1044140

research-article2022
PPSXXX10.1177/17456916211044140ZmigrodA Psychology of Ideology

ASSOCIATION FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Perspectives on Psychological Science

A Psychology of Ideology: Unpacking 2022, Vol. 17(4) 1072­–1092

© The Author(s) 2022

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https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916211044140
DOI: 10.1177/17456916211044140
www.psychologicalscience.org/PPS

Leor Zmigrod
Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, and Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute,
University of Cambridge

Abstract
The psychological study of ideology has traditionally emphasized the content of ideological beliefs, guided by questions
about what people believe, such as why people believe in omniscient gods or fascist worldviews. This theoretical
focus has led to siloed subdisciplines separately dealing with political, religious, moral, and prejudiced attitudes. The
fractionation has fostered a neglect of the cognitive structure of ideological worldviews and associated questions
about why ideologies—in all their forms—are so compelling to the human mind. Here I argue that it is essential to
consider the nature of ideological cognition across a multitude of ideologies. I offer a multidimensional, empirically
tractable framework of ideological thinking, suggesting it can be conceptualized as a style of thinking that is rigid in
its adherence to a doctrine and resistance to evidence-based belief-updating and favorably oriented toward an in-
group and antagonistic to out-groups. The article identifies the subcomponents of ideological thinking and highlights
that ideological thinking constitutes a meaningful psychological phenomenon that merits direct scholarly investigation
and analysis. By emphasizing conceptual precision, methodological directions, and interdisciplinary integration across
the political and cognitive sciences, the article illustrates the potential of this framework as a catalyst for developing a
rigorous domain-general psychology of ideology.

Keywords
ideology, political psychology, ideological cognition, identity

Belief systems have never surrendered easily to political manifestos and from racial supremacy to
empirical study or quantification. Indeed, they authoritarian nationalism. These accounts are broadly
have often served as primary exhibits for the doc- termed “ideologies” and envelope humans’ personal
trine that what is important to study cannot be and social lives to a considerable degree. The Pew
measured and that what can be measured is not Research Centre estimates that 84.4% of people affiliate
important to study. with a religious institution,1 and the International Insti-
tute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance approxi-
—Converse (1964/2006, p. 1)
mates that over 1.3 billion people voted in their local
parliamentary elections across the world between 2016
and 2019.2 Exposure to and participation in collective
Synthesizing a Science of Ideology ideologies is therefore remarkably prevalent and con-
Since the birth of modern civilization, human beings sequential to people’s daily lives.
have been creating stories that capture their theories
about how the world works and how they should act
within this complex world. These narratives both Corresponding Author:
describe and prescribe human action and exist in a Leor Zmigrod, Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge
kaleidoscope of forms—from religious doctrines to Email: [email protected]
A Psychology of Ideology 1073

How should ideology be defined? Political theorists, perspective can illuminate relationships that have been
sociologists, and psychologists have espoused (at times hitherto unexamined.
radically) different conceptualizations of ideology. Defi- In sum, this proposal for an integrated psychology
nitions have ranged from the general (e.g., Adorno of ideology aims to catalyze interdisciplinary synthesis
et al., 1950; Converse, 1964/2006) to the particular (e.g., regarding what it means for ideological scripts to be
Platt & Williams, 2002). As a starting point, most con- internalized by the human mind and how the funda-
temporary definitions of ideology have recognized that mental mechanisms of cognition shape the ideologies
an ideology functions as a force that epistemically orga- that we endorse and evangelize. It also seeks to dem-
nizes beliefs about how society ought to be structured onstrate how we can diagnose thought patterns (and
(Adorno et al., 1950; Campbell et al., 1960; Kerlinger, individuals, and perhaps communities or societies) that
1984) and how people ought to behave. It provides are strongly ideological from those that are weakly so,
“both an interpretation [emphasis added] of the envi- or not at all. A science that tackles the commonalities
ronment and a prescription [emphasis added] as to how between diverse ideologies can facilitate a more con-
that environment should be structured” (Denzau & ceptually and methodologically mature psychology of
North, 1994, p. 24). Ideologies also operate as forces ideology.
that socially organize communities, such as tribes,
classes, constituencies, and societies (Freeden, 2001;
Van Dijk, 2006). Although there is variability in the
The History of Demarcating Ideology
specific definitions of ideology, there is a general con- Historically, there have been continual changes in the
sensus among scholars that ideologies are epistemically available and predominant ideologies. Correspondingly,
and socially organizing forces. there have been shifts in what has been considered an
This article seeks to make three central claims about ideology. Perhaps the earliest manifestations of ideolo-
the study of ideology with the aim of building a robust gies are evident in folk myths; these narratives theo-
science of ideological thinking. First, the term “ideology” rized about the causal structure of the world, imagining
has been used in different ways by scholars from the unseen agents that were responsible for objects and
disciplines of politics, sociology, and psychology, and this occurrences in the observable world (Atran, 2002;
had led to challenges in distinguishing between psycho- Norenzayan, 2013). Myths were elaborated on by orga-
logical and nonpsychological processes in the realm of nized religions to legitimize and dictate certain forms
ideologies. Second, whenever psychologists have inves- of personal and social behavior. This was followed (in
tigated the nature of ideological beliefs, they have been a historical sequence that is neither linear nor uncon-
largely guided by a theoretical interest in the content of tested) by the emergence of “secular religions” in the
ideological beliefs rather than the structure of ideological form of sacralized political action and organization. It
thinking. In other words, researchers have focused on was at this point in the development of contemporary
asking why individuals believe specific ideological claims political life that the term “ideology” entered common
(such as about the presence of omniscient gods or social- usage, and so ideology is often synonymized with polit-
ist worldviews) rather than why ideological attitudes— ical ideology (Freeden et al., 2013). But viewing history
regardless of their content—are so compelling to the through a broad lens reveals that the ideologies that
human mind and pervasive across civilizations. The focus have governed the human story have in fact shifted and
on ideological content has also obscured critical ques- oscillated between mythical, religious, and secular-
tions about why some individuals are more attracted to political forms.
ideological doctrines than others. Nonetheless, there are The term “ideology” was coined during the French
notable structural and psychological commonalities Revolution by French “ideologues” who wished “to label
across diverse ideologies, and so it is possible to advance a new science outlined in the framework of the Enlight-
a psychology of ideology that is attuned to the cognitive enment programme, the teaching of ideas” (Stråth, 2013,
structure of ideological thinking across a multitude of p. 16)—ideology was therefore originally meant to
ideological domains. This article builds on these observa- reflect a new science of ideas. Nonetheless, the expres-
tions to formulate a framework of ideological thinking sion was quickly politicized during Napoleon’s reign
that posits domain-general components and tractable and became synonymous with “unrealistic theories that
research questions. Methodologically, this endeavor tried to intervene in the spheres of government and
involves examining the psychological substrates of ide- political action” (Stråth, 2013, p. 20). By the mid-20th
ologies that may seem radically different and even oppos- century—after the rise and fall of several totalitarian
ing in objectives under unified empirical investigations. ideologies—“ideology” was reimbued with a sense of
This structure-oriented approach does not negate systematicity: Ideologies were conceptualized as long,
content-focused approaches, but the structure-based coherent chains of thought that served as instruments
1074 Zmigrod

0.000550%
0.000500%
0.000450%
0.000400%
0.000350%
0.000300%
0.000250%
0.000200% Ideology

0.000150%
0.000100%
0.000050%
0.000000%
1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

Fig. 1. Frequency of the term “ideology” in English books between 1850 to 2010 according to Google Books Ngram Viewer. The y-axis
indicates the percentage of single-word phrases in English GoogleBooks that are equal to “ideology.”

for managing societies and negotiating social and politi- primary aim is to identify a tractable conceptualization
cal power. This conceptualization is also mirrored in the of ideology that is applicable both to political ideologies
exponential rise in the usage of the term “ideology” (commonly conceptualized along a left-to-right political
between 1940 and the 1970s (see Fig. 1). Contemporary spectrum) as well as ideologies that are not explicitly
definitions of ideology typically deal with the latter politi- about political organization (e.g. religious, environmen-
cal interpretation because this interpretation has emerged tal, nationalistic, patriarchal). This approach facilitates
most recently on the world stage and rapidly modified the building of models of ideology that are informative
social relations and traditional power hierarchies. Since across diverse cultural and historical contexts and that
then, much ink has been spilled over whether ideology achieve greater precision in delineating the mechanisms
should be defined in a value-neutral fashion or whether by which ideologies serve as epistemic and social orga-
to espouse positive or pejorative definitions. Notably, the nizational forces.
use of the word ideology itself has experienced a steep
decline since the late 1990s—perhaps as a response to The Psychological Structure of Ideological
the worry that it is an ambiguous and historically con-
tested term (Corner, 2001; Rorty, 1993).
Thinking: Domain-General Components
Some scholars have considered ideology to be a Psychologists have far from neglected ideologies: In fact,
necessary aspect of social cohesion (e.g., the function- rich lines of inquiry in social psychology have sought
alist structuralists; see Malešević, 2006), whereas others to unpack the complex processes by which individuals
have viewed ideologies as mechanisms for distorting form ideological beliefs. Nonetheless, the study of ideol-
reality to satisfy the interests of the few and to induce ogy is marked by substantial balkanization. There is now
“false-consciousness thinking” (Dant, 1991; Mannheim, a psychology of politics ( Jost et al., 2003), religion
1936; Marx & Friedrich, 1939; Williams, 1977). These (Norenzayan, 2013), nationalism (Anderson, 1983; Billig,
definitions have changed over time in response to his- 1995), prejudice (Brandt, 2017; Dovidio et al., 2010;
torical events such as the Holocaust and the dismem- Duckitt & Sibley, 2009b), dehumanization (N. Haslam,
bering of the Soviet Union, as well as landmark disciplinary 2006), obedience (S. A. Haslam & Reicher, 2007; Reicher
proposals and critiques3 (see Fig. 1). Although compre- & Haslam, 2011), collective action (van Zomeren et al.,
hensive reviews of the concept of ideology in different 2008), moralization (Rhee et al., 2019; Rozin, 1999),
subdisciplines can be found elsewhere (e.g., in psychol- conspiracy theories (Douglas et al., 2017; van Prooijen
ogy, see Jost et al., 2008; in sociology, see Malešević, & Van Vugt, 2018), radicalization (Kruglanski et al.,
2006), here I broadly synthesize these definitions to 2014), and so on—but there is not an overarching psy-
delineate a phenomenon that is more specific than chology of ideology.
merely a “system of beliefs” (Converse, 1964/2006) and The reasons for this fractionation are historical, meth-
scientifically clearer than a “universal and complex odological, and conceptual and perhaps all can be traced
social process through which human actors articulate to a theoretical interest in the content of ideological
their actions and beliefs” (Malešević, 2011, p. 283). A beliefs rather than the structure of ideological thinking.
A Psychology of Ideology 1075

Psychologists have concentrated on the frequency, prev- fosters passionate feelings of immersion and connected-
alence, and popularity of specific ideological claims ness with the ideological group. Indeed, people are
(e.g., political conservatism or supernatural beliefs) often prepared to kill and die over a flag or a defaced
rather than why ideological attitudes—regardless of their ideological symbol that represents their group (Swann,
content—so powerfully captivate the human imagina- Gómez, Dovidio, et al., 2010; Swann, Gómez, Huici,
tion. An emphasis on the content of ideological beliefs et al., 2010; Whitehouse et al., 2014). Crucially, these
justifies the existing academic landscape, in which each identity markers also signal who is not a member of
ideological domain merits its own discipline of study. In one’s ideological group, or who is a weakly committed
contrast, a theoretical and empirical focus on the sys- member. Symbolic gestures and rituals therefore serve
tematic processes of ideological immersion invites a as practical and tangible criteria for interpersonal behav-
holistic, interdisciplinary outlook that addresses the com- ior and the perceived legitimacy of collective action.
monalities across diverse ideologies. These common tools of ideological indoctrination—
Indeed, a striking—and often understated—observa- rigid dogma and identity markers—can be found con-
tion made by social scientists and theorists is that sistently across the spectrum of ideological persuasions.4
diverse, and sometimes opposing, ideologies use From fascism and communism to radical ecoactivism
remarkably similar tools and mechanisms to inculcate and religious evangelism, ideological groups offer abso-
their followers and galvanize them toward collective lute answers to societal troubles, strict rules for behav-
action and self-sacrifice (Hoffer, 1951). In particular, ior, and an in-group mentality through dedicated
ideologies possess two essential qualities regardless of practices and symbols. These mechanisms are further
the content of their beliefs or ambition: They are doc- amplified by propaganda (Holbig, 2013) and systems
trinal and relational. Each of these two characteristics of punishment for deviance and disbelief (Boyd et al.,
corresponds to particular means of ideological 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). They are also often aug-
indoctrination. mented via the use of familial and kinship metaphors
First, the doctrinal component of ideologies is facili- that depict fellow comrades as “sisters and brothers-in-
tated by the existence of a rigid dogma that the ideology arms,” religious leaders as “mothers and fathers,” the
embraces. This dogma assumes the existence of one true nation as the “motherland” or “fatherland,” and revolu-
explanation of—and corresponding solution to—existing tionaries as the “sons and daughters” of ideological
societal (and often personal) conditions. Dogmas fre- causes (Malešević, 2011, p. 287; Whitehouse & Lanman,
quently possess a compelling logic, if the premises are 2014). These characteristics emerge even when the ide-
believed (Arendt, 1951), and tend to enforce a sharp ology is guided by sincere or benevolent intentions and
distinction between those in possession of the ideology’s ideals and allow ideologies to endow followers with a
truth and those who are not. Dogmas also typically sense of coherence, belonging, meaning, and identity
espouse categorical divisions between what constitutes that is tightly intertwined with their attachment to the
“good” versus “evil” and who belongs to the ideological ideological group (Malešević, 2011).
in-group (“us”) and who does not (“them”). As sociolo- Consequently, an ideology, as defined and evaluated
gist Edward Shils suggested in 1958, “the belief of those here, possesses two characteristics. First, it has a doc-
who practice politics ideologically [emphasis added] [is] trinal component that is reflected in a doctrine com-
that they alone have the truth about the right ordering posed of a set of descriptive and prescriptive attitudes
of life—of life as a whole, and not just of political life” about social relations and norms. In other words, an
(Shils, 1958, p. 451). Ideologies thus breed rigidity and ideology interprets the world and offers prescriptions
dogmatism about truth, morality, and identity. for how people ought to think, behave, and interact.
Second, the relational facet of ideologies—character- The doctrine is fixed and resilient in the face of reliable
ized by parochial altruism toward fellow adherents but opposing evidence. Second, because there will be
and antagonism toward nonadherents and dissimilar adherents and nonadherents to the doctrine’s prescrip-
others—is facilitated by processes of identity demarca- tions, an ideology entails a relational component in
tion. All ideologies invent and adopt clear identity which there is strong in-group favoritism toward other
markers, such as flags, symbols, anthems, costumes, adherents of the ideology coupled with distrust toward
and rituals, that signal membership and devotion. out-groups.5 These structural components of ideologies
Examples are rife in nationalistic flags and dress, reli- can translate into the psychological realm: “Ideological
gious and spiritual rituals, political parties’ and move- thinking” can therefore be defined as a style of thinking
ments’ association with specific symbols and hand that is rigid in its adherence to a doctrine and resistance
gestures, and sports teams’ songs and colors (e.g., to evidence-based belief-updating (i.e., doctrinal) and
DeMarrais et al., 1996; Wiltgren, 2014). The shared, favorably oriented toward an in-group and antagonistic
visible, and physical nature of these identity markers to out-groups (i.e., selectively relational). 6
1076 Zmigrod

Ideology

Relational Component
Doctrinal Component Identity Demarcation &
Embrace of Rigid Dogma Differential Treatment of
Doctrine Adherents

Description Prescription Group Prejudice &

Identification Hostility
Absolute Rigid Rules for In-Group
Explanation for Thought, Favoritism Out-Group Distrust
Existing Behavior, & Toward Fellow of Nonadherents
Conditions Social Relations Adherents

Fig. 2. The components and subcomponents of ideology that are consequently psychologically
reflected in ideological thinking.

This definition posits that individuals vary in the or simply intergroup attitudes but a phenomenon that
extent to which they display ideological thinking, intertwines both. This can be broken down further into
depending on how epistemically dogmatic and inter- tractable subcomponents on the basis of the rich litera-
personally intolerant they are toward those who do not ture on political cognition (see Fig. 2). The doctrinal
belong to their ideological group. It is thus possible to component involves the embrace of a rigid dogma
envision a spectrum along which some individuals are and consequently the adoption of (a) an absolutist
ideologically extreme, in which case they are rigidly description of the present and past as well as (b) a set
espousing a doctrine and willing to harm others and of prescriptions for future thought and behavior. Indeed,
incur personal costs (such as self-sacrifice) in the name cognitive research reveals that mental representations
of the ideology, and others are ideologically moderate of what is are separable and yet bound up with what
and so are receptive to credible evidence and display can be (Phillips & Cushman, 2017; Phillips & Knobe,
tolerance for those with whom they disagree. There are 2018; Phillips et al., 2019; Shtulman & Tong, 2013) and
therefore gradations from ideological extremism to that this dichotomy begins in infancy (Shtulman & Phillips,
moderation. Notably, this definition of ideological 2018), and so the brain processes descriptions and pre-
thinking is agnostic with regard to (a) whether the scriptions of thought and actions in an intertwined yet
ideology possesses logical coherence and systematicity, distinct fashion. Synthesizing the social-psychological
(b) whether it reflects or captures objective truth, (c) literature, it can be posited that the relational compo-
whether it has a reality-distortion function, and (d) the nent of ideologies, in which in-group and out-group
extent to which the ideology is purely symbolic or members are demarcated, involves (a) strong personal
practical. This framework is also agnostic with regard identification with the in-group and (b) a rejection of
to the ideology’s content—it can be religious, political, nonadherents that often takes the form of hostility and
or secular. Instead, it emphasizes the structure and style prejudice. This relational component mirrors the sub-
of thinking that ideologies inculcate in followers. stantial literature in psychology on self-categorization
To synthesize a robust and fruitful science of ideol- and social-identity theory (Tajfel et al., 1979; Turner
ogy, it is essential to decide on empirically useful defi- et al., 1987) that illustrate how conceptions of the self
nitions of ideological thinking. As outlined above, are integrated with ideas about similar and dissimilar
ideological thinking can be described as a style of others. The level of identification with the group shapes
thinking that is rigid in its adherence to a doctrine and the level of hostility and prejudice, but the relationship
resistance to evidence-based belief-updating (i.e., doc- between them depends on context (e.g., Jasko et al.,
trinal) and favorably oriented toward an in-group and 2019) and individual differences (e.g., Hogg, 2005).
antagonistic to out-groups (i.e., selectively relational). Using this taxonomy, we can identify ideologies and
Ideological thinking is therefore not purely dogmatism ideological thinking on the basis of the structure of
A Psychology of Ideology 1077

ideological cognition rather than just the content of the thinking. The framework presented here can therefore
doctrine. This structure-oriented approach does not be used to diagnose ideologies and individuals that are
deny the importance of content, but it can elucidate particularly dangerous—when they breed evidence-
unexplored research questions. It can therefore expand resistant dogmatism and intergroup intolerance—and
existing knowledge into a more comprehensive theory those are less toxic. Focusing on the structure of the
of ideology. The four subcomponents (outlined in Fig. 2) ideology rather than its content can hence shed light
are all necessary and jointly sufficient for ideological on key processes that were previously obscured
thinking (and especially ideological extremism) to because of historical use of the term “ideologies” to
emerge in the full sense. Rather than purely focusing refer to a wide variety of phenomena.
on whether the ideology deals with questions of politi-
cal organization, social hierarchies, religious beliefs,
Theories of Ideology
environmental protection, or class struggles, the pro-
posed approach implies that we can separate thought To situate this account within broader research on
patterns that are strongly ideological from those that are ideologies—and to highlight its novelty and signifi-
weakly so, or not at all. For example, an ideologically cance—it is valuable to differentiate the phenomenon
extreme individual is one who (a) possesses a rigid, of ideological thinking outlined here from past or exist-
evidence-resistant description of the world, (b) strongly ing theories of ideology and related constructs. Between
adheres to inflexible prescriptions for how they and the 1960s to the 1980s, political scientists largely defined
others ought to live and act, (c) exhibits intense identi- a person who is “ideological” as one who possesses a
fication with fellow adherents, and (d) displays active coherent and stable belief system (Friedman, 2006; Jost,
hostility toward nonadherents. In contrast, an ideologi- 2006), and so many political scientists debated the
cally moderate individual is one who (a) adopts a extent to which ordinary citizens are capable of being
description of the world that is flexible and responsive ideological—that is, of possessing coherent, articulable,
to evidence, (b) does not rely on or impose on others and noncontradictory political beliefs (Campbell et al.,
rigid prescriptive rules for living, (c) displays weak or 1960; Converse, 1964/2006; Judd & Milburn, 1980;
moderate identification with others who believe in simi- Kerlinger, 1984; Tedin, 1987). The framework presented
lar worldviews, and (d) does not express hostility or here is not concerned with individuals’ capacity to be
prejudice toward dissimilar others. Consequently, the ideologically sophisticated or systematic: It begins from
question of whether the ideologies of these two indi- the premise that all individuals engage with ideologies
viduals concern race, gender, class, climate change, to differing degrees, and interesting empirical questions
religion, or politics is irrelevant as to whether they can arise when we consider why some engage with pre-
be designated as ideologically extreme or moderate. packaged belief systems in a strong and passionate way
Can ideological thinking be reduced to mere dogma- whereas others do not.
tism? In other words, can ideologies consist purely of In sociology, ideology has typically been evaluated
doctrines without relational identities? Such “isms” cer- in relation to systems of power, legitimacy, and collec-
tainly exist, such as free market capitalism or neoliberal- tive imagination (Kumar, 2006), especially in the con-
ism, but they may not be of genuine psychological text of capitalism, religion, fascism, and the production
interest. Political, historical, or sociological analyses are of knowledge (Hall, 1977/2018). For individuals to be
better suited for ideologies that do not engender in indi- “ideological” in the sociological sense, they are defined
viduals some kind of in-group identification and the as having simplified, reduced, and distorted a complex
potential for out-group derogation. For psychological social reality; ideology is in an antagonistic tension with
and cognitive scientists, the ideological phenomena that truth and science (Vincent, 2010). Other accounts that
warrant investigation are those that can breed intergroup seek to link the sociological and philosophical critique
intolerance and hostility. Consequently, even ideologies of ideology with political concerns have posited that
such as veganism or environmentalism can produce “what makes political thinking ideological [emphasis
ideological thinking for some people because individuals added] relates to the linguistic need and interpretative
can be both epistemically dogmatic about these ideolo- imperative to choose among contested meanings of
gies and treat nonadherents with contempt, suspicion, concepts, in order to attain the control over language
and sometimes violence. Not all individuals who adhere that renders collective political action possible”
to these ideologies will be dogmatic or intolerant, but (Freeden, 2003, p. 126). The problem with these broad
some individuals will be—and it is the difference truth- and action-oriented accounts of ideology is that
between these two groups that can yield fascinating lines they do not lend themselves easily to psychological
of research for the psychology of ideology. analysis or theory. These theories struggle to ask (and
“Isms” built around openness and tolerance may thus answer) why and how a particular mind comes to adopt
not always fulfill the criteria for provoking ideological ideologies fervently. In contrast, when we consider
1078 Zmigrod

ideological thinking as reflecting a combination of epis- deviant from embraced social conventions (Mavor et al.,
temic dogmatism and interpersonal intolerance, we are 2010), and so this line of research can help productively
working with concrete psychological phenomena that inform research on the relational components of ideo-
can be put under an empirical microscope and tested logical thinking. Nonetheless, the locus of the inter-
in a range of ideological contexts. group dynamic in the DPM approach is about how
Within psychology itself, ideology—the infamously individuals view social structures rather than how they
slippery construct—has often been synonymized with treat others who share or deviate from their ideology:
“belief system,” “worldview,” “social attitudes,” “values,” There is little attention to how individuals treat adher-
“culture,” “life philosophy,” or “political orientation.” It ents vs nonadherents (as in the relational component
is useful to briefly review how these terms relate to suggested here) or how dogmatically they adhere to
ideology, as conceptualized here. Koltko-Rivera (2004) these authoritarian or hierarchical ideologies (as in the
viewed worldviews as sets of beliefs and assumptions doctrinal component). The present framework on ideo-
that describe reality. Following a qualitative and histori- logical thinking therefore fills a gap in existing theories
cal review, Koltko-Rivera (2004) listed an extensive of the components of ideologies but also speaks col-
number of topics for worldview beliefs, such as world- laboratively to such accounts.
views on morality, agency, interpersonal justice, author- Another set of theories that focus on the motivational
ity, humanity, and more. Although valuable and widely origins of ideologies, and consider ideologies in a fairly
appreciated, Koltko-Rivera’s model of worldviews general way, are significance-quest theory (SQT;
includes over 40 possible worldview topics and so Kruglanski et al., 2014), uncertainty-identity theory
struggles to delineate tractable phenomena that can be (UIT; Hogg, 2014), and terror-management theory (TMT;
of easy use to the psychologist of ideologies. Saucier Greenberg & Arndt, 2011). Each posits that individuals
(2000, 2013) adopted a more empirical approach, rely- adhere to ideologies to satisfy needs to achieve meaning
ing on a factor analysis of dictionary-derived question- (SQT), certainty (UIT), and a sense of endurance and
naire items to evaluate the structure of terms that end esteem in the face of mortality (TMT). The current
in -ism, such as liberalism, nationalism, ethnocentrism, framework can be compatible with—and help expand—
fundamentalism, individualism, spiritualism, and others. these theories by providing greater specificity about the
This resulted in five dimensions that capture such -isms, nature of ideological thinking and by identifying struc-
which Saucier labeled tradition-oriented religiousness, tural cognitive features of ideologies—and not only the
subjective spirituality, unmitigated self-interest, com- motivations they satisfy—that make some brains more
munal rationalism, and inequality-aversion (Saucier, susceptible to ideological thinking than others. What
2013). These dimensions, especially tradition-oriented aspects of achieving meaning or certainty push individu-
religiousness and inequality-aversion, were related to als toward epistemic dogmatism? And which contribute
two ideological orientations that constitute Duckitt and toward interpersonal intolerance? An integrated account
Sibley’s (2009a, 2009b, 2010) dual-process motivational of ideological thinking will support a more mechanistic
(DPM) model: right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and approach to these motivational theories.
social-dominance orientation (SDO). The DPM model If we examine research on racism, nationalism, sex-
moves away from unidimensional accounts of ideology ism, religion, and other ideologies, we can detect how
that emphasize a single left-right political spectrum doctrinal and relational components are evident repeat-
(e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Jost et al., 2003) and instead edly within these diverse ideologies. In the context of
proposes that RWA and SDO are two distinct ideological racism, Jones (2000) defined personally mediated rac-
dimensions that express separable psychological and ism as consisting of adherence to racist beliefs and
motivational processes and traits. According to the DPM assumptions about the links between race, biology, and
account, individuals who score highly on RWA are moti- ability as well as differential treatment of others in
vated to establish collective security in response to accordance with this racist ideology (Trawalter et al.,
threats, whereas those who are high in SDO are con- 2020). The doctrinal and relational components thus
cerned with establishing group dominance and superior- reappear in the context of racist ideologies. Likewise,
ity. The utility of the DPM approach is clear and has been prominent theorists of nationalism (T. Blank & Schmidt,
applied to various ideological outcomes such as antigay 2003; Feshbach, 1994; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989)
attitudes (Moor et al., 2019), antivegan attitudes ( Judge defined it in terms of a doctrine of national superiority,
& Wilson, 2019), immigration attitudes and postcolonial dominance, and militarism combined with positive in-
ideology in New Zealand (Satherley & Sibley, 2016, group regard and hostile out-group treatment, implicitly
2018), as well as the evolution of political ideology echoing the doctrinal and relational features. Further,
(Claessens et al., 2020). The authoritarian-aggression ele- research on gender ideologies highlight how it encom-
ment of the DPM evaluates hostility toward individuals passes a nonegalitarian ideology that assumes binary
perceived to be dissident to endorsed authorities or gender roles based on essential biological differences
A Psychology of Ideology 1079

(i.e., the doctrine) and malicious treatment of individu- have illustrated that direct comparisons of right-wing
als who deviate from the expectations of this doctrine versus left-wing participants do generally reveal psy-
(Glick & Fiske, 2001; Hammond and Overall, 2013; chological differences in personality, motivations, val-
Saguy et al., 2021). Likewise, in a comprehensive ues, and cognition. For instance, research on the
account of the cognitive dynamics of religion (Barrett, personality and motivations of political conservatives
2007), Whitehouse (2000, 2004) proposed that religios- and liberals in the United States has shown that con-
ity can cluster into two distinct modes: “doctrinal” and servatives tend to self-report a greater need for closure,
“imagistic.” In the doctrinal mode, religion focuses on structure, order, certainty, and absence of ambiguity
transmitting and retaining highly complex bodies of (meta-analysis by Jost et al., 2018; see also Carney et al.,
knowledge (e.g., through theological texts and teach- 2008; Gerber et al., 2010; Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2009).
ing). In the imagistic mode, religion takes the form of Political liberals, on the other hand, report a more
highly emotionally arousing events and rituals that pro- favorable attitude toward science ( J. M. Blank & Shaw,
voke feelings of interpersonal connection and oneness. 2015; Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016; Tullett et al.,
These modes, empirically corroborated through anthro- 2016; but see also Washburn & Skitka, 2018) and tend
pological research (Whitehouse, 2002; Whitehouse & to perform better on tests of cognitive ability (Choma
Martin, 2004), map on nicely to the psychological & Hanoch, 2017; Deary et al., 2008; Eidelman et al.,
framework presented here, which emphasizes ideolo- 2012; Heaven et al., 2011; Hodson & Busseri, 2012;
gies’ doctrinal components on one hand and relational Onraet et al., 2015; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017). Political
features on the other. Thus, even a cursory view of a liberals are also more resistant to conspiracies or
range of ideologies reveals that both doctrinal and rela- misinformation ( Jost et al., 2018; Miller et al., 2016;
tional features characterize the psychological structure Pennycook & Rand, 2020; Pfattheicher & Schindler,
of ideologies, reappearing in multiple guises that can 2016; Sterling et al., 2016). Further research into values
be analyzed in a content-free fashion. and moral foundations has suggested that political con-
servatives adopt more “binding” values such as sanctity,
authority, and loyalty, whereas political liberals value
Psychology of Ideology more “individualizing” forms of morality that emphasize
Psychological differences according fairness and care (Graham et al., 2009, 2011; Kim et al.,
2012; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; Van Leeuwen & Park,
to ideological content 2009; however, for evidence that ideology drives moral
As noted earlier, psychological research on ideologies intuitions, see Hatemi et al., 2019). The emerging field
has largely focused on the discrepant content of ideolo- of political neuroscience (Haas et al., 2020; Jost et al.,
gies rather than the commonalities in the cognitive style 2014; Nam, 2020; Smith & Warren, 2020; Zmigrod &
these can impose on followers. As a result, the most Tsakiris, 2021) has even revealed differences between
popular experimental design has examined individuals political liberals and conservatives in their neurobiol-
who identify with the mission of a particular ideology ogy (e.g., Amodio et al., 2007; Haas et al., 2017; Kanai
and compared them with those who self-identify with et al., 2011; Nam et al., 2018; Oxley et al., 2008;
the opposing ideology. In political psychology, this has Schreiber et al., 2013) and in their neural responses to
taken the form of methodological comparisons between affective (Carraro et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2011), facial
self-identified political conservatives and liberals. In other (Vigil, 2010), and political (Leong et al., 2020) content.
social-psychology subfields, this approach is featured in Although this is far from an exhaustive review, most
the comparison between religious and atheist individuals outlooks on the literature will conclude that when
or between racist and nonracist individuals. politically opposed groups are compared on the basis
Content-based comparisons have yielded a profound of self-categorizations of ideological affiliations, psy-
theoretical and empirical debate between researchers chological differences between them do emerge.
who identify psychological differences between right-
wing and left-wing individuals (e.g., Baron & Jost, 2019; Psychological commonalities in
Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2003; Hibbing et al., 2014; Nilsson
& Jost, 2020) and researchers who challenge the widely
ideological thinking
held assumption that such differences exist (e.g., Bakker At the same time, however, when studies have taken
et al., 2020; Brandt et al., 2014; Crawford, 2017; Crawford an approach that emphasizes ideological extremity
& Brandt, 2019, 2020; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Ditto rather than purely focusing on the mission of the ideol-
et al., 2019; Frimer et al., 2017; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). ogy, a more complex picture has surfaced. From a
The findings from the political-psychology literature methodological standpoint, these studies often use
1080 Zmigrod

measurement tools that tap into continuous individual ideological contexts (Cichocka et al., 2018; Osborne et al.,
differences in ideological attachment, extremity, and 2019; Pliskin et al., 2020; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018; van
partisan radicality. These investigations have concen- Zomeren, 2016).
trated on the structure of ideological adherence and It is noteworthy that an immense array of personality
have illustrated that it is fruitful to study ideological traits have been studied in relation to one ideological
thinking in a way that is largely agnostic as to the aims domain (e.g., political conservatism) but not rigorously
of the ideology (Zmigrod et al., 2021)—this reveals examined in others, making extrapolation of the psy-
remarkable psychological commonalities in ideological chological correlates of “ideological thinking” challeng-
thinking across a variety of ideological domains. ing. For instance, the role of intuitive versus analytic
There have been two lines of research within psy- thinking has been examined in the context of political
chology that have revealed the striking similarities in conservatism and religiosity (for a meta-analysis, see
the psychological underpinnings of ideological thinking Pennycook et al., 2016), but its role in relation to dog-
across disparate ideological domains. The first line of matism and ideological extremity has not been carefully
research has centered on personality and motivational addressed. Likewise, the cognitive science of religion
factors (measured via subjective self-report question- has discussed the role of mentalizing abilities in pre-
naires), and the second has focused on the implicit dicting religious and paranormal beliefs (e.g., Gervais,
cognitive factors (measured with objective neuropsy- 2013; Jack et al., 2016; Norenzayan et al., 2012; Van Elk
chological and behavioral tasks) underlying ideological & Aleman, 2017), but this has not been coherently
thinking. linked to the mind-perception literature in intergroup
psychology (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hackel et al.,
Personality traits and motivations. In terms of per- 2014). Conducting research that assesses multiple ide-
sonality and motivation, it is possible to synthesize com- ologies simultaneously will help structure future
mon dispositions that predict ideological thinking across research on the personality antecedents of ideological
domains. Personality traits associated with reduced open- orientations in a more fruitful direction, allowing delin-
minded thinking (Pennycook et al., 2019), heightened sen- eation of what psychological processes are specific to
sitivity to distress and fear (for reviews, see van Prooijen particular ideologies and which can be evident in
et al., 2015; van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019), avoidance of adherence to any powerful ideology.
social risk-taking (Zmigrod et al., 2021), and intolerance of
uncertainty (for review, see Hogg, 2014) have been gener- Cognitive dispositions. With respect to the cognitively
ally implicated in ideological thinking in the context of oriented research, a number of cognitive traits have been
various ideological identities and groups. Another exam- recently shown to confer susceptibility to ideological
ple centers on the theory that intergroup behavior that thinking (Zmigrod, 2020). Three notable examples are
avoids foreign, dissimilar others may be rooted in behav- cognitive inflexibility, impaired strategic information pro-
ioral adaptations that protect against infection (the so- cessing, and slower perceptual evidence processing. First,
called behavioral immune system). Processes associated an emerging line of research suggests that a tendency toward
with disgust sensitivity and pathogen avoidance have been cognitive rigidity can foster ideological rigidity. Cognitive
implicated in authoritarian worldviews, out-group deroga- inflexibility is operationalized in the neuropsychological
tion, and moral judgments across multiple psychological literature as a difficulty with switching between modes of
paradigms and cross-cultural ecological studies, and across thinking and adapting to changing environmental contin-
multiple ideological domains (e.g., Ji et al., 2019; Karinen gencies (Zmigrod, 2020). Mental inflexibility has been
et al., 2019; Tracy et al., 2019; Tybur et al., 2016, 2018; implicated in extreme ideological identities (for review,
Zmigrod, Ebert, et al., 2020). Recent research centered see Zmigrod, 2020) in the context of politics (Zmigrod,
on dogmatism—measured through individuals’ general Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2020), nationalism (Zmigrod et al.,
receptivity to evidence and respect for credible alternative 2018), religion (Zmigrod, Rentfrow, Zmigrod, & Robbins,
viewpoints—has shown that dogmatic individuals have 2019), dogmatism (Zmigrod, Zmigrod, et al., 2019), and
highly impulsive personalities (Zmigrod et al., 2021). a willingness to endorse violence and self-sacrifice
Impulsivity was also implicated in individuals endorsing (Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2019). Importantly, cog-
ideological violence to protect their in-group (Zmigrod & nitive rigidity was manifest on both the extreme right and
Goldenberg, 2021), suggesting impulsivity contributes to the extreme left (Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2020),
ideological tendencies (Zmigrod et al., 2021). In addition, suggesting that ideological extremity may be as psycho-
from a motivational perspective, work on the psychology logically important as the mission of the ideology. These
of political action has posited that motivations surround- studies quantified cognitive inflexibility with objective
ing identity, efficacy, emotion, and morality may be core behavioral tests of executive function and perception, in
motivations for ideological action across a diversity of which participants were asked to continuously change
A Psychology of Ideology 1081

between mental rules and categories. Consequently, find- Conceptual and Methodological Directions
ings using behavioral experimental paradigms are not
susceptible to biases of social-desirability, self-perception, An emergent conclusion from the observed similarities
and social norms that can become manifest in self-report of diverse ideologies is that we should study ideological
questionnaires. This line of research illustrates that indi- thinking and related processes under one umbrella. An
vidual differences in cognitive inflexibility can confer sus- appreciation of the psychological structure of ideologi-
ceptibility to ideological thinking (Zmigrod, 2020). cal thinking can be empirically productive and theoreti-
Furthermore, recent research examining the cogni- cally valuable. How can this be achieved? Let us
tive profiles of a range of ideological attitudes found examine the directions which this emerging field can
that impairments in strategic information processing take in terms of (a) conceptual and (b) methodological
were linked to more conservative, authoritarian, nation- future avenues.
alistic, and religious tendencies (Zmigrod et al., 2021).7
This impairment was also evidenced in individuals who Developing a conceptual research agenda
were more willing to support extreme progroup actions
to protect their in-group. These impairments were man- Building on this integrative framework, a clear guiding
ifest in performance on executive-functioning tasks research agenda for this burgeoning field can be con-
associated with working memory and planning, illus- structed. In particular, one can envision three major
trating that there are common cognitive roots to ideo- research questions that need to be addressed:
logical thinking across a range of ideological contexts.
A difficulty in planning and executing complex action 1. Antecedents: What psychological traits and expe-
sequences in basic perception may thus increase peo- riences confer susceptibility to ideological
ple’s reliance on coherent collective dogmas that sim- thinking?
plify the world into absolute explanations and clear 2. Processes: What psychological factors shape the
behavioral prescriptions. intensity of ideological immersion and choice of
The study of low-level perception and cognition ideology?
has further revealed that how the mind processes per- 3. Consequences: What are the psychological and
ceptual evidence can confer susceptibility to ideologi- neurocognitive consequences of ideological
cal dogmatism across a diversity of ideologies. Using engagement?
drift-diffusion modeling of trial-by-trial performance
on two forced-choice tasks illustrated that slower evi- Focusing and delineating research efforts along these
dence accumulation of perceptual data is linked to a lines will allow us to address the nuanced processes
dogmatic thinking style (Zmigrod et al., 2021). This that confer initial susceptibility to internalizing ideologi-
suggests that nondogmatic individuals are better able cal doctrines, as well as the mechanisms that reinforce
to process and accumulate evidence in perceptual or dampen these effects. It will enable the field to
decision-making contexts generally, and this may construct comprehensive, causally minded theories and
translate to a better ability to process evidence in paradigms that can be positioned on par with other
ideological settings as well. Notably, these perceptual major scientific endeavors. When we adopt a frame-
phenomena occur on the order of milliseconds and work that seriously engages with the psychological
are not under conscious control. Consequently, the phenomena that underpin political thought and action,
findings suggest that individual differences in low- we can formulate socially pertinent questions that
level visual information processing can reveal varia- address the bidirectional links between ideologies and
tions in ideological thinking as well. cognition.
Finally, the analysis of perceptual decision-making To advance an integrated psychology of ideology
processes demonstrated that response caution—a per- that taps at these questions, it is essential to collabora-
ceptual preference for accuracy over speed in tasks in tively examine the psychology of religion, political psy-
which both accuracy and speed are rewarded—was chology, moral psychology, intergroup psychology, and
related to more socially conservative and nationalistic the study of obedience, conformity, and prejudice. This
worldviews (Zmigrod et al., 2021). Cautious perceptual will allow us to evaluate psychological processes that
strategies may therefore translate into cautious (i.e., have been hypothesized to be ideology-specific and to
conservative) ideological beliefs. Studying the relation- interrogate whether these are truly ideology-specific or
ship between ideological attitudes and individual dif- have simply not been studied (sufficiently) in the con-
ferences in low-level perceptual and cognitive text of other ideologies. We can then ask the essential
processing can therefore help elucidate the underpin- questions, that is, why some psychological traits are
nings of ideological thinking. predictive of adherence to certain ideologies and not
1082 Zmigrod

others and why some psychological dispositions are Boutyline and Willer (2017) found that individuals who
predictive of extremity regardless of the ideology’s were both more conservative and more extreme were
content. It is only through a rigorous integrative theo- more likely to seek out political homophily (affirma-
retical approach that we can design empirical tests that tions of their views rather than challenges to it). Con-
can truly begin to tap at mechanistic explanations in sequently, by empirically separating content and
the psychology of ideology. Furthermore, it will allow extremity, it is possible to identify their interacting and
researchers to build theories that directly address the amplifying effects on behavior—and consider the
research questions about the origins, processes, and con- (online) ecology that makes these ideological behaviors
sequences of engagement with ideological doctrines. We possible.
can thereby achieve greater precision in our mechanistic Last, with regards to research on the consequences
accounts of the ideological mind—arriving at general of ideologies on neural and cognitive functioning,
principles as well as nuanced trajectories that consider Krosch and Amodio (2019) showed that framing
where, when, and why the doctrine of the ideology can resources in terms of scarcity disrupts the neural process-
shape its impact on the minds of adherents. ing of minority group faces in the context of race. More-
A multitude of excellent examples in recent research over, this scarcity-induced disruption to neural encoding
have begun separating the content and structure of predicted discriminatory resource allocation of White
ideologies, and thereby elucidated the psychological participants. This finding reveals that the way in which
antecedents, processes, and consequences of ideologi- the brain responds to scarcity in its visual encoding of
cal engagement. With regard to questions of the cogni- minorities can shed light on the origins of discriminatory
tive antecedents of ideology, Peterson and Iyengar and prejudiced behavior in times of economic stress.
(2021) found that both political liberals and political Hence, context matters when minds process in-groups
conservatives exhibit sincere motivated reasoning of mis- and out-groups (also shown by Jasko et al., 2019), and
information, and both are influenced by moderate insin- so we must develop theories that integrate contextual
cere cheerleading effects that shape their information moderators of brain processes—such as resource levels,
processing of political facts. By putting into competition conflict dynamics, and stressors—when considering the
alternative theories of partisan information-seeking psychological consequences of ideological narratives.
behavior, including content-oriented and structure-based Furthermore, Goudarzi et al. (2019) indicated that eco-
hypotheses, the authors fruitfully clarified the nature of nomic-system justification is related to muted emotional
ideological gaps in news evaluation. Another example and physiological responses to manifestations of poverty
mentioned earlier is the data-driven investigation by and wealth. Ideologies can thereby serve psychophysical
Zmigrod and colleagues (2021) that examined the psy- functions, shaping the nervous system’s responses to a
chological factors that predict ideological thinking in a variety of social stimuli. However, scientists of ideologi-
range of ideologies. This study revealed that there are cal thinking will need to tackle difficult questions about
certain cognitive and personality dispositions that pre- why we observe correspondences between social atti-
dict strong or dogmatic adherence to any ideology and tudes and cognitive structure and what behavioral and
other psychological individual differences that are spe- neural mechanisms underpin these correspondences.
cific to particular ideologies. Hence, it is possible to This endeavor will involve the use of experimental
elucidate the patterns of psychological commonalities paradigms, behavioral genetics, and longitudinal and
and discrepancies by adopting a large-scale data-driven developmental studies to inform a nuanced account of
approach that facilitates robust comparisons between how neurocognitive susceptibilities are co-opted by
the psychological origins of different ideologies. ideologically prone contexts (Zmigrod, 2021).
In relation to questions on the psychological pro- Importantly, aiming at theoretical synthesis between
cesses of ideological cognition, recent research on ideo- ideological content and structure, and between the psy-
logical social action in online social networks has been chology of diverse ideological narratives, does not
able to control for both the content and extremity of mean achieving absolute synchrony in how we study
messages and study these interactive effects. This political, religious, and social ideologies. Rather, it pro-
approach has revealed that moral emotions such as pels us to develop broad paradigms that facilitate sci-
anger and disgust proliferate on Twitter for politicians entific coherence when we consider ideologies in
on both the left and right of the political spectrum, tandem. Theoretical unification should not necessarily
whereas certain forms of moral-emotional language and force us to draw false equivalences between ideologies
expression were more impactful for conservative politi- (Baron & Jost, 2019), such as between those that are
cal elites than for liberal elites, even after controlling used for social domination versus those promoted in
for ideological extremity (Brady et al., 2019). Likewise, the name of social equality. The key with this integra-
when examining politically engaged Twitter users, tive structure-oriented approach is to empirically and
A Psychology of Ideology 1083

theoretically test where diverse ideological movements such as: How do the doctrinal and relational aspects of
exhibit parallels and where they differ—and through ideological thinking emerge in tandem within an indi-
this endeavor understand who is most attracted to vidual? How are the doctrinal and relational elements
(certain) ideologies and why. structurally related? That is, does one temporally pre-
cede the other and how do they reinforce and amplify
each other? What personal and social experiences or
Methodological directions
motivations affect the emergence of each? Do the doc-
A key step necessary to advance a theoretically mature trinal and relational components possess separable or
(and conceptually adventurous) psychology of ideology similar cognitive correlates? What are the real-world
is to build appropriate, and sometimes novel, assess- manifestations of the relational component without a
ment tools. There are three main avenues for future doctrinal component (e.g., avid sports fans 8) or the
methodologically oriented research that will have a reverse (e.g., lone suicide terrorists 9)? Unpacking the
particularly fruitful impact on future studies. First, it is structure of ideological thinking through appropriate
necessary to create content-free measures of ideological methodological tools is therefore a key next step for
attitudes and behavior—tools that assesses ideological this line of research.
thinking without invoking the particular content of that Last, the field needs assessment tools that address
ideology. Measures for which the content is easily sub- the temporal dimension of ideological engagement in
stitutable with simple alterations are also valuable, such order to study the whole process of ideological immer-
that the structure of the questions is consistent regard- sion, from exposure to adherence to extremism. Each
less of the ideology in question. This is important to stage between initial exposure to radical adherence and
be able to truly compare the psychological correlates self-sacrifice is likely to have overlapping as well as
of diverse ideological orientations. This will also allow unique susceptibility factors, and so we need appropri-
for research outside of WEIRD (White, educated, indus- ate assessment tools to evaluate individuals’ position at
trialized, rich, and democratic) samples, which is espe- each stage. Indeed, developmental and longitudinal
cially critical to augment the cross-cultural and historical studies will be necessary to elucidate causal links and
validity (Henrich et al., 2010; Muthukrishna et al., 2020; self-reinforcing loops between cognitive dispositions
Roberts et al., 2020)—and highlight instances of cultural and ideological identity and behavior.
specificity—of this emerging science. Early seeds of these approaches can already be seen
Second, there is a need for measures that tap at the in recent research and can be built on in order for
structure of ideological thinking by separately quantify- the field to attain greater methodological maturity
ing the doctrinal and relational components of ideolo- (Rollwage et al., 2019; Zmigrod & Tsakiris, 2021). For
gies (see Fig. 3). For instance, measuring individuals’ example, a measurement tool that has grown in popu-
embrace of a dogma would involve surveying their larity is the identity-fusion index ( Jimenez et al., 2016),
beliefs about the causes of societal conditions (tapping in which the participant is asked to move a small circle
into the description subcomponent of the doctrine) and labeled “Me” in relation to a large static circle labeled
assessing their levels of endorsement of the dogma’s with the name of the ideological group (e.g., a person-
prescriptions and the need to punish when there is ally relevant religious group, political party, or nation).
deviance from the ideology’s rules (prescription sub- The amount of overlap between the two circles and the
component). To evaluate the relational component, it distance between the circles can be used as a metric of
may be necessary to measure individuals’ identification personal feelings of immersion with the ideological
and personal-identity fusion with the ideological group group. The power of this measure lies in its applicabil-
and the extent to which they would be ready to self- ity to any ideological or social group, such that the
sacrifice for its causes (group-identification subcompo- amount of identity fusion is quantifiable and translat-
nent). Measuring out-group derogation would involve able between ideologies. The identity-fusion index has
surveying individuals’ discriminatory behavioral ten- been used in the context of nationalism (Bortolini et al.,
dencies and their endorsement of violence against non- 2018; Jong et al., 2015; Kapitány et al., 2019; Zmigrod
adherents (prejudice and hostility subcomponent). et al., 2018), political partisanship (Misch et al., 2018;
There are measures that assess how one would treat Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2019), resilience in the
nonadherents, or one’s levels of prejudice, but these face of terror ( Jong et al., 2015), and willingness to
measures are usually not incorporated into the same engage in extreme protest and progroup behavior
study design as those that assess how evidence-resistant (Kunst et al., 2018; Paredes et al., 2019; Purzycki &
an individual is with regard to that ideology. This preci- Lang, 2019). The identity-fusion index therefore satisfies
sion in the assessment of the structure of ideological the criterion of being easily content-substitutable (by
thinking would facilitate research of pertinent questions, altering the group label on the large circle) and by
1084 Zmigrod

Psychology of Ideology
Methodological Directions

Content-Free or Structural Precision Temporal Sensitivity

Content Substitution
Measurement Tools That Measures That Tap Into the Measures That Consider
Are Not Excessively Structure of Ideological the Process of Ideological
Dependent on the Content Thinking, Including Engagement, From Initial
of the Ideology Doctrinal and Relational Exposure to Extremism
Subcomponents

Political Exposure
Ideology

Gender Religious
Doctrinal Relational Adherence
Ideology

Race National Group Prejudice &

Description Prescription
Identification Hostility

Climate
Extremism

Fig. 3. Methodological directions for a unified psychology of ideology.

tapping into the group identification subcomponent of measures that avoid social-desirability biases10 and effec-
ideological thinking. It can also be used in longitudinal tively tap at the psychological elements of ideological
designs (e.g., Misch et al., 2018) because it involves processes.
continuous scales that capture a large range of variation
in responses and can be repeated with little interfer-
Conclusions
ence from memory of past responding.
Another attempt to create a content-free or content- As the political thinker Walter Lippmann noted in 1922,
substitutable measure is the Open-Minded Cognition the political environment in which humans are
Scale, in which the scale items can be easily adjusted situated
to target general, political, or religious open-minded
cognition (Price et al., 2015). For instance, the six-item is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting
scale contains items such as “I am open to considering for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to
other (political/religious) viewpoints” and “I have no deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so
patience for (political/religious) arguments I disagree many permutations and combinations. And
with.” Nonetheless, Crawford and Brandt (2018) chal- although we have to act in that environment, we
lenged the predictive validity of the Open-Minded have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before
Cognition Scale and suggested that it may be best con- we can manage it. (Lippmann, 1922/1949, p. 11)
ceptualized as a measurement of self-perceived open-
minded cognition rather than open-minded cognition Ideologies thereby “impose a certain character on
itself (Crawford & Brandt, 2018, p. 24). Consequently, the data of our senses before the data reach our intel-
there is still substantial room for methodological work ligence” (Lippmann, 1922/1949, p. 65)—and it is this
that seeks to develop appropriate, reliable, and predictive profound mental structuring and filtering effect that
A Psychology of Ideology 1085

renders ideological thinking an important object for and brains when we are inculcated with ideological
rigorous investigation. mindsets. It is imperative to view ideologies (and the
Given the kaleidoscopic diversity of mass move- historical “-isms” that have been made automatically
ments, doctrines, and regimes that characterize human equivalent to ideologies) in a critical, creative, and
history and culture, it is urgent and paramount to iso- reflexively nondogmatic fashion.
late and define the core processes of ideological adher- Hence, it may be time to reevaluate Converse’s
ence, immersion, and extremism. A synthesis of the observation (quoted in the epigraph) that belief systems
multitude of literatures that deal with this topic indi- do not concede easily to empirical assessment. Since
cates that there are core commonalities in the substrates Converse published The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass
of adherence to ideological doctrines regardless of their Publics in 1964, we have come a long way in our ana-
content. But there are also likely to be important dif- lytic and methodological capabilities, and so perhaps
ferences that are ideology-specific. A holistic and inte- the psychology of ideology holds more promise and
grated psychology of ideology will be able to catch potential. Considering the domain-general elements of
these nuances and offer pegs on which to hang and ideological thinking will enrich our theories, improve
identify the various psychological dispositions and pro- the sophistication of methodologies, and position us
cesses that propel individuals to process and respond more firmly as a field that can build a fairer, more
to the world in an ideological fashion. Consequently, robust scientific community and set of scientific prac-
it is valuable to cluster these behaviors and tendencies tices. A psychology of ideology thereby holds the
in common terms and under unified theoretical frame- potential of combating the dangers of dogmatism and
works if scientific endeavors to deconstruct these phe- entrenched beliefs both within the field and in the
nomena are to be meaningful and applicable. An outside world.
integrated psychology of ideology will allow us to
more fully comprehend the susceptibility factors—and Transparency
antidotes—to worldviews that are dogmatic, extreme, Action Editor: Laura A. King
and hostile to dissimilar others. Editor: Laura A. King
This article set out to synthesize a tractable frame- Declaration of Conflicting Interests
work through which we can comprehend ideological The author(s) declared that there were no conflicts of
thinking and to demonstrate that we need to address interest with respect to the authorship or the publication
the unfruitful balkanization of this field. A siloed field of this article.
is the result of an interest in the content of ideological Funding
beliefs, such as why people believe in omnipotent This work was supported by Gates Cambridge Trust.
supernatural forces or why they adhere to hierarchical
conceptualizations of social relations. A unified field ORCID iD
would allow us to evaluate questions about the structure Leor Zmigrod https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8270-7955
of ideological thinking and thereby also to isolate the
role of an ideology’s content. Both levels of analysis— Notes
the structural and the substantive—can be brought to
1. Data can be found at http://globalreligiousfutures.org/
the fore, but only if we recognize and learn to quantify explorer#/?subtopic=15&chartType=pie&year=2020&data_
them effectively. To move the field forward, we must type=percentage&religious_affiliation=all&destination=to&c
disambiguate these two levels and find ways to bring ountries=Worldwide&age_group=all&gender=all&pdfMode=
them into contact. Future studies need to carefully con- false.
sider and delineate which level of analysis they are 2. Data can be found at https://www.idea.int/data-tools/
examining or neglecting. This will divulge fascinating question-view/441.
and pertinent questions, such as why we observe 3. Such as the effect of Adorno and colleagues’ (1950) The
repeated patterns of ideological indoctrination across Authoritarian Personality on social psychology, the effect of
cultures and throughout history and why some people The American Voter by Campbell and colleagues (1960) on
are susceptible to dogmatic thinking regardless of their political science, and the poststructuralist critique of the con-
cept of ideology in sociology.
political leanings. How are ideologies “inherited” and
4. The identification of dogma and identity markers as tools of
communicated? How malleable are the ideologies peo- ideological indoctrination approximately map onto Malešević’s
ple hold? What ideologies have the most powerful cog- (2006) distinction between normative and operative ideologies,
nitive impact? Through research practices that seriously in which the normative ideology entails the central pillars of
consider the multitude of ideologies that have graced the value system, including views on the structure of past, pres-
(and harmed) human existence, researchers will be able ent, and future of the society and what relationships between
to examine holistically what happens to our behavior people and groups are taking place or ought to be to change
1086 Zmigrod

or preserve them. The operative ideology is how the ideology Baron, J., & Jost, J. T. (2019). False equivalence: Are liberals
operates in daily routines. and conservatives in the United States equally biased?
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