout the last four years. I owe her a great debt of
gratitude not only for her role in aiding the completion of this dissertation, but also for the way in
which she continually supported me in all the endeavours I chose to pursue throughout our time
working together. It was a pleasure to be advised by such an incisive and committed academic.
A word of thanks also goes to Sibylle Schaefer for the tremendous administrative support which
facilitated our interactions, as well as to Professor Janis van der Westhuizen from Stellenbosch
University for his constant encouragement. I was further lucky enough to spend the final year of
the journey at Princeton University, working under the guidance of Professor Jennifer Widner. I
wish to thank her for making it possible for me to attend this exceptional institution, where I
was able to participate in coursework in addition to completing the writing process. The feedback
provided on the manuscript by her as well as by Professor Atul Kohli was invaluable. It was a true
None of this would however have been possible without the generous financial support provided
by a host of funding institutions. Perhaps the most decisive among these was the scholarship from
7
the European Commission, which initially enabled me to travel abroad and enrol at Berlin. The
journey would have been stillborn without this early faith they demonstrated in my abilities. Thank
you in this regard to Stefanie Böhler, Beatrice Lange and the rest of the coordinating team. Further
institutional support was subsequently provided by Princeton University, the Berlin Consortium for
Germanic Studies, as well as by the German Academic Exchange Service. I wish to also extend my
heartfelt thanks to these funders, and it is my hope that the project will go on to produce impacts
One of the greatest blessings of the journey came in the form of sharing the company of fellow
travellers. This includes longtime friends such as Aldu Cornelissen, Jeanie le Roux, Nelius Stephan,
Lappies Labuschagne and Egbert Loubser, who never wavered despite the years of distance between
us. I was further welcomed into a circle of truly exceptional people during my time in Berlin. To
Miguelangel Verde, Philani Mthembu, Anne Venhaus, Amrit Naresh, Benjamin Anderson, Daniel
Cardoso, Frank Odei-Addo, Julia Soeffner, Marc Venhaus, Raimonda Verde and Saud Al-Zaid:
At Princeton I wish to thank Emre Türköz, Alisya Anlaş, Aric Rousso, Bruce Perry, Dave
Sroczynski, Wes Reinhart, Korhan Koçak, Rachael McLellan, Alia Chaudri, Njeri Kimani as well as
the entire Kimani family. I also extend my thanks to Larissa Brezolin and Pedro Lara de Arruda for
their kind help during my time in Brazil. A special word of thanks furthermore goes to the Billerts.
You truly have become like a second family to me, and I will never be able to thank you for all that
you have done for me. From making my time at Princeton possible to always providing me with a
home in Germany, you have supported me throughout. Bernd, Heike, Vincent and Rouven: thank
Upholding all of this was the unwavering love of my family. Thank you to my parents, Jannie and
Suma, for providing me with the greatest role models a son could hope for. If any good ever comes
from my work, please know that your undying commitment to our family and your passionate belief
8
in the power of education is the reason. I am also proud to be a brother to such exceptional young
men as Harold and Hanno, and have no doubt that they will both go on to achieve great things. My
final word of thanks is reserved for my beautiful Julia, whose strength, love and dedication inspires
9
List of Figures
Figure 6.8 Number of SMGs per 1 000 children aged 0-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
10
Figure 7.1 Actor-Centred Institutionalism – Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Figure 7.5 Number of Parties Represented in the Chamber of Deputies (1994-2014) . . . 186
11
List of Tables
Table 6.1 Evolution of the pre-1994 South African Social Assistance System . . . . . . . 122
Table 7.1 Evolution of the pre-1990 Brazilian Social Assistance System . . . . . . . . . . 172
12
Table 7.2 Brazilian Social Assistance in 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Table 7.8 The Evolution of the Bolsa Famı́lia from 2003 to 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
13
Abbreviations
AG Auxı́lio Gás
CA Cartão Alimentação
14
CSG Child Support Grant
CT Cash Transfer
DA Democratic Alliance
DG Disability Grant
DP Dependent Variables
FZ Fome Zero
GIA Grant-in-Aid
15
HDI Human Development Index
ID Identity Document
IV Independent Variables
MP Member of Parliament
16
NA National Assembly
NP National Party
17
RPC Regime de Previdência Complementar
18
Chapter 1
Introduction
The world has witnessed a revolution in the extension of social protection during recent decades.
The fundamental motivation for undertaking this research project is the fact that the provision of
non-contributory social assistance Cash Transfers (CTs) to impoverished people living in developing
countries has expanded from an almost non-existent base during the mid-1990s to around 1 billion
people today (Barrientos 2013: 4). The staggering growth of these programmes, where beneficiaries
receive monthly cash payments as a result of their poverty or vulnerability, has given rise to a
tremendous amount of popular and academic interest, with most of the attention having been
focused on assessing their impact on a wide range of social and economic outcomes.1
In the rush to proclaim the significance of these interventions, analysts have been quick to paint
sponse to shared problems of persistently high levels of poverty and inequality. While this approach
may have succeeded in drawing attention to the phenomenon, it has come at the significant price
of sacrificing nuance and masking the tremendous variation that exists in how these programmes
1
See section 3.3 for an overview of the literature on this subject.
19
are actually implemented in different countries. The overview of the academic literature on the
subject carried out in chapter three of this study additionally reveals that no systematic inquiries
have directly addressed the political economy of the domestic development of social assistance poli-
cies.2 In short, we know very little about how these programmes came to be established in the first
place, and why different countries have often taken different approaches to redistribution as entailed
In seeking to address these issues, this study undertakes a comparative examination of the de-
velopment of such policies in two of the benchmark cases: South Africa and Brazil. Social assistance
programmes have come to occupy centrally important positions in the welfare and distributional
regimes of both countries since their respective transitions to democracy during the late-1980s and
early-1990s. In the case of South Africa, the provision of CTs to impoverished beneficiaries has
grown from a negligible level two decades ago to almost 16 million monthly beneficiaries at present
(29 percent of the total population). The same is true for Brazil, where about 54 million people
(27 percent of the country’s population) are supported through such programmes every month.
The transformation entailed by these developments is so monumental that the introduction of these
programmes are regarded as the ‘single most dramatic change’ to have affected these societies in
The central research question posed by this study is explanatory in nature: what accounts for the
differences between the South African and Brazilian social assistance systems? Answering this ques-
tion however initially entails a descriptive procedure where the differences that are to be explained
2
This is in contrast to the political economy of social assistance programmes that are externally designed and
funded. Following the success of locally designed interventions in middle-income countries such as South Africa
and Brazil, international development organisations have played an active role in implementing similar schemes in
low-income regions.
20
are discussed in detail. Chapter five of this study concerns itself with this descriptive objective. In
addition to meticulously chronicling the different features of social assistance provision in the two
cases, the analysis shows that they exhibit significant variation in terms of which population groups
are incorporated (coverage), whether beneficiaries need to comply with any conditions in order to
receive benefit payments (conditionality), and the way in which they define and assess beneficiaries
(orientation).
The study’s dependent variables result from this descriptive exercise, with the technical differ-
ences being abstracted and incorporated into two distinct typologies. The result is that the South
African social assistance system is classified as productive, while the Brazilian regime is regarded as
being premised on a protective approach.3 The subsequent explanatory endeavour assesses the va-
lidity of the study’s central hypothesis that variation in institutional structure is best able to explain
this difference between the cases. The hypothesis incorporates two causal variables by positing that
the deep historical entrenchment of social assistance norms, combined with a highly concentrated
state structure, led to the development of a productive regime in South Africa. Conversely, the
comparatively weak historical entrenchment of norms, in combination with a highly diffuse state
This endeavour is concerned with examining the development of social assistance policies fol-
lowing democratisation. Even though the analysis is therefore exclusively focused on accounting
for the subsequent emergence of empirical variation in terms of policy outputs, it is important to
acknowledge that it does assume that the introduction of democracy itself played a significant role
in providing an initial impetus for reform in both cases. As shown in the case study chapters,
the pressures for greater inclusivity4 entailed through democratisation initiated the processes under
investigation. But while democratisation can thus perhaps be regarded as a necessary element, it
3
Chapter five elaborates on these typologies.
4
These pressures were perhaps most obvious in the South African case, where they were principally expressed in
21
alone is simultaneously wholly insufficient in explaining why South Africa and Brazil ended up with
such different policy regimes. The near-synchronous adoption of democracy in fact only serves to
add to the puzzle, as it fails to explain why the two countries adopted greatly divergent approaches
even as they underwent broadly similar regime transitions. While democracy may have initiated
the reform processes in both countries, it did not shape it. Instead, the processes and the outcomes
they produced were ultimately moulded by much deeper variation on the institutional dimension,
The study further aims to balance the inherent endogeneity of this institutionalist approach
by assessing the accuracy of a set of popular alternative hypotheses premised on exogenous fac-
tors. Such explanations, usually based on functional and ideational claims, are widespread in the
academic literature. The investigation ultimately determines that, while exogenous functional and
ideational elements were certainly present during the policy development process, they alone are
unable to convincingly account for the cross-case variation. Instead, these elements were them-
selves moulded and channelled by the respective institutional structures, a conclusion which assigns
The cases of South Africa and Brazil were selected based on the principles of the Most Similar
Systems Design (MSSD) (Thomas 2011: 513). In the broadest sense, South Africa and Brazil are
two of the most sophisticated and high profile cases of developing countries implementing extensive
social assistance programmes. They certainly constitute the most similar instances out of the small
sample of potential cases,5 as measured at the beginning of the period under investigation. As
5
Aided by the abovementioned enthusiasm of international development organisations, a distinct feature of the
proliferation of social assistance schemes around the world has been the speed at which these programmes have
spread. An authoritative study that focused on social assistance schemes incorporating conditionality found that in
1997 there were only three such programmes in the world (in Brazil, Mexico and Bangladesh), along with South
22
indicated in table 1.1, the similarities however extend well beyond the contemporary prominence of
these policies. Levels of economic development were very similar by the mid-1990s, as both countries
were classified as upper middle-income with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of around
US$3 000. The Gini coefficient of inequality was still identical across the cases in 2000, with large
sections of their populations living in poverty while a small group of elites controlled most of the
countries’ wealth.
Table 1.1: Comparing South Africa and Brazil (Source: Adapted from Lieberman 2009: 111)
Both countries also experienced prolonged periods of authoritarian rule before transitioning to
democracy as part of the so-called ‘Third Wave’ during the early 1990s.6 This followed their coloni-
sation and settlement by European powers, a shared heritage which left both nations grappling with
the legacies of immigration and slavery. Their societies are also comprised of a wide mix of ethnic
and racial groups, with racial characteristics continuing to be correlated with wealth and income.
Both countries additionally had relatively well developed (if uneven) state apparatuses and largely
constructed their current social assistance systems under the governance of political parties with
broadly similar ideological persuasions. In recognition of the salience of these shared features, South
Africa and Brazil have since banded together on various public platforms by explicitly emphasizing
Africa’s unconditional system (Fiszbein et al. 2009: 4). By 2008, this figure had grown to at least 29. In addition to
thus currently being the largest, most sophisticated and most similar cases, this situation further justifies the focus
on South Africa and Brazil, given the fact that social assistance programmes have been operational in these two cases
23
the commonality of their characteristics and challenges. In short, ‘the vast array of social, politi-
cal, and economic similarities between the two countries described above provides something of a
“natural experiment” which is rare in cross-national social science research’ (Lieberman 2003: 8).7
The theme of this research fundamentally deals with questions of redistribution. Perhaps more than
any other single policy arena, the particularities of social welfare provision plays a tremendously
important role in shaping the overall distributional regime8 of any given country. The study’s de-
pendent variables thus address the scope and mode of redistribution through social assistance in
South Africa and Brazil. Through the classification of their divergent features into distinct typolo-
gies (protective versus productive), the analysis makes a decisive contribution to the scholarship on
emerging welfare states by undertaking the first qualitative examination of the political economic
But the relevance of the findings stretches well beyond these two (important) cases. The study
provides a striking account of the role played by institutional features in shaping social assistance
policy outputs in developing countries. It shows how the deep historical entrenchment of particular
norms can have profound path dependence effects even amidst the supposedly great transformation
entailed by democratic transitions. It further highlights the role of state structure in shaping political
incentives and subsequent policy development processes. At the broadest level, the outcome is a
powerful analysis of the role played by institutions in driving social welfare policy outputs and
Assessed purely from a scholarly perspective, these findings contribute to at least three distinct
7
Further justification for the comparability of South Africa and Brazil comes from the examinations undertaken
by authors such as Seidman (1994); Friedman and De Villiers (1996); Marx (1998) as well as Lieberman (2003; 2009).
8
These programmes are one of the most ‘direct and visible way in which states affect [distribution]’ (Seekings &
Nattrass 2005: 4) For more on the components of a distributional regime, see Seekings and Nattrass (2005).
24
streams of academic literature,9 including the recent rise of emerging welfare states, the concomitant
historical institutional theoretical framework to an exciting new empirical area. Regarded from
a somewhat more practical angle, the significance of the study is to emphasise the importance of
taking local institutional contexts into account when designing social assistance policy interventions.
This is of particular contemporary significance given the active role of international development
organisations in driving the proliferation of these programmes throughout the developing world.
The evidence suggests that these policies are likely to be both scalable and sustainable only in cases
where they are closely aligned with local institutional structures. In addition to its clear academic
relevance, this comparative study thus serves to affirm the decisive significance of ‘institutional fit’
This brief introductory chapter has served to illuminate the overall context wherein the project
is located, as well as to highlight its central themes. It achieved this by initially outlining the
background and rationale for undertaking the study through discussing the prolific recent rise of
social assistance programmes. This was followed by a specification of the central research question
and hypotheses, as well as a justification for the comparative focus on the cases of South Africa
and Brazil. The final section specified the substantial academic and practical significance of the
findings.
The following chapter introduces the project’s conceptual and analytical framework. Its primary
purpose is to provide consistent definitions in terms of the study’s central concepts. As such, the
initial part of the chapter situates social assistance policies within the broader framework of social
protection. It shows that the concept operates distinctly from other elements such as social insurance
9
See chapter three for a literature contextualisation.
25
and labour protection, thereby constituting an autonomous analytical subcategory. It then turns
its attention towards clearly articulating the way in which the concept of institutions is regarded in
The third chapter serves to further extend the contextualisation of the research by conducting
a detailed review of the existing literature. Its central aim is to illustrate the study’s contribution
to three primary streams of inquiry. The first of these flows from the outcome of the secondary
descriptive objective through the construction of qualitative typologies for classifying emerging wel-
fare states writ large. This is followed by a specification of the study’s contribution to the more
narrowly-defined scholarship on social assistance, an area which has been dominated by impact
assessments at the relative expense of explanatory inquiries. The chapter then discusses the signif-
icance of the project’s extension of a historical institutional framework to a fertile new empirical
area. The final section reviews the alternative functional and ideational claims which have emerged
Chapter four turns its attention to the question of research design. In addition to specifying the
research question and relevant variables, it meticulously discusses the methodology that was followed
in executing the project, with a particular focus on explaining the decision to conduct an inductive,
qualitative comparative case study. It additionally addresses issues such as information sources and
the data collection procedure that was followed, as well as clearly defining the delimitations of the
research focus. It concludes by examining the limitations and ethical implications of the research
process.
Chapter five commences the empirical analysis in earnest by conducting a highly detailed review
of the social assistance policies that are implemented in the two cases. The aim of the discussion is
to fulfil the study’s descriptive objective by clearly articulating the qualitative differences that exist
between the South African and Brazilian social assistance systems. It achieves this by carefully
reviewing all aspects of programme operation in both countries. This technical overview identifies
26
profound variation in terms of coverage, conditionality and orientation. Drawing from the latest
literature, these differences are then consolidated and abstracted in two distinct typologies which
The sixth chapter conducts the case study analysis for the South African case. It starts by
showing the significant extent to which particular norms regarding social assistance provision had
been entrenched as part of the construction of a segregationist and apartheid political economy, and
how these norms were subsequently transferred and incorporated into the institutional structure of
the post-apartheid state. This is followed by an account of the country’s highly concentrated state
structure, characterised by the centralisation of social assistance policymaking capacity and the
overwhelming power position of a single political party. The final section discusses the development
of the contemporary South African system by showing how the deep historical institutionalisation
of norms and a highly concentrated state structure ultimately shaped the emergence of a productive
Chapter seven conducts an identical analysis of the Brazilian case. Its initial review of the his-
torical record indicates that social assistance programmes were almost entirely absent in the period
leading up to full democratisation in the early 1990s. This lack of embedded norms prohibited the
manifestation of path dependent effects and provided actors with a greater deal of policymaking
space. The subsequent discussion further shows that the country features a diffuse state structure
in terms of social assistance policy design capacity, as well as a highly competitive political sys-
tem. Taken together, the final section shows how these specific institutional features directed the
Chapter eight consolidates the insights produced through the respective case studies by explic-
itly returning to the central research question and hypotheses. It initially conducts a systematic
assessment of the explanatory validity of the rival exogenous functional and ideational hypotheses,
determining that they are unable to satisfactorily account for the cross case variation. This is fol-
27
lowed by a similar procedure in terms of the central institutional hypotheses, which conclusively
demonstrates that the differences between the South African and Brazilian social assistance systems
fundamentally result from variation on the institutional dimension. The final chapter concludes by
summarising the findings and briefly addressing their generalizability, illuminating avenues opened
up by the study for potential future inquiries, as well as emphasising its significant contribution
to both the scholarly and practical knowledge on the role of institutions in redistribution through
28
Chapter 2
2.1 Introduction
The preceding introduction has already alluded to concepts that are vitally important to the theme
of the research. This chapter undertakes a precise conceptualisation of these terms in order to
clearly articulate the focus of the inquiry. The initial section provides conceptual clarity on the
notion of emerging welfare states in the developing world. This is followed by a specification of
social assistance programmes through clearly differentiating this category from other constitutive
elements in the broader framework of social protection, emphasising the way in which social assis-
tance interventions have come to form the core of the welfare state in the developing world. The final
section provides an explication of the way in which institutions are conceptualised in constructing
the Actor-Centred Institutionalist (ACI) analytical framework for this study. The chapter thereby
equips the reader with a thoroughgoing understanding of what is implied when using the concept
of ‘institutional variation’ to explain differences in ‘social assistance provision’ across the ‘emerging
29
2.2 Emerging Welfare States
The literature on the emergence of nascent welfare states in the global South dates back no more
than a dozen years.10 In contrast, the notion of ‘welfare state’ itself can be traced back to 1834
Britain with the introduction of the New Poor Law Act and the Chadwick Report of 1842, while
Bismarck’s Prussian state created the world’s first health insurance programme and old-age pensions
in 1889 (Gough 2004: 19). The term Wohlfahrtsstaat first came into usage in Germany in the 1920s
before being incorporated into the English speaking world during the 1940s. Following the end of
World War II, welfare policies became ‘a massive feature of all Northern states’ (Gough 2004: 19).
At the most general level, a welfare state regime11 is an institutional matrix of market, state and
family forms that generate welfare outcomes (Gough 2004: 23). Figure 2.1 introduces the basic
WELFARE STATE
Social Protection
Social policy as an academic field consequently blossomed during this period, as scholars aimed
to construct typologies reflecting and accounting for the variation in the welfare state regimes of the
global North. But the recent spread of welfare policies throughout the developing world has posed
a fresh dilemma, leading to criticism that existing approaches were not applicable to the unique
policy challenges faced by the rest of the world (Midgley 2004). Although on average scholars have
paid very little attention to the question of welfare states in the developing world, some attempts
10
See section 3.2 for a comprehensive review of the literature on this subject.
11
The ‘regime’ aspect of the concept refers to a set of institutions, rules and structured interests that constrain
individuals through compliance procedures (Krasner 1983: 1-3; North 1990: 200-202; Gough 2004: 22).
30
have been made to conceptually recast the welfare regime approach as an analytical tool that is
a way out of a classic dilemma in understanding social policy and social development across the
over-specificity. A regime approach can recognise, on the one hand, the commonalities across the
countries and regions of the South, while on the other hand identifying systematic qualitatively
This study consequently uses the concept of ‘emerging welfare states’ to clearly delineate the field of
inquiry as being concerned with the welfare regimes contemporarily implemented in the developing
world.
The overarching arena of social protection refers to a range of potential policy interventions available
to governments aiming to manage, prevent and ultimately overcome situations that adversely affect
people’s wellbeing (UNRISD 2010: 135). The nominal goal of any country’s social protection system
is to enable and support citizens in maintaining an adequate standard of living when confronted
by events such as unemployment, illness, disability, old age, maternity and economic or natural
disasters (UNRISD 2010: 135). In conceptual terms, social protection systems aim to address
vulnerability, risk and chronic poverty by employing a set of public actions either directed privately
or by the state. These systems are generally divided into three constitutive categories: social
31
WELFARE STATE
Social Protection
Figure 2.2: Social Protection Conceptualised (Source: Adapted from UKDFID 2005)
The figure also highlights the fact that these elements affect different societal groupings, with
access to social insurance and formal labour protection generally being limited to those working in
the formal economy,12 while the only form of social protection that is usually available to people
outside the formal economy (either due to unemployment or by virtue of working in the informal
‘sectors’ in order to ‘get away from the idea that informality is confined to a specific sector of economic activity but
rather cuts across many sectors. “Informal economy” also emphasises the existence of a continuum from the informal
to the formal ends of the economy and thus the interdependence between the two sides’ (Becker 2004: 8). The concept
of ‘informal economy’ is employed in contradistinction to the ‘formal economy’ here to refer to ‘all economic activities
by workers and economic units that are — in law and in practice — not covered or insufficiently covered by formal
32
Labour protection entails the enforcement of minimum standards to protect people within the
workplace, although this is largely applicable to the formal economy and presents significant enforce-
ment challenges in the case of the informal economy (ILO 2000). Meanwhile, both social insurance
and social assistance programmes are associated with some form of financial transfer to act as in-
come support (UNRISD 2010: 135). Contributory pensions, health insurance and unemployment
insurance are all classified as social insurance schemes, whereby individuals pool resources through
the regular payment of contributions to the state or a private provider in order to protect themselves
Social insurance can be considered more appropriate for the better-off sections of the popula-
tion, as its contributory nature presupposes the availability of a regular income, while its aims are
principally to prevent individuals from falling into poverty in the first place (Dekker 2008). Be-
cause of this limitation, social assistance programmes become vital in cases of already existing and
widespread poverty where many people may not be formally employed. Social assistance is defined
as non-contributory transfers to those deemed eligible by society on the basis of their vulnerability,
poverty or rights as citizens (UKDFID 2005: 6; UNRISD 2010: 135).13 The fundamental factor
therefore differentiating social insurance from social assistance in that of eligibility. The contribu-
tory nature of social insurance means that eligibility is determined by the ability to contribute in
the first place, whereas eligibility for social assistance is based upon needs or rights and previous
In the case of developed countries featuring large formal economies, the need for labour protection
and social insurance schemes are traditionally much greater than the marginal role often assigned
13
The term ‘social assistance’ in and of itself is a fairly vague expression, and it is worth emphasising that it is used
here exclusively to refer to non-contributory government programmes that transfer money to eligible beneficiaries on
the basis of need. It does not, for example, include the delivery of social services and other associated measures.
33
to social assistance (Dethier 2007). This is due to the prevalence of comparatively high employment
levels and low levels of poverty, deprivation and inequality. In financial terms, developed country
In addition to benefiting from labour protection measures, this means that they are tied to the
formal economy and can afford to contribute to social insurance schemes (both private and public).
In the event of unemployment or any other contingency, they become eligible to receive financial
support from the social insurance programmes they had previously contributed towards. At least
in basic theoretical terms, labour protection and social insurance is therefore largely considered
to be appropriate in these settings (Dekker 2008). The role of social assistance programmes is
much more limited here due to the simple fact that there is significantly less need for long term
formal employment.14
The outcome of this situation is that, under the rubric of social insurance, poverty and unem-
ployment are regarded as transient phenomena, meaning that developed country social protection
‘has traditionally been concerned with temporary or foreseeable income shortfalls and transitory
experiences of poverty in otherwise relatively stable life trajectories and acceptable living condi-
tions’ (UNRISD 2010: 135). Social insurance programmes generally include contributory medical,
The ability of social insurance to address the needs of society diminishes as access to employment
and regular income streams decline. Conversely, the more widespread poverty, unemployment and
non-formal employment are, the more significant social assistance becomes. This means that the
14
Although such programmes certainly do exist in developed countries, their scale is comparatively small in relation
34
ability of social assistance to adequately address economic and social deprivation vis-à-vis that
of social insurance is highly context-specific. The role of social assistance becomes much more
significant in the context of high unemployment, high levels of informal employment and poverty
associated with many developing countries (UKDFID 2005). In the countries of the developing
world, social assistance has become the core of the welfare state.
Compared to the entrenched position of social insurance dating back at least to the above-
mentioned Bismarckian reforms of the 1880s, the elevated status of social assistance as a defining
component of social protection has emerged only recently (Hanlon et al. 2010). Contemporary de-
veloping country social assistance systems mostly date back to the 1990s or 2000s, and consist of a
range of CT programmes targeted at specific population segments. The fact that they are thus very
recent policy innovations that have become central features of the distributional regimes present
in many developing countries, including in the cases under examination, makes this an exceedingly
universality or targeting and the division of responsibility between markets, states and households
(Hanlon et al. 2010). Notwithstanding the wide variations that exist concerning the ways in which
these programmes are implemented, they do comprise a fundamentally separate category within
In general terms, these are non-contributory programmes which transfer money from the state to
the poor directly for a specified period of time and are aimed at diverse population groups including
the elderly, children, unemployed adults and people with disabilities (Hanlon et al. 2010; Garcia
& Moore 2012: 18). The implementation of social assistance policies in developing countries has
been hailed as a ‘development revolution from the global South’ (Hanlon et al. 2010). Significantly,
these policies were initially neither imposed by developed donor nations nor inherited from colonial
administrations, but recently emerged as a policy response initiated by the countries of the South
35
themselves in an attempt to provide the poor with the boots required in order for them to ‘pull
Social assistance programmes have proliferated at a remarkable rate throughout the developing
world during the previous two decades, to the point where they currently reach more than a billion
people in low- and middle-income countries (Barrientos 2013: 4). The well documented examples
of CTs aimed at children and families illustrate just how rapid the growth in popularity of these
policies has been; in 1997 there were only four such programmes worldwide, but by 2008 this figure
had increased to at least 29 — and has continually grown further since then (Fiszbein et al. 2009:
31). This recent increase in the popularity of CTs, as illustrated in figure 2.3,15 has come to be
regarded as ‘one of the most significant developments in global social policy since the expansion of
Figure 2.3: Selected Social Assistance Programmes in the World, (a) 1997 and (b) 2008 (Source: Adapted from
Social assistance therefore represents a distinct component of states’ overall social protection
15
This illustrative figure highlighting the proliferation of social assistance programmes only includes information on
selected and currently active large-scale CTs directed at children and families. In some cases (as in the case of Brazil),
pre-existing programmes were recently merged or incorporated into ones with new names. This map of child-focused
programmes is obviously not nearly exhaustive, as social assistance also includes a range of other programmes aimed
36
frameworks, alongside labour protection and contributory social insurance. While non-contributory
programmes are found in many countries around the world, the relative significance of social assis-
tance is context specific, and it has recently proven immensely popular especially in middle-income
developing countries featuring high levels of poverty, inequality, unemployment or informal employ-
ment — to the extent that social assistance has become the central pillar of the emerging welfare
state.
The study furthermore applies a historical institutional framework in its analysis of the differen-
tiated development of social assistance policies in South Africa and Brazil. Given the fact that
neoinstitutionalism has spawned a variety of related approaches,16 this section endeavours to in-
troduce a concise specification of the way in which the framework is conceptualised in terms of
this particular project. Gough comments on the suitability of the approach for studying questions
related to welfare state regimes in the developing world by noting that the very adoption of a regime
approach automatically situates the research ‘within the historical institutional school of social re-
search’ (2013: 23). This allows for an analysis which ‘integrates structures and actors within a
development and different positions in the world system’ (Gough 2013: 23).
It is important to emphasise that historical institutionalism per se does not amount to a specific
real-world empirical puzzles through a historical orientation that pays attention to the ways in which
institutions structure outcomes (Steinmo 2008: 118). The analysis conducted in this study therefore
uses the ACI approach to achieve a more precise operationalisation of historical institutionalism
(Scharpf 1991; Mayntz & Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1997; Scharpf 2000; Boessen 2008; Pancaldi 2012).
16
Section 3.4 discusses the diversity of neoinstitutionalist approaches.
37
In a reflection of the fact that it is firmly rooted within the historical institutional school, this
analytical framework proceeds from the assumption that policy outputs are to be explained as ‘the
outcome of interactions among intentional actors, but that these interactions are structured, and
the outcomes shaped, by the characteristics of the institutional settings within which they occur’
The ACI focus on institutions enables researchers to utilise the same institutional information
with which actors themselves interact in order to reconstruct the policymaking process. The re-
sultant institutionalised expectations create conditions of common knowledge which reduces the
information costs associated with empirical research. In short, ‘once we know the institutional set-
ting of interaction, we know a good deal about the actors involved, about their options, and about
their perceptions and preferences’ (Scharpf 1997: 41). It assumes conditions of purposive actors17
operating according to bounded rationality, which implies that human action is not based on cog-
nition of real world data and causal laws, but on socially constructed beliefs about the real world
(Scharpf 1997: 21). The combination of purposive actors operating under conditions of bounded
rationality results in an analytic approach where actors strive to maximise their interests, but with
The framework thus emphasises the influence of institutions on defining the policy community,18
the modes of interaction, as well as the preferences and capabilities of actors. The institutional rules
of the game are firstly taken to define which actors constitute the relevant policy community.19 This
17
ACI conceptualises actors above the individual level into units of ‘composite actors’. The concept is consequently
employed in this study ‘in order to facilitate the task of explaining and predicting policy outcomes in actor-theoretic
support a certain view as to desirable policy outcomes. State actors are individuals or groups that hold senior office in
government bodies, while the concept of societal actor refers both to social actors, from civil society, and market actors
associated with the market economy. The communities are made up of individuals and groups who hold positions in
the state and societal spheres, and participate in policy networks, endeavouring to affect decision-making processes.
38
concept is utilised in order to demarcate the process whereby policy decision making takes place, and
includes both state and societal actors active in the social assistance sphere (Heclo 1978; Jordan
& Richardson 1979; Rhodes 1986; Côrtes 2013). It also regards institutions as influencing the
relevant modes of interaction open to different groups of actors, with at least four such avenues
being theoretically possible: unilateral action, negotiated agreement, majority vote and hierarchical
direction (Scharpf 1997: 47). As discussed in chapters six and seven, the particularities of the two
countries’ institutional structures meant that the characteristic mode of interaction in the South
African case was hierarchical direction, while the Brazilian case was characterised by interactions
The framework additionally supposes that institutions shape the capabilities and preferences
held by actors during their policy interactions. Indeed, despite the clear predominance assigned to
institutions, the ACI framework does not hold that they create outcomes in a deterministic sense
(Scharpf 1997: 42). It thereby encourages analyses which are additionally focused upon examin-
ing strategic interactions between actors potentially holding different preferences as the proximate
process translating institutionally-derived preferences into policy outputs. The result is a histor-
ical institutional framework that is sensitive to the (bounded) agency of actors by involving two
sequential analytical steps. The first involves a detailed examination of institutional structure in
order to obtain information on the policy community, modes of interaction and the capabilities and
preferences of actors; followed by a second step of empirical process tracing examining strategic
The present study incorporates the exact approach specified by Scharpf when he defines insti-
tutions as ‘systems of rules that structure the courses of actions that a set of actors may choose’
(1997: 38). This however includes ‘not only formal legal rules that are sanctioned by the court
system and the machinery of the state but also social norms that actors will generally respect’
(Scharpf 1997: 38). In the context of this project, the definition is composed of two independent
Their strategies are built up in processes closed to other communities and to the general public’ (Côrtes 2013: 137).
39
institutional variables: the level of historical entrenchment of social assistance norms20 (high versus
low) and the centralisation of state structure (high versus low). The case study chapters conduct
historical process tracing according to these variables. This initially involves an examination of the
degree to which social assistance norms were historically entrenched in both cases, and whether
these norms exhibited features of ‘institutional stickiness’ by constraining the options open to poli-
cymakers. In other words, it measures the degree to which the respective cases presented elements
of path dependence.
This concept is centrally important to many historical institutionalist analyses, and fundamen-
tally entails the assertion that ‘preceding steps in a particular direction induce further movement
in the same direction...This is because the relative benefits of the current activity compared with
other possible options increase over time’ (Pierson 2000: 252). This means that the deep historical
entrenchment of particular norms raise the cost of exit, leading to a self-reinforcing process (Pierson
2000: 252). The analysis shows that the South African case exhibited significant stickiness through
the deep historical institutionalisation of norms, while the Brazilian case featured relatively little
This is followed a specification of the second independent variable involving the respective state
structures. This variable again incorporates formal and informal institutional features in its exam-
ination of the distribution of power generated through both the constitutional-legal policymaking
framework, as well as the practical outcomes produced by the realities of electoral politics. It
concludes that the South African case has been characterised by a concentrated state structure
throughout the period under examination, in contrast to Brazil’s diffuse structure. The specifica-
tion of this variation in terms of the independent institutional variables is subsequently followed by
20
Even though they are in practise often subject to significant conceptual overlap, it is important to note the
difference between institutional norms and ‘ideas’ according to this approach. Fundamentally, ‘ideas’ become norms
once they are institutionally embedded and consequently approximate ‘something like basic templates upon which
40
the introduction of the respective social assistance policy communities, along with an explication
The final analytical phase involves the second step of the ACI procedure, which incorporates a
further round of process tracing which examines the contemporary development of the two countries’
social assistance systems. The narrative analysis, guided by the ACI analytical framework, thus
ultimately illustrates the centrally important role played by institutional variables in shaping the
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a clear articulation of the study’s central concepts. It initially illustrated
the project’s position within the greater scholarly paradigm of emerging welfare state research,
pillar of many nascent welfare states throughout the developing world. The chapter further sought
to articulate the way in which historical institutionalism is operationalised through the ACI ana-
lytical framework in order to conduct historical process tracing, premised upon an approach which
incorporates a broad definition of institutions and examines both the formal and informal features
41
Chapter 3
Literature Review
3.1 Introduction
The findings produced by this study respectively draw upon and ultimately contribute to at least
three distinct streams of academic inquiry. This chapter aims to elucidate the scholarly niche occu-
pied by the project through conducting a review of the current state of the relevant literature. The
first section surveys efforts to replicate in the developing world the considerable achievements of
scholars in comparatively chronicling and classifying the features of different welfare state arrange-
ments in developed countries. Overall, the literature on identifying varieties of welfare states in the
tomes that exist regarding their cousins in the global North. By explicitly undertaking an attempt
to differentiate and categorise the features of the South African and Brazilian approaches to social
assistance provision, this study thereby makes a significant qualitative contribution to the state of
The subsequent section examines the status of current knowledge claims related to the spe-
cific practise of social assistance provision in the developing world. Exploring this budding field of
research reveals that, while an impressive array of academic queries have focused on issues surround-
42
ing the implementation and impact of these programmes, very little is known about the underlying
factors that lead to their differentiated emergence in the first place. This study thus contributes to
the research on social assistance provision by taking up precisely that under-examined question.
The third part of the chapter shifts its attention towards reviewing the literature on the study’s
analytical framework. Relative to the other two fields this inquiry touches upon, research into the
effects of institutions on policy outputs is quite sophisticated. Nevertheless, the way in which this
study applies and extends a historical institutional ACI approach to the fledgling empirical field
of welfare provision in the developing world means that it also adds significant new value in this
regard.
The final section introduces a set of popular competing claims from the literature on the emer-
gence of social assistance provision. Despite the highly limited number of inquiries into the develop-
ment of these policies, most studies are content to simply point to exogenous functional or ideational
factors in explaining the design of programme features. These claims are consequently reviewed in
order to demonstrate their clear inability to account for the tremendous empirical variation that is
made manifest across countries. This literature review thereby introduces the reader to the current
state of scholarly understanding regarding emerging welfare states, social assistance provision and
the historical role of institutions, while simultaneously illuminating the study’s significant broader
relevance to scholarship in these fields and setting the scene for the subsequent empirical chapters.
Efforts to classify and interpret the nature of social welfare provision across different countries has
become one of the classic occupations of social science research. Scholars have applied an impressive
range of perspectives, including in fields such as sociology, history, political science, economics and
gender studies, in pursuit of understanding and explaining the profound variation between the
welfare regimes of different societies. This section provides an introduction to this area of inquiry
43
by initially examining the roots of welfare state research on the countries of the developed world.
It then looks at (limited) recent efforts to extend the classificatory approach to the newly emerging
welfare regimes of the developing world. It concludes by pointing to the fact that this study entails
one of the very first efforts to qualitatively assess, compare and explain the specific features of two
The reference point for much of the work on welfare states in the developed world is Esping-
Andersen’s much celebrated book, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990). This ground-
breaking treatise, premised on the classification of developed welfare state regimes into ‘liberal’,
‘conservative’ and ‘social democratic’ ideal-types, has become nothing short of a modern classic.21
For Esping-Andersen, the principal issue distinguishing these three ideal-types from one another is
the degree to which individuals or families can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living
state depends on the stringency of eligibility rules, on the level of income replacement and on
Esping-Andersen’s analysis built upon insights and decades of research produced by a stream of
scholarship that dates as far back as the 1940s, with Polanyi’s seminal The Great Transformation
setting the tone for the entire field of inquiry into social policy. This theoretical foundation was
further extended through work on social citizenship by Marshall (1950; 1963; 1965; 1981), and by
Titmuss on social policy and the philosophical underpinnings of the welfare state (1958; 1974).
Empirically, it drew upon research carried out during the 1970s and 1980s by a range of compar-
ativists, including Wilensky (1975); Flora and Heidenheimer (1981); Mommsen (1981); and Flora
The popularity of Esping-Andersen’s typology meant that it came under intense scrutiny, leading
to criticism that the specific categories were either flawed or lacked explanatory power (Lessenich
21
See Offe (1991); Cnaan (1992); Hicks (1991); Kohl (1993); as well as Arts and Gelissen (2002: 138).
44
& Ostner 1998; Baldwin 1996). These criticisms subsequently engendered a number of revisions.22
Its shortcomings notwithstanding, the book undoubtedly made a tremendous impact by going a
long way towards definitively establishing the practise of constructing comparative typologies to
make sense of the variations between different regimes of welfare provision. A host of contemporary
authors have subsequently followed in these footsteps by aiming to accurately represent and explain
The classification of welfare regimes into distinct categories has thus become a well established
much of the existing literature on comparative social policy has been concerned with the clas-
sification of welfare states and the identification of ideal-types of welfare provision. This is
understandable: state welfare is a matter of high complexity, particularly when it comes to ex-
plaining differences between existing models of social protection. The classification of welfare
states and the resulting identification of ideal-types is thus a powerful tool for comparative social
While much progress has therefore been made in terms of understanding the features of developed
welfare states, similar efforts to interpret welfare regimes in the developing world are still in their
infancy.
It is in fact only with recent work that similar analyses have been applied to emerging welfare
states (Gough 2004a; Gough 2004b; Gough & Wood 2004; Rudra 2007; 2008; Haggard & Kaufman
2008; Abu Sharkh & Gough 2009; Gough 2013). The fundamental premise of this growing field of
inquiry is that
existing scholarship overlooks the possibility of varieties of capitalism in the developing world.
institutional arrangements within the advanced capitalist countries, particularly with respect to
22
These are contained in Esping-Andersen (1993; 1994; 1996; 1997; 1999).
23
These include Pierson (2000; 2001); Huber and Stephens (2001); Arts and Gelissen (2002); Blekesaune and
Quadagno (2003); Scruggs and Allan (2006); Pestieau (2006); Pfeifer (2010); as well as Bonoli and Natali (2012).
45
their distributional regimes. Is it feasible that distribution regimes of relatively poor countries
The application of sophisticated multivariate statistical cluster analyses have led scholars to
answer that question in the affirmative, concluding that ‘there is thus prima facie evidence to sug-
gest that...[there are] distinct welfare regimes based on different institutions and cultural-historical
antecedents and following different paths of development’ (Abu Sharkh & Gough 2009: 22). Two
basic typological models have been produced from this largely quantitative research agenda. The
first is based on work by Abu Sharkh, Gough and Wood (Gough 2004a; Gough 2004b; Gough &
Wood 2004; Abu Sharkh & Gough 2009; Gough 2013), while the second stems from Rudra’s (2007;
2008) research.
The Abu Sharkh and Gough typology identifies four regime clusters in the developing world:
‘externally dependent insecurity regimes’, ‘less effective informal security regimes’, ‘more effective
informal security regimes’, and ‘actual or potential welfare states’ (Gough 2004a; Gough 2004b;
Gough & Wood 2004; Abu Sharkh & Gough 2009; Gough 2013). The primary measurement indi-
cators used in these analyses relate to public spending, international aid and remittance flows, as
well as welfare outcomes expressed through the Human Development Index (HDI). The accuracy
of this typology has been questioned for its focus on outcomes data, as it erroneously assigns the
effects of events like conflict and the HIV/AIDS epidemic to ineffective welfare provision (Seekings
2014).
In turn, Rudra’s analysis identifies ‘the existence of two ideal-types of welfare states in the
developing world...[while] cluster analysis reveals a third group with elements of both’ (2007: 379).
The first approach is classified as productive, in which policies are geared towards promoting the
market dependence of citizens. This model shares certain elements with Esping-Andersen’s liberal
model by embracing some of the ‘enthusiasm for the market and self-reliance’ (Rudra 2007: 384).
Productive emerging welfare states thus emphasise the commodity status of labour. In contrast,
46
the protective model is aimed at protecting individuals from the market through relatively greater
decommodification.
Rudra finds that protective emerging welfare states constitute ‘a curious fusion of elements of
emphasis on the preservation of authority (2007: 379; 384). The protective typology accordingly
involves a combination of features from Esping-Andersen’s original social democratic and conser-
vative categories, while the productive moniker strongly equates, within a different context, to
The descriptive classificatory exercise undertaken in chapter five of this study builds upon this
previous work through the incorporation of the conceptual categories recently developed by Rudra
(2007; 2008). The key difference between this analysis and the literature cited above is that instead
of taking a global perspective which examines the entire welfare state apparatuses of dozens of
developing countries, the present study exclusively focuses on the single most important aspect of
welfare policy in these two cases: social assistance. The resultant classification of the South African
social assistance system as productive and the Brazilian approach as protective thereby amounts
to the study’s initial noteworthy contribution to the existing scholarship by undertaking the first
documented attempt at constructing typologies for social assistance provision in the developing
world.
institutions, cultural-historical antecedents and different paths of development’ that underlay their
differentiated development (Abu Sharkh & Gough 2009: 22). In addition to therefore making a
for why these differences emerged in the first place. It thereby extends the proud scholarly tradition
of comparative inquiry into welfare provision to these exciting and fertile new cases through a focus
47
3.3 Social Assistance in the Developing World
This exclusive focus on social assistance (as a prominent subcategory of social welfare provision
in these cases) means that the analysis also ties into the related literature on the rise of social
assistance CTs to the poor in developing countries. The tremendous recent proliferation of these
schemes throughout the global South has been accompanied by a rush of academic interest. This
interest has however been almost exclusively preoccupied with measuring the impact that these
programmes have had on a dizzying range of outcomes, while research into why these schemes took
on different shapes in different countries has been neglected. This section introduces the state of
knowledge in these regards, while also demonstrating the present study’s value by constituting one
of the first attempts to actually explain why social assistance CTs took on certain specific features
The practise of scientifically measuring the effects of CTs in the developing world dates back to
the 1990s, when the first of these programmes were introduced at scale. The first such evaluations
were in fact carried out in Brazil by the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO),
UNESCO, as well as UNICEF shortly after the introduction of the country’s first subnational
CT schemes.24 These early assessments were particularly focused on measuring the impact that
This was followed by an explosion of similar inquiries by economists, sociologists, social policy
experts and international development organisations that attempted to measure the effects of CTs
on outcomes including poverty, child labour, human capital investment, schooling, nutrition, health,
gender relations, crime, inequality, domestic violence and entrepreneurship.25 Much of this work
24
These assessments are contained in Moraes and Santana (1997); Abramovay, Andrade and Waiselfisz (1998);
and Rubio (2005); De Janvry, Finan, Sadoulet and Vakis (2006); Schady and Araujo (2006); Soares, Soares, Medeiros
48
was carried out during the early-2000s with a regional focus on Latin America, where many of the
first programmes were implemented. More recent investigations have extended the endeavour of
measuring the impact of social assistance programmes to regions including Africa and the Indian
subcontinent.26 The vast majority of these assessments have found that CTs have a range of positive
impacts. Useful overviews integrating some of the findings from this expansive body of literature are
provided by Fiszbein et al. (2009); Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme (2010); as well as by Barrientos
(2013).
It is thus clear that our understanding of the impacts produced by social assistance CTs is
relatively advanced. But there are as yet no systematic studies aimed at interrogating and account-
ing for the tremendous amount of variation that exists in how these programmes are implemented
across cases. The only literature that even alludes to this variation (which includes features such as
coverage, conditionality and systemic orientation) spans a total of three published journal articles
and one review on the relative effects of conditional versus unconditional CTs.27 But by again
focusing purely on outcomes, these also do not take up the question of why such variation exists in
The scholarship on social assistance provision in the cases of South Africa and Brazil reflect
this same reality. In the case of South Africa, authors have meticulously analysed the outcomes
produced by the country’s social assistance policies,28 while a handful of studies have documented
and Osório (2006); Lagarde, Haines and Palmer (2007); Fernald, Gertler and Neufeld (2008); Adato and Hoddinott
(2009); Fiszbein, Schady, Ferreira, Grosh, Keleher, Olinto and Skoufi (2009); Leroy, Ruel and Verhofstadt (2009);
Soares, Ribas and Osório (2010); as well as in Soares and Silva (2010).
26
This includes work by Ahmed (2005); Kakwani, Soares and Son (2005); Hossain (2010); Lim, Dandona, Hoisington,
Jamers, Hogan and Gakidou (2010); UKDFID (2011); Ellis (2012); as well as by Garcia and Moore (2012).
27
Individual studies were carried out by Baird, McIntosh and Özler (2011); Akresh, De Walque and Kazianga
(2013); as well as Robertson, Mushati, Eaton, Dumba, Mavise, Makoni, Schumacher, Crea, Monasch, Sherr, Garnett,
Nyamukapa and Gregson (2013). These were subsequently reviewed in Baird, Ferreira, Özler and Woolcock (2013).
28
Including Case and Deaton (1998); Duflo (2003); Woolard (2003); Samson, Lee, Ndebele, MacQuene, Van Niekerk,
Gandhi, Harigaya and Abrahams (2004); Aguëro, Carter and Woolard (2006); Hall (2007); Williams (2007); UNICEF
49
the evolution of the system.29 The same is true in the case of Brazil, where the effects produced
by especially the Programa Bolsa Famı́lia (PBF – Family Grant Programme) have been loudly
proclaimed in both the academic and popular press.30 But the lack of rigorous comparative in-
vestigations into the political economy of social assistance provision means that there is very little
understanding of the processes whereby the specific features of these programmes actually emerged.
The present study thus directly addresses this shortcoming by conducting a detailed comparative
investigation into these two benchmark cases. While the current state of research on CTs reflects
an understandable preoccupation with the social and economic consequences produced by these
programmes, the time is ripe for more nuanced analyses that take up questions regarding the specific
features of social assistance programmes. By doing precisely that, this study compliments the
existing knowledge on programme effects by breaking new ground with an approach that explicitly
This inquiry adopts a historical institutional theoretical approach to explaining the variation across
cases. Examining the role played by institutional configurations in shaping policy outputs is a well
established approach in the political science literature. In fact, the institutional school represents
perhaps the oldest theoretical tradition in the field: Plato’s Republic investigates the role played
by institutions in shaping political behaviour, while Aristotle examined the effect of institutional
structures on shaping political incentives in Politics. These classical works went on to greatly
influence social science as it began to emerge as a modern academic discipline in the late nineteenth
(2008); Woolard, Harttgen and Klasen (2010); as well as Woolard and Leibbrandt (2010).
29
See Kruger (1992); Duncan (1993); and Seekings (2000; 2007).
30
Prominent examples include Medeiros, Diniz and Squinca (2006); Legido-Quigley (2009); Sedlacek, Gustafsson-
Wright, Ilahi and Lannon (2001); Lindert (2006); Soares et al. (2006) Lindert, Linder, Hobbs and De la Brière (2007);
Haddad (2008); Hall (2008); The Economist (2008); and Watts (2013).
50
and early twentieth century (Almond 1990). The earliest ‘institutionalists’ thus included celebrated
theorists such as Montesquieu, Weber, Polanyi and Veblen. Much of the research carried out during
this fledgling period of political science focused on the design of constitutions (Steinmo 2008: 119).
This ‘old institutionalism’ soon came to dominate the field of comparative politics. Studies
largely consisted of highly detailed configurative inquiries into varying formal legal, political and
administrative structures (Thelen & Steinmo 1992: 3). By strictly contrasting and comparing
institutional configurations across different countries, the overwhelming majority of these studies
were descriptive in nature; and often deeply normative in orientation. As a result, ‘this approach
did not encourage the development of...concepts that would facilitate truly comparative research
The social and historical context of the post-war years gave rise to deep scepticism and even
hostility towards the focus on institutions, as carefully designed democratic institutions fell to
dictatorship and chaos throughout the developing world. As a result, political scientists increasingly
came to view institutions as mere ‘vessels in which politics took place; what mattered was what filled
the vessels’ (Steinmo 2008: 119). This was further compounded by the ‘physics envy’ that emerged
in the wake of the progress made by the physical sciences, as well as a related desire to move away
from ‘thick description’ towards more theoretical approaches (Steinmo 2008: 120). The result was
that institutional approaches largely fell out of favour, to be replaced by the rise of behaviouralism.
Political science consequently witnessed the behavioural revolution in the 1950s and early 1960s as
a reaction against and a rejection of the old institutionalism (Thelen & Steinmo 1992: 3).
lated that politics could only be understood through analysing political attitudes, behaviours and
distributions of power. The perceived atheoretical bent of the old institutionalism thus came to
be replaced by the explicitly theoretical behaviouralist project (Thelen & Steinmo 1992: 4).31 In
31
It is important to note that despite the general trend away from institutional analyses and towards behaviouralism,
‘dissident’ scholars such as Barrington Moore (1966) and Samuel Huntington (1968) continued to strongly incorporate
51
turn, by the 1970s, a clear institutionalist critique of behaviouralism had congealed around a central
theme: precisely due to the fact that behaviouralist theories focused on the attitudes, characteris-
tics and behaviours of groups and individuals in explaining outcomes, they consistently overlooked
questions about why these same attitudes, behaviours and the distribution of resources between
groups themselves differed between countries (Thelen & Steinmo 1992: 5).
Kenneth Shepsle provided what amounts to perhaps the most succinct critique of this approach
the price we have paid for the methodological and theoretical innovations of the post-World War
II era, however, is the inordinate emphasis now placed on behaviour. Our ability to describe (and
less frequently, to explain) behaviour...has diminished the attention once given to institutional
context and actual outcomes. On net, the behavioural revolution has probably been of positive
value. But along with the many scientific benefits, we have been burdened by the cost of the
with the aim of producing institutionalist analyses that simultaneously contributed to theory build-
ing.
In contrast to the abstract grand theories pursued during the 1960s and early 1970s, neoin-
theory (Steinmo 2008: 123). But it soon became clear that at least two distinct strands32 had
ism. Whereas rational choice institutionalism was focused on uncovering general laws of political
behaviour and action by deductively testing theoretical models, historical institutionalist scholars
were more interested in explaining real world outcomes inductively (Steinmo 2001). In rational
institutional variables into their work during this period.
32
See Peters (2012) for a full elaboration on the different neoinstitutionalist approaches.
33
Some of the foundational rational choice works include Shepsle (1986); Levi (1988); North (1990); and Bates
(1981; 1989).
52
choice, the primary priority is creating, elaborating and refining a theory of politics; in historical
This study is situated within the historical institutionalist strand of neoinstitutionalism, with
a focus on inductively explaining real world variation. It thereby draws on a stream of scholarship
which argues that the role played by institutions in shaping politics is far greater than that suggested
by a narrow rational choice model, with the core feature being historical institutionalism’s treatment
of preference formation as endogenous (Thelen & Steinmo 1992: 5). Historical institutionalism
assumes that political struggles ‘are mediated by the institutional setting in which [they] take
place’, and incorporates a definition of institutions that includes both formal organisations and
informal norms that structure conduct (Ikenberry 1988; Hall 1986: 19; Thelen & Steinmo 1992: 2).
institutions are not just another variable, and the institutionalist claim is more than just that
‘institutions matter too’. By shaping not just actors’ strategies (as in rational choice), but their
goals as well, and by mediating their relations of cooperation and conflict, institutions structure
political situations and leave their own imprint on political outcomes (Thelen & Steinmo 1992:
9).
The late 1970s witnessed the first great flourishing of historical institutionalist scholarship,
including groundbreaking work by Peter Katzenstein (1978); Theda Skocpol (1979); Peter Hall
(1986); as well as James March and Johan Olsen (1984; 1989). This was followed by an avalanche of
historical institutionalist investigations into topics as diverse as the intersections between domestic
and international politics,34 American politics,35 the causes and consequences of revolutions and
34
See Friedberg (2000); Gourevitch (1986); Ikenberry (2001); Katzenstein (1978); Krasner (1978); and Simmons
(1994).
35
Examples include Skowronek (1997); and Hansen (1991).
53
social movements,36 the origins and development of economic regimes,37 transitions to democracy,38
the rise and fall of authoritarian regimes,39 and the role of social identity in politics40 (Pierson &
Skocpol 2002: 695). Of particular relevance to this study are the rigorous historical institutionalist
analyses that have been carried out in accounting for the development of welfare states.
Indeed, the work by Esping-Andersen (1990) on the classification of developed country welfare
states cited above represents the most famous example of an historical institutionalist approach
to explaining variations in welfare provision. Other authors who have contributed to the ‘striking
accumulation of knowledge’ in this field include Flora and Heidenheimer (1981); Hacker (1998);
Huber and Stephens (2001); Immergut (1992); Maioni (1999); Pierson (1994); Skocpol (1992); and
Steinmo (1996) (Pierson & Skocpol 2002: 695). The result of these previous inquiries has been to
firmly establish historical institutionalist approaches to studying welfare policies as a legitimate and
The study’s specific analytical approach of ACI also belongs to this contemporary school of lit-
erature (Scharpf 1991; Mayntz & Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1997; Scharpf 2000; Boessen 2008; Pancaldi
2012). ACI emerged during the 1990s and 2000s as a precisely oprationalised framework which en-
ables researchers to consistently define and study the processes and mechanisms whereby historical
institutional factors shape policy outputs. While it consequently regards institutions as the primary
force shaping such outputs, it additionally allows for the construction of a rigorous empirical pic-
ture through its incorporation of agency by regarding policy not as deterministic but as ‘intentional
36
See Goldstone (1991); Goodwin (2001); McAdam (1982); McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001); Skocpol (1979);
(1999); Haggard and Kaufman (1995); Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992); Yashar (1997) and Mahoney
(2000).
39
Examples include Doyle (1986); Ekiert (1996); Im (1987); Mahoney (2001); Snyder (1998) and Mahoney (2000).
40
See Hattam (1993); Katznelson and Zolberg (1986); Kryder (2000); Lustick (1993); and Marx (1998).
54
action by actors who are most interested in achieving specific outcomes’ (Scharpf 1997: 36).
The contribution of the present study is thus to extend what has become an accepted analytical
convention into an exciting new empirical area. In keeping with established academic norms, it
account for the variation in social assistance provision to the as-yet unexamined cases of South
Africa and Brazil. This pioneering project thereby hopes to encourage the further investigation of
emerging welfare states through the application of a historical institutionalist approach. It is a field
that is ripe for the picking, and institutionalist scholars are perfectly positioned to add great value
to our understanding of the recent domestic emergence of welfare policies in the global South.
Owing to the abovementioned lack of comparative inquiries into the emergence of social assistance
provision in the developing world, there remains a relative dearth of theoretical claims about what
accounts for the variation across cases. Despite the lack of rigorous explanatory analyses, a handful
of authors (usually of descriptive studies) have nevertheless proffered two primary hypotheses for
why social assistance programmes in any given country has taken on its particular shape (Graham
2002; Fiszbein et al. 2009; Hanlon et al. 2010; UNRISD 2010; Liesering & Barrientos 2013;
Mothiane 2014). These exogenous claims generally either lurk below the analytical surface, or are
often introduced in a rather matter-of-fact fashion without citing satisfactory supporting evidence
— usually in studies otherwise devoted to exalting the benefits of social assistance. This section
briefly reviews this conventional wisdom’s capacity to amount to potential competing claims for the
The first explanation usually introduced in accounting for the emergence of social assistance
systems is functional in nature, and it is nearly ubiquitous in the literature. A striking majority
of evaluations appear happy to loosely argue that programme features mechanistically emerged as
55
a result of high levels of poverty and inequality (see, for example, Fiszbein et al. 2009: 9; Garcia
& Moore 2012: 1). It is the assertion of proponents of this view that domestic social assistance
programmes arose in response to ‘economic crisis, structural adjustment and global integration,
where the limitations of residual, ad hoc safety nets to address the social consequences of neoliberal
A representative example is provided by one analysis on the rise of social assistance in Sub-
cash transfers arose...as recognition grew that some other types of aid were not effectively achiev-
ing their goals...Increasing migration, urbanization, and the evolution of traditional family struc-
tures have also weakened traditional safety nets...The ability of informal safety nets to protect
individuals has weakened considerably in the face of increased demands brought on by the
HIV/AIDS crisis...These problems are compounded when considered jointly with other sources
of vulnerability and poverty in the region, such as exclusion, patronage politics, insecure property
rights and landlessness, environmental degradation, and conflict stemming from ethnic differences
In addition to apparently assigning explanatory power to a stunning array of factors, the crucial
shortcoming of this interpretation is not that its diagnosis of social and economic challenges is
factually incorrect. It is rather that this functional view is not able to analytically accommodate the
empirical fact of significant variation across different countries. It paints a picture of a mechanistic
and uniform policy response to a panoply of shared crises (which have often persisted for many
decades prior to the adoption of social assistance) that leaves no room for nuance and is simply not
borne out in reality. Based on this logic, applying the functional hypothesis to this study’s research
question thus suggests that differences between the social assistance systems of South Africa and
Brazil must be the result of considerable ‘objective’ differences in the underlying policy problems
The second popular claim is related to the first in that it argues that the failure of traditional
56
approaches to development and the consequent persistence of high rates of poverty in developing
countries has led to ‘changed thinking’, with the introduction of social assistance therefore represent-
ing ‘a paradigmatic shift in poverty reduction’ (Barrientos & Hulme 2010: 4). This interpretation
therefore suggests that ideational factors constitute the primary explanatory variables in accounting
Reviewing the literature on this claim suggests that it is both the ‘ideology of the state’ and
‘public attitudes’ towards social assistance provision that supposedly determines the shape of policy
interventions (Mothiane 2014: 4; Graham 2002). In the simplest terms, the logic of this interpre-
tation means that ‘differences in political attitudes about redistribution’ are decisive, with a state
featuring a more ‘neoliberal’ orientation expected to yield a reduced scale of provision compared to
that of a supposedly more ‘social democratic’ state and polity (Graham 2002: 2). Operationalising
this approach in terms of the current study’s research question thus results in a hypothesis sug-
gesting that any differences between the two cases must have resulted from preceding differences in
While acknowledging that functional and ideational factors were certainly relevant during the
policy development processes in both cases, the outcome of this study’s careful evaluation shows
that these exogenous factors are not able to satisfactorily account for the variation in the approaches
adopted by South Africa and Brazil. Functional and ideational factors were plainly too similar across
the cases to be of any real explanatory relevance. The failure of these approaches to adequately
account for the policies implemented in these two benchmark cases serves to confirm the existence
of an alarming gap in our understanding of the political economy of social assistance provision in
developing countries.
In addition to the extension it entails to the scholarship on the classification of emerging welfare
states, social assistance provision, and historical institutionalism, addressing this explanatory void
in the literature is the primary objective of this study. Proceeding inductively from the empirical
57
observation that ‘in developing countries, social transfer programmes show considerable innovation
and diversity’ (Barrientos 2013: 6; Steinmo 2001: 571), it applies an analytical framework that
emphasises endogeneity and the way in which varying historical institutional configurations influ-
enced policy outputs by channelling functional and ideational factors through the creation of specific
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the way in which the current study directly contributes to expanding
the state of knowledge in at least three important streams of scholarly literature. It initially reviewed
each of these in turn with the aim of illustrating the particular niche occupied by the project, followed
by the introduction of a set of competing explanatory claims regarding the domestic emergence of
social assistance provision in developing countries. The first section thus illuminated the study’s
contribution to the established academic practise of classifying the features of different welfare state
arrangements by qualitatively extending this endeavour to the important emerging cases of South
Africa and Brazil. The significance of this contribution was emphasised by pointing to the way
in which the identification and chronicling of systematic divergence in the welfare regimes of the
This was followed by a section introducing the literature on the emergence of social assistance
CTs throughout countries of the developing world. The review concluded that, while a great deal
of scholarly interest has been directed towards examining the (important) impacts produced by the
introduction of these programmes, scant attention has been paid to explaining their differentiated
development in the first place. It was subsequently argued that it is crucial for analysts to com-
pliment this descriptive knowledge by taking up explanatory questions which directly address the
tremendous amount of nuanced cross-case variation in how social assistance policies are actually
implemented. The contribution of this project is to do precisely that with regard to the cases of
58
South Africa and Brazil.
The review then shifted towards an explication of the literature on the study’s analytical frame-
work of historical institutionalism. It showed that there is a deep scholarly tradition of applying
this approach to analyse questions surrounding the development of social policy. The novelty of
the current study lies in its extension of this established interpretive framework — through an ACI
analytical approach — to a new empirical field. This was followed by a final section introducing a
set of popular competing claims aimed at accounting for the recent domestic development of social
assistance systems in many developing countries. It showed that these functional and ideational
explanations are often somewhat carelessly proffered, and concluded with a juxtaposition of these
claims relative to the study’s central institutional hypothesis. The review thereby sets the stage for
59
Chapter 4
Research Design
4.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the study’s research design and offers guidance on the analytical procedure
that follows. The initial section specifies the research question and dependent and independent
variables. This is followed by a discussion of the study’s methodology that illustrates the suitability
of the comparative case study method for addressing the research question. A subsequent section
reviews the procedure that was followed throughout the process of data collection, discussing sources
of both primary and secondary information. The chapter also addresses the limitations and delim-
itations of the present study. It articulates the procedures that were followed in overcoming the
practical challenges which arose, while simultaneously clearly framing the precise themes addressed
by the research. The final section reviews the ethical considerations which arose during the research
process, particularly with regards to the participant interviews. The chapter thereby provides a
concise overview of the primary methodological and practical aspects of the research project.
60
4.2 Methodology
As mentioned briefly in the introduction, the study’s research question is: what accounts for the
differences between the South African and Brazilian social assistance systems? In effect, the anal-
ysis aims to explain why South Africa adopted a productive social assistance regime, while Brazil
implemented a protective approach. These typologies, summarised in table 4.1 below as the study’s
dependent variables, are operationalised along three dimensions: coverage, conditionality and orien-
tation. The subsequent explanatory endeavour is conducted according to the independent variables
As hinted at by the nature of the theme under investigation, the study adopts a qualitative
orientation to answering the research question. The rationale for undertaking a qualitative inquiry
is fundamentally related to the way in which this allows for the interpretation of phenomena within
their overall contexts (Denzin & Lincoln 2005: 3). As such, the research was premised upon
‘the collection of data in a natural setting sensitive to the people and places under study, and
data analysis that is inductive and establishes patterns and themes’ (Creswell 2007: 37). Further
61
justification for the suitability of a qualitative orientation aimed at developing hypotheses emerged
from the preceding review of the literature, where it was clearly established that ‘existing theories
do not adequately capture the complexity of the problem we are examining’ (Creswell 2007: 40).
Having settled upon a qualitative orientation, the next methodological consideration was to
decide upon a specific approach out of what initially appears to be a ‘baffling number of choices’
(Creswell 2007: 6). Creswell’s exhaustive survey on the nature of qualitative inquiry assisted greatly
in this pursuit, as it fundamentally narrowed the amount of options down to a limited number of
qualitative approaches that feature ‘systematic procedures for inquiry’ (2007: 9-10). Yin (2003)
further introduces the matrix depicted in table 4.3 to assist in identifying an appropriate research
method.
Table 4.3: Relevant Situations for different Research Methods (Source: Yin 2003: 111)
depends in large part on the research question. The more that the question seeks to explain some
present circumstance (e.g. ‘how’ or ‘why’ some social phenomena works), the more that the case
study method will be relevant. The method also is relevant the more that your questions require
62
This study’s research question deals with precisely these themes. It firstly contains a distinct and in-
depth descriptive (‘how?’) element in terms of articulating the cross-case variation. When combined
with the explanatory (‘why?’) essence of the research question, the comparative nature of the study,
the fact that behavioural control was not required, as well as the contemporality of the inquiry, it
became abundantly clear that the case study method was ideally suited for addressing the subject
The use of this strategy is a well-accepted convention in the quest to ‘understand the complex
social phenomena’ constituted by social welfare provision (Yin 2003: 2). A detailed recent review
concluded that the practise of employing case studies in social science research is in fact ‘solidly
ensconced and, perhaps, even thriving’ (Gerring 2004: 341). It is a particularly useful method when
a holistic and in-depth examination is required, as with the present topic (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg
1991). Case studies can however be further subdivided into three distinct types: exploratory,
The present study is y-centred and explanatory in nature, with a secondary descriptive element,
as it firstly attempts to identify ‘patterns of association within the data, [combined with an] attempt
to account for why those patterns occur’ (Ritchie & Lewis 2003: 215). It incorporates multiple cases
into the subject, thereby constituting cross-case analysis. The study is carried out on the macro
level through the investigation of the policy regimes of two cases (the units of analysis): South Africa
and Brazil. The analysis is conducted on the basis of a parallel study, as the timelines utilised for
examining the cases run concurrently from approximately 1990 to the present (Thomas 2011: 517).
The study incorporates an inductive approach in carrying out the case analysis. The process
initially involved an observation of the empirical world through measuring the differences between
the cases. This was followed by ‘thinking in increasingly more abstract ways, moving toward the-
oretical concepts and propositions’ (Neuman 2005: 60). The analysis of each case takes the form
of a historical process tracing narrative, guided by the effects produced by the independent vari-
63
ables. Systematisation is achieved through the application of the historical institutionalist analytical
framework of ACI. This approach is ideally suited to account for the differentiated developmental
processes due to its focus on the role played by specific institutional incentives and constraints in
the course of policy formulation, enabling a parsimonious exposition of the underlying processes.
The application of the case study method often calls for the assembly of a large amount of data.
In order to increase the validity of the findings, every attempt was made to obtain data from a
multiplicity of sources. This list ultimately included scholarly publications (books and journal ar-
ticles), information sourced through the popular press, statistical records, government documents
and regulations, annual reports, records of parliamentary proceedings as well as participant inter-
views. This diverse set was comprised of both primary and secondary sources. The initial part
of the research process was focused on reviewing the existing literature on the emergence of social
assistance provision in the developing world. This phase, which was principally carried out based on
secondary data from books, journal articles and working papers, allowed for the initial identification
It was also during this period that the shortcomings of existing accounts on the development
of specific programme features were first identified. It became clear that most analyses were only
interested in examining the effects produced by these policies, while largely ignoring the significant
of the policies were usually limited to sweeping statements premised on functional or ideational
interpretations. The identification of South Africa and Brazil as the most suitable candidates for an
analysis premised on the MSSD approach was followed by intensive research into the specific details
of social assistance provision in these two countries. Working papers from research institutions and
think tanks, as well as governmental information portals, statistical reports and legal regulations
64
proved critical in this regard.
The data gathered through these secondary sources were subsequently complimented by inter-
views with policymakers, civil society actors and social policy experts. In-depth interviews with
South African actors were carried out during a fieldwork trip to that country in November and
December 2012, while interviews with Brazilian policy actors were conducted during a research stay
in Brası́lia from October to December 2013. Given the intensive nature of the interviews carried out
for this study, as well as the generally small network of actors involved in social assistance policy
In the case of South Africa, the first interviewee was the head of a prominent government
commission on social assistance, while the first participant identified for the Brazilian interviews
was the instigator of the initial programmes in that country. This was followed by a procedure of
purposive and snowball sampling, where the predetermined list of participants was complimented
through interviewees providing links to other potential informants. At the same time, these formal
data gathering exercises were supplemented by the invaluable informal dialogue fostered through
participation in internships at the South African Parliament and the UNDP’s International Policy
The final phase of the data collection process involved the triangulation of data from these
different sources. Information collected through document analysis, press clippings and interviews
were combined in order to ‘clarify meaning by identifying different ways in which the phenomenon
is being seen’ (Stake 1995: 97). Discussions with numerous experts in the policy community as
well as the feedback generated through presentations at a range of academic conferences further
strengthened these efforts. The result is that sources have been drawn from as wide a spectrum
as possible, while every attempt was made to confirm and validate the narratives and findings
65
4.4 Limitations and Delimitations
The nature of qualitative research implies a number of inherent limitations that must be acknowl-
edged. Despite the fact that a rigorous procedure was followed to assure the validity of the findings,
a methodology premised on written sources and participant interviews automatically raises ques-
tions regarding sample selection. With regards to the interviews and given the specificity of the
topic, it was determined that representative or randomised sampling approaches would not be ap-
propriate. The theme of the research necessitated discussions with very specific groups of policy
actors.
Drawing from general precedent, the decision was made to follow a method that combined
purposive and snowball sampling. In general, the main potential limitation of this approach is
that participants are largely drawn from the same network. However, the limited size of the social
assistance policy communities meant that in-depth interviews with a small group of interrelated
actors were deemed appropriate. Nevertheless, a keen awareness of this potential limitation meant
that additional purposive steps were taken to gather the views of actors from different networks,
including government, civil society, academia and opposition parties. Despite these efforts, it is
nevertheless still possible that important potential participants were simply unavailable during the
A further practical limitation worth mentioning concerns the data gathered from various written
sources on the Brazilian case. In spite of the generous assistance received from colleagues and the
utilisation of the latest translation software, it is possible that some important Portuguese language
sources were omitted. The widespread global coverage of Brazilian social assistance programmes
however offered a partial remedy to this, as it was generally not significantly more problematic to
gather relevant information on this case than it was for South Africa.
It is also important to note a few facts regarding the delimitations of the project. In contrast to
the vast majority of work on this topic, this study does not undertake an evaluation of the effects
66
produced by social assistance interventions in these two cases. Neither does it explicitly argue that
one approach is necessarily normatively superior to the other. This is in spite of the fact that the
analysis shows that the Brazilian system qualitatively fosters somewhat greater decommodification
and provides greater redistributive coverage than its South African counterpart. It is however up
Even though the study examines the effects produced through path dependence (or the lack
thereof), it is also not primarily concerned with examining the reasons for certain practices and
norms being transferred (or not) into the institutional-legal configurations of the countries following
an endeavour which falls outside the scope of the present inquiry. The focus is instead on illustrating
the effects that these configurations had on subsequently shaping social assistance policy outputs.
The general point to keep in mind is that this study is aimed at explaining variation in terms of a
While it is forthrightly acknowledged that social assistance provision touches upon and is inti-
mately related to a number of other policy arenas that ultimately shape a country’s distributional
regime, this study does not address policies related to social insurance, labour protection, healthcare
or any other fields traditionally associated with welfare provision. It is instead resolutely focused
on one crucially important but specific aspect of welfare policy: programmes that transfer cash to
beneficiaries on a non-contributory basis. While it is certainly hoped that this strict focus and the
results produced thereby will spur similar comparative studies into additional aspects of redistribu-
tive policies in newly emerging welfare states, this study presently occupies itself only with this one
specific theme.
67
4.5 Ethical Considerations
The process of carrying out the research did not present any extraordinary ethical quandaries.
The nature of the project meant that the primary consideration was ‘ensuring that [interview]
participants are not harmed, privacy is maintained, and the participants have provided informed
consent’ (Lichtman 2013: 51). These conditions were all met, including the crucially important
issue of informed consent. All participants agreed to conduct the interviews on the record, including
recording of the audio for subsequent transcribing purposes. Publications that emerged during the
In addition to meeting these specific requirements, the research procedure adhered to all the
requirements of good scholarly practise. Throughout the research process, the author was certainly
‘as concerned with producing an ethical research design as [with] an intellectually coherent and
compelling one’ (Bloomberg & Volpe 2008: 76). No aspect of the inquiry necessitated formal
intervention by an institutional review board. The research thus conforms with standards of ethical
scholarly conduct.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the reader to the primary methodological and practical considera-
tions relevant to the project. In addition to specifying the research question and variable sets, it
expounded upon the study’s methodology with a particular focus on illuminating the rationale be-
hind conducting comparative case studies. This was followed by a discussion on the data collection
procedure, information on the steps that were taken to address potential limitations, as well as a
clear delimitation of the themes under examination. The final part of the discussion addressed the
ethical implications of the research procedure. The outcome is a chapter which effectively deals
with the relevant methodological and practical aspects of the research project.
68
Chapter 5
5.1 Introduction
This chapter is oriented towards addressing the study’s descriptive objective concerning the qual-
itative features of, and differences between, the South African and Brazilian systems of social
assistance. This initially involves a conceptual specification of each country’s social protection
framework, as well as detailed technical analyses of the exact features that constitute the social
assistance systems in South Africa and Brazil. This section includes a focus upon the coverage of
the systems through the prism of lifecycle risks, the legal and institutional frameworks governing
them, the individual programmes that constitute the two approaches, benefit levels, targeting and
Moving from a technical to an abstract discussion, the subsequent section of the chapter un-
dertakes a direct comparison that identifies significant variation across the cases in terms of sys-
temic coverage, the enforcement of conditionalities and orientation. These differential features are
subsequently synthesised into two distinct typologies, where it is argued that South Africa has
69
implemented a productive social assistance system, while Brazil’s approach is classified as protec-
tive. This synthesis of the key variations into distinct typologies — which constitute the study’s
dependent variables — sets the stage for the following chapters analysing the development of both
systems. The chapter therefore plays a crucial role in defining the exact parameters of the ensuing
investigation through inductively specifying the dependent variables and addressing the descriptive
research objective.
In terms of the conceptual approach outlined in chapter two, the South African social protection
framework is composed of a labour regime governed through legislation such as the Labour Relations
Act (RSA 1995a), the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (RSA 1997a), and the Employment
Equity Act (RSA 1998), as well as a large social assistance system and a relatively small social
insurance system.42 These three components are in turn composed of various different individual
programmes, statutory bodies and enforcement mechanisms. While the focus here is evidently on
the social assistance aspect, figure 5.1 below introduces a brief conceptualisation of the overall social
A crucial feature of this framework is the way in which it approaches eligibility. By definition,
labour protection is only applied to workers in the formal economy, leaving those in the informal
economy exposed. Social insurance funds, both statutory and voluntary, overlap to a large degree
with those people who are formally employed and covered by labour regulations, due to the fact
that eligibility is determined on the basis of previous contributions. This leaves social assistance as
the only part of the South African framework that supports those people who do not contribute to,
70
SOCIAL PROTECTION IN
SOUTH AFRICA
Road Users
Figure 5.1: Social Protection in South Africa (Source: Adapted from NPC 2011: 329)
Having contextualised the position of social assistance within the general social protection frame-
work, this section will focus exclusively on social assistance programmes in an attempt to specify
the exact contours of these policies in South Africa. It carries out an in-depth review of the sys-
tem’s principal features, including its coverage, legal and institutional framework, the individual
programmes that constitute the system, benefit levels, targeting and eligibility requirements, the
71
Coverage
An important initial approach to conceptualising the system involves examining it through the
prism of lifecycle risks. This entails mapping the social assistance framework in accordance with
the various life stages and their associated basic risks, in order to assess the extent of overall
?
Health/Disability Health/Disability Risk: Health/Disability
Risk: Risk:
Figure 5.2: South African Lifecycle Risks (Source: Adapted from Smith 2011)
there [is a] critical gap [in the South African social assistance system, through] the lack of
protection for many working-age people. . . For those who are willing and able to work, but who
are locked out of the economy, there is no meaningful level of social protection (NPC, 2011: 331).
The Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF – a contributory social insurance programme) provides
some support to workers who have lost their sources of income; in 2010/11 average monthly benefits
43
A checkmark indicates that there is a programme in existence aimed at addressing a particular risk, while a
question mark indicates that there is no programme protecting against a specific risk. In the education phase, the
programmes providing support are the Child Support Grant and the Foster Child Grant (poverty; education funding
risk), as well as the Care Dependency Grant (health/disability risk). During the accumulation phase there is no social
assistance programme aimed at the poverty/unemployment risk, while the Disability Grant covers the health/disability
risk. Finally, for the dependent phase, there is the Older Persons Grant (poverty/old age risk and health/disability
risk).
72
amounted to R466.8 million paid to 207 646 beneficiaries (NPC 2011: 331). However, this figure
represents only a fraction of the total unemployed, which stood at between 4.6 million and 17.7
million by the end of 2013 (Stats SA 2013: XI). As a result, only 3 percent of the unemployed have
access to these unemployment benefits at any given time (Klasen & Woolard 2008). This is due
to the fact that fully 55 percent of the unemployed have never worked and, by implication, have
never contributed towards the UIF, while 44 percent of unemployed people who have previous work
experience have been unemployed for more than a year and ‘would have exhausted their benefits if
This means that there is a yawning gap right in the middle of the South African social assistance
adults. In effect, once you turn 18 years old in South Africa, you are ‘on your own’ (Ulriksen 2014:
30). The implications are significant, as this shifts the considerable burden of unemployment onto
workers and those lucky enough to have access to social grants44 meant for other purposes, as the
able-bodied impoverished have no choice but to depend on ‘goodwill transfers’ from them. This
in turn dilutes the anti-poverty effects of social assistance and exacerbates existing wage pressures,
pushing households that are already financially constrained even further into poverty (NPC 2011:
332-333).
In lieu of implementing social assistance schemes to support this vulnerable societal group,
South Africa has instead created the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP). The creation
of a large, national public employment programme45 is relevant here because many of the people
44
Social assistance programmes are commonly known in South Africa as ‘social grants’, and ‘social assistance
The programme has been severely criticized because it does not create any ‘real’, permanent jobs (and income) for
beneficiaries and offers only meagre, short-term employment to those lucky enough to be enrolled (Meth 2011; McCord
2012). Its potential in providing any kind of safety net to the unemployed is further diminished due to the fact that it is
not an employment guarantee scheme, and therefore does not provide income security through a guaranteed minimum
73
who end up working on EPWP projects are precisely those who would otherwise have been eligible
for support through social assistance. The state has thereby effectively chosen to focus its anti-
poverty efforts in relation to poor adults on public works programmes which supposedly provide
the poor with the ‘dignity of work’ (Seekings 2008: 33). The design of the South African social
assistance system thus reflects a ‘classic northern conception of desert...[that] those poor who are
unable to work should be assisted, but those of working age must go out and earn a living (or be
The lack of universality in the South African system has two very important implications. The
first is that in spite of one of the world’s highest rates of unemployment, all adults who are physically
able are compelled to rely on selling their labour to earn an income through working (Seekings 2008:
33). The second, related, implication is that some people — adults who are unable to find work —
should be allowed to live in poverty. Thus emerges the first important feature of the South African
system: the coverage gap resulting from the lack of any social assistance programmes supporting
Moving beyond these key framing contours, it is important to identify the legal and institutional
framework governing the administration of social grants. This is derived from provisions contained
in the following set of laws and regulations: sections 27 (1) (c) and 27 (2) of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa (RSA 1996a); the Social Assistance Act, as amended (RSA 2004); the
South African Social Security Agency Act (RSA 2004); the Department of Social Development’s
(DSD) Regulations (RSA 2009); the Promotion of Access to Information Act (RSA 2000a); the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (RSA 2000b); the Promotion of Equality and Prevention
number of days of work for the unemployed (Mpedi 2014: 32). These features further underscore the fact that the
implementation of the EPWP instead of a social assistance programme aimed at working age adults constitutes a
74
of Unfair Discrimination Act (RSA 2000c); and the Public Finance Management Act (RSA 1999a).
The social assistance system is centrally administered by the national DSD, which is responsible
for formulating policies, regulations and guidelines. However, a subsidiary of the department, the
South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), is the implementing agent. SASSA is a section 3
(a) entity under the Public Finance Management Act, and its stated aim is to ‘[pay] the right social
grant, to the right person, at the right time and place’ (Interview 2; SASSA 2014). Prospective
beneficiaries therefore have to apply for grants at local SASSA (not departmental) offices. In
addition to the head office in Pretoria, SASSA currently has 902 service points, 335 local offices
and 9 937 pay points spread throughout a total of 44 districts across the country, with more than
Individual Programmes
This institutional overview sets the scene for an introduction of the individual social grants which
constitute the system, as administered by the DSD through SASSA. Table 5.1 provides information
on the respective grants, the beneficiaries and age brackets they target, their monthly monetary
value, and the total number of beneficiaries currently benefiting from each programme.
(max 5)
Disabled Adults
Table 5.1: Social Grants in South Africa (Source: RSA 2014; SASSA 2013)
75
Social assistance in South Africa is composed of five46 primary social grants currently paid out
to 15 644 273 total beneficiaries on a monthly basis (SASSA 2013). The system can broadly be
divided into providing support for children on the one hand, and the elderly and disabled on the
other. The first element of the social assistance system is the Child Support Grant (CSG), which
forms the single biggest social assistance intervention with almost 11 million beneficiaries (SASSA
2013). It currently pays R300 (US$30)47 per child on a monthly basis to the caregivers of children
younger than 18 who annually earn less than R34 800 (US$3 480) if single, or R 69 600 (US$6 960)
The state also provides a Foster Child Grant (FCG) of R800 (US$80) per month and a Care
Dependency Grant (CDG) of R1 270 (US$127) to the caregivers of foster and disabled children
(younger than 18). The other end of the spectrum provides for the elderly and disabled adults. The
Older Persons Grant (OPG) targets the first group. It is available to all citizens above the age of 60
earning less than R49 200 (US$4 920) per year and who own assets worth no more than R831 600
(US$83 160) if single, or, if married, less than R99 840 (US$9 984) and R1 663 200 (US$16 6320),
respectively. The grant value is R1 270 (US$127) per month, with 2.9 million recipients (SASSA,
2013). Finally, a Disability Grant (DG) for adults is available in the amount of R1 270 (US$127)
per month.
46
Two additional niche grants are not explicitly listed here: the so-called Grant-in-Aid (GIA) and the War Veterans
Grant (WVG). The GIA is only available as a ‘top up’ in the amount of R300 (US$30) per month to severely disabled
people who are already receiving another social grant (SASSA 2013). For the purposes of this analysis it has thus
been incorporated into the DG. The WVG (which has a mere 479 recipients) is subsumed under the Older Persons
Grant, as it is essentially an identical social pension for war veterans above the age of 60 (SASSA 2013).
47
Current exchange rates are calculated according to the average for the third quarter of 2013: USD1.00 = ZAR10.00;
USD1.00 = BRL2.30. All exchange rates are based on data from Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer 2013.
76
Eligibility
Each of these grants is by definition non-contributory in nature, with eligibility being determined on
the basis of need. However, a specific set of targeting requirements ultimately determines whether
any given individual is eligible.48 The most significant aspect determining eligibility involves means
testing, where the income of an individual (or household) needs to be lower than a specified threshold
in order for that potential beneficiary to qualify for enrolment into the programme. The means test
essentially ‘defines [the] criteria of a target group. Ideal-typically the means test selects a group
of people who are identified as being in need and, in order to be cost efficient, the means test is
supposed to exclude those who do not need support’ (Haarmann 1998: 178). Table 5.2 introduces
Table 5.2: South African Means Test Thresholds (Source: RSA 2014)
48
An exhaustive list of the full set of eligibility requirements for each grant is attached in Appendix C.
77
Orientation
These registration requirements make it clear that the orientation of the South African system is
individualist in nature. This is in contrast to a familial orientation, where the means and eligibility
of beneficiaries are assessed based upon their position within defined family or household structures.
Instead, the South African system identifies and assesses each beneficiary as an individual.49 This
becomes especially clear with regards to the CSG, where the focus is explicitly on ‘following the
child’ by simply identifying the child’s ‘primary caregiver’, independent of familial or household
composition (Lund 2008). This ‘accommodates the mobility of [individual] children moving between
different households’ (Patel 2011: 371; Lund 2008: 53). An individualist orientation is another
Appeals Mechanism
There are two sequential remedial options available to applicants who have had their social grant
applications rejected. The first is through an internal reconsideration in terms of section 18 (1) of
matter regulated by this Act, that person or a person acting on his or her behalf may, within 90
days of his or her gaining knowledge of that decision, lodge a written application to the Agency
requesting the Agency to reconsider its decision in the prescribed manner (RSA 2010: 3).
This is an internal application handled by SASSA through its Internal Reconsideration Mechanism
(IRM), and the official reconsidering the application must be of a higher rank than the official
who initially rejected it. SASSA must inform the applicant within 90 days about the outcome of
49
This is true even though the means test does make provisions for assessing the income and/or assets of individuals
who are married. However, this is achieved by simply doubling the means test’s income threshold, and crucially does
not involve a means assessment based on per capita ‘family’ or ‘household’ income. The means test regards beneficiaries
78
reconsideration.
Should an applicant disagree with the outcome of internal reconsideration, their next option is
to lodge an external appeal in terms of section 18 (1) (a), which specifies that
a person or a person acting on his or her behalf may, within 90 days of his or her gaining
knowledge of that decision, lodge a written appeal with the Minister against that decision, setting
out the reasons why the Minister should vary or set aside that decision. (2) The Minister may —
(a) upon receipt of the applicant’s or beneficiary’s written appeal and the Agency’s reasons for
the decision confirm, vary or set aside that decision; or (b) appoint an independent tribunal to
consider an appeal contemplated in subsection (1) (a) in the prescribed manner and that tribunal
may, after consideration of the matter, confirm, vary or set aside that decision. (3) If the Minister
has appointed an independent tribunal. . . all appeals contemplated in subsection (1) (a) must be
considered by that tribunal. (4) Notwithstanding subsection (1) (a), the independent tribunal
may in the prescribed manner condone any late application by an applicant or a beneficiary
The tribunal alluded to in the legislation is the Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals
(ITSAA), which is composed of legal practitioners. SASSA must abide by any ruling made by the
Delivery
Once beneficiaries have been enrolled onto the system, the next step in the administrative process
involves delivering the actual cash payments. This is another core competency of SASSA. However,
this phase of the procedure is currently executed by a private contractor through a R10 billion (US$1
billion) government tender that will expire in March 2017, with SASSA aiming to take over full
control and administer payments in-house from that date onwards (Monama 2013). Beneficiaries
have three options in collecting their monthly grant payments: through having it uploaded onto
a SASSA biometric Electronic Bank Card (EBC) for withdrawal at selected financial institutions;
79
through collection at a one of 9 937 pay points across the country; or through delivery to the homes
Conditionality
SASSA also has the authority to conduct periodic reviews regarding the medical and financial status
of grant beneficiaries. The decision to review is based upon ‘evidence [existing] that changes in the
medical or financial circumstances [of a beneficiary] may have occurred’ (RSA 2009). The agency
must inform any beneficiary who is up for review three months in advance of the date on which the
review is scheduled to take place. SASSA conducts two basic types of reviews; a medical review
where medical proof of continued disability must be submitted, and an administrative review where
financial documentation and a life certificate (proof that the beneficiary is still alive) is reviewed.
Additionally (and if applicable), beneficiaries who receive their grant payments through a bank
or similar institution are required to fill out a life certificate for their children at SASSA offices every
year (RSA 2014). Although the review process (and anti-fraud measures) specify the circumstances
under which a grant may be terminated, it is important to note that the South African system
does not enforce any conditionalities. This is especially noteworthy with regards to the CSG, as the
norm throughout most of the developing world in relation to child-focused CTs is to place certain
This section shifts the focus towards the Brazilian case. The first step in this endeavour involves
the introduction of the country’s basic social protection framework. The labour regime component
of the Brazilian social protection framework is largely governed through the Consolidação das Leis
do Trabalho (CLT – Consolidation of Labour Laws), as amended (FRB 1943). In addition to the
respective statutory bodies and enforcement mechanisms, social insurance is divided into three
80
pillars, encompassing private sector, public sector as well as complimentary funds (MPS 2009:
13). In turn, social assistance is composed of two overarching programmes. Figure 5.3 provides a
Similar to the case of South Africa, the unemployed and workers in the informal economy are
left vulnerable by a labour protection regime that largely applies to the formal economy, while
eligibility for social insurance benefits depends on previous contributions. This means that, just as
in South Africa, social assistance is the only component of the Brazilian framework which provides
significant protection to people who are not eligible to be supported through formal, contributory
Servants’ Social Security fund it is Regime Próprio de Previdência Social (RPPS); and for the Complimentary Social
81
SOCIAL PROTECTION IN
BRAZIL
Figure 5.3: Social Protection in Brazil (Source: Adapted from NPC 2011: 329; MPS 2009: 13)
This initial contextualisation now allows for the introduction of the precise technical features of
the Brazilian social assistance system. This involves an examination of systemic coverage, the legal
and institutional framework, the individual programmes comprising the system, the benefit levels
of these programmes, their targeting and eligibility requirements, delivery mechanisms as well as
relevant conditionalities.
82
Coverage
It is highly instructive to map the Brazilian system in a similar way to the South African one in
terms of lifecycle risks, in order to gain a better understanding of the overall approach to coverage.
This is done in figure 5.4 by assessing whether there is a social assistance programme in existence
Health/Disability Health/Disability Risk: Health/Disability
Risk: Risk:
Figure 5.4: Brazilian Lifecycle Risks (Source: Adapted from Smith 2011)
This figure reveals that, in contrast to South Africa, the Brazilian social assistance system does
provide coverage throughout the entire lifecycle. Importantly, this includes a basic social assistance
benefit protecting able-bodied unemployed adults. Indeed, a full 15 percent of PBF beneficiaries
are impoverished adults who do not have any children (Interview 12).
The Plano Brasil Sem Miséria (PBSM – Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan) further illumi-
51
A checkmark indicates that there is a programme aimed at addressing a particular risk, while a question mark indi-
cates that there is no programme in existence protecting against a specific risk. In the education phase, the programmes
providing support are the basic, variable 1 and variable 2 Programa Bolsa Famı́lia benefits (poverty/education funding
risk) and the Benefı́cio de Prestação Continuada (health/disability risk). During the accumulation phase the basic
Programa Bolsa Famı́lia benefit is aimed at poverty/unemployment risk, while the Benefı́cio de Prestação Continuada
covers the health/disability risk. Finally, for the dependent phase, the Benefı́cio de Prestação Continuada covers both
83
nates the the system’s approach through instituting a ‘residual’ benefit52 which is explicitly aimed
at making sure that all social assistance beneficiaries live above the extreme poverty line, while
prioritising the inclusion of all eligible families by mandating that the state actively search for un-
registered potential beneficiaries (FRB 2011b). The universality of the system, as well as the stated
focus on using it to eliminate extreme poverty,53 means that the Brazilian regime has some very
The first is that able-bodied adults should not be left solely to rely on selling their labour to earn
an income. The second implication is that no person should be allowed to live in ‘extreme’ poverty.
In fact, Brazil was the first country in the world to adopt legislation towards the implementation
of a Basic Income Grant (BIG), which would guarantee a minimum basic income to every citizen
regardless of need. President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva signed the bill establishing the BIG into
law on 8 January 2004 (FRB 2004a). The law envisions a progressive rollout of the policy, with
the focus initially being on those most in need of income support. Some within the government
in fact regard the PBF to be the first step towards the full-scale implementation of a universal
BIG in Brazil (Suplicy 2008: 4). The fact that coverage is universal across the lifecycle, as well as
the implications flowing from this, therefore constitutes the first important feature of the Brazilian
system.
The analysis now turns towards the legal and institutional framework, with the following set of
laws and regulations governing the overall system: articles 203 and 204 of the Constitution of the
Federative Republic of Brazil (FRB 1988); the Lei Orgânica de Assistência Social (LOAS – Organic
Social Assistance Law), as amended (FRB 1993; 2011); the Regulations as set forth in decree number
52
See table 5.3.
53
There is some controversy over the (inherently political) ways in which the extreme poverty line is determined in
Brazil, with the current level of R$70 having been set in July 2009 (Interview 12).
84
6.214 (FRB 2007); the Polı́tica Nacional de Assistência Social (PNAS – National Social Assistance
Policy) (FRB 2004b); and the ‘Bolsa Famı́lia Law’ number 10.836, as amended (FRB 2004c).
Overall coordination responsibility for the decentralised social assistance system is situated
within the national Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (MDS – Ministry
of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation) through the Sistema Único de Assistência Social
(SUAS – Unified Social Assistance System). However, the ministry has no field offices and only
coordinates and transfers funds to states and municipalities, who are then responsible for disbursing
the funds.
Individual Programmes
This institutional structure governs the individual programmes that constitute the Brazilian system.
Table 5.3 introduces these programmes, and provides information on the target groups and age
brackets, monthly monetary value as well as the means test thresholds for each programme. The
Brazilian system, with more than 54 million total beneficiaries, can be meaningfully divided into a
system of support for older and disabled people on the one hand, and all other households on the
other.
The first social assistance programme to be implemented in post-authoritarian Brazil was the
Benefı́cio de Prestação Continuada (BPC — Continuous Cash Benefit), which was effected in 1995.
It is the direct result of constitutional article 203 (5), as it transfers a monthly cash amount equal
to the minimum wage (currently R$677 or US$294) to disabled individuals of any age and to those
above the age of 65 whose household per capita income is less than one quarter of the minimum
wage (R$169 or US$73) per month. By September 2013, the BPC went to 3.9 million elderly and
disabled beneficiaries, making it a core element of the overall social assistance system (MPS 2013:
11).
The other major component of Brazilian non-contributory income support is the PBF. The
PBF was created in January 2004 through the merger of four smaller pre-existing programmes
85
Programme Target Group Ages Monthly Value
Bolsa Famı́lia (Variable 1) Households in poverty (R$70- 0-16 R$32 (US$14) per child (max
Bolsa Famı́lia (Variable 2) Households in poverty (R$70- 16-18 R$38 (US$17) per adolescent
Bolsa Famı́lia (Residual) Households still in extreme poverty All Per capita value of residual
PBF benefits
uada (Disability)
Table 5.3: Social Assistance Programmes in Brazil (Sources: CEF 2014; MPS 2013: 11)
which were all aimed at supporting families earning less than half the minimum wage. The PBF
those citizens not covered by the BPC (Bither-Terry 2013: 114). It has since undergone continued
expansion and maturation, with a total of 13.8 million families (representing more than 50 million
individuals) currently enrolled (FRB 2013). This makes it the largest CT programme in the world.
The programme consists of a fixed and a variable component. The first is a basic monthly
benefit of R$70 (US$30) paid to households in extreme poverty, defined as a monthly income of
less than R$70 (US$30) per capita (this applies to all households, even those without children or
youths). The second component is a variable benefit, which is paid to poor families with children
who have monthly earnings between R$70.01 (US$30) and R$140 (US$61) per person. For families
with children younger than 16, the benefit amount is R$32 (US$14) per child, up to a maximum
of five children. For households with children aged 16 or 17, the benefit is R$38 (US$17) for a
86
The residual benefit is aimed at all households that are still in extreme poverty even after
receiving the PBF’s other benefits. This means that if a family’s per capita income is still below R$70
(US$30) per month after receiving the variable PBF benefit, the household will additionally receive
the residual benefit equal to the remaining ‘extreme poverty gap’. For example, if a family’s per
capita income is equal to R$42 (US$18) per person after the PBF’s variable benefit, the household
will receive an additional R$28 (US$12) per capita to bring income levels above the extreme poverty
The existence of this benefit highlights the dual nature of the PBF. On the one hand there
is an explicit focus on the PBF’s role as a vehicle for universally eliminating extreme poverty in
Brazil through the unconditional transfer of cash (via the basic and residual benefits) to all families
living in extreme poverty. On the other hand there is an additional emphasis on breaking the
intergenerational cycle of poverty through the conditional variable benefits aimed at children and
adolescents (Fiszbein et al. 2009). The combination of these elements has led some analysts to
regard the PBF as an ‘unconditional CT nestled within a conditional CT’ (Interview 12).
Eligibility
The Brazilian system also incorporates means testing, with a specific set of eligibility requirements
for each programme. The means test threshold for each individual programme is introduced in table
5.4.54
54
Refer to Appendix D for a list of additional requirements.
87
Grant Name Individual Means Test Threshold
Bolsa Famı́lia (Residual) Below R$70 (US$30) even after receiving other Bolsa Famı́lia
benefits
(Disability)
Age)
Table 5.4: Brazilian Means Test Thresholds (Sources: CEF 2014; FIAP 2011)
Orientation
In contrast to South Africa, the requirements related to eligibility highlight the fact that the orien-
tation of the Brazilian system is familial in nature, because ‘the [fundamental] assistance unit is the
family’ (Lindert et al. 2007: 54). The LOAS law clearly specifies that social assistance is aimed at
supporting those people who do not have the ‘means to provide maintenance of their own or have
it provided by their family’ (FRB 2011a). Indeed, ‘the concept of family was first defined in [article
20] of the LOAS as a “mononuclear unit, living under the same roof, which is maintained by its
members’ contributions”’ (Legido-Quigley 2009: 5). Subsequent amendments have slightly altered
the definition, with it currently reading that the ‘family consists of the applicant, [their] spouse or
partner, parents and, in their absence, a stepmother or stepfather, unmarried siblings, unmarried
children and stepchildren, provided they live under the same roof’ (FRB 2011a).
The result is that eligibility is determined through measuring the per capita income of the
entire household (total household income divided by the total number of family members). This
is distinct from an individualist orientation, where only the individual income of the applicant or
primary caregiver (and his or her spouse, if applicable) is taken into consideration when applying
88
the means test, with total household income and family composition not featuring at all. This
Appeals Mechanism
Turning to the issue of controls and appeals in Brazilian social assistance, it is important to note that
qualification for PBF benefits does not automatically guarantee that an applicant will receive them,
as the PBF is technically not a social right (Interview 12). However, an applicant is still allowed to
lodge a complaint or appeal against rejection. The inherent decentralisation of the system means
that municipalities are the primary entities responsible for handling complaints and appeals, and
they must communicate decisions on outcomes within 15 days to appellants (Lindert et al. 2007:
54; 79). It is only in cases where the municipalities are unable to resolve a dispute that the matter is
escalated to the MDS. BPC applicants have 15 days to appeal against a rejection and — unlike the
PBF — an applicant does have the option of going to court in order to have an appeal overturned,
because the BPC is considered to be a constitutional right (Legido-Quigley 2009: 5; Interview 12).
Delivery
The process of delivering the payments for the PBF and BPC takes place through the regular
banking system, with some branches also operating in post offices, lottery agencies and commercial
establishments (Medeiros, Diniz & Squinca 2006: 4). While the procedure for the BPC is managed
by the Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS – National Institute for Social Security), it follows
the same pattern as the PBF. In the case of the PBF, the Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF – Federal
Savings Bank) credits payments to beneficiaries’ EBCs on a monthly basis. Although the payments
are implemented by the CEF, the process if overseen by the MDS. The ministry firstly validates
the monthly beneficiary list and then sends a financing proposal to the Treasury for approval. The
CEF then generates the monthly payroll and, following approval by the Treasury, issues a bank
order and transfers funds from a Treasury account located at the Central Bank to the CEF’s PBF
89
account. The final step in the process then involves the crediting of beneficiary accounts (Lindert
Beneficiaries can withdraw this money from any of the 2 000 CEF branches and 30 000 other
participating locations throughout the country. Fully 97.8 percent of beneficiaries use the EBC
to withdraw their monthly benefits, with 65 percent preferring lottery points, 30 percent using
automated teller machines55 and 5 percent making withdrawals from stores or supermarkets. The
remaining 2.1 percent who do not use EBCs withdraw their benefits from CEF agencies. Beneficia-
ries have 90 days to withdraw the funds, after which time it is returned by the CEF to the original
Conditionality
While beneficiaries are re-evaluated every two years, the BPC is an unconditional programme. In
fact, it can be regarded as more than that, as its constitutional position enshrines it as a universal
citizenship right that cannot be denied and ‘any individual who meets the eligibility criteria can
receive the benefit and might demand it judicially’ (Medeiros, Britto & Soares 2008: 2). This is in
contrast to the child-focused components of the PBF, where conditionality is deeply enshrined as
part of the programme’s operation. Here the Brazilian system stands in sharp contrast to its South
African counterpart (the CSG), as the PBF endows beneficiaries with a set of responsibilities which
These include an 85 percent school attendance requirement for children between six and 15
years old and 75 percent for 16 and 17 year olds; prenatal monitoring of pregnant and lactating
mothers between 14 and 44; immunisation and growth monitoring for children between zero and
seven; and an 85 percent attendance rate of socio-educational services by children and adolescents
up to 15 years of age who are at risk or have been liberated from child labour (Jaccoud, Hadjab
& Chaibub 2010: 12). Failure to adhere to these conditions initially results in an intervention by
55
Beneficiaries are however not required to have a bank account.
90
a social worker, temporary suspension of the benefit and ultimately, following a third instance of
the Brazilian social assistance system: the incorporation of conditionalities in programmes aimed
It is clear from this technical discussion that a number of similar fundamental features emerge across
the cases. However, these similarities are all related to the basic composition of social assistance as
a distinct category within social protection. The fact that both systems are non-contributory CTs
where eligibility is determined on the basis of need only tells us that they are in fact both social
assistance regimes, and does not tell us anything about different policy choices or dissimilar overall
The previous sections therefore set the scene for a more abstract extrapolation of the different
approaches taken by South Africa and Brazil. This section will undertake such an extrapolation
by directly contrasting the relevant features. This involves an assessment of possible differences
regarding the overall benefit values of the systems, their overall coverage, conditionality and systemic
orientation. The analysis indicates that there are no significant differences in terms of overall value,
while vitally important differences emerge with regards to coverage, conditionality and orientation.
Comparing Value
Perhaps the most intuitive area to commence with a direct comparison of the two systems is assessing
their overall value. Significant differences in the amount of money that actually ends up in the
hands of beneficiaries would clearly constitute an important feature in need of explication. The
same applies to significant differences in targeting through means test thresholds. However, an
analysis based upon the available data suggests that the overall benefit and targeting levels of the
91
South African and Brazilian systems are quite similar.56
A headline figure which is often used to assess and compare spending levels across countries
is total social assistance expenditures as a percentage of GDP. In 2008, this figure (calculated on
the basis of spending reported by individual countries to the World Bank) stood at 1.4 percent for
Brazil, while the corresponding number for South Africa was 3.2 percent (Weigand & Grosh 2008:
7). While this seemingly indicates a notable difference between the two countries, there are myriad
problems with simply using this all-encompassing figure as the basis for analysis.
This includes the fact that there are no comparable data available on what fraction of these
figures are purely administrative and other spending. Some countries may include social service
provision under social assistance spending, while others do not. Another obvious problem is the
fact that different countries (especially ones with different institutional structures) can have vastly
different reporting frameworks and definitions. In sum, concentrating only on this expenditure
would be misleading, as ‘not all spending counts equally’ and ‘expenditures are epiphenomenal to
the theoretical substance of welfare states’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 19). The result is that this
simple figure does not tell us much about the strictness of targeting or the amount of money that
The only way to determine whether there are significant differences between benefit and targeting
levels is therefore to directly compare the actual value of social assistance benefits, as well as the
relative severity of the means tests. This is achieved through the construction of a weighted value
measure which takes into account both the benefit amounts paid to beneficiaries as well as the
relevant means test thresholds, to enable a viable side-by-side comparison of the cases. The first
step in compiling this measurement involves calculating the composite benefit values paid out to
beneficiaries. Figure 5.5 indicates that the weighted average monthly benefit value paid out per
92
80
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Brazil South Africa
A higher level in figure 5.5 indicates higher payout amounts, with composite benefit levels there-
fore being slightly higher in South Africa. But this is only one element in the overall measurement
of programme value. The second feature to take into account is the strictness of the respective
means tests. A direct comparison of the rigidity of means test thresholds is introduced in figure 5.6;
it indicates that the composite average means test threshold in Brazil is US$57.50 and US$55.71 in
South Africa.58
producing a final figure encompassing the total expenditure on social assistance benefit payouts every month by each
country. The corresponding amount for Brazil is US$21 292 560 54 and US$907 078 561 for South Africa. These
totals were then divided by the total number of beneficiaries paid each month (53 907 804 in Brazil and 15 644 273
in South Africa) to produce a weighted average of U$39.50 received per beneficiary in Brazil and US$57.98 in South
Africa.
58
Calculating these composite averages involved a slightly more complicated procedure than the one that was
required to produce figure 5.5. The complication stems from the different orientations inherent to the systems.
Whereas Brazil’s familial orientation measures eligibility in terms of total monthly per capita household income,
South Africa’s individualist approach only assesses the income of individual beneficiaries without regards to household
structure. The only workable solution in enabling a meaningful comparison thus involves firstly converting the South
African means test into one similar in shape to its Brazilian counterpart. This is achieved by firstly dividing the means
93
80
60
(US$) 50
40
30
20
10
0
Brazil South Africa
As with figure 5.5, a higher level in figure 5.6 indicates a more generous means test threshold.
The result is that in this case Brazil has a slightly more generous approach. However, the only way
to draw any concrete conclusions from this comparison is by constructing a composite measure of
overall value by combining both benefit levels and means test thresholds into one weighted average
test thresholds indicated in table 5.2 by 12 to produce a ‘monthly means test’ figure for South Africa. The next step
entails a further division of this figure based upon the average household sizes of social grant beneficiaries. Research
into the household composition of social grant recipients in South Africa indicates that the average household size
for beneficiaries of the CSG is 6.4, while the corresponding figure for OPG beneficiaries is 5 (DSD et al. 2012: 15;
Ambler 2011: 54). These are the household sizes that were applied to the respective grants in the conversion of the
South African means tests. Once this conversion was achieved to enable direct comparison, the same basic procedure
as the one employed in figure 5.5 was followed. This involved weighting each individual social assistance programme
by multiplying the number of beneficiaries that receive it by its means test threshold. This procedure was repeated
for each programme, producing a final figure encompassing the combined value of monthly means test levels in each
country. These totals were subsequently divided by the total number of beneficiaries paid each month (53 907 804 in
Brazil and 15 644 273 in South Africa) to produce a composite average means test threshold of U$57.50 per beneficiary
94
value measurement. This measure is introduced in figure 5.7, which indicates that the composite
average value of the Brazilian system is US$48.50 per beneficiary, while the corresponding figure
is US$56.85 for South Africa.59 This analysis of the benefit levels and means test thresholds of all
80
70
Weighted Average Value (US$)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Brazil South Africa
social assistance programmes in South Africa and Brazil thus indicates that the overall values are
similar. The only conclusion to be drawn from this is that there is fundamentally no real variation
Comparing Coverage
The first important feature where significant contrasts do emerge is in relation to the issue of which
people are actually covered by the social assistance systems in both countries. The mapping of basic
lifecycle risks indicates that both countries have provisions to support children, disabled people of
all ages, as well as the elderly. An important contrast however emerges regarding the issue of
impoverished able-bodied adults. Whereas Brazil provides some support to such families who live
59
This consolidated measurement of overall generosity is created by adding the weighted average benefit value (figure
5.5) and the weighted average means test threshold (figure 5.6) together, and dividing the resulting number by two.
95
in extreme poverty through the PBF’s basic and residual benefits, South Africa’s system offers no
such protection.
This leads to some very different implications: while the South African approach implies that
able-bodied adults should solely rely on selling their labour to earn an income, its Brazilian coun-
terpart implies that those people should not solely rely on earning an income through the labour
market; and while the Brazilian approach conceptually emphasises that no person who qualifies for
social assistance should be allowed to live in extreme poverty, the South African system accepts
that at least some people should be allowed to live in extreme poverty. This is very significant, as it
means that between 4.6 million and 17.7 million impoverished people are left unprotected in South
Africa (Stats SA 2013: XI). This distinction alludes to fundamentally dissimilar policy choices in
each country, constituting the first major feature in need of explanation: why is it that the social
assistance system provides universal60 coverage in Brazil, but only limited coverage in South Africa?
Comparing Conditionality
Another important element of social assistance policy design relates to conditionality. South Africa
— dissimilarly from the approach taken by a number of its peers — does not implement any social
aimed at the elderly and disabled in Brazil, they form an integral part of the PBF’s variable benefits
aimed at supporting children and adolescents. As mentioned above, these conditions include that
children between six and 15 years of age must achieve an 85 percent school attendance rate; 16
60
The characterisation of a welfare system as ‘universal’ is traditionally employed in debates to indicate a system
where everyone, regardless of income level, receives regular income support. It is usually contrasted to a ‘targeted’
approach where means testing is used to identify the ‘deserving poor’. This is not the context of its usage in this
study. Instead, a social assistance system is characterised here as ‘universal’ if some support is available across the
entire lifecycle, regardless of the fact that such support may be means tested (as is the case in Brazil). This stands
in contrast to a ‘limited’ approach, where certain segments of the poor are entirely excluded from even means tested
income support (as is the case with unemployed able-bodied adults in South Africa).
96
and 17 year olds must achieve a 75 percent attendance rate; prenatal monitoring of pregnant and
lactating mothers between 14 and 44; immunisation and growth monitoring for children between
zero and seven; and an 85 percent attendance rate of socio-educational services by children and
adolescents up to 15 years of age who are at risk or have been liberated from child labour (Jaccoud
This marks a vital point of distinction between the two approaches, as the literature overwhelm-
straightforward ‘income transfer’ from a ‘transfer plus interventions aimed at human. . . capital ac-
cumulation’ (Barrientos, Niño-Zarazúa & Maitrot 2010: 7). Others argue that the incorporation
both ‘present and future poverty’ through attempting to additionally break the ‘intergenerational
cycle of poverty’ by ‘encouraging investment in human capital’ (Das, Do & Özler 2005; Lindert et
al. 2007; Fiszbein et al. 2009; Santos, Paes-Sousa, Miazagi, Silva, & Da Fonceca 2011). The scope
of these claims means that this constitutes another significant point of differentiation between the
Comparing Orientation
A final interesting area of contrast emerges with regards to systemic orientation. This involves the
ways in which the societal position of beneficiaries are defined. Are beneficiaries defined based on
their positions within a specific household or family unit, or are they strictly defined as individuals
regardless of household context? In practical policy terms, the implication of this fundamental
distinction is between providing family-based income support and individual-based support (Lund
2008: 53).
While ‘the five major social assistance policies in [South Africa] focus only on specific individ-
uals’, Brazil’s emphasis on families is made explicit even by its incorporation of the word ‘family’
into the title of the PBF (RSA 2012: 7). Through the preceding examination, it becomes clear that
97
South Africa has adopted an individualist approach, while Brazil follows a familial orientation. The
issue of systemic orientation therefore constitutes another significant differentiating feature between
the cases.
This section synthesises the insights generated throughout the preceding parts of the chapter by
identifying and consolidating cross-case differences as the study’s dependent variables. It essentially
categorises the variation across the cases in terms of coverage, conditionality and systemic orien-
tation into distinct typologies which serve as the study’s dependent variables. The construction of
these typologies is informed by the existing literature, resulting in the South African case (as out-
lined in section 3.2.1) being regarded as a protective social assistance system, while Brazil (section
Addressing the descriptive research objective thus leads to the multi-dimensional identification of a
number of contrasting features regarding the social assistance systems of South Africa and Brazil.
Variation in terms of these features — coverage, orientation and conditionality — are consolidated
into the policy regime typologies which constitute the study’s dependent variables, as indicated in
table 5.5. The aim of subsequent chapters is thus to account for the emergence of the variations in
these features through examining the development of the social assistance systems in South Africa
and Brazil.
98
5.5.2 Typologies of Social Assistance
Crucially, these differences are not merely isolated contrasts nestled within contexts of otherwise
overwhelming similarity. Instead, variation on such profoundly important aspects as systemic cov-
erage, conditionality and orientation are unambiguous indicators that these cases constitute two
different ideal-types of developing country social assistance provision. This section therefore con-
solidates the variations in terms of the dependent variables into coherent classification typologies in
an attempt to make analytic sense of this significant cross-case variation and enable a subsequent
The ideal-types introduced in chapter three provide the basis for classifying the two cases.
Rudra’s (2007; 2008) work forms the foundation of this endeavour, and it is worth recalling that
her analysis identifies the existence of two ideal-types of welfare states in the developing world.
The first, the productive variant, features efforts ‘primarily directed towards promoting the mar-
ket dependence of citizens’ and shares ‘certain elements with [Esping-Andersen’s] liberal model...by
embracing...enthusiasm for the market and self-reliance’ (Rudra 2007: 379). The particular prop-
erty of the liberal paradigm which ultimately distinguishes this productive typology is the way in
which it serves to strengthen ‘the commodity status of labour’ (Rudra 2007: 379). The second
variant is the productive approach, which amounts to a ‘curious fusion of elements of socialism and
By applying this typological framework to the cross-case variation in terms of coverage, condi-
tionality and orientation, it becomes clear that the South African social assistance system best fits
the productive classification, while Brazil reflects the logic of a protective system.61 An examination
61
It is important to note that this classification not only involves borrowing terminology from Rudra (2007; 2008),
but also entails a modification of the features used to classify a system as productive or protective. This is because
her focus is upon the overall distributional regimes, while the focus of this study is only upon one aspect of the
distributional regimes, namely the social assistance element. The different scope involved thus means that, while the
logic and titles of the typologies are preserved, they are strictly applied only to the social assistance aspects of each
99
of the system’s features reveals that the South African productive approach certainly contains (in
the progress of social reform has been severely circumscribed by traditional, liberal work-ethic
norms: it is one where the limits of welfare equal the marginal propensity to opt for welfare
instead of work, [and where] the state encourages the market (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26).
The classification of the South African system as productive is based upon the fact that it as-
sumes that people should rely solely on selling their labour to earn a minimum income and that at
least some people should be allowed to live in extreme poverty through providing only limited cov-
erage. In a reflection of eminently liberal ‘work-ethic norms’, South Africa in fact actively ‘pushes’
impoverished people out of the social assistance system and into the realm of the labour market
and its associated policies through highly limited public works schemes such as the EPWP, which
supposedly provides them with the ‘dignity of work’ (Seekings 2008: 33). South Africa has further-
more adopted a more traditionally liberal approach in not prescribing behavioural conditionalities
and strictly defining beneficiaries as individuals without regards to family structure, as well as by
‘switching from biological parent to practical carer’62 in terms of its ‘follow the child’ policy (Lund
2008: 64).
In contrast to this, Brazil’s system is classified as protective. Consistent with the above defi-
nition, it certainly involves a ‘curious fusion of elements of socialism and conservatism’. It can be
convincingly argued that by not assuming that people should solely rely on selling their labour to
earn a minimum income and emphasising that no person should be allowed to live in extreme poverty
through providing universal coverage (as well as at least legally adopting a BIG), the Brazilian sys-
tem reflects a certain ‘distrust of markets’. An interesting conservative element also emerges in the
Brazilian case, as the state both actively intervenes in the choices made by beneficiaries through
country’s overall distributional regime.
62
Lund explicitly expresses concern about the reaction from conservatives to these liberal policies, who may regard
100
its conditional approach and defines beneficiaries in terms of their family structure. Both of these
the preservation of traditional family-hood’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). Brazil’s system is there-
fore indeed an interesting mixture of social democratic and conservative essentials, in accordance
the outstanding criterion for social rights must be the degree to which they permit people to
make their living standards independent of pure market forces. It is in this sense that social
The analysis suggests that the South African approach certainly permits people to ‘make their living
standards independent of pure market forces’ to a lesser extent 64 than in Brazil. This compara-
tively lesser decommodification in South Africa is complemented by liberal policies with regards to
autonomous decision making and defining beneficiaries as individuals. This enables classification of
the South African social assistance regime as productive. In contrast, the social democratic element
through conditionalities and defining family structures, thus allowing it to be classified as a pro-
tective developing country social assistance regime. This synthesis of the different policy outputs
This analysis thus serves to integrate the variations which were inductively identified throughout
previous sections of this chapter into distinct social assistance typologies, which in turn constitute
the study’s dependent variables. This inductive approach to classifying the dependent variables
enables a focus in subsequent chapters on addressing the explanatory research question: what
63
Although clearly in a very different context from the developed welfare states he examined.
64
There are certainly no developing countries that achieve levels of decommodification comparable to those achieved
by some OECD nations, meaning that there are no developing countries where people can truly ‘make their living
standards independent of pure market forces’. However, some are comparatively more decommodifying than others.
101
Feature Productive (South Africa) Protective (Brazil)
accounts for these differences between the South African and Brazilian social assistance systems?
5.6 Conclusion
The focus in this chapter has been on addressing the study’s descriptive objective concerning the
qualitative features of, and differences between, the South African and Brazilian systems of social
assistance. The process involved an initial contextual overview of social protection in South Africa
and Brazil, followed by a subsequent in-depth discussion on the precise features of social assistance
in each country. This discussion included a focus upon a range of fundamental elements, including
an examination of coverage, benefit levels, the legal and institutional frameworks governing each
system, the individual programmes that constitute the two approaches, targeting and eligibility
The final sections of the chapter moved away from technicalities towards an abstraction of the
cases by specifying divergence in terms of coverage, conditionality and systemic orientation. These
differences were consequently incorporated into the construction of distinct typologies, with the
South African social assistance system being classified as productive, and the Brazilian system as
protective. The empirical fact of these qualitatively distinct policy typologies constitute the study’s
dependent variables. By undertaking this descriptive overview, the chapter has thus contributed
towards the identification of important variations across the cases. The focus in subsequent chapters
shifts towards explaining the emergence of these different typologies and their associated features
102
Chapter 6
in South Africa
6.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the explanatory research question for the South African case. As such, it
aims to account for the emergence of a productive social assistance system in South Africa through
carried out inductively, guided by the study’s analytical framework of ACI. Figure 6.1 describes the
ACI analytical procedure for the South African case. The application of this approach initially en-
tails a detailed examination of the institutional context according to the two independent variables.
This is followed by an examination of the ways in which the resulting institutional configuration
channelled interactions among policy actors into concrete policy outputs. Figure 6.2 introduces the
The chapter commences by addressing the first independent variable through analysing the his-
torical emergence and institutionalisation of social assistance norms in South Africa. It examines
both the historical process that initially led to the entrenchment of a productive approach to social
103
Institutional Setting
(1) Norms deeply Institutionalised
(2) Concentrated State Structure
Policy Environment
Figure 6.1: Actor-Centred Institutionalism – South Africa (Source: Adapted from Scharpf 1997: 44)
IV1:
Institutionalisation of
Social Assistance
(High)
Constitutional- Preferences of Interactions Policy
Legal Policy Actors between Actor Sets Outputs
Framework (Productive
IV2: Concentration of System)
State Structure (High)
assistance, as well as the way in which this approach and its associated norms were subsequently
constitutionally transferred into the political economy of the post-apartheid state. It is essentially
an eight decade story of path dependence which saw the survival and entrenchment of productive
social assistance norms codified during the transition to democracy in the early 1990s. This is
followed by an examination of state structure as the second independent institutional variable. The
discussion focuses on both the formal institutional construction of the state and the distribution
of political power during the period under examination. It concludes that South Africa featured a
104
highly concentrated social assistance policymaking structure, with the capacity to formulate and
implement policy having been entirely centralised. Analysing these two independent variables there-
The subsequent section proceeds to examine the way in which interactions between actors from
the policy community, embedded within the previously specified institutional context, effected the
distinctive policy outputs constituting the contemporary South African social assistance system. In
accordance with the ACI analytical framework, this is achieved through specifying actor preferences
and analysing the way in which interactions between different actor sets determined the shape of
the country’s social assistance policies. The chapter thus demonstrates that an examination of
institutional structure is able to account for the fact that post-apartheid South Africa features a
This section initially conducts an overview of the emergence of distinct social assistance norms in
South Africa following unification in 1910. The analysis shows that by the time of the transition to
democracy in the 1990s, institutional norms regarding limited coverage, an unconditional approach
and an individualist orientation had become deeply entrenched in the South African political econ-
omy. This is followed by an examination of the extent to which these norms were subsequently
legally codified and institutionalised through the current Constitution and other pieces of flagship
social welfare legislation. The section thus addresses the first independent variable by analysing the
historical emergence and institutionalisation of distinct social assistance norms in South Africa.
By the time of South Africa’s transition to democracy in the 1990s, social assistance policies had
become deeply institutionalised in the country’s overall political economy (Kruger 1992; Duncan
105
1993; Van der Berg 1997; Seekings 2000; 2006; 2007). In fact, already as early as the 1930s, ‘South
Africa had developed a welfare state that was remarkable in terms of both the range of risks against
which it provided and its coverage of the poor’ (Seekings 2006: 1). Even more remarkable were
the specific features of this welfare state, as ‘unusually in the world, and exceptionally in the global
South, South Africa developed in the course of the twentieth century a public system based primarily
An overview of social assistance since the unification of South Africa can be meaningfully di-
vided into three main epochs: an initial period seeing the introduction and elaboration of the first
programmes: the OPG,65 DG and State Maintenance Grant (SMG); followed by the introduction
of apartheid and the associated reracialisation and retrenchment of social assistance programmes;
as well as a period of later apartheid featuring systemic expansion and reduced inequality. This
subsection carries out a review of the pre-1994 period in order to demonstrate the extent to which
certain features became deeply entrenched in the country’s approach to social assistance. These
features subsequently played a crucial role in shaping the institutional context and preferences held
The scarcity of historical examinations into the provision of social assistance (and social security
more broadly) in pre-colonial Africa is a serious shortcoming which hampers attempts at analysing
their potential path dependence effects. While the absence of formal institutions in pre-colonial
Africa certainly does not preclude the presence of strong, informal institutions catering for impov-
erished people, it does make it very difficult ‘to trace the development of [social assistance] before the
arrival of formal institutions from Europe and has made it necessary to start in the. . . Eurocentric
way with the first European settlement at the Cape in 1652’ (Kruger 1992: 108).
65
For much of its life, this grant was known as the Old Age Pension. The name was changed to Older Persons
106
The early period of European settlement66 during the 17th and 18th centuries featured very little
in the way of even rudimentary ‘poor relief’67 and social services, with provision being dominated by
the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK – Dutch Reformed Church), and the state only featuring
in a minor piecemeal capacity (Van der Berg 1997: 485). What little role there was for the state
was dominated by extremely modest and stigmatising poor relief along the British model, including
both outdoor relief (grants in cash or in kind) which was often also administered by churches even
when funded by the state, and indoor relief in the shape of almshouses (Seekings 2007: 380).
Additionally, the common law made children directly responsible for maintaining aged and indigent
parents (Seekings 2007: 379). This situation largely persisted for most of the first two decades
following the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, as ‘poor relief [remained] the most
important state programme in the social welfare field until about 1928’ (Kruger 1992: 157).
In 1913 the Union government introduced the Children’s Protection Act (USA 1913). While
the Act ‘gave the powers to refer children to institutions and appropriate care’, it did so without
making provision for the financial implications of such referral (Kruger 1992: 161). Such provisions
only emerged in 1921 through the Children’s Protection Amendment Act, which authorised and
introduced the payment of the SMG in South Africa (USA 1921; Kruger 1992: 162; Haarmann
1998: 82). The SMG was payable to mothers, stepmothers and grandmothers who were taking care
of a child who had been committed into their care under the Act, if she was a widow, or if the child’s
father was unable to care for the child due to reasons beyond his control (Kruger 1992: 162). The
SMG can therefore be regarded as the first modern social assistance programme in South Africa,
and its aim was largely to ‘protect white family life’ (Lund 2008: 15).
66
By definition, this entire review of the pre-democratic era focuses on the role of a state where only whites (initially
only men) were enfranchised with political and voting rights, while all other groups were practically excluded from
social welfare provision, taking its name from the 1662 enactment of the ‘Poor Relief Act’ by the British Cavalier
107
In a sign of things to come, the grant was only paid in support of black children under exceptional
circumstances. Black people living in rural areas were entirely excluded, while the law stipulated
that all other avenues, such as the ‘repatriation’ of children to relatives in the rural areas or the
provision of day-care services, had to be exhausted before an application for an SMG could be
considered in respect of an urban black child (Kruger 1992: 162). The introduction of the SMG was
followed in 1924 by the proposals contained in the Collie Memorandum. This document featured the
results of an investigation into old age pension schemes and signalled a shift towards the acceptance
of state responsibility in the provision of welfare. The acceptance of this situation was deemed
necessary by the government primarily due to the extent of the problem of ‘poor whites’,68 as well
as the fear of the so-called swart gevaar (black danger) (Seekings 2007).
The early 1920s was a period of intense social, class and racial conflict in South Africa that saw
the initial emergence of poor whites: high levels of unemployment and poverty among white people,
a situation which affected about 10 percent of the white population (USA 1922; 1925; 1929; Berger
1983; Davie 2005). The period also featured a relaxation of the strict racial hierarchy69 through a
weakening of the ‘colour bar’70 and the associated practice of job reservation, due in large part to
the demand for black labourers on the gold mines of the Witwatersrand (Seekings 2007). The result
was that some rural white people had become impoverished, while some urban blacks had become
68
The pre-apartheid, apartheid as well as post-apartheid period sees the classification of the South African popu-
lation into different racial groupings, and the use of these terms is relevant to the subject of this study. The terms
‘black’, ‘coloured’ (people of mixed race and/or descendents of former Malay slaves), ‘Indian/Asian’ and ‘white’ are
therefore used throughout in this context. The terminology has been standardised where other authors have used
different terminology to refer to these population groups. Poor whites were ‘far from being the poorest people in
South Africa, but they were poor in the sense that they were poorer than growing numbers of [non-whites]’ (Seekings
2007: 381).
69
This racial hierarchy was effectively defined as 1) whites, 2) coloureds, 3) Indians and 4) blacks.
70
The colour bar was a systematic definition of racial hierarchy mainly expressed through the practise of job
reservation. It principally emerged from the 1911 Mines and Works Act, where skilled jobs were reserved for whites
108
richer (in spite of pervasive economic and social restrictions).
In turn, this led to protests from white workers in favour of stricter job reservations, with
tensions being further exacerbated through a sharp drop in the gold price in late 1921 (Krikler
2005). The situation finally exploded during the insurrectionary Rand Revolt of 1922, where white
workers attacked blacks but were in turn the victims of state repression (Krikler 2005). The Collie
investigation into old age pensions (and subsequent legislation) can therefore be regarded as having
essentially formed part of the government’s response to the crisis and the problem of poor whites, as
the elderly and invalid comprised ‘the most pressing category of “deserving poor”’ (Seekings 2007:
384).
The Collie Memorandum explicitly made the conceptual distinction between contributory and
non-contributory models of old age pension provision, setting out eight possible non-contributory
schemes for South Africa. While men and women would receive equal benefits and all of the
proposals covered non-white groups, they also discriminated in terms of benefit levels (Seekings
2007: 384). The government did not immediately act upon these recommendations. But further
the Economic and Wage Commission, continued to argue that prevailing welfare provision for the
(white) elderly and disabled was inadequate (USA 1924: 201; 1925: 112; 339).
This emerging consensus around the need for greater welfare measures led to the formation of
the Commission on Old Age Pensions and Social Insurance in February 1926. It was chaired by
senior National Party (NP) Member of Parliament (MP) Ben Pienaar and came to be known simply
as the Pienaar Commission. Its mandate featured a call to investigate ‘the payment of pensions by
the state to necessitous aged and permanently incapacitated persons who are unable to maintain
themselves and for whom no provision at present exists’ (USA 1927). The final recommendations
of the Commission featured two significant differences from all eight of Collie’s suggested schemes:
it made no provision for blacks, while the pension benefit level was set at a much lower level that
109
amounted to only £26 per year — lower than the wages paid to many black labourers (Seekings
2007: 386). The programme would also be means tested, and the Commission estimated that old
age pensions would be paid to 15 500 whites and 14 000 coloureds and Indians (Seekings 2007: 386).
In July 1928 the government officially enacted the Old Age Pension Act. It generally accepted
the recommendations of the Pienaar Commission, setting benefit levels for whites at £30 per year,
which was slightly higher than the £26 recommended by the Commission. Coloured pensioners
would receive £18 per year, while blacks and Indians were excluded. The programme was to be
means tested, with the age of eligibility set at 65 for both men and women, who were to receive
equal benefit amounts (Seekings 2007: 387). Very significantly, the law did not take into account
familial circumstances. If an applicant’s child ‘was in a position to maintain the applicant, then
the Commissioner of Pensions might recover from the child part or all of the pensions paid to the
parent, but this would not preclude the initial payment of a pension (emphasis added)’ (Seekings
2006: 6). The South African OPG, which would go on to become a deeply institutionalised feature
knowledge about contributory alternatives meant that ‘the [social] insurance option was, quite ex-
plicitly, rejected in South Africa with respect to old age pensions’ (Seekings 2007: 387). There were
essentially two reasons for this fateful choice of social assistance over social insurance: the perceived
urgency of assisting poor elderly white people and the difficulty entailed in establishing insurance
schemes that were racially discriminatory (Seekings 2007: 388). A social insurance approach would
have meant that the country would need to wait as beneficiaries first accumulated (contributory)
benefits, which would have caused a significant delay in implementation while impoverished elderly
(white) people continued to suffer. It would also have been significantly more expensive to exclude
black workers from a contributory scheme, while simultaneously raising the cost of employing white
workers.
110
These problems did not arise under a social assistance rubric, as ‘non-contributory pensions made
it easier to establish a clear and unambiguous racial hierarchy’ (Seekings 2007: 388). As a result, the
implementation of a social assistance-based OPG partly reflected the urgency of addressing white
poverty in order to ‘raise all white people to “civilised” standards of living’ (Seekings 2007: 378).
This entailed a clear response to the voting power of whites, who were the only enfranchised group
in the country. But it also revealed ‘the urgency of re-establishing a racial hierarchy [in response to
fears of the swart gevaar ] by raising the incomes of white (and coloured) people whilst excluding
The next significant step in the institutionalisation of social assistance in South Africa was the
set of five reports produced in 1932 by the non-governmental Carnegie Commission of Inquiry into
The Poor White Problem in South Africa. The Commission was funded by the Carnegie Corporation
of New York, and was composed of academics, civil society groups and representatives of the NGK.
Their work built upon prior inquiries into the poor white problem and focused renewed attention
on it,71 inaugurating a period of accelerated state social spending which featured the expansion of
existing social assistance programmes and the introduction of new ones (Seekings 2006: 19).
The expansion of the social assistance system was further propelled by the realities of the Great
71
Seekings challenges this popular interpretation by pointing out that many of the Carnegie Commission’s proposals
amounted to ‘a deeply conservative reaction against the modernising impulses represented by the Pienaar Commission
and the Old Age Pension Act’ (2006: 12). As such, he regards it as an ‘emphatic backlash against the existing
programmatic, state-based responses to poverty among white South Africans’ (Seekings 2006: 6). Whereas the
Pienaar and Economic and Wage Commission investigations of the 1920s interpreted the problem in structural terms,
the Carnegie Commission’s analysis was essentially psychological, as it stated that the redress of poverty would require
‘eliminating vice and ignorance’ among poor whites (Seekings 2006: 7). This approach was opposed by a civil society
coalition led by Hendrik Verwoerd and the Afrikaanse Christelike Vrouevereniging (ACVV – Afrikaans Christian
Women’s Organisation). Seekings further notes that, by the late-1930s, the head of the Department of Social Welfare
‘became convinced that the ACVV and Verwoerdian proposals were better than those of the Carnegie Commission
and NGK’ (Kruger 1992: 167; Seekings 2006: 25). The result was the consolidation of the emerging programmatic
system.
111
Depression, a significant improvement in public finances and a change of government in 1933. The
onset of the Great Depression fuelled the growth of poverty among ‘morally upstanding’ and ‘hard-
working’ families, which had the effect of undermining arguments about their ‘moral inferiority’
as causes of poverty. This effect was further enhanced through the concerns it generated in South
Africa about the security of white supremacy and national decline (Klausen 2004: 23). Somewhat
paradoxically, the improvement in public finances during this period was greatly facilitated by the
rise in the gold price following the collapse of the gold standard (Seekings 2006: 27).
These developments were finally consolidated by the incoming ‘fusion government’72 in 1933,
which saw the responsibility for social welfare designated to Jan Hofmeyr, who would go on to play a
decisive role in further systemic expansion (Seekings 2006: 30). The effects of the Great Depression
therefore generated a consensus on the need for a programmatic approach to social assistance, while
the government had the surplus money to spend as a result of the rise in tax revenues generated by
spiking gold prices. When combined with the incoming government Ministers’ deeper commitment
to programmatic reform, it becomes clear that this was the perfect political recipe for the expansion
This resulted in the introduction of a means-tested grant for blind coloured and white people
older than 19 in 1936; the extension of this DG to physically disabled whites in 1937; the introduction
of war veterans’ pensions and ‘cost-of-living allowances’ to protect the beneficiaries of the OPG
against rising war-time inflation in 1941; as well as ‘a number of measures. . . which to some extent
implied an awareness by the authorities of family poverty and poverty among working people’
(Kruger 1992: 169). In 1937 the state also lowered the OPGs eligibility age to 60 years for women
(while it remained 65 for men) (USA 1937a). In addition to thus generally beginning to provide for
more contingencies, the first step towards broader population coverage was also taken in 1937 with
The Act made the SMG payable under wider conditions that left more room for administrative
72
This period saw the ‘fusion’ of the South African Party and the National Party into a new United Party.
112
discretion, as the SMG could now be paid for ‘the maintenance of any child by any person in
whose custody the child has been placed under this Act or by its parent or guardian’ (USA 1937b).
Administration of the SMG was furthermore transferred from the Department of Education to the
newly established and autonomous Department of Social Welfare in 1937 (Kruger 1992: 170). While
the SMG system was still highly racially discriminatory — with 13 276 white, 5 816 coloured, 3 034
Indian and only 190 black children receiving benefits in 1942 — the amendments and administrative
consolidation broke the traditional approach where services for blacks were provided separately
through the Native Affairs Department (Iliffe 1987: 141). Kruger regards this move as inaugurating
‘a period of more coordinated, ambitious and equalizing action in the provision of social [assistance]’
(1992: 159).
Perhaps the most important step in this regard was the de jure deracialisation of the OPG
and the DG by the government of Jan Smuts. This entailed the legislative extension of pensions
for the blind and aged to blacks and Indians73 in 1944, while the DG was subsequently extended
to all disabled groups through the Disability Grants Act in 1946 (USA 1946; Kruger 1992: 171).
By 1947/48, the OPG was being paid to 196 846 black people, while 49 128 were receiving a DG
(Kruger 1992: 171). Despite the fact that this signalled the legal inclusion of all population groups
in the social assistance system for the first time, benefit levels and means test thresholds were still
highly discriminatory.
In general, the ‘means test was stricter and benefits lower for the other races than for whites’
(Kruger 1992: 171). Indeed, in 1947 the maximum monthly OPG benefit for coloureds and Indians
was 54 percent of the level for whites, while the maximum benefit level for blacks was a mere 33
percent; the corresponding ratios for the SMG stood at 34 percent and 25 percent respectively
(Pollak 1981: 157). Additionally, benefit levels were lower for rural inhabitants than for urban
beneficiaries in terms of both the OPG and SMG. While racial discrimination thus persisted, the
73
Although ‘non-statutory payments’ were already being paid since 1935 to the Indian ‘aged, infirm and blind’ and
113
1940s was nevertheless a period of expansionary reform.
social citizenship in South Africa thus has its origins in the period immediately prior to the NP’s
electoral victory in 1948. . . because the state had. . . accepted some responsibility for the welfare,
broadly understood, of the black population. It was in the early and mid-1940s that the state
first assumed this responsibility, with a series of reforms that established a multi-racial welfare
system. . . Some of these reforms were undone after 1948, but others (including especially the
As a result, South Africa had created the ‘basis of a remarkable welfare state’ by the late 1940s
(Seekings 2006: 2). The fledgling social assistance system covered all population groups (albeit in
a highly discriminatory manner) and was composed of the SMG to support children, the DG to
support the disabled and the OPG to support the elderly. All programmes were unconditional,
their orientations were individualist through defining beneficiaries without regard to familial cir-
cumstances, while overall coverage was strictly means tested and limited to the ‘deserving poor’74
The trend towards increasing deracialisation and consolidation that had clearly emerged towards
the end of the 1940s came to an abrupt halt with the electoral victory of the NP in 1948, and the
resulting implementation of apartheid. The period was ‘characterised by a direct and purposeful
assault on aspects of the new fragile welfare construction that had begun to emerge during the
previous decade’ (Bromberger 1982: 175). In terms of social assistance, the assault was expressed
Means testing and benefit levels became more potent tools in the government’s quest to increase
racial discrimination (Kruger 1992: 175-176). Indeed, in 1944 the means test threshold for social
74
In effect this was impoverished children, as well as the disabled and elderly poor.
114
pensions in terms of coloured and Indian beneficiaries was 60 percent that of the white level, while
the figure stood at 40 percent for blacks. By 1966 this ratio was further reduced to 50 percent
for coloureds and Indians, and to 12.5 percent for blacks (Kruger 1992: 175). As noted above, in
1947 the maximum monthly OPG benefit for coloureds and Indians was 54 percent of the level for
whites, while the benefit level for blacks stood at 33 percent. By 1960 these maximum levels had
been reduced to only 40 percent for coloureds, 35.9 percent for Indians and 14.9 percent for blacks
(Pollak 1981: 156-158). In terms of average monthly OPG payouts, by 1962 whites received R267.19,
while coloureds were paid R118.01, Indians R102.24 and black people a mere R25.57 (Kruger 1992:
175). This trend held true for the SMG and DG as well (Kruger 1992: 175).
This systemic contraction and increase in discrimination was further enhanced through the
return to the ‘self-balancing principle’75 in welfare administration from 1948. It resulted in the
racial fragmentation of service provision and attempts to eliminate or at least minimise the financial
cross-subsidisation of segregated social assistance services (Kruger 1992: 175). In this regard, the
logic of the apartheid political economy resulted in an attempt to move dependent blacks, including
the old and infirm, out of areas under ‘white administration’ and to the homelands.76
The aim was to ‘transfer welfare institutions and provisions to the homelands’ and to organise
welfare provision
along ethnic and tribal lines. The lack of effective administration and financial constraints on
homeland governments led to de facto pension coverage far below what legal entitlement would
indicate. The process of fragmentation of welfare provision gained further momentum after
control of coloured welfare was transferred to the Department of Coloured Affairs in 1958 and
responsibility for [blacks] to the Native Affairs Department in 1960. The involvement of other
75
A central premise of apartheid, this principle held that ‘every group should be regarded as a separate political
and economic unit’ (Van der Berg 1989a: 197). In practice, this meant that ‘white taxes’ were not to be spent on
115
population groups in the provision of black welfare was also declared as ‘contrary to policy’ in
1957, necessitating expensive and inefficient duplication of voluntary and state welfare structures
The resulting inequality was clear: by 1958 blacks composed 60 percent of the 347 000 people receiv-
ing the OPG, although they received only 19 percent of the total amount spent on the programme
By this time, the underlying nature of the South African social assistance system was becoming
clear. As shown above, it had principally been created prior to the onset of apartheid in order
to protect the white population. Given the fact that white employment was now largely secure
(in contrast to the situation during the Great Depression), the need for social assistance continued
to be limited to the most vulnerable groups: the elderly (the OPG), children (the SMG) and
the disabled (the DG) (Van der Berg 1997: 488). The retrenchments of the early apartheid period
again confirmed that despite significant poverty among particularly rural blacks in this group, social
assistance would not be forthcoming to support impoverished people of working age, as there was
In addition to therefore ignoring the needs of the majority of impoverished unemployed peo-
ple, early apartheid policies actively retrenched the social assistance safety net open to non-whites
through increasing discrimination and a concomitant contraction in coverage. All of these develop-
ments therefore served to further reaffirm the limited nature of social assistance provision through
excluding almost all but the deserving poor (here perhaps best understood simply as young, el-
derly and disabled whites), while the principles of unconditionality and an individualist orientation
remained intact.
Although it was not yet being reversed, the trend towards retrenchment and increasing inequality
in terms of social assistance started to slow during the early 1960s. This was initially made clear
116
through the fact that the positions of coloured and Indian OPG beneficiaries started to improve,
as benefit levels began to increase relative to whites (Bromberger 1982: 183). This was eventually
followed by a similar halt in the deterioration of relative benefit levels for black OPG beneficiaries
(Bromberger 1982: 183). These developments further went along with an overall increase in absolute
and per capita expenditure on black people from 1962/1963 (Kruger 1992: 178). This revealed ‘the
waning of determined efforts to reduce expenditures on black social services, possibly illustrating the
realisation of the need for cross-subsidisation between income groups and across the racial divide’
In spite of this implicit acknowledgement of the need for social assistance spending on all groups,
the idea that ‘separateness and equality can co-exist’ remained deeply entrenched (Kruger 1992:
178). The continued salience of this approach was demonstrated through the fact that administra-
tion of ‘black areas’ was taken over by the Administration Boards77 in 1972, which implied ‘an end
to all direct and indirect subsidies within municipal areas and thus reflected a continued belief in
the ideal of financial self-sufficiency of the different groups’ (Kruger 1992: 178).
Despite this shift, a more distinctive trend towards reincorporation and reduced inequality did
start to emerge from the mid-1970s, although it developed in a highly uneven and ambivalent
fashion that continued to reflect the logic of preceding periods (Bromberger 1982: 183). The
trend was expressed most clearly in the area of social assistance through a reduction in OPG and
DG spending differentials due to an increased awareness of poverty and the need for corrective
policies (Bromberger 1982: 185-187; Kruger 1992: 179). Indeed, in 1970 the maximum benefit
level for coloureds and Indians amounted to 43 percent of the level for whites, while blacks received
13 percent of the white level. By 1991, these ratios had improved to 86 percent for coloureds
77
In 1972, ‘the country was divided into twenty-two regions, in each of which an Administration Board was set
up. The Boards were to take on most of the functions previously exercised by municipalities in the administration
of urban [blacks]’ (Maylam 1990: 68). The Boards were expected to be financially self-sufficient (principally through
117
and Indians, and 74 percent for blacks (Kruger 1992: 180). Furthermore, in 1978 black people
accounted for 70 percent of the 770 000 pensioners and received 43 percent of the amount spent
on OPG benefits. By 1990, 67 percent of the total amount spent on the OPG was going to black
The slow movement towards deracialisation reflected a reluctant acceptance of the fact that
the apartheid fiscal paradigm, premised on features such as the self-balancing principle and limited
cross subsidisation, was failing (Van der Berg 1989a: 198). This meant that ‘once it was recognised
that fiscal apartheid cannot be legitimately retained in an integrated economy and society, the
implication was that horizontal fiscal justice across race boundaries was required’ (Van der Berg
1989b: 9). In the area of social assistance, practical ‘horizontal fiscal justice’ entailed taking steps
towards deracialisation and equalisation. Despite the clear emergence of a such a trend78 in the
late apartheid period, change remained highly uneven. This is reflected by the fact that despite the
progress in terms of the OPG and DG, average SMG benefit levels in 1987 for blacks was still only
among all groups, with the 1976 report of the Theron Commission on Coloured Affairs being
regarded as the first sign of this increased recognition (Bromberger 1982: 186). The growing
protest voice of the disenfranchised poor put further pressure on the state to carefully consider the
impact of social assistance policy choices (Kruger 1992: 182). However, the government’s evermore
heightened concern with equality in terms of social spending did not immediately translate into
abandoning the ideal of apartheid.79 Indeed, it can be argued that the period featured renewed
efforts to consolidate ‘separateness’ through the introduction of the Bantu Homelands Citizenship
78
Kruger rightfully cautions against over-emphasising this trend, as means tests were probably not adjusted as
rapidly as benefit levels (1992: 180). The implication is thus that weighted average composite benefit and means test
118
Act in 1970, which compelled all black people to become citizens of the homeland that purportedly
corresponded with their own ethnic group, regardless of whether they had ever lived there or not.
The concept of separate governance was additionally strengthened through the introduction of
the Tricameral Parliament80 in 1984. However, the effect of these attempts to legitimate separate
governance was ironically to further equalise social assistance spending. Indeed, a major impetus
for expanding social assistance resulted from attempts to politically legitimate the homeland system
and the Tricameral Parliament. The social assistance funds flowing to the homelands consequently
rapidly increased, especially in terms of the OPG. Both coverage and benefit values for the elderly
black population increased markedly, and ‘in 1993 there were almost twice as many black pensioners
inside the homelands as outside’ (Van der Berg 1997: 487). Additionally, social assistance funding
directed at the coloured and Indian communities also increased rapidly, with both coverage and
Incorporating these small and relatively marginal groups into the social assistance system
throughout the 1970s and 1980s was financially manageable (Van der Berg 1997: 488). The much
bigger fiscal challenge arose once the principal of parity in terms of both benefit levels and means
test thresholds across all groups was accepted in the late 1980s. The situation was further compli-
cated by the rise of neoliberal economics and the discourse of fiscal conservatism. In South Africa,
this resulted in an ‘increased insistence from government sources on the need to limit and even
reduce the role of the state in the economy’ –– also in terms of social assistance provision (Kruger
1992: 183). This resulted in a shift towards ‘residualism’ as part of the wider strategy to reduce
state expenditure and shift the burden of welfare to individual consumers (Van Niekerk 2003: 366).
Because fiscal constraints thus precluded simply increasing expenditure on black social policies to
match white levels, the focus instead shifted towards reducing entitlements traditionally earmarked
80
While the Tricameral Parliament theoretically granted limited representation to coloured and Indian South
Africans, it also served to further embed the approach of separate governance for different groups.
119
for whites. This was achieved most readily in the area of social assistance, where the number of
elderly and disabled poor whites who qualified under a regime of limited coverage was politically
marginal (Van der Berg 1997: 488). Equalisation in terms of the OPG was thus achieved through a
combination of enhancing black benefit levels (by an average of 7.3 percent each year from 1970 to
1993) and systematically eroding white levels. While in 1980 white pensions displaced more than
30 percent of average wages and black levels only displaced 8.6 percent, pension parity was achieved
in 1993 with a universal wage replacement rate of 15.5 percent (Van der Berg 1997: 488). Figure
6.3 shows the outcome of this process of equalisation for the OPG.
100
90
80
70
60
Percentage
50
40
30
20
10
0
1947 1960 1970 1991 1993
Coloureds Indians Blacks
Figure 6.3: OPG Benefit Levels as a Percentage of White Level (Source: Kruger 1992; Van den Berg 1997)
The period also witnessed the introduction of two further social grants. The state created the
FCG following the promulgation of the 1983 Child Care Act (RSA 1983). This grant was aimed
at supporting foster parents who were caring for a child committed to their care by way of a court
order (SALC 2002: 714). This was followed by the introduction of the Care Dependency Grant
CDG81 in terms of the Social Assistance Act of 1992, supporting the caregivers of disabled children
81
Lund describes the administrative inefficiency that characterised this grant at that time by stating that ‘in 1996 it
was still impossible to determine the number of CDGs. . . The CDG was applied for through the health department, but
120
(RSA 1992). Even with attempts to limit the fiscal impact of full equalisation and the elimination
of racial barriers in terms of the OPG, the DG, the FCG, and the CDG (the implementation of the
SMG meanwhile remained highly discriminatory), the effect was to rapidly increase overall social
assistance spending. Spending on the OPG thus rose from 0.59 percent of GDP in 1970 (which was
down from 0.8 percent in 1960) to 1.82 percent by 1993 (Van den Berg 1997: 487-488).
In spite of this development in relation to the deracialisation of some programmes, other funda-
mental social assistance norms that emerged during earlier periods remained wholly intact. Even
as programmes were expanded to include more groups, overall coverage remained limited through
not providing for impoverished people of working age, benefits remained unconditional and the ori-
entation continued to be individualist. In fact, the process of deracialisation during late apartheid
served to further embed these norms by beginning to extend them without alteration to cover the
entire population.
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the pre-1994 development of the South African social
assistance system was inexorably tied to the overall process of state formation within a segregationist
and eventual apartheid political economy. Table 6.1 provides a broad summary of the evolution of
the system.
delivered through the judicial services (magistrates’ courts), and the records were held at these courts, individually,
and never centralised. The welfare department simply did not know how many grants were being awarded’ (2008:
19).
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Period Note
1921-1936: Introduction
1948-1961 Contraction
1961-1980: Expansion
1980-1994: Deracialisation
Table 6.1: Evolution of the pre-1994 South African Social Assistance System (Source: Adapted from Driabe et al.
1995: 5)
an outflow of [South Africa’s] apartheid history, which allowed the tender plant of the welfare
state to be artificially protected by racial barriers, and later accounted for the surprisingly rapid
expansion of social security [through deracialisation] as the balance of social and political power
By the 1990s, many of ‘the social pensions and grants which were set up to protect the white
population [had] gradually expanded their eligibility rules to include all South Africans’ (Lund 1993:
22). Despite this incorporation of other groups, the system nevertheless continued to reflect the
underlying norms of the one originally created to protect the white population under the segrega-
tionist and apartheid paradigm. As a first step towards assessing the general landscape of social
assistance at this time, table 6.2 indicates the social assistance programmes in operation by 1994.
The striking conclusion is that the vast majority of the programmes in existence today were already
122
Name Year Created Target Current Status
Grant 18/22)
(60+/65+)
In addition to bequeathing these programmes to the incoming government, the norm of only
providing limited coverage through excluding the working age poor was also firmly entrenched
during previous periods. Reconstructing South African lifecycle risks for 1994 indicates that it
indeed mirrors the one currently in operation (with only slight differences in age eligibility) because
it too excluded able-bodied impoverished people who were too old to receive the SMG,82 and too
Poverty/Old Age
Poverty/Education Poverty/Unemployment Risk:
Funding Risk: Risk:
?
Health/Disability Health/Disability Risk: Health/Disability
Risk: Risk:
Figure 6.4: South African Lifecycle Risks in 1994 (Source: Adapted from Smith 2011)
Additionally, the core norms of unconditionally distributing benefit payments and assessing the
82
While the SMG was legally available to all groups at this point, it practically remained a highly discriminatory
programme that covered only a very small percentage of potential black beneficiaries
123
needs of potential beneficiaries through individualist means testing were also well-established during
the preceding decades. Finally, despite the significant progress that had been made in deracialising
the welfare state, the SMG remained a highly discriminatory social assistance programme by the end
of apartheid. When democracy arrived in April 1994, South Africa had thus already constructed an
elaborate social assistance system dating back some 70 years. This tumultuous historical process led
to the deep entrenchment of particular social assistance norms (limited coverage, unconditionality
and an individualist orientation) which would subsequently prove to have powerful path dependent
The transition to democracy during the early 1990s represented a critical juncture with the potential
to break the path dependent institutional stickiness that had developed through the entrenchment
of productive social assistance policies and norms during previous decades. While the South African
Constitution is often lauded as a highly transformative document that severed institutional ties with
pre-democratic South Africa, the area of social assistance represents a clear case of institutional
Instead of transforming them, the Constitution served to further embed productive norms into
the political economy of social assistance by translating them into the country’s supreme law. This
process formalised institutional norms into concrete legal rules, enhancing their ultimate effect upon
policy preference formation. This subsection reviews the constitutional provisions and policy White
Paper related to the provision of social assistance in an attempt to illustrate the ways in which they
served to embed the norms that were carried over from the pre-1994 period into the institutional
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The Constitution (1996)
The supreme source of institutional norms in South Africa is the Constitution, which was promul-
gated in 1996. Up until the adoption of this final Constitution, the country had functioned according
to the provisions of a 1993 interim Constitution that arose from the negotiations between the NP
and the African National Congress (ANC) to end apartheid. Negotiations and deliberations aimed
at drawing up the text for the final Constitution continued after the overwhelming electoral victory
of the ANC on 27 April 1994 and the subsequent inauguration of Nelson Mandela as President. The
task of finalising the Constitution thus fell upon the Government of National Unity (GNU),83 which
adopted the final text on 11 October 1996. After being duly certified by the Constitutional Court,
it was signed by President Mandela on 10 December and officially proclaimed on 18 December 1996.
The South African Constitution is generally regarded as one of the most progressive in existence,
and has even been described as ‘the most admirable Constitution in the history of the world’
(Sunstein 2001: 261). This is because it ‘gives extensive recognition to and entrenches not only
so-called first generation (civil and political rights), [but] also so-called second and third generation
fundamental rights (socio-economic and environmental rights, respectively)’ (Olivier 2002: 119-120).
This is especially true with regards to the Bill of Rights, which bestows extensive rights in areas
ranging from labour relations, the environment, land, housing, healthcare, food and water, and
with particular regard to children, education, language and cultural rights, the rights of cultural,
religious and linguistic communities, and just administrative action (Olivier 2002: 119-120; RSA
1996a: chapter two, sections 23-33). A further example of the entrenchment of a socio-economic
83
The interim Constitution provided for the establishment of a GNU, whereby any party with 20 or more seats in
Parliament following the 1994 election could claim one or more Cabinet portfolios in government. The main purpose
of the arrangement was to adopt the final Constitution in an inclusive manner. The NP announced its withdrawal
from the GNU as soon as the final Constitution was effected on 4 February 1997, although the arrangement only
125
right is the right to social assistance.
Section 27 in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution discusses a range of rights, including the
declaration in subsection (1) (c) that ‘everyone has the right to have access to. . . social security,
including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assis-
tance’ (RSA 1996a). This framing of access to social assistance as a constitutional right amounts to a
Reading this section in conjunction with section 2 of the Bill of Rights — which states that ‘this
Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and
the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled’ –– justifies the conclusion that ‘the fundamental
right to access to social [assistance] is enforceable, because section 2 explicitly states that duties
imposed by the Constitution must be performed’ (RSA 1996a; Olivier 2002: 122). This is further
‘fortified by the constitutional provision that the state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the
rights in the Bill of Rights’ (Olivier 2002: 122). The unambiguous language in the Constitution
withholding welfare payments on the basis of a failure to comply with conditions would be deemed
21 (1) (c) cited above also laid the initial groundwork for entrenching the norm of providing only
limited coverage by declaring that everyone has the right to social assistance ‘if they are unable
to support themselves and their dependents’ (RSA 1996a). This had the effect of ‘locking in’ the
principle of limited coverage (Bond 2014: 7). The Constitution furthermore introduces the principle
of the ‘progressive realisation’ of certain rights. Section 27 (2) specifically elaborates on the right to
social assistance by requiring that ‘the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of [this] right’ (RSA 1996).
126
In this context, progressive realisation is thus regarded as a ‘qualifying subsection’ to the right
to social assistance (SAHRC, 2009: iii). The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
a recognition of the fact that full realisation of all economic, social and cultural rights will
generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of time. . . It is on the one hand a necessary
flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any
country in ensuring full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the
phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective. . . which is to establish clear obligations
for states in respect of the full realisation of the rights in question (1990: para. 9).
The concept is based on the recognition that socio-economic rights would generally not be realised
in a short period of time, and it thus introduces ‘an element of some flexibility in terms of the
The Constitution therefore indicates that, alongside the right of access, ‘financial viability’ is
to be regarded as a key paradigm informing the development of social assistance in South Africa
(Olivier 2002: 122). While the Constitution places an obligation on the state to ensure access to
social assistance, it simultaneously allows a degree of elasticity in relation to three key aspects:
‘the progressive realisation of the right, the taking of reasonable measures and the availability of
resources’ (Olivier 2002: 122). When read in conjunction with section 7 of the Bill of Rights, which
declares that ‘the rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained. . . elsewhere
in the Bill’, it becomes clear that the availability of resources is to be a key factor in determining
In effect, ‘resource constraints could be a basis for the state justifying its rate of progress
(or lack thereof) in achieving the full realisation of social [assistance] rights’ (Olivier 2002: 122).
In this way, the concept effectively becomes a limitation that is placed upon the right to access
second pillar of constitutional social assistance rights is to legally entrench, legitimate and provide
127
constitutional justification for the already extant institutional norm of limiting access to social
The Bill of Rights’ extensive incorporation of both negative and positive rights84 further results
in the inclusion of strong provisions on legal and social equality. Section 9 effectively amounts to
a definition of individual equality that is more detailed than the Universal Declaration of Human
everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. . . The
state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds,
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth (RSA 1996a).
Within the context of an extremely socially and culturally diverse country such as South Africa,
this focus on promoting individual equality effectively discourages the conceptualisation and defi-
nition of social assistance beneficiaries in terms of family structure, as this would almost inevitably
involve normative definitions involving issues of marital status, religion, conscience, belief and cul-
ture.85 These provisions thus make it clear that the Constitution encourages the institutional norm
The popular narrative asserts that ‘the South African Constitution is the world’s leading ex-
apartheid “root and branch”’ (Sunstein 2001: 224-225). While there is undeniable truth to this
general statement, the effort to eliminate institutional norms originating in the apartheid and pre-
apartheid era ‘root and branch’ did not fully extend to the area of social assistance. Even though
complete deracialisation was to be achieved (completing a process that had already been underway
84
Negative rights generally include first generation civil and political rights and largely oblige inaction (prevents
infringement upon certain rights). Positive rights usually include second and third generation rights obliging an active
128
for some time), the fundamental systemic social assistance norms survived wholly intact in the new
Constitution.
In the same vein, the Constitutional Court has argued that the Constitution ‘retains from the
past only what is acceptable and represents a radical and decisive break from that part of the past
which is unacceptable’ (ZACC 1996). In terms of social assistance, racial discrimination was deemed
to be a wholly unacceptable part of the past. However, the Bill of Rights then implicitly deems as
‘acceptable from the past’ the three core norms underwriting the social assistance system in South
orientation. The Constitution effectively codified legal and institutional norms that allowed for
the further entrenchment of a productive social assistance system in the political economy of post-
The adoption of the Constitution was followed by the publication of the White Paper for Social
Welfare (WPSW) in August 1997 (RSA 1997b). The DSD describes it as ‘the primary policy
document [serving] as the foundation for social welfare in the post-1994 era’ (DSD 2014). It is
meant to further express the social welfare provisions introduced in the Constitution by articulating
the ‘principles, guidelines, recommendations, proposed policies and programmes for. . . social welfare
in South Africa’ (Potts 2012: 76). The way in which the WPSW builds on the abovementioned
constitutional provisions further reinforces the institutional norms associated with a productive
In addition to the need for completing the process of deracialisation through phasing out ‘all
disparities in social welfare programmes’, the document echoes the Constitution’s effective entrench-
the government will take steps to ensure the progressive achievement of. . . appropriate social
assistance for those unable to support themselves and their dependents. . . to give effect to the
129
constitutional right to social security (WPSW 1997: 21; 45).
In this regard, the WPSW takes ‘the lead from the [newly introduced] constitutional right of access
to social security’, acknowledging the salience of this rights-based approach and the related norm
The WPSW further builds on the constitutional caveats of limiting social assistance to those who
are ‘unable to support themselves and their dependents’ and financial viability through ‘progressive
realisation’ by introducing the paradigm of ‘developmental social welfare’ to serve as the overall
geared towards providing citizens with an ‘opportunity to play an active role in promoting their
own well-being’. The priority on individual self-activation, under the guise of ‘empowerment’
discourse, was combined with a view of social security and social services as ‘investments which
lead to tangible economic gains’. Public spending expansion was seen as dependent on economic
growth in a context where ‘the high expectations of many people for the new democratic govern-
ment to deliver welfare services and programmes to address pressing needs cannot be fully met
in the short-term’. Market forces, productivism and individual responsibility came therefore to
2005: 343).
The priority assigned to providing only limited coverage through a residual system that excludes
the ‘non-deserving’ poor (unemployed able-bodied people of working age) is forthrightly expressed
in chapter 8 of the WPSW: ‘whilst welfare programmes should be available to all South Africans,
the focus must be on the poor, those who are vulnerable and those who have special needs’ (RSA
1997b: 8.4). This approach, based on providing limited coverage, is furthermore explicitly framed
in macroeconomic terms through the admission that ‘fiscal constraints’ make it impossible ‘for the
welfare function to grow in real terms in the medium term’ (RSA 1997b: 8.11). The resulting
‘residualist orientation accompanied its emphasis on reducing dependence on state social assistance
130
The WPSW explicitly strives for the construction of a productive social assistance through
framing the state as a ‘provider of last resort’, advocating for ‘more stringent and appropriate
means testing and eligibility requirements’ and programmes intended to ‘divert people from the
ultimately and ‘programmatically’ departs from approaches based on universalism of access and
the point, wage labour discipline is presented as a stark alternative to welfare ‘dependency’
According to the WPSW’s logic, social assistance should be oriented to the economy’s needs
— not to the needs of society (Bond 2014: 4). This rationale leaves no space for social assistance
programmes to support ‘the [able-bodied] 35 to 40 percent of the working age population who
cannot find work or even engage in informal entrepreneurial activity’ (Bond 2014: 4). The WPSW
unambiguously sets out an institutional path towards constructing a productive social assistance
This section has examined the way in which the social assistance norms associated with South
Africa’s productive system came to be deeply institutionalised in the country’s contemporary polit-
ical economy. It illustrates that the rudimentary origins of the current system can be traced back
to the policies that were initially enacted during the period of segregationist and apartheid state
construction over a period of eight decades. The principles of limited coverage, an unconditional
approach and an individualist orientation all originated through this historical process.
The discussion also highlighted the fact that these norms were not discarded during the tran-
sition to democracy in the early 1990s. Instead, these principles remained unaltered as they were
legally codified in the 1996 Constitution and expanded upon in the WPSW of 1997. The historical
institutional context facing policy actors hoping to define the contours of social assistance in demo-
131
cratic South Africa was thus clear: they were operating within a policy environment where distinct
institutional norms were not only historically deeply entrenched, but had also been constitutionally
embedded. The effect of this high level of entrenchment was to significantly reduce the policy op-
tions available to actors through the mechanism of path dependence as they looked to define social
In addition to the historical development and legal codification of particular norms, the institutional
context facing policy actors was further shaped by contemporary South Africa’s highly concentrated
state structure. This section thus addresses the second independent variable through examining the
way in which the centralisation and concentration of political power in post-apartheid South Africa
influenced the institutional context and, ultimately, the capabilities and preferences of actors. It
takes a broad approach to defining state structure, focusing both on the formal state institutions
shaping policymaking capacity and the way in which political power was practically distributed.
The initial section details the formal institutional and organisational structure of the state,
highlighting the way in which social assistance policymaking capacity was wholly centralised in the
national DSD. This is followed by an examination of the distribution of political power in post-
apartheid South Africa, a discussion which serves to highlight the extreme concentration of power
in the hands of the ANC. Synthesising these two elements culminates in the conclusion that in terms
of the institutional capability to formulate and enact social assistance policy, South Africa features
a highly concentrated state structure. The capacity to determine social assistance policy is solely
vested in the national government, while said national government has been, and continues to be,
132
6.3.1 Concentrated Institutional Structure
The South African Constitution elucidates the organisational structure of the contemporary South
African state. The country is a constitutional democracy with a three-tier system of national
government and features an independent judiciary (GCIS 2012a: 286). Legislative authority is
vested in the national Parliament, reflecting the fact that South Africa is governed according to a
parliamentary system. Parliament itself is firstly composed of the National Assembly (NA), which
According to section 46 of the Constitution, between 350 and 400 representatives are elected to
the NA every five years through a closed party-list proportional representation system, where half
of the members are proportionally elected from the nine provincial party lists and the other half are
chosen from national lists (RSA 1996a). The upper house of Parliament is the National Council of
Provinces (NCOP). The function of the NCOP is to ensure that provincial interests are represented
during the national legislative process (Parliament 2014). Section 60 of the Constitution stipulates
that the NCOP ‘is composed of a single delegation from each province consisting of ten delegates’,
thereby giving equal representation to all provinces, irrespective of population size (RSA 1996a).
Section 91 of the Constitution further specifies that executive authority is vested in the Cabinet,
which is composed of the President, Deputy President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers (RSA 1996a).
The President appoints and assigns the powers of the Deputy President and Ministers, and may
dismiss them. The Deputy President and Ministers (save for two) are selected from among the
members of the NA. The President furthermore appoints a member of Cabinet to be the leader
of government business in the NA. In turn, the President is elected from among the members of
the NA (RSA 1996a: 86). Once elected President, ‘a person ceases to be a member of the NA
and, within five days, must assume office by swearing or affirming faithfulness to the Republic and
obedience to the Constitution’ (RSA 1996a: 87). The President serves a five year term of office,
and ‘no person may hold office as President for more than two terms’ (RSA 1996a: 88).
133
The third tier of national government is the judiciary, with judicial authority being vested in
the courts. Courts are wholly independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which
they are required to apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. Organs of state are
constitutionally required to assist and protect the courts (RSA 1996a: 165). The highest court in
the land is the Constitutional Court, followed by the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court of
South Africa and the Magistrates’ Courts (RSA 1996a: 166). The country features a hybrid legal
system, primarily consisting of a Roman-Dutch civil law system, a British system of common law,
In addition to the national layer, the country also features provincial and local governmental
spheres. The nine provinces have their own provincial legislatures, with members being elected
through a closed party-list proportional representation system and which consist of between 30
and 80 members (RSA 1996a: 105). Provincial executive power is located in the office of the
Premier and their Executive Committee. Managed according to chapter seven of the Constitution,
the local government level includes 226 local municipalities and 44 district municipalities (RSA
1996a). The executive and legislative authority of a municipality is vested in its Municipal Council.
Municipalities have the right ‘to govern, on their own initiative, the local government affairs of its
Importantly, schedules four and five of the Constitution specify the areas of concurrent national,
provincial and local legislative competence. Although the Constitution thus nominally contains
certain weak federal elements, the country ‘is largely a unitary state’ (Ile 2007: 2). In fact, the
a type of government that seeks to concentrate power at the centre for various reasons. It may
This means that such governmental subunits are mere extensions of the central government or
This statement is particularly true in the case of social assistance policies. According to these formal
134
institutional arrangements, welfare (including social assistance) policymaking is strictly a national
Only the national government has the constitutional authority to design social assistance pro-
grammes (Interview 1; Interview 2). The Constitutional Court has further independently affirmed
‘that social assistance is a national government competence’ and that only a national government
entity has ‘the competence to administer social assistance’ (Interview 2). SASSA was subsequently
set up in the wake of this ruling as a subsidiary of the national DSD to implement all social assis-
tance programmes, thereby further reflecting the extreme degree of centralisation of social assistance
policymaking and provision in South Africa. The result is that subnational political units have no
control or authority over the formulation or implementation of social assistance policies, with all
This highly concentrated policymaking structure, derived from the formal institutional configu-
ration, is further reinforced through the reality of political power distribution in South Africa.
Figure 6.5 illustrates that ever since the onset of democracy, the country has been a single-party
dominated state, where ‘multiple parties compete for power, but only one party wins consecutive
Under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, the ANC won its first general election in 1994 with
62.65 percent of the vote (AED 2014). This increased to 66.35 percent in 1999 when Thabo Mbeki
became President, followed by a showing of 69.69 percent in 2004 (enough support to achieve the
86
It is worth briefly considering the underlying reasons for this political power concentration in the hands of the
ANC. The defining role played by the country’s apartheid history has resulted in a situation where politics is largely
defined by racial nationalist discourse. As the party of liberation, the effect of the ANC’s nationalist legitimacy has
been to entrench its political support throughout the period under examination. This resulted in the postponement
of class mobilisation and the associated potential proliferation of political power, allowing the ANC to exclusively
135
100
90
80
70
Percentage 60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
African National Congress Democratic Alliance Other Opposition
Figure 6.5: Electoral Support, General Elections (1994-2014) (Source: AED 2014)
two-thirds majority required for constitutional change) (AED 2014). The party got 65.90 percent
when Jacob Zuma became President in 2009, followed by 62.15 percent in 2014 (AED 2014). The
period has witnessed a small consolidation of the opposition vote, with the Democratic Alliance
(DA)87 being the primary beneficiary. The party managed to increase its share of the national vote
The same one-party logic is visible in terms of provincial and local government, although op-
position parties have been marginally more successful in these spheres. The ANC controlled seven
out of nine provinces after the 1994 elections, eight out of nine following the 1999 election, all
nine provinces after the 2004 elections, and again eight out of nine following the 2009 and 2014
general elections (IEC 2014). The party has also consistently governed more than 90 percent of
the country’s municipalities since 1994 (IEC 2014). The overall conclusion suggested by the data
is clear: in contemporary South Africa, political power is highly concentrated in one party and po-
litical ‘constraints on the ANC are very weak’ (Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer 2001: 163). The
combination of one-party dominance and the strong unitary features of the state outlined above
87
The Democratic Alliance was known as the Democratic Party prior to the 2004 general election.
136
means that social assistance policymaking authority is thus highly concentrated in South Africa.
The preceding sections of this chapter have served to outline the South African institutional con-
text. The analysis indicates that social assistance norms regarding coverage, conditionality and
orientation were historically deeply entrenched, preserved and constitutionally codified during the
transition to democracy; and that both the formal institutional composition of the state, as well
as the de facto distribution of political power, means that South Africa features a highly concen-
trated state structure — particularly in terms of social assistance policymaking capacity. Table 6.3
consequently summarises the South African case in terms of the study’s independent variables.
ture
It is important to pause here and emphasise that this concludes the first part of the two-step ACI
proceeds from the assumption that social phenomena are to be explained as the outcome of inter-
actions among intentional actors. . . but that these interactions are structured, and the outcomes
shaped, by the characteristics of the institutional settings within which they occur (Scharpf 1997:
1).
The preceding sections thus set the scene for an examination of the way in which the South African
institutional setting shaped the distinct preferences of policy actors, and how these preferences were
88
This section further develops and expands upon some initial insights previously published in Schreiber 2014.
137
ultimately translated into concrete social assistance policy outputs.
This is possible because ‘once we know the institutional setting of interaction, we know a good
deal about the actors involved, about their options, and about their perceptions and preferences’
(Scharpf 1997: 41). Analysing the way in which actors embedded within the previously specified
institutional setting went about the process of policy formulation initially entails articulating the
empirical examination of the way in which interactions among members of this policy community
ultimately determined the shape of South Africa’s productive social assistance policy regime.
The shape of the South African social assistance policy community was itself determined by
the country’s concentrated state structure. Due to this institutional configuration — where only
the national government had the constitutional authority to formulate social assistance policy —
the primary venue for policymaking since 1994 has been the national DSD. The Department has
been headed by six different Ministers since then, all from the ANC. This setting witnessed the
emergence of a distinct group of actor sets comprising the social assistance policy community and
The first such set was national state actors,89 composed of bureaucrats from the national DSD,
national politicians and state legal advisers (Schreiber 2014: 269). Although this was undoubtedly
a highly diverse group of individual actors, they are treated as a collective due to the fact that
they were ‘institutionally constituted’ according to the same set of ‘pre-existing rules and that they
depend on [this same set of] rules for their continuing existence and operation’ (Scharpf 1997: 39).
This allows them to ‘coordinate their choices within a common frame of reference that is constituted
by institutional rules’ (Scharpf 1997: 39). These actors were all operating directly under the rules
138
The second composite group of actors that featured in the policy development process were civil
society actors. This actor set was composed of ‘independent experts...economists, representatives
from civil society organisations and academic researchers’ (Schreiber 2014: 269). This was quite
clearly also a highly diverse set of individuals, but they are treated as a composite group due to the
fact that they too were governed by a common set of pre-existing rules upon which they depended
for their continuing existence and operation; this group of actors all operated under the rules which
concrete social assistance policy outputs in South Africa. The nature of these interactions was
moulded by the rules governing engagements between national state actors and civil society actors.
It is important to note once more that only national state actors ultimately had the authority to
formulate policy. No politician from the provincial or local government sphere, or activist lobbying
the national DSD, could directly determine policy outputs (Interview 2). Instead of having direct
influence, the principal interaction avenue that was open to civil society actors came in the shape
Such commissions were created by the national DSD on an ad hoc basis as a formal venue for
civil society actors to provide input on social policy formulation. This mode of interaction however
featured highly
unequal power relations, with state actors having the upper hand. This is because civil society
actors were dependent on the state actors for their legitimacy. The committees were created by
the very actors who were ultimately to consider their reform suggestions. Power resided with
state actors, because any particular reform recommendation made by civil society actors could
not be implemented without their approval. This observation serves to emphasise the role of
was a deeply engrained practise in South Africa, perhaps itself constituting an institution of sorts.
139
As a result, the characteristic mode of interaction in the South African case was hierarchical direction
The role of the institutional setting was however not limited to shaping the interactions within
the policy community; it also decisively influenced the very preferences held by actors (Scharpf
1997: 1; 21). The preceding description of the institutional framework allows us to glean a great
deal of information about the preferences held by these two actor sets. At the most fundamental
level, the analysis proceeds from the assumption that state actors were in all cases motivated to
attain or retain power91 (Davis, Hinich & Ordeshook 1970: 438). In the South African context,
the overwhelming electoral majorities of the ANC however meant that these actors faced ‘little
immediate electoral incentive’ (Seekings 2008: 35). They were therefore insulated to a significant
extent from the pressures of electoral competition, with very little fear that they would be removed
from power. In policy terms, this meant that there was no need for ANC actors to distinguish
In terms of their specific preferences, constitutional provisions firstly prioritised the process of
deracialisation and equalisation of welfare programmes which had commenced during the previous
decade. The language contained in the Bill of Rights was clearly incompatible with racially discrim-
inatory policies, which meant that ‘there was a constitutional imperative that it could not only be
provided for one racial group and not for the others’ (Interview 11). As outlined above, the decla-
rations contained in section 27 of the Bill established a preference for an individualist, rights-based
approach to social assistance (RSA 1996a; Interview 11). State actors were further influenced by
the provisions related to ‘fiscal constraints’ and ‘progressive realisation within available resources’,
as outlined in section 27 (2) of the Constitution and the WPSW (RSA 1996a; RSA 1997b: 8.11).
This had the effect of creating an additional preference for fiscal restraint (Bond 2014: 10; Seekings
91
This well-established inference ‘assumes that the candidate’s objective is to maximise his plurality. Although the
rewards [actors] seek vary, it is important to note that winning, at the very least, is instrumental for realising most
140
2007: 384). The preferences of state actors thus arose in an institutional context characterized by
a strict rights-based approach, fiscal restraint and individualism — premised on continued political
and policymaking power concentration. This structure encouraged a top-down process of policy
In sharp contrast to this, the preferences of civil society actors were largely determined by
functional factors. These actors repeatedly expressed a desire to ‘solve the problem’ as they saw
it (Lund 2008: 25). Positioned outside the institutional constraints of the central government,
the preferences of this actor set were ‘directly influenced’ by the perceived features, and functional
shortcomings, of the social assistance system the country inherited from its apartheid past (Schreiber
2014: 271). The result was a thoroughgoing preference for functional effectiveness, with civil society
actors agitating for the creation of a system that could above all be deemed ‘appropriate’ and
The fact that national state actors and civil society actors occupied different positions within the
institutional setting meant that they had different answers to the question: what should the post-
apartheid social assistance system look like? State actors were primarily concerned with preserving
the deeply embedded norms of limited coverage, unconditionality and an individualist orientation.
In partial contrast, civil society actors were largely concerned with implementing functionally ap-
propriate interventions. These divergent preferences, combined with the institutional rules guiding
interactions within this policy community, set the scene for the interactions which would ultimately
Having specified the institutional setting, actor constellation, modes of interaction and the distinc-
tive preferences held by different groups of actors, this subsection proceeds to empirically trace
the way in which interactions between actor sets translated these preferences into concrete policy
141
outputs. The discussion highlights the way in which the high level of institutionalisation of norms
related to social assistance, combined with a highly concentrated state structure, led to the en-
trenchment of a productive social assistance system in South Africa. The analysis is subdivided
into three chronological parts: an initial period (1994-1999) which saw the first round of policy
formulation, a second period that witnessed largely failed attempts by civil society actors to under-
The first step in the policymaking process was taken shortly after the April 1994 elections, with the
appointment of the Lund Committee on Child and Family Support (hereafter ‘Lund Committee’
and ‘the Committee’) by the Minister of Welfare and Population Development92 in December 1995.
The Committee was headed by Francie Lund, a leading expert in social security research, and
was further composed93 of economists, representatives from civil society organisations, organised
labour and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (Lund 2008: 22-23). Its aim was to make
92
This is the previous name of the DSD.
93
In addition to being chaired by Lund, the Committee consisted of economists Pieter le Roux and Servaas van der
Berg; Laura Kganyago from the Rural Women’s Movement; Jackie Loffell of the National Committee for the Rights of
Children; Marilyn Setlalentoa from the National Welfare, Social Services and Development Forum; Jean Triegaardt of
the Joint University Committee for Social Work; Ndivhuho Sekhoba from the Maintenance Action Group; academic
Debbie Budlender; Marj Brown of the Black Sash; Marion Stewart from the Programme for Unemployed Women with
Children; and Este Lohrentz of the national Department, who was there in the role of secretariat (Lund 2008: 22-23).
142
recommendations for the reform of the state’s family support system94 (Patel 2011: 369).
The Committee’s terms of reference ‘can be read to signify the acceptance by the welfare ministry
of the discourse of targeting and limited assistance’ (Lund 2008: 25). While the appointment of
the Committee signalled a certain level of trust in the expertise of external experts, the Committee
‘crucially lacked any institutional and policymaking power’ (Schreiber 2014: 269). The outcome
of interactions between these external civil society actors and the national state actors that had
appointed the Committee were to provide the first concrete social policy outputs in post-apartheid
South Africa.
The Committee convened for the first time on 1 December 1995, with the first full meeting taking
place on 9 February 1996 (Lund 2008: 19). Committee members largely interpreted the heart of
their mandate as ‘solving the problem of the SMG’ (Lund 2008: 25). As outlined in section 6.2.1,
racial parity had largely been achieved by 1993 in terms of individual grants, with the SMG being
the primary exception. For the Lund Committee, fulfilling their mandate by ‘solving the problem of
the SMG’ meant that the content of their reform recommendations would be determined exclusively
By this time, the grant had been an entrenched feature of the social assistance system for more
than 70 years. Legally, it was available to a parent or guardian95 living with a child younger than
18 years (this age limit was extended to 22 if the child was in secondary or tertiary education)
(Haarmann 1998: 144; Lund 2008: 62). The requirements for qualification included that the parent
94
The precise mandate called on the Committee to undertake a critical appraisal of the existing system of state
support, in all departments, to children and families; to investigate the possibility of increasing parental financial
support through the private maintenance system; to explore alternative policy options in relation to social security
for children and families as well as other anti-poverty, economic empowerment and capacity-building strategies; to
develop approaches for effective targeting of programmes for children and families; and to present a report giving
143
or guardian had been deserted by the spouse for more than six months; was widowed, separated
or unmarried; had a spouse who had been in a drug treatment centre, prison or similar facility for
more than six months; or had a spouse who had been declared unfit to work for more than six
months or was receiving a social grant themselves (Lund 2008: 15). The SMG was unconditional.
It also featured a complicated two-pronged means test, with the actual cash transfer also con-
sisting of two components. Firstly, qualification for the monthly flat rate child payment of R135
(US$24) per child was limited to those applicants with monthly earnings below R1 118 (US$202)
for a single income and below R2 236 (US$404) for a dual income (when one partner received a
disability grant) (Haarmann 1998: 81). The child payment was traditionally available for up to four
children, but in 1992 this was reduced to two (Lund 2008: 15). The second part was a caregiver
allowance with a maximum pay-out of R430 (US$78) per month (Haarmann 1998: 81).
However, this component featured another, extremely rigid means test. For every R1 (US$0.18)
earned above R258 (US$47) per month, 50 cents (US$0.09) was deducted from the maximum of R430
(US$78). This continued until the minimum pay-out level of R90 (US$16) was reached (Haarmann
1998: 144). This meant that the total value of the grant for a caregiver with a single child varied
from R225 (US$40) to R565 (US$102) per month. Qualification for the caregiver component was
further predicated upon an applicant being a single parent with a child falling within the appropriate
age range. An applicant was not eligible if they received private maintenance and it had to be proven
that an attempt was made to obtain private maintenance from the partner or other parent of the
In 1995/96, South Africa’s welfare budget totalled R13.4 billion (US$3.1 billion) (RSA 1995b:
4.10). The SMG’s share of the expenditure on social grants was R1.2 billion (US$279 million)
— approximately 9 percent of the total welfare budget (Haarmann 1998: 83). It represented 84
percent of total social assistance spending directed at child and family care, indicating its undisputed
position as the most significant intervention in that regard (Lund 2008: 14). Calculations for the
144
projected costs of maintaining the existing SMG system but extending it to the entire eligible
population through deracialisation and equalisation ranged from R12 billion (US$2.7 billion) to
R13.7 billion (US$3.2 billion) (Lund 2008: 18; Haarmann 1998: 88). The latter total would have
A vital de facto feature of the SMG was that it continued to be tremendously skewed in racial
terms. Indeed, ‘black children [were] almost entirely outside the system, for the few who [did]
receive grants, the average grant size [was] much smaller than for the other races’ (Dlamini &
Simkins 1992: 70). Additionally, the system of providing the SMG had become so fractured that
the impression existed that ‘Pretoria really did not have control over what was being implemented
with regard to this particular grant’ (Lund 2008: 16). Dysfunction, uncertainty and ambiguity
prevailed. The implication of the priority assigned to providing the SMG principally to whites,
Indians and coloureds while severely neglecting blacks, combined with the administrative chaos,
was that although black children were by far the poorest and most vulnerable, very few of them
actually received the SMG. This was in contrast to coloured and Indian children, who were less
impoverished but constituted the biggest beneficiary pool. Some white children also qualified and
got the grant, but due to much lower poverty levels among this group the demand was simply not
very high.
Statistics from 1993 (the last year for which racially disaggregated welfare spending data is
available) indicates that 5 percent of coloured children, 4 percent of Indian children, 1.4 percent of
white children and only 0.2 percent of black children were in receipt of the SMG (Lund 2008 as cited
in Woolard & Leibbrandt 2010: 8). This was despite the fact that out of all impoverished people
in South Africa in 1996 (defined as less than R250 (US$45) per month) 91 percent were black, 7
percent were coloured, 1 percent were Indian and 1 percent were white (Leibbrandt, Woolard &
When this fact is interpreted in conjunction with figure 6.6 below, it meant that even though
145
the vast majority (91 percent) of poor individuals in South Africa were black, this group was only
receiving about 1.8 percent of all funds allocated through the SMG. There was thus a complete
mismatch between those in need of child-directed social assistance and those actually receiving it.
This is vividly illustrated in figures 6.6 and 6.7, with figure 6.8 showing that the situation persisted
for multiple decades. These features meant that the SMG was by no means a functionally effective
programme.
70
60
50
Percentage
40
30
20
10
0
Black Coloured Indian White
Figure 6.6: Poverty Headcount Ratio by Population Group at R250 (US$45) per month (1996) (Source: Leibbrandt
et al. 2007)
Beyond the desire to remove these racially discriminatory elements which were severely limit-
ing the grant’s ability to combat poverty among the majority of children, the Committee further
concluded that the SMG’s effects were being diluted through operational assumptions that were
inappropriate in the South African context (Woolard & Leibbrandt 2010: 11). As discussed in
section 6.2.1, it was originally designed in the 1920s to protect white family life (Lund 2008: 15).
The focus was very much on single mothers who were widowed or had been abandoned by their
spouses and excluded all other potential family scenarios. The inference of this approach was that
the SMG assumed a nuclear family configuration where both a father and mother were present to be
146
50
45
40
35
30
Percentage
25
20
15
10
0
Black Coloured Indian White
Figure 6.7: Percentage of SMGs received by Population Group (1993) (Source: Author’s calculations based on
the norm, with only those ‘fringe’ cases involving widowhood or disability requiring state support.
Moreover, it clearly reflected a belief in the prevalence of near-full employment where access to
paid work was typical, as evidenced by the exclusion of (paternal) unemployment and low wages as
valid grounds for qualification. It assumed that unemployment and poverty was not a widespread
problem and that for a (white) family to be caught in such a position was somewhat irregular. It
thus clearly reflected the assumptions that — initially only within the white community — families
largely consisted of a married father and mother living together and raising children; unemployment
and poverty was not a widespread problem; and that support was largely needed when men were
Comparing these underlying assumptions to the reality of the situation throughout all communi-
ties in South Africa during the 1990s, the Committee concluded that they were entirely inappropriate
and severely limiting the SMG’s effectiveness (Lund 2008: 80). The majority of households living in
poverty often contained three or four generations, both in rural and urban areas. Poorer households
thus tended to be much larger than richer ones (RSA 1996b). The legacy of the migrant labour
147
60
40
30
20
10
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year
Figure 6.8: Number of SMGs per 1 000 children aged 0-17 (Source: Van der Berg 1996 as cited in RSA 1996b and
Haarmann 1998)
system was also evident in these households, as the ‘middle’ generation was often missing due to
the father or mother working in a different area or having died (RSA 1996b).
This problem was especially pronounced in the case of fathers, although the precise extent was
unknown.96 Large numbers of men established dual households: one in the traditional rural area and
one in the urban centre where these labourers went to work, resulting in the eventual establishment
of two permanent households (RSA 1996b). Subsequently, in 1996 the proportion of children with
absent fathers who were still alive stood at 42 percent (SAIRR 2011: 2). Moreover,
a frequent occurrence [was] that a mother has a child with one partner, out of a formal union.
When she has a child later with another man, he will not agree to care for another man’s child.
She leaves the child or children with her own mother, or aunt, or other traditional guardian
(RSA 1996b).
The outcome was that by 1995 less than half of all black children under seven years old lived
96
There are various technical problems related to the process of capturing data related to this subject in surveys,
148
with both parents, and fully 20 percent of South African children were not living with either of their
parents (Budlender 1996; SALDRU 1993). A very significant proportion of children were thus not
being continuously parented by either or both of their parents (RSA 1996b). Household boundaries
were extremely fluid, with family members and children themselves being moved around in search
of better opportunities. While it is possible that caregivers other than parents may be able to
provide quality care, the fact is that there was ‘a sequence of different caregivers, and generations
Another prominent shortcoming of the SMG’s assumptions about family structure was a cultural
one. The fact that high numbers of children were born outside formal partnerships was extremely
problematic with regards to the grant’s supposition that only nuclear family structures were legit-
imate. The existence of different cultures and customs where betrothal is not necessarily an event
but a process during which a child may be born; the birth of children culturally considered to be
entirely legitimate into formal polygamous relationships; and the side-by-side existence of ‘Western’
and traditional values and systems of paternal obligations within the South African context meant
The members of the Lund Committee were thus convinced that the SMG’s exclusive focus on
nuclear family structures stigmatised other household forms by not incorporating such structures
into the benefit, limiting its overall effectiveness (RSA 1996b). They also deemed it to be inappro-
priate due to the fact that it regarded problems of unemployment and poverty to be fairly limited.
Statistics from the time reveal that in 1994 the official unemployment rate stood at 20 percent, one
of the highest figures in the world (World Bank 2013a). Similarly, the data reveals that in 1993 the
overall poverty rate was 24.3 percent (World Bank 2013b). Overall, economic and social deprivation
was clearly widespread. The outcome was that the Committee not only wanted to deracialise the
system of child support; they also desired a move away from the misguided assumptions that formed
the basis of the SMG and led to its ineffective operation (Lund 2008: 24).
149
The first set of recommendations produced by the Lund Committee clearly reflected this. The
proposals contained in what came to be known as the Itala Agreement followed from the Itala think
tank, which was held at a game reserve in Kwazulu-Natal during May 1996. In addition to the mem-
bers of the Committee, this gathering brought together a wide range of civil society stakeholders97
and would prove to be a ‘defining event in the Committee’s work and in the policy reform’ (Lund
2008: 32). The aim of the think tank was to ‘have a concentrated time of learning and discussion,
the outcome of which would be decisions about the main policy options and recommendations’
The Itala Agreement was thus a pure articulation of the functional reform preferences held by
these civil society actors. The Agreement called for a child benefit available to all children below a
defined age to replace the SMG (Lund 2008: 130). It also contained a proposal to pay the new child
benefit to the ‘primary caregiver’, as well as statements calling for ‘no means testing because all
the logic goes the other way’ (Lund 2008: 130). This was further underscored through the stated
desire to link the grant ‘with participation in some form of health activity’ (Lund 2008: 130). The
document also called for the continued implementation of the FCG and the CDG.
A mere two weeks after the Itala think tank, the government formally introduced the Growth,
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) framework to guide its macroeconomic policy. GEAR
was a succinct statement of state actors’ preference for fiscal restraint, as it essentially insisted that
it was largely up to the private sector to lead economic development in South Africa. Deep cuts
in government spending were advocated, with the implication that social service delivery budgets
needed to be reprioritised in order to address the claims of the poor. At the same time, those social
97
These stakeholders included the members of the Committee, as well as ‘the Development Bank’s social policy
analyst Benny Mokaba; former Black Sash pensions worker Marj Brown, who was then co-opted on to the Committee,
paediatrician Neil McKerrow, for his specialist knowledge and activism around the AIDS epidemic and children;
economist John Kruger, for his knowledge of [the SMG] and welfare in general; and economist Charles Simkins, with
his broad knowledge of economic and social policy’ (Lund 2008: 32-33).
150
services that could be undertaken more effectively by the private sector or could not be provided at
all, such as social assistance grants to impoverished children, were to be scaled down or eliminated
(Visser 2004: 9). The consequence of GEAR’s policy orientation was that economic concerns were
to crowd out social welfare concerns in cases where they were not aligned (Hölscher 2008: 116).
The formalisation of the state’s preference for fiscal restraint through the introduction of GEAR
on 14 June 1996 thus directly clashed with the Lund Committee’s desire to eliminate means testing.
In effect, the Committee’s proposal challenged the preference of state actors to apply fiscal restraint
(as they feared that such an approach would be significantly more expensive). Lund recounts that
the Deputy Minister of Finance directly told her that the political leadership would not ‘entertain’
any policy recommendations which did not ‘reform within the existing envelope’ (Lund 2008: 30).
A policy recommendation that did not take fiscal restraint seriously ‘would itself not be taken
The Committee consequently recognised that their interactions with these powerful state actors
were exclusively premised on hierarchical direction, which created an array of possible veto points
due to the fact that their recommendations would have to ‘travel a political road’ (Lund 2008: 90).
Indeed, Committee members perceived themselves to be involved in ‘a battle to preserve the R1.2
billion allocation to welfare’ (Lund 2008: 86). This led them to emphasise
the functionality of the welfare system to economic growth within the GEAR framework [in order
to] respond to the need of rescuing (emphasis added) the most advanced features of the existing
system, like the [OPG] and children grants, from pressures inside the government, especially the
This distress strikingly illustrates just how unevenly power was distributed during the process, as
it was anticipated that state actors had the ability to block the entire reform initiative — and
scrap the practice of state child support altogether — if their preference for fiscal restraint was
meaningfully challenged.
The outcome was the Committee’s calculation that they would have to ‘strategically. . . work
151
within fiscal constraints’ (Lund 2008: 30). This situation led to a vivid confrontation between the
different actors during a meeting involving Committee members and government lawyers. Amidst
appeals by the Committee that the desire for scrapping the means test was the ‘result of a considered
and purposeful policy choice’, the reply of legal advisors was that ‘this is just going to be another
handout’ (Lund 2008: 87). In an expression of the hierarchical structure of interactions, state actors
proceeded to veto the proposal to scrap means testing and the Committee had to ‘[retreat]. . . into
a diminished scale of provision’ (Lund 2008: 87). The result was that the final report of the Lund
Committee, contrary to the preference expressed in the Itala Agreement, called for means testing.
The Committee’s final report was submitted to Cabinet on 5 March 1997 (Lund 2008: 128). Its
proposals argued for the replacement of the SMG by the CSG, which was to be
paid to the primary caregiver of a child according to a simple means test; it should be payable
from birth for a limited number of years, with the number of years used as a cost-containment
mechanism; a condition for receiving the grant should be the proper registration of the birth of
It also recommended that the FCG and the CDG remain in place (Lund 2008: 131). The Lund
Committee’s tenure ended in March 1997 and the process of finalising the CSG’s implementation
details was taken forward by the Child Support Grant Task Team (CSGTT), which continued to
include some of the original members of the Committee (Lund 2008: 128). But the publication of
the Lund Committee’s final report was not the end of the policymaking road, as state actors again
Principal among these was the call to create linkages between the CSG and the healthcare
system. Although the Lund Committee was careful to point out that they were not in favour of
conditionalities where beneficiaries could be cut-off from the grant, they did propose that the CSG
be linked to the healthcare system as an incentive (Lund 2008: 68; Interview 7). This was to be
achieved through suggesting that the primary caregiver needs to be in possession of a Road to
Health Card. This card was already being used by 75 percent of caregivers as a way to monitor
152
for signs of under-nutrition in children between zero and five years old (RSA 1999b). A further
possibility was to promote child immunisation by taking the child to a healthcare centre around the
In a reflection of their preference for functional efficiency, these proposals were intended to ‘draw
people administratively closer to the system’ (Interview 7). However, despite generally supporting
the CSG in Cabinet, the Minister of Health vetoed these suggestions; she was unwilling to make
any commitment for the cooperation of the health services in implementing the programme, thereby
rejecting even these modest proposals for linking the CSG to health (Lund 2008: 70). The reason
for the vetoing of this suggestion was state actors’ perception that such measures would leave them
open to possible constitutional challenge, reflecting their preference for taking a strict rights-based
The regulations which were finally passed as part of the Welfare Laws Amendment Act in 1997
to enable the introduction of the CSG and replace the SMG were thus far removed from the initial
functional preferences expressed by civil society actors in the Itala Agreement (RSA 1997c). Despite
the fact that the CSGTT experienced some very significant challenges during the initial process of
implementing the CSG,98 its fundamental features had become clearly discernible by the end of
the Mandela administration’s tenure in 1999. The CSG was to be a means tested grant, initially
available to children between the ages of zero and seven (up to their seventh birthday). Instead of
being linked to the healthcare system through ‘soft’ conditionalities, the CSG was to be entirely
unconditional. It would also take a strictly individualistic approach to the issue of orientation,
By 1999, the South African social assistance system thus provided support to impoverished
children between the ages of zero and seven; disabled children between the ages of zero and 18; foster
children between the ages of zero and 18; disabled adults; and impoverished elderly people above the
age of 60/65. Table 6.4 summarises the coverage of this productive policy regime which continued
98
See Lund 2008: 72-75 for a description of these initial challenges.
153
to be premised on limited provision (by excluding all but the ‘deserving poor’), unconditionality
(60+/65+)
The phasing out of the SMG and the implementation of the CSG was shortly followed by the
establishment of an interdepartmental task team convened by the national DSD in order to review
the social security system in the country. It identified a number of inefficiencies in the system, and
experts to ‘investigate a move to a comprehensive and integrated social security structure’ (RSA
2002: 2). This led to the creation of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of
Social Security for South Africa (hereafter ‘Taylor Committee’ and ‘the Committee’), chaired by
Professor Vivienne Taylor from the University of Cape Town’s Department of Social Development.
The Taylor Committee was to carry out the most comprehensive review of social security provi-
sion ever undertaken in South Africa. It was composed of an astounding array of leading national
and international experts,99 which meant that the Committee’s proposals amounted to a compre-
hensive statement on the preferences of these external civil society actors. With regards to social
assistance policies, the Committee’s terms of reference called for them to evaluate ‘the entire social
99
See RSA 2002: v-viii for a full list of participants.
154
assistance mechanism including all grants, their funding mechanisms, and the efficiency with which
they achieve their goals’ (RSA 2002: 2). After two years of work, the Committee submitted its final
among these was the call for the introduction of a universal BIG in the amount of R100 (US$10)
per month ‘as a means of providing social security to all and alleviating poverty’ (Brockerhoff 2013:
25). The Committee’s functional rationale was based on the belief that the BIG would overcome the
fact that the UIF covered less than 40 percent of the total labour force and a mere 6 percent of the
unemployed population. It was therefore essentially proposed as an effective solution that enabled
the inclusion of the unemployed and those working within the informal economy in the country’s
social assistance system (Brockerhoff 2013: 25). The report made it clear that the recommendation
to implement a BIG unambiguously reflected the preference of civil society actors for designing the
Their analysis indicated that the BIG had ‘the potential, more than any other possible so-
cial protection intervention, to reduce poverty and promote human development and sustainable
livelihoods’ (RSA 2002: 62). It pointed towards the benefits of such an approach, including a forti-
fication of the poor’s ability to manage risk, the fostering of multiplier effects related to improved
self reliance, as well as strengthening overall societal cohesiveness (RSA 2002: 62). The BIG was
thus directly aimed at plugging ‘the coverage gaps within South Africa’s social [assistance] system’,
thereby making it ‘a general social assistance grant for all South Africans’ (RSA 2002: 326-327).
The Committee recommended that the BIG be financed through progressive tax reforms (RSA
2002: 327).
The recommendations proposed that the BIG be phased in over a period of 13 years, from 2002
to 2015 (RSA 2002: 65). The first step in this process involved changing the name of the CSG
in order for it to be called an ‘income support grant’, thereby reflecting the desire to establish
155
universalism (RSA 2002: 343). This remodelled CSG was then to be expanded to cover all children
up to the age of 18, before it was transformed into a BIG that made social assistance available to
destitute people of all ages. After extensively examining the effect of means testing, the Committee
also called on the state to ‘simplify the means tests where they obstruct equity, administrative
But members of the Committee were well aware that national state actors did not necessarily
share their preferences, and that they operated in an environment where interactions were premised
on hierarchical direction. In recognition of this fact, the Committee’s report noted that these
national state actors could instead prefer to maintain the status quo
based on the view that...income poverty interventions cannot be accommodated due to inflexible
fiscal constraints...There will probably be considerable support for this option, particularly from
those mainly concerned about possible financial implications of any proposed interventions. The
Committee, however, is of the view that this would be an ultimately short-sighted position (RSA
2002: 63).
It turned out that these fears were well-founded. The Committee’s reform suggestions amounted
only limited social assistance coverage in South Africa. This directly clashed with the preferences
Given their position within the institutional context, these state actors continued to have very
little incentive to radically reform the country’s productive approach to social assistance provision.
Their political power was completely consolidated, having won more than 66 percent of the vote in
the most recent national election (AED 2014). They also perceived the suggestions of implementing
a universal BIG and removing the means test as being completely at odds with their preference
for fiscal restraint. Instead of adopting these measures aimed at relatively greater redistributive
decommodification, the ANC’s 2002 national policy conference ‘placed a major emphasis on the
creation of short-term employment in the form of public works programmes for the sake of “pride
156
and self-reliance of communities”’ (Barchiesi 2006: 16).
reaffirmed that the task of his government is to ‘reduce the number of people dependent on
social welfare, increasing the numbers that rely for their livelihood on normal participation in
the economy’, while Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, lambasted the BIG as an ‘unsustainable’
and ‘populist’ idea. ANC ideologue and government spokesperson Joel Netshitenzhe argued that
the best form of social inclusion for South Africans remains to ‘enjoy the opportunity, the dignity
proposals were ‘essentially forestalled by the intensifying hostility of the government and the ANC’
The only element of the recommendation that was ultimately adopted was the gradual extension
of the CSG to children older than the age of seven — to nine years old in 2003; 11 in 2004; 14
in 2005; 15 in 2008; and 18 in 2009 (DSD et al. 2012: 2). This continued to reflect the state’s
preference for a rights-based approach, as the country’s legal framework defined a child as ‘a person
under the age of 18 years’ (RSA 2005). Not providing the CSG to children older than seven thus left
the state vulnerable to constitutional challenge. This was the only part of the recommendations to
be adopted because it was the only reform suggestion which aligned with the preferences of national
state actors. The rest of the Taylor Committee’s social assistance policy suggestions were all vetoed.
State actors saw this preference for a rights-based approach and the concomitant fear of Consti-
tutional Court challenge strengthened in 2006, when the government was sued for gender and age
discrimination in terms of the OPG. Up until the point of the court challenge, the OPG had been
provided, since 1937, to women from the age of 60, and for men from the age of 65. In Roberts
and Others versus the Minister of Social Development and Others, the Constitutional Court ruled
that this age discrimination violated section 27 (1) (c) of the Constitution on the right to social
assistance, and consequently struck is down (Seekings 2008: 49). As admitted by the DSD, this
157
served to further emphasise the preference for narrowly following the rights-based approach of the
Constitution (at least when it came to the ‘deserving poor’), as ‘Constitutional Court rulings have
This period additionally marked the start of the government’s embrace of public works pro-
grammes, as the EPWP was also formally adopted in 2003. This occurred ‘despite the fact that the
Taylor Committee had rejected the idea of public works programmes as ill-suited for tackling South
Africa’s unemployment problem’ (Brockerhoff 2013: 27). State actors thus explicitly rejected the
Taylor Committee’s proposals for universalism in social assistance policy in favour of intensifying
story of the struggles and debates on the BIG in post-apartheid South Africa reveals to what
extent the government’s wage-centred social policy has marginalised fiscal transfers and social
grants [which are independent from] individual employment, despite the many signals on the
growing inadequacies of wages to keep citizens out of poverty (Barchiesi 2006: 17).
By the end of the two Mbeki and brief Motlanthe100 administrations in 2009, the country
had thus strongly reaffirmed its commitment to a productive social assistance regime. Despite the
challenge mounted to the underlying norms of this system by external civil society actors in the shape
of the Taylor Committee, interactions based on hierarchical direction with powerful national state
actors and their conflicting preferences meant the even stronger entrenchment of limited coverage,
dent from 25 September 2008 to 9 May 2009 as a ‘placeholder’ for Jacob Zuma.
158
Name Year Created Target
The period since Jacob Zuma assumed the presidency in 2009 has been characterised by the consol-
idation of this system. It has featured no further significant practical policy changes, and has been
primarily marked by a continued growth in take-up rates and enhancing administrative efficiency,
particularly in terms of the role of SASSA as the implementing agent. One interesting development
that did however take place during this period is related to a somewhat schizophrenic ideational
Regulations introduced on 31 December 2009 stipulated that beneficiaries of the CSG must
ensure that children between the ages of seven and 18 are enrolled at and attending school (RSA
2009). It further called for beneficiaries to provide ‘proof of school or an educational institutional
enrolment and attendance’ within one month of their initial participation in the programme, as well
as the submission of their child’s signed school report card to the DSD every six months. In the
case of a CSG beneficiary’s child not attending school, the regulations required that ‘appropriate
steps’ be taken to ensure that the child is enrolled at and attending school (RSA 2009).
As noted at the time by the Deputy-Director General of the DSD, these ‘provisions are not of
a punitive nature. Where a child does not attend school, the grant is not going to be stopped’
(PMG 2010). Despite the language contained in the regulations clearly appearing to approximate
conditionality, he also insisted that ‘condition is too strong a word, but [this is] rather a provision
159
that provides for an incentive that caregivers ensure that their children attend school’ (PMG 2010).
The Minister of Social Development at the time, Edna Molewa, further emphasised this by stating
that ‘proof of school enrolment is not a condition for the Child Support Grant’.
In a turn of phrase that echoes the sentiments of one of the early architects of the Brazilian
system,101 the Deputy Minister (and current Minister) Bathabile Dlamini argued that this provision
would ‘help us towards ensuring...that we use education as an instrument for fighting poverty’
(PMG 2010). The DSD had clearly warmed to the idea of educational conditionalities. But, as
Dlamini herself noted in response to a later parliamentary question, they soon found that they
were prohibited from actually implementing them because ‘the Constitution provides for the right
of access to social [assistance] without necessarily providing for a condition of school attendance’
(GCIS 2012b). The result was that the CSG remained unconditional, while the 2009 regulations
In 2010, the Zuma administration launched yet another central government commission, the Na-
tional Planning Commission (NPC). It was tasked with taking a ‘broad, cross-cutting, independent
and critical view of South Africa’ in order to produce clear recommendations for government (NPC
2014). This mandate culminated in the publication of the National Development Plan (NDP) in
November 2011, which sought to offer a ‘vision for 2030’ in ‘the process of charting a new course for
[the] country’ (NPC 2011: 1). In sharp contrast to both the Lund Committee in 1995 and the Taylor
Committee in 2002, the NPC was primarily composed of national state actors (chaired by Deputy
President Cyril Ramaphosa and Minister in the Presidency Jeff Radebe), while Vivienne Taylor
(the former chair of the Taylor Committee) was the only social policy expert on the Commission.
The NPC thus had much less political independence than either of its predecessors. Its mandate
was clearly also much broader. This came to the fore vividly in terms of the NDP’s recommendations
there [is a] critical gap [in the South African social assistance system, through] the lack of
101
See section 7.5.1.
160
protection for many working-age people. . . For those who are willing and able to work, but who
are locked out of the economy, there is no meaningful level of social protection (NPC, 2011: 331).
But despite reaching this conclusion, neither the BIG nor any other of the Taylor Committee’s
proposed changes to the social assistance system are even mentioned in the document’s 430 pages.
Instead, it again emphasised the government’s commitment to the EPWP due to its view that
it ‘provides people with...the dignity of being productive, rather than dependent...[which allows]
unemployed people to become a productive part of the economy’ (NPC 2011: 334). The recom-
mendations contained in the NDP, which the ANC government regards to be its ‘blueprint’ for the
country’s future, thus clearly reflected the preferences of national state actors. While it is safe to
assume that certain members of the NPC (as well as external experts providing inputs) lobbied for
undertaking reforms that mirrored their own functionalist preferences, the policy recommendations
contained in the NDP make it clear that those suggestions were again vetoed by powerful national
state actors. The above quotation on the EPWP in fact neatly captures the essence of the country’s
The system has thus undergone little real change during the Zuma administration, with minor
adjustments to benefit levels announced in the annual budget being the only practical modifica-
tions currently being made (Gordhan 2014). As indicated in table 6.6, the outcome is the policies
currently being implemented in South Africa: a productive social assistance system that continues
orientation.
161
Grant Name Target Group Age Bracket Monthly Value Beneficiaries
(max 5)
Disabled Adults
Table 6.6: South African Social Assistance in 2014 (Sources: RSA 2014; SASSA 2013)
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has undertaken a thorough review of the development of social assistance policies in
South Africa. The analysis was carried out according to the ACI analytical framework, proceeding in
two phases. The first involved a detailed specification of the institutional context. The discussion
was initially guided by the study’s first independent variable, namely the institutionalisation of
specific social assistance norms. It showed that norms regarding limited coverage, unconditionality
and an individualist orientation were historically deeply entrenched and constitutionally codified
during the transition to democracy in the early 1990s. This was followed by an examination of state
structure as the second independent variable. Following an exposition of the formal institutional
policymaking structure and the practical distribution of political power, this section concluded that
South Africa features a highly concentrated state structure with social assistance policymaking
This specification of the institutional configuration set the scene for the second analytical step,
which involved an examination of the ways in which the institutional setting introduced during
162
the first part of the chapter shaped both the preferences held by different groups of actors, as well
as their interactions. Finally, a discussion on the process whereby interactions between actor sets
within the social assistance policy community ultimately shaped policy outputs empirically traced
the development of social assistance policies in South Africa. The investigation indicates that policy
outputs were profoundly shaped — through the mechanism of path dependence and preference for-
mation — by the institutional configuration, which featured high levels of norm institutionalisation
and a highly concentrated state structure. It showed that, despite the existence of different possible
choices on multiple occasions, the state repeatedly preferred not to embark on alternative policy
paths.
ment committees indeed repeatedly called for a shift towards precisely such alternative paths. But
through interactions premised on hierarchical direction, their proposals were consistently rejected by
powerful national state actors facing little incentive for reform by virtue of their operation within
a context of high norm institutionalisation and a concentrated state structure. In this way, the
analysis is thus able to account for the implementation of a productive social assistance system in
163
Chapter 7
in Brazil
7.1 Introduction
This chapter extends the analytical endeavour to the Brazilian case study, with its core aim being
to account for the emergence of a protective social assistance system in the country. This entails
undertaking a thorough examination of the policy development process, guided by the analytical
approach of ACI. Figure 7.1 illustrates the analytical procedure to be carried out for the Brazilian
case study. This two-step process firstly entails a detailed explication of the institutional configu-
ration according to the study’s two independent variables. This information is subsequently used
to introduce actor preferences, followed by an analysis of the ways in which strategic interactions
between these actors transformed institutionally-derived preferences into tangible policy outputs.
Examining the institutional context initially involves addressing the first independent variable
by discussing the historical emergence and institutionalisation of social assistance norms in Brazil.
The discussion highlights the fact that such programmes were not deeply entrenched by the time of
164
Institutional Setting
(1) Norms weakly Institutionalised
(2) Diffuse State Structure
Policy Environment
Figure 7.1: Actor-Centred Institutionalism – Brazil (Source: Adapted from Scharpf 1997: 44)
IV1:
Institutionalisation of
Social Assistance
(Low)
Constitutional- Preferences of Interactions Policy
Legal Policy Actors between Actor Sets Outputs
Framework (Protective
IV2: Concentration of System)
State Structure (Low)
the country’s transition to democracy, producing relatively weak path dependence effects and pro-
viding policymakers with a comparatively clean institutional slate. This is followed by a subsection
analysing Brazilian state structure as the second independent variable. Through an examination
that is focused upon both the formal policymaking structure and the practical distribution of po-
litical power, the discussion shows that Brazil featured a diffuse social assistance policymaking
The final section carries out the second step in the ACI procedure by investigating the ways
165
in which interactions premised on negotiated agreement between the relevant actor sets within
the Brazilian social assistance policy community led to the emergence of the policy outputs that
constitute the contemporary social assistance system in that country. This is achieved through
empirically tracing the process of policy development. Through an examination of the decisive role
played by institutional structure, the chapter is thereby able to account for the emergence of a
The initial part of this section undertakes an overview of the provision of social assistance in Brazil
prior to democratisation in the late 1980s. The key insight produced by the analysis is that spe-
cific institutional norms regarding social assistance were only weakly entrenched in the Brazilian
political economy. Indeed, prior to the 1970s, non-contributory social assistance programmes were
wholly absent in the country, and it was only during the final decades leading up to democratisation
that such policies slowly began to emerge. This historical examination is followed by an analysis
of the legal norms constitutionally codified during the democratic transition. The section is there-
fore aimed at addressing the first independent variable by analysing the historical emergence and
By the time that Fernando Collor became Brazil’s first directly elected democratic President since
the military seized power in 1964, the country had followed a very different historical trajectory from
South Africa in terms of the development of its social welfare regime. In keeping with the general
trend throughout Latin America, Brazilian social welfare was historically designed according to
Bismarckian principles (Schwarzer & Querino 2002; Amann & Barrientos 2014). In effect, this meant
that social security provision was overwhelmingly dominated by the construction of contributory
166
social insurance schemes, while social assistance provision was practically non-existent (Schwarzer
The initial part of the examination reveals the historical lack of development of social assistance
in Brazil where, prior to the 1970s, social assistance did not feature on the policy agenda at all.
This is followed by a discussion on the introduction of the first de facto social assistance scheme by
the military dictatorship, the Renda Mensal Vitalı́cia (RMV – Lifetime Monthly Income), which
targeted impoverished people over the age of 70. The subsection thus traces the historical process
in order to illustrate the way in which social assistance norms were only weakly institutionalised
by the time of the transition to democracy. In turn, this state of affairs played a decisive role
in shaping the institutional setting which ultimately led to the construction of the contemporary
Brazilian system.
As is the case in much of the colonial world, a dearth of historical data on the provision of social
security in Brazil prior to the arrival of European colonists does not necessarily entail a complete
absence of strong informal institutions. But it does mean that this review must commence with the
arrival of Pedro Álvares Cabral and his fellow Portuguese settlers in 1500. In general, the colonial
and imperial periods102 in Brazil were characterised by the way in which the provision of care for the
poor was considered a matter of Christian charity, particularly through the introduction and growth
of charitable hospitals known as Santas Casas de Misericórdia (Hospitals of Mercy) (Schwarzer &
In this case it was largely the Roman Catholic Church that provided ad hoc poor relief, with the
first organised welfare scheme during the 17th and 18th centuries being an insurance plan granting
102
The colonial period lasted from 1500 until 1808, when the Portuguese royal court fled from Napoleon’s invasion
and moved the imperial government to Rio de Janeiro. This inaugurated the imperial period, which featured the
declaration of independence by Dom Pedro I in 1822 and lasted until the republican coup of 1889.
167
pensions to the dependent widows and children of deceased navy officers (MPS 2009: 7). A decree
issued by Dom Pedro I in 1821 is recognised as the ‘first legal text that registered the issue of social
welfare in Brazil’ (MPS 2009: 7). But concern with assisting the poor remained almost entirely
absent during the transition from a society based on labour coercion and slavery (which lasted until
Where ad hoc arrangements did exist, they were frequently ‘reduced to a scheme of local poverty
management with patronising characteristics’ (Schwarzer & Querino 2002: 2). The rupture with
the Old Republic and the emergence during the 1930s of the Estado Novo (New State), with its
more centralised power structure, allowed for the implementation of national (instead of regional
and ad hoc) policies (Driabe, Castro & Azeredo 1995: 3). The first modern social protection
law institutionalising social insurance was the Eloy Chaves Law, introduced in 1923 (MPS 2009:
7; McGuire 2010: 159). This law initially granted contributory pension and health coverage to
The following decade saw this insurance system evolve into a ‘very fragmented, company-based,
low coverage set of isolated programmes, operating under a full capitalisation regime’ (Beltrão,
Pinheiro & Oliveira 2002: 3). The fledgling system was eventually consolidated into sector-wide
institutes during the first Vargas period of the Estado Novo (1930-1945) (Beltrão et al. 2002: 3;
Schwarzer & Querino 2002: 2). These moves coincided with initial efforts to undertake industrial-
isation, as well as with the tentative emergence of the labour movement (Beltrão et al. 2002: 3).
Although this movement was often repressed, members of the new urban working classes neverthe-
less joined trade unions and pushed the federal government throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s
for social security provision. The resulting programmes were all based on contributory insurance
the concentric expansion of social security coverage under the populist governments of those
decades had much to do with the political power enjoyed by a particular social/professional
168
group or with the potential threat it may have represented (2002: 3).
In a similar vein, Hunter notes that during the corporatism of the Vargas period social policy’s foun-
dation rested upon occupational status, and was segmented accordingly (2014: 18). By providing
benefits exclusively to the civilian and military bureaucracy, as well as to the most well-organised
and strategic sectors of the working class, the state revealed its motive: to pre-empt the development
By the end of the 1940s, this strategy resulted in there being ten times more insured mem-
bers than in 1934 (MPS 2009: 8). Despite this expansion, social insurance provision remained
qualitatively and quantitatively extremely unequal throughout the period — while social assistance
continued to be entirely absent (MPS 2009: 8). In what can be regarded as a striking indication
of the low priority assigned to social security provision in general, vast resources from the social
insurance institutes were used to finance President Juscelino Kubitschek’s vision of ‘fifty years of
prosperity in five’ during the 1950s. Through the ‘biggest real estate investment in their existence’,
these institutes effectively financed a significant portion of the costs related to the construction of
the new capital city, Brası́lia, from 1956 to 1960. This was done without any ‘guarantee of necessary
By the end of the so-called Second Republic in 1964, Brazil had thus constructed the very
rudimentary foundations of a welfare state. Unlike in South Africa, Brazil’s approach was entirely
based upon a Birmarckian system reliant on contributory social insurance. This meant that the
weakest social groups who lacked political power, including rural workers, the indigenous population,
as well as urban informal and domestic workers, were effectively not considered for social security
coverage (Schwarzer & Querino 2002: 3). The result was that social assistance was totally absent,
with no support available for people who were locked-out from the formal, contributory system. This
also meant that no specific institutional norms had emerged in terms of social assistance provision
169
Military Dictatorship and a Tentative First Step: The RMV
It was only following the 1964 coup d’état establishing the military dictatorship that a comprehensive
Lei Orgânica da Seguridade Social (LOSS – Organic Social Security Law) was adopted (FRB 1964).
After 14 years of debate in Congress, this law finally unified the costing and benefit schemes across
the various social insurance institutes (Beltrão et al. 2002: 4). This was followed by the creation
of the Instituto Nacional de Previdência Social (INPS – National Social Security Institute) in
1966 to unify and consolidate the management of social insurance by incorporating the revenues,
expenditures, assets and liabilities of the respective institutes (MPS 2009: 10; Beltrão et al. 2002:
4). Although the majority of urban workers were theoretically covered by the system by the mid-
1960s, in practice coverage was still below 50 percent even for the wage-earning, employed population
The focus throughout the 1970s was on the further administrative consolidation of welfare
provision with the founding and expansion103 of the Sistema Nacional de Previdência e Assistência
Social (SNAPS – National Social Welfare and Assistance System), which was aimed at integrating
the provision and maintenance of benefits, rendering services, funding activities and programmes,
as well as administrative and financial management (MPS 2009: 9). Steps to incorporate the rural
population into the social security system also commenced during this decade with the introduction
Programme) in 1971. Effective insurance coverage for this group was achieved by 1974, with a
103
The period saw the further introduction of the Instituto Nacional de Assistência Médica da Previdência Social
(INAMPS – National Institute of Medical Assistance of Social Welfare), the Instituto de Administração Financeira da
Previdência e Assistencia Social (IAPAS – Institute of Financial Administration of Social Welfare and Assistance), the
Central de Medicamentos (CEME – Centre for Medication), the Empresa de Processamento de Dados da Previdência
Social (DATAPREV – Social Welfare Data Processing Company), the Fundação Nacional do Bem-Estar do Menor
(FUNABEM – Foundation of Minors’ Welfare) and the Legião Brasileira de Assistência (LBA – Brazilian Legion of
170
benefit equal to half the minimum wage being made available to the rural disabled and workers
older than 65 (Beltrão et al. 2002: 6). The inclusion of this relatively marginal political group
signalled an important directional shift that would subsequently lead to the establishment of the
The establishment of FUNRURAL was thus shortly followed by the introduction of the RMV
in 1974 (FRB 1974). Assessing the nature of the programme is somewhat problematic, as it was
technically classified as a social insurance programme aimed at impoverished people over the age of
70104 (both rural and urban) who had made at least 12 contributions to the social security system
during their lifetimes (FRB 1974; MDS 2014a; Beltrão et al. 2002: 6). Beneficiaries had to earn
less than 60 percent of the minimum wage, and the RMV’s value was equal to half the minimum
wage (FRB 1974). The requirement for prior contributions was however rarely enforced, resulting
in the RMV being implemented in a way more akin to a social assistance benefit (Interview 12).
Following administrative adjustments in response to the intense fiscal and popular pressures of
the 1980s, Brazil’s social welfare system was further elaborated under the technocratic authoritarian
regime installed in 1964. These reforms defined the core of state intervention, the centralised appa-
ratus to support this intervention was established, the required funds and resources were aligned,
the principles and operational procedures were defined, as well as the rules of social inclusion and
exclusion (Driabte et al. 1995: 4). The initial establishment of a system entirely premised on social
insurance during the 1930s thus culminated in the consolidation of the Brazilian welfare state by
the mid-1970s.
Instead of granting social protection to all citizens, this arrangement was characterised by the
nearly exclusive extension of social protection to urban workers formally participating in the labour
market, as well as to segments of the corporatively organised middle class. It featured highly
fragmented access which was ‘associated positively with systems of force, bargaining, and privileges,
104
This high age threshold was very exclusionary as, by 1980, average life expectancy in Brazil was still only 63 years
171
and negatively with low levels of universality and uniformity of social benefits’ (Driabe et al. 1995:
1). The military regime elaborated a system premised almost solely on social insurance, with the
only programme even resembling a social assistance scheme being the belatedly-introduced RMV.
The result was that specific norms regarding the operation of social assistance continued to be
largely absent.
This historical discussion highlights the way in which welfare provision in Brazil emerged within
its own particular historical political economic context. It was initially closely tied to the process
of state formation following the end of the Old Republic and the emergence of the Estado Novo in
the 1930s. The initial introduction of a purely Bismarckian insurance-based system was expanded
during the subsequent periods, particularly during the phase of military rule. By the late 1980s,
Brazil had very little experience with social assistance provision. A broad overview of the (limited)
Period Note
1974-1990 Introduction
Table 7.1: Evolution of the pre-1990 Brazilian Social Assistance System (Source: Adapted from Driabe et al. 1995:
5)
The lack of social assistance therefore stands out when assessing the social welfare landscape
at this time. Table 7.2 shows that social assistance consisted exclusively of the RMV (which itself
was legally established as a contributory insurance scheme). This means that, in sharp contrast
to South Africa, no programme currently in existence in Brazil originated in the period prior to
172
democratisation. The fact is therefore that social assistance was not historically entrenched in
Brazil. Apart from the principle hesitantly embodied by the RMV that the impoverished elderly
and disabled were entitled to some modicum of de facto non-contributory support, social assistance
norms were not historically institutionalised. Constructing Brazilian lifecycle risks for 1990 in figure
7.3 confirms that there were serious coverage gaps in the system at that time.
? ?
Health/Disability Health/Disability Risk: Health/Disability
Risk: Risk:
Figure 7.3: Brazilian Lifecycle Risks in 1990 (Source: Adapted from Smith 2011)
When full democracy was established in 1990, Brazil had largely failed to construct a social
assistance system. Instead, through its own particular historical process primarily propelled by the
political economy of the Estado Novo and the military dictatorship, the country had built a welfare
system almost entirely predicated on social insurance. The general absence of social assistance
norms patently meant that there was subsequently much less potential for the manifestation of
173
7.2.2 The Legal Codification of Social Assistance Norms in Brazil
This state of affairs went on to have an important impact on the subsequent development of social
assistance policies in a democratic Brazil. In a similar vein to South Africa, the 1988 Constitution
was to lay the basis for the construction of a new state. But instead of being constrained by a set
of deeply institutionalised social assistance norms, the drafters of the Brazilian Constitution had a
relatively blank slate to work with (Interview 12). This subsection reviews the relevant provisions
of the Constitution and the LOAS in order to illustrate the way in which they reflected this shallow
Following a ‘lost decade’ in the 1980s marked by recession, stagflation and civil unrest featuring
demands by Brazilians to directly elect their leaders,105 the transition to democracy got underway
in earnest in 1985. The first move was the indirect election of Tancredo Neves as President by the
Electoral College, an institution that was then still dominated by the military (Zaverucha 1997:
5). In a dramatic turn of events adding further uncertainty to an already volatile situation, Neves
collapsed and died the night before his inauguration. He was consequently replaced by his running
mate and Vice-President, José Sarney. Sarney thereby became ‘the President of a government
tasked with leading the transition from authoritarianism to democracy’ (Zaverucha 1997: 7).
The government subsequently passed a constitutional amendment calling for elections for a
National Constituent Assembly (NCA). One of the leaders of the resistance movement, Ulysses
Guimarães, was elected to preside over the NCA, which was granted full powers to draft and enact
a new democratic Constitution. The NCA was in session from February 1987 until October 1988,
while the military was ‘able to negotiate the terms of its disengagement from the government with
105
Principally through the Diretas Já movement.
174
civilians’ (Zaverucha 1997: 7). During these 20 months, ‘Congress and Brası́lia was the centre of
Brazilian life’ (Souza 2005: 81). The Constitution was eventually ratified and adopted on 5 October
Similar to its South African correlative, the Brazilian Constitution is generally quite detailed
and articulates an array of social and economic rights (Souza 2005: 82). But it is again instructive
to examine the specific language when it comes to social assistance provision. Unlike the South
African Constitution, the Brazilian document draws a clear distinction between social insurance106
and social assistance. Title 8 of the Constitution deals with the ‘social order’, with section III being
solely dedicated to social insurance provision (FRB 1988). This is followed by section IV, where the
framework for social assistance is introduced. Instead of enshrining access to social assistance as a
fundamental right, article 203 simply states that ‘social assistance shall be rendered to whomever
The only social assistance right directly entrenched is in article 203 (V), which guarantees a
monthly benefit equal to one minimum wage to those elderly and handicapped who are able to
prove their incapability of providing for themselves or having support provided for by their families
(FRB 1988). The inclusion of this section in the Constitution represents an ‘evolution of the RMV’
and was eventually to lead to the creation of the BPC (Interview 12). It is no coincidence that
the only de facto social assistance programme that existed prior to the transition to democracy in
Brazil was directly carried over into the new Constitution. This serves to further affirm the power
Apart from the section guaranteeing the BPC, the Brazilian Constitution thus does not enshrine
the provision of social assistance payments as a fundamental right (Interview 12). The implication
is that the government has much greater discretion in designing the parameters of such programmes,
especially in terms of linking them to conditionalities. The Constitution does not guarantee general
access to social assistance, and leaves space for the denial of benefit payments through conditional-
106
Under the heading of ‘social security’ in section III of title 8.
175
ities (Interview 12).
The document also introduced significant measures to potentially insulate welfare spending from
discretionary budget cuts. Article 195 calls for the establishment of a separate social welfare budget
that is ‘not part of the budget of the Union’ (FRB 1988).107 As set out in section II, the social
welfare budget pertains to ‘all direct and indirect administration entities or bodies connected with
social security, as well as funds and foundations instituted and maintained by the government’ (FRB
1988). In short, ‘government actions in the area of social assistance shall be implemented with funds
from the social welfare budget’ (FRB 1988). These funds were to be collected from payrolls and
earmarked taxes on the gross turnover (Contribuição para o Financiamento da Seguridade Social
– COFINS) and net profits (Contribuição Social sobre o Lucro Lı́quido – CSLL) of enterprises, in
The process laid out in the Constitution resulted in the Brazilian budget being very rigid.108 It
directly mandates a vast array of expenditures and earmarks tax revenues to specific uses, desig-
nating them as mandatory. The effect is to insulate a very large part of the budget from scrutiny
and potential cuts. In fact, estimates indicate that over 90 percent of the annual budget is subject
to such rigidities (Blöndal, Goretti & Kristensen 2003: 101-102). This situation is further compli-
mented by the abovementioned practice of tax earmarking spending on the social sectors (Blöndal,
Goretti & Kristensen 2003: 101-102). Most fundamentally, the Brazilian Constitution did not con-
107
Instead of a single integrated budget, the Constitution calls for the creation of three distinct budgets: ‘the fiscal
budget regarding the powers of the union, their funds, bodies and entities of the direct and indirect administration,
including foundations instituted and maintained by the government; the investment budget of companies in which the
union directly or indirectly holds the majority of the voting capital; [and] the social welfare budget, comprising all
direct and indirect administration entities or bodies connected with social security, as well as funds and foundations
essentially meaningless to have a specific appropriation in the budget in nominal terms. By linking expenditures with
a revenue source, it was possible to “insure” the expenditures against the effects of inflation, as the revenues would
176
tain any reference to the notion of ‘progressive realisation’ of rights and the implied primacy of
fiscal restraint.
The diversification of the financing of contributions and taxes was in fact one of the guiding
social policy principles of the Brazilian Constitution, constructed with the goal of ‘increasing the
stability of social policy funding’ (Schwarzer & Querino 2002: 4). The effect of this was to make it
harder for fiscally conservative actors to constitutionally justify reduced scales of provision, thereby
providing still greater policy development space. The Constitution had built-in mechanisms which
provided the potential to shelter social welfare spending. In sum, Brazilian policymakers were
not as severely constrained as their South African counterparts by constitutional notions of fiscal
discipline.
A final significant feature of the Constitution was the way in which it defined the family as
‘the foundation of society’, which was to ‘enjoy special protection from the state’ (FRB 1988).
Article 203 lists a range of ‘objectives’ for social assistance, including an explicit reference to ‘the
protection of the family’ (FRB 1988). Eligibility for the constitutionally guaranteed benefit (which
was to become the BPC) was predicated upon proof that the handicapped and elderly could not have
support ‘provided by their family’ (FRB 1988). This language clearly encouraged the conclusion
that ‘the family unit (rather than the individual) was the appropriate entity to receive the benefit
and should in turn bear responsibility for meeting programme requirements’ (Lindert 2006: 68).
The Brazilian Constitution thus outlines an institutional framework which differs in important
respects from the South African one. These differences primarily result from the fact that social
assistance norms were historically only weakly institutionalised in the Brazilian political economy
prior to the transition to democracy. This reduced the potential for path dependence effects,
resulting in the ‘representatives of the population that were writing the Constitution at that time
on the social rights chapter, and specifically on social assistance, [having] a blank paper that they
could fill in’ (Interview 12). The outcome was, with the exception of the principles introduced by
177
the RMV, the construction of an entirely new set of institutional norms.109
The enactment of the Constitution was followed by the publication of the LOAS in 1993 (although it
was only fully implemented from 1995 onwards) (Schwarzer & Querino 2002: 16). The LOAS further
elaborated on the principles introduced by the Constitution, meaning that it ‘regulates this aspect
of the Constitution and establishes standards and criteria for the organisation of social assistance’
(MDS 2009: 4). The way in which the provisions contained in the LOAS built upon relevant
constitutional provisions served to strengthen the emerging norms associated with a protective
In this vein, it elaborated on article 203 (V) of the Constitution regarding the guarantee of a
monthly benefit equal to the minimum wage for impoverished handicapped and elderly persons by
mandating the creation of the BPC (FRB 1993: art. 20). In language very similar to that of the
continuous benefit [in the form of] a guarantee of one monthly minimum wage for the handi-
capped and the elderly older than 70110 years or more who have no means to provide for their
own maintenance or have it provided by their family (FRB 1993: art. 20).
However, apart from the BPC, the LOAS did not directly guarantee any other specific social assis-
tance benefits, thereby continuing to leave the door open for the potential enactment of condition-
greater institutional space, this naturally raises an important question about the process whereby the new Constitution
was drafted and associated new norms created. See Hochstetler (1997) for an examination of the role played by social
movements in the construction of new norms and Souza (2005) for an analysis which regards them as a result of the
178
Instead, it articulated a set of general guiding principles. In addition to once more noting the
primacy of the ‘protection of the family’ and ‘respect for...the family’, the LOAS strongly emphasised
the ‘supremacy of meeting social needs above the requirements of economic profitability’ (FRB 1993:
art. 4). The combination of this approach with the Constitution’s relative insulation of social welfare
budgets meant that the provisions contained in these documents sharply diverged from the guidelines
introduced by the Constitution and WPSW in South Africa. The Brazilian documents de-link social
assistance from general economic considerations to a greater extent, thereby creating space for the
ultimately illuminate an institutional path towards a more protective social assistance system in
Brazil.
The preceding discussion has investigated the historical development of social assistance norms in
Brazil. It shows that these norms were weakly institutionalised, with only the principle of providing
some support to the elderly and disabled (through the RMV) emerging in the decades leading
up to the transition to democracy. This means that, in contrast to South Africa, norms related to
coverage, conditionality and orientation did not originate through a deep historical process. Instead,
the delegates of the NCA charged with writing the Constitution had a significant amount of leeway
The result was that the historical institutional context facing policy actors in Brazil allowed them
to operate within a policy environment where norms were only weakly institutionalised. Although
the Constitution favoured certain outcomes — the protection of the family primary among them
–– it provided a much greater degree of flexibility by not enshrining general social assistance as a
fundamental right, and by constructing mechanisms to insulate social welfare spending from the
government’s fiscal and investment budgets. The effect of this low level of institutionalisation was
to provide policy actors with a larger set of potential policy options in their efforts to, for the first
179
time in the country’s history, construct a social assistance system in Brazil from 1990 onwards.
The second aspect of the institutional framework shaping the policy context in Brazil was the
country’s diffuse state structure. The following section examines this further institutional variable
by discussing the role played by the diffusion of political power in influencing the institutional
context and ultimately channelling policy outputs. Although the discussion initially centres on
the legal distribution of policymaking capacity as defined by formal aspects of state structure, the
The first section therefore highlights the fact that, in terms of formal institutional and organ-
The subsequent discussion elucidates the distribution of political power in democratic Brazil and
serves to emphasise the high degree of power diffusion. Taken together, the analysis concludes that
in both legal and practical terms, Brazil features a diffuse state structure in the realm of social
assistance policymaking. The capacity to formulate and enact such policies is widely distributed
and not limited to the federal government sphere, while no political grouping has been able to attain
The Brazilian Constitution outlines the formal organisational structure of the state. The country
is a federal presidential republic composed of three ‘independent and harmonious’ branches: the
executive, legislature and judiciary (FRB 1988: art 2). Reflective of this is the fact that the
President is both head of state and the head of government. Executive powers are exercised by the
President and the Ministers of the federal government. The President has the exclusive power to
initiate legislation, appoint and dismiss Ministers, and to preside over the upper management of
180
the federal administration (FRB 1988: art 84).
The President and Vice-President are simultaneously directly elected on the first Sunday of
October of the year prior to the termination of the sitting President’s term. The President’s mandate
runs for four years and commences on 1 January of the year following his or her election (FRB 1988:
art 77; art 82). There is a two-term limit to the presidency, but a former two-term President may be
re-elected provided that they did not stand as a candidate during the four-year period immediately
after their second term in office. Voting is also compulsory for literate citizens between the ages of
18 and 70.111
The legislative branch is the National Congress, which is composed of the Chamber of Deputies
(lower house) and the Senate (upper house). The Chamber of Deputies represents the people of
each state, and is currently composed of 513 Deputies.112 Members are elected every four years
represent the 26 states and the federal district. Each state is represented by three Senators, who
are directly elected for eight year terms. The configuration of the electoral cycle means that either
An independent judiciary is the final branch of the Brazilian state. As articulated in articles 101
to 103-B of the Constitution, the highest court in the country — equivalent to the Constitutional
Court in South Africa — is the Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court). This is followed
by the Superior Tribunal de Justiça (Superior Court of Justice) as the highest appellate court
for non-constitutional matters, other superior courts, the Tribunais Regionais Federais (Regional
Federal Courts) and the Conselho Nacional de Justiça (National Justice Council).
In addition to these three branches, Brazil’s federal structure means that the country features
111
Voting is non-compulsory for youths between the ages of 16 and 18, people older than 70, and illiterate citizens.
Voter turnout is usually around the order of 80 percent. Failure to comply with the responsibility to vote is subject
to a fine.
112
Each state is guaranteed a minimum of eight and a maximum of 70 members, while the number of seats per state
181
three tiers of government: the federal (national) level,113 states (including the federal district) and
municipalities (FRB 1998: art 1). The country is comprised of 26 states plus the federal district,
which are further subdivided into a total of 5 561 municipalities (Souza 2005: 78). Each state
has its own Constitution, while states and municipalities have their own legislative and executive
institutions. Elections for the President, governors and for congressional and state representatives
take place simultaneously every four years. This is followed by mayoral and Municipal Council
A crucial part of the Brazilian state structure is the decentralised distribution of power between
these three spheres. The country features a system of symmetrical federalism, with ‘each constituent
unit having the same powers as those granted to constituent units in the United States and Mexico’
(Souza 2005: 84). This extends to the issue of municipal autonomy, as the 1988 Constitution incor-
porated municipalities alongside states as part of the federation and ‘shifted considerable political
power and tax resources from the federal government to the states and municipalities’ (Selcher
1998: 25). The adoption of the current Constitution entailed dramatic changes to the resources
As a result, the share of public revenue being directed towards local governments increased from
18.2 percent to 22.8 percent (3.5 percent of GDP) (Souza 2002a: 3). This has resulted in a situation
where Brazilian municipalities are financially well-off compared to municipalities in other parts of
the developing world. The period between the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution and 1998
featured an increase in local revenue of 197 percent, with local revenue representing 1.6 percent
of GDP in the same year — a higher amount than federal constitutional transfers (Souza 2002a:
3-13). This is reflective of the fact that when the Constitution was adopted, ‘one of the main
objectives...was to leave subnational levels plenty of room to determine where and how to spend
In all, ‘there is a broad consensus among analysts that Brazil is the most decentralised country in
113
The federal government sphere is legally known as the União (Union).
182
the developing world’ (Souza 2002b: 24). This means that Brazilian federalism is characterised by
various power centres, features financial interdependence among governmental units, and contains
multiple routes for designing and implementing policy (Souza 2002b: 45). The adoption of the 1988
Constitution resulted in the emergence of competing power centres with access to decision making
and policy implementation mechanisms, particularly in terms of social policies (Souza 2002b: 45).
These multiple power centres114 ‘compete both among themselves and with the federal executive’
Article 22 of the Constitution lists the exclusive competencies of the national level, followed by
article 23’s explication of the areas of concurrent powers (FRB 1988). It notes that
the Union, the states, the federal district and the municipalities, in common, have the power:
II –– to provide for health and public assistance, for the protection and safeguarding of hand-
icapped persons; X –– to fight the causes of poverty and the factors leading to substandard
living conditions, promoting the social integration of the underprivileged sections of the popula-
tion...The Union, the states and the federal district have the power to legislate concurrently on:
XII — social security, protection and defence of health; XIV –– protection and social integration
of handicapped persons; XV — protection of childhood and youth (FRB 1988: art. 23-24).
In short, the federal, state and municipal levels thus have a shared competence for implementing
‘health and social welfare [policies, as well as] combating poverty and social marginalisation’ (Souza
2005: 86). Additionally, preschool and primary education are areas of ‘mainly local’ constitutional
authority (Souza 2005: 86). The result is that, in Brazil, the subnational spheres formally enjoy
much greater power to design and implement social assistance policies affecting these issue areas.
114
Despite the decentralised nature of the Brazilian state, it is important to note that the federal level nevertheless
183
7.3.2 Political Power Fragmentation
distribution of political power in Brazil. Figure 7.4 introduces the results of presidential elections
between 1994 and 2014.115 It illustrates that these national elections are characterised by a high
degree of competition between the candidates from the two primary national political parties, the
Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT – Workers’ Party) and the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira
100
90
80
70
Percentage
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Partido dos Trabalhadores
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira
Other Opposition
Figure 7.4: Electoral Support, Presidential Elections (1994-2014) (Source: TSE 2014)
Following the tumultuous years of the Collor and Franco presidencies, the politics around pres-
idential elections settled into a pattern of fierce contestation between the PT and PSDB, with
potential third-party spoilers being an ever-present reality. The success of the economic stabilisa-
tion programme known as the Plano Real (Real Plan) initially propelled Fernando Henrique Cardoso
to the presidency in 1994. Cardoso won the election by a margin of 27.3 percent, the largest in
115
The personalistic nature of politics in Brazil means that the value of thinking in terms of competition between
parties is limited. It is however useful for the purposes of this section by illustrating the high levels of competition.
184
Brazilian history (TSE 2014).
Subsequent to a constitutional amendment allowing him a second term, Cardoso was re-elected
in 1998 with 52.1 percent of the vote (TSE 2014). However, in the 2002 election, the PT swept to
victory under Lula, garnering 46.4 percent in the first round and winning comfortably in the runoff
against the PSDB candidate (TSE 2014). Lula was elected for a second term in 2006 in an initially
close race with the PSDB (he won the first round with 48.6 to 41.6 percent). Lula was subsequently
succeeded in 2010 by Dilma Rousseff, who won re-election in the 2014 race — a campaign that
featured the closest runoff election in the country’s history (TSE 2014).
The pattern of intense competition is even more pronounced in the case of legislative elections.
Figure 7.5 indicates that the number of parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies has never
been less than 17, with no party ever having managed to garner more than 20 percent of the vote
(TSE 2014). Additionally, every governing coalition has consisted of between four and nine parties
in the Chamber of Deputies.116 The intensity of political fragmentation under Brazil’s multiparty
(Mainwaring 1992: 1, also see Figueiredo & Limongi 2000; Geddes & Neto 1992). The result is that
all Brazilian presidents must engage in a process of coalition-building in order to attain a majority
The picture of intense competition is further confirmed at the state and municipal levels.117 Dur-
ing the 2014 gubernatorial elections, candidates from nine different parties were elected as governors
for the 26 states and the federal district (TSE 2014). The pattern is also clear in the municipal
116
While this section focuses on the dynamics within the Chamber of Deputies, the same fractious pattern is visible
in the Federal Senate. A total of 15 parties are currently represented, with eight of them being part of the governing
coalition.
117
In contrast to South Africa, where the overwhelming racial nationalist legitimacy of the ANC has postponed the
pluralisation effects of class mobilisation, Brazil has seen the emergence of a political discourse centred on class which
has served as an underlying reason for the diffusion of political power. The result of this has been to further fuel the
185
30
25
Number of Parties 20
15
10
0
1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Total Governing Coalition
Figure 7.5: Number of Parties Represented in the Chamber of Deputies (1994-2014) (Sources: TSE 2014; Figueiredo
sphere where, in the 2012 municipal elections, mayors were elected from 26 different political parties
(TSE 2014). Out of the 5 561 municipalities in the country, the Partido do Movimento Democático
Brasileiro (PMDB – Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) won the most mayoralties: 1 014; fol-
lowed by the PSDB with 699 and the PT with 623 (TSE 2014). This means that no party controls
The implications in relation to the topic of this study are clear: contemporary Brazilian pol-
itics, both formally and in terms of practical power distribution, are marked by a high level of
competition and the diffusion of authority. When this fact is combined with the country’s decidedly
federal structure, it becomes clear that the framework for social assistance policymaking is highly
decentralised in Brazil.
186
7.4 The Institutional Setting
The first sections of this chapter have introduced the Brazilian institutional context. The discussion
has illustrated that, compared to South Africa, social assistance norms were historically only weakly
entrenched; and that both in terms of the formal design of the state and through the practical
distribution of political power, Brazil features a diffuse state structure, especially in the area of social
assistance policymaking. Based on this preceding analysis, table 7.3 introduces the independent
ture
The above examination of the institutional context amounts to the first step in the two-part ACI
analytical procedure, setting the scene for an examination of the impact that this institutional
setting had on the construction of actor preferences and the ways in which these preferences were
ultimately transformed into social assistance policy outputs. This initially involves an introduction
of the relevant policy community alongside their institutionally-derived preferences, as well as the
predominant mode of interaction, followed by an empirical analysis of the policy development process
The preceding discussion highlights the fact that the country’s diffuse state structure meant
that policymaking capacity was not limited to the federal government sphere. The authority to
develop social assistance policy in post-authoritarian Brazil was widely dispersed throughout the
state, involving policy actors from municipalities, states and the federal government in a process
187
of decentralised policy innovation. The country thus featured a more expansive policy community
than the South African case. Brazil’s diffuse state structure meant that state actors were effectively
divided into two subgroups, namely subnational state actors and federal state actors.118
The first subgroup included a wide array of municipal mayors, state governors and their associ-
ated advisers,119 while the second set of state actors was composed of policymakers at the federal
level, including Presidents, Ministers of Social Development, Health and Education, legal advisers
and federal bureaucrats. The final group constituting the social assistance policy community was
civil society actors, which included journalists, social activists, economists, historians and other
The shape of interactions within this actor constellation was institutionally determined. In
contrast to the case of South Africa, where the highly concentrated state structure meant that almost
all relevant policy interactions were conducted through ad hoc central government committees, the
Brazilian case featured less centralised and more regular avenues of interaction. Due to the fact
that subnational actors had the authority to independently design social assistance interventions, a
range of interactions took place at the local and regional level, largely between local politicians and
civil society actors. At the same time, a further set of interactions took place at the federal level
Interactions were often conducted by way of the newly-established social assistance councils
which included representatives from civil society120 — through the Conselho Nacional de Assistência
Social (CNAS – National Social Assistance Council) at the federal level and its subnational corre-
lates on the state- and municipal levels.121 Even when policies were introduced through pieces of
118
The distinction between subnational and federal state actors is consistent with the approach adopted by Coêlho
137).
121
See section 7.6.
188
federal legislation, the decentralised social assistance policymaking structure and the neocorporatist
nature of social assistance councils meant that interactions were largely characterised by instances
The institutional setting also played an important role in shaping the preferences held by policy
actors (Scharpf 1997: 1; 21). As in the case of South Africa, the analysis proceeds from the
fundamental assumption that both subnational and federal state actors were motivated to retain
or attain political power (Davis et al. 1970: 438). Whereas in the South African case this was an
almost trivial statement because of the ANC’s deeply entrenched power position, the assumption
becomes a much more potent force for shaping preferences in the case of politically competitive
Brazil.
In contrast to South Africa, where state actors faced ‘little immediate electoral incentive’ when
designing the post-apartheid social assistance system, Brazilian policymakers at all levels were
constantly subject to intense political competition (Seekings 2008: 35). The fact that legislative
turnover in Brazil has consistently exceeded 50 percent during each election since 1990 means that
state actors held a preference to design and implement social assistance policies that would reach as
many people in their jurisdiction as effectively as possible in order to distinguish themselves from
the competition and to be identified as ‘reformers’ (Samuels 2000: 481; Keefer & Khemani 2003a;
Keefer & Khemani 2003b). The goal was to create social policies which were popularly perceived
The incentive to utilise social assistance provision as a vehicle for attaining political credit was
further enhanced by the flexibility introduced by the lack of historical norms, as expressed in the
country’s constitutional-legal framework. The institutional structure also meant that even though
these groups were sometimes differentially positioned within the state and potentially competing
with each other, federal and subnational actors held broadly similar policy preferences driven by
the intensity of political competition. Both federal and subnational actors consequently wanted to
189
be able to take credit for designing social assistance policies that were effective and reached a wide
swath of voters. The preferences of state actors thus arose in an institutional context characterized
by greater policy and fiscal flexibility, and premised on political power diffusion. This structure
encouraged bottom-up policy experimentation and innovation fueled by the realities of political
competition.
The preferences held by civil society actors122 in Brazil mirrored those of their counterparts in
South Africa. The group often included actors previously involved in the Diretas Já movement,
and their institutional position outside the narrow constraints of the state meant that this group
of actors were naturally not subject to the imperatives of political competition. Instead, they
were focused on creating functionally effective policies available ‘to all citizens entitled to social
assistance’ (Côrtes 2013: 136). The historical lack of social assistance programmes in Brazil often
meant that this concern with functional effectiveness implied lobbying for more expansive coverage,
particularly through the movement that was to develop around the notion of a universal BIG in the
country.
The institutional setting thus gave rise to a somewhat different set of preferences in the Brazilian
case. Beyond the need to comply with the requirements of the new Constitution, state actors were
concerned with maximising the potential electoral returns of effective social assistance policies, while
civil society actors wanted to continue the process started during the struggle for democracy by
creating a significantly expanded system. The institutional setting guiding their preferences and
assistance system.
122
Côrtes (2013) provides a fascinating account of the dynamics within these social assistance councils and the way
190
7.6 The Policy Development Process
Following the specification of the institutional setting, actor constellation, modes of interaction and
actor preferences, this subsection empirically traces the policy development process for the Brazilian
case. Its principal aim is to illustrate the route whereby the weak institutionalisation of social
assistance norms combined with a diffuse state structure directed the construction of a protective
system in Brazil. The chronological discussion traces the role of these two independent variables in
four phases: an initial period (1990-1997) characterised by the emergence of the BPC and the first
conditional programmes at subnational level, a second period which saw the first actions to provide
federal support and eventually federal coordination for the major social assistance initiatives (1997-
2003), a third period characterised by the unification and initial universalisation of social assistance
(2003-2006) and a final period marked by the expansion and consolidation (2006-present) that has
The tumultuous fledgling years of Brazil’s new democracy were consumed by issues of economic
instability and runaway inflation. Federal politics centred on the fight against inflation, with seven
different economic stabilisation plans being implemented in the period between 1986 and 1994.123
It was only with the adoption of the Plano Real in July 1994 that stability started to return to
the Brazilian economy and inflation was tamed. The architect of the Plano Real was Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, who was finance minister during the presidency of Itamar Franco. Cardoso was
The first steps on the road towards constructing the contemporary Brazilian system of social
assistance followed shortly after the economic stabilisation brought about by the Plano Real and
123
These were the Plano Cruzado, Plano Cruzado II, Plano Bresser, Polı́tica Feijão com Arroz, Plano Verão, Plano
191
the implementation of the LOAS in 1995 (Schwarzer & Querino 2002: 16). The LOAS had a
particularly profound impact on the creation of the system, as it ‘deeply changed the structure of
social assistance in Brazil’ (Schwarzer & Querino 2002: 17). Its implementation led to the creation
of a Secretaria de Estado da Assistência Social (SEAS – Secretariat for Social Assistance) within
the federal MPS in 1995 with the aim of coordinating the decentralised policy design and execution
process.
This was soon followed by the construction of a national social assistance policy, the issuance of
tasked with promoting ‘dialogue between the three government levels, [determining] the scope of
each level, [settling] financial issues, and [implementing] a participative council scheme at the three
levels’ (Schwarzer & Querino 2002: 17). Civil society groups were represented at each governmental
The LOAS required every municipality, state as well as the federal government to create such
an advisory social assistance council with the purpose of ‘providing richer policies, securing par-
ticipation, and making policies more transparent. The principle guiding the councils is to reach
consensus (emphasis added) between the different actors’ (Legido-Quigley 2009: 4). It also called
for each administrative unit to draw up an official social assistance policy document stating its
main objectives and principles, as well as the creation of an executing agency (a social assistance
secretary) at each government level (Schwarzer & Querino 2002: 17). Table 7.4 indicates that rapid
progress was made in these regards, with 88.6 percent of municipalities having a social assistance
council and 82.5 percent having a formal social assistance policy by 2000 (Schwarzer & Querino
2002: 18).
The first actual policy changes took place with regards to the Constitution’s call in article 203
(V) for the creation of a guaranteed monthly benefit equal to one minimum wage to the impoverished
handicapped of all ages and the impoverished elderly (FRB 1988). This new benefit — which later
192
Year Total Municipalities Municipalities with Social As- Municipalities with Social As-
Table 7.4: Municipal Social Assistance Competency (Sources: Schwarzer & Querino 2002: 18)
became known as the BPC — was to be regulated by the LOAS itself in order to replace the RMV
(FRB 1993; Schwarzer & Querino 2002: 16; Interview 12). It called for the BPC to be coordinated
by the Ministério da Previdência Social (MPS – Ministry of Social Security) which, through the
INSS, was already responsible for implementing social insurance pensions in Brazil. This meant
that the non-contributory BPC had to be incorporated alongside these contributory programmes
The programme stipulations laid out in the legal framework were very detailed: the federal
government was required to create a social assistance programme directed at disabled people of
any age and to those above the age of 65 whose household per capita income was less than one
quarter of the minimum wage per month. It was constitutionally mandated that this programme be
unconditional and assess the needs of beneficiaries based on their family structure (FRB 1988; FRB
1993). Given the fact that the BPC’s core institutional norms were defined in such great detail by
the Constitution and LOAS, policymakers did not grapple with issues of coverage, conditionality
and orientation.
The institutional framework was explicit: the BPC was to be unconditional; its orientation was
to be familial; and it was to cover impoverished disabled people of all ages and the impoverished
elderly by providing a monthly benefit equal in value to one minimum wage. This did not leave
much room for policy contestation. Instead, the main issues under consideration during the policy
design process were related to the BPC’s operationalisation. Throughout 1995, negotiations around
193
this were coordinated at the federal level by the SEAS and involved actors from all three spheres of
government and civil society through the newly-established administrative commissions and social
The main issue dealt with during these negotiations was the question of the benefit payment
mechanism. Given the fact that the INSS was already experienced in delivering the benefit payments
for contributory pensions, and despite discussions about the possibility of adopting a system where
the payments would be contracted out to local authorities, a decision was reached to task the INSS
with delivering the BPC payments across the country (Legido-Quigley 2009: 4). The BPC benefits
would consequently be paid out by the INSS via the same channels (commercial banks and post
offices) and on the same dates as contributory pensions (Legido-Quigley 2009: 4). Even though
the BPC has thus been a federal programme since its inception, the brief process that took place
to determine its operation hinted at what was to come: a decentralised procedure of negotiated
The BPC officially became operational on 2 January 1996, marking the first implementation of a
genuine non-contributory social assistance intervention in Brazilian history. At the same time, new
applications for the RMV were no longer accepted after 1995, while benefits which were granted
up to 1995 continue to be paid.124 In a further reflection of the power of institutional norms, the
operationalisation of the BPC got off to a somewhat rocky start primarily due to the fact that INSS
officials were not used to working with a non-contributory benefit. As a result, ‘the mentality within
the INSS was that you had a right to a pension if you had previously contributed to the system’
(Legido-Quigley 2009: 4). Despite this initial difficulty, by 1998 the BPC was being paid out on a
non-contributory basis to a total of 844 632 beneficiaries every month (Schwarzer & Querino 2002:
18).
At the same time that the BPC was being phased in, there were two closely related policy
124
In 2014, a total of 183 531 beneficiaries were technically still considered to be receiving the RMV (MPS 2014:
11).
194
stirrings taking place elsewhere which would go on to have a decisive impact on shaping the pro-
tective social assistance system in Brazil. The first was the intensification of a theoretical debate
around the potential introduction of a BIG, while the second was the practical creation of the first
(localised) conditional CTs aimed at the impoverished population not covered by the fledgling BPC
(children, families and unemployed adults). Along with the implementation of the BPC, examining
the way in which these developments were institutionally channelled provides a persuasive account
Early discussions around the potential for introducing a BIG originated among civil society
actors in the 1970s, but it was only during the 1990s that the issue was taken up in policy circles.
The political champion of this agenda was Senator Eduardo Suplicy from the PT, who introduced a
draft bill to the Senate in 1991 calling for the establishment of a social assistance scheme that would
guarantee a minimum income to all adults with incomes below a specified threshold (Suplicy 2002:
2; Lindert et al. 2007: 10). The bill was approved by the Senate, but the Chamber of Deputies failed
to vote on it. Despite the failure to adopt this particular bill, the debate around it placed the issue
of expanded social assistance squarely on the political agenda. Through a process of intense policy
experimentation, competition and proliferation, the idea eventually found some practical expression
in the introduction of the first subnational social assistance programmes in January 1995.
The first one to be created, known as the Programa Bolsa Escola (PBE – School Grant Pro-
gramme), became operational on 3 January 1995 in the federal district (Lindert et al. 2007: 12).
As the first programme to be implemented, the features introduced by the PBE would subsequently
go on to have a tremendous impact on shaping the eventual characteristics of the PBF programme.
After running on the platform of the PBE, the programme was introduced by incoming PT governor
Cristovam Buarque immediately upon assuming office (Interview 16). The initial impetus behind
the PBE originated through interactions with functionally-oriented civil society actors during Buar-
que’s time as rector of the University of Brası́lia in the late 1980s, where he engaged in debates on
195
challenges facing the country with academics (including sociologist and future President Cardoso)
and other civil society actors through the Centre for Studies of Contemporary Brazil (Buarque 2013:
11).
Along with journalist Gilberto Dimenstein, Buarque went on to further expound on the idea of
the PBE in two books.125 Buarque and his civil society collaborators emphasised the idea that ‘the
principal vector of development was not the economy, but was, indeed, quality education’ (Buarque
2013: 10). As such, they began to view social assistance provision as a tool to enhance educational
outcomes through conditionality. The ideational foundation was simple: if there were families with
children who are unable to go to school due to poverty, then they should be paid on the condition
that the children must study (Buarque 2013: 14). The aim was to use the poor’s ‘need for income
as a way to induce them to place their children in school’ (Buarque 2013: 14).
The notion of the PBE was first introduced to the general public in August 1994 during the
election campaign for the governorship of the federal district. The implementation of the programme
was initiated immediately after Buarque won the election. The PBE was set to become the first
conditional CT in Brazil. It would pay the equivalent of one minimum wage to families with
children between the ages of seven and 14, and would be conditional upon school attendance. The
programme was managed by the Secretary of Education and was well and truly a local programme,
A few months prior to the initiation of the PBE in the federal district in January 1995, the
then-mayor of the city of Campinas in São Paulo state, José Roberto Magalhães Texeira, had
shown an interest in the ideas previously published by Buarque, and invited him to discuss them
125
The first was entitled Revolução das Prioridades – da Modernidade Técnica à Modernidade Ética (‘The Revolution
of Priorities – from Technical Modernity to Ethical Modernity’) and A Segunda Abolição – uma proposta para a
erradicação da pobreza no Brasil (‘Abolishing Poverty: A Proposal for Brazil’). The case for a conditional CT was
further made in a series of academic and newspaper articles published in the Folha de São Paulo by economist José
196
in person (Buarque 2013: 16). Shortly after witnessing the introduction of the PBE, Teixeira (who
was from the rival PSDB) initiated his own programme126 in Campinas on 3 March 1995. Although
the Campinas programme closely emulated the PBE model, it was managed by the Secretary for
Welfare (instead of Education) and featured somewhat softer conditionality (Buarque 2013: 20).
By the end of 1998, 20 000 families in the federal district were receiving the PBE, while Campinas
What followed these initial experiments amounts to a remarkable tale of policy diffusion. The
PBE immediately proved to be immensely popular, both with beneficiaries and in the media. The
press played an important role in disseminating information across the country through ringing
endorsements that appeared in some of Brazil’s leading titles, including O Globo (19 November
1995; 20 December 1996); Veja (10 July 1996; 10 October 1996); Policarpo Júnior (8 October
1997); Sandra Brasil (8 October 1997); Jornal de Brası́lia (19 September 1996); and Estado de São
Headlines included phrases like ‘The great silent revolution: Brazil surmounts the phase of
pompous solutions and begins to resolve its education problem with simple ideas’; ‘Help and even
kindness out of the horror – there are three solutions for the drama of childhood lost in the street:
school, school, and school’; ‘House and school – federal district government helps poor children
– and their parents as well’; ‘The example of Brası́lia’; ‘Complementing family income reduces
school dropouts in the federal district – program guarantees R$100 a month to needy families that
keep all their children in school’; and ‘UN gives prizes to federal district educational project –
Bolsa Escola pays one minimum wage to the students who do not skip school’ (Buarque 2013: 51-
59). The programme also won the prestigious Getúlio Vargas Foundation Public Management and
The PBE furthermore received international recognition, with a profile appearing in Time mag-
126
This intervention was known as the Programa de Garantia de Renda Familiar Mı́nima (PGRFM – Familial
197
azine as early as December 1995. Nobel Laureate for Economics Gary Becker praised it in a 1997
Business Week article, while the programme won the 1996 UNICEF Children and Peace Prize
one of the programmes that [was] most consulted by the country’s other governors. Every day
the federal district Secretary of Education received dozens of telephone calls, letters, and visits
In this way, the programme effectively became a model which was replicated across the states and
municipalities of Brazil. By 2001, more than 100 municipalities and at least seven states covering
200 000 families were operating programmes based on the PBE (Lindert et al. 2007: 11; Buarque
2013: 32).
Without any involvement from the federal government, municipalities and states governed by
political parties from across the ideological spectrum that were ‘deeply diverse in terms of popu-
lation, poverty levels and economic weight...decided to fund the same programme, an event that
occurred in a relatively short period of time’ (Interview 12; Coêlho 2012: 57). The driving force
behind this tremendous horizontal policy diffusion was political competition channelled by Brazil’s
highly competitive and decentralised institutional structure, as politicians quickly learnt through
election results that resoundingly endorsed the popularity of the programmes (Fonseca & Montali
1996; Caccia Bava et al. 1998; Lindert et al. 2007; Coêlho 2012).
Heading into the 1998 presidential election year, the foundation for the construction of the
Brazilian social assistance system had thus been established. It provided comprehensive federal
support to impoverished disabled people of all ages and the impoverished elderly via the BPC, while
a disparate set of subnational programmes were providing coverage through conditional programmes
to families with school-aged children in a majority of municipalities and states. Already at this time,
the system had thus incorporated conditionalities and assessed the needs of potential beneficiaries
on a familial basis. Table 7.5 provides a snapshot into this evolving system.127
127
There was no unified, national PBE at this time, and this table only indicates that there were a range of such
198
Name Year Created Target Beneficiaries
ally 0-14)
Elderly (67+)
Table 7.5: Brazilian Social Assistance in 1997 (Sources: CEF 2014; MPS 2013: 11)
Despite initial scepticism from bureaucrats surrounding the cost implications of federal social assis-
tance provision, it would soon simply become impossible for the government in Brası́lia to ignore
the continued proliferation, positive impact evaluations128 and growing electoral popularity of the
subnational PBE programmes (Interview 16; Buarque 2013: 62). Recognition of the model’s success
had in fact caused it to begin spreading beyond Brazil’s borders, as the Mexican federal govern-
ment had set up the Progresa (Progress) conditional CT in 1997 explicitly based upon the federal
Driven by the realities of political competition, the federal government decided to get in on the
act. The PSDB administration identified an initial opportunity to do so by leveraging its financial
resources to induce cash-strapped municipalities into sharing political credit for the programmes
with the national sphere. The federal government thus identified and initiated negotiations with
financially constrained subnational units about the possibility of creating some room for federal
programmes being implemented by states and municipalities across the country. The figure for the BPC includes
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the UNDP, ILO, UNESCO and UNICEF.
129
In Mexico, the programme was subsequently renamed Oportunidades (Opportunity), and is currently known as
Prospera (Prosper). President Ernesto Zedillo had sent a delegation (which included his wife) to the federal district
in 1996 to learn about the PBE before setting up the Mexican scheme (Interview 16).
199
involvement in the financing of local PBEs.
The process resulted in the introduction of the Programa de Garantia de Renda Mı́nima (PGRM
– Programme for a Guaranteed Minimum Income) in 1998. The bill creating this scheme was
introduced to Congress by Nelson Marchezan from the PSDB. The PGRM was managed by the
federal Ministry of Education, and provided transfers to municipalities which were implementing
their own conditional CTs but lacked the necessary resources to sustain the programmes (Lindert
et al. 2007: 12). Municipalities were however still required to contribute at least 50 percent of
Through this process of negotiated agreement, the PGRM was ultimately extended to cover 1
350 of the poorest municipalities in the country (Coêlho 2012: 57). Although it was not a social
assistance intervention per se, the PRGM represented the first foray by the federal government
into the provision of social assistance to groups not eligible for coverage under the BPC. It thus
In turn, municipalities ceded some of their political authority to the federal government. As such,
the PGRM was not only an important factor in further promoting and sustaining subnational CTs,
but also became a gateway for the design and implementation of future federal social assistance
Meanwhile, Cardoso was re-elected in the 1998 presidential election and assumed office in Jan-
uary 1999 to commence his second term — with the diffusion of subnational PBE programmes
continuing unabated across the country. Despite its financial involvement, this reality meant that
the federal government risked foregoing the opportunity to be definitively associated with what had
become the most popular social policy initiative in Brazilian history. It had to act. Much of the
impetus for federal action continued to come from Congressman Marchezan (Cardoso’s colleague
in the PSDB) through the hosting of a national seminar on minimum income linked to education
in the Chamber of Deputies during November 2000. The outcome of these efforts was to convince
200
the Cardoso administration of the (political) necessity of establishing a nationwide, federal PBE
The final two years of the Cardoso presidency subsequently saw the introduction and rapid
expansion of federal CTs. Federal politicians had become thoroughly convinced by the potential
of CTs to generate political support, and ‘every Minister thought: “this is a good idea, I want
one too”. It started to come out everywhere’ (Interview 13). Fittingly, the first to be introduced
was a federal PBE programme. On 11 April 2001 Cardoso created, through executive decree,130 a
national version of the programme that was originally implemented in the federal district six years
earlier to replace the PGRM (Lindert et al. 2007: 13). The federal PBE thereby consolidated the
Managed by the Ministry of Education, the programme targeted families with children between
the ages of seven and 16 years old and paid a monthly sum of R$15 (US$7) per child to families with
per capita income of less than R$90 (US$43) conditional upon a minimum school attendance rate
of 85 percent per child (Lindert et al. 2007: 13). The operation of the programme was therefore
identical to its subnational predecessors. The primary change was an organisational one: although
still implemented in a decentralised fashion by individual municipalities, the PBE had now become
a national programme funded exclusively by the federal government. It had thereby gained much
firmer legal footing, even as political credit for the PBE continued to be shared between local and
federal politicians. From a small local programme targeting 20 000 families in the federal district
130
The widespread use of executive decrees in Brazil’s presidential system is a topic of some controversy among
analysts (Ames 1995; 2001; Limongi & Figueiredo 1995; Figueiredo & Limongi 2000; Reich 2002). The Constitution
grants Presidents the power to enact a measure for a period of 30 days through executive decree, during which time
Congress is supposed to vote on its permanence. But in a vast majority of cases Congress fails to vote on executive
decrees (Reich 2002: 10). When this happens, the decree expires. However, the practice of simply reissuing the same
decree for months or even years on end — thereby enabling the continued implementation of the particular provision
— has become a deeply embedded presidential practice which also manifested itself in the creation of conditional CTs
in Brazil.
201
in 1995, the federal PBE ‘was present in almost all cities in the country’ and reached a total of 4.8
The federal executive quickly moved to consolidate this political momentum by additionally
creating the Cadastro Único (Central Registry)131 with the aim of collecting information on the
living conditions of all impoverished families in the country. This would allow the government to
design further programmes targeting this population. The first subsequent step was taken on 6
September 2001, when Cardoso issued a presidential decree creating the Bolsa Alimentação (BA –
Food Grant). Explicitly modelled on the PBE, this CT was aimed at families with children between
the ages of zero and seven years old and was conditional upon complying with a schedule of pre- and
post-natal medical visits, ensuring that all children were vaccinated according to an official schedule,
the Ministry of Health and also paid $15 (US$7) per child to families with a per capita monthly
income of less than R$90 (US$43). Once eligibility for the programme expired at age seven, families
with eligible children transitioned onto the federal PBE (Lindert et al. 2007: 13).
The federal government’s newfound zeal for CTs was also expressed through the creation of the
Auxı́lio Gás (AG – Gas Voucher) programme in January 2002 as a ‘compensatory measure for the
phasing out of cooking gas subsidies’ (Lindert et al. 2007: 13). This scheme was administered by
the Ministry of Mines and Energy, and paid a transfer of R$15 (US$7) in bi-monthly instalments
to families with monthly per capita income equal to less than half the minimum wage (Lindert et
By the end of Cardoso’s second term, profound changes had consequently been made to the
Brazilian social assistance regime. Although still incomplete, the system now not only provided
coverage to the disabled and elderly through the BPC, but also extended federal coverage to impov-
131
The creation of the Cadastro Único proved to be an administrative masterstroke. The database currently contains
information on the living conditions of 78 million of the poorest Brazilians and has become an operational centrepiece
202
erished families with children between the ages of zero and 16. It continued to define beneficiaries
in familial terms, and strongly incorporated elements of conditionality. Table 7.6 illustrates the
2001 (federal)
Elderly (67+)
Table 7.6: Brazilian Social Assistance in 2003 (Sources: CEF 2014; MPS 2013: 11)
On one level, the 2002 presidential election brought profound change to Brazilian politics. After two
full terms under Cardoso’s PDSB government, Brazilians elected Lula and his PT in a second-round
runoff during his fourth campaign for President. Lula and the PT had first run for President in
1989, and had for many years openly advocated for the implementation of socialism in the country.
But the successful adoption of market reforms during the Cardoso years had ‘rendered the party’s
socialist project unviable’, forcing it closer to the centre of the ideological spectrum and ultimately
The pressures of vote maximisation produced by a highly competitive political arena, combined
with the need to demonstrate results in office following a series of successful subnational elections
in the 1990s, increased the weight of pragmatists in the party and led the PT to undertake a
credible shift closer to the political centre (Samuels 2004; Hunter 2010). This undertaking was most
profoundly expressed prior to the election in Lula’s famous Carta aos Brasileiros (‘Letter to the
Brazilian People’) where he promised to honour the country’s debts and uphold current economic
132
This list does not include the niche AG programme. The figure for the BPC includes remaining RMV beneficiaries.
203
policy. The same pattern of continuity is visible in the area of social assistance, where Lula’s election
did not imply a profound break with previous policy. Instead, successive PT administrations would
(Faulbaum 2013).
But the Lula administration would have to learn a hard lesson about institutional stickiness
first. During his inaugural address on 1 January 2003, the new President announced the creation
of the Fome Zero (FZ – Zero Hunger) programme as his government’s flagship programme. It
at eradicating hunger in the country (Lindert et al. 2007: 13). Lula also announced the related
(MESA – Special Ministry for Food Security) to coordinate the introduction of a pilot project known
as the Cartão Alimentação (CA – Food Card), where money was to be transferred to impoverished
beneficiaries to enable them to make food purchases (Bither-Terry 2013: 1; Lindert et al. 2007:
13).
The FZ intervention soon proved to be a dismal failure, largely because it disregarded existing
institutions and ‘failed to engage constructively with policy legacies from the Fernando Henrique
Cardoso government’ (Bither-Terry 2013: 1; Interview 13). At the same time, a new set of supple-
mentary survey questions in the 2004 household survey had found that CTs were having positive
impacts on the poor. It made a big difference in terms of the poverty headcount ratio and, perhaps
more significantly in the Brazilian context, was having a ‘huge impact’ in terms of reducing inequal-
ity (Interview 13). By the end of Lula’s first year in office, he was ‘[beating] a hasty retreat from FZ
and invested in social programmes similar to Cardoso’s, increasing their resources’ (McCann 2008:
40). The administration was admitting policy failure as far as FZ was concerned: it abolished the
From 2004 onwards, the Lula government shifted its attention away from the institutionally
204
incompatible interventions of FZ towards what was to become the PBF. Even though voices in some
quarters of the PT, including Cristovam Buarque who was now federal Minister of Education, had
been lobbying Lula since 2002 to further expand CTs across the country, it took the failure of FZ to
finally convince the President that these interventions were more politically effective (Buarque 2013:
37; Interview 13). Lula consequently requested officials from the Ministry of Social Assistance133
and the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA – Institute of Applied Economic Research)
On 9 January 2004, Lula formally created the PBF through an executive decree (FRB 2004c).
The programme unified the existing CTs (PBE, BA, and CA) into one massive conditional federal
programme. The language used in the operational justifications for the reforms that resulted in
the PBF included references to ‘leveraging synergies’, ‘rationalisation and consolidation’, ‘improved
efficiency and targeting’, ‘strengthening monitoring and evaluation’, ‘promoting vertical integration’,
More decisive than this rationale was the political justification. In the face of intensifying
criticism and the failed FZ approach, the leftist Lula government was eager to claim political credit
for what were proving to be extreme popular social programmes (Interview 13). Indeed,
after the much-ballyhooed Fome Zero programme failed to get off the ground in 2003-4, Lula was
receiving low marks in this area. He set his sights on reversing this situation in the second half
of his administration. Staking his prospects on the Bolsa Famı́lia was a cost-effective strategy
Motivated by the realities of political competition, the administration proceeded to build on the
policy legacies inherited from the Cardoso years with the aim of leveraging the PBF into political
support.
It did this while being fully cognisant of the realities of the country’s diffuse state structure, as
the negotiated agreements that were reached with subnational actors in the creation of the PBF
133
This ministry was merged with MESA in January 2004 to form the MDS, headed by Minister Patrus Ananias.
205
allowed them to continue sharing in some of the political credit for the creation of the programme:
by sharing the day-to-day operation of Bolsa Famı́lia with Brazil’s 5 500 municipal mayors, the
President allowed local elites to reap some of the benefits of this hugely popular programme
This outcome was crucial, as it enabled the Lula government to take credit for the creation of
the PBF while simultaneously ensuring continued political buy-in from subnational actors in the
The other relevant development that took place during this period was related to the debate
surrounding the BIG in Brazil. The discussion, still championed by the PT’s Suplicy, had already
played a role in spurring the expansion of social assistance provision. The BIG had been part of
Lula’s PT election campaigns throughout the 1990s, and his election finally led to a vote in Congress
on a BIG bill authored by Suplicy (Suplicy 2006: 43). Both houses of Congress approved the bill
during 2003, and it was signed into law by Lula on 8 January 2004 (FRB 2004a). Brazil had thereby
become the first country in the world to adopt a law calling for the creation of a universal basic
income.
However, the language contained in the bill made it clear that it was the prerogative of the
executive to determine the pace of its implementation (FRB 2004a). The BIG law was a very
flexible piece of legislation, as ‘the amount given and its realisation will be gradual and given under
the criterion of the national executive, which gives priority to the neediest until everybody can
receive it’ (Suplicy 2006: 53). In practise, the PBF was regarded by many as the first step on the
road towards implementing a BIG by gradually extending its coverage (Lindert et al. 2007: 14).
In the face of mounting criticism regarding its initially slow progress on social policy issues
and the failed FZ programme, the Lula government thus responded to the political pressure by
claiming the PBF as its own, and then framing the PBF as the first step in implementing a BIG
across Brazil134 (Hunter & Power 2007: 19; Suplicy 2006: 10; Lindert et al. 2007: 14). The
134
Despite the fact that the law was politically framed in this way, some analysts question whether the PBF will
206
influence of the BIG law was made particularly visible through the introduction of the PBF’s basic
benefit (a benefit that did not exist for any of its predecessors), which enabled individuals living
in families classified as ‘extremely poor’ to qualify for a per capita payment of R$50 (US$23) per
month regardless of their demographic composition and whether they had any children (Lindert et
al. 2007: 16). This step had the effect of introducing, for the first time, universal coverage that
also included the able-bodied poor of working age in the Brazilian social assistance system.
The final two years of the first Lula administration were dominated by the execution of the
administrative actions required to fully operationalise the PBF. The programme underwent a tran-
sition year in 2004 during which its foundations were established. This included the creation of
the MDS in January of that year, followed by the issuance of operational instructions. The year
2005 ‘represented a period of consolidation and maturation for the PBF’ during which its ‘core
architecture’ was strengthened (Lindert et al. 2007: 14). ‘Massive efforts’ were also undertaken to
enhance the accuracy of the Cadastro Único and monitoring conditionalities (Lindert et al. 2007:
14). By the end of 2004, the programme was already reaching 59 percent of eligible families; this
grew to 77 percent by 2005 and almost 100 percent by 2006 for a total of 11.1 million families, or
44 million individuals (Hunter & Power 2007: 19; Lindert 2006: 67).
The 2006 general election was the next decisive event in the construction of the Brazilian social
assistance system. Despite his party being embroiled in the Mensalão (‘big monthly payment’)
corruption scandal, Lula remarkably won the runoff against the PSDB’s Geraldo Alckmin with
more than 60 percent of the votes (TSE 2014). The election results represented a clear testament
to the political success of expanding the conditional, familial PBF programme through a process
of negotiated agreement (Hunter & Power 2007; Zucco 2008; Zucco & Power 2013). Lula’s support
base had undergone a pronounced shift, as voters from wealthier regions of the country abandoned
him due to the corruption scandal, while voters from relatively more impoverished regions of the
ultimately result in the implementation of a BIG; see Britto 2011.
207
country (who had not supported him in 2002) now voted for him en masse135 (Hunter & Power
the voters who carried Lula to victory appear to have been strongly influenced by the govern-
ment’s social policies, especially the PBF. . . The poorest, least educated citizens in Brazil have
seen material improvements in their lives since 2003. In 2006, they made clear that they are avail-
benefits. . . In sum, the social policy story is arguably the single most plausible explanation for
The 2006 election results thus vindicated Lula’s gamble on the PBF and testified ‘to the wisdom of
[his] acceleration of social policy in the second half of his first term’ (Hunter & Power 2007: 19).
The signature achievement of Lula’s first term was the unification and universalisation of social
assistance in Brazil through the introduction of the PBF. It was the culmination of a decade long
bottom-up policy development process where the norms of universal provision, conditionality and
a familial orientation were continuously being entrenched. Table 7.7 provides an overview of what
the system looked like by the time that Lula was re-elected for a second term as President.
Bolsa Famı́lia Variable 1 1995 (subnational) Poor families with children aged 0-16 (up
Elderly (67+)
Table 7.7: Brazilian Social Assistance in 2006 (Sources: CEF 2014; MPS 2013: 11)
135
Even though this interpretation was criticised by Bohn (2011), the data introduced by Hunter and Power (2007),
as well as by Zucco and Power (2013), amount to highly compelling evidence that Lula’s voter base did indeed swing
from the wealthy southwest to the impoverished northeast between 2002 and 2006.
208
7.6.4 Expansion and Consolidation (2006-present)
The adoption of the BIG law and the political popularity of the PBF would go on to play a decisive
role in spurring further moves towards universal social assistance provision in the country. With
the ever present reality of political competition lurking in the background, the PT government had
become thoroughly convinced that expanding the PBF to cover the entire impoverished population
— based on conditionality and a familial orientation — was a winning electoral strategy (Hunter &
Power 2007).
In addition to continuing to implement the BPC and strengthening the administrative mecha-
nisms of all programmes, Lula’s second term from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2010 was mainly
characterised by the PBF’s continued expansion in coverage and benefit values. The programme
effectively had three sets of eligibility criteria between 2003 and 2010: R$50 and R$100 from 2003
to 2006; R$60 and R$120 from 2006 to 2009; as well as R$70 and R$140 since 2009 to the present
(Osório & Ferreira de Souza 2013: 1). The benefit levels were adjusted four times during this
period: in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011. The biggest expansion in the programme’s coverage was the
introduction of the adolescent (variable 2) benefit in December 2007. This adjustment expanded
coverage to families earning between R$60 (US$25) and R$120 (US$50) per capita with children up
to the age of 18 (Osório & Ferreira de Souza 2013: 2). The maximum eligibility age for the variable
benefit thus increased from 16 to 18. Table 7.8 summarises these expansionary changes.
209
Year Changes and Adjustments Benefit Design (at year end)
Creation of the PBF, with two levels of eligibility that referred, but Basic: R$50
were not bound, to the amounts of 1/4 and 1/2 the minimum wage Children: R$15 to R$45
(R$200 in early 2003) of per capita household income, with a basic Poverty: from R$50 to R$100
benefit given only to extremely poor families, and a variable benefit, Children: R$15 to R$45
given per child aged 0-15 years, for a maximum of three children.
The eligibility levels are adjusted for the first time, with no change to Basic: R$50
The benefit design is altered for the first time, with the creation of a Adolescents: R$30 to R$60
benefit for up to two 16- and 17-year-old adolescents. Poverty: from R$60 to R$120
The eligibility levels are again readjusted to the amounts that would Adolescents: R$33 to R$66
remain in effect until the end of 2012. The benefits are also read- Poverty: from R$70 to R$140
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2011 March Extreme Poverty: up to R$70
The benefits are readjusted, and the benefit design undergoes a sec- Basic: R$70
ond change, expanding the limit from three to five children. Children: R$32 to R$160
The PBSM’s per capita transfer is introduced, aimed at households Extreme Poverty: up to R$70
which, even after receiving the PBF benefit, had remained extremely Basic: R$70
The age range of children eligible to participate in the PBSM is rede- PBSM: remaining per capita gap
Table 7.8: The Evolution of the Bolsa Famı́lia from 2003 to 2012 (Sources: Osório & Ferreira de Souza 2013: 2)
By the end of Lula’s second term in 2010, the PBF was covering 12.7 million families (52
million individuals) (ECLAC 2013). The social assistance system theoretically provided an absolute
monthly minimum income of R$70 (US$30) to every impoverished person in the country, while
children, the disabled and elderly were entitled to an additional monthly amount (up to three
children per family between zero and 18 received an additional amount of R$32 (US$14) or R$38
(US$17) through the PBF, while the disabled and elderly received R$677 (US$294) via the BPC).
Thanks in large part to these policies, the number of people living in poverty had fallen by 20 million
under Lula; from 49.5 million (28.5 percent) to 29 million (16 percent) (The Economist 2010). At
the same time, the number of Brazilians who were too poor to properly feed themselves had fallen
It was within this context that the 2010 general elections took place. Lula’s successor as PT
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presidential candidate and his former chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff (popularly known simply as
Dilma), came up against the PSDB’s José Serra. In an illustration of the extent to which social
assistance had become politically entrenched, Serra promised that he would maintain the PBF if
elected (R7 Notı́cias 2010). But the PT’s association with such programmes allowed Dilma to
aggressively campaign on the promise of further expanding social assitance (R7 Notı́cias 2010). The
strategy again paid-off, as Dilma was elected by a margin of 56 percent to 44 percent in the runoff
Reflecting the priority assigned to the continued expansion of social assistance provision, one of
the first moves made by the Dilma government was to increase the benefit values and the number
of children eligible per family for the child-focused part of the PBF (variable 1 benefit) from three
to a maximum of five (Osório & Ferreira de Souza 2013: 1). This was followed by the introduction
of the PBSM in June 2011, which amounted to the biggest coverage expansion since the creation
of the PBF in 2004. This plan built on the institutional legacy inherited from the Lula years by
introducing the residual benefit to the PBF. The plan explicitly targeted the ‘approximately 16.2
million Brazilian identified by the 2010 census who are still in a situation of extreme poverty, that
The programme also featured an ‘active search’ component aimed at proactively looking for and
registering all of the remaining extremely poor families that had not been located yet (FRB 2011b:
6). Dilma made it clear that the PBSM’s aim of finally eradicating extreme poverty in Brazil by
ensuring that no person lived on less than R$70 (US$30) per month by 2014 was her government’s
‘key priority’ (BBC 2011). In order to achieve this, the PBF’s residual benefit would forthwith cover
the remaining poverty gap for each beneficiary family (FRB 2011b). For example, if a family’s total
income after the basic and variable PBF transfers still amounted to only R$50 per capita, then the
state would pay an additional R$20 per person to ensure that the household was brought above the
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Dilma’s first term was focused on implementing the PBSM. While it continued to incorporate
conditionality and a clear familial orientation, the PBF under the PBSM also served to further
emphasise what had become the universalistic nature of the Brazilian system. And the electorate
was about to reaffirm once more that the expansion of this system was politically advantageous.
Even as a wave of popular middle class protests swept over Brazil and the economy weakened in
2013, Dilma was claiming that the government had almost met the target of eliminating extreme
poverty (Boadle 2013). By late 2014 and in the heat of the next election campaign, the Minister of
Social Development, Tereza Campello, stated that the government had complied ‘with all the goals
Following a tumultuous campaign which again prominently featured the PT candidate primarily
running on the government’s record of social assistance provision, Dilma was re-elected in an tight
runoff against the PSDB’s Aécio Neves (TSE 2014). She embarked on her second term as President
in a Brazil that had undergone profound changes in terms of social assistance provision. From a
baseline of practically zero, the previous two decades had witnessed the construction of a protective
system based on universality, conditionality and a familial orientation. Table 7.9 illustrates the
213
Name Year Created Target Beneficiaries
Bolsa Famı́lia Variable 1 1995 (subnational) Poor families with children aged 0-16 (up
Bolsa Famı́lia Variable 2 2007 Poor families with adolescents aged 16-18
(up to 2 adolescents)
Bolsa Famı́lia Residual 2012 All families with per capita income still
below R$70
Elderly (67+)
Table 7.9: Brazilian Social Assistance in 2014 (Sources: CEF 2014; MPS 2013: 11)
7.7 Conclusion
The chapter has conducted a thorough overview of the development of social assistance policies in
Brazil. It has illustrated the way in which a productive system emerged within an institutional
context characterised by the weak institutionalisation of norms and a diffuse state structure. The
analysis proceeded according to the ACI procedure, which entailed two sequential steps. The first
involved the explication of the Brazilian institutional structure according to the two independent
variables. The discussion initially highlighted the fact that institutional norms relating to coverage,
conditionality and orientation were only weakly entrenched, owing to the absence of social assistance
provision in Brazil prior to the transition to democracy. This left the constitutional architects with
a relatively blank slate, which they subsequently filled with a flexible set of emerging norms.
This was followed by an examination of state structure, which indicated that formal policy-
making capacity and the practical distribution of political power were both highly dispersed. The
specification of the institutional setting subsequently enabled the second analytical step, involving
an examination of the role played by this configuration in shaping the preferences and interac-
214
tion structures of actors within the policy community. The final section empirically reviewed the
actual process of social assistance policy development in Brazil through a focus on interactions
between diverse sets of policy actors, culminating in an approach premised on universal coverage,
The analysis shows that even when efforts were made to undertake alternative policy paths,
such as with the Lula government’s unilateral introduction of the FZ programme at the potential
premised on weak norm institutionalisation and a diffuse state structure ultimately undermined such
attempts. The chapter thus illustrates that even as it was initiated by the transition to democracy
and influenced by functional and ideational factors, the process leading to the construction of a
protective social assistance system in Brazil was ultimately decisively channelled and shaped by the
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Chapter 8
Explaining Variation
8.1 Introduction
This chapter explicitly returns to the study’s research question by interpreting the preceding case
studies. As such, it aims to account for the variation on the dependent variable (the creation of
a productive system in South Africa versus a protective approach in Brazil) by pointing to the
variation on the independent variables (institutionalisation of norms and state structure) as the
primary explanatory factor. In short, it argues that differences on the institutional dimension most
effectively explain the fact that South Africa has adopted a productive approach to social assistance,
It achieves this by initially investigating the veracity of the set of competing claims introduced
in section 3.5. The analysis shows that while functional and ideational factors were tautologically
relevant to the policy development process, these explanations fail to comprehensively account
for the differing outcomes. This is followed by a return to the study’s central argument that
differences in institutional features offer the most plausible explanation. In a powerful confirmation
of the institutional hypothesis, the discussion demonstrates the way in which (often similar) policy
problems and ideas were institutionally channelled into varying outcomes across the cases and
216
ultimately led to the construction of a productive social assistance system in South Africa, and a
This section subjects the empirical discussion on the development of social assistance policies in
South Africa and Brazil to a functional and ideational interpretation. These two dimensions have
emerged in the literature as the principle explanatory vectors in accounting for the recent design
and implementation of such policies in the developing world (Graham 2002; Fiszbein et al. 2009;
Hanlon et al. 2010; UNRISD 2010; Liesering & Barrientos 2013; Mothiane 2014). As the analysis
will show, these interpretations are however inadequate in accounting for the emergence of different
policy regimes across the cases, as measured along the dimensions of coverage, conditionality and
orientation. Regarding the recent introduction of social assistance provision in the developing world
purely as a product of broadly similar ‘objective’ policy problems and/or ideas is an oversimplifica-
tion which severely underestimates the decisive role played by local institutions in shaping varying
policy outputs.
A functional account of the rise of social assistance in South Africa and Brazil provides a useful
of this approach assert that the implementation of CTs represents a response to ‘economic crisis,
structural adjustment and global integration, where the limitations of residual, ad hoc safety nets
to address the social consequences of neoliberal policies became painfully apparent’ (UNRISD 2010:
135). The introduction of these programmes is therefore seen as a functional response to the policy
problem of persistently high poverty (and inequality) rates. It is argued that the interventions
‘reflect a situation of high poverty and inequality’ that have ‘increasingly led governments...to
217
examine whether social protection in general — and cash transfer programmes in particular — can
address some of the...challenges’ (Fiszbein et al. 2009: 9; Garcia & Moore 2012: 1).
If the design features of social assistance interventions purely represent ‘appropriate’ responses
to exogenous policy problems, then it can be expected that cases featuring similar problems would
exhibit similar responses. The veracity of the functional claim thus depends upon demonstrating
that governments adopted similar policies in similar contexts. Beyond the somewhat tautological
claim that poverty needs to be present for CTs to be justified, a brief examination of the features of
the South African and Brazilian cases illustrates the highly limited applicability of this explanation
in accounting for their specific features in terms of coverage, conditionality and orientation.
A functional explanation for the variations in coverage (limited in South Africa, universal in
Brazil) would need to demonstrate that broader coverage was required to alleviate poverty in Brazil
than in South Africa. Specifically, such an account would need to explain why it is that able-bodied
unemployed adults are covered in Brazil but not in South Africa. Straightforward proxies for testing
this are provided by data on poverty and working-age unemployment rates: perhaps poverty and
unemployment rates were simply higher in Brazil than in South Africa when the systems were
designed, necessitating the incorporation of this impoverished societal segment there. Figure 8.1
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45
40
35
30
Percentage
25
20
15
10
0
Poverty (US$1.25 per day - Poverty (US$2 per day - Unemployment Rate
PPP) PPP)
South Africa Brazil
Figure 8.1: Poverty and Unemployment Rates (1995) (Source: World Bank 2015a; 2015b; 2015c)
The data indicate that poverty and unemployment rates were higher in South Africa than in
Brazil at the beginning of the period under examination (and have remained that way throughout).
It is safe to deduce from these figures that able-bodied unemployed adults were probably in some-
what greater objective need in South Africa than in Brazil. According to the functionalist view,
this would have necessitated broader coverage in South Africa than in Brazil — the exact opposite
of what actually transpired. There is thus no functional justification for the provision of universal
A functional argument for the implementation of conditionalities in Brazil but not in South
Africa is equally unsatisfactory. An explanation for the variation in conditionality according to this
approach again rests upon the assumption that there was some greater objective need in Brazil
for conditions than in South Africa. Given the fact that Brazilian conditionality primarily focuses
on improving health indicators for young children through vaccinations and school attendance for
adolescents, the data would need to show that Brazil fared significantly worse than South Africa on
these measures in order for the argument to be plausible. Using the best available cross-country data,
219
vaccination rates137 are introduced in figure 8.2 as a proxy for testing the functional interpretation
100
90
80
70
Percentage
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
BCG (1995) Hep B (2000) DTP (1995) Polio (1995) Tetanus Measles
(2000) (1995)
South Africa Brazil
Figure 8.2: Vaccination Coverage for Children 0-7 (Source: WHO 2014; World Bank 2015d)
In another refutation of the hypothesis, the data clearly shows that vaccination rates were actu-
ally somewhat higher in Brazil. As such, the policy problem appears to have been relatively more
acute in South Africa, making health conditionalities for young children seem more likely there
than in Brazil. But the actual policy outputs were again contrary to this functionalist expectation.
Owing to a severe dearth of cross-country data, assessing the validity of this explanation for educa-
tional conditionalities presents more of a challenge.138 The only reliable figure capable of serving as
a proxy for school attendance is introduced in figure 8.3, where the net primary school enrolment
While it is hard to draw firm conclusions, the limited available data make it seem likely that
137
The indicated vaccinations all come from the official schedule used by the PBF.
138
In addition to a simple lack of data for actual daily school attendance, there are significant problems in creating
accurate comparisons due to the potential presence of myriad complicating factors such as dropout rates and grade
repetition. In a reflection of this situation, the data introduced here is thus of a very rudimentary nature.
220
100
90
80
70
60
Percentage
50
40
30
20
10
0
South Africa Brazil
Figure 8.3: Net Primary School Enrolment Rates (2000) (Source: UNESCO 2011; World Bank 2015e)
enrolment figures in primary and secondary education was not very different across the cases (UIS
2015). But this still says nothing about daily school attendance rates, which is a different metric
from the once-off yearly act of school enrolment. While it is therefore difficult to directly compare
the cases, the latest research on the South African education system makes it clear that the country
features a very high school dropout rate, making it likely that educational conditionalities could
have been functionally justified there as well (Spaull 2015). Taken together with the data on
vaccination rates, the functionalist interpretation is thus unable to conclusively explain the use of
What about the functional hypothesis’ applicability to the issue of orientation, where the South
African system assesses the need of beneficiaries in individualist terms while Brazil has adopted a
familial approach? Liesering and Barrientos make a functionalist case for focusing on families by
are increasingly the unit of intervention as regards social protection and social assistance. This
focus on households arises from the practice of social protection. In sub-Saharan Africa, for
example, children are a majority of the population. In practical terms, reaching children for
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the purpose of ensuring their rights to social protection involves working through their parents,
According to this logic, a higher share of children in the population would serve as an important
functional justification for a familial orientation. However, despite the fact that children compose
a greater population share in South Africa than in Brazil139 (as indicated in figure 8.4), it is the
latter rather than the former that has adopted a strict focus on families. The statistics on household
composition shown in figure 8.4 does nevertheless appear to provide some functional basis for South
Africa’s individualist ‘follow the child’ approach. This is due to the fact that a mere 36 percent
of children live in families with a nuclear structure where both parents are present (IPUMS 2015).
This is very different from Brazil, where nuclear families are the norm — with 76 percent of children
living in a family with both parents (IPUMS 2015). Additionally, 70 percent of households in South
Africa include members of the extended family or other adults (IPUMS 2015).
The upshot is that family structures are significantly more diverse in South Africa than in Brazil,
are concerned with defining child beneficiaries in the most effective way. This is however only
applicable to child-focused programmes like the CSG and certain components of the PBF, and
does not provide a conclusive answer as to why systemic orientation also differs in terms of social
assistance benefits that are exclusive to adults (such as parts of the BPC in Brazil, and the OPG
At the most general level, it is clearly a truism that some level of poverty and inequality needs to
be present in order for social assistance to become functionally ‘necessary’. However, as the analysis
indicates, it is a gross oversimplification to assume that programme parameters are designed purely
as a mechanistic response to policy problems. In addition to the fact that the functional hypothesis
does not say anything about timing (as these problems persisted for many decades prior to the recent
implementation of social assistance schemes), it also fails to provide a convincing account of why
139
This statistic is for children between the ages of zero and 14 years.
222
80
70
60
50
Percentage
40
30
20
10
0
Children as Children living Children living Children living Probability of
share of total with 0 biological with 1 biological with 2 biological household
population parents parent parents including
extended family
South Africa Brazil
Figure 8.4: Family Structures (Source: CIA World Factbook 2015a; 2015b; IPUMS 2015)
the South African and Brazilian systems took on different shapes. While functional considerations
thus certainly played some role as part of the policy context, they are unable to explain why South
Africa implemented a productive social assistance system whereas Brazil went the protective route.
Another potential exogenous explanation for the differences between the cases is that ideational
bases were different in South Africa and Brazil. Perhaps the adoption of a productive system in
South Africa simply reflects the salience of ‘neoliberal’ ideology, while Brazil’s protective system
posits that, in explaining the features of social assistance, ‘it is important to pay attention to the
understandings of poverty which support it’ (Liesering & Barrientos 2013: 59).
As a result,
the ideology of the state is an important factor. . . Neoliberal economic policy encourages the
reduction of social grant programmes through reduced state spending and requires more action
or responsibility on the part of beneficiaries. By contrast, social democratic policies may encour-
223
age the state to increase commitment to social spending and to increase the capacity of grant
programmes through (in some cases) more universal grant policies’ (Mothiane 2014: 4).
If it is true that ‘differences in political attitudes about redistribution’ can account for variations in
the structure of social assistance, then we would expect to see significant variations in beliefs about
poverty between the two cases under examination (Graham 2002: 2). These beliefs may include
The two parties primarily responsible for the construction of the systems, the ANC and the PT,
exhibit a number of striking ideological similarities. Measures of party family classification indicate
that their ideological underpinnings represent a case of ‘most similar’ orientations (Lipset & Rokkan
1967). Specifically, the ANC and PT are parties ‘that mobilised in similar historical circumstances
or with the intention of representing similar interests’ (Gallagher, Laver & Mair 2001: 202). Where
the ANC arose as a leftist party in alliance with labour unions and communists within the context
of the anti-apartheid struggle, the PT was established by trade unionists and socialist intellectuals
In addition to therefore having emerged to represent broadly similar interests, the two par-
ties have actively affirmed their similar ideational beliefs through membership in the transnational
Progressive Alliance. The organisation’s stated aim it to be a global network of ‘progressive, demo-
cratic, social democratic, socialist and labour movements’ (PA 2015). The ANC and the PT were
thus born into similar historical circumstances to represent similar interests, and have voluntarily
But it is also apparent that the ideational orientations of the South African and Brazilian
publics need to be taken into account. If there were vast differences in societal beliefs about the
role of welfare and redistribution, then the ideational hypothesis may still be plausible. In terms of
explaining variations in coverage, the data would have to specifically indicate that concern about
poverty as well as support for redistribution and universal social assistance was greater in Brazil
224
than in South Africa. Data from the World Values Survey provide a useful tool for assessing this
argument by comparing the basic ideational orientations of South Africa and Brazil towards the
public provision of social welfare. Figure 8.5 compares the percentage of people who strongly agreed
60
50
Percentage
40
30
20
10
0
It is humiliating People who Incomes should Government Reducing
to receive money don't work be made more should tax the extreme poverty
without having become lazy equal rich and is a top priority
to work for it subsidise the
poor
South Africa Brazil
The results show that there is little variation between the two cases, with the exception of beliefs
about the importance of government taxing the rich and subsidising the poor — a statement that
South Africans agree with much more strongly than Brazilians. In a further set of surveys, 76
percent of Brazilians indicated that people are poor because ‘society is unjust’ while 70.5 percent
agreed with the statement that ‘the poor have very little chance to escape from poverty’ (Fiszbein
et al. 2009: 10). In South Africa, recent research has similarly found that 82.3 percent of people
strongly agree that ‘most people on social grants desperately need the help’, while 65.9 percent
strongly agree with the notion that ‘the government should spend more money on social grants for
the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes’ (Noble, Ntshongwana & Surender 2008: 13-14).
On the specific issue of whether impoverished adults who are unable to find work should be
entitled to social assistance, fully 74.4 percent of South African respondents agreed with the principle
225
that ‘people who can’t get work deserve help in the form of social grants’ (Noble et al. 2008:
10). Given these fairly similar ideational beliefs about public welfare provision, it thus seems
highly unlikely that policymakers were simply responding to societal beliefs about social assistance
provision when they were designing the systems in their respective countries. This is particularly
true in terms of systemic coverage, where strong societal support for extending provision to the
able-bodied unemployed was only translated into policy in Brazil, but not in South Africa. The
The empirical evidence further suggests that the absence or presence of conditionalities was also
not ultimately determined by ideational factors. As discussed in the case studies, both cases featured
actors calling for the introduction of conditionalities on ideational grounds. This includes the current
South African Minister of Social Development, who has expressed her desire to incorporate them
in an attempt to ‘take children out of intergenerational poverty’ — language very similar to that
employed in Brazil (PMG 2010). Despite the fact that the most recent amendments to the relevant
legislation allude to this, conditionalities were never imposed in South Africa but have been a part
of the Brazilian approach since the very beginning. An ideational explanation alone cannot account
for this variation between two cases both featuring calls for conditionalities amid broad ideological
similarities.
It further appears to be unlikely that different ideational beliefs about the appropriate mode of
assessing the needs of beneficiaries are able to convincingly account for South Africa’s individualist
orientation, while Brazil has defined beneficiaries in familial terms. As indicated in figure 8.6 below
and in spite of the relatively more precarious position of families in South Africa (as described above),
fundamental beliefs about the importance of ‘promoting family life and strengthening families’ are
It would thus appear that the claim that South Africa’s productive system emerged in contrast
to Brazil’s protective approach purely because South African politics was somehow ‘more neoliberal’
226
120
100
80
Percentage
60
40
20
0
Family is very important in Greater emphasis on I trust my family
my life families would be a good completely
thing
South Africa Brazil
and Brazil’s ‘more social democratic’ amounts to another oversimplification (Mothiane 2014). While
the case studies indicate that ideational factors, just like functional elements, were certainly present
during the policy development process, they alone are plainly unable to satisfactorily explain why
South Africa opted for limited coverage, unconditionality and an individualist orientation while
Brazil pursued universal coverage, conditionality and a familial orientation. Instead, the specifics
of policy problems and ideas about how to solve them were themselves shaped and channelled by
It is the contention of this study that variation on the institutional dimension is the single most
important factor in explaining the differences between the cases. However, it does this without
outright denying that exogenous elements were also present; the existence of high levels of poverty
and inequality as well as ideational underpinnings surely were relevant factors during the policy
development process. But these elements were institutionally informed and channelled, meaning
227
that the specifics of institutional configuration amount to the fundamental reason for divergent
policy outcomes in cases featuring such broadly similar policy problems and ideational orientations.
At the most general level, the case studies make it clear that the transition to more inclusive
democratic institutions triggered much of the momentum for reform. But the specific shapes of the
reform efforts, and the features of the systems they eventually gave rise to, were determined by the
8.3.1 Coverage
This is clear when examining the variation in coverage. The discussion on the South African
case highlights the way in which excluding impoverished able-bodied adults from social assistance
provision initially emerged as a norm during the process of segregationist state formation. The
transition to democracy did not break with this fundamental feature, as notions of ‘progressive
realisation’ and ‘fiscal restraint’ made their way into the constitutional-legal framework of the
newly emerging state, providing policymakers with incentives to effectively maintain the status quo
in terms of coverage (even as social assistance was deracialised). Contrary to the Brazilian case,
there were no built-in mechanisms to protect spending on these programmes, which meant that
economic concerns were to crowd out social welfare concerns in cases where they were not aligned
The role played by South Africa’s concentrated state structure is also abundantly clear. At no
stage did the ANC face any credible threat to its overwhelmingly dominant power position. Even in
cases where opposition parties have managed to win regional elections in a few local municipalities
or provinces, they quickly found that they had no policymaking capacity whatsoever to design
their own social assistance programmes. The ANC plainly ‘faces little immediate [electoral or
institutional] incentive to expand the welfare state. South Africa is, in this respect, very different
from many other countries, including Brazil...where there have been, and are, strong...pressures to
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The established historical practice of only providing limited coverage (due to the deep entrench-
ment of institutional norms) and the lack of political incentives (due to a highly concentrated state
structure) meant that the functional and ideational arguments made by actors serving on the Lund
Committee (1996), Taylor Committee (2002) or potentially even the NPC (2010) for expanding
coverage to include impoverished people between the ages of 18 and 60 years were doomed to fail.
The government in fact went in the exact opposite direction by excluding this group, rejecting calls
for a BIG, and instead implementing the EPWP. The decision to implement this programme in lieu
of providing social assistance coverage was only possible because of the country’s particular insti-
tutional configuration: a concentrated state structure that did not create adequate incentives for
expanding provision, combined with a deeply embedded historical commitment to only providing
limited coverage.
The opposite happened in Brazil, where coverage has been systematically expanded to the point
where social assistance has in practise become nearly universally available to those in extreme
poverty. The lack of historically established social assistance practises meant that policymakers
were not beholden to any given pattern of provision. In what may initially appear to be a paradox,
the near-complete absence of such programmes prior to democratisation subsequently made it easier
to pursue universal coverage. This was because (historically constructed) concerns regarding ‘pro-
gressive realisation’ and ‘fiscal restraint’ were not incorporated into the Brazilian constitutional-legal
framework. Instead, the case’s ‘blank slate’ allowed constitutional architects to construct mecha-
nisms with the potential to ‘increase the stability of social policy funding’ (Interview 12; Schwarzer
& Querino 2002: 4). As the LOAS itself made clear, the result was the ‘supremacy of meeting social
needs above the requirements of economic profitability’ (FRB 1993: art. 4).
Brazil’s diffuse state structure further played a decisive role in driving the universalisation of
social assistance provision. In addition to the creation of the BPC, the combination of the fact that
subnational governments had the authority to independently design policy interventions and the
229
intensity of political competition at all levels in Brazil fuelled a gradual but persistent bottom-up
expansion in coverage. Municipalities and states outright copied the earliest examples of municipal
CTs during the mid-1990s in an attempt to profit from the evident popularity of the programmes.
The federal PSDB government subsequently sought to associate itself with the policies through the
1998 introduction of the PGRM and the creation of the first federal interventions in 2001. This
was followed by the adoption of the BIG law, federal consolidation and full universalisation into
the PBF under the PT in 2004, as well as the 2012 introduction of the residual benefit to eradicate
The lack of historical precedents regarding coverage (due to the weak institutionalisation of
norms) and the presence of clear political incentives (produced by a diffuse state structure) led to
the adoption of a universalistic approach to social assistance provision in Brazil. This institutional
configuration channelled the functional and ideational considerations of policymakers, who had both
more room and greater incentives to implement policies that produced significant political payoffs
among as many beneficiaries as possible. The result was that universal coverage in Brazil, as well
as limited coverage in South Africa, was not principally the result of functional factors or ideology.
The variation was fundamentally directed by the particularities of each case’s institutional features.
8.3.2 Conditionality
A similar pattern is evident in accounting for variation in terms of conditionalities. The empiri-
cal discussion makes it clear that an unconditional approach to social assistance had already be-
come a deeply entrenched institutional norm in South Africa prior to the transition to democracy.
In a powerful expression of path dependence, this norm was transferred wholeheartedly into the
the implementation of conditions, a feature which was reinforced in the WPSW and subsequent
legislation.
A top-down process of policy formulation determined by the country’s highly concentrated state
230
structure ultimately led to the entrenchment of an unconditional approach. As the case analysis
makes clear, there were nevertheless calls from civil society actors to introduce some linkages to the
CSG on functional grounds, while the current Minister of Social Development herself and policy
actors close to her have all expressed some ideational preference for introducing conditionalities
(Lund 2008: 68; Interview 7; PMG 2010). But none of these efforts were successful, because
the institutional structure did not allow for it. The lack of conditionalities in South Africa did
therefore not result because policy problems or ideological orientations were fundamentally different
from those in Brazil. Instead, faced with little competition or political incentive (due to a highly
concentrated state structure) to impose conditionalities that went against established practices (due
to the deep entrenchment of institutional norms), policymakers in South Africa designed a system
The Brazilian usage of conditionalities for the child-focused components of the PBF stands in
complete contrast to this. Norms about conditionality were not entrenched in the decades prior to
democratisation, as the social assistance system remained largely undeveloped. This in turn meant
that conditionality for children was not prohibited in the constitutional-legal framework. The
Constitution rather left open the possibility of incorporating conditionality into these programmes,
while the LOAS and derivative legislation further affirmed this approach.
policy development channelled by the country’s diffuse state structure, which enabled local govern-
mental units to independently design policies within a highly competitive political context. The case
study makes it clear that subnational actors, although also influenced by functional considerations
and ideological orientations, were fundamentally encouraged by this diffuse state structure and the
policy diffusion that culminated in the eventual establishment of the contemporary system.
231
Conditionality in Brazil did thus not result because policy problems or ideational beliefs were
fundamentally different from those in the South African case. Rather, policymakers responded to
an institutional setting characterised by competition and clear political incentives (due to a diffuse
state structure) that did not constitutionally prohibit conditionalities (due to the weak historical
be politically advantageous.
8.3.3 Orientation
The same analytical pattern is visible when it comes to accounting for the fact that South Africa
defined potential beneficiaries in individualist terms, while Brazil adopted a familial orientation.
The process tracing in terms of the South African case again shows how deeply entrenched the
practise of means testing potential beneficiaries on an individualist basis had become during the
makes it clear that this norm had also been transferred into the contemporary institutional context
by placing relatively greater emphasis on individual equality. This encouraged the preservation of
The country’s concentrated state structure once more served to prevent any meaningful chal-
lenges to this norm from arising. The few regional governments under opposition control were pre-
cluded by this structure from designing any potential alternative arrangements, while the ANC’s
strongly fortified national political position did not incentivise it to challenge the status quo. While
the earlier discussion shows that there is indeed some functional justification for defining beneficia-
ries in individualist terms in the South African case, the decision to do so was not fundamentally
individualist terms (due to the deep entrenchment of institutional norms) and the lack of any polit-
ical rationale for challenging this established method (due to a highly concentrated state structure)
232
The Brazilian case meanwhile highlights the way in which the lack of norms regarding orientation
enabled the adoption of a familial approach. The near-total lack of social assistance provision
prior to the 1990s meant that path dependence and associated institutional stickiness was not
made manifest during the construction of the contemporary constitutional-legal framework. Early
policymakers took advantage of this policy space by adopting the position that the family unit was
‘the appropriate entity to receive [social assistance] benefits and...bear responsibility for meeting
The country’s diffuse state structure subsequently served to embed the practise of defining
beneficiaries in familial terms. The policy autonomy of different governmental spheres combined
with the ferocity of competition produced incentives to copy and spread the operational features
of programmes that had proven to be hugely popular right from their onset in the mid-1990s. The
bottom-up policy development process meant that each round of programme proliferation further
entrenched the practise of assessing the needs of beneficiaries in familial terms, culminating in the
eventual adoption of the approach for all federal social assistance schemes.
The relative dearth of historical precedents for defining social assistance beneficiaries (due to
the weak institutionalisation of norms) and the presence of clear political incentives to implement
programme features that were popularly perceived as being effective (due to the country’s diffuse
state structure) led to the enactment of a familial orientation to social assistance provision in
Brazil. As was the case with coverage and conditionality, this particular institutional configuration
channelled functional and ideational factors in a direction that eventually led to the adoption of an
approach which differed greatly from the one embraced in the South African case.
Synthesising the above findings allows for a return to the dependent variables introduced during the
descriptive overview of social assistance provision in South Africa and Brazil. It will be recalled that
the features of the South African case — limited coverage, unconditionality and an individualist
233
orientation — were categorised as constituting a productive regime. This regime centres on relatively
less decommodification and emphasises that the able-bodied poor are to rely exclusively on the
labour market for overcoming poverty. In South Africa, the adoption of the EPWP instead of
a BIG law or universal social assistance is a clear marker of this approach. It also incorporates
other ‘liberal’ features, such as not making individual choice conditional and defining beneficiaries
in individualist terms.
This stands in contrast to the Brazilian case, where universal provision, conditionality and a
familial orientation led to its classification as a protective system. This course involves a ‘social
democratic’ element through relatively greater decommodification based on universal provision that
emphasises the role of social assistance in overcoming poverty. In the case of Brazil, the adoption
of a BIG law and the explicit framing of the PBF’s role in eradicating extreme poverty (especially
following the introduction of the PBSM) are indicators of this. This regime furthermore contains
a ‘conservative’ streak through its incorporation of conditionality and the practise of denoting
The case analysis shows that the features constituting these regimes did not mechanistically arise
problems and ideological beliefs being broadly similar across the cases, testing these two competing
claims in fact demonstrates a number of instances where policy choices were in direct conflict with
what would have been expected if functional and ideational factors were paramount. Despite the
allure of these exogenous interpretations, it is instead endogenous variation on the institutional level
that is able to most convincingly account for the fact that South Africa and Brazil have implemented
The deep historical entrenchment of norms related to coverage, conditionality and orientation
combined with a highly concentrated state structure produced powerful path dependence effects
that resulted in the (now deracialised) maintenance of a productive system in South Africa. In
234
contrast, the weak historical rooting of institutional norms regarding coverage, conditionality and
orientation in combination with a diffuse state structure created an environment largely free from
path dependent institutional stickiness that both enabled and incentivised political actors to enact
reforms which produced the greatest political payoffs and eventually resulted in the implementation
8.4 Conclusion
This chapter has utilised the empirical discussions introduced during the case studies in order to
assess the veracity of the functional, ideational and institutional hypotheses. It initially assessed
whether the presence of different policy problems and ensuing functional responses across the cases
were able to satisfactorily account for the cross-case variation. The examination showed that in ad-
dition to the cases featuring broadly similar problems, a number of areas produced policy responses
which were actually in direct conflict with the logic of the functional hypothesis. A similar pattern
emerged when the claims of the ideational interpretation were tested, as ideological beliefs and
societal views regarding coverage, conditionality and orientation were not found to be substantially
different.
This was followed by an assessment of the study’s institutionalist claim. The discussion showed
that variations on the institutional dimension are able to most convincingly account for the vari-
ations on the dependent variable. The features of South Africa’s contemporary productive social
fundamentally arose out of the fact that norms which were historically deeply embedded were trans-
ferred into the institutional structure of the post-apartheid state, while a highly concentrated state
structure further incentivised the preservation of these practices. In contrast, the analysis indicated
that the emergence of Brazil’s contemporary protective system based on universal coverage, condi-
tionality and a familial orientation was directed by an institutional framework that featured weak
235
entrenchment of norms and provided much greater space for policy innovation, as well as a diffuse
state structure which incentivised and rewarded policies popularly perceived as being effective.
236
Chapter 9
Concluding Remarks
The remarkable proliferation of redistributive social assistance initiatives across the developing world
shows no signs of abating, with prominent proposals for the United Nations Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) regarding them as a ‘development priority in the post-2015 development agenda’
(ECA, ILO, UNCTAD, UNDESA & UNICEF 2012). In addition to expanding the scholarship on
emerging welfare states, social assistance in South Africa and Brazil, as well as historical institu-
tionalism, the urgent global relevance of this theme serves to further underscore the significance of
Discussions around this topic have largely centred on examining the social and economic effects
produced through these programmes. But there has been a glaring lack of emphasis on exploring the
factors which shape the emergence of such policies in the first place. This study’s research question
addressed this omission head-on by launching an inquiry into the variation between the South
African and Brazilian models of redistributive social assistance provision. Following a specification
of the conceptual and analytical framework, a review of the literature that clearly illustrated the
relevance and novelty of the project, as well as a discussion on the inquiry’s research design, the
237
first step in this process involved a descriptive exercise that sought to clearly define the variation
This involved a highly detailed technical evaluation of the social assistance systems of South
Africa and Brazil, addressing operational features such as coverage, the respective legal and institu-
tional frameworks, conditionality, eligibility, orientation, appeals mechanisms, delivery, and specify-
ing the individual programmes. The analysis ultimately showed that there were clear differences in
the policy regimes of the two countries regarding coverage, conditionality and systemic orientation.
These differences were subsequently classified into a set of distinct typologies which constituted the
study’s dependent variables, with the South African system being regarded as protective and the
The case study chapters subsequently conducted historical institutional ACI analyses of the
development of social assistance policies in South Africa and Brazil. This was achieved through
initially examining the historical emergence of particular norms, combined with a specification of
each case’s state structure. In the case of South Africa, the analysis found that norms regarding
coverage, conditionality and orientation had become deeply entrenched in the decades prior to
democratisation. In combination with the country’s highly concentrated state structure, these
norms went on to have powerful path dependence effects in shaping the contemporary productive
system. In contrast, the Brazilian case clearly showed the way in which historical norms were absent
in the period leading up to democratisation. This feature combined with the country’s diffuse state
structure to drive a policy development process that ultimately resulted in the implementation of
a protective system.
The case studies were followed by a comparative chapter which returned to the initial set of
the two most commonly discussed explanations, premised on exogenous functional and ideational
factors, and found them both wanting. The variation across the cases in terms of the dependent
238
variables could simply not be satisfactorily explained by these two interpretations. Instead, the
latter part of the analysis integrated the insights from the case studies in order to show that
the differences between the systems in fact primarily resulted from variation on the institutional
dimension. Whereas South Africa featured deeply entrenched historical norms regarding coverage,
conditionality and orientation, as well as a highly concentrated state structure, Brazil clearly lacked
such norms and operated under a diffuse state structure. These differences amount to qualitatively
distinct institutional frameworks which ultimately channelled policy outputs in different directions.
These findings are of great significance given the prominence that has been afforded to this
field by both scholars and practitioners. On the theoretical level, the analysis extends the histor-
ical institutionalist ACI analytical framework into an exciting new area. Empirically, it makes a
tremendous contribution by offering the first answer to the question of why there is a clear pat-
tern of divergence in the social assistance regimes implemented across the developing world; the
differences result from distinct local institutional configurations. This finding in turn feeds into
the broader literature on the rise of emerging welfare states incorporating different distributional
regimes. Finally, the practical significance of the study is to provide development and policy prac-
titioners with powerful evidence that local institutional configurations should feature prominently
in any future efforts to implement social assistance programmes elsewhere. Taken together, the
findings thus entail a theoretical extension of historical institutionalism; produce novel empirical
answers to a popular scholarly field of inquiry; and practically inform future social assistance policy
development.
239
9.2 Generalizability
The significance of these findings are further enhanced through briefly examining their relevance
in the case of another prominent emerging welfare state: Mexico.140 While it is important to
again emphasise that the universe of potential further cases is fairly limited due to the fact that
much of the global proliferation of social assistance programmes has subsequently been driven by a
somewhat distinct process often involving financing and guidance from international development
organisations, it is revealing to briefly consider the Mexican case in order to ascertain whether the
processes at work resemble those which took place in either of the cases examined in this study.
A cursory review of the Mexican case indeed illustrates that it strongly mirrors the develop-
mental processes which were at work in Brazil. Like Brazil, Mexico followed a pattern of welfare
state building throughout the twentieth century which was very much predicated upon the delivery
of social insurance. It was also only during the 1970s that Mexico first introduced programmes
resembling social assistance interventions (Lopez 2011: 295). But the first true step towards the
elaboration of the current social assistance system operating in Mexico, which covers upwards of 25
percent of the total population, was taken with the 1997 introduction of the Progresa CT.
Initially modelled on the Brazilian PBE and supported by the World Bank, this programme
rapidly grew to the point where it currently serves more than 5.8 million families across the country
(Lopez 2011: 297). Now renamed Prospera, it is child-focused and incorporates educational and
the other side of the spectrum by the 70 y más (70 and Over) old age pension (Willmore 2014).
This intervention, which currently supports 3.5 million elderly Mexicans, emerged in a decidedly
bottom-up fashion. It was initially introduced by the governor of the federal district in 2001 and
subsequently spread throughout all states of the country before recently being fully federalised.
140
The prominence of the Mexican case is confirmed through the fact that it has been the subject of more impact
240
In 2009 the Mexican government additionally moved towards the universalisation of the country’s
social assistance system through the creation of the Programa de Apoyo Alimentario (Food Support
Programme) (UMS 2014). This nutritional aid programme targets impoverished families who do
not qualify for Prospera, including those without children (UMS 2014). It pays an amount of $310
(US$20) per month, along with in-kind transfers, to more than 26 million households (Barrientos
et al. 2010). The similarities between the Brazilian and Mexican systems thus include a conceptual
focused programmes, as well as a familial orientation. In short, Mexico appears to have also adopted
The findings produced by this study suggests that this commonality is the result of similari-
ties in terms of institutional configuration. It is indeed the case that Mexico featured a similarly
weak entrenchment of social assistance norms prior to the consolidation of democracy during the
2000s (Bruhn 2009). The contemporary Mexican state structure also strongly resembles Brazilian
federalism, with a high level of formal policymaking decentralisation and a diffusion of political
power.142
This correlation indicates that the development of the Mexican system may well have been
shaped by institutional features similar to those which were present in the Brazilian case. This
further enhances the significance of the findings, as it suggests that similar processes may have been
at work in many other cases — and that domestic institutional configurations will continue to exert
their influence as the proliferation of social assistance interventions continues unabated across the
electoral victory of Vicente Fox, leading to the first change of government in 71 years.
241
9.3 Opportunities for Future Research
This also makes it clear that the research agenda on emerging welfare states will benefit from simi-
larly detailed inquiries into the social assistance policy regimes adopted in those other cases where
these programmes have also come to occupy centrally important positions. The perceived success
of these policies in cases where they were domestically designed has further spurred international
development organisations, spearheaded by the World Bank, into developing and financing similar
programmes in a range of countries that are too poor to autonomously afford them. This presents a
further opportunity for researchers interested in examining the processes whereby these programmes
have proliferated in recent decades. The study thus ultimately lays the groundwork for future in-
quiries in a field that is set to assume even greater academic and practical prominence as an ever
These findings additionally expand avenues for potential future research by conclusively estab-
lishing the practise of conducting comparative political economy analyses of emerging welfare states.
As discussed in chapter two, this is a practise that has become widely accepted when assessing the
constellation of welfare regimes extant in the developed world. The typologies constructed and
findings produced by this study however provides a powerful justification for undertaking similarly
extensive analyses with regards to the countries of the global South. The recent spread of social pro-
tection initiatives throughout the developing world means that scholars currently have a tremendous
opportunity to gain insights into the different distributional regimes that exist in these countries.
In terms of the two cases under examination, the greatest opportunity lies in expanding the
scope of the research. The many similarities across the cases means that there are a whole host of
other social policy arenas — including social insurance, labour protection, and healthcare — that
are deserving of similarly focused comparative efforts. While the topic of this study addresses a
vitally important aspect of the overall distributional regimes of these two cases, the other elements
comprising such a regime are certainly also worthy of further study. Although the social assistance
242
programmes examined here are arguably the most significant redistributive interventions, a potential
goal of future comparative research efforts would thus be to produce a complete picture of the nature
and origin of related policies in the important emerging welfare states of South Africa and Brazil.
A number of relevant practical recommendations also result from these findings. At the most general
level, the study serves to affirm the decisive importance of ‘institutional fit’ in the implementation of
social protection programmes. The fact that two cases characterised by such tremendous similarity
and facing broadly similar problems nevertheless ended up with greatly varying policy approaches
serves as a clear testament to the decisive importance of local institutions in shaping successful
and scalable interventions. The additional fact that both South Africa and Brazil domestically
and autonomously designed their social assistance regimes without the guidance of international
development organisations means that their cases represent something akin to ‘natural experiments’.
And the results produced by both ‘experiments’ make it clear that large scale social protection
As can be observed from the case analyses carried out in earlier chapters, one of the primary
concerns for policy practitioners interested in implementing functionally effective social protection
schemes relate to the maximisation of the ability of such programmes to address particular policy
problems. The foundational idea is to create a system which would operate as effectively as possible
within the bounds of its given resources. In turn, a significant portion of achieving this aim hinges
on the scalability of such programmes. Indeed, during the previous two decades, international
development organisations have often initially launched such interventions on the basis of pilot
projects with the aim of scaling them up only after evaluations have proven such scalability to be
feasible.
This research suggests that practitioners would be well served by efforts to investigate and
243
understand the local institutional context prior to launching such projects. This would aid in
avoiding situations where, for example, exclusive responsibility for policy design and implementation
is assigned to the national government sphere in a context characterised by a diffuse state structure.
the operational norms of any potentially pre-existing social protection practices (both formal and
informal) would allow for the implementation of interventions which do not challenge entrenched
implementation conventions.
Apart from such specific examples, the ultimate practical contribution of the study is to compre-
hensively reorient perspectives on the emergence of social welfare policies in the developing world.
Far from operating within a vacuum which yearns only for the enlightened advice of policy experts,
the continued rise of emerging welfare states is just as much shaped by domestic institutional struc-
tures as their counterparts in the developed world were. Incorporating this reality would go a long
way towards enabling an approach to development policy which takes seriously the particularities
of institutional configuration on the road towards designing interventions which are both effective
and sustainable.
244
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Appendix A: Interviews – South
Africa
Number
285
Appendix B: Interviews – Brazil
Number
12 Research Coordinator at the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth 25 October 2013
13 Director of Social Policy at the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 6 November 2013
14 Social Assistance Analyst at the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 20 November 2013
15 Social Security Analyst at the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 27 November 2013
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Appendix C: Eligibility Requirements
– South Africa
(Annual)
Child Support Single: R34 800 The applicant must be the child’s primary caregiver (parent, grandparent
Grant (US$3 480) or a child over the age of 16 heading a household). If the applicant is not
Married: R69 the child’s parent, proof must be provided that they are the child’s primary
600 (US$6 960) caregiver through an affidavit from a police official, a social worker’s report,
an affidavit from the biological parent or a letter from the principal of the
school attended by the child. The applicant must be a South African citizen
or permanent resident. The child must be under the age of 18 years; not be
cared for in a state institution; live with the primary caregiver (who is not
being paid to look after the child); and both the applicant and child must live
in South Africa.
Foster Child N/A The applicant must be taking care of a foster child placed in their custody
or refugee; both the applicant and the child must live in South Africa; the
foster must have been legally placed in the care of the applicant and must
remain in their care; and the child must be younger than 18 years.
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Care Depen- Single: R151 The grant is aimed at supporting the primary caregivers of children with se-
dency Grant 200 (US$15 120) vere disabilities in need of fulltime and special care. The applicant must be
Married: R302 a parent, primary caregiver or a foster parent appointed by the court; be a
400 (US$ 30 South African citizen or permanent resident. The child must be younger than
240) 18 years; not be cared for permanently in a state institution; and must have a
The means test severe disability and be in need of fulltime and special care — a state medical
does not apply officer assesses the child before the grant is approved. Both the applicant and
ents.
Disability Grant Single: R49 200 The Disability Grant is aimed at beneficiaries with a physical or mental dis-
(US$ 4 920); ability that makes them unfit to work for a period of longer than six months.
assets <R831 Beneficiaries qualify for a permanent disability grant if their disability will
600 (US$83 160) continue for more than a year and a temporary disability grant if their dis-
Married: R98 ability will last for a continuous period of not less than six months and not
840 (US$9 884); more than 12 months. A permanent disability grant does not mean that
assets <R1 663 they will receive the grant for life, but that it will continue for longer than
200 (US$166 12 months. An applicant must be a South African citizen, permanent resi-
320) dent or refugee and living in South Africa at the time of application; be be-
tween 18 and 59 years of age; not be cared for in a state institution; possess
tor appointed by the state assess the degree of their disability — the doctor
completes a medical report and forwards it to SASSA. The report is valid for
Grant-in-Aid N/A The Grant-in-Aid is directed at people already receiving another social grant,
but who are unable to care for themselves. The benefit is intended to enable
them to pay for the person who takes fulltime care of them. In order to qual-
ify, the applicant must already be receiving a Disability Grant, War Veterans
Grant or a Older Persons Grant; not be able to look after themselves owing
another person; and must not be cared for in an institution that received a
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War Veterans Single: R49 920 The War Veterans Grant is aimed at former soldier who fought in the First
Grant (US$4 992); World War (1914-1918), the Second World War (1939-1945), the Zulu Upris-
assets <R831 ing (1906) or the Korean War (1950-1953) and are unable to support them-
600 (US$83 160) selves. An applicant must live in South Africa; be older than 60 years of age
Married: R99 or be disabled; not receive any other social grant; and must not be cared for
200 (US$166
320)
Older Persons Single: R49 200 An applicant must older than 60 years of age; be a South African citizen or
Grant (US$4 920); permanent resident; live in South Africa; not receive any other social grant;
Married: R99
200 (US$166
320)
Required Documents
In addition to completing an application form, applicants are required to submit a set of documents
at their nearest SASSA office as part of the application process. The requirements are slightly differ-
ent for each grant, and can also depend on the specifics of the applicant’s situation. The following
list of documents may be required: ID; birth certificates for children; proof of any maintenance
received for children; if they are a refugee, their status permit and refugee ID is required in addi-
tion to the child’s birth certificate or ID from the country of origin; proof of earnings; a marriage
certificate; if an applicant is divorced, the court order indicating that they have custody of a child;
if one or both parents are dead or missing, the death certificate of the deceased or proof that the
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parent is missing (such as a missing person’s report from the police); a medical assessment report
that confirms the applicant or child’s disability; salary slips, bank statements for the previous three
If the applicant does not have an ID or the child’s birth certificate, they must complete an
affidavit on a standard SASSA form in the presence of a Commissioner of Oaths who is not a
SASSA official and submit a sworn statement signed by a reputable person (such as a councillor,
traditional leader, social worker, minister of religion or school principal) who knows the applicant
and child. They are furthermore required to submit proof of application for an ID and/or birth
certificate at the Department of Home Affairs; a temporary ID issued by the Department of Home
Affairs (if applicable); a baptismal certificate if available; a road to health clinic card if available;
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Appendix D: Eligibility Requirements
– Brazil
per month)
Bolsa Famı́lia Variable 1 R$70.01 (US$30) to R$140 (US$61) The benefit is aimed at household with children
or lactating woman.
Bolsa Famı́lia Variable 2 R$70.01 (US$30) to R$140 (US$61) This benefit is aimed at households with children
benefits
Benefı́cio de Prestação R$169 (US$73) The BPC’s disability component is aimed at dis-
291
Benefı́cio de Prestação R$169 (US$73) The old age element of the BPC is directed at
qualify.
Required Documents
Determining eligibility for the PBF is ultimately the responsibility of the MDS, as directed through
the Cadastro Único. Potential beneficiaries are required to enrol onto the database of the Cadastro
Único prior to formally applying for the PBF. Applications are then made at local municipal offices,
where prospective beneficiaries self-report their family incomes and submit birth certificates and civil
identification documents. This data is then cross-referenced against the information contained in the
Cadastro Único, which determines benefit eligibility according to income and family composition.
This is followed by additional cross checks by the MDS in order to further validate self-reported
income.
In the case of the BPC, applicants must submit a declaration issued by an authority (judge,
local police chief or municipal administrator) containing information about the per capita income
of the candidate’s family. These declarations are submitted to the local municipality, where a social
worker receives and forwards them to the regional office of the INSS. The INSS then analyses the
documents and issues an authorisation to grant the benefit. Applicants for the BPC’s disability
292
Abstract
Recent decades have witnessed the profound proliferation of social assistance cash transfer pro-
grammes throughout numerous countries of the developing world. While scholars have subsequently
paid a great deal of attention to the largely positive socioeconomic effects generated through the
expansion of these redistributive interventions, the literature has neglected the fact of tremendous
empirical variation regarding the ways in which different countries have designed their social as-
sistance policy regimes. The smattering of studies which have taken up the question have usually
been content to regard fundamental differences in these patterns of welfare provision as the result of
functional and ideational factors on the basis of conventional wisdom, rather than through rigorous
analysis.
In the first study of its kind, this inquiry explicitly addresses this gap in the literature by
resolutely focusing on the systemic variation in social assistance provision in the two benchmark
emerging welfare states of South Africa and Brazil. Its central aim is to account for the disparity
between the policy regimes instituted by the two countries. The fact that South Africa and Brazil
have adopted very different approaches regarding issues of coverage, conditionality and orientation
results in the construction of distinct typologies which sees the South African system classified
as ‘productive’ and the Brazilian approach as ‘protective’. The description of this empirically
Actor-Centred Institutionalism.
293
The resulting investigation into the comparative political economy of social assistance provision
reveals that, while conventionally accepted functional and ideational hypotheses fail to explain the
divergence across the cases, variation on the institutional dimension is able to convincingly account
for the fact that South Africa and Brazil have adopted qualitatively different policy approaches. The
study thereby provides the first explanatory account of the contemporary domestic emergence of
programmes which have become centrally important in combating poverty and inequality through-
out the countries of the developing world. In addition to making a significant and entirely novel
explanatory contribution to the knowledge on the subject, the findings attest to the decisive prac-
tical importance of the role played by local institutional structures in shaping context appropriate
policy interventions.
294
Zusammenfassung
genmerk auf die überwiegend positiven sozioökonomischen Effekte, welche durch die Ausweitung
derartiger redistributiver Interventionen erfolgten, gelegt haben, wurde in der vorliegenden Liter-
atur vielfach vernachlässigt, einen Nachweis über die umfangreichen empirischen Variationen in
Bezug auf die Ausgestaltung von sozialpolitischen Regimen unterschiedlicher Länder zu erbringen.
Studien, die sich bislang der Fragestellung angenommen haben, begnügen sich in der Regel damit
sen basierend - als Resultat von funktionalen und Ideengeleiteten Faktoren anzusehen, anstatt eine
Die vorliegende Studie adressiert daher als erste seiner Art die bestehende Lücke in der wis-
senschaftlichen Literatur indem es einen deutlichen Fokus auf die systemische Variation von sozialen
Hilfsprogrammen in den beiden Bezugsländern Südafrika und Brasilien legt. Zentrales Ziel ist
aufzuzeigen. Die Tatsache, dass Südafrika und Brasilien unterschiedliche Ansätze hinsichtlich der
Reichweite, der Konditionalität und der Orientierung ihrer sozialen Hilfsprogramme gewählt haben,
resultiert in der Konstruktion verschiedener Typologien, derer zufolge das südafrikanische System
als ‘produktiv’ und das brasilianische System als ‘protektiv’ angesehen werden kann. Nach einer
Beschreibung dieser empirisch nachweisbaren Unterschiede erfolgt in der vorliegenden Arbeit eine
295
Darstellung ihrer jeweiligen Ausgestaltung mittels der Anwendung eines historisch-institutionellen
Theoriegerüstes, welches wiederum durch den analytischen Ansatz des Akteurszentriertem Institu-
Die resultierende Untersuchung im Bereich der Vergleichenden Politischen Ökonomie von sozialen
Hilfsprogrammen macht deutlich, dass, während konventionelle funktionale und Ideengeleitete Hy-
pothesen sich als unzureichend erweisen unterschiedliche Fälle zu erkennen, Variationen in den
qualitativ unterschiedliche Politikansätze gewählt haben. Die vorliegende Studie liefert demgemäß
die erste tiefgreifende Untersuchung in Bezug auf das Aufkommen zeitgenössischer länderspezifischer
Programme, welche von zentraler Bedeutung im Kampf gegen Armut und Ungleichheit in Entwick-
lungsländern sind. Abgesehen von einer signifikanten und vollständig neuen Untersuchung zum Wis-
sen zu dem Thema, zeigen die Ergebnisse auf, dass lokale institutionelle Strukturen von zentraler
sind.
296
Publications during Course of
Research
Peer Reviewed
Schreiber, L. A. 2014. ‘Institutions and Policy Change: The Development of the Child Support
Grant in South Africa’ in Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, 41 (2): 267-288.
Reports
Schreiber, L. A. 2013. ‘The Expansion of Social Assistance in Brazil and South Africa’ on Friedrich
Naumann Foundation.
Conference Proceedings
Schreiber, L. A. 2013. ‘Institutions and Policy Change: The Development of the Child Support
Grant in South Africa’ presented at 11th Annual International Conference on Politics and
Schreiber, L. A. 2013. ‘Social Assistance in South Africa’ presented at 1st Berlin Forum on Global
297
Journal Referee
Schreiber, L. A. 2015. ‘Britse kiesers gee les vir SA’ in Rapport, 17 May [print].
Schreiber, L. A. 2015. ‘Ons is almal só: Nie oukei nie’ in Rapport, 26 April, p. 4-5 [print].
Schreiber, L. A. 2015. ‘Small Yet BIG: The Basic Income Guarantee’ on The Huffington Post, 23
April.
Schreiber, L. A. 2015. ‘Time to burst our deluded notions of exceptionalism’ in Daily Dispatch, 21
April [print].
Schreiber, L. A. 2015. “n Griekse boodskap aan Europa’ in Rapport, 1 February, p. 14-15 [print].
Schreiber, L. A. 2014. ‘Armoede neem Muur se plek in’ in Rapport, 9 November [print].
Schreiber, L. A. 2014. ‘Ons kan leer by Brasilië’ in Rapport, 12 October, p. 12-13 [print].
Schreiber, L. A. 2014. ‘Sal SA ooit die Skotse riel dans?’ in Rapport, 14 September, p. 12-13 [print].
Schreiber, L. A. 2014. ‘Die Europese keiser is kaal’ in Rapport, 1 June, p. 22-23 [print].
Schreiber, L. A. 2014. ‘Haatlike simbool nie verdedigbaar’ in Beeld, 25 February, p. 11-12 [print].
Schreiber, L. A. 2014. ‘Tyd dat die middelklas begin saamstaan’ in Rapport, 4 January, p. 5 [print].
Schreiber, L. A. 2013. ‘Why is the voice of middle class protest absent from South Africa?’ on
Politicsweb, 14 August.
298
Schreiber, L. A. 2013. ‘Welfaart laat hul kla’ in Rapport, 7 June, p. 3-4 [print].
Schreiber, L. A. 2013. ‘Protests in Brazil are the result of progress’ in Business Day, 2 July [print].
Schreiber, L. A. 2012. ‘Why a “Lula moment” is not possible in South Africa’ on Politicsweb, 8
October.
Schreiber, L. A. 2012. ‘An important experiment in the Western Cape’ on Politicsweb, 15 May.
299
Biography
Leon Schreiber is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the Freie Universität Berlin and a
Visiting Student Research Collaborator at Princeton University. Originally hailing from the rural
Namaqualand region of South Africa, Schreiber went on to earn a Certificate in Business Man-
agement from the University of South Africa, as well as a Bachelor’s degree, a Bachelor’s degree
with Honours and a Master’s degree in International Studies and Political Science from Stellen-
bosch University. His research interests include social policy, poverty, and the comparative political
economy of development, while his Ph.D. dissertation comparatively examines the development of
Schreiber’s work has been recognized through numerous grants and awards from Stellenbosch
University, the European Commission, the German Academic Exchange Service, the St. Gallen
Symposium Wings of Excellence Award, Princeton University, and the Berlin Consortium for Ger-
manic Studies. He is a columnist for one of South Africa’s largest Sunday newspapers, and regularly
appears as a political analyst on a weekly actuality television programme. Schreiber has previously
worked in various capacities at a wide range of social impact organisations across four different
continents, including think tanks, universities, local government structures, political parties and
300