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Vsatngaltz

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abdoudi2008
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Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management Tel: + 27 + 11 + 717-3904

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg Fax: + 27 + 11 + 717-3910

P O Box 601, Wits, 2050 e-mail: [email protected]

VSAT Case Studies


(Nigeria, Algeria and Tanzania)

Research Report prepared by


Steve Esselaar, Aki Stavrou and Jennifer o’Riordan
on behalf of the LINK Centre
for the IDRC, CATIA and GVF

Date: 12 March 2004

Enquiries to:
Alison Gillwald
[email protected]
Executive Summary
This report covers three country case studies on the status of VSAT commissioned by
the IDRC through the GVF as part of CATIA component 1a on low cost satellite
access in Africa. The country case studies were conducted in Nigeria, Algeria and
Tanzania. The report analyses VSAT from two angles: firstly, from a policy and
regulatory perspective and secondly, from an economic and usage perspective. In the
first instance, the report finds that Algeria, Nigeria and Tanzania are on different
points of the ICT development curve. The significant explanatory factor for the
various levels of development are the different levels of sophistication of the policy
and regulatory bodies of each country.

Nigeria has seen dramatic growth in the levels of investment in the ICT sector since
2001, coinciding with the liberalisation and deregulation of the sector. Algeria is
undergoing a dramatic sector restructuring project following a previously absent
policy and regulatory framework. The success of this path is limited by the lack of
skills in the regulator. Tanzania rivals Nigeria in its move towards liberalisation and
deregulation. However, Tanzania’s commitment to unfettered competition along with
the regulators perception of its function as a revenue generator for the national
treasury, have limited local investment and consequently the development of the
sector.

There is no doubt that VSAT has a substantial role to play within each country.
However, its development is hindered by the lack of knowledge in key areas. Broadly,
the recommendations arising from the surveys conducted for each of the country case
studies to improve the profile of VSAT can be summarised as:
• Nigeria – the dissemination of VSAT technical literature and the marketing of
Ku band VSAT as a viable alternative to C band (particularly from a cost
perspective)
• Algeria – technical (issues around installing a local hub), economic
(monitoring costs of bandwidth) and regulatory (case studies of other countries
that have followed the liberalisation path) support
• Tanzania – entering into dialogue with government and the regulator with the
aim of developing the local ICT sector rather than solely representing
international satellite interests

In the second instance, the report finds a diversity of opinions amongst primary users
in different countries but greater consistency amongst consumers. In Nigeria,
commercial users consider the NCC to have undergone a transformation from a
bureaucratic and inefficient organisation to one run along business lines. The
challenge in Nigeria is not a regulatory one (though with a moratorium on new VSAT
licences it could become one) but the lack of technical skills, particularly the belief
that Ku band suffers tremendously from rain attenuation.
In Algeria, users are concerned about the regulators vacillation around the issue of
licensing VSAT and see the attempt to impose a satellite sky tax as indicative of the
lack of understanding of the industry. Clumsiness on the part of the regulator is
creating an inward looking industry (witness the move towards games on the LAN by
cybercafé consumers rather than the use of cybercafes to access the World Wide
Web.).

In Tanzania, users are demanding the active involvement of government in the sector,
arguing that the lack of regulation has negatively impacted on the industry. The large
number of players ensures a highly competitive environment but one where few
parties are prepared to risk increased investment because of the perception that there
will be low returns. Consequently, Tanzania lags behind other countries in terms of
local Internet exchanges or in local VSAT hubs.

The survey paints a picture of the average African cybercafé consumer and his or her
demands and expectations. The environmental differences described above are
reflected in the cybercafé usage patterns. The frequency of usage is highest in Lagos
and consumers are demanding more bandwidth intensive applications. In Algeria, the
uncertain environment has created a tendency amongst consumers to turn to
applications that do not use bandwidth, such as games. The stagnating market in
Tanzania is reflected in the high percentage of consumers that report the same
cybercafé usage patterns over the last six months.

Finally, one effect of the stagnating market in Tanzania has been the effort to find
alternative markets. The partnership between a public data operator and a local ISP to
provide rural connectivity is one that merits further research in other locations. It
indicates that a sustainable model for connectivity is possible.

3
Table of Contents:

1. Part One: Introduction........................................................................................6


1.1. Objective of study ......................................................................................6
1.2. Research methodology...............................................................................6
2. Part Two: Nigeria...............................................................................................8
2.1. Nigerian ICT Policy...................................................................................8
2.2. Regulatory Framework - Nigeria ...............................................................8
2.3. Licence Fees.............................................................................................10
2.4. Current situation – Nigeria.......................................................................10
2.4.1. Licences ...............................................................................................10
2.4.2. The role of the Nigerian Communications Commission .....................10
2.4.3. Distinction between C and Ku bands................................................... 11
2.4.4. Alternatives to VSAT...........................................................................12
2.4.5. Uses of VSAT ......................................................................................12
2.4.6. Technical expertise...............................................................................13
2.5. Recommendations - Nigeria ....................................................................13
3. Part Three: Algeria...........................................................................................15
3.1. Algerian ICT Policy.................................................................................15
3.2. Regulatory Framework – Algeria ............................................................15
3.3. Current situation – Algeria.......................................................................16
3.3.1. Licences ...............................................................................................16
3.3.2. Licence Fees: .......................................................................................18
3.3.3. Universal Service Obligations: ............................................................19
3.3.4. Voice over Internet Protocol: ...............................................................19
3.3.5. Distinction between C and Ku bands:..................................................19
3.4. Recommendations - Algeria ....................................................................19
4. Part Four: Tanzania ..........................................................................................21
4.1. Tanzanian ICT policy...............................................................................21
4.2. Regulatory Framework - Tanzania...........................................................22
4.2.1. Licences: ..............................................................................................23
4.3. Current situation - Tanzania.....................................................................24
4.3.1. Levels of investment ............................................................................25
4.3.2. Availability, quality and standards of service ......................................25
4.3.3. Cost of services ....................................................................................25
4.3.4. Efficiency of production and distribution of services..........................26
4.4. Recommendations - Tanzania ..................................................................27
5. Part Five: Cybercafe Surveys...........................................................................28
5.1. Introduction..............................................................................................28
5.2. Demographic Specifics of Cyber Consumers ..........................................28
5.3. Communications and Computation Patterns............................................30
5.4. Cybercafé Usage ......................................................................................31

4
5.5. VSAT........................................................................................................35
6. Part Six: Conclusion ........................................................................................37
7. Appendix 1. Interview Schedule - Nigeria ......................................................39
8. Appendix 2. Interview Schedule - Algeria ......................................................40
9. Appendix 3. Interview Schedule - Tanzania ....................................................42
10. Appendix 4. References ...............................................................................44

5
1. Part One: Introduction

Over the last few years there has been increasing research on the digital divide. The
digital divide refers to the discrepancy between access to communication
infrastructure and services in Developed Countries (DC’s) and Least Developed
Countries (LDC’s) - the international digital divide - as well as the discrepancy within
countries, between those with access to Information, Communication Technology’s
(ICT)’s and those without - the domestic digital divide1. There are fears amongst the
international development community, and marginalised countries themselves, that
the ICT gap between DC’s and LDC’s will continue to grow. Over the last few years
there has been a concerted effort internationally to exploit the digital opportunities
that provided low cost, rapidly deployable technologies to reduce these digital
divides. Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) is such a technology. The
characteristics that determine this potential include:
• its distance independence makes it suited towards locations that are not easily
accessible for more traditional forms of connectivity such as fixed line
technologies
• installation is relatively inexpensive and rapid
• maintenance costs are low and the technical expertise needed to maintain
equipment is relatively low
• allowing for the use of applications, such as Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP), that can reduce the cost of service to low-income people.

1.1. Objective of study

The overall objective of the research is to determine the existing licensing and
regulatory framework for VSAT and, further, how VSAT is being used in a country
specific context. Specifically, this study looks at the use of VSAT in three countries,
namely Nigeria, Algeria and Tanzania.

1.2. Research methodology

The primary purpose of the research was to establish the status of VSAT usage in each
of the three countries. The methods used included desktop research to obtain
background information on the socio-economic and regulatory situation in the three
countries followed by data collection and finally quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Interviews to survey the views of different interests and gather further data on usage
patterns were also conducted.

For the purposes of the research a distinction was made between users and consumers.
Users were defined as commercial companies making use of VSAT in some way.
Consumers were defined as the end user and, for the purposes of this research, were
the limited to cybercafés.

1
Spanning the Digital Divide. www.bridges.org. Retrieved on 1st November 2003.

6
The quantitative analysis conducted involved enumerators covering a total of fourteen
cybercafés in Nigeria and twelve cybercafés each in Algeria and Tanzania. A total of
418 questionnaires were completed in Lagos and 350 in Algiers. In Tanzania, 297
questionnaires were conducted in Dar es Salaam and a further 196 in the rural town of
Mtwara.

The qualitative analysis involved a series of interviews with industry experts, ISP’s,
industry stakeholders (such as telecom companies); appropriate regulatory bodies and
Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (SMME’s). Select interviews were conducted
with the owners/managers of cybercafés to get a more qualitative understanding of
consumer trends. In addition, a further set of two focus groups were conducted
amongst a wide range of consumers in Nigeria.

7
2. Part Two: Nigeria

2.1. Nigerian ICT Policy

The National Policy on Telecommunications was published in 1998. The Policy is


clearly aimed at achieving the expansion of telecommunication networks and
integrating the country into the global telecommunication network. To achieve this
aim, the policy document outlines institutional roles and responsibilities and enables
the formation of a transparent and accountable regulatory framework2.

The overall goals of the telecommunications sector, as laid out by the Nigerian
government’s Vision 2010 Committee, are:
• to increase teledensity from 1 telephone per 200 people to 1 telephone per 50
people;
• increase landlines to 4 million and mobile lines to 3 million;
• to attain global universal coverage, global connectivity via a communications
network that is part of the information superhighway;
• institutional reform of the telecommunications sector and removal of existing
monopolies in order to improve efficiency and quality and to make services
more readily available;
• development and enhancement of domestic capacity in telecommunications
technology and services provision; and
• streamlining of processes and procedures so as to attract foreign and domestic
investors3

2.2. Regulatory Framework - Nigeria

The Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) was created by Decree 75 of 1992


as a response to the lack of development of the Nigerian telecommunications sector.
Since incorporation, in 1985, of the incumbent telecom operator (NITEL), Nigeria
had lagged behind other developing countries in terms of connected lines. The
purpose of the NCC was to:
• create a regulatory environment to facilitate the supply of telecommunications
services and facilities;
• facilitate the entry of private entrepreneurs into the telecommunications
market; and
• promote fair competition and efficient market conduct among all players in the
industry

In this regard, the NCC issued licences in the following areas:


• Installation and operation of public switched telephony
• Installation of terminal or other equipment

2
Africa ICT Policy Processes (unpublished) compiled by bridges.org and Miller, Esselaar and
Associates. October 2003.
3
BMI-Techknowledge Communication Technologies Handbook, 2002.

8
• Provision and operation of public payphones
• Provision and operation of private network links employing cable, radio
communications, or satellite within Nigeria
• Provision and operation of public mobile communications
• Provision and operation of telephones
• Provision and operation of value-added network services
• Repair and maintenance of telecommunications facilities
• Cabling4

Analysts have seen the issue of the GSM licences in February 2001 as indicative of
the NCC’s ability to create an accountable and transparent regulatory process. The
bidding process and the award of the GSM licences was seen as competitive and fair.

Since his appointment in 2000 as CEO, Engineer Ernest Ndukwe has stated that he
sees three technologies available to bridge the digital divide within Nigeria:

“My view is that three major technologies hold the key to solving the
challenge of accelerating digital access to most Africans within the shortest
possible time: Mobile Communications, VSAT and Internet”5.

To create an enabling environment, the NCC embarked upon a process of market


liberalisation and privatisation of state assets. In the past, the VSAT operator obtained
an Operator Licence from the NCC, then had to obtain a Frequency Licence from the
Ministry of Communications and finally, spectrum or bandwidth from the incumbent
fixed line operator, NITEL6. To obtain a VSAT licence, the operator had to go through
three agencies. This was time consuming and expensive.

In 2000, certain sectors of the market where deregulated. One of these was the
provision of domestic VSAT services. Other markets that were deregulated include:
• sales and installation of terminal equipment;
• Internet services, and
• tele-centres/cybercafés.
The number of regulatory bodies that a potential licencee had to go through has been
cut down to only one – the NCC. Licences have been consolidated into three major
types:
• permits,
• basic licences, and
• major licences.
Permits are valid for a period of 12 months and cost considerably less than basic
licences. All the cybercafés interviewed held permits. Basic licences are held for a
period of five years and include both a licence fee as well as a percentage of annual
net turnover (2.5%).

4
National Telecommunications Policy www.ncc.gov.ng/telecommunications_policy.htm. Retrieved on
the 2nd of November 2003.
5
Keynote address by Ernest Nkukwe “Contributions of Government to the Development of
Information and Communications Technology in Nigeria. June 2003.
6
Speech by Engineer Johnson. http://www.ncc.gov.ng/Speech%20by%20Engr.%20J.%20Asinugo.htm

9
2.3. Licence Fees

There are primarily two categories of licence: permits and basic licences. Services
such as cybercafés require a permit which costs 5,000 Naira in rural areas and 25,000
Naira in urban areas. These permits are valid for twelve months.

Basic licences incorporate ISP’s, Satellite Network Services (VSAT) and the sales of
satellite terminal equipment. An ISP licence costs 500,000 Naira, is valid for 5 years
and has an annual operating fee of 2.5% of net turnover. A Satellite Network Services
Licence is valid for 10 years, costs 8.45 million Naira and also has an annual
operating fee of 2.5% of net turnover.

2.4. Current situation – Nigeria

2.4.1. Licences

Since early 2003 no VSAT licences have been issued. When the GSM and Second
Network Operator licences were issued, they included international VSAT licences.
Since the winners of these licences (MTN, Econet Wireless and Globalcom
respectively) paid such a premium for their licences, it seems that the NCC wished to
increase the value of the licences by preventing open competition in VSAT service
provision. In addition, many of the VSAT licences originally awarded are not
operational. Of the 88 VSAT licences that were issued, it is estimated that about 80%
are not operational.

The process of applying for VSAT licences, while time-consuming, is a transparent


process. Part of the licence requirement was how the operator intended to source the
funds and all successful licence holders reported that there were no hidden costs. It is
possible that the reason for such a large number of licence holders not implementing
VSAT services has more to do with business inexperience than the licensing process.
The cost of hardware in particular is decreasing, potentially allowing more licence
holders into the market. However, since no new VSAT licences are being issued, this
has artificially pushed up the price of VSAT licences as operators bid for the limited
number of licences or compete to form partnerships with existing licence holders.

2.4.2. The role of the Nigerian Communications Commission

Ernest Ndukwe, the chairperson of the NCC, is perceived, amongst the larger
telecoms companies, to have transformed the NCC from an inefficient bureaucracy to
a governmental organisation run with private sector efficiencies. From their point of
view, the NCC is transparent and participative. Large telecom companies are asked to
contribute to policy-making and inputs are acknowledged and often implemented.

“He has brought dynamism and initiative to the NCC”7.

7
Mr Christopher Ajayi. 21st Century Technologies. Interview.

10
Companies now believe that they have “government support” in doing business and
believe that the telecommunications industry is a successful example of how to
deregulate an industry. All of the larger telecom companies interviewed believed that
the NCC’s credibility was enhanced through the GSM licencing process.

The dominant view is that the policy makers must further deregulate the industry.
Specifically, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) needs to be unleashed. Once VoIP is
deregulated, point-to-point voice traffic will become more widespread. VoIP was seen
as an application that could reduce the cost of calls, both locally and internationally.
Call charges (mobile and fixed line) were seen as exorbitant and that there is strong
demand for a service that can reduce these prices. While the NCC was generally
applauded for its role in reducing governmental bureaucracy, government was still
seen as not responsive enough to the rapidly evolving technology needs of the
Nigerian telecommunications environment. As one interviewee put it:

“Any government who comes in the way of change can’t survive”.

Amongst SMME’s, the perception of the NCC is more mixed: Licence and permit
fees are perceived to be overpriced. SMME’s have difficulty getting access to
licences for several reasons:
• high levels of bureaucracy. (For example, it is advantageous to have a lawyer
to act as a third party to ensure that all forms are correctly filled in).
• getting a licence is a time consuming process. (Even though the licence forms
are available online one still has to go to the NCC offices in Abuja to have
them processed).

Amongst SMME’s, unlike the larger operators, the NCC is seen as uncommunicative.
The accusation is that it does not understand SMME’s needs and is only interested in
high licence and permit fees.
“We are trying to make the Internet accessible, but the NCC is interfering in
the channels by which the medium is growing”.
The clear implication amongst SMME’s is that NCC interference means that there is
less chance for growth for small companies.

2.4.3. Distinction between C and Ku bands

The introduction of Ku band for cybercafés, ISP’s, SMME’s and corporates is


perceived as a relatively new phenomena. Around 90% of all interviewees stated that
there is a negative attitude towards Ku Band because of the perception that it is
unreliable and effected by the weather. Estimates of the downtime that users of Ku
band experienced ranged from 1 hour per day to 60 days per year.

With the exception of large telecom and VSAT operators (such as IPDirect and Direct
on PC), cybercafés and ISP’s reported no links to industry specific literature on VSAT
networks. Thus the incorrect impression that Ku band is unreliable persists. One of
the responses to customer reservations about using Ku band was to point out the price
discrepancy between C band and Ku band. However, this is not a consistent response
since some companies provide very little distinction, in terms of price, between Ku

11
band and C band to customers. Only with the advent of mass roll-out of Ku band by
companies such as Direct on PC and IP Direct is the lack of price discrepancy being
addressed.

A common theme amongst interviewees was that a greater awareness of VSAT


needed to be introduced into the Nigerian market. This was substantiated by the cyber
café user survey, which indicated that nearly all respondents understand that VSAT is
a satellite technology. However, there is little understanding of the different types of
VSAT networks and the advantages and disadvantages of Ku vs. C band.

2.4.4. Alternatives to VSAT

Lagos is the world’s third most densely populated city and it is estimated that 60% of
national telecom revenue is generated within Lagos and surrounds, despite poorly
developed infrastructure. With strong economic growth expected in Lagos and an
increasing desire for connectivity amongst the population, investment in fibre optic
cable is becoming a serious alternative. Of the large telecom companies interviewed,
all were moving towards optical fibre because of its lower cost (based on large
numbers of users) and increased functionality. However, the ubiquitous availability of
fibre optic cable in Lagos is estimated to be at least five years away. Fibre optic cable
was also seen as a viable alternative for corporates in the short-term future (within one
year) and for SMME’s and cybercafés within five years.

Optical fibre is used, primarily, to connect corporates to the Internet rather than
consumers (including cybercafés). In terms of an alternative to VSAT it is interesting
to note that fibre optic cable has a common characteristic with Ku band. It is
associated with dialup by consumers (this is not the case with corporates) and in turn
is associated with Nitel and unreliability and high costs. In other words, the only
technology currently believed to be reliable by the majority of users is C band VSAT.

2.4.5. Uses of VSAT

There are two types of users of VSAT networks. The first is the corporate user,
particularly banks and oil companies. The second type of user is the individual
consumer that uses VSAT, usually because it most successfully supplies connectivity.
The majority of individuals use VSAT through cybercafés. The uses of VSAT can thus
be divided into two areas: corporate and individual use:

Corporate Individual (i.e. cybercafé)


Transaction based, between remote Greater than 50% of time is spent on
branches (for e.g. banks) social activities on the web, including
chat and email
Information based, between remote Telephone calls, particularly to
branches (for e.g. oil companies) international destinations using VoIP
Voice & data connectivity Web surfing

In the cybercafé proprietors survey, 8 out of 10 reported that voice was a growth area
for international calls. Call charges using traditional networks are too expensive,
resulting in high demand for Internet based telephony. For example, it costs between

12
20 & 30 Naira per minute to call a fixed line phone in the USA. The cost of a local
fixed line call, in contrast, is estimated at about 35 Naira.

2.4.6. Technical expertise

In the survey conducted amongst ISP’s and cybercafé proprietors, all reported a lack
of local technical skills. The time taken to install VSAT equipment ranged from two
days to six weeks, with the average being around 7 working days. Given the
simplicity of the VSAT installation, this would suggest that there is inadequate
training and expertise. Those ISP’s that were subsidiaries of foreign companies
seemed to faire better in installing VSAT equipment. Those ISP’s that relied on local
technicians had a more extended installation time. For example:

“The local engineers didn’t understand the installation diagram, thereby


making it long and some equipment was damaged”.

All ISP’s reported that “local technicians could not be trusted”. Of all the interviews
conducted, only one company actively trained local technicians. From this company’s
viewpoint, locally trained technicians were cheaper, knew local conditions and could
respond faster and more effectively than imported technicians. However, resources
had been dedicated to training local technicians, something that did not seem to be
taking place in any other companies.

The lack of local technical skills is further exacerbated when VSAT equipment and
bandwidth is sold in neighbouring countries. Installation is often done on tight
budgets and with no training of local technicians. The result is that when something
goes wrong the costs of correcting it can be too high for the VSAT supplier to
countenance.

2.5. Recommendations - Nigeria

There are several factors that must be taken into account when making an assessment
of VSAT in Nigeria including the regulatory framework; the credibility of the
regulator; alternatives to VSAT; and threats and opportunities for VSAT.

The deregulation and liberalisation process begun in 2000 has transformed the
Nigerian telecommunications market. The result has been a spectacular increase in
investment in the industry. The number of people connected has increased. Bandwidth
has increased and prices are on a steady decline. Both the corporate and individual
consumer market are benefiting from the increased range of options to connect them
to the information superhighway.

The regulator, the Nigerian Communications Commission, has proved its credibility
amongst the operators and service providers who have benefited from regulatory
reform. However, smaller players who do not have the financial and technical
resources to secure VSAT licences and have therefore not been beneficiaries of the
reform process view the regulator less favourably.

13
The central obstacle to the development of VSAT within these areas is the
misconception that Ku band suffers from serious reliability problems, primarily rain
attenuation. As more companies begin to offer Ku band with competitive pricing, Ku
band will become a cheap and an effective alternative to C band. This process could
be fast-tracked by improving access to technical literature about the distinction
between Ku band and C band and the advantages and disadvantages of each type of
technology.

The research revealed the lack of local technical expertise to deploy VSAT optimally
in Nigeria. A common theme was the distrust of local providers based on their
perceived lack of skills. Therefore one recommendation is to focus on the provision of
technical skills in order to overcome this negative perception and the development of
local expertise in installing and maintaining VSAT (specifically Ku band) technology.
A consequence of the lack of local technical skills is that African VSAT suppliers
routinely underestimate the costs and difficulties of doing business in other areas of
Africa, most particularly in neighbouring countries.

14
3. Part Three: Algeria

3.1. Algerian ICT Policy

The liberalization of Algeria’s telecoms sector has been fixed for April of this year
[2004]. The Minister of Posts, IT and Communications Amadou Tou admitted that
current transmission capacity was weak and that the solution was the liberalisation
of the sector. He admitted that though they had come to this conclusion a little late
the total liberalisation of the sector was vital to the growth of fixed and mobile
telephony in the country8.

The Ministry of Post, Information and Communication Technologies (PICT) has


targeted 2004 for liberalisation of various sectors of the telecoms market. PICT is
following a planned liberalisation process. Each step depends upon the previous one
being completed:

GSM VSAT GMPCS Rural Telephony

International Telephony Fixed line network

The planned liberalisation process arises out of the National ICT Policy formulation
committee that began in 2000. The Ministry of PICT wishes to establish Algeria as an
ICT hub in North Africa. It wishes to extend connectivity to all Algerians and sees
GSM as the first step in this process. Because of the advantages that VSAT offers
(most importantly that it is distance independent) it is seen as the second step in the
planned liberalisation process.

3.2. Regulatory Framework – Algeria

The Algerian regulator, Autorité de la Poste et des Télécommunications (ARPT) was


formed in May 2000. It reports to parliament annually. It is funded through operators’
contributions and does not receive any government funding. It does not report to any
other organisations and the regulator is not legally obliged to consult or inform any
other organisation prior to making decisions. The role of the regulator is to ensure that
policy decisions of government are enforced. The ARPT is the regulator for both the
Algerian Post Office and the telecoms sector.

The ARPT was created by government to manage the liberalisation and deregulation
process initiated in 2000. The completion date is 2004. The ARPT is a relatively
young organisation and still coming to terms with its duties. There is plainly a
shortage of skilled staff with a significant portion of staff coming from the incumbent,

8
Algeria: Liberalisation fixed for April 2004. Balancing Act. March 8. http://www.balancingact-
africa.com/news/current1.html

15
Algeria Telecom (AT). This creates a tendency to rely on data supplied by AT in
making rulings. A recent example of this is local call price increase in June 2003.
Local calls were increased by 355%, based on the argument by AT that the existing
tariff structure was not covering its costs. The impact on the Internet users has been
deleterious and the impact on the industry, and the economy more generally, is still
being felt.

The see-sawing between issuing VSAT licences, withdrawing the licence, allowing
multiple VSAT users and suppliers and then potentially re-issuing two licences is
indicative of the lack of regulatory experience and therefore ability to provide an
enabling but stable environment. The imposition of a sky tax of $5000 per month per
ISP on space segment is illustrative of a lack of understanding of the negative impact
on the cost of VSAT. While this was subsequently withdrawn, the fact that it was
implemented also shows a lack of consultation with major industry players and yet a
desire to correct the error once the implication became clear.

In effect, the ARPT is on a steep learning curve. Greater consultation internationally


and internally, plus development of human capital are vital components to its success.
Government is committed to a fast liberalisation process, but without sufficient
human resources the 2004 target is unlikely to be met.

3.3. Current situation – Algeria

Different technologies are required for different geographic areas. Algeria is more
densely populated in the North. The southern parts of the country are dry with few
inhabitants. It is not economically viable to operate networks other than VSAT in the
southern parts of Algeria. The northern parts of the country are mountainous and fixed
wireless and fibre optic networks are difficult to install and maintain. VSAT, in both
the ARPT and the Ministry of PICT’s opinion, is the solution to these problems.

Direct to Home (DTH) VSAT networks used for broadcasting purposes are
widespread. There are no licence or registration (authorisation) requirements for DTH
VSAT systems or receive-only VSAT systems. Two-way VSAT systems require
authorisation. The motivation for duplex VSAT systems to have authorisation was
provided by the military who were concerned that they would be used for ‘terrorist’
purposes, particularly in the south of Algeria. The result is that many cybercafés use
receive-only VSAT for the downlink and dial-up for the backhaul.

3.3.1. Licences

There are currently two categories of licence:


• Private network
• Public network
The ARPT has not issued any public network licences. To understand this (and the
distinction between public and private licences), one must also understand the
ARPT’s definition of a VSAT network. A VSAT network requires a public licence if it
fulfils two conditions: firstly, the hub is located in Algeria and secondly, if bandwidth
is being resold using this local hub. According to this definition, there are currently
two VSAT operators: Algeria Telecom and Tele Diffusion of Algeria (TDA). Algeria

16
Telecom is the incumbent and operates a VSAT network. Algeria Telecom does not
need a VSAT licence. TDA is primarily a broadcaster, though it also sells bandwidth
to ISP’s (basically, it is a carrier of carriers). Since both are government owned and
the existing legislation is under review, the ARPT has decided not to issue VSAT
operator licences to these two organisations. Instead, when the new licensing
requirements are issued in 2004, TDA will have to apply for one of the two VSAT
operator licences being offered. It is assumed that the two operator licences being
considered are in addition to Algeria Telecom.

In terms of private network licences, any company may use VSAT. (Please note that
the ARPT does not view any ISP selling bandwidth via VSAT and connecting to the
PSTN (Algeria Telecom) as having a public network). If a company sells VSAT
equipment, authorisation must first be acquired. There is no licence fee for importing
VSAT equipment. The authorisation consists of registration with the ARPT.

Any company using VSAT equipment is required to obtain an authorisation from the
ARPT. The existing authorisation process is as follows:
• Letter of request
• Technical details of equipment
• Copy of company’s status and/or contract between demanding organisation
and Algeria Telecom.
• Company registration form
• 3000 Dinar per VSAT station
Authorisation forms are easy to obtain and copies may be made. Once the forms have
been completed they must be submitted to the ARPT. Online or faxed forms are not
accepted.

In all the interviews conducted, amongst both ISP’s and users, the time period for a
VSAT authorisation was about three months. ISP’s and users argued that this was the
major obstacle to the broader roll-out of VSAT . Companies got frustrated with the
extended time period and would look to alternative methods of providing
connectivity. The authorisation process is as follows:
• Submit authorisation documents to the ARPT
• The documents are then delivered to the Ministry of Posts, Information and
Technology
• The Ministry of PICT in turn delivers the documents to the army for clearance
• The army returns the documents to the Ministry of PICT
• The documents are returned to the ARPT
The extended time period and the arbitrariness of the granting of authorisations have
led to accusations of corruption against the ARPT and government. The view amongst
ISP’s is that those individuals that are too critical of government are unlikely to
receive authorisation.

17
3.3.2. Licence Fees:

There are currently no licence fees. The administrative fees are:

Description Duration Amount


Fee per VSAT Not applicable 3,000 DA (US$ 43)
installation
Usage fee 1 year (annual fee) 20,000 DA (US$286)

The proposed VSAT operator licences will be awarded to the highest bidder. The
Ministry of PICT is budgeting for around US$2 million for both licences.

The telecommunications regulatory regime is being reviewed. The government is


intent (at this point) on re-instating VSAT licences (specifically two licences will be
granted). The intent of the proposed licencing regime is to create a local VSAT
network with a hub in Algeria. The Ministry of PICT argues that the current
configuration of VSAT networks with the hub outside of Algeria limits the number of
VSAT terminals within Algeria. The demand for VSAT is so great within Algeria that
the creation of a local hub is the only way of satisfying this demand at the best price
possible. Once the VSAT operator licences have been granted, users will be
encouraged by the ARPT to purchase bandwidth from the licence holders. The ARPT
argues that users will migrate to either of the two licence holders because the pricing
will be better than any other operator (specifically, those using international satellite
service providers). The ARPT will ensure this through the monitoring of bandwidth
prices.

Existing ISP’s that re-sell bandwidth provided by international satellite providers will
be allowed to continue to operate under their ISP licences.

The Ministry believes that licensing VSAT will:


• provide a revenue stream (note that the ARPT is not funded by government);
and
• increase Internet connectivity in Algeria.

The Ministry of Posts, Information and Technology commissioned a report in 2000


that argued for the re-imposition of VSAT licences. The argument was based
primarily on the point that currently no VSAT service providers operate a hub in
Algeria. The Ministry argues that no single local operator can handle the potentially
high demand for VSAT – estimated by the Ministry of Posts, Information and
Technology at over 10,000 individual stations. Thus, one of the requirements of the
new licensing regime will be the installation of a local hub.

Incumbent ISP’s are gravely concerned about the anticipated changes to the
regulatory regime. The proposed licensing regime will mean that the importation of

18
VSAT equipment requires only authorisation (type approval), the use of VSAT
equipment (as an end user) also requires only authorisation (different from the import
of equipment). The selling of bandwidth requires an ISP licence, but is not difficult to
get. A user may purchase bandwidth from any company. There is no distinction
between local and foreign service providers. However, once the VSAT operator
licences are issued, preference will be given to one of the two licenced operators.

3.3.3. Universal Service Obligations:

Both GSM and the incumbent operator (Algerie Telecom) have universal service
obligations. The Universal Service Fund (Fonds du Service Universel) was set up at
the beginning of 2003. Operators are required to contribute 3% of turnover per year.
The fund pays out monies to those operators that extend their networks to villages and
communities with less than 2000 inhabitants. The list of villages and communities
that qualify for USF assistance is yet to be compiled.

There have been no payments out of the Universal Service Fund to date. Payments are
scheduled to begin in 2004.

3.3.4. Voice over Internet Protocol:

With the current regulatory regime under review, the ARPT has been reluctant to issue
any licences. According to current legislation, the provision of Voice over IP (VoIP)
must be licenced. To get around this conundrum, the ARPT has issued a number of
experimental licences. Of the ISP’s interviewed, all had received the experimental
licences without any difficulty. Specifically, the VoIP licences are called “test”
licences. There is a general expectation that with the new licensing regime in 2004,
these test licences will be withdrawn.

3.3.5. Distinction between C and Ku bands:

In the Nigerian case study, the study found a strong distinction between C and Ku
bands. This distinction does not apply in Algeria. The Ku band coverage of Algeria is
excellent because of its proximity to Europe. The applicable distinction in Algeria’s
case is between receive-only VSAT and duplex VSAT. Because of the current
regulatory regime, users (both corporate and individual) tend to choose receive-only.
The documentation needed to acquire authorisation is simple but the bureaucracy
behind the authorisation process prevents VSAT’s wide-scale adoption. This means
that for Internet access, the preferred method of connecting is through receive-only
VSAT and then backhaul through dial up.

3.4. Recommendations - Algeria

Algeria is unusual in that it changing from a relatively absent regulatory environment,


that has been successfully exploited by operators, to an inhibiting regulatory
environment. The desire to unleash the potential of telecommunications and
specifically VSAT is there, but it is nullified by the lack of understanding of what an
enabling regulatory environment can achieve. VSAT has great potential within the

19
Algerian environment because of the geographic challenges that the country faces,
and its relatively high GDP.

The key recommendation for Algeria is to build both regulatory and technical
expertise. The Ministry of PICT is convinced that a planned liberalisation process is
instrumental in developing the ICT industry, but has little access to resources. The
ARPT has several challenging issues in the next few months. These include
• the setting up of a local VSAT hub,
• licensing of two VSAT operators, and
• monitoring costs (specifically bandwidth)

Support from a technical, regulatory (for example, other countries experiences) and
economic perspective (monitoring of costs) is needed.

20
4. Part Four: Tanzania

4.1. Tanzanian ICT policy

Despite good intentions, Tanzania has been plagued by an unclear and inconsistent
policy environment. This is acknowledged in the National ICT Policy was approved
by parliament:

The lack of an overall policy and poor harmonisation of initiatives, has led to
random adoption of different systems and standards, unnecessary duplication
of effort, and waste of scarce resources, especially through the loss of potential
synergies. Therefore, this National ICT policy deploys a broad-based strategy
to address Tanzania’s developmental agenda.
The need for an appropriate institutional arrangement to ensure that all
stakeholders can rise to the challenge of implementing this ICT policy, cannot
be overemphasised9.

The policy is divided into several key areas which include (but is not limited to) the
development of ICT infrastructure and Universal Access. Nearly a year later, how
successful has the National ICT policy been? Has it achieved any of its stated aims or
objectives? The success – so far – of the policy can be evaluated through two
representative examples: the creation of the Tanzanian Internet Exchange and the
Rural Telecommunications Development Fund.

The National ICT Policy has as its first objective the need to:
Foster efficient, inter-operable, reliable and sustainable national ICT
infrastructure commensurate with grass-roots needs, and compliant with
regional and international standards, with increasing access while reducing
cost10.
A key to realising this objective must be the creation of a domestic Internet exchange.
This will reduce costs in two key ways: firstly, by bypassing the international gateway
for domestic communication and secondly, by allowing ISP’s the ability to purchase a
greater volume of bandwidth, leading to reduced bandwidth prices. The policy
acknowledges this and states that:
Government will set up national IXP’s and hierarchical IXP’s in collaboration
with other countries as well as regional information and communications
infrastructure11.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of any implementation strategy, this objective has not
been achieved by government. Instead, the private sector has set up an IXP (the
Tanzanian Internet Exchange) with funding from international donor agencies.
Beyond writing a letter of encouragement, neither the Tanzanian government nor the
TCRA has been involved in the actual establishment of the TIX.

9
National ICT Policy. Ministry of Communications and Transport: March 2003.
10
Ibid pp. 17
11
Ibid pp. 18

21
The Rural Telecommunications Development Fund (RTDF) which is meant to provide
mechanisms to decrease the divide between urban and rural ICT access is dormant As
a result, operators have suspended payments to the Fund until it is operationalised and
there is no implementation strategy. It is understood that a study on the issue of the
implementation of the RTDF will be completed by the end of March.

Both of the above examples highlight Tanzania’s inability to implement objectives


that it sets itself. The ICT policy process further highlights this. The ICT policy was
completed in October 2002. The policy steering committee was disbanded until
approval by parliament, which occurred in March 2003. The committee was re-
established in August 2003 to develop an implementation strategy for the National
ICT policy. This outcome is still awaited.

4.2. Regulatory Framework - Tanzania

The Tanzanian Communications Regulatory Authority Act of 2003 combined the


Tanzanian Communications Commission and the Tanzanian Broadcasting
Commission into one body named the Tanzanian Communications Regulatory
Authority (TCRA). The Act stipulated that a Board of Directors and a Director
General had to be appointed. The Board consists of four non-executive members, a
Chairman, Vice Chairman and a Director General. A nomination committee is
currently interviewing candidates to the positions and a shortlist is to be submitted to
the Minister of Communications. It is expected that the Board of Directors will be
appointed within the next few months. While the telecommunications and
broadcasting commissions have been assimilated, the corresponding functions within
government continue to exist. The TCRA reports to two ministers, the Minister of
Communications and the Minister for Broadcasting.

The Act defines the functions of the TCRA into three broad categories:
• Licensing
• Monitoring
• Dispute resolution
The TCRA’s primary raison d'être is the issuing or cancellation of licences. It is
important to note that this is not an independent function in the sense that the TCRA
can make a decision to grant or cancel a licence on its own. Any licence relating to
universal access or with a time period of more than five years must be approved by
the Minister of Communications or the relevant sector minister12.

On the key role of monitoring, the functions of the TCRA are laid out in the Act:
To monitor the performance of the regulated sectors including in relation to –
i. levels of investment
ii. availability, quality and standards of service
iii. the cost of services
iv. the efficiency of production and distribution of services

12
The Tanzanian Communications Regulatory Authority Act, 2003. pp. 9.

22
v. other matters relevant to the Authority13
Based on this section, the TCRA is expected to develop the capacity to monitor the
size and growth of the ICT sector in Tanzania.

Since the regulatory authority is in transition, no new decisions can be made. Among
decisions that are currently awaiting the newly constituted board are:
• Legal action against the TTCL for failing to meet its infrastructure roll-out
targets (the fine is currently sitting at 46 million USD and a schedule of
payment is expected to be submitted by the TTCL to the TCRA by the end of
March).
• Granting of new licences such as Public Data Operator licences
• Implementation strategy for the Rural Telecommunications Development
Fund
•Reduction of the royalty fee paid by Public Data Operators from 3% to 1.5%
as stipulated in the Tanzanian Communications Regulatory Authority Act of
2003
In addition, existing licensing documentation is being revamped. Specifically,
documentation referring to VSAT station licences is being reviewed. In the past, all
telecommunication stations using the radio spectrum were licenced using the same
forms (Radiocommunication Station Licence). This is under review and VSAT will, in
future, have its own licensing forms and supporting documentation.

Currently the TTCL is the only operator allowed to transmit voice over its networks.
This is expected to change in 2005 with data operators being allowed to utilise VoIP.
One of the challenges highlighted in the National ICT Policy document is to
Promote convergence of voice, data, computing and video (for example,
multimedia services, VoIP)14.
The exclusivity period granted to TTCL ends in February 2005.

4.2.1. Licences:

There are currently five basic categories of telecommunications operators of which


three are relevant to this report:
• Public data communication operators
• Private data communication operators
• Internet service providers
There is full competition in each of these categories. The barriers to entry are
primarily financial (namely, start up capital and licence fees) rather than regulatory.

13
The Tanzanian Communications Regulatory Authority Act, 2003. pp. 9.
14
National ICT Policy. March 2003.

23
The licence fees for the categories relevant to VSAT and the existing number of
operators are captured in the table below:

Type of Licence Number of Application Initial Annual Fee


Operators Fee (US$) Licence Fee (Royalty)
Public data 10 $1,000 $100,000 3% of annual gross
communication turnover or $30,000
service whichever is higher
Private data 6 $500 $5,000 $500
communication
service
Internet Protocol 23 $75 $1,000 $5,000
Service
(Commercial)

In addition to the above licence fees, there are spectrum charges. For every VSAT
station there is a $1,000 annual fee. A VSAT station is defined by the TCRA as any
satellite system that is capable of receiving and transmitting data or, other words, has
a transceiver.

4.3. Current situation - Tanzania

The key theme across the Tanzanian ICT industry is the lack of government
implementation. In certain areas, the lack of any government coordination has created
competitive sectors in the market, such as the ISP sector. While other sectors, such as
public data operators, are dysfunctional. One of the unstated themes of Tanzanian ICT
policy is that a competitive market will provide more efficient services and reduce the
burden on government. This has meant that the data communication sector has been
thrown open to whomever can afford the licence fees.

The belief in competition has informed the approach of the TCRA to the ICT sector.
The regulatory body sees itself as primarily the generator of revenues for the
government. It does not currently play, or forsee itself playing (at least under the
current management), any constructive role in the active creation of “a conducive
framework for investments in capacity building”15. The TCRA is currently a reactive
body (reactive primarily to government) rather than a proactive body that is intent on
creating value in the ICT sector.

The previous section (the regulatory framework) laid out the functions of the TCRA
according to the Tanzanian Communications Regulatory Authority Act of 2003.
Specifically, it highlighted the section on monitoring. The TCRA is required to
monitor the levels of investment in the sector, the availability, quality and standards of
service, the cost of services and the efficiency of production and distribution of
services. Each of these functions is addressed below.

15
National ICT Policy. March 2003. pp. 2.

24
4.3.1. Levels of investment

Several interviews were conducted with public and private data operators. The
majority of these companies use VSAT as the only available alternative to fixed line
technology. The oft-repeated complaint about the TTCL is that the leased line service
is far too expensive, the levels of service are appalling and the waiting period for
connection is too long. Thus VSAT has a large role within the Tanzanian ICT
economy.

Of the ten public data operators, only seven are operational. Of the seven functioning
operators, only one (Satcom Networks) has built a local hub at a cost of
approximately 2.5 million USD. This is despite the fact that operators are obliged to
build local hubs as part of their licence conditions. Satcom Networks argue that the
provision of a local hub serves two purposes: it removes latency in the network by
eliminating an extra hop to an international gateway and it provides a higher quality
of connection.

The other public data operators interviewed stated that they were not willing to mimic
Satcom Networks and build a local hub because the investment environment was too
risky. It is too risky because the TCRA has stated that it sees no limit to the number of
data operators that can be licenced. Thus, there is the danger of the market being over-
traded (something that existing data operators argue is already the case). Adding to
the uncertain environment, the high royalty fees (3% of revenues) on revenues
encourage the operators to maintain a high margin business with low sales growth
focused on the corporate market. Operators are, in a sense, incentivised not to grow
too fast or invest too much because the sales will be disproportionately taxed through
the royalty system.

4.3.2. Availability, quality and standards of service

If ICT is to be an enabling sector of the economy and contribute to economic growth,


one of the objectives must be availability. VSAT is particularly suited towards
connecting locations that are not served by the existing infrastructure. However, the
lack of any universal access policy retards the availability of connectivity. More
importantly, the lack of any coordinating body (or, in the words of one interviewee, a
‘harmonising’ entity) means that there are multiple initiatives underway to expand
connectivity. None of these initiatives is coordinated leading to duplication of
infrastructure and more strain on limited financial resources.

4.3.3. Cost of services

It is outside the scope of this study to analyse trends in costs of services. However,
costs are unlikely to be low in an environment that encourages
• High margins and low number of clients (by penalising high increases in sales)
• That does not incentivise access to connectivity by the majority of people,
regardless of location (for example, through the RTDF)
• Low levels of investment

25
4.3.4. Efficiency of production and distribution of services

One of the stated aims of the National ICT Policy is to build ICT equipment. Given
the low levels of investment, it is unlikely that his has been achieved. There are
several, uncoordinated efforts to achieve distribution of services (or, as this report puts
it, access to connectivity):

The Tanzanian Posts Corporation is in the process of setting up a VSAT network to


connect 14 of its postal branches to an internal network. The network will allow the
transfer of monies between branches (there is a building society component to the
post office) and faxes can be reliably sent between branches. In addition, post offices
will offer cybercafé facilities at selected branches. The cybercafés are currently not
profitable, but they are perceived by the post office as a potential avenue for revenues
(the network was funded by international donor agencies).

International donor agencies such as SIDA are investigating setting up a VSAT


network for distance education, linking teachers together so that information can be
exchanged on teaching methods and tools. This VSAT network will be one of the
largest in the country (approximately 34 stations). It is seen as a test case for the
provision of connectivity at an affordable cost.

The Department of Management Information Systems at the President’s Office is


investigating upgrading existing government VSAT networks to connect local
government branches and to migrate applications such as payroll and other HR
functions onto the network. The Ministry of Defence currently owns an analogue
VSAT network of which only 10% is utilised. The project is investigating whether this
network can be digitalised and more effectively utilised by government departments.

In terms of a sustainable private sector model for VSAT implementation, the most
promising candidate is a private sector initiative supported by Simbanet, a local
public data operator. The model assumes that multiple sources of revenues have to be
found in order for rural projects to be sustainable (and therefore profitable). There are
several steps to Simbanet’s model:
• To partner with local businesses
• To sell value added services to local businesses in the surrounding area (in
other words, to become the local ISP)
• To create a 50% partnership between Simbanet and the local business
entrepreneur which shares the start-up costs
The model has many advantages. By partnering with the local business, Simbanet
places the local business under its public data operator licence and thereby avoids the
need for the local business to be registered with the TCRA and to pay its licence fees.
Simbanet pays the annual VSAT spectrum fee as part of its contribution to the costs of
the new business and removes that area of red tape from the entrepreneur. The
equipment is leased by Simbanet to the entrepreneur16. If one includes the costs of

16
At the site visited in Mtwara, C band was selected. The reason supplied was that there is severe rain
attenuation during the wet season when Tanzania experiences torrential downpours. In addition, C band

26
depreciation, the number of small businesses that must be signed up to the local ISP
for it to survive is in the region of 70 to 75. The cybercafé installed at the ISP offices
is seen as a side business which brings in much needed revenue, but one that is not
reliable and does not have much growth given current income levels in the area.
While the one site visited cannot be a representative sample, similar models are worth
investigating as a sustainable method of introducing connectivity to rural areas with
limited consumers and businesses.

Within the private sector (specifically the corporate sector) the commitment of the
TCRA to untrammelled competition is having another effect. The corporate market
represents an area of high margins for local public data operators. The lack of any
incentive to invest combined with onerous licensing fees has contributed towards high
costs. This has encouraged well-resourced companies to bypass public data operators
and to install their own private VSAT networks. Many multinational companies and
NGO’s have agreements with suppliers in their countries of origin, bypassing local
operators. The requirements for operating a private network is a $5,000 USD annual
licence fee. The effect has been to limit the size of the market and adds to the lack of
incentive on the side of public data operators to invest in local infrastructure and
skills.

4.4. Recommendations - Tanzania

More by default than by intent, Tanzania has adopted an open market access model
for the ICT sector. The current regulatory body does not play an active role in the
creation of a vibrant and growing ICT sector. The effect has been strong competition
in some sectors but with low investment in local infrastructure. To achieve its policy
vision of increased affordable access to the ICT sector by the Tanzanian people, the
following issues need to be addressed:
• Enforce the licence conditions of the public data operators, specifically the
requirement that for a local hub. This should have the effect of reducing the
number of operators (not all operators will be able to afford the capital
investment).
• Review the royalty fee system altogether and look at mechanisms to
encourage operators to provide low cost bandwidth. By influencing bandwidth
prices, it is possible that ISP’s will be able to provide lower cost access to
subscribers.
• For the TCRA to play an active role in the coordination of different initiatives
to provide access to connectivity and prevent duplication of initiatives and
ineffectual use of financial resources.
• To conduct more in-depth research of the public data operator – local ISP
partnerships. In particular, to investigate what the break-even point is in terms
of providing local ISP services and which areas of Tanzania would meet these
criteria.
• To increase the ICT human capital of the TCRA and thereby enable it to
effectively fulfil its mandate to monitor investment, availability and
distribution of infrastructure and cost of service.

could provide dedicated bandwidth while Ku band was shared. This was perceived to lead to a potential
decline in service.

27
5. Part Five: Cybercafe Surveys

5.1. Introduction

As part of the study, surveys of cyber café consumers were conducted in each of the
three countries. In Nigeria a largely pre-coded quantitative survey was administered to
418 cybercafé consumers at 14 cybercafés in 12 districts in Lagos. In Algeria a
similar survey was conducted amongst 350 cybercafé consumers at 12 cybercafés in
10 different districts in Algiers. In Tanzania, the same type of survey was conducted
amongst 297 cybercafé consumers at 12 cybercafés in 10 districts in Dar es Salaam.
In addition, six in-depth interviews were conducted amongst consumers in Algiers,
seven in-depth interviews and two focus groups of twelve and fourteen respondents in
Lagos and six in-depth interviews in Dar es Salaam. In Tanzania, an additional 194
consumers were interviewed at 2 cybercafés in Mtwara, which is a perfect example of
rural town. Located in far south of the country on the coast at the Mozambique border,
Mtwara is an underdeveloped town that is the main urban centre for a very
underdeveloped region. The findings for Mtwara are presented in tabular form,
however a detailed description of these, as well as for all the other areas can be found
in the country specific reports.

The research was undertaken during October 2003 in Lagos, November 2003 in
Algiers and March 2004 in Dar es Salaam and Mtwara. In all the areas the surveys,
wherever possible, were spread throughout the week across a daily eight-hour spell
(11:00 to 19:00), including weekends, in order to allow for all types of potential
consumers to be reached. The aim of these surveys were to profile cybercafé
consumers and by implication consumers of VSAT technology. In all three countries,
local researchers and enumerators administered the interviews, which were in English
in Lagos, French in Algiers, and Swahili in Dar es Salaam and Mtwara.

5.2. Demographic Specifics of Cyber Consumers

In all the surveys respondents were asked a number of questions relating to


demographic variables, from which the average age of the cybercafé consumers in
Lagos was enumerated at a little under 28 and one-half years, compared to a little over
25 years in Algiers and 29 years in Dar es Salaam. It would seem that at the lower end
the ‘entry’ age for using cybercafés is between 15 and 17 years, with the number of
consumers increasing into the 20-year age cohort, before levelling out and declining.
In Algiers, this decrease is already noticeable amongst consumers over the age of 30 ,
being somewhat higher in Lagos and Dar es Salaam (40 years).

There is a perceptible gender imbalance amongst cybercafé consumers, with men


accounting for 72% of all consumers in Lagos, 59% in Algiers and 55% in Dar es
Salaam. Although the reasons for this discrepancy are not distinctly accounted for, as
it is the case in many other activities in African countries, gender can be a critical
variable in defining the culture of using the Internet, and shaping access to and
knowledge about the technology. As a case in point, traditional beliefs and prejudices

28
regarding gender based role divisions and thus the tacit inhibitions females feel in
relation to showing up in public places without the courtship of men, among other
things, could partly explain the lesser proportion of female cybercafé consumers. This
could also be related to the relatively lower occurrence of women involvement in
higher education and formal employment, as will be later shown that the vast majority
of the cybercafé consumers were found to be scholars and full time employees by
vocation. This finding was also further substantiated by visits on campus Internet
cafés in all three capital cities, where it might be supposed that women might be more
likely to be found using cybercafés than elsewhere in those cities, however in all cases
the similar ratios of consumers with other cybercafés were observed.

Qualitative information would suggest that women simply lacked interest in the types
of subjects that were found on the Internet: general news, sports, pornography and
music. Additionally in Algiers, it emerged that women’s travel from their place of
residence was more limited than that of men, and the lack of cybercafés in residential
areas limited their scope to utilize them, however, as will be shown later, cybercafés
exist in sufficient numbers in locations close to where consumers live, thus
discounting this hypothesis as a reason. In Dar es Salaam the difference was not as
large as in the other two cities and when raised as an issue, it was said that at the entry
level, “girls” tend to take up the usage of cybercafés a little later than “boys” but then
catch up, whilst at the older age cohorts, men dominate, but that this would fade away
as they are swamped by new younger consumers of both genders.

What is striking about the demographic composition of cybercafés consumers is their


high levels education, with 72% of consumers in Lagos being currently in tertiary
education and 13% either in or having completed a secondary school. In Algiers 83%
had either received or were still in tertiary education and all the rest having either
completed or currently in secondary school. In Dar es Salaam, similar trends were
found with 43% of consumers having either completed or were still currently in
tertiary education and 51% of consumers either completed or were still currently in
secondary education. Such high levels of education would mean that a there would be
a high correlation between employment and consumers, which is borne out by the fact
that just over 60% of consumers in Lagos are engaged in a full time work with a little
under 10% on a part time basis, with scholars and students accounting for 19% of all
consumers. In Algiers there was an inverse relationship amongst consumers, between
on the one hand scholars and students (56%) and on the other those working full-time
(24%), and like Lagos, a little under 9% were working part-time and 10% were
unemployed. In Dar es Salaam, 43% were employed, 36% were scholars or students
and 7% unemployed.

The fact that the distribution of the cybercafé consumers was highly skewed in favour
of scholars and those involved in full time employment can be related to the financial
capability and/or appreciation of the different technology services availed of by these
consumers. If the aim of proponents of VSAT technology is to secure and consolidate
what currently represents the existing market, then a narrow band of the population
needs to be targeted, which given the nature of its education levels the message would
have to be no different to that used elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, given their
predominance in the employment sector, it ought to be a group of consumers for
which usage should not decline, however, this trend is tested for later.

29
5.3. Communications and Computation Patterns

In order to better understand communications and computation configuration of


cybercafé consumers, they were asked a number of questions about the types of
telephones found within their households, the contractual arrangements relating to
these telephones, and usage in terms of monthly costs. In addition, they were asked
whether they had access to a computer or the Internet, either at home or at work, and a
number of usage patterns were also probed for.

In Lagos, a cybercafé user typically comes from a household that will on average
have 2.5 working mobile phones and in all except for 1.4% of consumers there would
be at least one mobile phone in their household. In Algiers, cybercafé consumers
households averaged 2.1 working mobile phones, however, 22.6% of user households
do not have a working mobile phone at all. In Dar es Salaam the average number of
working mobile phones per cybercafé user is 1.8, with 7% not having a mobile phone.
In Lagos, the overwhelming majority (95%) of mobile phones are on a pay-as-you go
basis which is similar to 97% in Dar es Salaam, however in Algiers, 34% of all
mobile phones amongst cybercafé consumers and their family members were on a
monthly contract.

In Lagos a cybercafé user spends 4,200 Naira (US$34.62) per month on their mobile
phone, with the similar expenditure being 1,200 Dinar (US$16.67) for Algiers and
19,115 Shillings (US$17.54) for Dar es Salaam. Cybercafé consumers were also
asked whether they had a fixed phone at home, with slightly more than 42% having
one in Lagos, 71% in Algiers and 40% in Dar es Salaam having one.

Table 1: Mtwara Cybercafé Consumers – demographic, communications and


computation statistics
Gender composition 64% male 36% female
Average age 28.7 yrs
Education Level - completed 32.3% secondary 19.5% tertiary
Vocation - employed 23% students 60% employed
Personal mobile telephone, ownership 58%
Personal mobile telephone, monthly expenditure US$ 20.19
Household fixed telephone, ownership 34%
Fixed telephone, monthly expenditure US$ 26.45
Personal computer home ownership 22%
Internet connection at home 14%
Use of computer at school / work 27%
Internet connection at school / work 23%
Average time spent on internet at home and school /
work 19.8 hrs

30
Home-based personal computer ownership was recorded at 40% for cybercafé
consumers in Lagos, 51% in Algiers and 36% in Dar es Salaam. In Lagos, only 12%
of all cybercafé consumers have an Internet connection at home, the same applying to
18% and 11% of cybercafé consumers in Algiers and Dar es Salaam respectively. In
Lagos, those respondents with working Internet connections in their homes, claimed
to spend on average 7.7 hours per week on line. In Algiers cybercafé consumers with
an Internet connection at home claimed to spend approximately 15.1 hours a week on-
line, this would compare with 12.4 hours per week for the same generic sub-group of
cybercafé consumers in Dar es Salaam. For the month preceding the survey,
consumers reported to have paid or have an account, which included fixed line
telephony, of an average of 8,204 Naira (US$63.10) in Lagos, 4,001 Dinars
(US$56.57) in Algiers and 22,522 Shilling (US$20.66) in Dar es Salaam.

In Lagos, 62% of cybercafé consumers had access to a working computer at school


and/or work, with 32% also having an Internet connection for personal use, which on
average was used for six hours per week. In Algiers 34% have access to a fully
functional computer at school and/or work, with 31% having Internet that was used
for approximately six hours a week. In Dar es Salaam, 32% have regular and 47%
occasional access to such a computer, 36% to Internet and on average spend four
hours a week on-line. A combination of home and school or work based Internet
usage shows that cybercafé consumers spend an average of 9.2 hours in Lagos, 18.4
hours in Algiers and 5.1 hours per week in Dar es Salaam,. However, this is
applicable to 65% of cybercafé consumers in Lagos, 44% in Algiers and 45% in Dar
es Salaam. However, what this demonstrates is that for a proportion of cybercafé
consumers, a significant amount of time is spent on the Internet away from
cybercafés, therefore it can be assumed that if time and cost factors can be made to be
compatible to consumers abilities, the scope to increase usage time exists.

5.4. Cybercafé Usage

Respondents were asked a series of questions about the cybercafés they use, the
distance these are from their homes and pace of study or work, the amount of time
and money spent at these cybercafés and a few questions as to what might influence
their selection of a particular cybercafé.

Figure 1: Frequency of Weekly Usage of Cybercafés

24.9% 24.0%

19.0% 19.1%
17.2%
16.5% 16.2%
14.1% 14.0%
12.1% 13.6% 13.8% 13.5%
12.9% 12.8%
11.4%
11.1%
8.0% 8.8% 9.3%
7.7%

1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days


Algeria Nigeria Tanzania

31
In Lagos the average time to get to the nearest cybercafé from home is 11.5 minutes,
with one quarter of all respondents having a cybercafé less than five minutes walk
from their homes. The nearest cybercafé from school or work is 15.3 minutes away,
with one quarter of all consumers being within three minutes of a cybercafé after
leaving their place of study or work. In Algiers the nearest cybercafé from home is
eight minutes and from school or work approximately 10 minutes, whilst in Dar es
Salaam 21 minutes and 11 minutes respectively were recorded for the cybercafés
closest to home and school or work.

Interestingly however, only 19% and 26% of cybercafé consumers in Lagos, 45% and
10% in Algiers and 28% and 32% in Dar es Salaam used the cybercafé closest to their
home or school or work. The rest traveling an additional 15 minutes in Lagos, 18
minutes in Algiers and 17 minutes in Dar es Salaam to use a different cybercafé. The
reasons for this were that a relationship had been created between them and the either
the owner or other consumers at this further away cybercafé, speed of connection was
noticeable faster, hardware both better and more varied and the ambiance more to
their likening. The latter included the cybercafé layout, including space between
consumers, privacy in terms of what was being viewed and air-conditioning.

Figure 2: Six-Monthly Usage Change of Cybercafés

In Lagos, cybercafé consumers


visited a cybercafé on an average
12.5%
of 4.5 days per week with 47%
16.5%
31.1% saying that the frequency of their
36.4% 54.9% visits had increased and 35% of the
28.4%
consumers had not undergone any
40.5% 47.1% change over the six months
32.7%
preceding the survey. In Algiers,
Algeria Nigeria Tanzania cybercafé visits averaged 3.6 days
Increased Stayed the same Decreased
per week, having increased for
41% of consumers and decreased
for 28% of consumers. In Dar es Salaam, 4.0 days was the weekly average cybercafé
use, with 33% having recorded an increase and 55% no change during the six months
preceding the survey.

On average a Lagos based cybercafé user spent 239 Naira (US$1.84) per visit with
51% of the consumers stating that there had been an increase in their average
expenditure in the cybercafé, 10% a decline and 39%) a consistency in their average
expenditure at the cybercafé during the six months preceding the survey. In Algiers,
the amount of money spent per cybercafé visit averaged 123 Dinars (US$ 1.70), with
45% feeling that their average expenditure in cybercafés has increased, 37% stayed
the same and 18% decreased over the previous six months. In Dar es Salaam, average
cybercafé expenditure per visit was 890 Shilling (US$0.82), which was an increase
for 35% of consumers, a static amount for 52% of consumers and a decrease for 13%
of consumers over a six-month period.

32
Figure 3: Six-Monthly Expenditure Change at Cybercafés

Such expenditure patters meant that


18.0% 12.8% consumers spent an average of
39.3% 4,179 Naira (US$32.15) in Lagos,
36.7%
9.6% 52.2% 1,720 Dinars (US$23.89) in Algiers
and 16.657 Shilling (US$15.28) in
51.1%
45.3% 35.0% Dar es Salaam on average
cybercafé each month. However, in
Algeria Nigeria Tanzania such instances it might be prudent
to control for extreme expenditures
Increased Stayed the same Decreased
at the outer levels and look at the
median expenditure, which is the
50% point, which measured US$22.62 for Lagos, US$15.60 for Algeria and US$9.63
for Dar es Salaam.

In the focused discussion with consumers, the trend for Internet usage was reported to
decline amongst those participants who use the Internet for e-mailing purposes alone
and/or those who did browse a little or none at all. On the other hand, over one-fifth
of the participants who use the Internet for socializing purposes like chatting, reported
that their use of the Internet has increased through time and they envisage an even
greater usage (amounting to half of the time they spend on line) over the months to
come. Furthermore, during focused discussions it was revealed that the participants
spent a lot of time browsing and the most popular sites were the International Press. In
fact, a number of students said that this accounted for more than half of all the time
spent surfing the net. Music and video sites were the next most popular, however only
one respondent claimed to download from the net. Hobby and sports sites also
emerged in the list, as did fashion and clothing accessory sites. Finally, pornography
sites were also mentioned as sometimes being used, resulting in a debate where it was
claimed that these were the most popular, although not necessarily amongst the group
discussing the issue. Interestingly, International Press sites were more common
amongst women than men, music and video the younger as opposed to older
respondents and pornographic sites the exclusive preserve of younger men. During the
discussions it was unanimously agreed in the discussion that women did not visit
pornographic sites, and such sites were described as the exclusive preserve of men.

It was also claimed that the Internet is used, among other things, as a way of passing
time - browsing and socializing- chatting, and/or as an information source- job
related. Interestingly, unemployed and students claimed that that browsing accounted
for more than half of all the time spent surfing the net, whilst employed cybercafé
consumers tended to use the email most often. Chat rooms were used more by
younger women than other respondents. It was argued that the usage of chat rooms
seems to have declined during the past year, as had the downloading of music,
although music and video sites remained the most popular amongst younger
consumers and second most popular overall. The wide usage of the Internet by current
students does not necessarily mean that they use the technology for academic reasons.
The finding from the focused discussion suggests that the Internet is not conducive for
studying purposes. In addition, it was argued that the reason that the Internet tended

33
not to be used for study purposes was attributed mainly to the user unfriendliness of
information sourcing, and the prohibitive cost of surfing while trying to locate
relevant materials.

In Lagos, 55% of cybercafé consumers had noticed a positive (9% negative)


qualitative difference in both the quality and the speed of the Internet during the
previous six months. In Algiers, 61% of consumers indicated that there has been no
noticeable difference, 23% that the speed of Internet access had increased while
15.4% said that Internet connection has slowed down during the six-month period
preceding the survey. In Dar es Salaam 69% said that there was no noticeable
difference in speed, 21% felt that they had noticed an increase and 10% said that they
felt that the speed had decreased.

In order to test price elasticity, respondents were asked whether they would pay more
money to go to cybercafé which is no further than that most frequently patronized but
having a faster Internet connection. In Lagos, 80%, Algiers, 79% and Dar es Salaam,
74% of consumers reported that they would pay more money for a speedier access. In
a focused discussion, speed was argued as being essential when browsing, as it saved
money and reduced levels of frustration, but was not considered as being important
when the Internet was used for other purposes. It was also argued that most
consumers were ‘single finger’ typists and as such a speedy connection did not make
much of a difference when mailing was in operation.

Those respondents that would not migrate to a cybercafé with a faster connection
were asked to explain their responses, which were: user cybercafé loyalty, possible
higher user costs and current satisfaction with the service (including speed of
connection) and facilities, as well as the location of their current preferred cybercafé.
Of those user that would be willing and capable to pay more for an Internet
connection that is faster than it is at the current café, in Lagos cybercafé consumers
will willing to incur an average of 18% more, in Algiers 26% more and in Dar es
Salaam 13%, more than their current average expenditure, which could then be
projected to average monthly expenditure for cybercafé consumers of US$26.69 for
Lagos, US$19.66 for Algeria and US$17.40 for Dar es Salaam.

Table 2: Mtwara Cybercafé Consumers – cybercafé statistics


Length of trip to cybercafé from home or school or
work (shortest) 28.9 mins
Number of days per month that cybercafé is used 12.5 days
Change in usage during previous six-months 27% increase 28% decrease
Average monthly expenditure at a cybercafé US$ 10.30
Increase in expenditure during previous six-months 23% increase 16% decrease
Knowledge of operating system 22% yes
Additional amount willing to pay for better service 20.8%
Potential monthly expenditure for better service US$ 12.43

34
Finally, cybercafé consumers were asked what factors inhibited a greater usage of the
Internet and by implication cybercafés. In Lagos - 18%, Algiers – 28% and Dar es
Salaam 31%, reported that they have no inhibitions whatsoever in relation to having
optimum usage of the Internet and no changing conditions would convince them to
increase usage. In all three areas respectively 55%, 43% and 42% cited a lack of time
and 27%, 28% and 27% - financial constraints, with the rest saying that it was an
interplay of both together with the poor quality of the service (including Internet
traffic and poor network), self discipline from or fear of being addicted,
inconvenience of the working hours of the cybercafés, remoteness of cybercafés from
one’s residence, reasons related to one’s profession and inadequate resources in the
cybercafé were the other factors mentioned as accounting for the inability of
respondents to use the Internet more. In theory however, a better and more convenient
service that would not result in increased costs could potentially result in increased
usage time for approximately three-quarters of all current consumers.

5.5. VSAT

Finally, respondents were asked whether they were interested in knowing what of
operational system the cybercafé they frequent uses. In Lagos - 69%, Algiers – 70%
and Dar es Salaam - 93% had no idea as to how the cybercafés they patronised were
connected to the network. Those who did know however argued that they placed a
high importance on such knowledge, whilst the rest shrugged off their lack of
knowledge by claiming that it did not matter, so long as the systems worked. In
Lagos, a fraction over 22% of those who knew the technology used, said that a
knowledge of the latest technology was important for it increased their ability to
choose, in terms of being able to access easier and faster browsing. In Algiers a
different type of trend was recorded with 60% not considering knowledge of the type
of system used as being important. Of those who assigned importance to knowledge
on the type of system the cybercafé uses, 44% of respondents claimed that it was
important to know if the connection was fast or slow. In Dar es Salaam, only 9% felt
it was important to know what operational system cybercafés had, because it would be
interesting and might save money.

Respondents were then asked whether they knew what VSAT is. In Lagos, the sample
was almost evenly divided, with 45% knowing about VSAT and 55% having no idea
at all what VSAT is. Those consumers who claimed knowledge reported different
responses when asked to state what exactly they think VSAT is. The majority of the
consumers (41%) consider VSAT as the use of Internet through satellite. The second
most mentioned response (14%), was that VSAT constitutes a small apparatus, which
is used for Internet connection. The next most mentioned reply (10%) described
VSAT as an ISP connector. 9% of the consumers prefer to describe VSAT in terms of
the benefits it endows to the consumers, i.e. speedy access. For 7% of the consumers
VSAT is an apparatus for satellite reception, for 6% of the consumers VSAT signifies
a very small antenna and for just over 5% of the consumers VSAT was the new
Internet. A small proportion of consumers (2%) described VSAT as the modem
through which computers work. One respondent said that it was, “the exam one must
pass if they wished to emigrate”. There was no difference in knowledge of VSAT in
terms of age, gender, education, or vocation. There was however a difference in terms
of consumers of cybercafés that had VSAT. This finding, as well as that from focus

35
groups and in-depth interviews, would suggest that once a cybercafé moves to VSAT
technology, regular consumers find out fairly quickly. In addition, they tend to then
form an opinion on the speed of connection and quality of service.

In Algiers, 83% of cybercafé consumers did not know what VSAT is and of those that
did, the overwhelming majority - 97%, answered simply by saying it is a satellite
connection to the Internet. One respondent said that it was linked to ARABSAT and
that the connection is excellent with another saying it is a video satellite. In Dar es
Salaam, only 5.4% of consumers knew what VSAT was describing it as a wireless
connection that was faster than using fixed line dial-up. Finally, in Mtwara 10% knew
what VSAT was.

36
6. Part Six: Conclusion

If one were to plot telecommunications development for Algeria, Nigeria and


Tanzania, Algeria would be at the bottom of the development curve, Tanzania
somewhere in the middle and Nigeria some distance above it. The explanation for
Nigeria’s higher position on the developmental curve can be attributed to how much
further it has progressed in liberalising and deregulating its market. But the
underlying explanation for Nigeria’s progress is the superiority of the regulator in
comparison to both the Algerians and Tanzanians.

Growth of the Algerian ICT market is being held up by an opaque and inconsistent
regulatory framework, creating a high regulatory risk for investors. The erratic policy
environment however reflects the desire by government to create an enabling
environment. The fundamentals of transparent and consultative administration and
implementation are absent. While the endpoint is clear, the understanding of how to
get there from both government and the regulator is not. This is due to a lack of
human capital skills in both organisations.

As the VSAT policy process shows, there is a strong possibility that future
development of the industry in Algeria is going to be inhibited. Through a
combination of a lack of proper consultation with industry players and stifling
bureaucracy, a regulatory framework is being put in place that is unlikely promote
development. The impact of this is going to be the stagnation of the industry and very
slow growth in access to the majority of the Algerian population.

In contrast, the regulatory framework in Nigeria is open, relatively consultative and


enabling, particularly for the larger players. Of course, the moratorium on the issue of
new VSAT licences might have an impact on the sector and the effects will have to be
monitored over time. Nevertheless, the result is a growing telecom sector and
increasing demand. In fact, the primary constraint to increased usage identified
amongst cybercafé consumers was a lack of time rather than a lack of financial
means. However, there is a danger that VSAT will be bypassed in this growth curve.
Obstacles to VSAT’s growth include a lack of local technical skills and the perception
that Ku band VSAT suffers inordinately from rain attenuation. Both obstacles can be
easily removed with some simple information dissemination, demonstration and
marketing.

Algeria does not suffer from the same technical skill deficiency. Rather, its growth in
terms of consumers will be effected by a constraining regulatory environment. Price
increases, the issue of new licences where none used to exist and a bureaucratic
approach to regulation of the market has stifled growth. Unlike Nigeria, consumers
report cost as the largest obstacle to increased usage of the Internet. Interviews with
cyber café owners indicated that using the LAN for playing games was becoming
more popular than surfing the web. Games didn’t even feature in the Nigerian case
study.

37
The Tanzanian ICT market risks continued underdevelopment based upon the
regulators insistence on not taking an active or participatory role in the ICT sector.
The TCRA perceives its function to be the collecting of taxes rather than the
development of the sector. Thus the TCRA continues to licence new operators. The
result has been that operators (such as the public data operators) focus on high margin
business such as corporates in order to pay their licence fees. Operators do not
perceive Tanzania to have an environment that will provide them with a return on
their investment and this explains their reluctance to invest in a local hub. The
development of VSAT is dependent upon the creation of an environment suitable to
local investment. The role of institutions such as the Global VSAT Forum should be
in pressurising the Tanzanian government and the regulator to play a role in the
creation of local investment rather than supporting one set of interests, such as
international satellite operators (a criticism of the GVF in Tanzania).

As urban development increases, VSAT usage will be pushed out to areas where it is
not economically feasible to install alternatives such as fibre optic cable (for example,
rural areas). The three case studies highlight different sets of problems: firstly, the
inhibiting regulatory framework in Algeria, secondly, the lack of technical skills in
Nigeria and thirdly, the high regulatory transaction costs and poor investment
environment in Tanzania. The cybercafé consumer surveys reflect these differences.
Usage is increasing dramatically in Nigeria with consumers requiring more bandwidth
intensive applications. Consumers in Lagos use cybercafés more regularly than their
counterparts in either Dar es Salaam or Algiers. This is also reflected in Figure 2
where 47.1% of consumers stated that they had increased their usage of cybercafés
compared to 40.5% in Algiers and 32.7% in Tanzania. In Algeria, usage is increasing
steadily but consumers are beginning to turn towards applications that do not require
excessive bandwidth. A significant portion of consumers (31.1% compared to 16.5%
and 12.5% in Lagos and Tanzania respectively) in Algiers reported that their usage
had decreased over the last 6 months. In Tanzania, a common complaint is the high
prices of bandwidth. 54.9% of consumers reported that their usage patterns had
remained the same. The conclusion to be drawn here is that the consumer and user
market is stagnating without investment in local infrastructure.

The consumer surveys undertaken in all three capital cities of the countries, which
were identified as case studies, was meant to supplement the findings on the
regulatory environment and what suppliers, industry stakeholders and service
providers were saying. The consumer surveys, however, are dynamic in their own
right for what they reveal is a composite picture of demand including some
demographic criterion of cybercafé consumers, including some communications and
computer patterns and cybercafé trends. What is striking is the similarity in the usage
trends, and although these findings are limited they do indicate that a similarity in
demand that is driven by the need for affordable, reasonably fast connectivity. If
VSAT is able to do this more effectively, this is what they want..

38
7. Appendix 1. Interview Schedule - Nigeria

Name of Institution/ Organisation Officials


Linkserve Limited Mr Cyril Amago
Corporate Headquarters Support Engineer, Wireless/ VoIP
PO Box 74045
Victoria Island
Lagos
21st Century Technologies Limited Mr Christopher Ajayi
Plot 249A Muri Okunola Street Head, Business Development
Victoria Island Annex
Lagos
ACCAT Limited Mr Obilor Dozie
39 Creek Road Sales Engineer
Apapa, Lagos
GS Telecom Mr Adeyinka Adedayo
PO Box 75628 General Manager, Business Development
Lagos
Direct on PC Limited Mr Sandeep Jayaswal
Plot B, Block 1 Managing Director
Ilupeju Industrial Avenue
Lagos
Cellcom Limited Mr Wally Molere
33 Saka Tinubu Street Network Administrator
Victoria Island
Lagos
General Telephone & Electronics Mr Micheal Anialoa
9 Estaport Avenue, Soluyi, Gbagada Chief Engineer
Lagos
Ecobank-Nigeria PLC Mr Rasheed Oredegbe
PO Box 72688 Information Technology Manager
Victoria Island
Lagos
Smart.comm Mr Gbenga Ore
140 Awolowo Road Managing Director
Ikoyi, Lagos
Compumetrics Solutions Limited Mr Jimmy Adeyemi-Offor
PO Box 2267, Marina, Lagos General Manager

39
8. Appendix 2. Interview Schedule - Algeria

Name of Institution/ Organisation Officials


Autorité de la Poste et des Sidi Med Bouchenak Khelladi
Télécommunications (ARPT) Membre du Conseil
Rue Kaddour Rahim
Hussein Dey
Alger 16008
Autorite de la Poste et des Mme Khenchelaoui
Telecommunications (ARPT) Director of Networks
Rue Kaddour Rahim
Hussein Dey
Tel. 213 21 47 9628
Ceriste Mme El-Maohab Aouaouche
Departement Reseaux et Serveurs Technical Director
Rue des Trois Freres Aissiou
Ben-Aknoun
Etablissement de Gestion de Service Maamar Abdessalam
Aeroportuares (EGSA) Commercial Director
Tel. 213 21 50 91 91
General Computing Systems Younes Grar
126 cite Mohamed Saidoune Chief Executive Officer and
Djenane Ben Omar President of the Algerian ISP Association
[email protected]
Algeria Telecom Abdelaziz Chiheb
Route National No. 5 Chef de Division Marketing et Gestion
Cinq Maisons Qualite
El Mohammadia
[email protected]
Telediffusion d’Algerie Abdelah Nemer
B.P. 50 Route de Bainem Directeur General Adjoint
Bouzareah [email protected]
Swan Informatique & M. Kahlane
Satlinker Technologies C.E.O
56A, lot.En-nahda,
16012
Alger
Gradient Management Amine Haddam
33 rue Dar El Alia Bouzareah Directeur General
www.gradient-management.com [email protected]

40
Sei-Net M. Said Cherfi
Technical Director

Ministry of PICT M. Irzouni


Central Director

41
9. Appendix 3. Interview Schedule - Tanzania

Name of Institution/ Organisation Officials


Standard Chartered Bank (T) Limited Mr Gratis Sakaya
PO Box 9011 Head, Technology & Operations
Dar es Salaam Technology & Operations
Tanzania Internet Exchange (TIX) Mr Frank Habicht
Treasurer
United Nations Development Programme Mr Charles Owe
(UNDP) Information Management Analyst
PO Box 9182
Dar es Salaam
KPMG Miss Lollobrita Mushema
PO Box 1160 Consultant – Information Technology
Dar es Salaam
Satcom Networks Africa Ltd Miss Leena Kapadia
PO Box 79315 Marketing Manager
Dar es Salaam
Tanzanian Communications Regulatory Colonel Nalingigwa
Authority Acting Director General
PO Box 474 Mr J. A. K. Magesa
Dar es Salaam Senior Telecom Engineer, Frequency
Management and Spectrum Planning
Afsat Communications (T) Ltd Mr Frank Goyayi
PO Box 6154 Marketing Manager
Dar es Salaam Mr Douglas Mutembei
Technical Analyst
University of Dar es Salaam Computing Professor Beda Mutagahywa
Centre Ltd. Managing Director
PO Box 35062
Dar es Salaam
Cats Tanzania Ltd Mr Joe Pereira
PO Box 2569 Deputy Managing Director
Tanzanian Postal Corporation Mr David Mtake
Chief Analyst Programmer
Raha.com Mr Hussein Dharsee
PO Box 12933 Managing Director
Dar es Salaam

42
Simbanet (T) Limited Mr Gregory Almeida
PO Box 14827 Operations Manager
Dar es Salaam
Sida Mr Nils Jensen
Embassy of Sweden ICT Project Manager
PO Box 9274
Dar es Salaam
Economic and Social Research Mrs Margareth Nzuki
Foundation Coordinator
PO Box 31226
Dar es Salaam
President’s Office Mr David Sawe
Department of Information Director - Management Information
PO Box 9143 Systems
Dar es Salaam
Makondenet Mr Vipul F. Mistry
PO Box 6528 Managing Director
Dar es Salaam

43
10. Appendix 4. References

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March 10 from http://www.balancingact-africa.com/news/current1.html

Asinugo, J. (n.d.). Regulating satellite communications and associated technologies in


Nigeria: Imperatives for the year 2000 – 2001. Retrieved on the 3rd of November
2003, from http://www.ncc.gov.ng/Speech%20by%20Engr.%20J.%20Asinugo.htm

BMI-Techknowledge. 2002. Communication Technologies Handbook.

GSM Operations Start in Nigeria in NigeriaBusinessInfo.com. retrieved on the 17th


of November 2003, from http://www.nigeriabusinessinfo.com/gsm080801.htm.

Intelecon Research and Consultancy. (2002). Tanzania Rural ICT and Market
Opportunity Report. Retrieved on the 26th of February 2004, from
http://www.infodev.org/projects/telecommunications/351africa/Guide%20to%2010%
20Rural%20Market%20Assessment%20reports.pdf

Intelecon Research and Consultancy. (2002). Algeria Rural ICT and Market
Opportunity Report. Retrieved on the 15th of November 2003, from
http://www.infodev.org/projects/telecommunications/351africa/Guide%20to%2010%
20Rural%20Market%20Assessment%20reports.pdf

ITU (2003) World Telecommunications Indicators Database, 7th Edition. Geneva:


ITU.

Jensen, M. (2003). (Unpublished). Background on Algeria.

Madavo, C., Tomlinson, M., Wolgin, J., Woicke, P., and Husain, A. 2002.
Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association and the
International finance corporation to the Executive Directors on an Interim Strategy
Update for the Federal Republic of Nigeria. World Bank Report. Report No. 23633-
UNI: Nigeria.

Miller, Esselaar and Associates and bridges.org. October 2003. (unpublished). Africa
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