Chapter Two.

The Rise of the City of Patrimony: Heritage Tourism,

Patrimonialization, and Slum Clearance

In 1962, former president Eduardo Santos sent a series of public letters to the mayor of

Cartagena, Nicolas Salom Franco, sharing his thoughts about the city’s present and future. He

believed Cartagena had a bright potential as a modest but promising tourist destination, thanks to

its rich colonial architecture, vibrant culture, and privileged location on the Caribbean coast. Yet,

Santos was concerned about the striking contrast between the early spots of tourism development

and the pervasive poverty of the surrounding areas:

Many times I felt shocked by the strange contrast between Chambacú and the
new neighborhood of Bocagrande. A harsh contrast indeed because they
represent two extremes; Bocagrande is beautiful, and Chambacú is disturbing
and painful. Just a few blocks separate them. The former has everything, and the
latter lacks everything. This bitter and shocking contrast may not continue […]
Cartagena needs to solve this urban problem without further delays if really
aspires to become the first tourist city of the Caribbean.166

The contrast between these different sides of Cartagena did not go unnoticed by travelers

either. In 1968, a reporter from the Washington Post described the changing landscape as he

went through the Clock Tower, once the main gateway to the old city, toward Getsemaní: “As

you approach the periphery of the walled compound the pace quickens. City gates lead to where

the real action is. Taxis and big open-sided buses painted in brilliant day-glo color pass. Across

the way, vendors and hawkers have set the business. The public market spreads across a corner

of the city."167 Chambacú and the Public Market certainly disrupted the colonial landscape of the

walled city. Chambacú was a densely populated shantytown located next to the south side of the

walls. By the early 1960s, at least 10,000 people lived there, mostly in overcrowded wooden

166
Eduardo Santos, “Cartas al alcalde,” 1962, 3
167
H.P. Koenig, “Cartagena: Gateway to the Emerald Coast,” The Washington Post, December 29, 1968, G11.

77
shacks without sewerage or running water. The Public Market, located across from the Clock

Tower, was a building from 1904 surrounded by hundreds of street vendors. In an article for the

New York Times, the same reporter described the Public Market in 1968 as “neither particularly,

colorful nor exotic. It is just a native market - the real thing - without touches to brighten it up for

the tourist trade. This points up an essential fact about Cartagena. In spite of obvious historic

endowments, the city is mainly shabby and rundown.”168

Local and national authorities, city planners, developers, and tourism entrepreneurs could

not agree more. They also believed the Public Market and Chambacú embodied Cartagena’s

contradictory landscape. The walled city and nearby areas hosted both exceptional pieces of

Spanish colonial architecture and the slums, blighted buildings, and crowded streets. Despite the

city’s economic potential for heritage tourism, Cartagena was far from ready to meet that

market’s basic needs. As noted in the first chapter, the city indeed had a precarious tourism

infrastructure by the mid-1950s. To make it worse, the walled colonial quarter – perhaps

Cartagena’s greatest appeal– was shady, ruinous, and severely neglected. Aside from a few

fortresses and public buildings, most of the privately-owned colonial houses were in bad shape

or abandoned. While the government and private agents made some minor efforts to restore the

city’s architectural patrimony focused on specific buildings and fortresses, it was only in the late

1960s that the state, assisted by experts, carried out comprehensive plans to restore and preserve

the area. The prospects of tourism guided these efforts. In this chapter, I will analyze the

patrimonialization of the walled colonial city, this is, the process through which the state turned

the area and its buildings and fortresses into historical patrimony by enacting laws to regulate

their uses and conducting publicly-funded initiatives of architectural conservation. The ultimate

168
H.P. Koenig, “Cartagena -- Proud and Poetic,” New York Times, October 6, 1968, XX23.

78
purpose was to turn the downtown into an object of cultural consumption in the city’s model of

heritage tourism. In short, this chapter deals with the making of the City of Patrimony.

The state, particularly during President Carlos Lleras Restrepo’s term, led the earliest

phase of patrimonialization, conducting and fully funding the first experiments of architectural

restoration, in order to set the stage for private investments. This pattern was congruent with the

leading role the state played in tourism development. I will analyze the immediate and long-term

effects of patrimonialization, mainly, the transformation of the walled city into a historic district.

As I will show, this process led to the removal of two lower-class neighborhoods in the early

1970s, Chambacú and Barrio Chino, and several small-scale clearance efforts. Chambacú

became a target given its location near downtown. The city removed a portion of Barrio Chino in

order to clear the space for the new Public Market. While the local and national governments

looked at these initiatives as critical steps for tourism development, residents struggled to cope

with their effects and defend their rights as citizens and property owners. This clash embodies

the conflictual relationship between the City of Patrimony and the City of Rights.

I will begin by analyzing several city plans, architectural conservation and restoration

studies, and projects of tourism development that guided the making of the City of Patrimony

beginning in 1957, when the Stanton Robbins study came out. I will pay particular attention to

the City Plan of 1965, which classified the downtown as a historic district for the first time,

establishing new uses and banning others, including the use of the area as the core of popular

commerce. It was the first plan to consider the removal of the Public Market and to set zoning

changes in order to turn Cartagena into a tourist destination. I will show how the City Plan also

led to the removal of Chambacú and the Barrio Chino in the early 1970s. Finally, I will examine

several architectural conservation and restoration studies made between 1967 and 1972. They all

79
had as their ultimate purpose turning Cartagena into a destiny of heritage tourism. The

implementation of these studies, besides leading to minor displacements, progressively

transformed the walled city into a historic district, and furthered the changes enforced by the City

Plan of 1965. Ultimately, state-funded restorations and new regulations about the use of urban

space set the ground for future initiatives of patrimonialization.

Map 2.1: The Walled City

The City Center at the Dawn of Tourism Development

In 1957, the J. Stanton Robbins Plan for Tourism Development made some

recommendations regarding the old walled city, which he considered “one of the most interesting

80
and best-preserved centers of the Spanish era in the Western Hemisphere.”169 Robbins proposed

“a broad gauge but specific program aimed at maintaining and enhancing the original character

of the old city,”170 meant to be led by a tourism state agency along with the Academia de

Historia and the planning office of the city’s Public Works Department. Robbins recommended

considering the creation of an effective zoning ordinance, in addition to the existing regulation,

to prevent architectural changes without permission. He also suggested using old buildings for

modern purposes, i.e., museums, public and religious institutions, additional shops and

warehouses, restaurants, and housing. For example, he advised using the Bovedas, –a late

eighteenth-century warehouse complex used for storage in the 1950s– to house a small café, art

exhibitions, and souvenir shops. 171 Overall, Robbins endorsed the modest practice of heritage

tourism that prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s in Cartagena: publicly funded restoration of

few pieces of colonial architecture to be turned in assets of the tourism infrastructure, besides

regulating the use of private properties in the area through zoning ordinance.

Long before the Stanton Robbins plan, the state had enacted several laws to preserve and

restore the local historical patrimony, beginning with law 32 of 1924 that prohibited the

demolition of fortresses and created the Society of Public Improvements –a state-funded private

agency meant to preserve and restore them.172 In the following decades, other laws took further

the ruling enforced through the Law 32. Law 11 of 1932 created the Board of Tourism and

Historical Monuments and for the first time proposed making pieces of colonial architecture as

169
J. Stanton Robbins, “Tourist Development in Cartagena, Colombia” (New York City: Stanton Robbins & Co.,
Inc., 1957). Lachlan F. Blair Papers, 1919, 1933-2000, Box 2, University of Ilinois Archives, Urbana-Champaign,
25.
170
Robbins, “Tourist Development,” 25.
171
Ibid, 25.
172
“Law 32 of 1924,” Diario Oficial 55, no. 19754 (November 1924), 1.

81
objects of cultural consumption.173 The Society of Public Improvements replaced the Board two

years later. Law 5 of 1940 174 and Law 163 of 1959175 made the national government responsible

for restoring publicly owned historic buildings. Most of these laws only led to isolated actions on

specific historical buildings without being backed up by a national policy for the preservation of

historical patrimony. Law 163 of 1959 was a turning point. It created the Council of National

Monuments, attached to the Ministry of Education, in order to create basic standards to preserve

historical patrimony across the country. It also introduced the concept of historical urban sites to

classify districts of historical value, rather than specific buildings or structures. This facilitated

enforcing zoning regulations meant to create historic districts.176

Despite these efforts during the first half of the century, the walled city was in bad shape

by the mid-1950s, and only improved after 1967, when authorities began funding essential

restorations and implementing zoning regulations. Prior to this, colonial buildings and fortresses

were often misused if not entirely abandoned. The Bovedas, for instance, were used to store

public works equipment.177 Weeds had invaded the walls, and neighbors used to throw trash on

them. In 1959, a journalist claimed, referring to the walls, that "nothing that could appeal to the

tourists was left, nothing that could cause a good impression about the history of those walls,

which once were the pride of the Cartageneros.”178 In the city’s economic boom at the turn of the

nineteenth century, authorities had demolished large sections of the wall to integrate the old city

173
“Law 11 of 1932,” Diario Oficial, 68, no 22096 (September 1932) 1.
174
“Law 5 of 1940,” Diario Oficial, 76, no 24458 (September 1940) 1.
175
“Law 163 of 1959,” Diario Oficial, 96, no 30139 (January 23, 1960) 4.
176
José Salazar, “Los programas de conservación de los centros históricos en Colombia. Una visión retrospectiva,”
in Rehabilitación integral de áreas o sitios históricos latinoamericanos. Memorias del Seminario-Taller 10-14 de
enero de 1994, edited by Hernán Crespo Toral y María Alexandra Silva (Quito: Instituto Italo-Latino Americano,
Municipio de Quito – UNESCO-ORCALC, 1994), 20.
177
Pedro Florez, “Un proyecto turístico de gran transcendencia,” Diario de La Costa, February 11, 1956, 7.
178
Pedro Flórez, “Las murallas también amontadas,” Diario de La Costa, August 18, 1956, 4.

82
with the suburbs.179 Several colonial houses were torn down as well and replaced by neo-

classical buildings. Many others lost any trace of colonial architecture after severe

transformations.180 Streets were mostly unpaved and frequently flooded with garbage and

sewage. A journalist from the Diario de la Costa said in 1959: “The tourist walks in our streets

and feels shocked when realizes that right at the city center there are hundreds of dirty garbage

cans in every door, full of trash."181

Despite the emergence of new neighborhoods, the walled city continued to be the urban

core, which meant it still concentrated public and private institutions, popular commerce, low-

income housing, municipal facilities, and schools. For instance, aside from the Public Market,

vendors occupied several streets and squares. The construction of La Matuna, a 1950s modern

urban development of high-rises in between Getsemaní and the north side of the walled city,

aggravated the problem by causing a higher concentration of vendors in the nearby streets.182

However, for local authorities, developers and tourism entrepreneurs, the Public Market was the

most troubling form of popular commerce. When built in 1904, the market served a city of fewer

than 10,000 inhabitants. Fifty years later, Cartagena had more than 128,000 but the very same

market. Grocery shops had filled the original structure and began spreading all over the area.

Nearby buildings, some of them from the colonial era, became unofficial extensions of the

market. As the core of popular commerce, the Public Market attracted a substantial amount of

human traffic and soon became a sort of bus terminal. A tourist in 1968 described the busy life in

179
Adolfo Meisel, “Cartagena 1900-1950: a remolque de la economía nacional,” Cuadernos de historia económica y
empresarial 4, (1999): 1-64.
180
Guillermo Henriquez T., “Por los fueros de Cartagena,” Diario de La Costa, April 3, 1959, 7.
181
"Lloviendo sobre mojado," Diario de la Costa, December 1, 1959, 3.
182
German Bustamante Patrón, “Conservación de Cartagena y el impacto del turismo,” in Rehabilitación integral de
áreas o sitios históricos latinoamericanos. Memorias del Seminario-Taller 10-14 de enero de 1994, edited by
Hernán Crespo Toral y María Alexandra Silva (Quito: Instituto Italo-Latino Americano, Municipio de Quito –
UNESCO-ORCALC, 1994), 177-182.

83
the market: "As you approach the periphery of the walled compound, the pace quickens. City

gates lead to where the real action is. Taxis and big open-sided buses painted in brilliant day-glo

color pass. Across the way, vendors and hawkers have set the business.”183

Buses coming from the periphery and rural areas made their last stops nearby, and so did

the merchant ships that docked in the bay next to the market. Vendors of vegetables, raw meat,

and fish dumped their trash in nearby waters. The everyday life of customers, passersby, and

workers made some to believe that the Public Market’s presence in downtown posed a problem

to the city. A 1959 newspaper article complained about the unsanitary conditions of the plaza

while denouncing the “dirtiness” of its people: “the amount of idle men and women that hang

around the market is the most horrible scenario. There they spent their time, without obligations,

causing troubles, drunk, insulting everybody, dirty, destroyed, just like the worst scum of

Cartagena […] the market remains the greatest urban embarrassment of this tourist city.”184 By

the 1950s many believed so; thus they proposed to build satellite markets in the new

neighborhoods outside of the walls, to reduce the size and chaos of the original, and decentralize

popular commerce.185 However, few suggested removing the market altogether: “it would cause

new inconveniences to the people in the Centro who would have to move to the outskirts to do

their groceries,”186 a journalist said in 1956. Still then, many saw the walled city as the original

urban core and the most obvious place to house popular commerce and extensive residential

areas. People seemed to believe what former president Santos would say years later: the city

center may endure as “the urban core of Cartagena … Conserve it, I repeat, as a living organism;

183
H.P. Koenig, “Cartagena: Gateway to the Emerald Coast,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, December 29,
1968, p. G11.
184
“Sobre el mercado turístico,” Diario de La Costa, August 18, 1959, 7
185
“Los nuevos mercados,” Diario de La Costa, February 24, 1956, 9, 10. Alberto “Mr Tollo” Lemaitre, “Los
mercados resistentes,” Diario de La Costa, February 26, 1956, 9.
186
“Los nuevos mercados,” Diario de La Costa, February 24, 1956, 10.

84
never with the sad character of a museum, defending the essential guidelines, without giving up

the reforms and progresses that improve the life of the people.”187 Like Santos, some believed

the walled city could mingle the features of modernity along with the historical features without

compromising its tourist appeal. The very same Santos believed the Market “rather than clashing

with opposite creations, mingles with them into something full of appealing details, of splendid

novelties…”188

Figure 2.1: Public Market (1978). Antonio Lemaitre. Fototeca Histórica de Cartagena.

By the early 1960s, the common perception had changed, largely, because the building’s

conditions after an explosion partially destroyed it in 1962. Authorities began working on plans

to remove the market altogether. However, they did not consider moving it outside the city

center. A plan of the Company of Municipal Services proposed relocating the market in the area

of la Matuna, leaving the original site available for offices, housing, storage, and retail shops.189

187
Santos, "Cartas," 8.
188
Ibid, 7.
189
“La transformación del Mercado,” Diario de La Costa, July 28, 1962, 10.

85
Even merchants, who proved reluctant to move years before, agreed to do so as long as they

could move to that place.190 The Academia de Historia, backed by the Council of National

Monuments, opposed building the new market in la Matuna.191 They considered that placing the

market there would undermine the preservation of the walled city. The intervention of the

Academia exemplifies a growing concern about how modern uses of urban space negatively

affected the historical value of the area. As time passed, state regulation and urban planning

joined forces to control socio-economic practices that troubled the making of the City of

Patrimony. The City Plan of 1965 was a milestone of that process.

A Turning Point: The City Plan of 1965

Law 163 of 1959 introduced the notion of historical urban sites, creating a legal

framework to distinguish areas of historical value from the modern city. The Council of National

Monuments’ intervention to prevent the construction of a new Public Market in La Matuna

exemplifies how the law came into practice to regulate the use of urban spaces that once were

solely determined by the principles of real estate profitability and modern development. 192 The

City Plan of 1965 went along with that philosophy. The Section of Urbanism of the Instituto

Geográfico Agustin Codazzi designed it as part of a series of town planning projects for

intermediate cities across the country, including Ibagué, Pereira, Valledupar, Pasto, and Cúcuta.

The Plan for Cartagena was the first one. Its main objective was to guide Cartagena’s urban

expansion for the next fifteen years, according to the expected demographic growth, and to

organize a local office of planning. It also intended to set the stage for tourism development. The

City Plan stated that “the industry of tourism has good perspectives at the national and

190
“Unión de Pequeños Comerciantes informa,” Diario de La Costa, September 8, 1962, 3.
191
“La polémica latente,” Diario de La Costa, October 11, 1962, 8.
192
Salazar, “Los programas de conservación,” 21.

86
international level. The physical attractions (sea, beaches, and swamps), sports activities,

colonial constructions, and the social and cultural characteristics of the population prove

Cartagena is a top-rank tourist city.”193 In order to accomplish its purposes, the Plan created

legally binding zoning regulations to determine the use of land and buildings. In doing so, it

divided the city into seven areas: areas of total or partial clearance (shantytowns), areas of

rehabilitation (lower-class neighborhoods), areas of transformation (neighborhoods where uses

and density were meant to change), areas of conservation (mostly upper and middle-class

neighborhoods meant to be preserved as they were), vacant areas (underdeveloped areas near the

downtown), areas without development (for future expansion, and located on the periphery), and

historical areas (the colonial walled city and fortresses).194

The historical area covered the walled city, fortresses in the bay and the mainland, and

the convent on top of Popa Hill, but excluded neo-classical buildings in the city’s downtown,

Manga, and Pie de la Popa. In the mid-1960s, the notion of patrimony in Colombia only defined

colonial architecture as having historical value.195 Plans for the walled city’s revival even

recommended demolishing neo-classical structures that marred the colonial landscape, like the

Monument to the Flag and several houses attached to the wall at the beginning of the century.

The City Plan of 1965 defined historical areas as those “with special characteristics, holders of

the historical and cultural patrimony of the city. These areas show a progressive decay, and ruin

in some cases, due to the passage of time; given their peculiar nature and undeniable value, they

need a special cure.”196 Accordingly, the Plan proposed the creation of the Executive Office of

193
Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, Plan Piloto de Desarrollo Urbano de La Ciudad de Cartagena (1965),
(Bogotá: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, 1965), 9.
194
Ibid, 42-44.
195
Stephanie Sarmiento Rojas, Santa Bárbara, el barrio que no soportó las tempestades. Recuperación de una
historia disidente en el proceso de construcción del relato histórico de Bogotá entre 1980 y 1983. (Bogotá: Editorial
Universidad del Rosario, 2017)
196
Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, Plan Piloto, 42-44.

87
Restoration and Conservation to lead the patrimonialization of the walled city, along with the

Board of Conservation of Historical Monuments, composed of members from the Academia de

Historia, the Board of Municipal Planning, the Executive Office's chief architect, and a

representative of the city’s architects. They would establish a set of rules to determine the proper

use of the area and monitor the constructions and restorations accordingly. The City Plan added a

Code of Urbanism to regulate works on the houses’ facades, patios, kitchens, beams, ceilings,

and roof-tops. Any intervention on colonial structures had to receive the approval of the Board of

Conservation of Historical Monuments.197

Unlike previous projects, the City Plan of 1965 stressed the need to move the Public

Market out of the walled city. “The current location of the market,” the Plan said, “is

inappropriate because it is in Getsemaní (Historical area), leading to the neighborhood’s decay;

being close to the commercial and administrative core of the city [la Matuna], it causes a lot of

traffic; it does not have proper facilities to function there, and it is no longer close to residential

areas."198 The Plan recommended building five new markets across the city, but none in the

walled city. However, it proposed the creation of a tourist and commercial area in the colonial

quarter with souvenir shops, bars, restaurants, and hotels “in restored colonial structures, taking

advantage of buildings, squares, and walls.”199 In the meanwhile, it gave orders to “eliminate the

mediocre bars located in the walls next to the Clock Tower, which cause its deterioration and

harm its aesthetic value.”200

When it came to determine what kind of commerce would endure in the downtown, the

Plan proved openly biased. While it denounced the presence of popular commerce, embodied by

197
Ibid, 156.
198
Ibid, 57.
199
Ibid, 66.
200
Ibid, 67.

88
street vendors and the Public Market, it endorsed the construction of tourist-oriented commercial

hubs deep in the walled city. This indicates that authorities and planners did not perceive

commerce itself as a threat to the making of the City of Patrimony. On the contrary, they

believed the massive human traffic, the deterioration of nearby colonial structures or the

presence of low-class bars and restaurants was the actual disruption of the colonial landscape.

The idea undergirding the Plan was to create a boundary between the spheres of labor and

leisure, so tourists could enjoy themselves without being exposed to the everyday dynamics of

city life, including traffic, crime, or street vending. Such separation was instrumental to recreate

the colonial landscape.

To be sure, as noted before, the presence of Public Market made tourists felt they were

observing another face of Cartagena opposed to the quiet atmosphere of the rest of the walled

city. “Outside the gate,” a reporter for The Washington Post said in 1972, “the city is a happy

bedlam. Fishing boats that sail with the early tide are tied up at the docks […] Inside the gate the

remnants of the colonial world still survive.”201 The process of patrimonialization beginning in

the 1960s tried to bridge the gap between these two universes that inhabited the walled city.

After then, uses, activities, and constructions were made contingent upon approval of public and

private organizations, such as the Council of National Monuments or the Academia de Historia,

which had to determine whether they troubled the aesthetics of colonial architecture or not.

Patrimonialization worked to turn the walled city into an object of cultural consumption. To do

so, it had to accomplish two goals first: to reestablish the “legibility” of urban space,202 which

meant to unify the aesthetics and architecture between Getsemaní and the rest of the walled city,

Horace Sutton, “Bringing In the ‘Gold,’” The Washington Post, February 27, 1972, H5.
201
202
Mark Overmyer-Velázquez, Visiones de la ciudad esmeralda: modernidad, tradición y formación de la Oaxaca
porfiriana (Oaxaca: Universidad Autónoma Benito Juárez de Oaxaca - Congreso del Estado de Oaxaca, 2010) 79-
133.

89
and to create a boundary between spaces devoted to labor and leisure. The Public Market and the

economic and social activities that emerged in the surroundings troubled these aims. So did the

houses, some of them of neo-classical style, that were at the foot of some fortresses. The City

Plan proposed to remove them in order to make these colonial structures fully visible.203

In terms of removing human settlements for the sake of preserving patrimony, the City

Plan went further. As noted before, the Plan divided the city into seven areas, including one of

partial and total eradication that comprised several shantytowns deprived of proper housing,

municipal services, or decent facilities such as San Francisco, Chambacú, Barrio Chino, la

Esperanza, Ceballos, Boston, or Tesca. In these cases, the Plan stated that “the only possible

treatment is to raze them to the ground in order to prepare the site for a new development, where

the former use [residential] may be preserved or not.”204 While all shantytowns shared similar

characteristics, the Plan only proposed to relocate three of them: Ceballos, Chambacú, and Barrio

Chino. The plan targeted them due to their role in the process of patrimonialization. In the case

of Ceballos, the Plan suggested removal to build a planned train station, which never came into

being. The slum survived to the present. However, the Plan sealed the fate of Chambacú and

Barrio Chino, as it considered the clearance of Chambacú necessary to make the city a tourist

destination. The Barrio Chino just happened to be in the site where the Plan proposed to build the

new Public Market.

The City Plan suggested increasing the density of the area that surrounded the walled city

in order to facilitate public transportation and the provision of municipal services, besides

preventing land devaluation. Thus, it proposed building hotels and multi-family housing for the

upper and middle classes in all the surrounding neighborhoods: Bocagrande, Manga, Marbella,

203
Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, Plan Piloto, 67,
204
Ibid, 42.

90
and Pie de la Popa. Chambacú was to become the site for high-rises that integrated offices,

commerce, and housing. This would be the extension of the modern development of La

Matuna.205 It also proposed to clean up the nearby bodies of water “in order to improve the land

conditions and maximize the aesthetic and tourist potential of the area.”206

In the case of the Barrio Chino, clearance was necessary to relocate the Public Market,

which the City Plan had agreed to move outside the walled city for the sake of the historical

patrimony. What these cases reveal is the biased approach of the City Plan, and future efforts of

urban planning, toward popular neighborhoods. As I will show in the fifth chapter, informal

settlements were largely tolerated as a safety valve for the increasing housing deficit. But

informal settlements that blocked the advance of the City of Patrimony were targeted for

elimination. That was the case of Chambacú and Barrio Chino.

The Clearance of Chambacú and Barrio Chino

In the 1930s, long before Cartagena’s local politicians and entrepreneurs dreamed of

transforming the city into an international tourist destination, homeless families from the city’s

lower-class neighborhoods and nearby towns settled in the island of Chambacú. Only a lagoon

and the colonial walls separated it from the city center. Little by little, squatters filled in the

lagoon with anything they had at hand, either trash, debris, or rice husk. On top, they built their

houses, mostly shacks of wood, zinc, and cardboard, or single-story concrete homes at best. The

neighborhood turned into a slum, particularly, when the City bought the island and allowed

squatters to freely occupy the area, without providing further means for the residents to build

their houses.207 By the 1950s, the neighborhood still lacked running water and sewers, paved

205
Ibid, 31, 41-42.
206
Ibid, 32.
207
Nancy Guerrero and Freda Hawkins, “Estudio socio-económico sobre la Isla de Chambacú,” (Bachelor thesis,
Universidad de Cartagena, 1965), 7.

91
roads, well-equipped schools, or health centers. However, it was appealing for low-income

families, including rural migrants, as it offered affordable rental housing near the city center.

When Vilma Sará Figueroa moved to Cartagena along with her parents in 1955, she went to live

in Chambacú: “It was a very humble neighborhood, like Cartagena’s black sheep. But it was all

that my dad could afford.” They lived for a year in a small sub-divided house that they shared

with the homeowner’s family before moving to Getsemaní.208

In 1954, the Institute of Crédito Territorial (ICT), the national housing agency, produced

the first plan to clear Chambacú. Unlike future efforts, the latter was not driven by tourism

development but was part of a Rojas Pinilla’s nationwide plan of slum clearance and public

health for port cities, including Barranquilla209 and Buenaventura. The projects sought to provide

affordable and decent housing to low-income families. They claimed to be moved by the purpose

of forging citizenship and the sense of national belonging among marginal segments of society.

In the case of Chambacú, the ICT planned to relocate the neighbors to pre-fabricated housing

units in a project north of the city center.210 Thus in 1955, the city of Cartagena and the ICT

signed a contract. The ICT committed to build 1300 pre-fabricated units partially funded by the

city and the tenants. Once Chambacú was cleared, the ICT would buy the island and build along

with the city a new working-class neighborhood. For the next five years, the city would transfer

5 percent of its budget to cover the costs of the relocation.211 The city mayor celebrated the

project and claimed it matched Rojas Pinilla’s ideals of social justice.212

208
Vilma Sará Marrugo (retired teacher) in discussion with the author, April 4, 2019.
209
See Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Zona Negra: rehabilitación de un sector urbano (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito
Territorial, 1955)
210
See Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Chambacú: regeneración de una zona de tugurio (Bogotá: Instituto de
Crédito Territorial, 1955).
211
City Council Act N° 35, 12 September 1955, Alcaldía fond, Archivo Histórico de Cartagena, Cartagena, 2-4.
212
Hernando Cervantes Zamora, "Mensaje de año nuevo," Anales del Municipio 3, January 25, 1955, 1.

92
 Figure 2.2: Chambacú (circa 1968). Fototeca Histórica de Cartagena.

When a coalition of Liberals and Conservatives forced Rojas Pinilla to resign in 1957, the

clearance project faded. On top of that, the city’s authorities no longer felt the terms of the

contract were reasonable. The mayor and the Council claimed it was unfair to force the city to

transfer 5% of its budget to the ICT, besides having to cover the housing projects’ construction.

A commission of the City Council also argued that was inconvenient to sell the island to the

housing agency. They believed the city should be free to sell it to a third party if they made a

better offer.213 The disagreement turned into a legal battle between the city and the ICT that

lasted for several years. In the meanwhile, some began thinking about alternative solutions for

Chambacú. In 1959, the director of the Diario de la Costa proposed to offer legal ownership to

the neighbors. By doing so, they could feel more compelled to improve their houses without fear

213
“El Concejo Municipal informa a la ciudadanía sobre el problema de Chambacú,” Diario de la Costa, September
22, 1959, 7.

93
of losing everything with eviction.214 Some politicians and community leaders proved

sympathetic to the proposal.215 One leaders claimed the proposal brought “a great satisfaction to

most of the neighbors,” since it was reasonable and respected the “rights of those that inhabit the

island.”216

The proposal sparked a debate that revealed how some already viewed Chambacú as an

obstacle for tourism, a scar on the landscape and aesthetic of the so-called Colombian capital of

tourism. Eduardo Lemaitre, by then a Conservative city councilman, accused the promoters of

that initiative of trying to “block the future of the city as an international tourist destination,

which will be severely affected if Chambacú is allowed to stay where it is, because no one could

expect that North Americans will travel from their homeland to here just to witness the show that

the streets of Chambacú currently offer.”217 Along the same lines, an editorial from El Figaro

wondered days later: "Would it be possible for anyone to prove that the permanence of

Chambacú –where it is and how it is– will be more convenient than the removal of the slum and

the construction of a grandiose middle-class neighborhood in the cleared area?"218 To be sure,

the Diario de la Costa and El Figaro were associated with opposite factions within the

Conservative Party and accused each other of trying to take advantage of the Chambacú problem

for electoral purposes.

In any case, the problem of Chambacú was far from over. Even after the city and the ICT

reached another partial agreement in 1960,219 there was very little local authorities could do to

214
Rafael Escallón Villa, “Legalicemos los títulos de los actuales ocupantes de Chambacú y otros sectores,” Diario
de la Costa, October 6, 1959, 1.
215
Carlos Peláez, “Estoy de acuerdo con la necesidad de buscar una solución legal y social,” Diario de la Costa,
October 16, 1959, 1.
216
José J. Miranda, “La voz de Chambacú,” Diario de la Costa, October 16, 1959, 8.
217
Eduardo Lemaitre, “El problema de Chambacú. Demagogos tratan de perpetuar infrahumano de los moradores de
la Isla,” El Figaro, January 14, 1960, 6.
218
“Chambacú y la demagogia,” El Figaro, February 1-7, 1960, 2.
219
Vicente Martínez Martelo, “Mensaje del alcalde,” Anales del Municipio 179, November 7, 1960, 2.

94
carry out removal. According to the new terms, the city would retain full ownership of the island

after the removal, while the ICT would not be obliged to build the new housing project unless the

city offered the funding up front. In order to cover the amount needed to carry out the clearance,

the city took out a loan from the Banco de la República.220 While granted, it was invested in

another housing project two years later.221 Since the city had no funding to cover the costs of

building a housing development from scratch, the ICT suggested the city to consider the

alternative of a self-help program through which neighbors would build their own houses on

their own lots with the assistance of the agency.222 In 1963, Mayor Antonio Lequerica refused to

accept this formula fearing that “giving to each dispossessed family a lot with the basic elements

of a housing project would lead to the creation of another zona negra.”223 For the next six years,

very little was done to solve the problem of Chambacú, other than selective removals to clear

some space for the construction of Pedro de Heredia Avenue.224 Chambacú continued to make

tourism promoters uneasy. One of Avenue’s developers proposed to build walls on each side of

the road so the tourists could not witness the slum’s misery. He compared the task with

“sweeping the reception room and placing the trash under the carpet […] That is at least a

practical alternative to free the city from that embarrassment,” he added.225

The final boost for the clearance of Chambacú came in 1969 when the national

government headed by Carlos Lleras Restrepo promised to fund the removal of the slum and the

construction of new housing projects for residents.226 As noted in the first chapter, Lleras

Restrepo committed to foster tourism in the Caribbean region as part of the national plan of

220
Vicente Martínez Martelo, “Mensaje del alcalde,” Anales del Municipio 187, March 7, 1961, 3.
221
“Estancado el plan de Chambacú,” Diario de la Costa, April 6, 1962, 1.
222
“Acuerdo 11 de 1963,” Anales del Municipio 240, April 16, 1963, 18-20.
223
Antonio Lequerica, “Mensaje del alcalde,” Anales del Municipio 242, May 16, 1963, 9.
224
“Juicio de expropiación de 18 casas en Chambacú,” Diario de la Costa, June 8, 1968, 11.
225
Un urbanizador, “Cartas al director,” Diario de la Costa, July 19, 1967, 9.
226
“58 millones a remodelación,” Diario de la Costa, November 21, 1969, 3.

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development. His Urban Renewal Plan called for the clearance of Chambacú, the restoration of

the walled city, and the completion of Santander Avenue connecting the airport with the city

center, and Bocagrande. While the plan initially purported to be a comprehensive project of

rehabilitation and clearance of slums in the northern part of the city, where a substantial share of

informal settlements was located, it only carried out specific actions for Chambacú.227 The

Ministry of Public Works, the National Corporation of Tourism (CNT), and the ICT co-funded

the plan.228

By 1969, Chambacú's neighbors were still reluctant to move unless the city and the ICT

considered more reasonable terms. During a meeting in the City Council, Damaso Prada, the

president of the Council of Community Action, said: "The residents of Chambacú do not oppose

to the government's project in this sector, as long as they receive a treatment fit for human

beings." Prada complained about being harassed by Eduardo Bechara, the director of the Office

of Slums, who “has outraged the neighbors of Chambacú, as if they do not deserve respect and

care by the society, and attention from the authorities, just because they are poor.”229 As a

response to the potential threat of removal, the Council of Community Action told the neighbors

to demand legal ownership of their houses, so they could request a fair compensation in case

they were evicted. The Council said: "Everybody must refrain from selling without having

property titles before. Having that, we could sell, but let’s negotiate the land collectively. To sell

individually may result in being cheated with a ridiculous amount of money, which means, that

anyone who does that may end up living in another slum.”230 Neighbors might have been aware

227
Roberto Gamboa, “La remodelación en marcha. Chambacú a un paso del cambio social,” El Universal, April 7,
1971, 1, 4, 9.
228
“Este año arranca la remodelación. Anuncia Gómez Otálora,” El Universal, June 15, 1969, 1, 11, “Sobre
remodelación de la zona norte,” El Universal, October 11, 1969, 1, 11.
229
City Council Act no. 13, 17 January 1969, Alcaldía fond, Archivo Histórico de Cartagena, Cartagena, 12.
230
Junta de Acción Comunal de Chambacú, “Un llamado a los vecinos de Chambacú de la Junta,” El Universal,
May 14, 1969, 10.

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of the fate of those evicted earlier to build Pedro de Heredia Avenue.231 They received a

monetary compensation, but less than half what they requested, and were not provided with any

other housing to move into. Instead, they went to lots near the Swamp of the Virgin, and soon,

that area too turned into a shantytown.232

For the next two years, neighbors bargained with authorities to reach a beneficial

agreement. While they were promised relocation to new ICT housing projects, as planned at first,

they demanded compensation for their old houses in order to lower to cost of the new ones. They

negotiated the house appraisals directly with the national office of the ICT when they failed to

reach an agreement with the local one.233 Finally, the relocation began in 1971, by which time

very few opposed it. Beginning that August, the families of Chambacú moved to five different

projects built in the south of the city.234

While the families of Chambacú moved and then resumed their lives in the new projects,

those of the Barrio Chino were still fighting to cope with the effects of their eviction. Their

ordeal began in 1966, when the City Council followed the 1965 Plan and ruled that the new

market would be built where their neighborhood was currently located.235 In April 1967, the city

declared the Barrio Chino subject to eminent domain, which created the legal basis for the

municipal government to expropriate the lots needed for the Market.236 In contrast with

Chambacú, many of the residents of Barrio Chino had property titles.237 However, city officials

231
“Listos 3 millones para erradicar los tugurios,” Diario de la Costa, February 9, 1966, 1, 3.
232
Letter from former residents of Chambacú to President Misael Pastrana Borrero, 7 January 1972, Box 47, Folder
3, Ministerio de Gobierno fond, Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá.
233
Del Rio, Arnulfo, Osorio, Omaira and Palma, Luz, “Cambios operados de un grupo de familias erradicadas de
Chambacú y relocalizadas en el barrio Nuestra Señora de Chiquiquirá,” (Bachelor tesis, Universidad de Cartagena,
1976), 33.
234
“El éxodo de Chambacú. Me voy feliz, aunque extrañaré este lugar,” El Universal, August 17, 1971, 1, 12.
235
Ignacio Amador de la Peña, “Tribuna Pública,” El Universal, June 28, 1969, 2, 12.
236
“Declaradas de utilidad pública zona del antiguo FF y del Barrio Chino,” Diario de la Costa, April 4, 1967, 5.
237
Primitivo Carrillo M, “Tribuna Pública,” El Universal, June 10, 1969, 2.

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labeled the neighborhood as a shantytown and questioned its legal status. When asked whether

the Barrio Chino was indeed an informal settlement, an engineer working on the preliminary

studies for the new market: "There are no doubts about it, because most of the neighborhoods in

Cartagena are slums. They have emerged from classic squatting, or people have bought from

persons who lack property titles."238 While the city decided to build the market in Bazurto, next

to the Barrio Chino, which meant it only would expropriate 32 of the 300 hundred houses, some

authorities still considered clearing the neighborhood entirely, to replace it with a barrio for

visitors and traders “with electricity, running water, sidewalks, schools, theater, parking lots, and

essential services.”239 Authorities believed that the presence of slums would cause

inconveniences for the Market, including robberies, smuggling, and rioting. Finally, the City

decided to expropriate only the 32 houses to avoid a financial burden.240

Unlike in the case of Chambacú, residents of Barrio Chino were not offered new houses

in exchange for the old ones. Instead, the City offered a monetary compensation based on

appraisals made by the Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi. In May 1969, the neighbors

submitted a memorial to the City Council complaining about the appraisals and compensations,

which they considered arbitrary and insufficient.241 By June of that year, only half of the

residents had accepted the offer.242 A month later, the City threatened to enforce the

expropriation regardless of the neighbors’ opposition.243 Neighbors accused the secretary of the

Company of Municipal Services of threatening the residents of Barrio Chino with a gun if they

refused to accept the compensation.244 By 1971, the situation had changed very little. Many

238
“En zona de 10 hectáreas será construido mercado de abastos de la ciudad,” Diario de la Costa, April 5, 1967, 3.
239
“Plan Piloto para el barrio Chino estudia Oficina de Tugurios,” Diario de la Costa, April 22, 1967, 1.
240
Augusto Tono Martínez, “Mercado en la isla de Bazurto,” Diario de la Costa, April 30, 1967, 8.
241
City Council Act no 21, 13 May 1969, Alcaldía fond, Archivo Histórico de Cartagena, Cartagena, 3.
242
“Expropian 15 casas en el Barrio Chino,” El Universal, June 7, 1969, 1.
243
“Juicio de expropiación de 14 casas en barrio Chino la próxima semana,” El Universal, July 9, 1969, 1.
244
City Council Act no. 27, 12 August 1969, Alcaldía fond, Archivo Histórico de Cartagena, Cartagena, 3.

98
residents still believed the offer too little. They claimed it did not even cover a fifth of the actual

value of their properties.245 The president of the local Council of Community Action said: “We

are willing to defend our rights before the Company of Municipal Services, and the problem of

our property appraisals.”246

These claims reveal what was at stake in this conflict: the making of the City of

Patrimony against the property rights of residents. In the case of Chambacú, neighbors alleged

they were at least the legitimate owners of the houses they had built on the seized land. City

officials usually claimed these neighborhoods were shantytowns as a means of justifying their

clearance or disputing the legality of residents’ demands.247 City Councilman Carmona Torres,

for example, argued that the Company of Municipal Services labeled Barrio Chino as a

shantytown, even dismissing the value and qualities of some properties, to justify the unlawful

removal. Yet, regardless of the legal status of the neighborhood, the language of rights was

critical for the inhabitants fighting for the defense of their communities. The neighbors of Barrio

Chino fought for years to protect their properties and secure a more appropriate compensation. In

1972, after reaching an agreement with the Company of Municipal Services, the remaining

families moved out of Barrio Chino, leaving the space free for the completion of the new Public

Market.

Planning the Colonial Landscape

As demonstrated in the first chapter, between 1965 and the early 1970s, several studies,

plans, and projects evaluated and developed the city’s prospects as a tourist destination. Others

addressed the more specific task of guiding the walled city’s process of patrimonialization. They

245
“Denuncian injusticias con terrenos del Barrio Chino,” Diario de la Costa, August 22, 1971, 3.
246
“Habitantes del Barrio Chino se oponen a avalúos de EPM,” Diario de la Costa, September 8, 1971, 11.
247
City Council Act no. 31, 1 September 1971, Alcaldía fond, Archivo Histórico de Cartagena, Cartagena, 2.

99
all shared the common purpose of turning the city center into a historic district for the sake of

heritage tourism. This means they sought to transform the area into an object of cultural

consumption. This transformation entailed actions beyond restoring colonial architecture or

cleaning up streets and squares. These works proposed to transform the use of urban space,

discouraging some practices and boosting others. In doing so, they set the stage for Cartagena to

be declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1984. At first, the sole purpose was to boost the

city’s tourist appeal. While the Stanton Robbins plan already envisioned doing so, the plans,

studies, and projects after the mid-1960s proposed a more aggressive plan to purge the historical

center of practices at odds with the colonial aesthetics that authorities and entrepreneurs sought

to recreate.

As I will show in the fourth chapter, the colonial landscape was indeed part of the city’s

appeal. Travel literature usually referred to Cartagena as a Spanish colonial city frozen in time.

The slow pace of the old town, the solid fortresses, and even the shady and ruinous buildings

captured the tourists' attention. An article from the Washington Post said in 1968: "Down in

narrow, high-walled streets it is as though you had not only moved to another continent but had

also gone back to a former century. The quietness belongs to a time different from our own.

Passageways lead beyond the thick walls into cool green patios.”248 A 1969 article from The

Hartford Courant revealed how some felt transported back in time as they walked through the

narrow streets of Cartagena: "There are other mementoes of the Spanish Colonial days including

balconied and patioed mansions of long-dead Spanish grandees and vari-colored adobe dwellings

of more humble citizens, stately churches with religious treasures and the imposing Palace of the

H.P. Koenig, “Cartagena: Gateway to the Emerald Coast,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, December 29,
248

1968, G11.

100
Inquisition.”249 Similarly, another The Washington Post article in 1972 stated: “Inside the gate

the remnants of the colonial world still survive. There is the quiet palm-shaded square where one

can sit on a stone bench and wait to hear the tolling of a bell.”250 Patrimonialization became

critical to preserve and heighten the appeal of the old city’s colonial landscape.

The revival of the walled city became crucial to plans for tourism development after

1965. A representative example is the 1968 report on regional tourism by Juan de

Arespacochaga. While his report centers on the tourist potential of the northern area and the

Tierrabomba island, he wrote some lines about the importance of the old city. For him, the

colonial architecture was the city’s third greatest appeal, after the year-round tropical weather

and the extensive coastline. Arespacochaga said about Cartagena: “its potential appeal draws

from the historical treasure embodied by its architectural monuments and old urban buildings.

Cartagena was once one of the most important cities and strongholds in the New World. Today,

the relative preservation of all its buildings, especially bastions and old castles, make the city

unmatched by any other in the continent.”251 Arespacochaga made a list of colonial buildings

according to the conditions of the structure. He did not make further recommendations to restore

those that were not in good shape. Yet, Arespacochaga proposed promoting the city abroad

through films that recreated key historical events that took place in Cartagena during the colonial

era.252

Architect Alejandro Ciardelli’s 1968 proposal for tourism development made further

recommendations to recreate a colonial landscape in the walled city.253 Ciardelli proposed

249
“Conquistadors, Pirates Come Alive in Cartagena,” The Hartford Courant, October 5, 1969, 7F.
250
Horace Sutton, “Bringing In the ‘Gold,’” The Washington Post, February 27, 1972, H5.
251
Juan de Arespacochaga, “Desarrollo Turístico Regional de Cartagena,” (Paris: UNESCO, May 1968) 5.
252
Ibid, 12
253
Alejandro Ciardelli, “Posibilidades Turísticas de Cartagena,” 19 November 1968, Box 100, Folder 3, Departamento
de Planeación Nacional fond, Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá, 13-18.

101
transforming the entire downtown area into a heritage tourism center. To do so, he recommended

eliminating automobile traffic in the colonial streets altogether, just allowing tiny cars to

transport merchandise, and convoys to tour visitors. As others proposed before and after,

Ciardelli suggested using colonial building for tourist purposes. For example, recommended

restoring “old buildings to establish there luxury hotels, clubs, etc., preserving the colonial style

in the environments and facades.” Similarly, he proposed using the Bovedas as shops for

handicrafts and souvenirs from several regions of the country. To recreate the colonial landscape,

Ciardelli also proposed to dress up guardsmen with colonial outfits. 254

While the National Plan of Tourism Development of 1972 centered on planning

developments in Barú, it also gave some instructions about how to improve the historical

character of the walled city in order to boost heritage tourism. The plan said in that regard,

“[Cartagena’s] historical and cultural attributes make it one of the most interesting cities in the

Western hemisphere, and a first-class attraction for international tourism.”255 The plan's

intervention in the patrimonialization process was primarily based on previous plans of tourism

development, like those of Ciardelli and Arespacochaga, and on studies about the restoration of

the walled city, which I will address later. Unlike previous plans, this one included specific

instructions about costs and tax exemptions to appeal to investors. The plan considered several

measures to enhance the tourist use of the walled city, including the restoration of monuments

and unique buildings, the burial of electrical and telephone lines, pedestrianization of some

streets, and restoration of facades and private. The plan expected that restored colonial houses

might become affordable hotels for young adults or tourists with cultural interests. All in all, the

254
Ibid, 15.
255
Arthur D. Little Inc, Habitar Ltda., Obregón and Valenzuela Ltda., and Integral., Plan de Acción para el Proyecto
de Desarrollo Turístico de la Costa Atlántica y San Andrés. Volumen I. (Bogotá: Corporación Nacional de Turismo,
1972), II-5.

102
plan believed that “the walled city, once restored and preserved, has many chances to become a

historical and cultural center, with specialized shops, first-class restaurants, and art galleries.” 256

To do so demanded cooperation by state organizations which may have to fully fund the

restoration of key colonial buildings and monuments, and the burial of municipal services’

networks. The state was expected to offer loans and tax exemptions to private investors and

property owners who planned to restore colonial houses.257

These plans of tourism development reveal the relevance that heritage tourism gained

after the mid-1960s. While they all considered the restoration of the walled city as a collateral

development, aside from the development of tourist centers in Barú, Tierrabomba, and the area

of La Boquilla, they certainly believed that the recovery of the colonial landscape was critical to

furthering the appeal of the city. Two studies carried out between 1967 and 1968 worked

specifically on that task: the study Cartagena, Zona Histórica by a group of scholars from the

Universidad de los Andes,258 led by architect Germán Téllez, and the study of Juan Manuel

Zapatero (1967). The city government requested and funded both.259 Zapatero’s only dealt with

the restoration of fortresses. Téllez’s instead considered the walled city altogether.

The study that German Téllez led, on behalf of the Universidad de los Andes, was

expected to guide the making of policies and regulations for the walled city, attending to the

Venice Charter. After a close in-site evaluation in 1967, the group of experts became critical of

the concentration of socio-economic activities:

the accumulation of uses in the historic zone creates an inconvenient and

disadvantageous situation. Official institutions, schools, universities, public and

256
Ibid, II-12.
257
Ibid, 12.
258
German Téllez, Ernesto Moure, Raimundo Angulo, and Antonio Salazar, Cartagena, Zona Histórica, (Bogotá:
Corporación Nacional de Turismo – Universidad de los Andes, 1979)
259
“Firmado el contrato de estudios de restauración. Se inician los de la zona franca,” Diario de la Costa, February
11, 1967, 1, 12ª, Juan Manuel Zapatero. Las Fortificaciones de Cartagena de Indias. Estudio Asesor para su
Restauración. (Madrid: Banco Cafetero de Colombia, 1969)

103
 private offices, a considerable share of the city's commerce, etc., concentrate in a
small corner, where the traditional urban net cannot withstand anymore the
intensive use caused by these institutions. The current tendency to decentralize
and alleviate this congestion, exemplified by the relocation of the Public Market
in another zone of the city, as well as the relocation of the Navy and Central
Hospital and the creation of offices in Bocagrande are beneficial to the historical
zone.260

Thus, the study proposed to decentralize the city by regulating the uses of urban space,

banning some activities that took place in the historic district, while encouraging tourist uses. For

example, the study recommended forbidding wholesale trade, warehouses larger than 200 square

meters, and medium-size industries, such as printing houses, laboratories, or soda factories.

Likewise, it proposed relocating schools and universities out of the area, to prevent massive

concentration of users. The study recommended removing immediately public institutions and

facilities that occupied colonial buildings, such as police headquarters, the prison, and the

Universidad de Cartagena. Instead, they proposed using these places for tourist purposes,

“including small and medium-sized hotels, shops, restaurants, cafes, and exposition halls.”261 In

order to reduce the impact of automobile traffic, the plan recommended turning streets into

pedestrian corridors. Finally, they insisted that whatever the results of the urban renewal process

might be, this should not increase the population density. "An extreme densification," they said,

"as a result of embracing inflammatory notions of the provision of low-cost housing, dismissing

its impacts on the environment, is truly inconvenient for the historical zone. Furthermore, the

expected result is the blighting of the urban area and its physical and environmental decay…”262

The Universidad de los Andes study indeed sought a radical transformation of zoning

regulation aimed at decentralizing the city and reducing the concentration of socio-economic

260
Téllez, Moure, Angulo, Salazar, Cartagena, Zona Histórica, 12.
261
Ibid, 32.
262
Ibid, 33.

104
activities in the walled city. It intended to turn the urban core into a site of heritage tourism. Like

previous plans or studies, it opposed any activity that compromised the making of the City of

Patrimony or disrupted the colonial landscape. In this case, the study criticized the use of

colonial buildings for institutional purposes, due to the damaging consequences they allegedly

had on the structures, and because of the concentration of people and automobile traffic they

caused. These studies found the pervasive presence of locals in the walled city as troublesome. In

short, they troubled the slow pace of the colonial landscape that tourists found so appealing.

Crowds made visitors feel that different layers from a different reality inhabited the old city. A

reporter from the Chicago Tribune said in 1970: “There are layers and layers of different

atmospheres: there is a teeming downtown with armies of uniformed school children competing

with fruit and oyster vendors for sidewalk space.”263 The making of the City of Patrimony

depended largely on keeping locals –and their economic and social practices- away from tourist

areas.264

Juan Manuel Zapatero’s 1967-9 study focused only on the restoration of fortresses.

Zapatero was a Spanish expert in military history and worked extensively on colonial fortresses

in the Americas. Before arriving in Cartagena in 1967, he had worked on the restoration of

fortresses in Puerto Rico, Florida, and Lima. Zapatero was hired at first by the city government

as the advisor for the restoration of historical monuments.265 Over the following years, Zapatero

personally assisted key restorations and led the whole patrimonialization process through the

early 1970s. For him, the ultimate goal of his work was to “give back to this beautiful city, the

263
"Cartagena Grows Young," Chicago Tribune, March 22, 1970, H17.
264
Ironically, a year before, German Téllez, while in a conference at the Palace of Inquisition, argued it was
necessary to restore the walled city, without turning the whole area into a "tourist attraction." For him, it was critical
to maintain extensive economic uses other than those related to tourism. “Cartagena debe cuidar su patrimonio
histórico, dice el arquitecto German Téllez,” Diario de la Costa, April 2, 1966, 1,5.
265
“En cuatro etapas hace el Dr. Zapatero estudios de los fuertes de Cartagena,” Diario de la Costa, February 10,
1967, 5, “Juan Manuel Zapatero habla de historia y restauración,” El Universal, October 15, 1969, 1.

105
Historical Capital of the Caribbean, its splendid importance, and make it a first-rank tourist

destination.”266 To do so, Zapatero planned the restoration of the fortresses in the bay and

mainland, and their conversion into tourist attractions. Zapatero proposed to recreate the colonial

landscape by using light and sound systems, dressing up the service staff, and decorating bars

and restaurants with eighteenth-century representative items. More importantly, Zapatero

provided specific instructions to restore the original appearance of the. To do so, Zapatero

considered it necessary to suppress modern elements that disrupted the colonial aesthetics. He

listed every bastion and fortress that needed intervention and noted which elements may have to

be removed. For example, Zapatero recommended removing all the houses below the San Lucas

bastion and next to the breakwater of Las Tenazas, to improve the visibility of the area, and to

further its tourist appeal.267 On the other hand, Zapatero advised strengthening the economic use

of the fortresses, placing restaurants and bars on top of them, as long as they did not trouble the

original aesthetics of the structure. Residential areas rarely could escape removal. These were

examples of the several low-scale clearances that took place in these years as the city put in

practice the recommendations made by these studies and plans. Houses, along with facilities and

institutions, were targeted for removal to consolidate the City of Patrimony.

The Revival of the Walled City

In September 1966, José Ruiz Morales, Spain ambassador to Colombia, received a phone

call from President Lleras Restrepo. Lleras asked him to join him on a trip to Cartagena: "They

want to restore it, and I want to walk with you, at night, the old streets of the walled city. I have

seen what you did in Spain with your castles. With respect, good taste, modernity, and efficiency

266
Zapatero, Las fortificaciones, 39.
267
Ibid, 139.

106
you have adapted them to the needs of our times.” While passing by the breakwater of Las

Tenazas, Lleras wondered whether he knew anyone capable of advising the restoration of the

walled city. Without hesitation, Ambassador Ruiz Morales recommended Juan Manuel

Zapatero.268 A few months later, Zapatero arrived at Cartagena to conduct fieldwork.269. The

financial aid provided by President Lleras through regulations and different state institutions

proved critical to the success of the process. During his term, the process of patrimonialization

received unprecedented support that set the ground for the transformation that the city underwent

in the 1970s.

The restoration of historical patrimony was key to Lleras’ efforts to boost tourism. Law

60 of 1968, which defined the functions of the newborn National Corporation of Tourism, stated

that the institution would take care of the restoration and preservation of historical monuments,

and their expropriation when necessary.270 According to decree 2700 of 1968, the manager of the

National Corporation of Tourism (CNT) would be part of the National Council of Monuments

along with the Ministry of Public Works, the presidents of the Colombian Academia de Historia

and the Colombian Society of Architects, and the Ministry of Education.271 The Council’s budget

came from the state institutions that made it up. In 1969, the CNT contributed 64% of the

Council’s annual budget.272

The changed composition of the National Council of Monuments revealed a new

approach to historical patrimony as an object of cultural consumption. Formerly, the Council was

made up of directors of museums, science academies, and institutes, while headed by the

268
José Miguel Ruiz Morales, “Para atraer el turismo a Colombia, a restaurar las fortificaciones,” Diario de La
Costa, October 8, 1967, 8.
269
“Por técnico español será estudiada restauración de Monumentos Españoles,” Diario de La Costa, January 25,
1967, 1, 5.
270
“Law 60 of 1968,” Diario Oficial, 150, no. 32681 (December 1968) 2.
271
“Decree 2700 of 1968,” Diario Oficial, 100, no. 32646 (November 1968) 4.
272
“13 millones de pesos destinan para conservar los monumentos,” El Universal, March 4, 1969, 3.

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Ministry of Education or the President.273 The restoration and conversation of monuments were

only for educational or cultural purposes, with no consideration of economic interests.274 But

Cartagena leaders were important in shifting the state’s approach to historical patrimony. In

February 1967, Antonio Álvarez Restrepo, the Minister of Development, meet with members of

Congress and delegates for the Department of Bolívar to discuss a bill to promote tourism.

Álvarez expressed President Lleras’ support: “We have no money, and it is necessary to increase

tourism as a source of foreign currency. The President and I committed ourselves while walking

in the streets of Cartagena late at night to increase tourism." The delegates from Cartagena

stressed the importance of historical patrimony for this. Congressman Rafael Obregón pleaded

for essential measures to prevent “the destruction of the colonial wealth of Cartagena for the sake

of the so-called progress.” He also pointed to specific actions such as banning automobile traffic

in the walled city and recommended prohibiting “the construction of modern buildings in the

area of the old city, and making sure that those built in the perimeter were adapted to an

architectural style that matched the colonial past.” Architect Germán Téllez, who was a delegate

of Cartagena, stated that current legislation proved useless to prevent the destruction of historical

patrimony. Minister Álvarez Restrepo claimed that the bill had a section regarding that specific

matter.275

The meeting proved fruitful when Law 60 of 1968 defined monuments, historical

buildings, and squares as “national tourist resources,” thus making the national government

responsible for their restoration and conservation. The law allocated an annual budget of 100

273
“Decree 264 of 1963,” Diario Oficial, 99, no. 31025 (March 1963) 5.
274
“Law 163 of 1959,” Diario Oficial, 96, no. 30139 (January 23, 1960) 4.
275
“Se trata en Bogotá sobre defensa de Cartagena y desarrollo de turismo,” Diario de La Costa, February 22, 1967,
5

108
million pesos to the CNT.276 Those resources largely funded the patrimonialization of the walled

city in Cartagena.

In December 1966, two months before the meeting with Minister Álvarez Restrepo,

architects Germán Téllez and Victor Contreras offered an overview of their plan for restoring the

walled city during an interview. Téllez and Contreras aimed to give the historical district an

economic function so it might become

not into a burden on the city and community’s budget, but a source of income
that justifies the investments on its restoration and conservation. For that reason,
it is important to note that nowadays it is not possible to restore just for the sake
of aesthetics, but to the extent that [restoration] is useful and profitable for the
community. A city, or a sector, that is economically useless but visually pleasant
has always been a contradiction […] We will try, first of all, to establish
priorities and regulations that may provide space for hotels, restaurants, meeting
places, tourist shops in the historic zone. After that, we will determine which
individual buildings of lesser interest, while part of the urban complex, are
eligible for administrative and economic incentives to facilitate their restoration
and conservation.277

Téllez and Contreras’ statement reveals the economic rationale behind Cartagena’s

model of patrimonialization: state investments to yield a for-profit adventure. Accordingly, the

director of the Office of City Planning, Carlos Ignacio Corrales, described the public agenda for

restoration in 1967:

The historic district of Cartagena may be remodeled taking into account the
usefulness of the increase in domestic and international tourism […] The
beautiful colonial houses in the downtown will be turned into hotels, tourist
attractions, to include bowling, tennis courts etc. Undoubtedly, many tourists
may prefer to stay in well-cared for colonial houses, rather than in conventional
hotels like those of Bocagrande, fairly common everywhere around the world.
On the other hand, the restoration of colonial houses will bring life to nearby
beaches, such as Santo Domingo and La Merced.278

276
“Law 60 of 1968, Diario Oficial 150, no. 32681 (December 1968), 2.
277
German Téllez and Victor Contreras, “El futuro del turismo internacional en Cartagena,” Diario de La Costa
(Promociones), December 17, 1966, 1.
278
Pedro Portela, “A casas coloniales del centro se dará función turística,” Diario de La Costa, July 4, 1967, 3.

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 Over the next years, the national government, and to a lesser extent the city, funded

patrimonialization through the CNT, the Ministry of Development, and the Ministry of Public

Works. Other state institutions bought and restored colonial houses to use them as local offices.

They publicly declared they were doing this for the renewal of the walled city. Private actors

rarely participated in these endeavors. When they did, they were usually aided by state

institutions. That was the case of Society of Public Improvements, which led the restoration of

the San José Bocachica fortress in 1969 with funding from the Ministry of Public Works.279

Even before new legislation guaranteed national resources for patrimonialization in

Cartagena, the central government provided some initial funding. In March 1967, President

Lleras allocate 350,000 pesos to expropriate and remove several houses that surrounded the San

Felipe fortress and the breakwater of Las Tenazas,280 following the recommendations of Juan

Manuel Zapatero’s report a month before. A year later, the City ordered the expropriation of 21

houses located at the foot of the San Felipe fortress. 281 Since the 1930s, the Society of Public

Improvement had carried out poorly-funded works to restore this fortress. These interventions,

led by a self-taught architect, were mostly aesthetic and barely addressed structural failures. 282

The substantial aid of the national government took this further. In 1969, the Ministry of Public

Works granted 700,000 pesos to restore the San Felipe fortress, the city walls, and other

fortresses in the bay. The Society of Public Improvements lead the works under the guidance of

279
“San José de Bocachica,” El Universal, February 13, 1969, 2, “Destinarán 250 mil pesos para San José de
Bocachica,” El Universal, March 1, 1969, 1, 12.
280
“El Fuerte de San Felipe y sectores de Santa Catalina y Tenaza serán despejados,” Diario de la Costa, May 23,
1967, 1.
281
“Se ordena expropiación de casas que circundan el cerro de San Felipe,” Diario de la Costa, May 22, 1968, 1, 6,
“Expropiarán casas en San Felipe, pronto,” Diario de la Costa, June 6, 1968, 3.
282
Carlos Crismatt, interview by Natalia Tous Dominguez, Entrevista a Carlos Dionisio Crismatt Araújo sobre su
padre Carlos Modesto Crismatt Esquivia, July 2002.

110
Juan Manuel Zapatero.283 In 1971, the Ministry invested 900,000 pesos to complete the

restoration of the fortress’ gallery and to build a retaining wall to prevent the collapse of an

artillery battery on the south side of the structure. In the following year, it was expected to

resume to clearance of few remaining houses located at the bottom.284

The Ministry of Public Works also funded the restoration of the San Fernando fortress

and the city’s walls, particularly the section between the Clock Tower and the Bastion of San

Ignacio, the former entryway to the colonial city. 285 The Ministry's role in patrimonialization

was part of the national government's commitment to tourism, as reflected in the 1968 creation

of a Section of Monuments to assist in restoring colonial buildings. But this work was also the

result of the efforts of José Vicente Mogollón, the local entrepreneur who represented the

society that designed the first tourism development project for La Boquilla, and who now served

as General Secretary of the Ministry during Lleras Restrepo’s term. While serving, Conservative

politician Martin Alonso Pinzón said, Mogollón “put all his efforts in the works of restoration of

our historical and architectural values of the colonial era,” besides helping to propel other works

related to tourism development, such as Santander Avenue and the defense of beaches.286 As

noted in the previous chapter, he also worked as representative of the Corporación para el

Desarrollo Turístico de Cartagena, before joining the Ministry. Mogollón himself believed the

recovery of the colonial landscape was critical for the city’s future:

the fortresses of Cartagena are unique in the world, and along with the viceroyal
architecture, have the greatest appeal for international tourism […] If the

283
“Continuará restauración de castillos,” El Universal, July 2, 1969, 1, “No demolerán la Torre del Reloj,” El
Universal, August 15, 1969, 1, 12.
284
“La restauraciones, paso importante dado en 1971,” El Universal, December 27, 1971, 1, 11.
285
“Continuará restauración de castillos,” El Universal, July2, 1969, 1. The works on the walls focused on removing
undergrowth off the structure, the reconstruction of the floor, and the construction of “tendales” mirroring those of
the colonial era. In the Bastion of Santo Domingo, it was built a “garita” (Spanish for sentry) demolished during a
nineteenth-century civil war. “La restauraciones, paso importante dado en 1971,” El Universal, December 27, 1971,
1, 11.
286
Martin Alonso Pinzón, “Discurso en homenaje a Mogollón Vélez,” El Universal, March 22, 1969, 10.

111
 destruction of houses and convents in the downtown and Getsemaní is allowed,
we may lose the most important architectural treasure of Colombia, and perhaps
of Latin America. We have the enormous responsibility of ensuring that the
organisms in charge of their care and restoration fully meet their duties.287

The CNT significantly contributed to the patrimonialization of Cartagena as well. In 1969,

the agency invested over a million pesos to conduct several works in the city, including the

restoration of Las Bovedas,288 minor improvements in the colonial convents of San Francisco,

San Pedro, La Popa, and San Juan de Dios. It also bought the Marquéz de Valdehoyos’ house, a

large seventeenth-century colonial building, which had been awaiting restoration since law 163

of 1959 made the national government responsible of its care.289 The CNT first bought the house

to host a museum of colonial history but ended up using it as its local headquarters. For

Hernando Gómez Otalora, the Minister of Economic Development these specific works of

patrimonialization were critical to turn Cartagena into “a top ranking tourist attraction in the

national sphere […] these upcoming works are not only of local and regional but of national

interest.”290 In August 1969, President Lleras appointed Nicolás del Castillo Mathieu, a

Cartagena-born businessman and historian as manager of the CNT.291 During his term, the

Corporation was closely involved in the recovery of the colonial landscape. 292

The CNT also helped the city’s independent projects of patrimonialization. In 1969, the

city restored a nation-owned large building next to the Clock Tower that had served as the

287
José Vicente Mogollón Vélez, “Cartagena si puede salir adelante si trabajamos unidos: Mogollón Vélez,”
El Universal, March 22, 1969, 11.
288
Ibid, 1, 11.
289
“Law 163 of 1959,” Diario Oficial, 96, no. 30139 (January 1960) 4.
290
“Importantes obras para fomentar el turismo anuncia el gobierno,” El Universal, April 18, 1969, 12.
291
“Nicolás del Castillo nombrado Gerente de la Corturismo ayer,” El Universal, August 9, 1969, 1.
292
For a detailed description about the works funded by the CNT between 1969 and 1970, see: Victor Pérez Reyes,
“Informe de proyectos de fomento turístico en la ‘Costa Atlántica’,” 1 September 1969, Box 100, Folder 2,
Departamento de Planeación Nacional fond, Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá, 79-88, “Inversiones turísticas en
la Costa Atlántica y estudios para el desarrollo turístico de la Región,” 23 January 1970,Box 100, Folder 2,
Departamento de Planeación Nacional fond, Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá, 163-173.

112
customs house during the colonial era. The “Palacio de la Aduana” later became City Hall. The

agency added a million of pesos to the city's budget and lent it 990,000 pesos more.293 The

restoration works, which lasted for over two years, were made in keeping with German Téllez

and the Universidad de los Andes’s study. 294

The “Plaza de la Aduana,” the square in front of the new City Hall, was a key node in the

geography of the historic district. While the square was used as a parking lot, the city hoped to

restore the surrounding buildings to improve the area’s aesthetics. In 1970, the SENA, the

National Vocational Training Agency, proposed to buy a colonial house across from the Hall

and for a school of tourism and hospitality. In doing so, the SENA planned to train the local

labor force for tourism while advancing the restoration of the colonial landscape. The institution

wanted to make a “contribution to meet one of the needs Cartagena had regarding its tourism

development. It assumed that creating a pilot school could also make a work of architectural

restoration. That was the origin, the motivation, and inspiration for acquiring an old house that

currently is in the worst condition of abandonment.” 295In 1970, the City expropriated the house,

and after a long dispute with the property owners, a price was set, and the SENA bought the

house in 1971. The restoration cost 5.000,000 pesos.296 However, renters refused to leave the

house, especially a modest restaurant-owner who occupied the first floor and several families

who lived in a tenement on the second floor. For almost a year, the City negotiated with the

occupants, while SENA threatened to drop the offer. In February 1972, the Municipal Civil

Court ordered the immediate evacuation of tenants. Following the mayor’s orders, the Police

293
“Palacio Municipal será inaugurado el sábado,” El Universal, December 8, 1971, 1, 9.
294
“Abrirán licitación para nuevo palacio municipal,” El Universal, March 1, 1969, 1.
295
“Azaroso caso judicial,” El Universal, April 17, 1971, 2.
296
“El SENA restaurará casa de la Plaza de la Aduana,” El Universal, December 19, 1971, 1.

113
evicted them, and placed their belongings in the street.297 This case is representative of the

spatial politics of tourism development. Tourism-oriented institutions and facilities drove out the

former uses of urban space in the historic district, including affordable housing. This kind of

low-scale displacement repeated over the next years progressively transformed the social make-

up and the everyday life of the downtown area.

Figure 2.3: “Plaza de la Aduana” (1972). Fototeca Histórica de Cartagena.

Other uses were also discouraged as patrimonialization took over the downtown. In

October 1972, the Ministry of Justice bought the “Cuartel del Fijo,” an eighteenth-century large

building that housed a public school, and placed there the State Court of Justice. The national

government offered 7.000,000 pesos to restore the building, due to the lobbying of Conservative

congressmen Joaquín Franco Burgos and Raimundo Emiliani Román.298 The school moved to

the periphery of the city. As the time passed, the “layers and layers of different atmospheres,”

297
“Lanzados inquilinos de la casa expropiada en Plaza de la Aduana,” El Universal, February 26, 1972, 1, 7.
298
“Las dependencias judiciales estarían en un solo edificio,” El Universal, October 26, 1972, 1, 12, “Siete millones
apropiados para Palacio de Justicia,” El Universal, December 6, 1972, 1

114
that a reporter for the Chicago Tribune described in 1970, “with armies of uniformed school

children competing with fruit and oyster vendors for sidewalk space,” became less common.299

Several schools and multiple municipal facilities left downtown over the next years.

After Lleras Restrepo’s presidential term, the national government’s support for

patrimonialization flagged and the city’s leadership struggled to continue the process. While

private and public institutions offered some relief after 1971, fewer resources flowed. In July

1972, the Society of Public Improvements sent a desperate letter to President Pastrana Borrero

asking for financial support to resume the restoriation of San Felipe fortress. “The inexorable

passage of time,” the director of the Society commented, “embodies a serious threat to the

integrity of our colonial patrimony, a threat that demands the investment of extraordinary

resources that my entity lacks.”300 Still in 1973, Mayor Juan Arango Álvarez, was demanding

proper support from the Ministry of Public Works to prevent the collapse of the fortress.301 After

a long but useless exchange of letters, the Mayor sent a strong message to the Minister saying:

“It would not be disrespectful to remind you the great responsibility before strangers and us that

you will have if this monument falls to the ground…”302 Two weeks later, the Minister promised

to send 200,000 pesos to fund the works, an amount that local leaders considered “laughable.”

Authorities estimated that the entire operation would cost several million pesos.303 After further

negotiations, the Ministry of Public Works authorized a more substantial budget in March

1974.304

299
"Cartagena Grows Young," Chicago Tribune, March 22, 1970, H17.
300
Letter from Humberto Rodríguez Puente to President Misael Pastrana Borrero, 25 July 1972, Box 47, Folder 3,
Ministerio de Gobierno-Despacho del Ministro fond, Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá, 208.
301
“S.O.S. para San Felipe,” El Universal, March 1, 1973, 2.
302
“Se inicia proceso para restaurar el Fuerte de San Felipe de Barajas,” El Universal, May 10, 1973, 1.
303
“Salvar el Castillo de San Felipe costará varios millones de pesos,” El Universal, May 10, 1973, 8.
304
“Para el Fuerte de San Felipe. Dos millones y medio autorizó Minobras,” El Universal, March 29, 1974, 1, 7.

115
 Despite the new circumstances, the spirit of patrimonialization had set in motion new

ways of managing urban space that proved fruitful to prevent the further deterioration of the

colonial landscape. Few examples reveal how zoning regulations, for instance, came into

practice. As noted before, after the clearance of Chambacú in 1971, plans were made to build a

large building complex to host a hotel, theaters, and offices there. A year later, the ICT had

second thoughts. In 1972, they hired Narciso Gross, a Cuban landscape architect, to elaborate a

plan for tourist development in the area. He considered that the original project would “destroy

the “Cartagena colonial” […] Many attacks have been made on the historical patrimony and the

natural landscape, and Chambacú might become the greatest of these crimes.”305 Gross proposed

instead to create a natural park in the north side facing the downtown and build the tourist

complex behind. In 1976, the ICT decided to reserve half of the area for a park, specifically the

space between the walled city and the San Felipe fortress, in order to preserve the visibility of

the latter.306 In 1974, the Society of Public Improvements blocked the construction of a long-

distance bus station near the San Felipe fortress. In a letter sent to the Ministry of Public Works

and the National Council of Monuments, the director of the Society claimed that the

construction was “an attack to the visibility and image of the castle which is the greatest

monument of America.”307 In 1972, the National Institute of Transportation, heeding a CNT

request, restricted the automobile traffic in key areas of the historic district. When asking to

carry out that measure, the local CNT director said: “This office is interested in easing the

orientation and comfort of the tourists as they walk down our streets, especially those where the

history has left its marks. According to the desire of many of them, we request that you study the

305
Roberto Gamboa, “Chambacú sería una gran zona verde,” El Universal, November 16, 1972, 12.
306
“50 por ciento de Chambacú se destinará a zona de recreo,” El Universal, January 23, 1976, 10.
307
“Dice la Sociedad de Mejoras Públicas. Inconveniente el sitio para central de transportes,” El Universal,
September 1, 1974, 1.

116
traffic in the walled city, suggesting which streets may be closed to automobiles, particularly

those eminently traditional…”308 The new measure came with further restrictions to vendors. As

the last chapter will show, street vending was persecuted and severely restricted during the

1970s as the city prepared to become a World Heritage Site.

Conclusion

According to Nestor García Canclini, the making of cultural patrimony went through

four stages defined by the actors responsible and their larger purposes: first, substantialist and

traditionalist, in which the aristocracy used the patrimony to evoke a glorious past; second,

conservationist and monumentalist, as the state recovered patrimony to forge a symbol of

national unity according to a given political project; third, mercantilist, as private actors

recovered patrimony for the sake of profit, usually in the form of heritage tourism; and fourth,

the participative paradigm, the most recent form, in which everyday people, residents, and

home-owners actively take part in endeavors to guarantee that patrimony would meet their needs

and expectations as citizens.309 Cartagena's model of patrimonialization complicates García

Canclini's analysis and shows the nuances of the process. Since the mid-1960s, the local and

national governments funded the revival of the walled city in order to transform the historic

district of Cartagena into an object of cultural and touristic consumption. Profit interests guided

these endeavors all along. More specifically, the state believed the recovery of the colonial

landscape was a pivotal investment in a greater developmentalist effort to turn tourism into a

source of foreign currency. The local elites certainly envisioned the making of patrimony as a

308
“Restringen tráfico automotor en el Centro amurallado,” El Universal, November 21, 1972, 11.
309
Nestor García Canclini, “Los usos sociales del patrimonio cultural,” in Patrimonio etnológico: nuevas
perspectivas de estudio, edited by Encarnación Aguilar Criado (Granada: Junta de Andalucía, Instituto Andaluz del
Patrimonio Histórico, 1999), 23-26.

117
way to reconnect with the Spanish “motherland,” but only the resources allocated by state

institutions seeking to forge tourism development made patrimonialization possible. Over the

1970s, private actors would get involved more actively, buying properties in the walled city and

investing in their restoration, usually taking advantage of the aid and tax exemptions offered by

the local government. The state paved the way by carrying out patrimonialization endeavors

beginning in the mid-1960.

Patrimonialization led to dramatic changes in the social geography of Cartagena that

went far beyond the downtown. The removal of Chambacú might have been the largest slum

clearance ever made in the city. Nonetheless, low-scale displacements also widened the gap

between popular classes and tourist areas. The prohibition of certain socio-economic practices

and uses of the space and the relocation of public facilities outside the historical district

strengthened this pattern of segregation. The ultimate goal of these endeavors was to suppress

anything that could disturb the colonial landscape, even if this implied compromising citizens'

rights. Neighbors from Chambacú and Barrio Chino struggled over several years to guarantee

their rights as residents and property owners would not be affected by the remaking of the city.

These scenarios exemplify the clash between the making of the City of Patrimony and the City

of Rights and the progressive transformation of the downtown into a segregated space.

The remaking of Cartagena as a tourist destination sparked several debates in the city.

Despite the critical support of the national government, and the committed efforts of the local

one, there was litte consensus about the process, and some became critical of its implications.

The next two chapters analyze how the intersection between class and race informed these

debates. Some intellectuals, politicians, journalists and everyday people saw tourist development

as widening the gap, not only between poor and rich, but also between blacks and whites. The

118
widespread assumptions that divided Cartagena spatially into areas understood to be black or

white, though not marked off by the law, led some to believe that the city was becoming racially

segregated.

119