Copyright

Charles 0. Houston, Jr.

1952
 T H E P H I L I P P I N E S

COMMONWEALTH TO REPUBLIC

An Experiment in Applied
Politics

P A R T I

The Economic Bases

CHARLES ORVILLE HOUSTON, JR.

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the Faculty of Political Science,
Columbia University

1952

New York
 D E D I C A T I O N

TO M Y FATHER

Who taught his son that each of us is

his brother's keeper.

But whereunto shall I liken t h i s

generation? It is like unto children
sitting in the markets, and calling
unto their fellows.
And saying, We have piped unto you,
and ye have not danced; we have mourned
unto you, and ye have n o t lamented.

...Matthew 12:16,17.

II
 FOREWORD

*
This brief record of the Filipino people is presented

by one who, until lately, had seen neither the country nor

the people concerned. The prejudices and predispositions of

those who have been concerned intimately with the nation, in

the past, are not, it is hoped, a part of his intellectual

baggage. It would seem that it is now possible to look at the

Philippine scene with less passion and loss of perspective than

has characterized much of the writing on the subject up to

this time. Books that have been written about the Philippines

have been generally of two kinds (with certain notable excep­

tions): travel books, or works written by apologists for one

of two opposing sides in the past events in the Philippines.

Books have been written by imperialists and anti-imperialists.

Books have been written which have attempted to portray the

Philippines as a kind of Oriental Central America, with the

inhabitants painted as "typical” lazy peons who seek no more

out of life than full stomachs and roofs over their heads.

Books have also been written by individuals with an axe of

some kind to grind, and these individuals have gone to the

Philippines for a definite end in view and have looked at the

scene there through spectacles colored for this purpose and

this end.

This writer is not concerned with the victorious

individuals and groups in the various contests that have been

waged in the Philippines. Rather he is concerned with how and

ill
why these individuals and groups gained their victories.

As we regard the situation in the Philippines today,

it is possible to state one thing with certainty; Whichever

side wins the victory in the present struggle — the Govern­

ment or the Hukbalahaps -- the only sufferer will be the

people at large. It was the people who suffered from inep­

titude in the Government before the War; the people who

suffered from the machinations of unscrupulous labor leaders;

the people who suffered from national disasters, in which they

were only partly aided by the Government; the people who

possessed no body of reserve capital to meet the many changes

in the tides of misfortune. When War came, it was the people

who bled, suffered and died - not the politico. whose destiny

was too frequently merely a change of position. It was the

people who were trapped between the Japanese and native

bandits -- both in and out of the Government — and the

conditions of the day. The people who fled from the provinces

to seek haven in Manila, were caught there at the end of the

War, and were either executed by fleeing Japanese, killed by

American bombardment, or starved by the breakdown of military

and civil authority.

Until the people realize their strength, which can

only be accomplished through education, they will continue to

be victimized by those degraded enough to gain power and pelf

through the sufferings of their fellows. A solution to the

nation's ills can never be found through the use of bayonet

iv
and club, for the innocent are injured along with the guilty.

And the innocent are not allowed respite by the opposition

who charge the people with their defeats and grant them nothing

from their victories. The present position of the Government

and its opposition was brought about largely by the War. The

resistance, by the Government, early in the years of the

Republic, to the demands of the opposition, crystallized the

leadership and the objectives of that opposition, allowing it

to develop in a more stable fashion than would have been the

case had they attempted the task in the years of semi-prosperity

before the War.

The present conditions in the Philippines are neither

new nor strange in the Philippine scene. They are the ultimate

outcome of events which run far back into Philippine history

but which may be said to have come into sharper focus from the

birth of the Commonwealth Government. Insurrections and up­

risings, so characteristic of the Philippines in the past, will

continue to find their place in the history of the country until

definite and well-integrated measures, so often promised in the

past, are instituted, bringing to the people a sense of security

and well-being.

Because of the excessive sensitivity of many toward

studies of this nature -- seeing a sword concealed in a pen and

animosity in interest — the author feels the necessity of

insisting that this present study be regarded not as an attack

v
upon the Filipino or the Philippine Government or Philippine

institutions, nor against all ideas expressed by the people,

in the Government or through the institutions. It is here

presented only as objective a study as possible -- to review

past accomplishments and failures -- to deepen the understanding

of all observers - American, Filipino, or whomever -- with

regard to the manifold and critical problems facing the Filipino

people, the Philippine Government and Philippine institutions.

A critical, historical examination of events, ideas and facts

is not a guileful "American imperialist" attack nor insinuating

Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist boring from within. The author is

neither an "American imperialist" nor an adherent to Communism

in any of its shadowy filaments ofdisruption. He seeks neither

the economic enslavement of the Filipino people through force

of the dollar nor the overthrow of the Philippine Government and

social system by Marxian violence. The author is by birth a

Republican, by conviction a Democrat, and by practice an indepen­

dent neutral. He neither affirms nor denies any religious or

spiritual beliefs or convictions of those with whom he comes

into contact -- either personally or through the printed word.

He is an optimist in believing that Man may yet obtain the

blessings for which humanity has so long striven, and a pessimist

in believing that this can not be achieved through the present

social and economic order whether in Russia or the United States

-- believing that the necessary changes can be achieved almost

wholly through the activities of the United Nations.

 He thus demands and expects that this study be accepted

in the spirit in which It is offered.

It is essential to plan intelligently for the future

and not waste our efforts in fruitless recriminations about

the past. Thus, many issues now highly controversial, are

touched upon only as they bear upon the main thread of the

narrative. It is the duty of the present to busy itself with

the enormous task of creating a nation from the stuff of chaos

and not to anticipate the verdict of posterity. Too, the

origins of many of these strife-laden issues are lost in the

past. In all likelihood, the actual story will never be told,

despite the fact that, as Seneca said, "The language of truth

is simple."

This study is presented as a record of the work of two

peoples to create an independent nation in a portion of the

world unkind to independence. It is necessarily an incomplete

story'. However, it is believed that even a portion of that

story needs telling at this time. For one reason, the

material relating to many of the events is fast disappearing.

For another, even a partial story may aid in some small measure

to bring about a better understanding of the Philippines, and

through it, the peoples of Asia, by the people of the United

States. This understanding, so lacking in the past, is

essential for the future. This uneasy, stirring giant that is

Asia -- long ignored by the West save as a servant to direct

vii
and call - now holds the key to the future security and happiness

of Man.

The record of Japan is presented, in this volume, only

by implication. The details of the story must await the second

volume, which will attempt to present all the errors of wish

and deed, the tragic ineptitude of the United States and its

military and diplomatic leaders, which so crippled the future of

a fine people and the peace of the day. The Occident has had

its last warning. If it ignores the present and forgets the

past it will have no future in Asia.

The Filipino people are a fine people, hospitable,

friendly, gracious and talented. As musicians, they are skill-

#
ful; as dancers, they are graceful; as artisans they are peers

of any people. Their manual dexterity is the admiration of all

Americans who have the opportunity of working with them. They

are agile of wit and brilliant of Intellect. They live in some

of the most pleasant isles in the world with a beneficent,

though capricious, climate. Why then are they unhappy today?

An anthropologist might say, because of the conflicts engendered

by the attempts to impose upon them an alien economy and

political system. The average Filipino farmer, however, would

says Government. Perhaps we may be able to find the answer in

studying in detail the developing events from 1934.

Much of the blame for the post-war unstable condition

of the country can be laid with justice at America's door. The

viii
Tydings-McDuffie Independence Law, the various Revenue Laws of

the United States Government and the ambivalent attitude of

the American people toward the Philippines, brought great dis­

turbance and eventual disaster to much of the nation's economy.

At present, plans are afoot to hold an economic conference

between the two Governments, to stabilize the economy of the

country. This will be the second attempt. It may be as un­

successful as the first unless the mistakes committed by both

Governments are remembered. It Is impossible to blame the

people of the Philippines for the failures of the Commonwealth

-- for there were failures. The United States must assume a

portion of the burden of these failures and, In fairness,

mistakes committed by the commonwealth must be reviewed.

It is clear that, by 1950, the failure of the Philip­

pine Administration to understand the basic requirements to

achieve its expressed goals as well as the fantastic fiscal

policies pursued after 1946 comprise the reasons for the

terrible conditions of the early years of the Republic.

In addition, they may well spell increased unrest and

disorder in the future,as well as permanent harm to the

agrarian economy of the nation, unless the Administration takes

some giant steps to implement existing social, economic and

political programs. These require money. Where Is it to come

from?

The economy, civilization and stability of the Government

lx
of the Philippines rests upon five major items I rice (associa­

ted with corn), abaca (Manila hemp), coconut products, sugar

and tobacco. Associated with these five is the fishing indus­

try, important as a food item and supplementary domestic

industry, and other agricultural and mineral products. The

present volume examines each of the major five items in detail,

and surveys the fishing industry, and the production of cash

crops such as cotton, rubber, minor fibers, vegetables, fruits,

and livestock. Since a majority of the economic problems of

the Philippines is tied to public health, the discussion is

terminated with an examination of nutrition, public health,

and relief activities. Since rice, is by all odds, the most

important item in the nation's domestic economy, a large portion

of this work is devoted to an intensive discussion of its

importance in the history of the Philippines from 1934 to 1950,

the problems connected with its production and distribution,

and the efforts of the Government to meet these problems. The

four major export items are then treated in a similar, but

less detailed, fashion.

In the course of preparing this work during the last

three years, it was early discovered that it would be necessary

to spend much time gathering and assembling references and

other materials pertinent to the subject due to an extraordinary

lack of normal reference material. Hie author, therefore,

x
found it necessary to travel widely throughout the Philippines,

seeking and asking aid wherever necessary* Much of the history

of the Commonwealth still rests in the hands of individuals who

have collected and managed to preserve letters, documents and

other material throughout the past trying years. For the aid

freely offered, the author wishes to express his deep apprecia­

tion for the interest and help received from: Edward Sf. Mill,

and Catherine Lucy Porter of the American State Department,

Washington; J. Weldon Jones (formerly Auditor of the Common­

wealth, acting High Commissioner and longtime friend of the

Philippines); Mr. Evatt D. Hester, formerly of the American

Embassy, Manila, friend and critic of the Philippines; Dr. Jack

Y. Bryan, Cultural Attache of the American Embassy; Dr. Alfredo

Morales, Secretary of the U.S. Educational Foundation, American

Embassy, Manila; the late Chief Justice Frank L. Murphy;

Senator Lorenzo M. Tafiada; the Hon. Cesar Fortich of Bukidnon,

Mindanao; the Hon. Francisco A. Perfect© of Catanduanes; the

late Justice Gregorio Perfecto; Dr. Jose P. Laurel; Dr. Jorge

Bocobo; Mr. Tomas V. Benitez, Second Secretary, Philippine

Embassy, Washington; Consul Leopoldo T. Ruiz, Philippine

Consulate General, Chicago; Mr. Pablo A. Pefia, Vice-Consul,

Chicago; Mr. Anastacio B. Bartolome, of the Department of

Foreign Affairs; Dr...Adeudato Agbayani, Adviser to the Philip­

pine Consulate General, Sydney, Australia, who generously loaned

the author a portion of his valuable collection of Filipiniana

and offered much valuable advice; Jose Q. Dacanay, Editor of

xi
the Plant Industry Digest; Director Deogracias V. Villadolid,

of the Bureau of Fisheries; Jose R. Montilla, of the Bureau of

Fisheries who made available, and helped with preparation of

charts, graphs and maps; Attorney I.A. Villanueva, Bureau of

Fisheries for freely aiding the author in acquiring material on

the Bureau's activities; Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., Director of the

Philippine Institute of Nutrition and Secretary of Health for

his invaluable aid in gathering information on public health

and nutrition; Dr, Isabelo Concepcion, of the Bureau of Health,

longtime leader in Philippine scientific research; Dr. T.

Elicafio, Director of Hospitals; Director Eduardo Qnisumbing, of

the Philippine National Museum, guiding spirit in Philippine

science and world authority on orchids; Dr. Canuto G. Manuel,

Chief of the Museum's section on Zoology; Mr. Robert Fox,

anthropologist-ethnologlst-botanist-explorer extraordinary,

close friend and sharp critic; Professor E. Arsenio Manuel,

the Department of History, University of the Philippines, for

invaluable assistance and information; Director Luis Montilla,

of the Philippine National Library, for his many kindnesses; Mr.

Alfredo Reyes, Assistant to the Director of the National Library,

for his unfailing enthusiasm in rescuing fugitive reference

material; Professor Gabriel Bernardo, Librarian of the University

of the Philippines; Mr. Tiburcio Tumaneng, formerly Chief of

the Filipiniana Section of the National Library; Juan C.

Apostol, Chief, Inspection Division, Fiber Inspection Service;

Dr. Vicente Aldaba, Manager of the National Abaca and Other

xii
Fiber Corporation; Mr. Robert V. Terhune, of the U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service; Professor Carlos X. Burgos, Bureau of Animal

Industry; Eduardo Taylor, Manager, Cebu Portland Cement Company;

Zosimo Montemayor, Superintendent, Bukidnon National Agricul­

tural School, Musuan, Bukidnon, Mindanao; Director Leon Ma.

Gonzales, of the Bureau of Census and Statistics; Assistant

Director Manuel E. Buenafe, formerly of the same bureau, for

constant aid in supplying statistics; Col. Pedro C. Medalla,

Chief of the Manila Harbor Police; Ramon A. Alegre, Bureau of

Immigration; Lieutenant-Commander Charles Pierce, U.S. Coast

and Geodetic Survey for special assistance; Dr. J. Canuto, Chief

of the Disaster Relief Service, Philippine National Red Cross;

Mr. Edward H. Cavin, Disaster Service, American National Red

Cross; Mrs. Virginia A. Pefia, Field Director, President's

Action Committee on Social Amelioration; Miss Fanny Adarna,

Philippine Community Chest; Mr. Guillermo Torres, President,

Mindanao Colleges; Dr. Ricardo Guinto, Leonard Wood Memorial

Foundation (for research on Hansen's disease); Fr. Rector

Daigler, S.J., Ateneo de Davao; Fr. Rector James Haggerty, S.J.,

Ateneo de Cagayan; Fr. William Masterson, S.J., Ateneo de

Manila; Fr. Ralph Lynch, S.J., Del Monte, Bukidnon; Fr. Pollock,

S.J., T§galoan, Occidental Misamis, Mindanao; Mr. J. MacNeill

Crawfurd, President, Philippine Packing Corporation, Del Monte;

and Dr. Andres Castillo, of the Central Bank of the Philippines,

for much advice and criticism on present-day Philippine economics.

I wish to express an additional word of deep appreciation

xili
for the many months of advice, criticism and teaching on the

part of H. Otley Beyer, grand old man of Philippine science

and education. One of the outstanding figures in the Philip­

pines as well as in international science, the author is

deeply indebted for the patience and kindness with which Dr.

Beyer has shared a portion of his vast and unique knowledge

of the Philippines and the Filipino peoples. Possessor of

the greatest collection of documents and reference material

extant in the Philippines, he has been most gracious in his

permission to the author to consult and utilize this treasure

trove.

A special word of thanks is due to Jose P. Santos, for

his great assistance and kindness in sharing with the author

his invaluable collection of Filipiniana. To Father Walter

B. Hogan, S.J., a soldier of Christ in the front ranks of

society, the author is indebted beyond repayment, as well as

to Fr. Francis X. Lynch, S.J., whose generosity and friendship

has enriched the work and life of the author. Special apprecia­

tion is expressed to President Mariano V. de los Santos, of

the University of Manila, for his sympathy and forbearance in

assisting the author in countless ways. Without his invaluable

aid, this work could not have been possible. To Lloyd Millegan,

special thanks are due for aid and suggestions. Thanks are

expressed also to Miss Carmen Alfonso and Attorney Felipe

Eloisida, of the University of Manila, for their special

assistance, and to the constant comfort of my wife, Flor de Lys,

xiv
is due whatever merits this work may possess.

A final word of appreciation must be expressed to my

professor, Allan Nevins, for his criticisms and suggestions.

Heedless to say, all opinions expressed in the book,

while possibly reflecting those of other individuals with

whom the author has talked, are those only of the author.

C.O.H.

The University of Manila

Manila
1950

xv
 TABLE OP CONTENTS

Page

FOREWORD ............... iii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED ........................ xix

INTRODUCTION ...................... 1

I. THE PLACE OF RICE, CORN, AND ABACA IN

THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY .................... 25

II. THE PLACE OF COCONUT PRODUCTS AND SUGAR

IN THE PHILIPPINE E C O N O M Y ................ 58

III. EARLY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE RICE INDUSTRY. 93

IV. EARLY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE RICE

INDUSTRY (Cont’d.) ........................ 137

V. EARLY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE RICE

INDUSTRY (Concluded) .......... 168

VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ABACA INDUSTRY:

1934-1941 .................................. 194

VII. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COCONUT INDUSTRY:

1934-1941 .................................. 229

VIII. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY:

1934-1941 .................................. 267

IX. THE RICE INDUSTRY: 1941-1950 .............. 315

X. THE ABACA AND COCONUT INDUSTRIESj

1941-1950 .................................. 350

XI. THE SUGAR INDUSTRY: 1941-1950 ............. 378

XII. THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY: 1934-1950 ........... 394

XIII. CERES’ HORNS COTTON-RUBBER-VEGETABLES

AND OTHER PLANTS-FRUITS-COFFEE-THE ROXAS
FOOD PRODUCTION CAMPAIGN ................. 416

xvi
 Page

XIV. THE TWO BOWERS: .......................... 444

1. THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRIES

2. THE FISHING INDUSTRY

XV. NUTRITION AND PUBLIC HEALTH ............. 471

CONCLUSION .......................................... 512

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ............................... 525

B I B L I O G R A P H Y ................................. 533

APPENDICES

Table 1. Rice Prices: November, 1933- September,

1935.
GRAPH 1. Comparative Monthly Sales of Rice by the
NARICl 1946-1949.
2. Comparative Monthly Average Quotations
of Rice, Macan No. 2: 1946-1949.
3. Coconut Oil and Copra Production.
4. Sugar Production and Exports of the Philip­
pines.
5. Agricultural Production.
6 . Merchandise Exports and Imports.
7. Wholesale Prices.
8 . Physical Volume of Production.
9. Individual and Corporate Incomes.
10 . Wage Rates of Laborers In Public Works.
11 . Money and Real Wage Rates of Selected
Industrial Workers in Manila.
12 . Wage Rates of Laborers in Manufacturing
and Commercial Firms.
13. Cost of Living and Food Costs of Wage
Earner's Family in Manila.
14. Retail Prices of Strategic Commodities in
Manila.
15. Retail Cost of Food in Manila (For Wage
Earner1s Family).
16. Gross Income from Agricultural Crops and
Their Products.
17. The Nation's Gross and Net National Product,
18. Classification of Arrests for Juvenile
Delinquency: 1945-1949.
19. Analysis of Arrest Records of Juveniles.
20 . Classification of Arrests, by Age, for
Juvenile Delinquency: 1945-1949.
21. Population, Rice and Flour Importation
and Rice Production.

xvii
 CHARTS 1. Licensed Fishermen and Total Invest­
ments in Commercial Fishing Boats :
1945-1949.
2. Quantity of Catch at Landing Points;
1948-1949.

BUREAU OF HEALTH
TABLES I. Average Annual Death Rate per 100,000
Population From Beriberi.

II. Cases and Deaths and Morbidity and

Mortality Rates from Beriberi per 100,000
Population; 1924-1940; 1946.

III. Deaths and Death Rates From Beriberi per

100,000 Population for the City of Manila;
1926-1940; 1946.

IV. Reported Number of Deaths From Beriberi

(Adults and Infants), Scurvy, Rickets,
Other Avitaminosis, Inanition Under One
Year, and Inanition One Year and Over, and
Rates per 100,000 Population in the Philip­
pines and City of Manila; 1938-1947.

V. Estimated Population, Cases and Deaths

From Selected Diseases; Morbidity and
Mortality Rates per 100,000 population;
1946.

VI. Report of Cases, Deaths and Rates per

100.000 Population, From Selected Causes
in 1947 and 1948.

VII. Infant and Maternal Mortality Rates per

1.000 Live Births for 1940, 1946, 1947,
and 1948.

MAPS 1. Four Climatic Types of the

Philippines ................ fa cing-page 35a

2. Major Fishing Areas of the

Philippines ................ faoing page 456a

3. Major Sport Fishing Areas of

the Philippines ........... ffoolng page 458a

xviii
 ABBREVIATIONS USED

AAAPSS -- - Annals of the American Academy of Political

and Social Sciences

ACIL — - Agricultural-Commercial-Industrial Life

CIMP ------ Commercial and Industrial Manual of the

Philippines. 1937-1938; 1958-1939: 1940.

FEQ. ---- — Far Eastern Quarterly

F E S ------- Far Eastern Survey

JPIMA ----- Journal of the Philippine Islands Medical

Association

M.O.P. --— Messages of the President

NACOCO ---- National Coconut Corporation

NAFCO ---- National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation

NARIC ----- National Rice and Corn Corporation

NASB --— -- Natural and Applied Science Bulletin

PJC ----- Philippine Journal of Commerce.

PRATRA ---- Philippine Relief and Trade Rehabilitation

Administration.

xix
 INTRODUCTION

America's attitude toward the Philippines may be

summarized in the following apt phrase: "The Philippines is

foreign for domestic purposes and domestic for foreign."^

This has been true since the acquisition in 1899 of the

Islands. There was a strong undercurrent of opinion in the

United States in early days that the United States should

never have acquired the Philippines in the first place, and

that the sooner the American rule was removed the better it

would be. One may note that this meant it would be best

for the interests of the United States rather than for t h e

Filipinos. Whenever questions were placed before Congress with

regard to policy in the Philippines, It invariably resulted in

the preparation of several bills for the granting of indepen­

dence to the Islands. In the words offormer Governor General

Forbes, "these bills always received enough support in both

Houses of Congress to cause more or less embarrassment to the

Administration, which found it the best policy not to seek

Congressional legislation for the Islands."2

Coupled w i t h this is the lack of information a n d

interest of theaverage American with regard to the Filipinos

■h/lf.L. Holland and Kate Mitchell: P r o b l e m s o f the

Pacific. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p . 99.

2W.C. Forbes, The Philippine Islands. (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Co., 1928, 2 vols.}, Vol. II, pp. 311, 312.

1
 2

and Philippine affairs. He knew little and cared less about

these Islands so far away on the other side of the Pacific. In

addition, the United States in 1899 was in no position to care

adequately for the dependencies it acquired, and the possession

of such was never envisaged by the framers of the American

Constitution nor by individuals in early American administrations.

Partly due to these facts, and partly for other reasons, the

United States never had a concrete opinion with regard to the

ultimate disposition of the Philippines. Those individuals who

did, and who chose to make their homes and fortunes in the

Islands, were never completely comfortable since they always

had hanging over their heads the threat of eventual independence

and possible discriminatory legislation. For this reason as

well as the half-hearted efforts of the American Congress to

legislate for the Philippines, the colonial policy of the United

States was never endorsed by Americans in the Islands.

There is no doubt that American policy in the Philip­

pines could easily have been conducted on a higher plane of

altruism. Many Individuals have believed, and have pointed out,

that whatever was done with regard to the Philippines was

motivated by the desires of special groups in the United States

who hoped to derive benefits from whatever course of action

was taken. Many Filipinos, however, have believed that the

United States offered the outstanding example of altruistic

colonialism by being true to its word with regard to the

 3

preparation for, and eventual granting of, independence to

their country.®

Since Americans were not trained for the manifold prob­

lems attendant upon the administration of a dependency, it

is not surprising that American policy has always been of an

experimental nature. These experiments have irritated more

than they have pleased the Filipinos and have been the cause

for much friction between the two countries. Several individ­

uals connected with the administration of the Philippines,

such as Worcester, Forbes, Williams, and Malcolm, in tune with

the social and economic beliefs of their day, held to the view

that a government should be operated like a business. This

entailed a well-organized,highly departmentalized governmental

structure which would work in cooperation with the Filipinos

in developing the country socially, economically, and polit­

ically. These men believed in policies which were designed,

said Worcester, to "encourage the development of the unused agricul­

tural, mineral, and forest lands of the Philippine Islands with

the assistance of foreign capital, energy and technical skill.

While this undoubtedly was true to a certain extent, few there

have been who have raised the question as to whether it was

absolutely necessary to utilize all the natural resources of

3
Loc. clt.

^Dean C. Worcester* The Philippines Past and Present.

(New York* The Macmillan Co., 1930), p. 51.
 4

the land, especially in the absence of concrete and specific

plans of development. Observers have pointed with a feeling

approaching horror to the profligacy of the United States,

for example, in the utilization of its natural resources and

have raised the question as to whether or not it might not be

wiser, if not so comfortable perhaps, to accept a lower standard

of living if thereby one’s natural resources are strengthened

rather than diminished. Would it not be wiser, they ask, to

wait until governments and peoples can determine sanely a

revolving system of utilization of their resources: that is,

in exploitation coupled with regeneration.

In addition, little thought was given to the future

problem of whether or not the Filipinos would be able to admin­

ister this complex type of Government planned by early American

administrators for a country wholly dissimilar in nature,

economy, traditions and attitudes in government. Judge Malcolm

stated that "tested by the colonial standards of other govern­

ments, the United States failed miserably in her Philippine

adventure."® One may agree with his opinion but for different

reasons than he has stated. His analysis is correct in so far

as it goes. It is quite possible, however, that the American

rule in the Philippines was overly concerned with the superficial

material aspects of living and life, that is, in the establish­

ment of roads, health systems, domestic order, etc. Despite the

®G.A, Malcolms The Commonwealth of the Philippines.

(New Yorks Appleton-Century, 1936), p. 85.
 5

fact that the most Important legacy of the American rule Is the

educational system of the Philippines, it Is very true that the

United States failed in inculcating into the minds and spirits

of the majority of Filipinos an adequate and lasting realization

of what "democratic” meant and means. It may be true as

Malcolm stated, that ”no city, county, or state within the

United States has a system of government better concentrated or

more harmoniously administered than the Philippines has had,”®

but this, even if true, is no guarantee of success in the

experiment of applied government. Recent history could feasibly

show that the above statement is a weak description of govern­

ment in the Philippines. Americans took to the Philippines the

materialistic techniques, the technical superiority, and the

insistence upon order and peace In all phases of existence

characteristic of their own land, but they could not take with

them an Anglo-Saxon heritage nor a Western European type of

culture alien to the Philippines and outside their immediate

experience and understanding.

The ladings-McDuffle Law of 1934 was but one of a series

of similar laws which had been drafted and presented to the

Congress of the United States. Ever since 1900, the United

States had listened to the reiterated demands of Filipinos, in

the government, requesting first immediate independence,

secondly more autonomy, thirdly still greater autonomy, and

6Ibid.. p. 88.
 6

again immediate and complete independence. For some thirty

years those in the United States believing in slow and careful

development of institutions and governments had turned deaf

ears toward these importunities. At the same time, the

Democrats in Congress encouraged the Filipino in these importu­

nities with the result that the Filipino politico sought to

gain more and more autonomy and more and more independence from

these benevolent, tolerant friends. However, it was not until

the infant nation began sending its parent ever increasing

amounts of coconut oil, copra, sugar and cordage, that much

attention was paid to this riotous infant. Such organizations

as the Crude Cottonseed Oil Tariff Committee, the National

Board of Foreign Organizations, the American Farm Bureau

Federation, the Cordage Association, the National Dairy Union,

the National Grange, the National Cooperative Milk Producers

Federation, the Southern Tariff Associations, the American

Dairy Federation, and other "anti-imperialist" groups, began to

cast a weather eye toward the far horizon.

In their solicitude for the well-being, prosperity, and

happiness of their young charge, they began making representations

I
to Congress explaining carefully that the charge had now grown

to m a n ’s stature and deserved mature treatment. With their

defeat in the Fordney-McCumber Tariff, they became more and

more insistent and by 1933 had prevailed upon Messrs. Hare,

Hawes, Cutting, McDuffie and Tydings to make new provisions

respecting the future of this obstreperous, overgrown youngster.

 7

President Hoover said that economic independence of the Philip­

pines must first be attained before political independence

could be successful.7 However, there were many who gratui­

tously pointed out to the President that the economic factor

was not of great importance in considering the future of the

Philippines. In support of this point of view, the Hare-Hawes-

Cutting Bill, of January 13, 1933, passed over Presidential

veto, provided for a transitional period of but twelve years for

the n e w Philippine Nation, headed by a Filipino executive, but

remaining under the tutelage of the United States. In October,

1933, however, the Philippine Legislature rejected the Hare-

Hawes-Cutting Bill on the ground that it was not an independence

bill but a tariff and immigration bill against their products

and their labor.

It has been suggested that this rejection was engineered

by Manuel Quezon due to the fact that the bill had been sponsored

under the aegis of Sergio Osmefia and Manuel Roxas. Quezon, it

is said, now saw his opportunity to seize and consolidate a

superior position in Philippine politics. Grasping at the

provision granting military reservations to the United States,

he persuaded the Philippine Legislature to reject the bill. He

then sailed for the United States to secure a "better" law. He

7
Herbert Hoover. Veto Message Relating to Philippine
Independence. 72nd Congress, Second Session, House Document No.
524. IkJanuary 13, 1933. - ordered to be printed, with bill."
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933,
13 pp.
 8

had been informed by Osmefia that the Hare-IIawes-Cutting Bill

was the best that could be obtained from Congress at that time.

Upon his arrival in Washington, he found little enthusiasm for

reopening and going through the same old process of preparing

and passing a new Independence bill. He spent many hours

talking with Senator Millard E. Tydings, then Chairman of the

Senate Committee on Territorial and Insular Affairs. Senator

Tydings told (Quezon that he would undertake the repassing of

the Hawes-Cutting Bill if he could be given a guarantee that it

would be accepted by the Philippine Legislature. Quezon, in

turn, pointed out to Senator Tydings that in order to guarantee

this acceptance he would have to show some "improvements" in

the bill. Section 10 of the bill was then rewritten, providing

mainly that the United States would give up its military bases

in the Philippines upon independence and that a conference

would be held within two years following independence to deter­

mine the future of American Naval bases in the Islands. With

this exception, the original bill remained unchanged.

It would be unjust to ascribe to Quezon only political

reasons for his desire for a "better" bill. He was as worried

as Osmefia had been with regard to its provisions for the control

of Philippine imports into the United States. However sincere

Quezon may have been, it is undeniable that the economic

provisions remained in his "better" bill. The Philippines, how­

ever, had little chance in 1934 of securing a bill which would

 9

have liberalized America's control of Philippine economy. The

United States was in the depths of its greatest depression and

the farm groups, as well as others, were loud in their demands

for protection and support. President Roosevelt needed all the

support he could muster in the first critical years of his

administration to stabilize the American economy and the farm

groups were vital to this support. Had another bill been

passed, contrary to the desires of these special interests,

the President’s task would have been rendered more difficult

than it was. Too, any other sort of bill would, in all like­

lihood, never have received sufficient support to ensure its

passage.

On March 2, 1934, President Roosevelt had urged Congress

to revise the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill with the removal of the

provisions for American military reservations and to make

subject for further negotiations the subject of naval bases and

economic readjustment. This was done, the Tydings-McDuffie

Act adopted, modified in accordance with these recommendations.

The difficult days were still to come. The Philip­

pines had the independence act Quezon wanted, but it was now up

to the Philippine Legislature to accept and Implement it. On

this question was to arise the most bitter struggle in Philip­

pine political history until that time.

Upon his return to the Philippines, receiving a h e r o ’s

welcome, Quezon found two groups in opposition to the Tydings-

 10

McDuffie Act* The first was led by Osmefia who believed that

Quezon had secured the Act for his own political advantage and

that it was essentially the same as the H-H-C bill of the

previous year. The coldness which had developed between Quezon

and Osmefia over the fight with regard to the acceptance or

rejection of the H-H-C bill had now deepened, and the two

leaders were further apart than at any previous time in their

political careers. The second group was the increasing number

of discontented peasants as well as the more literate socialists

under the leadership of Pedro Abad Santos. The first group’s

opposition was soon dissipated. The second group, however,

was not so easily handled. The Sakdal uprising of 1935 will be

treated in subsequent pages; we may mention here, however, that

one of the surprises provided by the election of 1934 was the

strength shown by the Sakdalistas. Enough of them voted to

elect three members to the House of Representatives, one

provincial governor, and numerous municipal presidents, vice-

presidents, and councilors.

Both Quezon and Osmefia realized the necessity for a

unified approach to the problem of drafting a new government.

They, therefore, initiated a movement among their followers

for a fusion of the two opposing parties and a renewal of their

friendship. The late J.R. Hayden pointed out that the avowed

purpose of this fusion, which was finally achieved on June 16,

1935, was to secure agreement among the growing elements of the

nation for the establishment of the Commonwealth and the future

 11

Republic, and to place the execution of that program in the

hands of the same leaders who had in the past directed previous

campaigns for Independence.® In all likelihood, this fusion was

at best only one of expediency. It was not approved by the

great body of adherents in either of the two camps, many of

whom were left to shift for themselves with the unification of

the two parties.

Whether or not the critics of such a program approved

the mechanics of this fusion, it is undeniable that both

Quezon and Osmefia were being realistic in their approach to the

problem of organizing a government that was to prepare the

nation for ultimate Independence. American democracy, as such,

cannot be transplanted bodily from an indigenous environment

to a strange one, without suffering In the change many modifica­

tions of form and principle. Dr. Hayden repeatedly points out

that the Philippine Government has been, and always will be, a

government by Filipinos to satisfy Filipino requirements. It

is possibly quite true that had Osmefia remained in opposition

to Quezon and cooperated only in so far as it was necessary to

get the government started, the existence of a two-party system

might have prevented the growth of many forces which tended

during the period, and Immediately following the War, to promote

®For Dr. Hayden's acute analysis of the Coalition

Government, see his The Philippines: A Study in National
Development. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), pp. 367-375;
436; 543; 914-915; 920.
 12

weakness and disunion. It is interesting to note, in this

connection that, in 1940, Quezon went so far as to propose the

abolition of the multiple party system and a general revision

of democratic practices involving the surrender of a great

portion of individual liberties.

On May 1, 1934, the Philippine Legislature accepted

the Independence Act, and on July 30, a constitutional convention

convened to frame an organ for the Commonwealth as required by

the Act. After six months of labor, the convention completed

its task on February 8, 1935. On May 14, the Constitution was

presented to the people for their approval and as expected

was accepted by a vote of 1,157,962 against 39,920. Nine days

later, President Roosevelt approved the Constitution as submitted.

The following September, elections were held to select

a president, vice-president, and National Assembly which was to

be unicameral. Manuel L. Quezon was elected president by a

large majority but Sergio Osmefia received more votes for his

office than did Quezon. In addition, ninety-six assemblymen

were selected eliminating many members of the former Legislature

which had included a Senate of 24 and a House of 94. This was

to find an echo in an amendment of 1940 providing once again

for a bicameral legislature.

As constituted, the new government was provided with a

presidential term for six years and no re-election; the United

States retained control of defense and foreign relations,

 13

continued to exercise supervision over financial matters and

reserved the right to intervene to preserve the Commonwealth

Government. Appeals from decisions of courts in the Philip­

pines were to be carried to the United States Supreme Court.

The six years of the Commonwealth leading to the out­

break of war, were occupied with attempts at establishing the

new government and seeking means of laying a strong foundation

under the nation's economy in preparation for eventual indepen­

dence. The first act of the new National Assembly was the

National Defense Act providing for compulsory military training

supplementing the Constitutional provision for compulsory

civil service to the state. The third act of the Assembly was

to provide for the reorganization of the judiciary, reducing

the Supreme Court membership from nine to seven and creating

a Court of Appeals of fifteen members. A year later Courts of

First Instance were reorganized with the nation being divided

into nine judicial districts and an act was passed requiring

all justices of the peace to be duly qualified lawyers.

The main divisions of the Government were also re­

organized, the number of executive departments being increased

to nine, comprising: Interior, Finance, Justice, Agriculture

and Commerce, Public Works and Communications, Public Instruc­

tion,. National Defense, Labor, and Health and Public Welfare.

Within and under these were created many new commissions,

bureaus, councils and institutes having to do with national

 14

defense, economics, education, relief and public welfare,

special commissions for Mindanao and Sulu, the census, private

education, adult education, civil service, cooperatives, anti­

usury activities, national language and scientific research.

Filipino women had long held great prestige socially

and economically so with the emergence of the new government a

need was felt for their participation in the direction of their

national life. Therefore, in 1937, by a vote of ten to one,

the women of the nation ratified a national plebiscite providing

for woman suffrage. This had as a main result the increasing

appearance of women in the political life of the nation.

Despite warnings by opponents of the measure, there was no

appreciable change in political morality.

The structure of the Government was changed in 1940 by

the adoption of three amendments to the constitution. The

first, said to have sprung from "popular" demand for the re-

election of President (Quezon, provided that the tenure of

office of the President and Vice-President was to be four years

with an additional four years permitted if re-elected. The

second re-established a bicameral legislature springing from a

popular demand of unemployed representatives and the third

created an "independent" Commission on Elections composed of

three members. This Commission was not given coercive power.

A national plebiscite on June 18, 1940 approved these amendments

which were then submitted to President Roosevelt who approved

them on December 2, 1940.

 15

The first election, under the new provisions, was held

November 11, 1941, with President Quezon re-elected as President

and Sergio Osmefia re-elected Vice-President. It was the last

election in President Quezon's career. Both the President and

Vice-President were inaugurated in a solemn ceremony conducted

by General Douglas MacArthur on the Island Corregidor under

the fire of Japanese batteries on Bataan, following which the

Philippine Commonwealth Government went into exile in the United

States where, in 1944, shortly before the invasion by MacArthur

of the Philippines, President Quezon succumbed to the disease

which had steadily sapped at his incredible vitality throughout

his life. Sergio Osmefia assumed the office of President and

held it until the election of Manuel A. Roxas, in 1946, as first

President of the Philippine Republic.

The political history of the Commonwealth was char­

acterized by the alarums and excursions and teapot tempests so

much a part of the Philippine local scene. The greater portion

of these centered around the personality of President Quezon

whose brilliant, mercurial temperament became the focus for

everything that occurred during his administrations. Quezon was

the Government and every statement, every utterance, became the

occasion for analysis and evaluation which was to produce the

political currents of the period.

 16

He started his administration, in typical fashion, with

a quarrel with the Manila press. He attacked their reporting

mere rumors as fact and stated that if they were unable to get

the facts straight, he would take over the local radio station

and broadcast night and day. His charges were true, but the

press was not wholly to blame since the President had altered

the method of disseminating news following his assumption of

office. Former governors-general had met the press daily but

Quezon decided on a weekly conference. In order to have

interesting developments with which to keep their readers’

attention, the newspapers were reduced to securing information

from whatever source was available.

Continuing his attention to every detail of the life

of his nation, Quezon next attacked oil exploration grants which

had been given to American and Filipino firms. He cancelled

thirty-one of the total of sixty-three on the ground that their

fiscal organizations were inimical to Philippine interests and

were in violation of Philippine corporation laws. He indicated

that his next step would be a similar attack on the mining

companies. The fact that these were the largest dollar-producing

businesses in the Philippines remained outside the question and

the fact that the Philippines was unable to find and develop oil

resources has been ascribed to many reasons, none of which

considered the antipathy of the Government.

Quezon’s approach to local problems many times took

strange forms. Concerned with the peace and order situation he

exerted strenuous efforts to capture a notorious outlaw, one

Kulas Encallado, only to release him a day later to secure the

surrender of his followers. The bandit returned to his province

not a public enemy, said the Manila Bulletin, but "Public Hero

No. 1." This, the newspaper said, indicated that a half­

starved, aged bandit was recognized by the Government as being

more efficient in maintaining law and order than all the forces

of the Government. There were many serious problems facing the

country at this time: banditry was rampant, the Sakdals

represented a constant possible threat and profound agrarian

unrest was deepening throughout Luzon. The financial position

steadily deteriorated, with the main attention of the President

directed toward attacks on investments to curb oil speculation.

The President, whether from design or accident, continued to

meet such situations by an attention-getting move which

distracted the public and made it appear as though more efforts

were being exerted to solve the situation than was actually

the case. He resorted time and again through the years to

these tactics and was enormously successful in drawing attention

and criticism away from the central points by emphasizing

peripheral incidents which always captured the fancy of the

public.

Observers watched with appreciation and anxiety the

activities of High-Commissioner Frank Murphy, in whose person

they saw the only hope of maintaining stability in an uncertain

situation. The problems of protection of American property

 18

rights, the external and domestic stability of the country and

the worsening conditions in the Par East all demanded the closest

attention from the American executive in the Philippines. The

anxiety was caused by persistent reports that Mr. Murphy was to

be recalled to the United States to lend support to President

Roosevelt in Michigan and most observers believed that were

this done the strong, able hand needed would be difficult to

replace. That these fears were not unjustified became apparent

after the removal of Mr. Murphy with the appointment of Paul

McNutt, a statesman being replaced by a politician.

In February, the first step was taken by what was to

become a large group of Filipinos desirous of a continuation of

the Commonwealth status when Pedro Guevara, former Resident

Commissioner in Washington, advocated such a relationship in a

speech before the students of the College of Law, of the

University of Manila. He also warned against any alliance with

Japan which would mean "political, economic, and social

absorption."® Only by a maintenance of the existing relations,

he said, could the economic, social and cultural salvation of

the Filipinos be assured. The move to continue the Commonwealth

gained increasing strength until, by 1939, one group, the

Commonwealth Association, Inc., reported a membership of over

three thousand. Landowners, planters, merchants and labor

organizations joined the movement. One labor leader called on

®The New York Times. February 15, 1936.

 19

President Quezon in October, 1939, stating that more than indepenr

dence the Filipinos loved liberty. Quezon was reported to have

stated in reply that not all who talked of independence were the

real patriots. Whether this movement would have resulted in any­

thing concrete is difficult to say, for the High Commissioner,

Paul V. McNutt, felt called upon to render his opinion which

immediately aroused opposition and President Quezon who was far

from friendly with the High Commissioner, despite his private

leaning toward a continuation of the Commonwealth status, joined

the fray and succeeded in ending for the remainder of the

period any serious discussions about a movement which would

have been of the greatest benefit to the United States and the

Philippines.

President Quezon and President Roosevelt had issued a

joint memorandum on April 5, 1938, which, in essence, postponed

the economic independence of the Philippines until 1960. The

program embodied in the memorandum anticipated the conclusions

of the Joint Preparatory Committee which were released in May,

providing for an annual reduction of five per cent in the

American trade preferences for the Philippines, until by 1960

full duties would be imposed. The Report was endorsed by both

Presidents shortly after it was released and since 1960 seemed

far in the future, the Report marked the end of any further

serious economic planning in the Philippines to prepare for

that day.

Domestic conditions both with regard to peace and order

 20

and with regard to the nation's economy, continued to dete­

riorate steadily until by 1940 the President felt it necessary

to be granted emergency powers. These powers permitted the

President to control almost every aspect of the nation's

economy: farming industries, wages, profits, hours of work,

distribution of labor, transportation (including shipping),

public services, rents, and prices of primary necessities. The

days of the Commonwealth were numbered, however; the Japanese

effectively ended speculations as to the future in 1941. The

results of their occupation unquestionably completely altered

whatever plans were made for the future of the nation and with

economic problems not fully understood either in the United

States or the Philippines, the future existence of the nation

became questionable and highly problematical.

In his inaugural, President Quezon had announced a

three-fold program for the Commonwealth. The first, and

supposedly the most important, was the creation of a Philippine

Army and the drafting of a plan for national defense. The

second was a solution to domestic disorders through the "social

justice" campaign. The third was economic planning for the

purpose of establishing the Commonwealth on the road to

stability and progress. Through a series of events which may

or may not have been preventable, none of these three can be

said to have met with undivided success. The problem of national

defense, largely evolved by General Douglas MacArthur, was the

object of the first act of the special session of the National

 21

Assembly, mentioned above. This was to provide a standing army

of 19,000 men, of which 3,500 would be detailed to perform

functions of the Philippine Constabulary of glorious history.

The standing army was to be supplemented by a citizen reserve

which was expected to reach 500,000 men through the institution

of universal compulsory training. It was manifestly impossible

for the then existing armed forces of the Philippines to train

adequately the large number of men who were to be called

through the first registration; so it was planned that the

private colleges and universities of the nation would aid in

the training by the establishment of ROTC units, at their own

expense. This was expected to handle a considerable percentage

of the men to be trained. We shall speak of the social and

military implications and weaknesses of this plan in subsequent

pages. It need only be mentioned here that this plan created

much resentment, brought about real financial difficulty to

educational institutions affected and weakened morale in the

army in the early difficult days of the war. This situation

was responsible for much of the lack of coordination which

existed in the Philippine campaign of 1941 and 1942, and was

a characteristic of the army of the Republic. No army can be

completely democratic, but that is not to say that any army

cannot be trained democratically. The fact that a selected few

were given an opportunity for higher education and a greater

majority were trained in a helter-skelter, and many times in­

competent, fashion would not redound to the benefit or

efficiency of the Philippine Army. Too many of these ROTC-trained
 22

youths treated the men around them as though the latter were

their personal servants. Many a Filipino soldier felt that he

would be glad to die for his country but not for the benefit of

an "illustrado". President (Quezon refused to entertain

objections to this plan.

The peace and order problem was "settled" in a similar

desultory fashion. Bandits were slain, Sakdal leaders were

imprisoned, but the bandits remained and discontent and murmurings

arose from all corners of the nation increasing steadily, in

fact, from 1934 to 1941. It is never possible to solve an

agrarian problem by the imprisonment of a few leaders, ill-

advised as these leaders may be. Despite the passage of the

Minimum Wage Act, the Eight-Hour Labor Act, the Tenancy Act,

Public Defender Act, and the establishment of the Court of

Industrial Relations, the failure of adequate implementation of

these and allied measures illustrated the very real lack of

understanding on the part of Quezon and other government figures

as to the depths of the discontent in the agrarian regions.

This lack of understanding was responsible for the genesis of

the Hukbalahap of 1945 and following years.

New chartered cities were brought into existence, there

being eleven by 1941. The educational system of the nation was

the subject of some thought and consideration, resulting in the

Educational Act of 1940 which had not been suggested by the

special committee on education appointed by the President to

advise the Government on educational policies and necessary

 23

reforms in the existing system. This Educational Act provided

for the reduction of the elementary course from seven to six

years and provided for the adoption of what was called the

"double-single-session” whereby one teacher handled two separate

sets of students in one day. It raised the entrance age into

the school system to over seven but not more than nine years of

age and fixed the school year to run from July to April rather

than from June to March as formerly. It was agreed In later

years that while these were changes they were not accomplish­

ments. In addition, the Commonwealth instituted four broad

programs in public education. These were: the Piliplnization

of the system; emphasis on vocational education; stress on

character education, and establishment of free, compulsory

primary instruction. Educators in the early years of the

Republic were highly critical of the nature of these changes,

the consensus being that the program was a failure. Defenders,

on the other hand, point with some justice to the relatively

short period of time in which these were allowed to operate.

This defense, however, has not weakened the position of critics.

The most important task facing the Commonwealth lay In

developing a sound economy and solving the ever-present

agrarian problem. We shall discuss these in subsequent pages

at great length because of their supreme importance. 'We need

only say here that whether or not the programs envisioned by

the Commonwealth leaders would have succeeded, the outbreak of

the great Pacific War completely altered the circumstances and

 24

brought to a tragic halt the efforts begun with so much

enthusiasm. The War proved the greatest and most enduring

disaster in all Philippine history. The economy was utterly

disrupted. The face of the nation was scarred and maimed. A

moral decay infected like a virus the body politic and so

wasted the vigor of the nation that it was ill-prepared to

face the manifold challenges of independence which was

achieved July 4, 1946. Thus, Philippine history to be under­

stood or appreciated in the days of the Republic must be

examined in the light of the erections of plans and programs

which were either successes or failures. We thus begin by

studying in the following pages the folk economy which is the

life-blood of the Philippine nation.

 CHAPTER I

THE PLACE OP RICE, CORN, AND ABACA IN

THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY

The Philippines might present, to an economic deter-

mlnist, a prime example illustrative of his theories. The

history of the Philippines is the history of the land and the

people; the history of the economic development and attendant

problems and how these problems have been faced or avoided.

Economics, particularly the economics of the land, has been the

mainspring which has moved the wheels of Philippine history,

since agriculture has been and will continue to be, the chief

source of wealth. An analysis of Philippine political events

and institutions would be worthless without a clear under­

standing of the economic forces at work in the land, since as

Ellen C. Semple says, "A land is fully comprehended only when

studied in the light of its influence upon its people, and a

people cannot be understood apart from the field of its

activities.

The Philippines, in common with other Oriental nations,

has been plagued for generations with a land problem,2 and this

•^Influences of Geographic Environment. (New York* Henry

Holt & Co., 1947), p. 51.
o
Bernard H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara. (Cambridge, Mass.* Harvard
University Press, 1943), p. xvl 11The land system is derived
undoubtedly from the fact that the Philippines belonged to the
island world of Eastern Asia but they are, however, historically
only loosely connected with it.”

25
 26

problem during the period or the Commonwealth was seriously

heightened. The future seems to hold little promise that it

will be adequately solved under present or immediately foresee­

able conditions.

Studies have been made which are interpreted as

indicating that the Philippines can support a population six or

seven times greater than the present number. Despite the fact

that these and other theorists have said the land of the Philip­

pines can support this or that many millions of people, in

actuality it cannot. In 1941, the Philippines consumed 58

million bushels of rice and produced less than 54 million,

importing from Southeast Asia around 2 million bushels. Since

the land is at present incapable of supporting the needs of

its people with the basic food commodity of rice, needing in

fact, to import from other Oriental countries and the United

States vast amounts of the cereal, it Is flying in the face of

fact to state boldly that is now possible to support Its

population. The possibility the theorists have in mind can only

come about with a vast increase in the amount of tillable land,

the wider utilization of fertilizers and modern methods of

agricultural production, the settlement of age-old problems of

land-ownership, and the improvement of methods of distribution.

The average Filipino farmer is land-hungry and nearly desperate.4

^1948-49 production was 56,620,000 cavans representing a

deficiency from requirements of more than 8,000,000 cavans.

4Florence Horn, Orphans of the Pacific. (New York:

Reynal, 1941), p. 111.
 27

Despite the congestion of population in Central Luzon, for

instance, the nation as a whole is relatively underpopulated

If one compares its 147 persons per square mile to that of

Japan with 488, Java with 822, and Belgium with 712. The fact

is that population is very unevenly distributed. This may be

attributable in some measure to the natural features of the

land, but there is no question that the undeveloped road

system and the deadening nature of the tenancy system have

contributed greatly to this condition.

Despite the fact that early in the American regime an

effort was made to redistribute the centuries-old church lands

and feudal estates, the divisions of these areas proceeded

slowly and spasmodically. It was upon these lands, more than

anywhere else in the Philippines that conditions which can be

described only as slavery and peonage were bo be found.®

American authorities and enlightened Filipino public servants

bent every effort to encourage the acquisition of such lands by

people working on them. However, they were able to accomplish

very little because of the apalling ignorance, and the even

more appalling poverty, of those they hoped to benefit. Couple

5
Apart from the Moro territories where slavery is
sanctioned both by religion and custom and is mitigated by
special provisions in the Koran and the Lawarn Code.

Over one-third of the population in 1939 belonged to a

group of laborers ten years old or over, of which two-thirds
were engaged in agriculture. Of this latter figure, less than
half were farmers and owners, the remainder being mere laborers.
Catherine Porter. Crisis in the Philippines. (New York: Knonf.
1942), p. 64. ----
This will be treated in detail in the second volume.
 28

these facts with the reluctance of the great landed proprietors

to sell their properties at less than exorbitant sums, their

corruption and power, the inadequacy of the educational system,

and the general ignorance of the historical forces at work in

East Asia and we get a picture which helps explain the eruptive

nature of the Philippine scene during and after the war years.

Mindanao, the second largest island, contains 36,292

square miles. This is 14,000 square miles less than the area

of Java, which contains, however, a population of 42 million,

while that of Mindanao has but 1,828,071. The island of

Bantayan contains 640 persons per square mile; Luzon, 180; and

Mindanao but 49. These figures indicate the maldistribution

of population in the Philippines; they, however, apply only to

the country as a whole since many of the provinces have now

reached the saturation point.® Some shifting of the population

has occurred since the war, but not enough to change signif­

icantly the picture. Whatever fertile and empty land is

available will be much needed in the future, for the population

has been increasing at a somewhat greater rate than was

characteristic of Western countries in the Nineteenth Century.7

®Cebu had a population, in 1939, per square mile of

628; Iloilo, 576; La Union, 422. Trinidad A. Rojo, "Philippine
Population Problems," Philippine Social Science Review. XI,
No. 2 (May, 1939), 135-136, passim.

7Warren Thompson, Population and Peace in the Pacific.

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press7TT946), p7~275T See also
pp. 274-282 for an excellent discussion of currents In Philip­
pine economy which bode ill for the prosperity of the country.
 29

The Philippines has a favorable soil, temperature and

rainfall which would guarantee an excellent production of

agricultural commodities. Though not so fertile as the Island

of Java, it is rich enough, with a greater use of fertilizers

and with more economic farming methods, to provide adequately

for the needs of the nation.® Those areas in which the

population is concentrated, largely river valleys, seashores

and watered plains, have been cultivated intensively for many

generations. So great has been the industry of the people that

even the forested and almost inaccessible mountains have been

forced to yield their share. The chief concern of the population

is with the production of rice. This cereal, in the Philippines

as in other Eastern nations, is more than a mere agricultural

commoditys it is currency, and it is the basis of many

religious ceremonies. Many varieties are grown, ranging from

the brown and red rice consumed by the poorest to the purple

and black rice available only to the wealthy. So important is

rice to the Filipinos that at each stage of its growth and

production it receives a distinct name.

Rice Is found in almost every portion of the archipelago,

both In the lowlands and on terraced slopes. Most of it is the

so-called "wet rice” so common to monsoon Asia. However, it Is

also grown as a dry crop, the original method in the Philippines,

in the mountainous regions and in areas in which irrigation is

8 Ibid.
 30

impracticable or impossible. Both types of cultivation, in all

regions, have traditions and customs which have become an

integral part of the Philippine scene. Many of the customs are

derived from the Malayan heritage of the Filipino people, some

have been borrowed from Indo-China and China, while others are

indigenous to the Philippines.

In addition, many of the techniques are quite dissimilar.

They are fascinating and illustrate the tenacity of ancient

tradition and the effects of differing cultures in the native

milieu. For instance, in some sections of the province of

Batangas, survivals of ancient practices are merged with

activities illustrative of the Catholic influence in the life

of the peasant.

Nothing is more interesting to the Western observer

in the Philippines than the many customs and traditions

associated with this rice culture. It is evident to the most

casual eye that this cereal is the very backbone of Philippine

civilization and economy. To a nation such as the United States

such dependence upon one crop is almost unbelievable, and this

along with other great economic and cultural differences between

the two countries must be constantly kept in mind if we are to

appreciate the nature of the relations between the two countries.

Despite the fact that the Philippine archipelago has

 31

land available for an appreciable increase in the production

of rice, it has never been able to raise enough for its own

needs.^ In the rice-growing provinces of Ilocos 3ur, Ilocos

Norte, and Abra, ninety per cent of the farms are below one

hectare in size and ninety-nine per cent under five hectares.10

It is obviously impossible to expect much increase in the

yield of this section of Luzon, without an intensive adoption

of new methods of agriculture. Under the present system, an

individual is obviously limited in the amount he can produce

from one to nine acres.

Investment in farm industries has largely been in the

hands of the Filipinos, especially with regard to investments

of land and improvements.^^- The Filipino Investment in 1935

was well over ^3,000,000,000, the greater part of which was

represented by native farming. Rice showed an investment of

12
one and one-half billion pesos.

The area of rice lands, some 1,900,000 hectares before

the war, represented nearly half of the area planted to all

other crops. The production, before the war, of around fifty

®See above, p. 26.

Importer, L o c . cit.. quoting Horacio Lava, Levels of

Living in the Ilocos Region. Philippine Council, Institute of
Pacific Relations (Manila, 1938), 91 pp.

11This was shown by a survey conducted in November

1935. See the Philippine Statistical Review. No. 4, 1935
(Manila, 1936), Department of Agriculture and Commerce.

-*-2Porter, op cit. . p. 76.

 32

million cavans (or one hundred million bushels) had a value

exceeding that of any other product, including sugar. Produc­

tion increased from 19,000,000 cavans in the five-year period

1910-1914,^® to 54,129,940 cavans in 1 9 4 1 . ^ The production

for the year 1946 was reported as 36,000,000 cavans,^® some­

what less than the figures reported for the period 1920-1924.^-®

The increase was traceable to the encouragement given by the

Government during the First World War to rice growers, to the

imposition of a high tariff on imported rice, to the opening

of homestead lands, to the institution of much needed irrigation

facilities in some sectors, and to the use of improved seeds,

many types of which were developed by scientists in the Depart­

ment of Agriculture, the Bureau of Science and the University

13
Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Rice
Industry in the Philippines (Manila, 1939), p. 15.

-^Bureau of Census and Statistics, Yearbook of Phillp-

Statistics| 1946 (Manila, 1947), p. 145. This latter figure
is disputed by some officials of the former Department of
Agriculture and Commerce.

15Ibld.

l^Rlce industry in the Philippines, loc. cit. It is

interesting to compare figures of area, production and value
during post-war years: 1945-46: 1,649,960 (hectares),
36,893,940 (cavans), ^553,409,100; 1946-47: 1,879,600 (has.),
47,460,030 (cavans), ^679,519,400; 1947-48: 2,026,380 (has.),
50,928,480 (cavans), ^656,431,390; 1948-49: 2,164,100 (has.),
56,620,000 (cavans), ^772,682,800. It is estimated that the
crop year, 1949-1950, will produce 58,000,000 cavans, which
however will represent a deficiency of 8,000,000 cavans from
demand and consumption. Manila Bulletin. Vol. 141, No. 73,
(March 27, 1950), Section 6, p. 3.
 33

of the Philippine^.

The people of the Philippines, then, before the war

17
consumed more than one billion kilos of clean rice. This

figure included imported rice, which item, the Department

believed, could be eliminated by increasing the rice producing

areas some 16,500 h e c t a r e s . ' T h e belief of the Department

that the entire needs of the country could be met through the

utilization of large tracts of land available for rice in

19
Cotabato, the Bicol region, Nueva Viscaya, Samar, etc., was

based largely on wishful thinking, as events since have proven.

So, too, was their bald statement that "the problems of making

the country self-sufficient in rice would take care of them­

selves."^ Agricultural problems never take care of themselves;

they must be directed through continuing processes -- in the

Philippines, by paternalism on the part of the Government. Too

much reliance was placed on the mere opening of vacant land to

production, notably in Mindanao. A fault common to all peoples

is the belief that a projected program is consummated when it

is formulated and presented for action. Between the dream and

reality a wide gulf exists. Many critics of Government,

particularly in the Philippines during the Commonwealth period,

pointed to the common belief that a problem was solved at the

moment of drawing up plans for its solution. Filipinos as well

as Americans commented, half bitterly and half in amusement, on

170£. cit.. p. 17. 18Ibld. 19Ibld

20Ibid., p. 18.
 34

the initial enthusiasm of "la Government bureau for a projected

task and the subsequent collapse of this enthusiasm when

21
confronted with the necessity of implementing the program.

The Department suggested certain steps to be taken in

increasing the production of rice in the country:

....greater efforts should be made in the direction of

replacing the low-yielding varieties of rice with the
superior seeds in certain provinces. By this means
alone, a general increase of 10 per cent in the produc­
tion can be expected.
Green manures or planting of secondary crops in
rotation with rice should be practiced.... In the same
manner, proper fertilization.with mineral fertilizers
should be taken up gradually.
Large tracts of rice lands may be grown to peanuts,
beans... and cotton....
Prom social and economic aspects the area of the
tenant's holding should be made larger than it is at
present to provide him and his family with an indepen­
dent source of i n c o m e . 2 2

Some steps were taken to implement this program during the

Commonwealth period, but, in the main, its application lies in

the future.

The greatest concentration in rice production lies

within the Central Plain of Luzon. This area, before the war,

was responsible for the production of over two-thirds of the

nation's crop. The vicinity of Lingayen Gulf, in Northern

Luzon, the southern areas of the island of Panay (in the

2lfhis characteristic is called "Niflgas Kugon" ("burns

like cogon"), i.e.. it burns quickly and dies quickly. See
Mang Kiko (Francisco B. Icasiano), Horizons from My Nlpa H u t .
(Manila, 1941), pp. 33-37.

22T . a.
Loc. cit.
 35*-a.

FOUR CLIMATIC TYPES OF THE PUILIPPINES

TVPMOONS

v VBEV
>PR*.QueHT

»it TYPE
ZnJ TYP»
3rd TYPE
4<K TYPE VER.V
FtEausNr
> vl '/o

FREQUEMT
19^

&

FftlftUIMT
 35 -b

Visayas), and the region surrounding Lake Lanao in Mindanao,

are other important sources. Incorporated within these areas

are the two main climatic zones responsible for the varying

methods of cultivation. One zone has definite wet and dry

seasons, the other has a maximum rainfall with no perceptible

dry season. Two other types of climate exist in the Philip­

pines, but because of the year-round intermittent rainfall,

those areas which fall within them are more suited to the

production of crops other than rice, such as corn and abaca.

In the areas of pronounced variation in annual precipitation,

only one crop a year is produced, while, in the other major

type areas, two crops a year are usual. With the extension of

irrigation facilities, lands lying within the first category

will also be able to produce two crops, thus considerably

increasing the yearly production of grain. The zone in which

two crops are grown with the aid of irrigation is called palagad.

which can be translated, "short crop.” Grain is planted In

May and harvested In July, after which a second crop is planted.

The present Government is laying plans for an extension of

irrigation in Central Luzon, in the hope of easing the almost-

desperate situation in this region and Northern Luzon.

23
See map indicating climatic regions. Rainfall, In
both major climatic regions, is ample, the precipitation in
the first (wet and dry) averaging around 82 inches and in the
second (no dry) 71 inches. Months taken are June to October in
the first and November to March in the second. O p . cit.. p. 6.
 36

Coupled with rice as an important commodity is corn.

The problems of the two grains can be considered together and

were so considered by President Quezon and the Government; for

those to whom rice was not the main staple depended upon corn

as a source of food and income. In Cebu the lives of t h e

people are as closely bound to the success or failure of

corn as people in other parts of the land are bound to rice.

When the corn crop fails, as it did in 1948-1949, in Cebu, the

people suffer semi-starvation, imposing an additional burden

24-
upon the already overtaxed Philippine economy. ^ A short trip

through the rough interior of the island, and along the sharp,

spiny regions marking its center, is enough to illustrate the

importance of corn in the life of the people. Hillsides of

terrifying steepness, small plateaus jutting out from the

ridges,narrow stream bottoms and the tiny cleared yards around

the homes are all planted to corn.

This great dependence upon corn did not always exist.

At the time of the Rebellion in 1898, corn was raised only in

scattered localities by comparatively few people. It had been

brought to the Philippines during the great galleon

^ I n May of 1949, the author spent some time in Cebu at

which time the corn crop was causing some anxiety because of
dry weather and the resultant stunted nature of the crop. It
was learned, through conversations with people in the barrio
markets, that the price was rising rapidly causing great hard­
ship to individuals most of whom are earning from between
thirty and fifty centavos a day (fifteen to twenty-five cents).
 37

trade with Mexico.25 It had never gained much popularity among

the people; but since officials during the American regime

recognized that rice had to be supplemented in the diet of the

people, it became the policy of the Government to encourage corn.

With the establishment of barrio schools, the opportunity

presented itself and students were instructed in the techniques

of planting and cultivating corn in school gardens, the

produce being distributed to the families of the students. By

the time of the Commonwealth, enough corn was grown to provide

26
three million people with the main staple of their diet.

Despite this encouragement, the yields have generally been low.

According to a recent survey by American and Filipino agricul­

tural experts three main factors are responsible: "the use of

poor seeds, inadequate preparation of the land, and lack of

mineral or organic fertilizers."27 In addition, they commented

there is "great difficulty in reducing the moisture content of

25For a remarkable and fascinating account of this

galleon trade, see W. Lytle Schurz, The Manila Galleon. (New
York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1938), 453 pp.
Pfi
Porter, o p . cit.. p. 66.
Production, in 1940, was 10,038,340 cavans of 57 kilos.
This was increased slightly in 1942 but production dropped off
during the years between 1942 and 1946, in which latter year,
production was estimated at almost 6,000,000 cavans. Yearbook
of Philippine Statistics: 1946 (Manila, 1947), p. 149.

27Report. Philippine-United States Agricultural Mission,

Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, I.A.C. Series No. 3, June 1947, Washington D.C.,
p. 18.
 38

the grain for safe storage. Production could be increased by an

expanded extension program of demonstration on private farms to

encourage adoption of improved practices."^8

The present indications are that corn is increasing as

one of the principal foods of the Filipinos, some 28 per cent

of the population, in 1950, using it as their principal item of

diet. This represents an increase of 6 per cent since 1937. Its

use will, in all likelihood, increase in the years to come,

as the Bureau of Plant Industry is conducting a campaign to

make the Filipino corn conscious. The main purpose is, of

course, to wean some of the people from too much dependence

upon rice as their main food, but there are other objects as

well. Corn has a higher calorie value than rice, is richer in

vitamin A, and it has a higher percentage of protein and fat

than rice, while the corn germ is an excellent source of

vitamin B^.

In 1949, production was about 88 per cent of the last

prewar year, 1941, falling short by 2,155,527 cavans of the

goal of 10,391,053 cavans. Production, by 1950, had not yet

reached consumption requirements, but with the high price of

corn it was expected to increase rapidly. The FAO hoped to

reach an annual production of at least 13,603,544 cavans by

1954, which may well be actual requirements by that date. A

complicating factor here lies in the fact that the Philippines

2 8 Ibid
 39

PAO Committee has set definite targets of acreage production

which differ rqther sharply from those established by the Depart­

ment of Agriculture and Natural Resources. For instance, the

PAO wished to reduce the per capita daily consumption of 300

grams, while the Department desired an increase in consumption

for the reasons just mentioned.

The Bureau of Plant Industry, in 1949, stated also: "It

would be to the great advantage of the corn industry and of the

country if the various plans and work, present and future, of

the different government entities on the corn industry are

properly coordinated or integrated."99 This rather wistful

hope should be implemented. As the Bureau stated, "Except that

there is, by common consent, a plan to increase corn production,

we find no integrated plan of doing this, neither a plan for

the improvement and development of the corn industry in general."

That too many cooks were concerned seems plain. There is the

Bureau of Plant Industry, which is the most concerned since it

is in charge of production in general; the National Development

Company, more particularly its subsidiary, the RICPA (The Rice

and Corn Production Administration); the NARIC; and the PRATRA

(Philippine Relief and Trade Rehabilitation Administration).

The NARIC is concerned with procurement and Manila distribution,

^ Annual Report of the Bureau of Plant Industry Including

Progress in the Rehabilitation of Plant Industries for the Crop
Year Ending June 30. 1949. (Manila, 1949), p. 25. MS Copy loaned
the author by M. Manas y Cruz and Jose Q. Dacanay, Nov., 1949.
 40

and the PRATRA with price regulation, while the RICPA was charged

with the production of corn in certain specific areas on a large

scale.3^ Such duplication defeated the basic purpose of all

these agencies, which was to better the lot of the individual

Filipino, both as producer and consumer.

In the production of corn, many of the same problems as

in rice cultivation are met. The Bureau and other agencies have

drawn up plans to meet them. The distribution by the Bureau of

better varieties alone increased, by 1949, the average yield per

hectare, where used, from 9.72 to 15.6 cavans per hectare. It

is to be hoped that the Bureau will receive the appropriations

to carry out its excellent program and that the proposed

streamlining of the Government will eradicate the duplication of

effort.
3

Abaca, "the most valuable of all fibers for cordage,"31

is generally known as "Manila" or "Manila hemp." It resembles

the banana plant so closely that to unskilled eyes the plants

appear identical. The Philippines are thought to have been the

original home of the plant but it thrives even there only under

limited conditions: in clay loam soil, in regions of evenly

distributed rainfall.

3®For an excellent discussion of RI C P A fs weakness in

this respect, see: L.O. Ty, "So Far - So Bad," Philippines
Free Press. Vol. XLI, Nos. 17-20 (April - May, 1950, pp. 4,
57; 38-40; 16, 52; 16, 40.

31Encyclopedia Brltannica. (Chicago; Encyclopaedia

Britannica, Inc., 1947 edition), Vol. 1, p. 5.
 41

The Philippines produce fifty-seven varieties, of which

eight are commercially important and thirty-five sold. It

early became the leading export of the country holding that

position until 1920. In 1937, it ranked fourth among the major

crops, covering 502,700 hectares, eleven per cent of the total

cultivated area, and was valued at ^95,000,000. Exports for

that year were valued at 1=43,279,373, an increase over the year

1934, of 125,976,237. It supported some 2,500,000 people and

brought revenues of12,000,000, to the Commonwealth Government.

During the Commonwealth period, it was the third largest export

item, representing twelve per cent of the total exports by

value. The leading abaca producing provinces were Davao, Albay,

Sorsogon, Leyte, Camarines Sur, Samar, and Surigao. Albay,

Sorsogon, and Camarines are parts of the Bicol district, the

large peninsular-like portion of Luzon running to the south-east.

Abaca was exported to some thirty countries, the leading

customers being the United States, Japan and Great Britain.

This investment, the experts declared, was in danger unless

planters would be willing to allow their plantations to lie

fallow and open virgin lands every twenty-eight years. Unless

this were done, production would inevitably decline and disaster

result to the industry. Whether for this reason or not, by

June 30, 1947, hectarage had fallen to 280,840, and production

I-.*-
to 82,000 metric tons worth 125,891,040. The 1937 hectarage had

produced 3,171,170 piculs.

 42

.The total average planted in Davao, Albay and Sorsogon

amounted to 259,690 hectares, equivalent to 53 per cent of the

national total and was worth over 67 per cent of all total value.

These areas produced no less than thirty-five grades.

Costs of production throughout the Islands were general­

ly about equal. In Davao, however, new machinery advanced

methods of production and lowered costs while stripping eight

piculs an hour per machine. While it reduced costs per bale,

it also reduced the number of grades. The average cost per

hectare, in the leading provinces, was 184.00, and the net

average income was 152.50.

Abaca produced four major products: cordage, knotted

abaca, thread, and twine. Before the War (using 1937 as a base

year), there were five cordage factories, with a total invest­

ment of 1=4,900,000, fifty per cent of which was American. The

total spindle capacity was 125,450,000 kilos, consuming annually

38,247,000 kilos of fiber (about 600,000 piculs). Costs of

producing one short ton of cordage (1931-1935), ranged from

1=92.00, to 1108.00. The making of cordage is an old industry in

the Philippines and is as old as the earliest people In the

country. Still today there are many areas In which machine-made

•?2
The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philip­
pines . 1937-1938. (Manila: Publishers Inc., 1938), p. 283.

35Ibid.. p. 284.
 43

cordage has not been introduced and ropes are made by hand, from

the bark of trees, shrubs, rattan and other material. In many

towns near the City of Manila, ropes are made from cabo-negro

(a type of palm growing in marshy places), lubirin, bamboo and

other local materials, besides, abaca, maguey, and sisal.

The development of the industry had three stages:

hand-made, the rope-walk method introduced late in the Nineteenth

Century, and the machine method begun at the beginning of the

present century. The first rope factory was established about

the end of the previous century, but it was only in 1909 that the

first modern factory was established by Juan Feliciano and

Sisters, a Filipino concern now long out of business. Other

factories, such as the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company (1911), the

Elizalde Rope Factory (formerly Ynchausti Rope Factory, 1917),

the General Manufacturing Company (1923), and the Manila

Cordage Factory (1924), gradually assumed the leading position

they held throughout the Commonwealth. The number of persons

employed averaged around 1,030, and the number directly dependent

upon the industry averaged around 5,000.

Knotted abaca was generally shipped to Germany and

France, with the United States taking 4 per cent of the average

total value (1927-1936). The manufacture of thread and twine

was and is in its Infancy. In 1930, they were valued as

export, at 1*15,000, and in 1936, at only 1*10,000, with the United

^ Philippine Journal of Commerce. Vol. XIV, No. 2

(February, 1938), p. 29.
 44

States taking 77 per cent of the average total value. The

Bureau of Plant Industry conducted experiments in the manufacture

of sacking and encouraged the production of this item in those

areas periodically haunted by unemployment. Before the far, the

BIcol region took the lead in this industry, which, fortunately,

became an important household handicraft item during the lean

years immediately preceding and following the War. This Industry,

if continued and expanded, as a household craft would Immeasur­

ably lift the living standard of the people in areas of decreasing

quantity production of the fiber. The Bureau of Plant Industry

also exhibited the possibility of manufacturing a type of linen

for men's suits from abaca, and encouraged the development of

minor industries to provide cheap consumer goods, such as mosquito

nets, uppers for slippers, shoes, sandals, cushions, doilies,

vanity cases, belts, purses, billfolds, cigarette cases, ties,

hats, rugs, doormats and mops. The development of these items

had barely begun at the outbreak of the War but showed consider­

able importance for future encouragement and attention.

The local consumption of abaca was low. While local

cordage firms consumed about 8,000 short tons annually, only

30 per cent of the total production was consumed locally. The

10-year average production (1927-1936) of 183,700 short tons,

after deducting local consumption, showed an export balance of

175,000 short tons. The average value for these exports over

the same period was 3*36,026,545, with the United States taking

an average of 36.7 per cent of the total. The average value,

 45

over the same period, of fiber imports was 151,066,992, the

United States supplying 47.7 per cent of the total. These

imports consisted of brooms, brushes, miscellaneous fibers,

silk (Natural and artificial), cotton and its manufactures,

and wires and cables. The United States, then, enjoyed a

favorable balance of trade amounting to some 111,000,000, which,

if invisible items (such as interest, profits, and freight

charges and insurance) were included, would be considerably

greater.

While this was tragic enough, the picture was hardly

improved by the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law. The

Law provided that the United States would permit the exporta­

tion of three million pounds of cordage annually which would

be admitted free of duty during the first five years of the

Commonwealth. This amount represented but half the average

annual shipments for the 10-year period, 1927-1936. Then,

beginning the sixth year, in addition to this limitation, the

United States would impose import taxes increasing progressive'

ly from 5 per cent of the full duty (2 cents) per pound, to

25 per cent in the tenth year. This would amount, in the latter

year, to 188.00, a ton. This wouild mean that it would be

impossible for the Philippines to ship and sell even to U.S.

Pacific Coast ports, since the lowest possible price per ton

(3/4 inch and up) was 1160.00. The cost of manufacture was

approximately 1100.00 per ton, freight rates to Pacific Coast

ports were 1=47.30, per ton, making the total delivered cost
 46

^253.30 per ton, representing a loss to the manufacturer of over

1*75.00, aside from the additional payment of a local sales tax

of one and a half per cent. Only the finest grades, selling for

£300.00 a ton, would survive, but these grades were in limited

production.

The Cordage Act of June 14, 1935, effective on May 1,

1936, amended the Tydings-McDuffie Law by permitting the annual

quota, admitted duty-free, to be set at six million pounds;

above this, however, none could be shipped even upon payment of

the full duty. At the expiration of this Act, the provisions

of the Independence Law would become again effective. Mr.

Antonio Vallejo, Vice-president of the Philippine Fiber Products,

Inc., believed that the only course open to Philippine abaca

producers was research. He cited the growing use of rayon as

illustrative both of the results of research and the dangers

facing the industry outside the field of governmental limita­

tion. There were many disturbing factors within the industry

it seemed.

The culture, as carried on by individual producers,

was and Is inefficient and wasteful. The average small

producer plants on a hillside, first removing the valuable

forest cover; the plants are set out before weeds can grow and

then are cultivated with a bolo. On the large Japanese-owned

plantations, before the War, tillage was quite a different

matter, and it was there that the best abaca was produced, the

^ Op. cit.. pp. 299-300.

 47

type that established the reputation of "Manila hemp."

The process of "stripping" the fiber from the stalk is

the determining factor in the quality of product achieved. The

individual producer draws the leaf petioles, from which the

fiber is obtained, through a roller across a knife edge. As the

covering is drawn away from the fiber, It acts as a polishing

and softening agent which gives it its high, golden gloss so

admired by manufacturers. In one producing section of Albay,

the producers are so jealous of their product that they never

allow the fiber to touch the ground. It is drawn from the

stripper on to wooden supports, and is then hung up to dry

being handled with extreme care by the stripper.

While this method requires much hand labor and Is

relatively expensive, no mechanical stripper, or decorticator,

has been invented which produces the same high quality fiber.

The machine-produced fiber is baled and shipped with short,

broken and weakened strands which must be discarded before a

quality cordage is manufactured. Each strand, in the hand-

stripping method, is carefully handled and graded before it is

baled and shipped. Despite the mechanization employed by

Japanese producers, this stage of its production was always

accomplished by hand labor (except on the Furukawa plantation).

The NAFCO (National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation) is

reluctant to allow the use of mechanical decorticators in

 48

rebuilding the industry.'-*® What is apparently needed is a

mechanical decorticator which will strip the fiber and discard short

weak strands at the same time.

Despite the importance of abaca to the export trade of

the Philippines, the growth of the industry was slow and uneven.

The area planted and the annual production was determined by

price fluctuations. When the price rose producers hurriedly

stripped and sold as much of t he fiber as possible, thus glutting

the market and causing prices to fall. This resulted in the

limiting of production, the laying-off of workers and general

instability of the industry.

Plantations, before the War, were generally divided into

three groups: industrialized holdings, big haciendas and

This is not the official position of NAFCO but, in

1950, they exhibited no enthusiasm when the subject was
discussed. For a popular presentation about the modernization
of the industry, see Jose B. Santos: "A Close Up of Our Post
War Abaca Industry," The Evening News (Supplement), Vol. 140,
Sept. 30, 1949, p. 6. The main reason for the championing of
machinery for stripping, in this article, seems to be the fact
that it will produce "daily ten to twenty times the amount" of
fiber produced by the old hand method. Mr. Santos states "it
will produce uniform grades through the exercise of a little
care," but inspectors, with whom the author has discussed the
problem, are unanimous in stating just the opposite. From
personal observation, the author agrees with these inspectors.
The most casual eye, in comparing machine-stripped and hand-
stripped abaca, readily sees the tremendous difference in
quality. The most cursory examination reveals the superiority
of the hand-stripped product. The admonition, by Mr. Santos,
to the planters to keep their plantations clean, however, is
excellent advice as the mosaic disease now attacking so much of
the country's abaca is attributable to unclean plantations and
careless production.
 49

ordinary small plantations. In the first group were large

plantations applying modern methods of agriculture, using

mechanical devices and artificial methods of drying. The

second group comprised large haciendas operating in the old

ways but using some machinery and animal power and efficient

methods of drying the fiber. The third group, by far the

largest, consisted of plantations owned by small farmers who

operated only in traditional ways. They did no plowing, had

little idea about the best planting methods, and stripped the

fiber by hand using a bolo or other knife edge. In drying,

they utilized only sunshine. If it rained after the fiber was

hung, they had to await the uncertain reappearance of the sun.

While hand-stripping produces the best fiber, it is tedious,

hard work, and the stripper can work only three or four days

at a time.

With the Japanese preoccupation of Davao as a major

producing area, the important portion of the industry shifted

from its old home, the Bicol region, to Mindanao. The

increased production of the fiber in Davao resulted from

modernization of financing, cultivation and production, which

reduced costs as well. In most areas, outside Davao, workers

cleaned only the ground immediately around the plants to be

stripped, whereas Davao workers before the War methodically

cleaned the entire plantation until it took on the appearance

of a well-kept garden. The dried and yellowed leaves of the

abaca plants were carefully strewn on the cleared areas so as

 50

to fertilize and inhibit the growth of weeds. Small producers

also overcut, that is, they stripped both the mature and immature

plants which returned a temporary profit but eventually lowered

the standard of the fiber.

As early as 1937, planters in the Visayan and Bicol

regions were warned that unless improvement was made in the

production of the fiber, these plantations would probably be

forced to suspend operations. This prediction was borne out

during the Commonwealth period when the price of abaca dropped

alarmingly, causing acute distress in the Visayas and Bicol.

When, after the War, the price of abaca was high, and the Davao

area was practically at a standstill, these marginal producers

reaped large profits, but seriously damaged their holdings. If,

as is hoped, the Davao area regains its leadership the producers

in these marginal areas will be hard-pressed to meet the situation.

Manila hemp, before the War, was marketed under three

classifications: '’ordinary'’ (also known as Manila or "open-

grade"); "housemark," and "Davao.” "Ordinary" hemp was produced

in the provinces of Leyte, Samar, Albay, Sorsogon, Camarines

Norte, Camarines Sur, and other minor districts. Hemp which was

sold in loose form to exporters who themselves supervised the

grading and classification was baled and sold under the buyer's

mark and was denominated "housemark." "Davao” grade was produced

in Davao and immediately surrounding areas, almost exclusively

by Japanese. It ordinarily sold at much higher prices than the

 51

others despite its harshness of texture. Many manufacturers

learned to prefer the heavier Davao grade to the finer, silkier

product of other regions. The preference, in 1950, seemed to

be toward the latter, with the increasing use of other materials

in cordage manufacture, such as cellulose substitutes (Nylon,

etc.), setting the competitive standard.

Before the War, marketing was carried on in two ways.

One was the method of Japanese producers and the other was that

of Filipino planters. The Filipino method returned to the

small grower only a fraction of what the product brought on

the market. The hemp was first bought by rural buyers, general­

ly Chinese and "sari-sari" store owners, who acquired the fiber

as payment for loans to the needy farmer. These buyers then

sold to provincial merchants, also generally Chinese, in large

towns or provincial capitals. These, in turn, disposed of the

product to the wholesale traders in shipping centers or to

branches of exporting houses in Manila. After reaching the

export point, it was sold to exporters directly or through

brokers. In a few cases, the planter sold directly to wholesale

merchants and in very rare cases directly to exporters. Thus,

the fiber passed through four intermediary hands after leaving

the small producer.

The Japanese method illustrated the superiority of a

systematic procedure in marketing. The planter sold his fiber

almost always to the exporter., eliminating three wasteful steps

 52

and bringing to the producer the highest return for his labors

and investment.

The NAFCO upon its establishment sought to educate the

small producers to sell through the corporation, duplicating

the Japanese method for the benefit of small farmers who were

continually cheated of a just return for their labors. This

was no small task and was in 1950 one of the major raisons

d'etre of the NAFCO.

Another factor that favored the Japanese producer was

his participation in cooperative marketing associations.

Despite the efforts of various Government entities to persuade

the Filipino to organize such associations, little success was

37
achieved along this line.

Other problems which hindered the optimum operation of

the industry were the lack of a recognized basis for grading

the fiber in the hands of the producers, financial insolvency

during the periods of price fluctuations, cut-throat competition

37
° As a general rule, the Filipino is traditionally dis­
interested in cooperative enterprises. (For an excellent
illustration of this characteristic, sees Juan Cabreros Laya,
His Native Soil. University Publishing Co., Inc., Manila, 1941,
424 p p .) There are, of course, several exceptions, such as a
farming cooperative in Surigao and the Bicol, and a marriage
cooperative elsewhere, but these are of little economic
importance, taking the economy as a whole. The continuing
failures of Government-sponsored cooperatives has been a major
factor in prolonging this attitude. Cooperative members have
seen their investments frittered away in frivolous projects or
by outright malversation of funds. For a recent example, see;
The Sunday Times. Vol. V, No. 284 (May 28, 1950), p. 1. An
exception to the general rule, is the CAPCA (See below).
 53

in the local market, an unequal position vis-a-vis the merchants

and a general lack of concerted effort to withstand financial

reverses. All these demanded organization and cooperative action.

The failure to take advantage of the provisions of the Cooperative

Marketing Law (Act No. 3425, as amended) kept the industry from

achieving the stable basis needed for the best return to producers.

Producers were not lacking in initiative. Poor prices forced

those in the industry to seek other methods of increasing their

financial position; in the Bicol, for example, they turned to

the production of abaca twine, rugs, shoes, slippers, sandals,

market bags, sacking, belts, curtains and many other items for

local consumption as well as export. A factory was established

in Manila for the manufacture of household articles and souvenirs

but was never very large, the industry largely in the household

stage. The opportunity for an expansion of household industries

remains great.

Late in 1937, Mariano Garchitorena, manager of the Fiber

Inspection Service of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce,

reminded producers of the opportunities for the utilization of

abaca in the production of cellulose and alpha-cellulose. Paper-

making, he pointed out, was also a market for abaca wastes and

was an industry sorely needed in the Philippines. Mr.

Garchitorena pointed out that one advantage of manufacturing

cellulose in the Philippines would be the great lowering of costs,

"because we would avoid many burdens that now weight heavily on

our exported bales of abaca, such as the intervention of middle­

 54

men, the speculators, cartage, transhipment, and local freights,

and above all, the exorbitant and execrable ocean freight charges

we pay at present."®®

Dr. P.M. Clara, plant pathologist of the Bureau of Plant

Industry, reported to his chief, Hilarion Silayan, that the

vascular bundle disease had reached, by 1937, such threatening

proportions in Davao that, unless very energetic measures were

taken, the entire industry there would be heavily damaged. While

some measures taken by the Bureau were successful in controlling

the disease, a continuing policy of watchfulness would be

necessary. In addition, the industry was threatened also by the

"bunchy-top" and "mosaic" diseases, the latter a newly-discovered

danger. The extension of these disease was becoming so serious

that many Japanese plantation owners were considering removing

their investments elsewhere, and some had sent experts to study

the possibilities of Borneo. These diseases could only be met

and stopped by the institution of more abaca centrals under the

watchful care of government bureaus charged with such problems.

Secretary of Finance De las Alas had planned to use a portion of

the coconut oil excise tax fund for this purpose and the Philip­

pine National Bank expressed its interest in the plan by

offering cooperation with the National Development Company in

®®"Cellulose Manufacturing from Abaca Fiber is Urged,"

P J C . Vol. XIII, Nos. 10-11 (October-November, 1937), p. 4.

®$>The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philip­

pines. 1957-1938. p. 303.
 55

establishing centrals in Davao. If such a plan were to materialize

the Bank said that they would also consider doing the same thing

in the Bicol provinces.

Assemblyman Norberto A. Roque, of Sorsogon (one of the

major Bicol provinces), however, pointed out certain serious

problems which might prove a hindrance to such a plan. One of

the major difficulties was the problem of adopting a basic

share plan between the government corporation and the abaca

planters, the latter being reluctant to cooperate unless assured

of a 60 per cent share. Assemblyman Roque also pointed to the

different physical conditions in the Bicol; in the Davao area

roads were frequent and good, whereas in the Bicol the reverse

was true.

Similar difficulties were discovered in Leyte which had

the reputation, deservedly, of producing the worst abaca in the

Philippines. Agents who were sent there to investigate discovered

that farmers did not use proper instruments in stripping the

fiber, with the result that it was short and coarse. Suggestions

were advanced for the introduction of the famous Benito bolo

which produced such excellent fiber in Davao, as well as for the

introduction of better varieties.^

However, M.M. Saleeby, an abaca fiber expert, exporter

and organiser of the Government's floor inspection division,

stated that the need was not for direct government subsidies and

40
Ibid., pp. 303-304.
 56

establishment of centrals. He produced facts to show that the

major problem would be the organization of a government campaign

among abaca planters in the Bicol and on Samar and Leyte to

change their antiquated systems of planting and production. Be­

fore doing anything else, Mr. Saleeby believed, the farmers

should be instructed to clean their lands entirely and plant new

shoots which would take about three years. With the exception

of but four or five plantations in all of the Bicol, Samar, and

Leyte regions, the planters had been retaining the same old

trees that had been planted many years ago. worse than this, he

said, was the fact of the careless, slipshod and unscientific care

given the plantations by owners in these regions, contrasting

sharply with the Japanese in the Davao area who plowed fields

and planted new stocks as often as p o s s i b l e . ^ Mr. Saleeby's

competence in the field, and the mass of evidence he presented in

proof of his statements, should have invited the closest attention

and interest on the part of the government and other interested

parties. This was not the case.

Members of the industry throughout the Commonwealth

continued to demand aid from the Government for the rehabilita­

tion of their industry. Why this was so is difficult to say.

They realized, it is hoped, that the industry would be limited

for the remainder of the Commonwealth period in the amount of

abaca they would be allowed to ship to the United States. The

provisions of post-Independence relationships with the United

42)Ib i d .. p. 303.
 57

States were repeatedly reiterated and elucidated. Less and less

Philippine abaca would be allowed entry into the United States

following Independence until eventually it would have to compete

in that market on an equal basis with other nations, unprotected

by a price differential and special legislative rescue missions.

In their jealousy of the sugar industry, no doubt well-founded,^

they lost their perspective and failed to realize that the

rehabilitation or survival of the industry lay in their own hands.

A scientific program of research leading to the develop­

ment of better and better fiber as well as research into lowering

costs and improving all phases of the industry, from selection

of variety to marketing, grading and selling, was demanded.

This, of course, entailed the expenditure of reasonably large

suras of money. The sugar industry in Hawaii should have proven

an excellent example to the abaca men. They chose, however,

throughout the remainder of the Commonwealth, to bewail their

miserable position, to plead for more and more Government aid,

and as a last resort, to prostrate themselves before the American

Congress with piteous supplications for rescue from the

inexorable provisions of coming legislation. As a natural

result, the industry, in the early years of the Republic, was

faced with the identical problems of the early Commonwealth, now

complicated by additional factors resulting from the War and a

general lack of comprehension of the ddmands of the world of mid­

century.

^ C f .i "The Jealous Industry," a reprint of an editorial

from The Manila Bulletin. June 10, 1937, in: Ibid.. pp. 305-306.
 CHAPTER II

THE PLACE OP COCONUT PRODUCTS AND SUGAR IN

THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY

The third element of the Philippine economy is the

important industries derived from the coconut. The coconut

palm (Cocos nuclf era) is found in abundance throughout the

tropics all over the world and finds a favorable home in the

Philippines. Every portion of the tree has its utility -- the

nut, the leaves, the trunk -- and it has occupied a position of

importance in the native economy of all the tropical Asiatic

countries. In the Philippines,it has been of primary importance

since man first appeared there. The nuts supply food, with many

different methods of preparation, and several kinds of drinks,

from the pleasant unfermented water (erroneously called flmilkM

by Westerners) taken directly from the nut, to less pleasant

beverages produced by fermenting and distilling.1 The juice is

drawn from the unopened flowers and is boiled down to sugar or

is fermented and distilled producing a drink called "arrack” in

certain parts of the world and "tuba", in the Philippines. The

young bud, cut from the top of the tree, produces a "cabbage"

highly esteemed by the people. The trunk yields soft lumber

much used throughout the Islands for furniture and firewood. The

leaves are woven into a great variety of useful products, fans,

^"Milk" is expressed from the nut and is not the fluid

found in the hollow of the kernel.

58
 59

baskets, receptacles of one sort or another, and finds a

further use as roofing. The shell of the nut is made into

household vessels, utensils and a few implements. The external

husk is excellent for polishing floors, being cut in half,

turned face down, and then briskly rubbed back and forth. The

husk also provides coir from which ropes, cordage, brushes,

door-mats, and many other articles are produced. The meat of

the nut is the source of oil widely used for spap and margarine

making. When broken into small pieces and dried (either in the

sun or in ovens) it becomes copra. A general rule of the thumb

is that 1,000 nuts will produce around five hundred pounds of

copra, from which is extracted about twenty-five gallons of o i l ?

In the Philippines, at least 4,000,000 people are wholly

or partially dependent upon the coconut industry. The average

annual value of coconut products exported in the period, 1927-

1936, was $34,832,455, or 27 per cent of the total value of all

exports, and represented some 34 per cent of the world’s

3
production of copra.

In 1936, the Philippines, being the second largest

producer of coconuts in the world, had a total of 600,000 hectares

2
The Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Chicago* The Encyclopaedia
Britannica^ Inc^, 1947 edition)'^ VolT 5, p. 950.
3
For information with regard to the industry and production
practices in the Philippines, sees The Coconut Industry in the
Philippines. Department of Agriculture and Commerce, (Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 1939), 19 pp.
 60

containing over 115,000,000 trees, of which 75,500,000 were

bearing. Of the world's total of over three million hectares,

the Philippines thus had nearly 20 per cent. The most

important producing provinces were, in that year, Tayabas,

Laguna, Cebu, Oriental and Occidental Misamis, Albay, Samar,

Leyte, Negros, Bohol, Camarines Sur, Romblon and Pangasinan. The

total of the provinces of Laguna and Tayabas alone was about

210,000 hectares, or 35 per cent of the national total.

There are listed over one hundred variety names for the

coconut in the Philippines many of which undoubtedly refer to

the same variety in various areas of slightly different dialectical

change. There are probably no more than thirty distinct varieties,

of which the most important for copra are the Romano and the

Laguna. Other varieties serve various local purposes, some like

the Macapuno. being used for ice cream and other delicacies.

Costs of production varied widely throughout the Philip­

pines, depending, naturally, upon local conditions. In Tayabas,the

leading producer, the total average cost, in 1936, of producing

100 kilos of copra was 1=5.60. This resulted in a net average

income of 169.58 per hectare. The situation of the coconut

planters in 1933 and 1934, when prices dropped to 14.48 and 13.98

per 100 kilos are better imagined than described.

For domestic purposes, the Philippines manufactured four

important products from the coconut: oil, shredded coconut,

soaps, and vegetable lard. As a by-product in the manufacture

 61

of oil, copra cake and meal were of some importance at various

periods. This item ranked third in the list of coconut export

products. Other minor products were fatty acids, glycerine,

charcoal and coir. Margarine, during the early Commonwealth,

was rather inferior in quality, and had a difficult time

competing with foreign products. Patty acids were the subject

of much discouragement and agitation in the United States, and

glycerine and charcoal had only been in demand during the First

World War.^ The coir industry, while capable of expansion, was

believed only able to succeed when costs were reduced to levels

prevailing in India.® A writer, in 1937, believed that the

domestic consumption of coconut products was "so tremendous

that evidently, it has virtually reached the saturation point."

Therefore, for it to survive, he believed, "it must at least

maintain its export trade."® From the vantage point of later

years, there seems little reason to believe that domestic

consumption had reached the saturation point.

Since the coconut industry was particularly geared to

American economy, its fate was determined by far-away men whose ir­

responsibility often brought confusion, frustration and destruc­

tion to many. The coconut industry was most sensitive to

stimuli from abroad. The value of the product in 1929 was

P89,093,620; it declined to ^27,146,650, in 1934. It then rose

^Domingo B. Paguirigan: "Philippine Coconut Industry,"

The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philippines.
1937-1958. p. 246.

5Ibid. 6 Ibid.
 62

to £92,126,490, in 1938, the greatest rise taking place in home­

made oil and the utilization of nuts for food, and then dropped

to £=28,013,002 in 1939, a fall of over £64,000,000 in one year.

In that year, the production of copra fell off £56,000,000,

home-made oil some £200,000, and the utilisation of nuts for

food some eight million, while the production of tuba increased

almost £1,000,000.^

The first blow struck at the Philippine coconut producer

was delivered by the American Congress (at the instigation of

domestic oil producers) through the Revenue Act of 1934 (H.R.

7835). Aside from the selfish motives which inspired such a

step,® it was disastrous to the economy of the Islands,

contrasting sharply with the "altruistic11 motive which supposedly

inspired the Tydings-McDuffie Act. Observers have pointed to

the fact that the processing tax provided by the Act was to be

returned to the Philippine Commonwealth Government, thus

providing that Government with a handsome revenue. It is

interesting to note, as Professor Kirk points out, a provision

in that amendment which stipulated that such payments were to

cease if the Philippine Government provided any subsidy to be

paid the producers of copra, coconut oil, or allied products.9

^Yearbook of Philippine Statistics: 1946. (Manila:

Bureau of the Census and Statistics"' 1947), p. 153.
p
°Grayson L. Kirk, Philippine Independence. (New York:
Farrar and RInehardt, 1936), Chapter V, pp. 102-135.

9Ibid.. p. 133.
 63

A writer heatedly termed this act "The Congressional

Vendetta," calling the legislation senseless and unjust.

"Even when considering the economic unwisdom of such a tax,"

he said, "and questioning the legal right of Congress to impose

it, the question of the morality of such an action stands fore­

most.... Never in the 35 years of American sovereignty over the

Philippines has the United States Government ever perpetrated

an act of unmitigated injustice.... But of recent years, the

United States Government, particularly the congressional branch,

has passed or has sought to pass laws in utter disregard of the

interests of the people over whom or against whom these laws

c.
apply."11 Under the circumstances, this must be considered a

temperate statement. Governor-General Murphy was moved to wire,

on February 24, 19341 "intimate contact with the situation

locally forces me to the conclusion that the unlimited application

of the tax will provoke a near disaster in the economy of the

Philippines. The general feeling is pronouncedly against the

moral right of the United States to legislate so severely against

a territory under the flag as practically to destroy an industry

on which more than 3,000,000 people are dependent."12 But, in

1934, the United States Congress was not interested in morality

nor in the future of a people, of whom, President McKinley

stating the reason for acquiring the country in 1898, said:

^-^The Congressional Vendetta", Editorial, Philippine

Magazine. XXXI, No. 3 (March, 1934), p. 108.

11Ibid. 12Ibid.
 64

"...there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all,

and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and

Christianize them, and by G o d ’s grace do the very best we could

1g
for them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died."

In January, 1934, the copra market was noted for its

instability and most crushers were unwilling to enter into

further contracts due to the unfavorable world market conditions.

Spain had placed restrictions upon copra imports and it was

rumored that France would take similar action. The excise tax

by the United States, capped the climax and forced the exporters

and oil millers to curtail purchases while they awaited further

developments. The continuing uncertainty was greatly influenced

by developments in Washington. One bill after another was

introduced into Congress, providing for Philippine independence,

which generally was welcomed by Filipinos, but all these bills

were distinguished for their vagueness with regard to the

future of Philippine economy or their stringent provisions with

regard to it. This state of affairs was not conducive to calm­

ness in the Philippines and brought about a general instability

in those export products most sensitive to conditions in America.

The remarks of men like Rep. Harold Knutson of Minnesota and

Rep. E.P. Burke of Nebraska, upon the independence question and

the restriction of coconut oil created panic in business

circles in the Philippines. For example, Rep. Knutson opposed

the Hawes bill for independence, because it did not offer

13Kirk, 2£L* ci t ., p . 17
 65

sufficient protection for the dairy interests in the United

States* Rep. A.C. Schallenberger of Nebraska stated that

coconut oil was largely replacing beef and pork products and

should be greatly restricted in any independence measure. The

movement for granting Independence became a stampede, and

Representative Magnus Johnson introduced a bill calling for

independence within thirty or forty months but saying nothing

definitive with regard to the economy of the country.

Mr. H.M. Cavender, President of the American Chamber of

Commerce in Manila, declared that the Chamber should maintain

an aggressive policy in opposing the inimical measures that were

being considered in W a s h i n g t o n . T h e Philippine Chamber of

Commerce went on record against the excise tax, stating that it

would cause hardship to some 4,000,000 people, affecting an

even larger number than ’'unfair” restrictions on the sugar

industry. Governor-General Murphy proposed that either all

Philippine oil and copra used for non-edible purposes be exempted

from the tax, or that a quota of 200,000 long tons of oil be

exempted. The Secretary of War, George C. Dern, addressed a

letter to the House Ways and Means Committee, objecting strongly

to the tax on oil and copra.1® On February 1, the directorate

of the Coconut Planters Associations adopted a resolution which

14Phlllppine Magazine. XXXI, No. 3 (March, 1934), pp.

90-92.

15 16 -
Ibid. Ibid.
 66

declared that while a solution of the Philippine-American

relationship was pending, the Filipinos were entitled to the

’’full enjoyment of economic opportunity under American sovereignty"

and that the proposed tax ’’would be a flagrant violation of this

fundamental right, "■*‘7

In spite of these objections and proposals, the House

Ways and Means Committee refused to reconsider its action and

endorsed the proposal to levy an excise tax on copra and oil.

On February 4, Dern again protested against the tax, stating

that it would defeat its purpose of raising revenue by destroying

Filipino purchasing power. The Committee, however, countered

with the statement that it was motivated as much by the desire

to remove competition from the field of animal and vegetable

fats as by the idea of raising revenue.'*-® As pointed out by

Professor Kirk, this argument was without adequate basis and had

been repeatedly refuted by experts who appeared before the

C o m m i t t e e . T h e Governor-General again, on February 6 and 9,

protested the tax stating that it was equal to 200 per cent of

the current price and would work "incalculable harm to the

Philippines without advantage to continental United States...."

It meant, he said financially, the "bankruptcy of eight Impor­

tant provinces...questionable solvency for ten others....

Socially It will entail widespread distress and disaffection

among the people." He asked for a two or four years’ trial of

1 7 Ibid. 1 8 Ibid. 19Note 8 above

 67

the limitation plan previously proposed by him. The House

Committee, at that time, had voted three times to sustain the tax.

On February 15, President Quezon stated that he had

received tie promises of Tydings and McDuffie to oppose the

excise tax and Representative R.R. Eltse, of California, sharp­

ly attacked the measure, stating accurately that "American

farmers and all our people have been misled by false propaganda...'.1

"The tax", he continued, "would be detrimental to business

generally on the Pacific coast and also to the dairy industry

in all parts of the country since the Philippines is the

largest export market for American canned milk.... It seems

strange to me that the predominantly Democratic i/Vays and Means

Committee should have given birth to this renegaadfes high

tariff measure."^®

In the Philippines, Under Secretary Vargas appointed a

committee to study the possibilities of utilizing coconut by­

products in local industries, realizing that there was little

chance that the tax would be defeated.

Rumors were circulated, following the approval of the

Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act, that Congress would fail to

enact the excise tax. The rumor was started, it was reported,

to bring about a rise in prices, which, however, failed to

materialize. Two days after the passage of the bill, the Senate

finance committee voted to retain the excise tax but to reduce

20
Philippine Magazine. XXXI, No. 3 (March, 1934), p. 94.
 68

it from five to three cents a pound. Local producers saw no

relief in this, however, and predicted the destruction of the

industry.

Major William B. Anderson, Manila businessman, stated

that ten or twelve years of slow economic strangulation was

worse than a quicker death in three years. He predicted that

invested capital would liquidate and that new capital would not

enter, and that the only certainty was that the Japanese would

soon control the interior trade held by the Chinese and also

the import and export trade of the Islands. "It will probably

be found highly inimical for Americans to continue."2-*- Mr.

S. Dazai, manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank and head of the

Japanese Chamber od Commerce, in Manila, stated happily: I am

glad that the Philippines is now to obtain her independence.

No, I don't think Japanese capital will fly away; on the

contrary, there will be greater inducement for it to come into

the Philippines. I am afraid that it is the American capital

which will fly away. I am glad of independence because I believe

that the Orient should be for Orientals. We are like one people.

Oriental capital will come to the Philippines. Japan will play

pp
a great part in the economic development of this country." No

prophecy was ever more accurate and none received les3 attention

21Ibid.. XXXI, No. 5 (May, 1934), p. 179.

*^Ibld. Since this bank was subsidized by the Japanese

Government, Mr. Dazai’s comments conceivably represented the
official position on the subject.
 69

on the part of those most concerned. How short the years were

until fulfillment arrived with the checks of Japanese Government

subsidies and the bayonets shining under a December sun.

The excitement over the excise tax, which manifested

itself largely in restricted buying and which had brought a

gradual decline in the market, gradually subsided at the end of

i
1934. The lowest ebb was reached in May, June, and July, of

1934, after which the market gradually recovered. During this

lowest period, the industry might well have come to a complete

halt had it not been for the development of factors outside the

immediate Philippine economy. The most important of these, and

the one which permitted the industry to regain its feet, was

the advantage derived from an inflated currency. This enabled

the Philippines to undersell all other producers. An American

economist in the Philippines at the time stated that with the

former gold currency, the Philippines would have been unable to

continue production, as European price equivalents would have

been lower than the production cost.^3

Despite the slight advantage gained by inflated currency,

the price was so low that many planters in areas where transporta­

tion and marketing costs were high, found themselves unable to

sell at cost and fed the nuts to their hogs or extracted oil for

their own consumption. In so doing they withdrew from the

^ N o r b e r t W. Schmelkesj "The 1935 Prospects for the

Coconut Grower," Philippine Magazine . XXXII, No. 3 (March,
1935), p. 136.
 70

market a considerable quantity of copra. Since trees increase

in the Philippines by from two to three million annually, the

amount of copra which normally would have been shipped was

considerable, one estimate placing it at 60,000 tons.

At this point, fate stepped in. In 1934-35, the

American farmer faced one of the worst droughts in history. In

addition, the United States was experimenting with crop reduction

programs under the AAA. Until this time, the United States had

provided but a small market for Philippine copra meal. But with

the farmers unable to feed their cattle with home-produced feeds

and facing the possible loss of entire herds they frantically

turned to copra meal. The tremendous increase in consumption of

a commodity which had been selling in the Philippines at prices

barely above its value as fuel, increased prices some 250 per

cent to the delight of the starving coconut producers. This

naturally increased the value of copra and as soon as the

shortage in fats became evident and previous stocks of oil were

consumed, the market boomed.24

This would have been enough to bring a certain prosperity

to the producer, but fate again intervened in a typhoon which

swept through the major coconut-producing provinces, causing

prices to soar again. By the beginning of 1935, prices were hi$i

enough to be considered '’spectacular" and caused considerable

speculation whether the level could be maintained. In addition,

2 4 Ibid.
 71

the two-cent excise tax differential in favor of the Philippines

had the effect of shutting out other copra producing countries

and undoubtedly brought benefits to Philippine producers. Had

the excise tax not been imposed, there is little doubt that the

crisis of 1934-1935 in oil and copra meal could have been avoided,

which would have meant a considerable saving to American farmers—

one of the major groups eager for the imposition of the tax.

The Joint Preparatory Committee received a brief, in

1937, on the state of the coconut industry, setting forth its

nature, history, activity, importance to Philippine economy,

extent of dependence upon the American market, and the probable

fate of the industry as a result of the Tydings-McDuffie Act and

other possible future legislation leading to Philippine Indepen­

dence. Unless favorable amendments were added to the Independence

Law, the excise and export taxes as provided therein would be

disastrous to the Industry, It was believed. It would result,

they said, in the withdrawal of three-fourths of hectarage from

cultivation, adversely affecting some three million people and

lowering the revenues of the Philippine Government from the

5^7,000,000, of 1935, to a probable ,750,000.25

The industry believed that it was mutually beneficial

for the status quo to be maintained, since the trade In oils

and their derivatives was supplemented by certain advantages to

2 ®,fBriefM , edited by D.B. Paguirigan, The Commercial

and Industrial Manual of the Philippines. 1937-1938. p. 249.
 72

America, such as freight, insurance, continued purchases by

the industry in America, and interest payments on rather

extensive American investments. And since the United States

had to import seeds and oils from other countries because of the

excise taxes reducing imports of Philippine oil into America,

this showed that the United States had to import these items

because of industrial demands. Since this was so, and because

of the long association of the two countries, coupled with the

mutual trade advantage "and the responsibility shared by

American capital in the promotion of the Philippine coconut

industry", there should exist sufficient motive to waive any

discrimination against an industry so vital to the Philippines

and its people.26

The people of t h e Philippines were growing sugar cane

at the time of Magellan's arrival. Its development as a

national industry passed through three stages after the coming

of the Spanish. Under them, it constituted from 30 to 50 per

cent of the value of agricultural products exported. During

the second phase, the first ten years of American occupation,

it continued in a distressed condition resulting from the

Revolution and subsequent War. The last phase was that char­

acterized by free trade, the last limitation on exports being

2 6 Ibid.
 73

ended in 1913. Under encouragement from the Government and the

initiative of private capital, both Filipino and American, the

industry gradually began to assume its economic primacy in the

Philippines.

At San Jose, on the Island of Mindoro, an American

company established the first modern factory in 1910, and two

years later another American company began operation at the

first cooperative central at San Carlos, on the H a n d of Negros,

and another at Calamba, Luzon. These companies pioneered in the

modernization of manufacturing methods and pointed the way for

the many others which were to follow shortly.

With the creation of the Sugar Control Board in 1915 by

the Philippine Government and the creation in 1916 of the Philip­

pine National Bank, the change from old methods to new was

greatly accelerated and sugar production Increased by leaps and

bounds. The Sugar Control Board was to promote the industry

through financial aid by means of loans to corporations and the

purchase of bonds, while the Bank utilized the greater majority

of the funds at its disposal in aiding the industry. This

intimate association of Government and private initiative in the

industry was to increase as time passed and became one of the

major factors in the development of political, economic and

social control so characteristic of the emerging feudal economy

of the nation.

Sugar was the premier export item of the Philippines

 74

before World War II, the cane being grown in every province in

the country, though large cultivation was generally confined to

Occidental Negros, ihmpanga, Tarlac, Batangas, Laguna and Iloilo,

which comprised three-fourths of the total sugar land. Until

1941, the Philippines was the fifth largest sugar producer in

the world, exceeded by India, Java, Japan and the United States.

Since 1920, sugar had been the leading export crop of t h e

country, its value representing one-third of the total exports.

During the War, the industry suffered somewhat from neglect and

a great number of centrals were destroyed — although not nearly

so many as reported. The remaining centrals generally produced

muscovado sugar, primarily for home consumption.^^

The year 1934 was the peak year in the production of

sugar, with 305,890 hectares planted, producing 1,449,650,150

kilos (centrifugal), 21,172, 940 kilos (muscovado), 28,399,880

kilos (panocha), 6,868,270 liters of basi (an intoxicating

beverage), and 258,029,100 liters of molasses. By 1940, the

hectarage had fallen to 166,942 hectares, with a production of

947,067,288 kilos (centrifugal), and 36,842,827 gallons o f

2ft
molasses. ° The total value of all cane products in 1934 was

J^l62,784,310. In 1947, the hectarage was 40,990 hectares,

27
The Philippines (A Brief Historical and Factual
Survey) reprint from Trade Directory of the Philippines. Philip­
pine Embassy (Washington, D.C.), p . 6. (N . d .1
pp
Yearbook of Philippine Statistics: 1946. pp. 152-153.
 75

producing 119,670 metric tons worth ^60,071,840.29

The quota permitted by the Tydings-McDuffie Law was

952,000 short tons, some 60 per cent of the normal milling

capacities of the centrals. About two million people, before

the War, were directly dependent upon the sugar industry,

whose capital investment was estimated at some ^450,000,000,

and represented some 40 per cent of the total revenues of the

Government. It represented the major source of tax income

for five provinces, and the Manila Railroad received 40 per

cent of its total revenue from hauling sugar. Florence Horn

observed that the people who depended "on the sugar crop for

their living include the mill-owners and the planters, whose

profits in sugar are still great, the lowly sharecroppers, and

the 15 cents-a-day laborers. Only half as many live from

sugar as live from the coconut, but the coconut people are

scattered throughout every inhabited island in the archipelago.

The sugar people are concentrated.. . . There were forty-six

centrals (mills) operating, on a supposedly cooperative system,

with some 23,000 farmers most of whom owned only a few hectares

of land. The land laws in the Philippines allow a mill to own

but 2,500 acres of public lands. A central, therefore, was

forced to purchase its cane from nearby planters who, in turn,

subdivided their fields and let them out to some 175,000 tenants

29Journal of Philippine Statistics. Vol. IV, Nos. 1-6

(January-June, 1949), p. 13a.
3^Horn, o£. cit.. p. 245.
 76

who were the actual cultivators

Cultivation methods on these small farms were and are

far from efficient, and this was one reason for the poor quality

of Philippine sugar when compared with the Javanese or Cuban

product. Many small farmers still produced sugar in the age-old

fashion used by the Chinese during the Spanish era. There were

three steps in the process. First, blocks of hardened sugar,

called "pilones” , were taken from molds, the white sugar which

formed on top being separated from the lower portion, which was

usually heavy and wet. This lower portion was replaced in

molds and stored in a wooden shed for drying. The "pllones"

were then set on earthenware jars into which the molasses dripped.

A layer of mud was generally placed atop the "pilones" for a

period of about twelve days, in order to purify it as much as

possible. The sugar was also boiled in large kettles for the

same purpose. The final stage was to spread the sugar out on

mats, exposing it to the sun until dry. It was then packed into

"bayones" and stored in warehouses for export. The juice of the

cane was, in many parts, extracted by running the cane through

hard-wood rollers. The land was often cultivated with simple

plows, some hard wood and others of iron. On large haciendas,

after 1920, more modern and scientific methods were introduced,

accounting for the great increase in production despite the

dwindling hectarage planted to cane. The great bulk of small

producers throughout the Islands In 1950 still produced their

5 1 I b i d . . p. 241.
 77

sugar with primitive, inefficient and wasteful methods.

Whereas in other sugar-producing areas the mills are

owners and operators of plantations, in the Philippines,

corporations generally operate the mills and individual planters

produce the cane on their lands. The system divided the income

from the sugar between two groups of entrepreneurs, causing high

production and distribution costs. This factor was of great

importance to the future of the industry, since it meant that

the Philippine producers were not able to meet the competition

in other areas, such as India and Java, as well as Cuba, where

costs were lower. The same situation existed in 1950. It was

estimated before the War that it cost a Philippine producer

1=8.19 per picul for production (or 3.66 US cents per pound).

At the same time, the cost of production in Hawaii and Cuba was

but 3.39 and 1.74 cents per pound respectively.^ it was only

because the sugar industry in the Philippines had been developed

for American consumption and protected by a price differential

that the industry was able to survive.

Under the provisions of the Independence Law, the sub­

sequent legislation in the United States, and the world sugar

agreements emanating from London, the doom of the industry was

sealed. Its continued existence, following the Second World War

32Juan Z. SyCip: Sugar Industry in the Philippine Is­

lands . Senior thesis for B. b Ta ., University of Manila, 1934,
MS, pp. 21-23, passim.
 78

was due entirely to the world shortage of sugar, which enabled

producers to profit despite the rising costs of production.

Unless further protective legislation were passed by the United

States congress, the termination of arrangements (in 1950) and

the imposition of projected duties would mean the end of the

Philippine sugar industry. This will be particularly true when

the large producing countries such as Java and India recover

from the effects of war and enter once more as active competing

agents in the world market.33 Would there be any hope for

Philippine sugar in other markets? Sugar men realized there

would be none. Since Cuban and Javanese sugar costs were so

much lower, they could easily capture the markets of the world.

In fact, the costs of production of sugar in Java were so low

that "but for the Flag Law and in spite of tariff barriers,

Java sugar can even undersell native sugar locally."3^

Relations between millers and planters were governed by

contracts, generally for thirty years1 duration. Planters

delivered cane to millers, who processed and sometimes, though

not generally, distributed it. For this service, the central

ordinarily levied a charge in cane of from 35 to 50 per cent

of the sugar processed. Investments In centrals before the

War were estimated at $84,000,000, of which 43 per cent was

■'V -" :
3 *7 >7

C f . entries entitled "Sugar" in the Brltannlca Book of

the Year for 1947, 1948, and 1949.

S^The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philippines.

1937-1938. p. 226.
 79

owned by Filipinos, 33 per cent by Americans, 23 per cent by

Spaniards, and 1 per cent of what is euphemistically termed

"cosmopolitan" -- meaning Chinese or Chinese-other nationalities

partnerships. Central owners were organized into the Philippine

Sugar Association.

The planters held investments in land and its improve­

ments as well as annual crop loans amounting to some $203,000,000,

and employed laborers who with their dependents numbered some

610,000. In the words of Oscar Ledesma, President of the

Confederation of Sugar Planters before the War, these constituted

the "middle class of the three important economic elements

making up the industry."33 He was undoubtedly referring to the

planters and not the laborers, who could not be considered

"middle class" in any sense. Thirty centavos a day hardly placed

one in a middle class.

Generally, planters organized themselves into associations,

the purpose of which was to deal with the millers and the

protection of their interests. During the Commonwealth, partic­

ularly, when the industry was faced with what was believed total

extinction, these local groups formed themselves into a national

body called the Confederation of Planters Associations

(Confederacion de Assoclaclones y Plantadores de Carla Dulce).

This confederation had a membership of 16 local planters1

associations as well as many individual planters not members of

35,1Some Facts About the Philippine Sugar Industry,"

The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philippines. 1938-
1939. p. 169.
 80

any organization, and represented some 60 per cent of the total

producers of centrifugal sugar in the Islands., This confedera­

tion represented the planters in the industry's councils and

in matters of governmental actions, both in the Philippines and

the United States.

The planters expressed as much dissatisfaction with

their treatment by the centrals as the laborers with their treat­

ment by the planters. They continually demanded a larger share

in the division of the crop, this being the original reason for

the organization of their associations. Just before the begin­

ning of the Commonwealth period, this discontent reached such

a high pitch, that many of the planters themselves became

alarmed and took steps to enlist the aid of the Government in

their campaign.

The system outlined above was originally developed by

the planters, who realized that their old methods of production

and distribution were outmoded and costly. They interested

capitalists and the Government in erecting centrals; these

centrals were expected to operate so efficiently that the

resulting division of profit would leave the planter a larger

income than heretofore. The central would rent railways which

would be maintained by the planters for the length of their

milling contracts. The central served from fifty to five

hundred planters who owned land varying in size from one to

three hundred hectares. Most of this land was not owned by

 81

the planter. It waa rented for an agreed percentage of the

crop, ranging from 8 per cent as a minimum to as high as 20 per

cent, depending upon the productivity of the land. As a natural

result, a great number of these planters did not live upon their

lands, and rarely saw them, spending most of their time in

Manila or the larger cities in their province. They enjoyed the

fruits of the labors of others they never saw or cared about.

The plantation was left in charge of an overseer, who had

complete control over the lives and fortunes of the individuals

living on or near the plantation, wholly dependent upon it for

labor and the needs of their families. Too often, these over­

seers were of the type so familiar in absentee-landlord systems.

They were descendants of the cacique class, with all their

faults and few if any virtues possessed by that class. The main

center of the industry, the island of Negros, was particularly

cursed with this system, and figured large in the election of

1949 as the major source of terrorism, fraud and corruption.

When it is realized that fully 80 per cent of sugar land

was worked by tenants, wholly dependent upon the caprice or

whim of the owner, or renter, that the tenants had to provide

themselves with the necessary equipment, and that they received,

before the War, but thirty centavos per day, the weakness of

the industry can be understood more clearly. Prom the financial

point of view the planter took a greater risk than the miller

since the former was dependent upon the fertility of his land

and the vagaries of the weather — which in the Visayas means

 82

intermittent typhoons during the rainy season. The centrals

were insured against all risks beyond their control except the

fate of sugar in the world market.

The lowly tenant was the only one wholly unprotected,

because even the protection of the law has been denied him in

the great majority of cases where he has sought it. In those

areas in which the doctrines of Socialism, expounded by the

Filipino Socialist leader Pedro Abad Santos, attracted the

attention of the sugar workers, the labor situation became

explosive. In the province of Pampanga, the year 1939 saw a

wave of strikes unparalleled in the history of the country,

accompanied by the burning of the cane fields, with about

18,000 out of 40,000 voters of the province members of the

Socialist party.

The most authoritative study of these sugar tenants was

made in 1939 by I.T. Runes for the Institute of Pacific

Relations.®® He found that during the milling season, from

October to March, in the province of Occidental Negros, more

than 50,000 male laborers migrated from Iloilo, Antique, Capiz,

Cebu, and Oriental Negros. Most of them returned to their homes

at the end of the season, although a few remained to prepare the

land for the next planting. The capacity of the mills was so

36I.T. Runes: General Standards of Living and Wages of

Workers in the Philippine Sugar Industry. International Research
Series. (Manila* Philippine Council, IPR, 1939), 29 pp. This
study was never challenged and remains today one of the most
objective and informative labor studies made in the Philippines,
being supplemented by the study of the Ilocos region by Horacio
Lava (1938).
 83

great that this large force of laborers was required each year.

The work was done on a contract basis, the workers paid by the

ton. The planters assumed no responsibility with regard to

conditions of labor since the job was let out to imported labor

on a piece-work basis under the supervision of a contractor.37

The contractors rounded up the men and returned them to their

homes upon completion of the contract. For those laborers, on

the plantation the entire year, the average daily income was

3K5.371 to 3K).189, between the months of July and October. When

the milling season began, the laborer went on a piece-work

basis, his average earnings being a maximum of 1=0.868, a day,

to a minimum of 10.341 a day, at the end of the milling season.^®

Mr. Runes stated that these wages just cited "were evidently

higher than in most of the other plantations” since there were

no middlemen employed to contract laborers from other places.38

The laborers were paid irregularly; for saLthbu^ba law was

.passed later that year providing for prompt and regular payment

to workers, it was honored as much in the breach as in the

observance. Out of the thirty-four haciendas studied, Mr. Runes

discovered that nine paid them weekly while five paid once a

month. Four paid very irregularly, sometimes delaying payment

until after the passage of three or four months. One hacienda

paid at intervals of every five weeks, while at another it was

once in every four or five days. He also discovered that several

3 7 Ibid., p. 8. 5 8 Ibld.. pp. 10-11. 39lbid.

 84

haciendas in Occidental Negros {aid their laborers thrice yearly

With regard to hours of work during the off-season,

his findings were as dismal. Of the total number of haciendas

studied, eleven employed their labor for ten and one-half hours

a day, and seven employed them for eleven hours a day. Three

employed laborers for eleven and one-half hours while one

kept them working for twelve hours. One farm was discovered

which had no fixed opening and closing hours for work, the work

starting at sunrise and ending at sunset. The planters1

association claimed that "during the milling season the laborers'

full day's work may...- be as long as eight or nine or ten

hours" but Mr. Runes discovered that, on the contrary, the

laborers during that difficult season of the year worked with

great exertion "for as long as sixteen hours." Despite these

long hours and hard work, they would still fail to earn as

much as SKL.50 per day, a condition which was "also contrary to

the association's report to Judge Francisco Zulueta." During

more than half of the milling season, the laborers worked as long

as fifteen hours and only one hacienda had adopted the eight-

hour day during the milling season. This exception was the

La Granja Sugar Cane Experimental Station, "then of the

^ I b i d ., Since the War, on one or two plantations in

the same province, the laborers were not paid at all. They
were granted credit at the plantation store, owned either by
the overseer or by the landowner. At the expiration of a year,
the books were totalled and it was learned that the laborers
had either broken even for the year or were slightly in debt
to the store. A similar system has long been known in certain
areas in the United States.
 85

Government, which is however, considered in this survey only

for comparative purposes.”41 For this labor, Mr. Runes found

that the highest registered income for the year was P295.07

while the lowest was f'QG.SO. From the earnings, about 90 per

cent of the total was expended on food and clothing, food

alone receiving 79 per cent of the total of the entire family.

The average daily expense for food, for a family of 4.6 persons,

was 3K).415, the average daily expenditure for an individual

being 3K>.03 per meal. For this sum, the average family

consumed about a ganta of third-class rice, worth thirty-three

centavos. Five centavos went for fish and the remaining three

centavos went for salt or, occasionally, sugar or bananas.

His survey showed that "bread, butter, milk or cream, coffee,

i«42
and chocolate are unknown among the plantation workers...."

The personal possessions of the family, existing on

such a scale, could not be large, and Mr. Runes states that

seldom did they reach the value of twenty pesos per family.

Mr. Runes' report was published in 1939 and excited a

certain amount of comment, the burden of which was generally to

the effect that he was a communist and had selected the worst

areas for study. Few attempts were made before the War to

rectify conditions and reports trickling through the "brqss

curtain1' of Occidental Negros, in 1949, indicated that the

situation in many large areas had deteriorated. These reports

41Ibid., pp. 14.^15, passim.

42
I b i d .. pp. 15-20, p a s s i m .
 86

did not find their way into the large metropolitan newspapers

of Manila. While the revelations in' Mr. Runes* report should

have been frightening to alert observers, little permanent

attention was paid to it. The rising unrest, during the two

years immediately preceding the War and the first years of the

Third Republic, raised questions in the minds of many, but the

Government could still querously demand why the people should

consider revolt since, President Quirino declared, ’’there is no

suffering, no calamity, and no act by the Government to make

.47
the people feel downtrodden.

The Philippine sugar industry had been developed by

the United States for the United States market and became wholly

dependent upon the market for its existence. Yet, in 1934,

before the ink was dry on the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the United

States Congress passed legislation seriously hampering the

sugar industry. The reason for the legislation, as Professor

Kirk points out,^4 was the increasing competition between

American insular sugar areas and Cuban sugar. This raised

doubts in the minds of those interested in the Cuban industry

as to its ability to meet the rising competition of Philippine,

Puerto Rican and Hawaiian sugar.

Since the Cuban sugar industry is, for all intents and

^ S t a tement of President Quirino, reported in The Philip­

pines Free Press. Vol. XL, No. 49 (Dec. 3, 1949), p. 5.

44Kirk, o£. c i t .. p. 128.

 87

purposes, owned by American interests in the East (in which the

majority of refineries were located) and it was to the East

coast that the greater part of Philippine sugar was shipped and

processed, it was not particularly surprising that the powerful

lobby operated by these interests should engage in a campaign

to eliminate this rising competition. Upon the recommendation

of the Tax Commission and the President, Congress enacted the

V v* ■ ■

Jones-Costigan Act of May 9, 1934, which established quotas for

domestic producers, allowing the Secretary of Agriculture to

fix quotas for other areas. Secretary Wallace fixed the Philip­

pine quota for the year 1934 at 1,015,185 short tons, which

was t o be retroactive to January 1, that year. Since the

Philippine producers had already sold more than the maximum

amount by the time of the quota establishment, they were faced

with a surplus of 500,000 tons. This had to be carried over

to the following year, the quota for which was fixed at 991,307

short tons, a further reduction. Thus, during 1935, Philippine

producers were able to send to the United States but one-third

of their crop for the preceding y e a r . 45

Sugar men realized that the application of American world

price rate would close the American market and bring collapse

to their industry. The U.S.-Cuban Reciprocal Trade Agreement

of September, 1934, brought further worries to Philippine sugar

men. By this agreement, a duty of nine-tenths of a cent a

pound was imposed on Cuban sugar, with the proviso that at the

4 5 I b l d .. p. 131.
 88

expiration of the Jones-Costigan Act, December 31, 1937, the

rate would revert to one and a half cents a pound. Since the

delivery cost of Philippine sugar into the United States was

1*7.59 per picul, in 1937, and the cost of Cuban sugar delivered

was ^5.35, the danger to Philippine sugar was evident since

the Philippine preferential price was but 27 centavos less.

This price differential would be eliminated after the sixth

year of the Commonwealth. .Since the Tydings-McDuffie Act

provided that after the tenth year of the Commonwealth, a duty

equivalent to 100 per cent of the world rate would be imposed

on Philippine sugar (which would amount to 1*5.25 per picul),

the extension of the Cuban agreement would mean the end of the

Philippine sugar industry.

The industry therefore requested that since it was

"very young", and had not "as yet fully recovered the capital

invested in it", in "all fairness, the limitations imposed on

exports during the Commonwealth be either modified or removed."

The Philippine Sugar Association stated it was "asking only for

a slight increase of 244,080 short tons", bringing the total

to 1,200,000 short tons which was "still much below Philippine

normal production.” Also, "the United States, not being self-

sufficient in sugar production, can perform another altruistic

act by maintaining the present trade arrangement in Philippine

sugar, even after independence, instead of obtaining sugar from

other countries."^® It did not mention how much this altruism

4*5The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philip­

p ines. 1937-1958. p. 228.
 89

would cost the American housewife, nor did it take into account

the evolving Latin-American policy of the United States.

Sugar men continued to agitate for a change in the

situation, but to no avail. Many believed that independence

would be disastrous to the Philippines, since no less than

600,000 short tons would have to be exported yearly for the

survival of the industry,47 and worked for an extension of the

transition period, or for closer relations with the United

States than was actually provided in the Independence Law.

Rafael Alunan, President of the Philippine Sugar Association

and the Philippine American Trade Association at that time,

addressed the students of the University of the Philippines, on

November 22, 1934, comparing the advantages of trade with the

United States to that with Japan. He concluded his address by

declaring that the very existence of the Philippine civilization

depended upon the continuing close relations with the United

States. Yet, all were agreed that continuing relations based

upon the Jones-Costigan act, and other expected acts, would mean

the practical dissolution of the sugar industry in the Philip­

pines. He stated that "considered from the viewpoint of the

present laws the prospect is rather gloomy. There exists however

the hope that these laws may be amended."4®

47Ibid.. p. 226.

48Rafael Alunan: "The Sugar Industry Under the Common­

wealth," The Philippine Commonwealth Handbook. 1936, p. 267.
 90

President Quezon, departing from the United States for

the Philippines on November 30, 1934, (accompanied by former

Senator Harry B, Hawes, Washington representative for the

Philippine Sugar Association) stated that the aim of the Philip­

pines was to maintain "as far as possible the present economic

relations with the United States." Continuing, he said:

We have been the seventh best customer of the United

States and produce chiefly the things which America must
buy. Our economic relations are mutually advantageous.
We are concerned over the limitations of our sugar and
coconut oil exportations provided in the Tydings-McDuffie
Law and hope that the people of this country will realize
that in buying our goods they are establishing one of
their best markets.... The Philippine people have great
faith in the integrity and good faith of the American
people.49

On December 8,1934, a Congressional Committee, headed by

Tydings, McAdoo, McKellar and Gibson, arrived in Manila, and

declared they had come to listen to complaints about the Indepen­

dence Law so as to "be helpful in solving our mutual problems and

to correct in so far as we may such inequalities and imperfections

as will conduce to the most successful Philippine Independence."

Several days later, in Iloilo, they listened to a frank

complaint from Don Esteban de la Rama, delivered at a banquet

in their honor. Don Esteban vigorously attacked the economic

provisions of the Independence Law and called them "cruel and

unjust." He invited the mission to return to the Philippines

in ten years and witness the ruin that this act would have wrought.

49Phillpplne Magazine. XXXII, No. 1 (January, 1935), p.4.

^ S e n a t o r Tydings did return in 1945 for that purpose

but stayed only a week, and only in Manila.
 91

In addition, Don Esteban attacked General Aguinaldo for a state­

ment the latter had made two days before in which he had

advocated a shorter transition period. De la Rama stated

pointedly that Aguinaldo still thought as in days of yore "when

governments could be run without a budget and men hanged if

they refused to work for the government free."

The same day Senator McAdoo was taken ill and rettirned

to Manila by plane.

The mission continued to be bombarded with the complaints

they came after, throughout the month. Recommendations most

often given them were for the elimination of the export taxes,

increase In the sugar and cordage quotas, repeal of the coconut

oil excise tax, tariff autonomy during the Commonwealth period

and tariff reciprocity with the United States.

During this time, apparently no one considered the fact

that although they were complaining about the great dependence

of the sugar industry on the American market, and were faced with

Its possible collapse after independence and the end of the free-

entry period, they were making no efforts at limitation of

production. This great dependence of the country upon an

Industry based on such weak foundations contained the seeds for

the great economic confusion existing in the Philippines at the

beginning of the Third Republic. Many observers pointed to the

fact, agreed to by many producers, that the Philippine sugar

industry was Inefficient and costly and could not hope to meet
 92

the competition of other foreign sugars in the American market

after, as later developed, 1961. Yet no attempts were made

seriously to turn sugar lands, which were of marginal value

only, to the production of other more necessary domestic crops

- rice, for example. Year after year the production of sugar

increased, and year after year, the representatives of the

industry said the peak had been r e a c h e d . ^ Limitation was only

reached with the application of the Tydings-McDuffie, Jones-

Costigan, and Tydings-Kocialkowski Laws.

Despite the sufferings of the industry, so piteously

expressed in publications throughout the Commonwealth period,

the beginning years of the Republic saw the frantic efforts of

the industry to regain its prewar status in the American

market, a status it could hold only if arrangements were made

for future free-trade relations between the United States and

the Philippines. The hope, in 1950, was that the industry would

be able to achieve its favorable prewar position by raising the

increasingly important bogey of communism, which, unfortunately,

was sweeping Southeast Asia, by saying that unless aid were

given the industry more and more of the peoples of the Philip­

pine s would be attracted to the siren song of communism thus

depriving the United States of the "only Christian nation in the

Orient." Any suggestions to defeat communism within the country

by changing the appalling conditions of the workers on the
haciendas and elsewhere were not considered seriously.

51.Frederic g # Marquardt: Before Bataan and Aft e r . (New

Yorkj Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1943), pp. 129-134, passim.
 CHAPTER III

EARLY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE RICE INDUSTRY

Since the cultivation of rice requires some fifty per

cent of the total agricultural labor and forty per cent of

cultivated land, and is the mainstay of the Filipino's diet,

some government bureaus early in the Commonwealth period

became concerned with the problems affecting this staple. It

must be emphasized that whatever achievements were made, and

there were some despite the blackness of the picture,were made

not because of any effective efforts by the Government itself

but were the result of selfless labor on the part of the many

humble and sometimes insignificant individuals within some of

these bureaus and in private enterprise who worked long and

hard with no recognition and little appreciation in the form of

adequate appropriations on projects the importance of which

they alone recognized.

The aim of the Commonwealth, President Quezon said,was

’’the maintenance of a special commercial relationship,not only

during the transition, but also afterwards...." with the United

States.^- He listed three main objectives for the first year

of the Commonwealth. These were: a plan for national defense;

the creation of the national economic council (which, the

^To Mr. Harry Frantz, Chief of the United Press Bureau

in Washington, D.C., reproduced in The Commercial and Industrial
Manual of the Philippines. 1957-1938. p . 7.

93
 94

President said, "would survey the economic resources of the

country and submit a plan for their proper and coordinated

development" showing that "we are getting ready to stand on our

own feet..."); and, the reorganization of the Government.

Prom these objectives, he derived the achievements for

the first years "We have provided the country with defense,

we have adopted a plan for the reasonable use and conservation

of our national resources so as to make the country self-

dependent, and lastly, the government has been reorganized on

simple and efficient lines, capable of performing the tasks of

p
a progressive, strong, and just government." The problem of

national defense will be discussed later. As far as the re­

organization of the government was. concerned, it evidently was

not so simple and efficient as the President believed, since

in 1940 it again underwent "reorganization", and later in 1947

and 1951 similar "reorganizations" took place, with no appre­

ciable increase in either simplicity or efficiency. We are

concerned here with the "plan for the reasonable use and

conservation of" the natural resources.

But what was this "plan"?

The seriousness of the situation was reiterated by

bureau chiefs and specialists many times. The noted progress

which had occurred in education and the acquisition of wealth

with the accompanying rise in the standard of living, Director

2 Ibid.
 95

Hilarion S. Silayan of the Bureau of Plant Industry stated,

"has not reached the farmers who supply the food, but has been

confined among the merchants, the financiers and the producers

of export crops, such as sugar and copra."® He believed that

Philippine agriculture, while still in a pioneering stage, was

"facing economic problems of such magnitude and extent" that

any venture was no longer "a mere problem of seeds, soil,

climate, pests, diseases, and typhoons", but was a matter

"principally of economics."

And how was this problem being met? He stated precisely,

if gloomily, that no "facilities have been given or developed

for conducting research and survey in agricultural economics in

the same manner that laboratories and field stations are

provided at present for the studies of chemistry, agronomy,

horticulture, and animal h u s b a n d r y . H e made this accurate

statement, three years after the beginning of the commonwealth,

and two years after the submission of President Quezon’s "plan".

The problem was economic -- the economics of agriculture —

what it composed-and how to meet it. Yet, the most important

bureau organized for this purpose, the Bureau of Plant Industry,

had "no section of Agricultural Economics," Director Silayan

stated. Yet, he believed, as did other scientists, that the

greatest problem facing Philippine agriculture at the beginning

^"Agriculture,” Ibid., p. 159.

4 Ibid.. p. 156.
 96

of its most critical period, was "whether it can prosper under

the prevailing condition affecting cost of production, taxation,

present market prices, current rates of interests, present rural

unrest, international relations, in other words, under the

present pressure of economic conditions." At that time, there

was no government institution fitted to carry on well organized

research activities with regard to these determining economic

factors other than the College of Agriculture and allied

colleges, of the University of the Philippines which did so as

a part of its curricula.6 Director Silayan believed that

conditions with regard to food supply would be somewhat

ameliorated if the public lands then available for use, in

Agusan, Cotabato, Davao, Occidental Misamis and Surigao were

used. These lands were located in regions free of typhoons and

drought, and would assure a steady supply of food "provided,"

he said, "that the country adopts and follows a national policy

of land use."6

His final recommendation was the suggestion for the

establishment of a well planned adult farm instruction program.^

The restrained observations of Director Silayan seem to

^Ibld.. p. 158. 6Ibid.. p. 159. Italics supplied.

'''Some halting steps were taken in this direction, but

since they were carried on by various -understaffed and under­
financed government agencies, they were never very successful.
Had they been encouraged to organize, such as the Grange in
the United States, with the direction coming from the people,
the chances would have been much more favorable for t h e
achievements of this vital program in Philippine rural life.
 97

indicate that "national planning" was far from adequate or even

that it existed. Other scientists were in agreement. A

prominent scientist believed that these "plans" of the Govern­

ment would be far from adequate, if the work in progress was

taken as typical of the program and the thinking. When the

Government spoke of "planning,” he said, it undoubtedly referred

to "scientific planning." This involved thinking which was

experimental and objective. However, he believed, that many

were "not interested in experiments to get a direct reply from

nature" and only wished to broadcast their ideas and receive

"popular acclaim and credit for conceiving them regardless as to

Q
what nature herself has to say about them."

The economic situation in the Philippines, he thought,

was characterized by extreme conservatism in industrial develop­

ment. This conservatism was found both in the ranks of local

capitalists and those who were to be responsible for promotion

of new industries. This produced two schools of thought. One

believed that only those industries which resulted from free

trade should be continued while the other believed that the

Government should encourage the development of industries in

the Philippines which would supplant foreign goods. However,

he stated, “both schools are effusions from the swivel chair."

He pointed ironically to the impossibility through inductive

reasoning alone, of ascertaining, "with any degree of reliability,"

®Dr. Manuel L. Roxas: "Science for the New Commonwealth,"

Ibid., p. 61.
 98

whether the country could establish in a short period of time

new industries which would supply local demand. This could

only be discovered by scientific planning, which, he believed,

was absent.

Furthermore, science in the Philippines, he believed,

was at the mercy of politics and "political expediency," which,

he said, "is poison to scientific methods." For this reason,

as well as others, scientific endeavor in the Philippines should

be removed "from the destructive influence of politics."

What should be the first steps in planning? He stated

flatly that the most urgent problems -- more urgent than the

usual temporizing expediencies of politics in industry -- were

those of discovering the nourishment standard of the population,

of eradicating the excessive infant mortality, removing

susceptibility to tuberculosis, and discovering how to control

Q
the high incidence of deficiency diseases. Since Dr. Roxas

was at that time chairman of the National Research Council, he

was thoroughly familiar with the scientific work in progress.

His discouraged observations on the 3tate of this work had little

effect upon the "planners", however, and throughout the Common­

wealth period, and the early years of the Republic,

scientific research into the main problems facing the country

9 Ibid., p. 62
 99

remained at the mercy of political expediency .^

A specialist in Philippine agrarian problems, Jose L.

Celeste, the Executive Secretary of the National Research

Council, pointed in similar fashion to the necessity of careful

and thorough planning. This involved, he believed, not only

planning to meet domestic needs, but also the question of

supplying the world market with various export items. The same

old problems hindering the best development of Philippine

agriculture -- farm credit, marketing, opening of new lands,

etc. — he said, should be met and solved before any hope were

expressed of becoming self-sufficient. Of these, he believed,

one of the most important involved the settling of farmers on

new tracts. This had been unsuccessful largely because of

"disease, lack of capital", and the lack of "titles to cleared

land."H With regard to industrialization, he warned that too

much attention was being given to creating industries which

were supposed to supplant imported commodities. The real need,

-^Scientists in the early years of the Republic continued

to regard with dismay the totally unscientific methods of
planning resorted to by the various bureaus charged with discover­
ing methods of meeting the critical conditions of 1949 and 1950.
Throughout the period, theories and assumptions were the basis
for all emergency measures, since all "plans" were drawn up by
politicos who scorned, and continue to scorn, the opinions and
ideas of men trained and concerned in the various disciplines of
science which, when understood and utilized humanistically, bring
so much happiness and well-being to mankind. This tragic
condition was complicated by the insistence of the "planners" in
regarding problems in the country as political in origin.

i:LIbid., p. 71.
 100

the real goal, he said, "should not be to produce everything

that we now import but to manufacture only those articles to

which the resources of the country are well suited.... He

suggested the creation of an Industries Board to study the

problem and make specific recommendations.

Antonio de Las Alas, Secretary of Finance, and Chairman

of the National Economic Council, recognized the need of

establishing local industries to meet local needs, and mentioned

several his Council were considering: meat packing, dairy

products, canning, development of fisheries, and the manufacture

of cotton yarn. Others, while needed, were not so immediately

essential, he believed. These were: manufacture of glass and

clay products, sack making and pulp and paper, industrialization

of coconut products, and manufacture of tanning extracts and

leather. He believed that these necessary industries could be

initiated with but an appropriation of 3^1,500,000, "which could be

easily set aside from the public treasury."-^ The National

Development Company, he said, would be the parent body to

initiate these industries. However, he warned, these industrial

products would not become realities, until cheap power was

available. While the National Economic Council had recommended

the establishment of hydro-electric plants, and the Assembly had

created the National Power Corporation with an appropriation,

the power program of the Philippines was interrupted by the

12Ibid. 15Ibld.. p. 196

 101

outbreak of the War, and because of its cost, was delayed for

many years after the establishment of the R e p u b l i c . ^

In 1934, the Philippine Economic Association presented

a program to be followed by the Commonwealth with regard to

planning. This association was composed of fourteen committees

with a total membership of eighty-five, with Cornelio Balmaceda

as Secretary and Elpidfo Quirino as President. Mr. Q,uirino,

later second President of the Philippine Republic, in his

introduction to the report of this Association, said:

We have entered upon a stage of development in which

economics plays a dominant role.... While we have en­
riched our culture with the assimilation of the arts and
sciences of other countries, we have failed, however, to
grow commensurately in economic substance and this is
due, not precisely to the little importance we have
placed in the past upon our agriculture, commerce and
trade, or upon the various economic activities that would
turn into material values our rich potential resources,
but to the lack of a well-defined and consistent scheme
of development. Today we realize... we have to awaken,
on the one hand, national consciousness and, on the other
hand, contend with a vast territory of virgin lands and
unexplored natural and industrial resources which we could
hardly hope to develop without government help and direction.

l^The Chairman of the National Power Board, Mr. M.

Jesus Cuenco, stated that water power development was
"confronted with complex economic problems." Amplifying this
statement, he said: "Ordinarily, as a wise business venture,
capital investments in this enterprise must ultimately sell
the power produced at a cost below or equal to that at which
it can be purchased and higher than that at which it can be
produced, in the same manner that a local manufacturer's sale
price for his articles must be set between the selling price of
imported articles of the same quality and the cost of manufac­
ture. It is, however, obvious that prevailing rates for power
cannot be taken as our higher limit in our calculations, but
rather the raise at which our industries may be enabled to lower
production costs, and thus to capture trade and thrive." Ibid..
pp. 205-206.
 102

We must not be satisfied with piece-meal develop­

ment.... We are faced with the problem of making the
necessary readjustments in our political, social and
economic life. Our national economic structure...
must claim our attention. A comprehensive program of
economic planning for the nation is imperative....
The special attention paid to the cultivation o f
export crops, like sugar, copra, tobacco and abaca,
has produced an agricultural problem in the Philip­
pines which has well-nigh endangered our economic
stability. While these export crops have taken big
strides progress in other crops has remained
practically stationery.... Recently, the government
has embarked on a campaign of diversification, but it
will be some time before we learn of its results.15

To put whatever planning into effect that was adopted,

Mr. i^uirino suggested three stages in development. The first

would be the "Period of General Preparation", which would

encompass the delimitation, survey and subdivision of public

lands; the speedy disposition of cadastral and land registra­

tion cases; the colonization of public lands; and, extensive

vocational education. The second period would be the "Period

of Planning under the Commonwealth." This would involve

"agricultural readjustments"; "rural problems"; the develop­

ment of forest resources; the development of mines and

minerals; the promotion of manufacturing industries;

development of fisheries; "labor and population"; domestic trade;

transportation and communication; banks and credit facilities

including the creation of a Central Bank; currency; and, public

finance. The third would be the "Period of Planning under the

Republic." This would involve only foreign trade and trade

Philippine Economic Association; Economic Problems

of the Ph ilippines. (Manilas Bureau of Printing, 1954), p p .
iii-iv, p a s s i m . Italics supplied.
 103

reciprocity treaties; immigration, and, neutrality.-^

In addition to this program, each of the fourteen commit­

tees submitted its recommendations. The committee on agricul­

tural readjustment had this to say:

"1. Separation from the United States will create

problems in agricultural readjustment; namely, the reduction

of export crops and the consequent decrease of imports.

"2. These readjustment problems will produce a most

difficult situation in agriculture. The principal problems

are: (a.) concentration of our export crops in regions where

these are best adapted, and the production of substitute crops

In regions from which crops for export are withdrawn; (b) the

expansion of production of crops now in the Islands in limited

quantities but which are imported in large quantities; and the

adaption of other local products to local uses so as to lessen

importation.

"3. The task of the Government in effecting these

needed readjustments is a very Important one. The Government

should coordinate the various processes as well as give

intelligent direction to the movement so that the changes may

be made with certainty, speed and with the minimum of economic

disorganization.

"4. The greatest and most important task of readjustment

rests with Individuals. With the individual farmer and capitalist

16Ibld., pp. viii-Ix.

 104

rest the responsibility of effecting the necessary changes in

the farm business. On the individual consumers as well as

organizations rest the equally important task of cooperating

with the Government program in the work."-^

Since this "program11 was an official one, it must be

supposed that it was to represent the future planning of the

Commonwealth. Whether or not it was specifically effectuated

can only be determined by studying the situation as it developed

throughout the years of the Commonwealth, with reference to the

various programs, policies, and projects.

The dangers inherent in a heedless program of national

planning were pointed out as early as 1936 by H.V. Hodson who

said that national planning "without international cooperation

in the essential matters of currencies, tariffs, markets, and other

sources of supply is a movement of mass suicide...."1® There

was really no reason to suppose that the Philippines would be

able to find its path toward economic security in the future

by unilateral action. Both the planners in the Philippines and

those in the United States should have realized this. Each,

however, was handicapped by domestic-mindedness exemplified in

the quasi-mercantilist theory of one Filipino observer who

17
I b i d .. p. 42. Incidentally, the committee on rural
problems suggested as its major recommendation that "the rural
population should be enlightened about the problems of rural
life." This is undoubtedly not deliberately ironic.

18i»The Nemesis of National Planning," Pacific AfEiirs.

IX, No. 1 (March, 1936), p. 59.
 105

suggested that the Philippines "lay down a solid economic

foundation, conceived in che principle of nationalism, as the

lasting and permanent basis of our political edifice."1® Since

this unfortunate and questionable objective lay in the minds

of planners on both sides of the Pacific,the misunderstanding,

mistakes and misery that were to characterize the life of the

nation in later years were inevitable.

The Situation. 1954-1958 :-

If the agricultural situation in the Philippines were

looked at solely from the viewpoint of high-level observers,

concerned only with Government policies and activities (as so

much of recent writing on the Philippines has been), the true

story would not emerge. The lives of the people were in actuality

little affected by Goverment programs and plans except in a negative

fashion. The people were most concerned with how the development of

events touched their own lives and fortunes. Their reactions to these

developments would give us the full picture, but it is difficult

now, long after the events described, to recapitulate the moods

and feelings of the populace as they faced the situation except

in the most general way. However, to understand even a little

of the pressures and problems which determined the economic

development of the Commonwealth and its influence upon political

19
Manuel V. Gallego, Philippine Commonwealth Journal.
Vol. II, Nos. 7-8 (July-August”] 1955), p. 73.
 106

events, we should review largely for illustration, the shifting

current of events in these first few years of the new Govern­

ment.20 We shall examine market activities, price fluctuations,

natural influences and follow this with an examination of

Government policies and attitudes.

One of the many problems lay in the differential

existing between the prices given the grower for palay (from

provincial centers)2 ^ and the prices quoted on the central

markets -- sometimes as much as two pesos a sack and occasional­

ly much more. Also, prices fluctuated greatly from season to

season and from month to month, with the consumer and small

producer completely at the mercy of the weather and the middle­

men. The table®2 indicates the serious condition (rather

sketchily, it is true) existing in 1934-35 -- a condition which

it behooved the Government to rectify if unrest was to be

allayed in the provinces.

By June, 1934, the planting of the new crop of rice was

under way in Central Luzon, but was greatly retarded by drought

except in the few irrigated districts. It was hoped that the

seasonal rains would come in time for extensive planting. Many

2 0 The story of the year3 1939-1941 must be held in

abeyance until material is found relative to this period. It
is astonishing for the researcher to see the almost complete
la@k of sources for the period after 1939 to the outbreak of
the War .

2 1 Palay is the unhusked "raw" rice.

22 Table I, Appendix.
 107

requests had come from the United States for export supplies

which some observers believed indicated a possible market for

transshipment to Puerto Rico, Cuba, and other rice-consuming

markets. However, little attention was given by the dealers to

the problem of grading for export. Quality grading did not

exist except for the limited luxury market. It was stated by

qualified observers that any Improvement in the export trade

would depend upon the exchange situation as well as supply.2 ^

By the end of 1934, the estimates of observers24

pointed to the increasing seriousness of the situation. The

crop for 1934-35 was expected, for example, to be small

because of plant diseases and the effects of a typhoon at the

flowering period in certain districts. The carry-over was

small, and milling recovery was low because of these diseases.

During this same period, when many families were un­

able to procure the rice they needed, the Philippines shipped,

in the first nine months, some 2,866,000 kilos of rice, worth

5=328,000 to the United States, chiefly for brewing purposes

(the price of Philippine rice at that time being cheaper than

the American product). This figure contrasted sharply with the

56,000 kilos, worth 55,000 shipped in the corresponding period

of 1933. Coincident with the rise in amount shipped to the

23
Much of the material in this section is drawn from
detailed reports in the Philippine Magazine as well as from
summaries found in The Philippine Journal of Commerce. 1934-38.

2 4 S e e : "Business and Finance Summary" section, Philip­

pine Magazine. XXXI, No. 1 (January, 1934), and the following
numbers, for monthly resumes end observations with regard to
the developing situation.
 108

United States, the Bureau of Commerce issued new regulations

effective November 1, 1934, governing the exportation of rice

aimed at maintaining a high standard of quality. While this

was designed to increase the export business of the country,

the domestic problem of production and consumption was far

from a solution.

Surprisingly, the price of rice' in November declined,

despite the effects of a typhoon. At the same time it w a s

pointed out that the estimated figure of 1,400,000 tons for

the new crop was reduced by seme 250,000 tons because of the

weather and disease, particularly in Central Luzon. During

the month, the receipts of the cereal in Manila markets were

some 25,000 sacks less than in the corresponding period for

the previous year.

The end of November and the beginning of December saw

the Philippines swept by typhoons, causing extensive damage

and some fatalities in the Visayas and Luzon. As a result,

by January, reports from agents of the Bureau of Commerce

indicated that the rice crop in Central Luzon then being

harvested would be from ten to fifty per cent lower than the

1933 crop. It was reported that the crop was 50 per cent lower

in Bulacan, 40 per cent lower in Nueva E cija and 10 per cent

lower in Pangasinan. The total crop estimate was accordingly

reduced from 1,400,000 tons to 1,150,000 tons. Official and

private reports of the year's production were at variance,

 109

causing the Government to urge a thorough survey of crop

conditions, and particularly with reference to the effects of

the typhoons.

During January, 1935, rice prices continued firm be­

cause of reports of ample supplies, but it soon became clear

that these reports were either inspired by sources anxious to

steady the market or were erroneous. Although new supplies

became available in fair quantities, most holders were not

prepared to dispose of their stocks because of indications of

another shortage. This situation naturally resulted In sharp

advances during the last two weeks of the month, when specula­

tors began active buying of palay in the provinces. The

market remained firm and active with demand far exceeding supply.

Palay prices ranged from 51.60 to 51.85 per sack while market

prices ranged from 55.90 to54.70.

Late February and early March saw a decline in the

prices of luxury grades and in macan and palay prices. The

market constantly fluctuated due to the Inability of buyers to

estimate supplies, the small amount available in the markets,

and the weak demand due to the low purchasing power of consumers.

Informed observers pointed to the likelihood that this situation

would continue with no immediate stabilization of prices. Prices

remained steady until the reserves from the old crop were

disposed of, when they began to rise rapidly as it became clear

that the new crop was far below expectations. Althoagji some commit­

ments were made on the basis of the old price, the consumers
 110

refused to meet the advance, with a resulting falling of demand

and prices. In addition, great uncertainty again existed as to

the size of the crop, though it was generally agreed that it had

been considerably reduced by disease and typhoon damage. The

farmers, realizing the situation, held their stocks and preferred

to borrow against them in hopes of a general price rise of rice.

It was estimated that about 60 per cent of the crop was so held.

Merchants expressed the belief that extensive buying from Saigon

would be necessary and negotiations for such imports were reported.

However, the high price of Saigon rice, and the refusal of the

consumer to meet these costs made such importation unprofitable.

Late March and April saw the steadying of the prices of

rice as it became evident the crop was to fall below that of the

previous year. An increase in demand was also expected because

of the distribution of the sugar processing tax (under the U.S.

AAA). Some rice exporters protested against the imposition of

a one cent-a-pound compensatory tax by the American Government

to balance the one-cent-a-pound processing tax on American rice.

However, as it became clear that there would be no appreciable

surplus available for export during the year, little attention

was given this protest.

During April, a much larger volume of business was

contracted than in March resulting from the good demand from

the southern islands as a result of the typhoons there late in

1934 and early in 1935.

 Ill

During May and June, growers continued to hold their

crops, unwilling to sell at current prices any more than was

absolutely necessary. In addition, the June planting advanced

slowly, because of lack of rain, which indicated that the early

crop would be of moderate size. Expectations were that increased

planting would ultimately take place, however, mainly due to

the contracting of export c r o p s .

This continued through August, with prices of macan

rising as high as 1=6.50 a sack by the middle of September. By

that time, the Government was definitely alarmed over the

possibility of macan increasing in price beyond the ability of

the poorer people to pay, and it took steps to prevent a

further advance by setting up a revolving fund of 1=30,000, with

which the Manila Trading Center was to buy rice for resale in

the poorer districts of the city. The Trading Center had no

facilities, however, for extending this necessary service out­

side the city, and so was not able to keep prices down to proper

levels.

Again, there was wide variance of opinion with regard

to stocks. The Bureau of Commerce reported that the crop

planted during the summer would be lower than the last crop,
2S
but also said that supplies were ample. ° Other authorities

expected a shortage, estimating that the floods In Central Luzon

In July and August had destroyed 165,286 hectares of newly

2 ^Fhillpplne M a g a z i n e . XXXII, No. 11 (November, 1935),

p. 526.
 112

planted palay, of which 95,000 hectares were in the province of

Pangasinan.26 This meant about a quarter of the Central Luzon

hectarage. Seed-beds had also been destroyed which meant that

much of the affected area would not be replanted during 1935.

The stocks in warehouses were believed to be considerable

but there was no accurate information with regard to either the

amount or ownership. The Bureau of Commerce, replying to

complaints that the rice growers should not be deprived of their

first opportunity in four years to realize a good profit (while

they said hemp growers and others were reaping rich dividends),

maintained that at least 75 per cent of the rice was in the hands

of dealers and millers. Representatives of the latter, however,

claimed that the proportion was just the opposite: the growers

holding at least 75 per cent.27 The growers warehoused their

rice with the millers, in some instances borrowing against it

from the banks, and it was suggested by observers that the

millers, in many cases, were being wrongly accused of withholding

their stocks from the market, when they were actually only

warehousemen with no say as to its disposition.

Saigon rice, in Manila, was still above the Philippine

price and imports, as a result, were negligible. It was hoped

that if prices continued to rise the Government would ultimately

take the step of reducing the import duty temporarily.

26Ibid. 27Ibid
 113

In August a typhoon caused considerable damage to growing

crops, losses being estimated at over three million pesos.

Several hundred lives were reported lost in the subsequent

floods in Central Luzon. Transportation and communication

facilities were paralyzed, further complicating the situation.

Throughout September, rising prices failed to bring out

supplies to meet the needs of the people and considerable

distress resulted. On September 20, due to the growing unrest

among the people, the Cabinet decided to import rice free of

duty. Two days l a t e r the Governor-General issued a proclama­

tion declaring that an emergency existed, and designating the

Bureau of Commerce as a relief organization to import rice free

of duty, In any quantity necessary to sell to the public at

cost. Unrest and violence were reported from several provinces

28
as prices continued to soar.

On September 27, with conditions still serious, the

Governor-General issued an executive order requiring a report

to his office within five days of all stores of rice and

29
imposing restrictions on transfers and sales of the commodity.

The first of October saw a temporary relief from high prices as

a shipment of rice arrived from China, but two weeks later, on

October 14, a mob of hungry people raided the Goseco camote

plantation in Pampanga, and beat the overseer. Robheries and

assaults were reported from other places in Pampanga and Nueva

2 8 Ibid.. p. 526-527. 29Ibid., p. 528.

 114

Ecija. The emergency relief administration of the Bureau of

Commerce rushed sacks of rice to various points for distribution

to persons reported on the verge of starvation. w

Two days later, an armed mob of hungry people at Macabebe,

Pampanga, raided a number of fish-ponds, and a week later, the

Secretary of Labor, Ramon Torres, stated that landlords and

hacenderos were taking advantage of the misery of the people by

exactions of as much as five cavans of rice in repayment for

one cavan advanced, and blamed them for the unrest in many parts

of Luzon.

Luxury stocks increased to ^6.65 per sack by the end of

the month, while macan (the. staple of the people) went from

^5.90 to 1*6,00 to as high as 5^7.25. The Secretary of Agricul­

ture and Commerce, who had declared that ^6.00 was an ample

price for macan, tried at first to get rice to the poorer people

in Manila (naturally the great majority of the people), by buying

it in the provinces and reselling it through the Manila Trading

Center. This being completely ineffectual, it was finally

decided that the Government should admit a limited amount (as

mentioned above), free of duty, for distribution through the

provincial treasurers. It arranged to bring in some 60,000

sacks from Hongkong* As a result, a good deal of rice which had

been in storage appeared on the market and lowered prices some-

50I b i d . 310£. eft., No. 12 (December, 1955), p. 595.

 115

what. Local merchants had been encouraged to negotiate for

200,000 sacks from French Indo-China; but as a result of the

price-reduction, none of the tenders for Saigon rice were

accepted. &y the end of the month Government rice was selling

at from §*6.25 to 3^6.50. Then a rising tendency was noted early

in October.

Despite the efforts of the Bureau of Commerce to obtain

a reliable estimate, there was as yet no definite information

as to the amount of rice stored. Their agents discovered that

the new crop would be from 15 to 20 per cent below that of the

previous year in Central Luzon, because of the recurrent floods

and disease. However, private observers placed the estimate

considerably lower. Reports from the Visayas indicated a lower

crop in that area, particularly on Negros.

At the end of September, imports temporarily eased the

fear of a shortage, with a resultant small drop in prices.

However, when the Government refused all tenders of Saigon rice,

and the scarcity of the cereal became apparent in many sections,

prices quickly rose to around ?7.50 for macan and ?7.80 for

luxury grades. They remained at this level for the remainder of

the month despite the fact that the Government imported 78,000

duty-free sacks for distribution by the Manila Trading Center

and the Provincial treasurers. This Government rice was sold

in small quantities to the needy at 3^5.50 per sack. There was

some importation of Saigon rice, by local merchants, at the

 116

duty-paid rate which, however, meant it was unavailable for the

average customer.

It was also evident that further Imports would be

necessary in the coming year (1936) because of the damage

*Zp
inflicted by floods and plant disease. The rice was attacked

again by rust rot, and authorities continued to state that until

the problem of disease was solved the Philippines could not

count upon producing sufficient quantities to meet domestic

needs. One or two halting steps had been taken in this direction,

the Legislature having voted 3^200,000 before its adjournment

the previous July, for the extermination of locusts. But many

scientists felt this was far from adequate and campaigned for

more money to seek remedies for the diseases which took such

heavy toll of the crop each year.

On November 30, 1935, President Quezon, recognizing the

"state of emergency with respect to rice because of drought,

typhoon, flood, and similar conditions..." issued Proclamation

No. 11, which authorized "the importation of rice...for

distribution among distressed people, free of duty....'

Despite this move, the rice situation grew more serious

at the end of 1935. Although harvesting had begun, little rice

had appeared in the markets of Manila because of the heavy local

3^0p. c l t .. XXXIII, No. 1 (January, 1936), p. 4.

35M . 0 . P .. Vol. I (rev. ed.) 1938, pp. 214-215.

 117

demand in the provinces, where the shortage had been felt the

most. In addition, the crop harvested was small. The heavy

typhoon which struck the principal growing districts in the

middle of November was particularly destructive, since the crop

was in the process of pollination. Together with the resultant

flood and increased damage by insects, this reduced the estimated

crop to a 280 days' supply. It was apparent that during 1936

great stocks would have to be imported to avert almost certain

hunger. Following President Quezon's proclamation with regard

to the importation of duty-free rice, suggestions were made

that he be empowered to lower the tariff as the situation

demanded.34 But strong objections were raised by large growers,

who felt that this would permit private traders to Import and

distribute rice to their disadvantage.

In December, the price of rice eased as the new crop

began to appear in Manila markets, so the Government discontinued

sales of imported duty-free stocks. However, observers pointed

out that the crop was considerably smaller than the average for

previous years, and that no reserve existed to carry over until

the next season.33 The Government stated that it was prepared

to take immediate action should a shortage again become apparent,

and was holding for that emergency some 50,000 sacks of Saigon rice,3 3

34L o c » cit.

330p. c i t .. No. 2 (February, 1936), p. 54.

3 6 Ibid. . p. 55.
 118

However, no bills stabilizing the price of rice were

passed in December, 1935. Many authorities suggested that a

permanent solution would necessitate the study of plant diseases

which had been cutting the production of the cereal.37 The

Bureau of Plant Industry pointed out that, because of diseases

and other natural calamities, the crop would reach only

42,282,260 cavans of palay, as against an average for the

preceding four years of 48,981,676 (two cavans of palay yield,

on the average, one cavan of 57 kilos of cleaned rice). Thus,

the absence of a reserve clearly indicated another shortage for

the year 1936, requiring imports of from three to four million

sacks.

Rice dealers were jubilant over the price of rice, which

opened on the market in January of 1936 at from f=7 to £=7.10 per

sack of luxury grade, with macan offered at §=6.25 to 1*6.35. This

price, however, placed great numbers of people at a disadvantage

since it was well out of their reach.

Rice prices continued high during most of April, but

eased off at the end of the month when imports were begun by the

newly-founded National Rice and Corn Corporation (see below).

'These imports were expected to relieve the domestic shortage and

keep prices from rising to excessive levels. The National Rice

and Corn Corporation was designated a relief agency by President

Quezon ("in view of the serious shortage of rice and the imminent

37
Ibid., p . 57.
 119

danger of the inflation of prices as a result of manipulations

resorted to by those in control of the limited stocks."), on

April 23, and started selling on May 5, at 1*0.28 a ganta, which

was later reduced to UK).26. Dealers who purchased stocks from

the Corporation were forbidden to sell at higher r a t e s . L a t e r ,

during the month, prices steadied after a brief flurry caused

by the raising of the question whether the Corporation was

entitled to import rice free of duty. It was hoped that the

price would continue around the level set earlier in the month.

During the month of August, some optimism was expressed over

the rice prospects for the next year because of improved rain­

fall. The value of commercial letters of credit was unusually

high partly due to the credits opened for importation of rice

by the Rice and Corn Corporation. However, during September,

to the dismay of the dealers, the price fell off because of the

lowered selling price of Corporation rice. And, again, disaster

struck. Toward the middle of October, typhoons and floods

caused heavy damage to the Central Luzon crop, and some 400

persons were said to have lost their lives in floods (October

12), in Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac and Zambales. The

damage to crops was estimated at over ^1,000,000.39

On October 14, more than 20,000 people were made home­

less, 235 were known dead, and 612 were missing as a result of

the floods in Pangasinan and Pampanga, where a number of dikes

5 8 0 p . c i t .. No. 6 (June, 1936), p. 279.

590 p . c i t .. No. 11 (November, 1936), p. 526.

 120

gave way. Some 150 persons, mostly mine laborers, drowned

while leaving Barrio Tatay Masinloc. They were crossing the

Salasa River when the flood overtook them. Health forces were

mobilized to inoculate the people against cholera and dysentery

which immediately spread throughout the stricken area. Com­

plicating the situation, agitators took advantage of the

suffering to instigate further disorders. A serious local food

shortage threatened because of the wholesale drowning of pigs

and chickens.

On October 15, President Quezon visited the flood area,

and his sudden appearance in Cabanatuan quieted a crowd of 7,000

persons demanding food and clothing from wealthy residents. The

President promised all necessary Government aid to the sufferers.

The heavy damage and loss of life arose from the freak nature

of the typhoon which crossed north Central Luzon from Isabela

to Zambales and then, instead of continuing out to the China Sea,

retraced its course, sweeping down upon the unsuspecting

populace who were still recovering from its first blow.

On December 19, President Quezon, in a report to the

Secretary of War, placed the casualties at 74 dead and 200

missing, and the number of sufferers at 50,000. He estimated

property and crop damage at ^4,500,000, and expressed appreciation

for the aid rendered by the United States Army and American Red Cross.^

^^In the years 1934 to 1941, the American Red Gross extended
aid amounting to $127,500.00, the largest expenditures being made
in the period October, 1934 - April, 1935 ($75,000), and October
and December*, 1936 ($35,000).
 121

This latest flood was the worst in the Cagayan Valley, inhab­

itants of which had long pleaded for control works and irrigation

d a m s .41

In November, the Rice and °orn Corporation moved to

stabilize palay prices by offering 3^2.25 to!P2.50 a cavan at

producing centers. Despite the typhoon and subsequent floods,

it was hoped that it would be unnecessary to import large

quantities in 1937.

...... The year 1936 saw an increasing frequency of unrest and

disorder rising in pitch by June because of attempted ejection

of tenants by landlords in various places. The most immediately

menacing situation arose in Nueva Ecija, Rizal, and Iloilo.

The middle of June saw a ’’higher w a g e 1' campaign initiated at a

mass meeting in Manila, in preparation for a demonstration

before the Assembly later. Leaders of the disaffected pointed

out that with the price of rice constantly beyond the reach of

most laborers, it was imperative that a living wage be granted.

However, although the justice of this demand was apparent, action

toward granting higher pay proceeded slowly. Since rice prices

^ T h e Cagayan River, flowing north, is the largest river

in the Philippines, and drains almost one-fourth of the island
of Luzon. Its valley, some fifty miles wide, is one of the most
fertile in the Philippines. This region, also, has some of the
most tropical weather in the country with almost unendurable heat
throughout most of the year. Lying between two ranges of mountains,
the Caraballo and the Central Cordillera of the Sierra Madre, it
does not receive the cooling effect of the monsoons; so that the
region is excellent for tobacco production but very uncomfortable
for the people living there. Despite the fact that this important
region is but 400 kilometers from Manila, the area is periodically
cut off from the rest of Luzon by the floods that sweep through
the valley carrying away bridges and washing out roads.
 122

continued steady throughout the same month at the level deter­

mined by the prices charged by the Rice and Corn Corporation

for imported rice, Government leaders and others replied to

these wage demands by saying that the problem was nearly solved.

It had, however, only begun.

Throughout the early months of the year 1937, unrest

continued to grow in certain areas over the division of harvest

and the question of evictions. On March 13, for example,

twenty-two farm tenants were arrested in Pampanga charged with

"robbery in band" with bail set at 16,000 each, which might just

as well have been 1=60,000. The men were harvesting rice which

they had planted but upon land from which they had been evicted.

Speculation continued to injure the population. On

April 16, President Quezon released a proclamation declaring the

city of Manila to be in a "state of calamity", making it

possible for the Government to control prices. This was

necessitated by reports of "unreasonable and conscienceless

speculation" in land rents and foodstuffs in the Tondo fire area,

where 16,000 sufferers were without means of subsistence other

than those furnished them by the various relief agencies.

Contrary to the hopes expressed at the end of 1936, in

May of 1937, it was estimated that it would be necessary, again,

to import as much as one million sacks of rice to meet the

demand. The Rice and Corn Corporation at the same time released

its report for the preceding year showing a net profit of

12,500,000, 131 per cent of the paid-up capital stock, for the
 123

period April 31 to December 31, 1936. On May 23, rice dealers

protested against the free importation of stocks by the Corpora­

tion as interfering with the laws of supply and demand (!),

this (they said) depriving them of business and materially

affecting Government income. •‘■hey stated that instead of the

1=2,421,551 netted by the Corporation the preceding year, the

Government would have collected customs duties of over 1=5,000,000

on the rice imported from Saigon and could also have realized

around 1148,000 from sales tax proceeds. Corporation officials

replied that the benefits to the general public from the

establishment of the NARIC could not be measured in t erms of

revenue foregone by the Government. Whether or not this was

true, and some observers doubted it,42 it was undeniably true

that the dealers continued to display a complete disregard for

the welfare of the general public throughout the Commonwealth

period and into the Republic. At the same time, such business­

men were unable to understand the appeal of agitators and

communists who sought power from the dissatisfaction and unrest

of the public.

On May 25, the justice of the peace at Licab, Nueva Ecija,

sentenced Lucia Vda. de Tinio, wealthy landowner, to a month's

imprisonment and the payment of 139.30 to the aggrieved party,

Gaudencio Lina, for violating the Tenancy Law and appropriating

the 15 per cent share of the rice crop due the complaining tenant.

42
See: Manuel V. Gallego: Economic Em an cipation, pp.
22-30.
 124

Three days later, the Board of Directors of the Philippine

National Bank approved the proposal of the Secretary of Ag ricul­

ture and Commerce, Bulogio Rodriguez, to grant loans to rice-

land owners at 7 per cent so that these owners could in turn

loan it to their tenants at not more than 10 per cent!

During July, 1937, prices increased steadily because of

the rising demand, the destruction of stored as well as growing

rice, and floods in Central Luzon. August saw additional floods

there, causing further damage to crops and taking a score of

lives. In September, it was reported that, despite the damage,

the country would be self-sufficient in rice during the year

1938. The following month, however, prices rose due to the

report that the new crop would be considerably below estimates

as a result of drought and plant d i s e a s e s . 43 gy the end of that

month, famine was threatening in Nueva Ecija as the drought

began to affect some 50,000 hectares of rice land. On November

11, a typhoon passed over Luzon doing considerable damage.

Several scores of persons were drowned or killed, some

electrocuted b y wires blown down, and other thousands rendered

homeless. Crop damage was heavy and the towns of Infanta and

Polillo were practically wiped out.

The weather continued to give the lie to optimists.

During the month of November, clear days were the exception,

with two additional typhoons causing considerable damage to rice,

45PJC. XIII, Nos. 10-11 (October-November, 1937), p. 27.

 125

sugar, coconuts, and other crops. The rice crop was seriously

depleted by the drought which was too far advanced to be

checked by the persistent rains of November. It became n e c e s ­

sary for the National Assembly again to pass a typhoon bill

appropriating 1=500,000 for relief, the bill being signed by

President Quezon while in the hospital recovering from an

appendicitis operation. A few days later the President issued

a proclamation declaring the existence of a state of calamity

in Samar, Cebu, Iloilo and Bulacan. During the last days of the

month, the price of palay advanced as a result of speculation

which was encouraged by rumors that the Rice and Corn Corporation

would increase its buying price for palay, causing further har d ­

ship to the already suffering body of poor consumers.

One observer44 pointed out that business generally

declined during December, 1937, with a concomitant accumulation

of stocks and a deterioration of credit conditions. Rice prices

increased, due to speculative activity, which was encouraged by

rumors again that the Rice and Corn Corporation would increase

its buying price for palay. Alleviation of conditions was still

dependent upon public works projects and the distribution of oil

excise tax funds from the United States.

By March, 1938, rice prices continued their rise due to

a belief that the recent harvest would be inadequate for domestic

requirements, with the consequent necessity for imports from Saigon,

4 4 J. Bartlett Richards, in Philippine M a g a z i n e . XXXV, No.

2 (February, 1938), p. 72 and f f .
 126

Typhoons and drought had reduced the crop up t o .30 per cent in

many areas.4® During the month, the Assembly approved a public

works bill which authorized the President to spend at once

some forty per cent of the 1=97,000,000, four-year public works

appropriation, to meet the low level of living in the nation.

It was also disclosed that the NARIC was "considering

the adoption of certain measures" in the provinces as a step

toward "stabilizing and nationalizing" the industry. What

these measures were was not disclosed.4 ® Another factor of

importance, they were considering, was the suggested adoption

of price schedules for various localities by the Corporation

as well as a suggested appropriation of 1=200,000, for a palay

census "with a view to limiting over-production of palay greatly

In excess of consumption requirements."47 In connection with

this, the NARIC planned to limit production to only a few

varieties which would give high yields, the object being "to

compel farmers to discontinue inferior grade production."

There is no evidence that any of these programs proceeded farther

than the planning stage, just as there is no evidence that there

had ever been an "Overproduction greatly In excess of1 con­

sumption requirements” .

April saw a continuing rise in prices and reports were

received from primary sources indicating that stocks were running

46PJC, XIV, No. 3 (March, 1938), p. 21

4 6 Ibid., p. 30. 47 I b l d . (!)

 127

low and were being held by strong hands. It was believed that

prices would continue their rise until the Corporation began

selling. In the third week of the month, prices rose as much

as 25 centavos for macan and 60 centavos for Elon-elon, rising,

in the last week, from ^6,40 to 1^6.60 for the former and 3^7.00

to §=7.20 for the latter. Prices for palay registered similar

gains increasing 25 to 35 centavos for all varieties.

Despite a drop of around five centavos the following

month, and some arrivals of Ilocano rice from Cagayan and red

rice from Central Luzon, prices held steadily through the month

of June. During the last week of that month, prices rose 10

to 15 centavos, due to the activity of speculators who antici­

pated a shortage because of greater demand. Most large sellers

held onto their stocks hoping for further increases in prices.

In July, conditions continued much the same, with

rising prices for the first two weeks. The last two weeks of

the month saw the rise checked as the corporation started selling

macan at 3^6.67. Palay prices, however, continued to rise, with

all varieties increasing from 10 to 15 centavos. Heavy rains

and storms of July were largely responsible for this increase.

Iloilo, Capiz, and Pangasinan saw the heaviest increases as well

as the city of Manila. Floods, a few days later in Laguna,

caused heavy damage to crops there, and reports from Occidental

Negros and Capiz indicated acute shortages in those provinces,

with the Corporation board hardpressed to meet the emergency.

 128

On the 11th of July, despite the warning of the Corporation

that it would undersell millers and rice merchants if they

refused to lower prices, the price of rice soared to 35 cent­

avos per ganta. It was officially reported that the efforts

of the Rice and Corn Corporation to keep prices normal in all

parts of the Philippines were meetinp; with support from all

municipal and provincial authorities; but prices continued to

rise, to the disgust of the average consumer, who complained

that local officials paid little attention to the situation.

The middle of July saw a threat of drought to the rice

crop in Nueva Ecija, the condition being aggravated by worm

infestation. It was reported in the middle of the month that,

although the price of rice was higher than for the previous

year, it had stabilized somewhat. This provided small comfort

to the consumer. Officials reported that the Inability of the

Corporation to fix the "normal" price of rice was due to in­

complete data about rice stocks and surpluses. This lack of

reliable statistics, in all phases of Philippine economic life,

was to be a major perplexity throughout the Commonwealth period.

Toward the end of the month of July, reports from

Albay indicated that, because of typhoons and the eruption of

Mayon volcano, rice was being sold at from f‘7 to 1*7.20 per

cavan, with the retail price fixed at 35 centavos per ganta.

This price was more than 50 per cent greater than the average

consumer earning one peso a day could afford. Provincial officials

were seeking the aid of the Corporation to meet the situation.
 129

At the end of July, the Corporation reported that the

condition of the new rice crop in the provinces of Pangasinan,

Tarlac, Pampanga and Bulacan was "normal11 -- indicating, some

critical observers said, that they would be insufficient. The

Corporation stated that the local stocks of rice and palay

would be adequate to meet trade requirements until the next

harvest, and began wholesale shipments to the provinces in order

to bring down prices. This was not accomplished.

The first of August, the Rice and Corn Corporation,

announced that the first modern rice warehouse in the Philip­

pines had been constructed in Nueva Ecija. This, it was hoped,

would help meet the marketing and storage problems in the

industry and eventually bring about a general amelioration of

40
conditions. This hope went unrealized, and, as if to mock

these efforts, it was soon discovered that the provinces of

Isabela and Pangasinan faced poor crops for the coming year as

a severe drought had destroyed seedlings. Ten days later,

farmers in Nueva Ecija expressed fear that drought was gradually

killing; their rice seedlings as well. Later in the month

government agencies began laying plans for taking precautionary

measures to protect the public against manipulation of the

price of rice and profiteering. To indicate the seriousness of

the situation, in addition to the Corporation and the Bureau of

Commerce, the Bureau of Internal Revenue took an active part in

48PJC. XIV, No. 9 (September, 1938), p. 14.

 130

the program. However, the lack of adequate bureau personnel in

the provinces, as well as those invisible determining factors

prevalent in the country, precluded any effective control over

the situation -- a condition which still prevailed in 1950.

By the twenty-fourth, hopes were that the excellent corn

production in the Central Luzon provinces as well as the early

harvest of upland rice in Camarines Sur, Albay, and Palawan,

might help ease the situation which had grown very serious in

Central Luzon particularly. At the end of the month, the

special committee of the National Economic Council, created by

direction of the President to inquire into the rice situation

and determine whether price levels were reasonable, began its

work. The Philippine Rice Growers Association, at a special

meeting of its board of directors at the same time, went on

record as being opposed to price fixing of rice of the grade

"macan segundo" or better, unless the prices exceeded the landed

cost of imported rice of the same quality.

August, in the Philippines, is generally a quiet trade

month, because rains make the roads impassable, or nearly so.

This discourages the movement of goods. However, August, 1938,

saw just the reverse of the normal condition, for the severe

drought caused no interference to trade movements. It did,

however, restrict trade because of the fear by rice farmers of

crop failures. Shopkeepers restricted credit purchases, by

rice farmers, who normally live on credit granted by retailers

until their rice crops are harvested and sold. This cut sharply
 131

the purchasing power in districts devoted to export crops. In

view of the low world prices of abaca and copra, and the high

price of rice, both the rice producer and abaca and copra

producers found their economic position shaky indeed. Since a

small rice crop was expected, little relief appeared possible.

And there was none.

Rice prices continued high throughout August, but the

offer of the Rice and Corn Corporation to sell second class

macan at 1*6.65 kept prices in some districts from mounting un­

reasonably. However, in those areas where arrangements had not

been made for the distribution of NARIC rice excessively high

49
prices prevailed. New crop prospects were poor since the

drought continued causing severe damage to unirrigated fields,

particularly in Central Luzon.

On August 17, provincial governors meeting in Manila

urged the NARIC to peg the price of second class rice at ^5.50

-- from 1*1.00 to 1*2.00 less than the current price. Dr. Victor

Buencamino, head of the Corporation, stated that, in Its

efforts to stabilize the industry, the NARIC acted as a

moderator between the producers who wanted high prices and the

consumers who wanted low prices, and that the prevailing price

was normal on the basis of general averages.50 This statement

was made In answer to charges that the NARIC was responsible for

49Philippine Magazine. XXXV, No. 10 (October, 1938),

p. 452.

50Ibid.. p. 453.
 132

the high rice prices. President Quezon instructed the National

Economic Council to inquire into the matter, and upon receiving

its report declared that the NARIC, for good and sufficient

reasons, had established the price at a level which was complete­

ly justified. The President refused to interfere with the

situation and encouraged the NARIC to continue meeting the

problem as it saw fit.5^- Although this failed to satisfy the

NARIC's critics, it silenced most of them, and three days after

the President's statement, the NARIC announced that it was ready

to sell rice at 29 centavos per ganta, considerably below the

prices of private dealers.

The scarcity of rain continued throughout September and

even the "oldest inhabitants" found difficulty in recalling so

eg
dry a season. Reports from Central Luzon indicated, however,

that earlier reports with regard to the damage to the rice crop

were somewhat exaggerated. The damage had undoubtedly been

considerable and it was seen that the crop would be appreciably

below the 1937-38 crop; certainly it was inadequate to meet the

needs of the domestic market.^3

The tone of the market was set by the Rice and Corn

5 1 Ibid., p. 454.
52
The newspapers must retain a supply of "oldest inha­
bitants", for particular information on climate and crops, as
well as other items. An observer might say that this indicates
the fact that statistics, to the general public, are regarded
as a government affectation and that they prefer their own
sources of information.

550p. clt.. No. 11 (November, 1938), p. 500

 133

Corporation: It sold second class macan throughout the month

at 1=6.65 per sack, but reduced the price to 16.50 early in

October at the request of various c on s um er s1 organizations.

The Corporation augmented its stocks by importing 46,000 sacks

from Saigon and made plans to place orders for American rice.

The Philippine-Chinese Rice Merchants Association had

promised the Corporation that it would lower gradually its

prices of second class macan and ramay to 16.65 and 16.60

respectively. During the second week of September it did so,

prices dropping as much as 30 centavos.^4 Buyers increased

their bids during the rest of the month, but holders continued

indifferent expecting higher prices since the stock of palay

in the provinces was reported to be quite low. Private dealers

made capital of the fact that the Corporation had sustained an

operating loss of 116,000, during 1937, which fact was reported

55
early in September. The Corporation, however, remained

undisturbed and countered by instructing its agents, as well as

those of the Bureau of Commerce, to watch more closely the

56
price situation in the provinces.

'The Director of Commerce, in order to fix rice prices

in different municipalities, ordered a nation-wide survey by

Bureau agents of the stock of palay and rice in their districts

and instructed them to make immediate reports to Manila. Partial

54PJC, XIV, Nos. 10-11.. (October-November, 1938), p. 5.

5 5 Ibid., p. 33. 5 6 Ibid.

 134

reports on September 11, indicated sufficient stocks for

domestic needs, but most of the reports were retained by the

Bureau pending the receipt of the remainder. The survey had

been ordered to facilitate an even distribution of supply, this

according to the Bureau being the major problem. If even

distribution could be attained not only would stocks be suffi­

cient for the whole country but the price would be greatly

reduced. For this reason the Bureau urged the establishment

of warehouses throughout the country and the extension of means

of transportation.

Readers of the Philippine Journal of Commerce were

surprised on September 21, to note in the newspapers for that

day, that the Rice and Corn Corporation announced that construc­

tion was under way of the first Government rice central with

complete mills, warehouses and rolling equipment in Cabanatuan,

Nueva Ecija. Since this project had been announced In terms

indicating its completion in August the surprise was justified.

The central was expected to be completed by February, 1939, in

time for the harvesting of that year's crop. Taking no chances,

however, the Corporation Imported four days later, 46,000 sacks

(2,600,000 kilos) of rice from Saigon, paying the full duty of

^2.50 per 100 kilos. This duty-payment was necessitated by the

fact that a state of emergency had not been declared, which

would have permitted the importation free of duty.

57Ibid.. p. 63
 135

The last day of September saw the reduction by the

Corporation of the price of rice because the harvest was well

under way in the Southern provinces, and it promised to lower

prices further in the coming months. Prices continued their

decline in October as the Corporation released its Imported

stocks. It continued to make additional purchases to meet any

shortage likely to occur prior to the arrival on the market of

the new crop of domestic rice. However, in view of the low

supply of the old crop, most sellers held their stocks despite

the lower prices of the NARIC, and the start of trading in the

new crop in Tarlac, Pampanga and Pangasinan at prices 30 to 40

centavos lower than the old crop.

In the same month, the Department of Agriculture and

Commerce announced that the rice acreage of the Philippines had

increased considerably, with several provinces, in the past

non-producers, now yielding large quantities. These provinces

included Lanao, Cotabato and Agusan. The Department, therefore,

expected a production of 49,000,000 cavans for the 1937-38

season.8® It was not stated whether this was to be production

of palay or finished rice. According to the Bureau of Census

and Statistics, in its Yearbook for 1946, the actual area

planted for 1937 was 2,060,960 hectares, with a production of

rough rice (palay), of 55,015,730 cavans of 44 kilos. The area

for 1938 was lower, 1,912,050 hectares and production dropped to

580p. cit.. No. 12 (December, 1938), p. 12.

 136

52,345,210 cavans of 44 kilos (rough rice).8® If the Department

figure is taken to mean finished rice, then the actual production

was below its prediction.88 Census figures, for 1939, showed a

production of only 41,491,990 cavans from 1,829,990 hectares,

which may be taken as a bit more accurate than figures released

by other agencies. The point to remember, and which the Depart­

ment of Agriculture failed to consider, is that while production

might increase population increases in the Philippines at more

than two per cent a year.

Floods, during October, continued to damage property and

crops, so the NARIC continued its importation of rice to meet the

situation. On November 1, it imported 63,000 sacks and a few

days later President Quezon reduced the import duty to ^2.00 per

100 kilos.

59Page 145.

60According to several Individuals connected with the

Department at that time, the figure referred to rough rice only.
 CHAPTER IV

EARLY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE RICE INDUSTRY (Cont.)

The above review of the situation, 1934-1938 may seem

overly concerned with the month to month fluctuations of the

market. However, this may be justified if we realize that it

represents the pattern of economic development generally through­

out the Commonwealth. Prices of rice continued their upward

spiral through the years, and since the economy of the people

was geared to rice they were at the mercy of these fluctuations

in price and supply. Since rice prices increased as the years

passed,other items and consumer goods marched upward with them.

The wages the workers in industry and on the farms received,

however, remained the same. The rise, from 3^3.90 to 1=7.20, in

rice, from 1934 to 1938 was not accompanied by a similar rise

in earnings. Whether or not this situation would have been

changed had there bean no war is impossible to say. We may note ,

however, that a similar situation occured, on a higher level,

in the years after the war and during the early life of the

Republic. Disaffection and rebellion may perhaps have their

root s in this fact rather than in an adherence to new and

dangerous ideologies -- although there is no question but this

latter phenomenon took place.

The Government Programme

In the first session of the National Assembly, the Commit­

tee on Agriculture introduced a bill entitled "An Act providing

for the stabilization of the supply and price of rice and corn,

137
 138

creating a rice and corn stabilization board to carry out such

a policy, appropriating funds therefor, and for other purposes.

It was supported by a special message from President Quezon who

appeared in person on December 19, 1935, before the Assembly

and expressed the hope that it would "insure at all times an

ample supply of these commodities at reasonable prices to the

consumer while at the same time enabling the producer to

receive an adequate return for his investment and efforts so as

to encourage him to continue producing locally these products

thereby making our country self-sufficient in this respect.”^

Because of the destruction of rice and corn crops in 1935 by

typhoons, drought, and pests, President Quezon hoped for speedy

action by the Assembly. At the same time, he requested passage

of a bill appropriating 1=500,000, for flood control works In

Pampanga and P a n g a s i n a n , ^ a measure essential to the success of

the f o r m e r .

However, despite the urgency of the situation, and the

introduction of the bill (165) by the agricultural committee,

the Assembly closed its 25-day Inaugural session at midnight,

December 21, after passing only 19 of the 26 measures recommended.

ICommonwealth Act No. 165, First National Assembly,

Inaugural Session, Messages of the Pr es ident. Vol. 1 (Revised
edition, 1938), pp. 98-99.
2
M.L. Qu e zon, Message to the First National Assembly on
"The Rice and Corn Problem,” December 19, 1935, I h i d . , p. 97.
5
Commonwealth Act No. 122, Ibid.. p. 89.
 139

Among the bills passed were those providing for ^100,000

typhoon relief, creation of the National Economic Council,4

and the establishment of the National Loan and Investment

Board.®

Act No. 165, as introduced, provided for a Rice and Corn

Stabilization Board, to be composed of five members, one of

whom should represent producers and another the consumers.

They were to be appointed by the President (with the consent

of the Commission on Appointments) and were to hold office as

prescribed by him. It was to be their duty to "carry out the

declared policy of this Act" by administering and investing the

fund appropriated "for the purchase, sale, barter and distribution

of husked and unhusked rice and corn." In so doing, they were

empowered to enter into contracts, court actions, and all other

activities needful for the operation of a corporation. They

were further empowered to conduct an investigation into the

problem of stabilizing prices, and were to present recommenda­

tions to the National Economic Council, who would consider them

and then suggest a program to be effected through the President.

The Act appropriated ^2,000,000, for this purpose.

However, since the bill was not passed during this

session, President Quezon, on February 17, 1936, published an

4See below, pp. 142-145.

^The flood control bill and rice stabilization bill

were finally passed later in the following year (1936).
 140

executive order meeting the emergency (for an emergency had

been declared),® by creating a Rice Commission "for the purpose

of studying and making recommendations on ways and means to

solve the present rice crisis and to insure a permanent supply

of rice at reasonable prices.,,r^ The President stated that the

Assembly had failed to enact the necessary legislation; that

the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce had certified the

necessity of immediate action because of the rice shortage; that

the production and distribution of rice was one of "the most

important problems of this government", that it was necessary

"to provide adequate means for a steady and sufficient supply

of this commodity at prices reasonable to consumer, producer

and trader and thereby afford relief to hard pressed small

farmers and k a s a m a s . and the large body of consumers";® and that,

therefore, he was creating this Commission. The work of the

Commission, he stated, was "to make a careful investigation

and a study of the rice problem and recommend measures for

immediate r e l i e f .^ including the proper distribution of rice

throughout the Philippines at reasonable prices."-*-® They were

to "study further ways and means to insure at all times a steady

and sufficient supply of this commodity so as to prevent the

recurrence of a rice shortage"-*--*- and were to report the result

®Both in the act and in Q u e z o n ’s message with regard to it.

7
Executive Order No. 18, M . O . P .. Vol. II, Pt. I (rev.ed.,
1938), pp. 802-803.

8Ibid. ^Italics supplied. ~LQIbid. ^Ibid.

 141

of their findings as soon as practicable to the President.I**

Despite the organization of this Commission and other

steps by the Government, it became necessary just two months

later for the President to take further action. On April 23,

1936, he issued Proclamation No. 58, "Designating the Rice and

Corn Corporation (which had been formed a few days earlier)

13
as a Relief Organization to import rice, free of duty." The

Proclamation stated: "Whereas, official reports show that

there exist a serious shortage of rice and there is imminent

danger of inflation of prices as a result of manipulations

resorted to by those in control of the limited stocks at

present available for the local n e e d s , t h e President was

designating the Corporation as a relief agency to import what­

ever quantities were necessary. The Corporation was granted

the powers of the Director of Commerce with regard to the

issuance of rules and regulations for "the purchase, sale, and

hoarding of palay and rice...."15 The Bureau of Commerce had

been made the Government relief organization during the annual

rice crisis in the later part of 1935, and the handling of

importation and distribution had been its province until the

establishment of the National Rice and Corn Corporation to

fulfill this function. During the Bureau's period of administration

12
This Commission was composed of Manuel A. Roxas as
Chairman (he was at that time a member of the National Assembly),
Assemblyman Felipe Buencamiho, the Director of Commerce, Hon.
Vicente Singson Encarnacion, and Dr. Nicanor Jacinto.

150£. clt. . p. 610. 14Ibid. 15Ibld.

 142

it imported a total of 16,480,369,45 kilos of rice at a total

cost of I>=1,259 ,120.86. It realized a profit in its operation

of 1=231,191.08, which was turned over to the Insular Treasury.

This sum would have provided an additional amount of some four

million kilos which could well have been distributed at low cost

to indigent fami li es . ^

Quezon was well aware that his Government could succeed

only if the country enjoyed continued peace and order, and that

good order hinged upon a solution of the agrarian ills that

plagued the nation. In his inaugural address, November, 1935,

he had pointed to the necessity of raisin;; the living conditions

of the people in order to meet the responsibilities posed by

the establishment of the Commonwealth. He told his listeners

that the only way these responsibilities could be met was by increas­

ing the wealth of the nation through giving ”,

g reater impetus

to economic development, improving our methods of agriculture,

diversifying our crops, creating new industries, and fostering

our domestic and foreign commerce.

A month later, in his message to the First National

16PJC, XIII, No. 1 (January, 1937), p. 26.

17
Few observers pointed to the fact that a relief organ­
ization, if it makes a profit on its activities,is not fulfilling
to the fullest extent, its main function,which is to afford relief.
1 ft
M.O.P.. Vol. 1 (rev.ed., 1938), p. 16.
Assembly on December 18, 1935, he had asked that it consider

certain legislative proposals which he thought as urgent and

important as national defense (which had been the topic of his

first message to the Inaugural Session of the Assembly). He

stated that the country had largely solved Its political

problems, the government was organized satisfactorily, the

national defense was being provided for -- there remained little

to do In preparing the country politically for independence.

However, the economic problem was more urgent than any other

since it affected "directly the lives of our p e o p l e . . . . It

was necessary that plans be formulated for economic adjustment,

and that means of implementing them be provided. He said:

Our objective is clear and definite. We want to

build up a reasonably stable economic structure capable
of serving the financial and other needs of the nation,
supplying the masses of the people with the basic
social requirements and the essentials in food, clothing,
and shelter, and providing them with the opportunities
to toil and earn a decent livelihood.

The President believed these objectives were attainable

without changing the democratic Institutions of the country or

undertaking any too-radical departures in experimentation with

social control. Only the "sure and trodden paths" were to be

followed. He pointed out that, from the very nature of Philippine

economy, rapid changes were not to be expected - nor could they

be achieved. The people were to remain patient during the period

Ibid.., message on the "Creation of the National Econo­

mic Council,11 p. 80.
 144

of planning and by lending every aid to their government they

would eventually reap the benefits so ardently desired. But,

he s aid, it was necessary to lose no time, and f o r this

reason he was suggesting the creation of a National Economic

Council whose duties would be "the task of planning our national

economy, giving our economic development a rational and

definite direction, and coordinating the efforts of the Govern­

ment w i t h private initiati v e .. .. "2 -*- The Council, to be

composed of not more than fifteen members, was to advise the

Government "on economic and financial questions, Including the

improvement of existing industries and the promotion of new

ones, diversification of crops and production,tariffs,taxation,

and...other matters."22

This suggestion of the President was heeded by the

Assembly, which passed and approved such an act Decemher 23,

1935, appropriating £=150,000 for its operation. It is signif­

icant that this act, creating the National Economic Council,

was t h e second a c t passed b y the Philippine Commonwealth

National Assembly.

The highly directive nature of this council was

emphasized several times by the President, who said, "We do not

believe in the economic philosophy of 'laissez f a i r e 1. We

favor government leadership in production activities. We

21Ibid., p. 82. 22Ibid.. pp. 82-83

 145

believe in planning the national economy. He told them they

were free to express whatever opinion they held regarding the

problems to be solved, but that any one who "believed in good

faith...in the economic philosophy of 'laissez f a i r e 1, or in

the inherent unfitness of a government to own and operate an

industry...1,24 had no place on the Council.

Thus was the future direction of the Commonwealth pointed

out by its chief architect.

The rice problem became one of Q u e z o n ’s major headaches.

On December 7, 1935, he directed the Secretary of Agriculture

and Commerce, Eulogio Rodriguez, to investigate Director

Cornelio Balmaceda of the Bureau of Commerce, in connection with

the reported admission of shipments of Saigon rice. Meanwhile,

Balmaceda was suspended. He was charged with negligence on

signing affidavits with regard to contracts of Florencio Reyes,

rice dealer, with the Government. Three days later, Quezon

named Judge Sabino Padilla of the Court of First Instance of

Nueva Ecija to act as special investigator into the charges against

Director Balmaceda. On February 26, 1936, the President ordered

the reinstatement of Balmaceda, the investigation having shown

23 m .0 .P.. Vol. II, Pt. 1 (Rev.ed., 1938), "Economic

Planning and Progress"; speech before the National Economic
C o u n c i l ’s first meeting at Malacahan, March 30, 1936; p. 74.

2 4 Ib i d. . p. 76.
 146

that he was guilty of negligence in signing papers without

investigation, but not of dishonesty. The suspension, without

pay, for a period of two and one half months, was considered

sufficient punishment. ‘
The incident was illustrative of the

pressure under which Government officials were working during

this critical period.

On March 5, 1936, President Quezon lifted the ban on

accumulating large quantities of rice, as it was now available,

he found, in much more liberal quantities and also, he said,

because the original executive order (No. 872, 1935) "disturbs

the normal and orderly marketing of the new crops." This,

despite the fact that the "normal and orderly" methods, hereto­

fore in practice, had been considered by the President to be

disadvantageous to the economy.25

The following day the Rice Commission reported to

Malacahan, recommending that a national rice and corn corporation

be organized as a subsidiary of che National Development Company,

to engage in buying and selling rice, to maintain prices at a

level sufficient to cover the cost plus a reasonable profit,

and when necessary, to import rice free of duty, to be sold

through regular trade channels. They recommended that the

Philippine National Bank and the National Loan and Investment

Board grant crop loans and other credit facilities to relieve

growers from usurious practices, that to prevent over-production

2 ^-In speeches during the years 1934-35, and early 1936.

C f . Speech on National Economic Council, O p . c i t .. Vol. I, pp.
78-86.
 147

the Government adopt a land policy in relation to rice production,

and that for the present it withhold from occupation, except '

through homesteading, such public lands as were peculiarly adapted

to lowland rice culture. They recommended further that the Govern­

ment study new commercial uses for rice and Its by-products; that

the following year, a tax of f=0.03 a cavan of palay milled In

any power-driven mill be levied, payable by the miller, the

proceeds from which should be used for the benefit of the indus­

try and to finance exports of rice if there were unmanageable

surpluses; that legislation be adopted placing owner-tenant

relations on a fair and equitable basis; that a cavan of palay be

standardized at 44 kilos and a cavan of rice at 57 kilos, with

official standards for different grades; and that the recommenda­

tions be applied to corn also, in case of emergency.26

Two portions of these recommendations are puzzling to

the observer: that with regard to the prevention of "over­

production11, and that on exporting "unmanageable surpluses."

There can be no over-production of any food crop where there is

hunger and want. Economists make the mistake of regarding as

over-production conditions in which a "normal" price for the

commodity is not maintained. One of the chief characteristics

of the American system of free enterprise is, that the more one

produces per unit, per man-hour of labor, the greater will be

the production and the lower will be the cost to the consumer

26Philippine Magazine. XXXIII, No. 4 (April, 1936),

p. 167.
 148

and the higher will be the return to the producer. There are

those who prefer a lower production with a high return to the

producer but this brings dissatisfaction to the consumer and

eventual disaster to the producer, whether it be a nation or an

individual. In a country such as the Philippines, which never

produced enough rice to meet the demands of Its people, there has

never been a case of over-production. Prices have nothing to do

with the case, basically. It is a case of sheer need and the

supplying of this need. If the supply falls below the demand,

there is hunger and unrest, whether the producer receives a

large return for his product or not. The lower the consumption,

the lower the profit.

One of the difficulties that has hindered the peoples of

Southeast Asia in taking a more beneficial part In world affairs

has been the concern of the middlemen for high prices with no

regard to the needs of the people. The basis for the standard

of living In an agrarian country such as the Philippines, is the

supply of food available to the people, and not an artificial

price standard established for the benefit of a few producers

or economists. Too often, the economy of colonial areas has

been based upon B i e r c e ’s definition of "economy'1: "Purchasing

the barrel of whisky that you do not need for the price of the

cow that you cannot afford."

Cases of supposed "over-production" and "unmanageable

surpluses" in the Philippines have been due to maldistribution.

 149

On March 11, 1936, at the election of a new board of

directors for the Philippine National Bank, President Quezon

spoke of the necessity of studying "the feasibility of

establishing credit facilities for small merchants and small

farmers, especially to those tenants who depend exclusively on

their landlords for money advances." "The Bank," the President

continued,"lfrill be rendering a great service If by such credit

facilities, the social conditions of these tenants are improved

and the evils of usury eradicated in our rural communities...."27

Despite the urgency of the situation, the Bank moved very

slowly toward effecting such a program. Some half-hearted

efforts were made toward solving the problem, primarily through

the NARIC and several cooperative credit associations, but the

problem, in 1950, still faced the country at the same level of

1936.28

On March 17, 1936, it was announced that the President,

following the recommendation of the Rice Commission would order

pQ
the organization of a rice corporation. The two successive

years of bad harvest pointed to the necessity for an agency to

deal with the grave problem. The already over-burdened Bureau

of Commerce had been charged with relief activity, and when the

crop of 1935-36 proved a bigger failure than that of the p r ec ed in g

year, it was realized that an agency to enable the Government to

2 7 Ib id . 2 8 Jacoby, o p . c i t .. p. 211.

2 ^0]3. c i t . . No. 5 (May, 1936), p. 223.

 150

deal more effectively with the rice problem was required. So,

while other more fundamental problems were basically responsible

for the creation of the National Rice and Corn Corporation, the

rice crises of 1935 and 1936 were the immediate precipitators.

The National Rice and Corn Corporation (to be known as

NARIC) was thus organized on April 7, 1936, the responsibility

for its operation to rest in the manager*s office and five

subordinajfcfe departments: field and inspection, accounting,

administrative, warehouses and mills, and purchase and sales.

Its two main objectives were: to insure a steady and permanent

supply of rice and corn, and to stabilize their prices at levels

mutually beneficial to producers and consumers.

It was capitalized at §=4,000,000, and came into being

with half its capitalization paid up, one half of which came

from the Commonwealth Treasury and one-half from the Cebu Port­

land Cement Company, which was to act as the holding company.

Vicente JSingson Encarnacion was elected Chairman of the Board

of Directors and President of the Corporation. The directors

were: Assemblyman Manuel A. Roxas, Director of Commerce Cornelio

Balmaceda, Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, Mrs. Narcisa Vds. de Leon,

Maximo Noel, and Dr. Victor Buencamino, the last acting as Vice-

President and Manager.

Particular emphasis was to be laid upon ameliorating

the condition of the rice and corn producers, especially small

farmers and tenants. Since this was a social as well as

 151

economic problem, and since this class of producer was never

represented on either the Rice Commission or the NARIC, it is

not particularly surprising that by 1950 this improvement was

still far from attainment.

The first objective, however, was partially met in 1936

and 1938 by importing 2,245,000 bags of rice from Siam, Indo­

china and Burma, as well as some from the United States.

Stabilization of prices was reached somewhat haphazardly. NARIC

would set the price for retail selling; demand would level off,

price restrictions would be removed; a shortage would develop

with an increased demand over-night, market prices would rise

suddenly, the NARIC would be caught napping, and with its next

price-fixing, the general level would be somewhat higher than

before. It was never able to get ahead of this system, and the

price of rice continued to rise, by fits and starts, throughout

the period preceding the outbreak of the War. Taking into

consideration the effects of the War, it is significant that

whereas the average price of palay for the years 1937-40 was

§=2.70, the price as of July 31, 1946, was 1=23.06, almost ten

times the prewar average. As of 1949, the price of rice continued

its rise, and, in the month of November, doubled over that of the

preceding month.

In an article of the NARIC in 1939, the following

questionable conclusion was stated;

The second aim of the Corporation of stabilizing prices for

the benefit of producers, particularly tenants and small
 152

farmers, was similarly accomplished with apparent

success in 1937 when because of an extremely abundant
harvest, the Corporation had to embark on an exten­
sive program of palay purchases. All told it acquired
about 2,000,000 cavans of palay which, withdrawn from
the market, helped considerably in stabilizing prices
profitable to p ro du ce rs . The Corporation paid a
minimum price of ^ 2 . 50_for all varieties equal to or
better than second-class Macan and 1=2.25 for palay
inferior to them. For the first time in many years
farmers were paid a price which covered production
costs plus a reasonable margin of profit at a time when
palay should have sold even below 12.00 a cavan be­
cause of the exceedingly large harvest. That farmers
everywhere received the benefits of NARIC prices was
proved by the fact that quite a large number of them
were able to pay off their debts, acquired work animals
for their use and still kept a little cash and palay.30

The second aim of the Corporation was to stabilize rice

and corn prices at levels mutually beneficial to producers and

consumers. The benefits mentioned above refer to producers

only. It can be noted, also, that statistics with regard to

these "benefits" are conspicuous by their absence. "Quite a

large number" hardly seems statistical. It should be noted

further that the farmers who received the greatest benefits were

the large producers and hacenderos and not the tenant farmer

toward whose welfare the program was supposedly directed.

The Rice and Corn Corporation was to provide relief for

the consumer and farmer, who, Andres V. Castillo said, were

both "helplessly exploited by rice merchants and speculators."3 -1-

"NARIC", The Tribune. XIV Anniversary Number, June 17,

1939, p. 129. Italics supplied.

3l l n : Pedro de La Liana and F.B. Icasiano: The Philip­

pine Commonwealth Han db oo k. (General Printing Press, Manila,
1936), p. 166.
 153

It was hoped that stable rice prices could be attained through

the corporation's power to buy and sell rice at a standard rate

fixed at the beginning of the season. Its task Dr. Castillo

said, was admittedly "gigantic and delicate with all the dif­

ficulties that have to be met In connection with the fixing of

the standard price of rice.... On the supply side the Corpora­

tion will have to make a thorough study of cost which varies

in different regions and with different farmers; and on the

demand side It will have to consider the purchasing power of

consumers and the cost of living...."

The plan of the Corporation was to deal only with rice

in bonded and licensed warehouses which, Dr. Castillo pointed

out, "would still leave out the small farmer who needs help

m o s t ...because he does not avail himself of the services of

bonded warehouses. He has to sell his crop at once and at the

prevailing price fixed by rice dealers." Dr. Castillo suggested

that the Corporation make arrangements to buy from the small

farmers and operate Its own warehouses so as to widen the

protection envisaged for the small producer. He freely admitted

that the Corporation would lose money. But, he pointed out, it

was not expected to make a profit. It was to be a public service

and as such it "might as well be socialized for the sake of the

well-being of the whole population."32

Mr. Victor Buencamino, Manager of the NARIC, in 1937,

3^Ibld.. pp. 166-167, passim.

 154

reviewed the work of the Corporation since its founding and its

accomplishments. Its most important function, in his belief,

was to give preference to Filipinos in the distribution to

consumers of rice. "Rice," he said, "occupied an unusual

position In the economic life of the country," for which reason

"the control of this industry by the Filipinos Is indispensable

for the national security of our country."33

He divided the industry into three economic stages;

production, distribution and consumption. The first was totally

In the hands of nationals, and while it was the most tedious and

the least rewarded little attention was given this phase for

which reason it was "no wonder that the rice regions have become

the cradle of radicalism and the source of social unrest."

Following production, it was seen that distribution was

unevenly divided between aliens and nationals, with the Chinese

handling 90 to 95 per cent. Since this stage was the most

profitable, "it Is in this particular phase where the National

Rice and Corn Corporation has to play its decisive part if it

is to be useful at all." It was, he said, "the key that will

open the door to the complete nationalization of the rice industry."

Some 2,500 Filipino dealers were handling NARIC rice,

but still Mr. Buencamino believed, there were not enough. Some,

3 3 "The NARIC and the Nationalization of the Rice Indus-

try," The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philippines.
1937-1938. p. 334.
 155

then handling NARIC rice, were expected to drop out, but he

hoped that a substantial portion would remain and that others

could be induced to enter the trade although "many Filipino

businessmen and capitalists have, unfortunately, not yet

considered the possibilities of the trade." The fact that some

had been so persuaded, he believed, would give the NARIC cause

to state that "it has already taken a forward step in laying

the foundation for the nationalization of the distribution of

rice "34

President Quezon felt strongly about the Rice and Corn

Corporation and its task. Much concerned with the situation,

he was willing to try anything to seek a solution. "We have

to try new things in the Philippines," he said, "if we wish to

accomplish something." Despite the fact that they had been

talking "about economic development during the last 35 or 40

years," they were almost where they had been at the beginning.

The country had "immense possibilities" and needed development.

But nothing new had been done "or very little that is new."

"Of course," he said, "I am not infallible. It is possible

that some of the things that my administration has undertaken

will turn out to be a mistake or a failure, but unless we try

I b i d .. pp. 334-335, p a s s i m . In the year, 1949-1950,

there were 5,971 licensed rice dealers, who were required to
operate only with a NARIC license. The system was criticized
and following the end of the fiscal year a policy was begun of
granting licenses only during times of scarcity and the market
was opened to all who wished to sell.
something, we will never accomplish anything.

Continuing he said: "We have started our economic

policy by creating the Rice and Corn Corporation and we have

been bombarded from every source." These attacks came, he said,

from "rice producers, who themselves will be benefitted, by

the consumers who will be protected, if this is a success, from

possible future exploitation by unscrupulous merchants." What

was the situation? "Everybody," he said, "is criticizing.

Nobody is suggesting anything n e w . ... We are trying to do some­

thing to remedy this situation, and we think this is the remedy.

And what I have just said about the Rice and ^orn Corporation I

am saying of everything that we can attempt h e r e . "36

In further attempts to meet the many criticisms directed

at the NARIC and Its operations, President Quezon tried to

explain the situation to the farmers in his own province of Tayabas

"Let me inform you that the Government has established

the NARIC so that the price of palay will not be so low nor the

price of rice so high. One of our shortcomings is that we

permit others to hold the rice industry for us, and they are the

ones who make a lot of profit. The profiteers are like a saw:

35
How like the words of President P.D. Roosevelt under
similar circumstances 1 Cf. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.: "'It
is common sense to take a method and try i t , ’ he said in
ushering In the New Deal. 'If it fails, admit it frankly and
try another.'" "Roosevelt and His Detractors," H a r p e r 's
M a g a z i n e . Vol. 200, No. 1201 (June, 1950), p. 64.

*^M . O . P .. Vol. II, Pt. 1 (rev.ed., 1938), p. 107, pass 1 m .

In a speech before the Rotary Club, June 4, 1936.
 157

the saw eats be it pulled up or pushed down, and weFilipinos

are the ones being eaten."

He went on to say that the "NARIC cannot immediately

remedy the present rice situation because retailing rice Is not

in the hands of the Filipinos..."3,7 but the more basic issues

involved were not touched upon.

Following the establishment of the NARIC, President

Quezon announced the reservation of several thousand hectares

of land in the richest agricultural section of Davao for home­

steaders and announced that the penal colony there would be

used as a nucleus for the development of the region. This was

to effect the resettlement of farmers from overpopulated areas,

and to open new lands for rice and other staples. This plan

had been devised by Senators Elpidio Quirino and Claro Recto

who suggested the allocation of 3KL,000,000 for the development

of the region as had been envisioned in an act passed at the

last session of the old Legislature (pre-Commonwealth). One of

the main objectives for the establishment of the project was to

restrict further expansion of alien holdings there (mainly by

Japanese) and discourage large tract sales and leases. It was

hoped that with the extension of small holdings there a step

38
would have been taken toward the solution of the rice problem.

Such a hope was never realized and, indeed, the original

317I b i d . . Vol. 4, Pt. 1, p. 216. Speech delivered at

Tayabas Provincial Capital, Lucena, September 20, 1938.

^ Philippine Magazlre . XXXIII, N o . 5 (May, 1936), p. 225.

 158

appropriation was diverted to building and improving roads

since it was realized that the original sum was quite inadequate

for its purpose.39

On May 8, 1936, President Quezon caused consternation

in some quarters through a casual interview with the press in

which he stated that while he favored agricultural stations

he believed those which were not rendering real service should

be closed.4® Some feared, as a result, that the research

program, particularly with reference to rice, would be endangered

and observers commented that in scientific research immediate

results were not always attainable. They deplored any move to

close these stations, and hoped that the President would consider

the long-range value of their programs. The President, however,

had no intention of ending research and the incident served as

a reminder to him of the great import any of his observations

had to his people.4^-

The economic situation increased in seriousness but, by

the end of 1936, the National Economic Council which was to

direct the economic readjustment of the nation, had been

^ Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philippines.

1 9 57 -1 95 8. p. 61.

4°0p. c i t .. No. 6 (June, 1936), p. 280.

4^That such a danger is a real one in the Philippines,

however, was proved by the action of the Quirino administration
in 1950, when it cut off appropriations for the Bureau of
Science and the National Research Council as well as the National
Library (whose books, incidentally, were classified by the
Budget Commission as "furnishings, ) — thus leaving the Philip­
pines destitute of all organized research with the exception of
the Institute of Nutrition.
 159

consulted on only one issue. This was the advisibility of

creating the NARIC. Their consent to this measure was obtained

only after a long debate, and they stated that they approved

the "creation of an entity to put into effect whatever plans

may be definitely decided hereafter", but they were "not in

accord with the recommendations of the (Rice) Commission."4^

Though members of the Council expressed many doubts as to

effectiveness of the Corporation, the President was confident

that it would ultimately solve the rice problem.45 jje

expressed himself quite strongly upon the criticism directed

against the Corporation. He agreed that it was only natural

that there should be doubt, fear, and even resentment over the

action of the Government, coming mainly from "those who expected

to make unreasonable profit from the rice crisis,"44 and who

because they were unable to do so declared that the Corporation

was established for dishonest purposes. But, he added, all

these objections "did not deter the Administration from carrying

out the plan especially because no alternative had been suggested."45

President Quezon was to return frequently, during the

years before the War, to the adverse criticism of the Govern­

m e n t ’s program. He stated many times that he welcomed criticism,

but only if alternative and practicable plans were offered.

■ ^ Philippine M a g a z i n e . XXXIII, No. 5 (May, 1936), p. 224.

45M . P . P .. Vol. 2, P t . 1 (rev.ed.), speech on "Country's

Conditions and Problems" delivered before the National Assembly,
June 16, 1936; p. 167.

44Ibid.. p. 168. 45Ibid

 160

If none were forthcoming, he continued unruffled by opposing

views. It is also true that he often paid no heed even to well-

founded suggestions in his desire to see that a particular

program he started was carried through, but his bitterness and

anger over unjustified criticism seems to have been well founded.

He did not hesitate to use his power to carry through a

project, and when the Collector of Customs stated that he would

collect duty on rice imported by the Corporation, since he

claimed it was being sold at a profit, Quezon told him to do

nothing of the kind so long as the rice was utilized in meeting

the emergency.4®

When it was seen that farmers were still handicapped

in getting a fair return for their rice crop, because of market­

ing difficulties, President Quezon in a special message proposed

the creation of the National Produce Exchange.47 The operation

of such a body would obviate the necessity of the producers

disposing of their produce through middlemen, and would offer

them "the necessary credit facilities to finance their crops in

advance of actual harvesting and delivery."4 ® It would also

supervise effectively the produce exchanges, offering protection

to all. Since "the establishment of such produce exchanges will

be an important progressive step in the development of our trade,"

he urged, "the immediate enactment of the attached bill Into law."

46Ibid. 47Ibid.. pp. 344-345. (October 27, 1936).

48Ibid. 49Ibid.
 161

Acting upon his recommendation, the National Assembly

soon drafted the act for such a corporation. This National

Produce Exchange5® was to "establish and maintain a central

produce exchange in the bj.ty of Manila" and such other places

in the Philippines as the corporation considered necessary; "to

encourage and promote the establishment of cooperative market­

ing associations" before establishing exchanges in areas served

by such associations; "to establish rules and regulations

governing transactions"; to fix the necessary fees; and "to

establish uniform grades of classification of agricultural

products and a system of inspection thereof and to acquire and

disseminate market i n f o r m a t i o n . " ^ It was to see that all

exchanges organized under it were organized according to its

rules and regulations, and render reports to the President and

the National Assembly. It was to regulate subsidiary exchanges

so that no false Information could be disseminated and prevent

the manipulation of prices or the cornering of any product by

dealers and operators of such exchanges(Section 4). It was

empowered to suspend any exchange violating the rules established

(Section 5) and, on its own initiative, was to Investigate

marketing conditions from producer to consumer (Section 6).

President Quezon approved the bill on November 14, 1936.

As the year wore on, it became apparent that the weaknesses in

the system of distributing rice and corn were likely to cause

SOM.O.P.. Vol. 2, Pt. 2, pp. 1242-1246, ,CA No. 192,

First National Assembly, Special Session.
51Ibld.. pp. 1242-1243.
 162

further difficulties unless something were done to assist the

small farmers in disposing of their crops. Ore of the largest

hindrances to the Government's plan for aiding in this problem

lay in the inadequate marketing facilities of the country.

This subject will be treated in detail (in Part II), but we

might mention, in passing, the following.

In pre-Commonwealth days, acts^^ had been passed by the

Legislature creating a rice and corn fund, from which loans were

to be made to agricultural credit cooperative associations.

Another act5^ dealt with the organization and operation of

cooperative marketing associations. However, the situation, in

1936, showed clearly that cooperatives were at a great dis­

advantage in competition with private commercial businesses.

The National Assembly therefore passed an act54 making the money

appropriated under the rice and corn fund act available to

cooperative marketing associations, "not only for the purpose

of increasing the production of rice and c or n. ..but also for

the stable, orderly, and profitable marketing of agricultural

p r o d u c t s ...."55 This Agricultural Cooperative Fund was made a

revolving fund for the exclusive purposes of the act. The

National Loan and Investment Board was to issue "rules and

regulations for the proper loaning, collecting and protecting

52
No. 2818, as amended, and No. 2508, as amended.

53N o . 3425, as amended. 54Commonwealth Act No. 116.

55M . 0 . P .. Vol. 2, Pt. 2, p. 823.

 163

of moneys belonging to the said fund, upon the recommendation

of the Office in charge of the supervision of agricultural

cooperative marketing and credit associations. This act was

approved by the President on November 3, 1936; he had been for

several months requesting immediate action, saying (on September,

23) that it was one of "several measures of importance and of

urgent necessity to the welfare of the co untry....115?

Sine e the aim of the NARIC was to stabilize the industry

allowing a reasonable margin of profit for producers but at the

same time establishing a price level which would not be burden­

some on the consumer its activities were in line with the

objectives of cooperative marketing associations organized under

Act 3425, as amended.^8 Since these aims were so similar, Mr.

de Castro suggested the necessity of both coordinating their

56 ,. ,
Ibid.

^ I bi d .. Vol. 2, Pt. 1, (rev.ed.), p. 250. The same

statement could be made with even more accuracy with reference
to similar conditions under the Republic. Many observers, in
the early years of the Republic, were hopeful that similar
action would be taken by the Government, being convinced that
such a step would be a prerequisite to the solution of many of
the country's economic ills.
58
A. de Castro: "Rice and Corn Cooperative Marketing,"
The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the P hilippines. 1937-
1 9 3 8 , p. 335. Mr. de Castro was connected and concerned with
various phases of the cooperative movement for almost twenty
years. Despite the innumerable reverses this movement has
suffered in that period of time, his enthusiasm and optimism
appeared as strong in 1950 as in this article in 1937 when he
was Chidf of the Cooperative Marketing and Credits Division of
the Bureau of Commerce. Unfortunately, despite his and other's
efforts, the movement in 1951, was still at the place it held
in 1934.
 164

activities and operations. He stated a fact which, in 1937 as

in 1951, was barely appreciated: "The stabilization of the

rice industry whether along the lines of production or of price,

cannot be obtained without organized producers and a controlled

marketinp^ agency, operated and managed by the farmers themselves.it59

Unquestionably one of the major factors in the un­

certain price field was the effect of disorderly marketing,

with producers disposing of their products without taking into

consideration the operation of supply and demand. It was true,

of course, that many had no other course left to them since

dispose their goods they must in order to have funds on which to

exist until the next harvest. The cooperative marketing law

required that all members of an association deliver all or a

specified part of their products to their associations for a

period not exceeding ten years. The pooling of these supplies

would then, it was expected, result in an equitable price. The

law also provided for the establishment by the Director of

Commerce of marketing districts or territories. He was given

authority to refuse permission for an association to establish

itself in a territory in which it might enter into competition

with another. i/ftiether this would eliminate the good elements

of competition along with what was considered "harmful" is

impossible to determine precisely. One may note, however, that

wherever such a situation has existed, "harmful" competition has

been avoided, but equitable prices for consumers have been

59Ibid., italics supplied.

 165

extraordinarily difficult of attainment.

Mr. de Castro suggested that the NARIC act as the

national manager or financier for municipal and provincial

cooperative marketing associations. If this were done, he

believed, the NARIC would then be assured of a sufficient volume

to enable it to control the major portion of the rice trade.

However, it could not enter into any agreements with merchants,

millers, producers or bonded warehouses, for the purpose of

monopolizing the trade, this being forbidden by Act 3247. But

cooperative marketing associations were exempt from the provisions

relative to restraints of trade except that they were forbidden

to restrain trade by an arbitrary fixing of price or "unduly

enhancing the price of agricultural products."69 Since the law

exempted such associations from merchants' sales taxes and

Income taxes, it was extraordinary that the major problem in

forming such associations was lack of sufficient capital.

At the same time as these measures were being taken,

the Bureau of Commerce began the rehabilitation of the Rice and

Corn Fund to renovate old loans and lend new life to old

cooperative marketing and credit associations. ‘

The fund,

originally consisting of 1=1,000,000, appropriated to encourage

farmers in the production of better varieties of rice and corn,

had fallen by 1933, to 1=40,000, in cash. The fund had at first

(in 1919) been entrusted to the Department of Agriculture and

60Ibid., p. 336.
 166

Commerce and then to the old Bureau of Agriculture for adminis­

trative purposes. In April, 1933, the collection and administra­

tion passed to the Bureau of Commerce, with a total In out­

standing loans of 1=924,353.29, with 193 associations indebted

to the fund.6-*-

By 1937, the Fund had been increased to 1170,000, in

cash, from which 134,000 yearly was deducted for salaries and

operating expenses. The major function of the Bureau was to

collect loans due from the associations, amounting, in 1937, to

1828,061, some 1100,000 having been collected following the

assumption of this duty by the Bureau. These funds were in the

hands of 180 associations in thirty-two provinces. To enable

collection work to proceed with as little pain as possible, the

Bureau wisely decided on a policy of rehabilitating the associa­

tions, believing that were this accomplished, the Fund itself

would be rehabilitated. In this work the Bureau extended aid

in the collection of funds from individual members of associations

having difficulty in making collections. This work was done by

field agents of the Bureau, generally four men handling the

affair in each area. One was the collecting officer who kept

ledgers and was paid from the general appropriation of the

Bureau. It was exacting work since constant supervision was

necessary over both t h e 'associations concerned as well as the

agents themselves. In addition, the agents were charged with

the duty of supervising the operation of the associations acting

61Ibid., pp. 279-282.

 167

as representatives of the Director of the Bureau. Another task

with which they were charged was the organization, promotion,

and supervision of cooperative marketing associations, existence

of which was necessary for the optimum collection of outstanding

funds. The reason for this was obvious, since if a farmer were

a member of a well managed rural credit association, and an

equally well administered cooperative marketing association, h e

would have ]ess difficulty in solving his financial problems, thereby

ultimately strengthening the Fund itself and its larger program.

Naturally, this entailed a large amount of educational work by

agents of the Bureau, and this part of their work was the most

difficult and frustrating.

In any event, two years later, in July, 1938, President

Quezon reorganized the National Economic Council which thereafter

was to consist only of public officials. Although strictly a

governmental body, the NEC was expected to rely upon the co­

operation and advice of private industry'and individuals. The

old Council was never active. The reason was that it was felt

best to await the completion of the work of the Joint Preparatory

Committee before formulating an economic program. The Report

of this Committee, on May 20, 1938, was never fully Implemented,

possibly because of the outbreak of the War in 1941, and, as a

result, no comprehensive program was ever worked out during the

Commonwealth period leading to economic readjustment.

^ Philippine Magazine, XXXV, No. 9 (.September, 1938),

p. 408.
 CHAPTER V

EARLY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE RICE INDUSTRY

(Concluded )

Opinion and Attitudes

The seriousness of t h e rice situation was recognized by

all thoughtful observers, yet, during this critical period,

there was little self-criticism of the operations of the various

Government agencies charged with meeting the many problems. The

NARIC was generally praised for its efforts by individuals in

the Government and by some private observers, although many

others were highly critical and remain so. These critics, h o w ­

ever, were less vocal than supporters, and few of their

criticisms appeared in print. Not a few of these believed that

while an infant Government undoubtedly needs all the support it

can muster and should be praised forits successes, yet self-

evaluation from a critical standpoint should always be present.

It is of some v a l u e , then, in this study to survey

briefly this aspect of the situation during these few prewar years.

The Philippine Commonwealth J ou rn al , a supporter of the

Administration, in February, 1936, observed that the efforts of

the Government to find a solution to the rice problem was part

of the campaign to maintain law and order, "which is threatened

whenever the masses of the people go hungry." It optimistically

stated that rice producers were "ready and willing to help",

168
 169

which would mean that the Government "can effectively ward off

a rice crisis this year, and, therefore rice riots are very

unlikely.This shortage, it added, was the “one problem the

new regime has to tackle seriously, if it is to have smooth

sledding, without annoyance at least from within, through the

next 10 years." It stated the obvious fact that "no government

can expect perfect p e a c e ...however efficient and experienced

its leaders...if hungry mobs in the urban and rural centers,

especially in the hotbeds of sakdalism and communism, become

desperate due to lack of food...."^ The Journal predicted

that the year 1936 would see an increasing seriousness in the

situation, especially with the normal price of rice, per ganta,

rising from 17-20 centavos to 30-35. There is no explanation

for the apparent contradiction between this latter statement

and the one quoted earlier in the paragraph.

The Chinese dealers, the usual whipping boy for

demagogues and politicos, were blamed for the situation, without,

however, said the Journal. "any facts whatsoever to prove the

charge."® Government investigators discovered no evidence of

hoarding or illegal activity. The p o l i t i c o s 1 view was disputed

by what the Journal called "ostensibly well-founded criticism,"

1 V o l . II, No. 9, p. 53.

2 3
Ibid., italics supplied. Ibid.
 170

which correctly attributed the crisis to "unsystematic produc­

tion and distribution or marketing, and to shortage of crop

and consequently to poor adjustment of Inadequate supply t o

increased demand."4

With respect to the problems of "unsystematic produc­

tion and marketing, for which lack of coordination of agencies

handling these phases of the industry is blamed," the Journal

observed that two Government bureaus were established to meet

them. The Bureau of Plant Industry was concerned with the

production a n d the Bureau of Commerce with marketing. B y

inference, and here the Journal was in agreement with others,

it believed that were these two bureaus to function as had been

planned,the problems could be solved. The J o u r n a l , discussing

a report of the Bureau of Plant Industry which revealed that "30

per cent of the rice crops in Laguna, 50 per cent in Tayabas

and 75 per cent of the 8,000 hectares of lowland palay In the

Bicol Valley were destroyed," stated! "Evidently, the Bureau...

did not foresee the acute rice crisis in spite of the destruc­

tion of the crop in most places." The Bureau had stated that

"production will be equal to that of last year in spite of

typhoons and pests because of bigger areas cultivated and better

growth of the rice p l a n t s . "5 The invalidation of this prediction

should have served as a lesson to the Bureau with regard to pro­

phecy.

4 I b i d . The same situation largely applied to conditions

in the early years of the Republic complicated by other, new,
factors.
5Ibid.j p. 54.
 171

The Journal concluded its analysis inconclusively:

Rice as an industry is not organized.... Probably

the reason is chat it is not a leading export product,
and the only elements of the community, aside from
the nationals, interested in the industry are the
Chinese; who control distribution.

If rice could be industrialized to the extent of

any of the principal export products and if the govern­
ment would take a hand in the problem of storage or
warehousing, it is believed that 90 per cent of the
rice problem would be solved. The nationalization idea
would not cure the ills of our rice industry.

A plan has been proposed in the National Assembly

seeking to place the industry under government control
for which 1=2,000,000 is also asked. Mr. Jose Palarca...
has written extensively on the rice problem and offered
3 formulas to solve it: complete control of the
industry through ownership of its agencies of produc­
tion, manufacture, and distribution; state purchase of
locally grown rice; and creation of a government office
to act as intermediary between the producer and consumer....®

On November 24, 1935, the National Congress of Filipino

Businessmen closed a five-day session by adopting a resolution

pledging support to President Quezon, and favoring the simpli­

fication of the Government, the creation of a national economic

council and an economic planning commission, a central bank, an

agricultural bank, cooperative marketing associations, a tariff

commission and a national credit bureau.7 Many of these were

later to be created by the Government, but President Quezon found

it necessary several times in the years before the War to remind

businessmen of their stated support of his program and their

suggestions with regard to the creation and operation of these

SIbid.. italics supplied.

^Philippine Magazine, XXXIII, No. 1 (January, 1936),

p. 4.
 172

various organizations. He called them to task, from time to

time, for failing in their support of his program and for

criticizing the very organizations they had previously suggested

be created.

February 15, 1936, saw a national convention of rice

planters, who adopted a resolution pledging support of the

Government's rice control plan. Conventions find no difficulty

in adopting resolutions such as these; their subsequent adherence

to them offers the only proof of their sincerity to the principles

expressed. Beyond question, had these large planters faith­

fully adhered to the principles they expressed, much of the

unrest which was to be so costly to the Commonwealth and the

subsequent Republic might have been avoided. Men too often

forget the injunction of Pascal that those who seek good in

humanity find that it should be such as all can possess at once

without envy and which no one can lose against his will. It

would be incorrect to say that these rice planters, and others

like them, were evil men; but they were socially naive. They

were certainly childlike in their belief that, as late as the

third decade of the Twentieth Century, in a country where

agrarian discontent was almost as old as the country itself,

with the ideals of American democracy being taught in schools and

expressed in many other ways, with the growing demand of peoples

the world over for a share in the benefits of their labor, with

the deep land-hunger of the Filipino, they could pay lip-service

to ideals or an expressed national policy and ignore their

effectuation, without sowing seeds of discord and revolution.

 Their failure to understand the currents of the day and

the real desires of the people brought about the conditions of

1939 and the post-war period as surely as the monsoon brings

rain. This agrarian unrest which lay all over the Philippines

and which was to break into violence later in the Commonwealth

period and in the post-war era had deeper roots than political

subordination. J.B. Condliffe stated that it was "in fact a

phase of the economic dislocation caused by the breakdown of

the nineteenth century world trading system.... There is a common

cause of economic dislocation underlying the various forms of

Q
local agrarian discontents throughout Southeast Asia." The

failure of the landlord to realize this was mirrored by the

refusal of the Government, when it_ later became a landlord, to

understand the same conditions. As a result, E.H. Jacoby has

stated, "the Government was confronted by a hostile tenant

class, which identified it with the hated landlords."®

Bruno Lasker, one of the foremost authorities on South­

east Asia, points to a characteristic of the people which was

understood neither by the Americans nor by the Filipinos themselves

It is amazing, (he says) what men will bear -- and

not only Orientals -- as long as their faith in the
social system...remains unshaken. It is equally amazing
how quickly conditions no worse than those borne with
fortitude by many generations -- even conditions consider­
ably better than those tolerated half a century ago --

^J.B. Condliffe, in the Foreword to Erich H. Jacoby:

Agrarian Unrest in Southeast A s i a . (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1949), p. vii.
 174

are felt to be intolerable when men have caught a glimpse

of a possible alternative for which they can work and
fight. Few economists believe that, unless other
social changes are carefully contrived to increase the
productivity of labor, political independence will im­
prove the lot of native peoples. But millions do
believe it. They see things, as simple people do, in
personal terms.... Taxation, the sale of government of
land previously held in common, compulsory labor
services, foreign competition with home products in
the domestic market -- any one of a number of immediate
irritations may become the cause of a violent agitation
when conditions are ripe. Back of it all is the new­
born consciousness of poverty -- the sense of injury
and also the sense tha t there is no need for so much
suffering. U5

These almost obvious facts were either not grasped or

were ignored by the leaders of the Government and the powerful

upper classes. The tragic situation of 1946-1951 was the result.

Any attempt to justify the situation along theoretic lines must

be regarded in the light of Lasker's observation that "good

government in a tropical region where a large part of the

population still dwells mainly in the pre-industrial era obviously

means something different from good government in a region far

advanced in the mastery of modern techniques. Vi/hat this

means to the Philippines in the light of modern necessities is

put succinctly by Lasker, who Is convinced that "the attempt to

bring the brown man of the tropics into the realm of world

economy on a basis of free participation and adequate compensation

cannot succeed if at the same time he is to be held within the

confines of his traditional culture."'*-®

■^Bruno Lasker, Peoples of Southeast A s i a . (New York:

Knopf, 1944), pp. 219-220. Italics supplied.

1;LIbid., p. 248. 12Ibld. . p. 257.

 175

President Quezon, in his speech before the National

Assembly, June 16, 1936, failed to state the main causes for

unrest and disturbances. Ke believed that, although order had

been largely achieved, some danger from "sporadic public

disturbances" was still traceable to "professional demagogues

who make their living by exploitating the patriotism of the

uninformed or the real or fancied grievances of the discontented...."-*^

He believed that there was not "the slightest danger of any

general uprising," but was determined that no "serious

disturbance" should take place, despite the activities of the

Communists whose propaganda, at the same time, was not

"particularly effective."-*-^ He seemed worried over the

possibility of adverse criticism from America, and stated that

the "confidence and respect which in the future the nations may

have in the Philippine Republic will depend...in our ability to

maintain peace and order and to extend effective protection to

all the residents of the Island s . . ..11-*-** He held, therefore, that

it was "better that preventive measures be taken," and hoped

that the National Assembly would carry through appropriate

legislation without delay.

With regard to social injustices, he believed that the

importation of legislative measures from abroad would not solve

-*~^M . P . P .. Vol. 2, Pt. 1, (rev.edJ), p. 160. Italics supplied.

14Ibid.
15
I b i d ., italics supplied. How ironic these words seemed in 1950.
1 6 I b i d .. pp. 160-161.
 176

the situation, and advocated a "policy of progressive conser­

vatism b a sed upon the recognition_of th e essential and fundamen­

tal rights of l a b o r . H e pointed to the peculiar local

conditions in the Philippines which, with the low status of

industrialism and "the almost primitive state of our agricul­

ture," demanded a solution of the country's problem within the

framework of the existing system. The President was advocating

in "progressive conservatism" what Count Carlo Sforza^® called

the most difficult job of all, in a country the leaders of

which showed only slighb awareness of the difficulties facing

them -- either under the old oligarchic system or the new

conservatism of Quezon.

Illustrative of this was the outcry raised when, on

August 19, President Q,uezon issued an executive order fixing

minimum wages for Government employees, stating that tuberculosis

was caused by malnutrition, which in turn, was caused by low

wages. This was greeted with the same hostility as faced the

support of collective bargainning in the New Deal of President

F.D. Roosevelt.

The picture facing the country at the end of 1937 was

not a pleasant one. Yet, the Acting Director of Commerce wrote:

^ I b l d .. p. 161. Italics supplied.

18"rjihe Most Difficult Job," Harper's Magazine. Vol.

199, No. 1190 (July, 1949), p. 33.
 177

The year 1937 witnessed marked improvements in the

general business situation in the country. The cloud
of uncertainty which usually hovers over a new govern­
ment just reeling itself towards political and economic
stability, has practically cleared away, and the out­
look has been more promising than ever. The two most
unfavorable factors -- the drop in the prices of export
staples and the damages wrought by the year-end typhoons
and floods -- failed to exercise any substantial effect
on the rapid rate of recovery.... There is a feeling
that the year just closed marked a very active and
successful year. A general feeling of optimism prevails
in practically all lines of business.... Employment
has been generally higher than in previous years, labor
disturbances were net of much importance and did not
give much cause for worry. With the creation by the
President of a committee on unemployment, the labor
situation seemed bo b e well in h a n d . Agrarian disturb­
ances in most cases have been amicably and satisfactorily
settled.... The agricultural output was well maintained
in spite of the year-end floods and the ravages of
plant pests. And the yellow metal continued pouring out
from the bowels of the earth -- this year to the tune
of ^=50,000,000 — which is a great stabilizing factor in
the economy of the country.... The general price levels
for the staple products declined somewhat, although
still satisfactory to dealers and producers and was not
accompanied by a slackening of demand. Sales volume was
thus more than maintained and farm income was satis­
factory.... The market (r i c e ) was firm and notwithstanding
the importation of rice to the amount of 3P=4,748,215
during the first ten months of the year, the price
leaped to 1=5.44 in June and 1=6.06 in November. The
destruction of the rice plantations by the various
typhoons which swept the eountry coupled with the drought
and plant pests in some sections, probably might have
acted favorably on the rice situation.... Viewing the
progressive behavior of the fundamental factors of
business in the country particularly agriculture and the
continuing expansion of local industry... the Commonwealth
seems to be on the road to prosperity and well balanced
economy. The factors that should cause hesitation and
uncertainty was the undeclared Sino-Japanese 'War and its
threat upon our door, the mixed expectations on the Joint
Committee Report, and the continued Congressional tamper­
ing with the established relations of the two countries
— all these have no dampening effect on the continued
improvement of the business and economic situation of the
country. In spite of them our progress has paced steadily
and in rapid strides. The New Year undoubtedly starts on
fair weather, and we have every reason to be optimistic.19.

■^Anastacio de Castro} "Review of Business Conditions for

1937 " Philippine Journal of Commerce. Vol. XIV, No. 1 (January,
1938), pp. 7-8. Italics supplied.
 178

However, another source pointed to the facu that

business in 1937 could have been much better.^0 jn January,

1938, Director Balmaceda, writing in a local magazine, stated

that export prices of major Philippine commodities suffered

severe set-backs during 1937 as a result of "uncertainties and

various adverse factors." The serious fall in value, however,

was more than compensated for, he stated, by the increase in

the quantity of goods exported.

He examines the conditions existing in the main export

items (sugar, copra, hemp, tobacco) and finds that in each

there had been a noticeable, and sharp, decline in their

prices. For example, copra dropped from ^21.00 per hundred

kilos to "about 1N3.00 at the end of the year." After noting

this, and mentioning the fact that plans were being made to

relieve the situation, he concludes by saying: "The healthy

advance in the country's b u s i n e s s ...affords a sound background

for further progress in 1938. Of course, the big uncertainties

in the present situation cannot be ignored, and more unforeseen

events might arise to impede the course of business, but special

efforts are being made by the government to foster and develop

the country's economic life, and with its determination to

accomplish Its objectives in this field, coupled with the strong

fiscal position it now enjoys and the fundamentally sound

business situation which prevails, there is no reason why

20
It is Interesting to note the method so often used in
analyzing the economic situations after stating all the factors
that would indicate dangers aheqd, the analyst invariably ended
with an optimistic summary.
 179

further progress in 1938 should not be expected."21

The average small producer and farmer, who did not read

this and similar publications, felt quite differently. Dis­

satisfaction with their conditions continued to increase, and

unrest and disorder, in various sections of the country,

continued, with little real understanding shown by individuals

in the Government and other observers of its causes.

The official reports for the year were, almost without

exception, very optimistic , ^ but these reports seem to have

been made on the basis of a general volume of business and its

benefits to distributors rather than on the basis of the

standard of living for the small producer and consumer. There

would seem to be no other explanation for the fact that while

unrest was mounting throughout the country and reports were being

made of t h e difficult situation of the farmer at the same time,

the observers in the Bureau of Commerce and elsewhere were

optimistic over the situation.

Progressive Farming*^ had this to say of the operations

of the NARIC: "The National Rice and Corn Corporation...has

PI
Progressive Farming. Vol. II, No. 1 (January, 1938),
p. 30. Italics supplied. To many observers, this reasoning
seemed vague, but It apparently satisfied the readers of the
magazine, the majority of whom were businessmen and sugar planters.
22
P J C . XIV, No. 1 (January, 1938), pp. 11-12, 28-29.

2^Vol. ij^ No. 1 (January, 1938), p. 28. Italics supplied.

 180

brought into a minimum rice profiteering and has stabilized the

price of rice at a level which is fair to both producer and

consumer. At the same time consummating rice shortage by a

steady supply the NARIC has, by the aid of the Philippine National

Bank and the rural credit associations, encouraged farmers and

small tenants to increase farm production without assistance of

unscrupulous usurers." In the same issue, three pages later, it

was reported that "Because of a new buying and selling policy

of the National Rice and Corn Corporation, an upward revision

of the prices of palay and rice is highly expected with the new

crop season this year."^^ The article stated that the reason

for the high price of the cereal was the havoc caused by the

drought and the typhoons of the previous year, and that expecta­

tions were definite that the new crop would be more than thirty

per cent under the level of the previous harvest. It added

that the NARIC "should have decided this matter at its regular

meeting on December 21 but for the lack of final statistics on

the crop losses and reduction. However, said matter may be

taken up this month.11 The NARIC had authorized the erection of

warehouses in Panay and Cotabato, and was buying palay at the

"normal” price, when it was being sold below the old government

price for the protection of the producers.

The following month, February, 1938, the province of

Albay appropriated some eighteen thousand pesos for the salaries

of agricultural inspectors to look after the development

P4.
Ibid., p. 31. Italics supplied.
 181

program of the p r o v i n c e . I t was reported that "the campaign

for agricultural development being waged by the field men of

the Bureau of Plant Industry has awakened the interest of the

people, and crop diversification, crop improvement, promotion

of local agricultural Industries and the systematic control

of plant diseases are being carried out successfully...and, as

the rice grown locally could not supply demands, rice produc­

tion will also be increased. A study as to what rice varieties

are suitable for growing in the provinces is being undertaken."

It is interesting to note, in this connection, that Albay

produced (as an average, 1938-42) 817,100 cavans (of 44 kilos)

of palay, and in 194-6, 808,900 c a v a n s . ^ The figure reported

for the year 1942, is larger than either of the above figures,

but the statistics cannot be relied upon, particularly in view

of the fact that the crop year was to end June 30, which

coincided with a period of great disruption to the entire

economy of the islands as a result of the titer.

The same publication released an article of some vague­

ness with regard to the "stabilizing m ea sure...being considered"

by NARIC:

The National Rice and corn Corporation is now con­

sidering the adoption of certain measures in the
provinces, as a further step toward stabilizing and
nationalizing the rice industry.
The adoption of a schedule of prices for different
localities in order not to disturb unnecessarily the
rice market is another stabilizing measure which the
NARIC will have to decide in the near future. It is

25 PJC. XIV, No. 2 (February, 1938), p. 10.

^ Yearbook Qf Philippine Statistics. 1946, p. 146.

 182

believed that the board would make it effective with

the present harvest.
The NARIC board of directors has also under study
the m an a g e m e n t ’s request for the appropriation of at
least ^200,000 for taking a census of palay produc­
tion with a view to limiting overproduction of palay
greatly in excess of consumption requirements.
The NARIC has a l s o made arrangements with the
National Research Council for the purpose of conduc­
ting research work on the industrialization and wider
utilization of rice and its b y - p r o d u c t s . In con­
sonance with the limitation scheme it is planned to
limit palay production to only a few high-yielding
commercial varieties . which the government corporation
plans to buy in the fu t u r e . The object is to compel
farmers to discontinue the cultivation of palay o f
inferior grades and substitute them with varieties
which will give not only greater yields but also better
monetary returns.*”

We noted above that the NARIC had authorized the erection

of warehouses in Panay andCotabato. In the same issue of March,

1958, an article is headlined as follows: "NARIC Erects Ware­

houses in Lanao and Cotabato." A casual reader immediately

concluded that the plans were carried through and the warehouses

built. A closer examination of the article reveals, however,

the following:

"The NARIC board of directors has recently approved the

plan to construct warehouses in Dansalan, Lanao and Cotabato,

inline with its policy to help rice planters and consumers. The

warehouses to be constructed in Dansalan next February would

have a capacity of 40,000 cavans of palay. The construction of

the Cotabato warehouse will begin as soon as the land on which

pO
it is to be erected is acquired.

2 70p. cit.. XIV, No. 3 (March, 1938), p. 30. Italics supplied.

2 8 I b l d .. italics supplied.
 183

The article continued*

In deciding to construct these warehouses, the

NARIC took into consideration the reasons given by
the rice planters in those provinces; namely, that
for lack of government protection they are obliged
to sell their palay at P0.80 a cavan, and, in spite
of this low price the merchants are selling rice at
exorbitant price. After a careful investigation,
it was found out that these allegations are true.
In the entire island of Mindanao, Lanao and
Cotabato are the biggest rice-producing provinces,
and they have been supplying Misamis Oriental, Misamis
Occidental, Bohol, and Cebu with this cereal, but
since the big rice merchants of Cebu established
agencies and rice mills the production has declined.
The merchants, it is alleged, enjoyed all the benefits,
first the payment of the freight on rice, and second,
as they control the market, they can dictate the price
in the absence of any competitor.29

Aside from the interesting picture this gives of actual

conditions at that time, it is interesting to see the presenta­

tion of a belief, half expressed, that with the drawing up of

plans the end is achieved. Individuals in the Government

deplored this mode of thinking, but the psychology being unchanged

by the passage of time and event, the condition remains.

In May, it was announced that "Authority to import rice

early next year as an emergency measure will be asked by the

National Rice and Corn Corporation, if the present survey of the

rice situation regarding the present harvest available stock would

show a serious shortage, it has been reliably learned. Unless

the President declared a state of emergency, under which

importation of rice becomes imperative, the NARIC can not buy

rice, from foreign countries, it was explained."^8

29Ibld. 50PJC. XIV, No. 5 (May, 1938), p. 44.

 184

Yifriat is puzzling to an observer is that plans to restrict

the production of rice (above, page 182) were made at the same

time as plans to import the product. If overproduction did

exist, and there is no reason to believe that it did, then the

problem would undoubtedly be one of maldistribution. The

solution, then, would be along lines of easing the flow of

commodity from one region to another, and not along lines of

importation at higher prices than those prevailing in many sections

of the country.

In June, it was announced that Assemblyman M.A. Roxas

would study rice problems in America, supposedly to aid in the

solution of such problems at home. That they were serious, and

were to become pressing as time passed, is shown by an article

in the Philippine Journal of Commerce on the rice industry in

Leyte. The article is interesting in that it; portrays as well

the situation existing in other similar regions. The island of

Leyte is one of the major agricultural provinces covering an

area of 624,180 hectares of rice lands "especially adapted to

the growth and cultivation of abaca and coconuts." These last

two items were the principal means of livelihood of the people

but when the prices of these items dropped disastrously "the

farmers, through sheer dismay and utter disappointment, destroyed

their copra and abaca plants and substituted them with rice and

corn in the cultivation and production of which they now pin

their hope to recuperate all they have lost in their abaca and

copra industries...." Despite, however, the fact that rice

 185

cultivation became one of the principal industries, the total

harvest was not enough to last until the next harvest and to

supply local demand. As a result, during these months of

shortage, the province had to import rice from Cebu or Manila.

The province had an actual harvest of 793,522 cavans

of palay for 1937. The province in 1938, produced a total of

436,438 cavans of palay, approximately 45 per cent below the

harvest of the previous year. The poor harvest was due, the

observer said, "to the following factors: (1) floods as caused

by heavy rains, (2) intermittent rains followed by intense heat

of the sun and (3) heavy damage caused by rats and night birds

locally known as 'hanao', not to mention the havoc wrought on

the rice plants by rice bugs, turtles, slugs, crickets and fresh

water mollusks." The total population, for the year 1938, was

855,000, and the average monthly per capita consumption of rice

was about .427 cavan. Since the rice-eating population is

approximately 60 per cent, or 483,000, the total consumption was

estimated at 206,000 cavans per month or 2,472,000 cavans a year.

The shortage was thus around 2,000,000 cavans. Thus the produc­

tion for 1938, of 436,438 cavans lasted but two months necessita­

ting large imports from Cebu or Manila to meet requirements.

In addition, Leyte suffered a poor corn harvest for

1938, caused "by the following factors: (1) rats and crows...,

(2) new plantings have been damaged by unfavorable weather

conditions, such as (a) floods... (b) intermittent rains followed

by intense heat..., and (3) damage caused by mildew." As a

 186

result, Leyte would continue to import a large proportion of

its food.5 "*"

On the same page with the above article we find a

short note that "Economists Plan Agricultural Reforms for the

Philippines." The reformsmentioned include the correlation of

agriculture with the advances of modern sciences, a production

control system ("similar to the United States farm program"),

land reforms, and the establishment of larger land units (for a

"more efficient basis"),52 and a farm credit system to further

the purchase of lands in new areas. It is interesting to note

that these identical reforms were being proposed in 1949-1950;

as they xvere proposed by the Report of the Philippine-United

States Agricultural Mission in 1947, by President Roxas in

various messages to Congress, and by President Quirino.

The same issue of the Journal contained an announcement

that the NARIC had fixed the price of second class macan palay

at 1=2.50 a cavan. "The Board also declared that the corpora­

tion w i ll not import foreign rice in the meantime, nor Intervene

in lowering the price of r i c e . The price...was adopted by the

corporation in conformity with the suggestion of President

Quezon to the effect that in fixing the prices of palay and rice,

there should always be taken into consideration the two interests

5 l p p . c i t ., XIV, No. 6 (June, 1938), p. 15: Vicente F.

Jaca, "Rice Industry in Leyte." (A Provincial Commercial Supervisor).
32
Yet, plans were made for opening new lands in Davao to
many small producers with the object in view of restricting large
land units. See above, p. 157.
 187

which should be protected -- those of the producers and those

of the consumers. In case a need for the importation of

foreign rice arises,the rice that will be imported will be the

it33
class that will not compete with the macan.

In August, it was reported that the NARIC was "taking

steps to carry out the recommendations of Assemblyman Manuel

Roxas...for the rehabilitation of the rice industries." These

recommendations dealt with "the drying and storage of rice by

the use of machines and methods which are employed in the most

progressive rice producing states of America." The NARIC

reported that they had appointed an engineer to "study" the

situation so that "steps can be taken as soon as possible to

purchase machines of this kind for the provinces." The

advantages to be derived from such new methods were pointed

out. "What Mr. Roxas found in these states will be gradually

adopted in the Philippines to improve the local rice industry,"

ran the statement. "NARIC officials and those of the Bureau

of Plant Industry will cooperate to carry out the plans into

effect

In September, it was announced that the "first modern

warehouse in the Philippines built by the NARIC, equipped for

long storage, has been completed in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,

where the corporation is establishing its first rice central."

It was announced that another was under construction and work

^ I b i d . . p. 16. Italics supplied.

340£* d t . . XIV, No. 8 (August, 1938), p. 14

 188

on a third had been started, the capacity of the three, when

completed, to be some 300,000 cavans. "The entire plan calls

for the construction of about ten warehouses, a modern rice

mill and other departments.... According to recent reports,

plans for the construction of warehouses in several provinces

have been cancelled by the NARIC as a result of the establish­

ment of the National 'Warehousing Corporation, a new subsidiary

of the National Development Company, which would undertake the

warehousing projects of the Government.

In its issue for October-November, the Journal announced

that rice-producing provinces in Luj^on and as far down as

Marinduque, Iviasbate and Mindoro had suffered from drought

during the recent months. "Due to thedrought, Nueva Ecija,

the rice granary of Central Luzon, has encouraged the develop­

ment of the irrigation system. This system is expected to help

solve the problem of farmers during the planting season in

years of d r o u g h t . " ^ in 1950, the development of this irrigation

was still expected.

On the whole, agricultural conditions for the year 1938

were unsatisfactory. Despite programs and plans, the rice crop

fell below normal for the second consecutive year. As result,

prices were rather high, but the returns to the producers were poor.^7

350jp. c i t ., XIV, No. 9 (September, 1938), p. 14.

560p . c i t ., XIV, Nos. 1 0 - 1 1 , (October-November, 1938) p. 8.

57Paul P. S t e i n d o r f : "Annual Economic Review for 1938,"

C o r n e j o ’s Commonwealth Directory of the Philippines, 1959-1940,
p. 2392.
 189

In his survey of the conditions for the year, Mr. Paul P.

Steindorf, American Trade Commissioner, stated:

It is believed that there was some improvement

in minor agricultural products concerning which
accurate information i s not procurable. However,
this improvement was hardly sufficient to offset the
depression in the principal crops...which represent
the main source of livelihood of a large part of the
population.
Some indication of the unsatisfactory level of
agricultural prices._may be secured from the fact
that average prices of the four principal products,
namely, sugar, rice, abaca, and copra, were about 25
per cent lower than in either of the two preceding
years. This must have had an adverse effect on
general purchasing power and it is quite remarkable
that there has not been a corresponding reduction in
the volume of business. Apparently, the effects of
these low prices have been minimized by heavy govern­
ment expenditures, for publ i c works and other purposes.
Contributing factors were "the increases in mineral
production and the building boom which helped cushion
the shock and prevent a too rapid fall in buying power....®®

Unlike individuals in the Government, Mr. Steindorf was

not sanguine with regard to the prospects for the coming years.®®

He thought it somewhat difficult to make any definite predictions

concerning the outlook, owing to the large number of factors.

In general, he saw no basis for marked optimism. It was certain

that the then-existing low prices of Philippine products were

an unfavorable factor. Unless they advance, he wrote, "general

prosperity is practically impossible."4®

®®Ibid., italics supplied.

■*Q
Newspapers and periodicals were full of optimistic fo re ­
casts for the coming years. All that was disappointing or disas­
trous lay in the past. Pew, if any, individuals connected with
any of the government agencies wrote articles other than panegyrics
of the efforts of the Government and paeans of praise for the most
modest achievements. A spirit of quiet self-criticism and scien­
tific analysis was conspicuous by its absence.

40Ibid.. p. 2396.
 190

President Quezon, in 1939, initiated "Rice Planting

Day." On the occasion of the first such day, the President

delivered a speech to the tenants of bhe Buenavista Estate, San

Ildefonso, Bulacan, and planted a few stalks of rice himself.

What he said there has been forgotten by all but a few of the

people to whom he talked. Many who listened to him are now to

be found among the ranks of the disaffected — with the Hukba-

lahaps. Since the speech is typical of what the Government

promised the people so freely and since it illustrates the extra­

ordinary power of President Quezon as an extemporaneous speaker,

we reproduce it in extenso.

I have set this day for the celebration of the rice

planting season in the Philippines.... I have designated
this date as Rice Planting Day so as to familiarize the
people of the Philippines with the importance of this
plant in this country. It is also my desire to extol
the dignity of the tillers of the soil, who are the
source of our livelihood.
In the past, we felt ashamed if we were seen with
our clothes stained with mud, our pants rolled up, and
our work was in the rice fields. We were showing then
that a farmer occupies a lowly position. The truth is
that there is no man in our country more honorable than
the tiller of the soil....
This day is also significant to the residents of this
place -- the Buenavista Estate — because to them this
is the beginning of a new life. I have been informed
that there are still a few persons here who do not
believe in what the Government of the Philippines is
actually doing and in what it will do for the Buenavista
Estate and for your own well-being in the near future.
I have the information that some people here regret the
intervention of the Government in your affairs.
Countrymen of San Ildefonso a n d San Rafael :
Have you not noticed the new movement which has been
initiated in your place? Do you not see that we are
constructing roads leading to your barrios? Are you not
aware that you will soon have a road which will be wider
than those in Manila? Do you not know that on this
day we will lay the cornerstone of a new hospital which
will be built here? Do you not understand that even
n ow you can borrow money which can be paid in install-
 191

ments and at a low rate of Interest; and that this

facility will greatly help you In the cultivation of
your land? Do you not realize that from now on you will
acquire a bigger and better share from your cultivated
lands than that acquired by tenants of other estates?
And that,believing that the judicial tribunal will recog­
nize these lands as yours or as belonging to the Govern­
ment,is a mis cake? Have you seen the decisions of the
Court of First Instance,and of the Supreme Court? You
wasted time, you wasted money, you wasted energy —
all for what? .Simply for you to find out that the courts
cannot help but recognize the Torrens title....
As all troubles have now ended, let us start a new
life. You have no more Constabulary soldiers who used
to watch you hourly in the past. When there are soldiers
around, it seems as If you a r e not as good Fil­
ipinos as the rest. I hope that you will now not
only live peacefully, but also happily. I fail to
recall what I told you when I came here before. Do
you remember? (Laughter) (A man In the platform said:
'You told u s that you will not return anymore') Ah,
you really do not remember what I told you then. I
said that I would resign if I could not effect any change
towards prosperity in your economic status. Do n o t
think that I have intentionally forgotten what I told
you. If I only told you that I would not return here,
anymore, what is that to me? That is not a difficult
task to fulfill; but what concerns me most is your
prosperity which should be brought about by this n e w
movement which the Government has started.
My countrymen: within a few years we shall see
major changes in your barrios. You will have good roads
in this place. You know that landowners in the different
provinces are disgusted with the activities of the
Government here, for they fear that their tenants would
demand for the same concessions as you have been given
in this estate. My reply to those landowners and to
their tenants is that what the Government is doing in
the Buenavista estate cannot be asked of the property
owners,for their lands do not belong to the Government....
The day will come when she Government will have no
more funds, because I am afraid that all the people
will clamor from the state management the same improve­
ments as are being done here. You are lucky because
the Government has aided you first. I advise those who
still nurse a grudge against the Government to remedy
their own headaches; and I hope those who do not belong
to this place, but are living only through your generosity,
will not create further trouble, since I will not tolerate
any disorder here.
Countrymen: I shall now plant rice. Rice planting
is a serious task, although I am telling you now that
my rice planting at this moment will just be a joke,
 192

because this noble work does not belong to us who are

quite advanced in years.... It is really a difficult
task— a task which should only be performed by young
men and women for their bones are still soft and they
can stoop without feeling any pain in the back. But
an old person gets easily tired and fatigued in plant­
ing rice.
iky countrymen* I implore God to give you His Grace,
and may all things which I have been doing in Buenavista
Estate become the source of peace and prosperity to the
farmers here.41

In 1950, tenants of uhis Buenavista Estate were still

awaiting- the disposition of these lands. Their disposal still

lay in the hands of the Courts. We shall discuss the fortunes

of this estate later and we need only mention, in passing,

that the activities of the Government with regard to this one

estate engendered as much ill-feeling and positive hate as

any one thing the Government engaged in from 1934 to 1950.

S u m m a r y :-

We have seen that the rice industry was one of the

major props of Philippine economy with at least 75 per cent

of the population directly dependent upon it for their liveli­

hood. We have seen that it was the basis for the standard of

living of the vast majority of the population. We have

observed that at the opening of the Commonwealth period, in 1934,

vast problems of distribution, marketing, diversification,

modernization and control demanded solution. Vtfe have seen the

existence of a price differential between prices paid for raw

palay at producing centers and for finished rice at consumption

centers. We have seen the price standard at the mercy of large

^ M.O .P .. Vol. 5, Pfc.l, pp. 141-146. p a s s i m . Delivered

July S, 1939.
 193

distributors. We have noted the early eiTorts of the Government

to meet the situation by iihe creation of such official bodies as

the National Economic Council and the National Rice and Corn

Corporation. we have further observed that despite these bodies

the retail price of rice continued to mount beyond the ability

of the people to purchase, with wages and salaries remaining at

pre-Commonwealth levels.

The situation, then, at the outbreak of the War, was more

serious than at any time previous and was rapidly deteriorating.

We noted that, by 1941, the Government still had not formulated

an extensive and practicable program to meet the problems posed

by deteriorating conditions within the industry. The conclusion

is inescapable, therefore, that even without the enormous dis­

locations caused by the ravages of war and occupation in the

Philippines, the economy faced probable collapse and society great

disruption. The critical period approached as the years before

Independence shortened. As it h a pp e n e d ,this critical period

coincided with the post-war period, with little, if any, of the

pre-war economy of the nation intact. The manner in which the

Government was to meet the situation was to be the determining

factor in the future stability of the nation.

It should have been obvious to friends of the Philippines

in the United States that the nation was entering its independence

at the worst possible time and under the worst possible conditions.

Such a situation demanded sympathetic understanding and aid. It

is regrettable that this was not to be the case. We shall examine

the efiorts of the Government to obtain order from chaos and the
misdirected efforts of the United States in later chapters.
 CHAPTER VI

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ABACA INDUSTRY: 1934-1941

In December, 1937, the usual optimistic observations

with regard to industry in the Philippines -- this time the abaca

industry -- were presented in the Philippine Journal of Commerce.

It noted that the United States Cordage Institute had offered to

cooperate with the Government in the rehabilitation of the indus­

try. It suggested that an abaca advisory committee be appointed

by the President (which was done) and this committee, in coopera­

tion with the Institute should study the possibilities of widening

the market in the United States."^ At the same time, the Journal

reproduced the statement of James Fyfe, director and New York

representative of Wigglesworth & Co., Ltd., London, the largest

buyer of Manila hemp, who said that prospects for the product

were bright "in spite of the reverses it has suffered lately."^

He suggested an international limitation of fiber production, but

saw no immediate need for such a step.

The following May, the special committee on hemp in the

National Assembly held hearings on the industry, in which the dealers

and manufacturers pleaded for Government aid to the industry and

specifically requested the formation of a national hemp corporation

which would purchase surplus hemp directly from the producers and

1PJC, XIII, NO. 12 (December, 1937), p. 16.

^Ibid ., p. 30.

194
 195

regulate prices, In the same fashion as the NARIC with rice.

They also agreed that the production should be limited to

1,100,000 bales a year, some 400,000 bales less than the aver­

age annual production, and to take other measures to halt the

continuing drop in prices. They deplored the high cost of

transportation to the United States and Europe, alleging that

shipping costs "are about twice those in effect years ago when

hemp prices abroad were high."5 Secretary Eulogio Rodriguez,

of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, however, vigorous­

ly opposed limitation of production and exportation, stating in

a letter to Mariano Garchitorena, that such a step might work

more harm than good.4 He made the point that the Philippines

no longer held a monopoly on the production of abaca, and if a

limitation plan were put into operation, those countries not

bound by the scheme would be stimulated into serious competition

with Philippine trade. He stated that the Philippines could not

bind other countries to the plan, as had been done with regard

to the sugar industry; and since it would be an artificial

control it would be economically unsound and impracticable. The

price of hemp, he added, was not dependent upon supply in the

Philippines but was regulated by the world demand which fluc­

tuated with no relation to the situation in the Philippines.

Limitation would thus be a useless sacrifice. He concluded by

intimating that it would be well were the local producers to

solve the internal problems of the industry first.

30£. cit.. XIV, No. 5 (May, 1938), p. 7

4Ibld.. p. 8.
 196

Garchitorena, however, apparently held a different

point of view, which he expressed in a latter to Speaker

Montilla of the National Assembly. He stated that an inter­

national limitation plan would be preferable to a purely local

approach, and continued, "An international limitation of abaca

and other hard fibers production is furthermore more feasible,

much more feasible than the international limitation on sugar

which has rendered such rich rewards...."® He concluded! "I

see no reason why the sugar producers...are able to maintain so

successfully their agreement on international limitation whereas,

on the other hand, the producers of abaca...(produced only in

the Philippines) cannot reach the same successful result. The

Philippines, with a monopoly in the production of abaca, which

is the queen of all fibers, is in a position to head the inter­

national limitation of fibers. I congratulate Speaker Montilla

for the movement that he has just initiated."®

Elsewhere in the same periodical, Garchitorena addressed

an appeal to abaca producers, those "millions of small, suffering,

poor and destitute planters." He wished them to remember, in

the midst of their poverty and distress which "they so stoically

suffer" that they were remembered and that there was awaiting

them "a world of hopes and rehabilitation." This was because the

5Progressive Farming. Christmas edition, 1937, p. 30.

6Ibld.. italics supplied. The Secretary points out that

the nation had lost its monopoly of abaca; his division chief
states the opposite. It is possible that herein lies the explana­
tion for the failure of the Government’s program for strengthening
the industry.
 197

Government, “like a kind and solicitous parent,” was willing

to take them under its protection and to provide them with all

the "cares and attentions" needed, awaiting only the "collective

voice" of the producers who were "united in a strong and legal

association." His advice to the sufferers was to "associate

themselves without hesitation" into the National Association of

Abaca producers. This would entail no extra suffering since the

"dues are so small that they are within the reach of the most

modest citizen." This was because the association’s aim was

"not to amass big sums of money” but only to gather sums

sufficient for its efficient and economical operation. If this

were done, and if these dues were collected, they would be able

to form an association 4,so conscious and so numerous that their

petitions and recommendations may have sufficient weight in

obtaining from the government all the support and help that

they need."

Any project the Association would wish to carry out

should cause the members no worry about funds since "the govern­

ment is sufficiently strong and powerful to carry them out in

all those cases where it is considered reasonable and just."

The producers, however, should see to it that the Government was

aware of their existence, of their "legal" association, of the

fact that the voice of the association was the voice of the

entire abaca population "as numerous as it Is indigent and as

worthy as it is numerous." No other message, he said, could he

send to his colleagues "with deeper conviction."7

?Ibid.. p. 17.
 198

The fact that the Philippines’ monopoly of abaca was

more apparent than real was appreciated by a few government

experts in the Bureau of Plant Industry. It should have been

apparent to more individuals that the Philippines faced

challenges In its abaca market from competition in metal cordage

and various other vegetable fibers. In addition, the Bureau of

Plant Industry had conducted experiments, in cooperation with

the College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines,

which indicated that two dangerous factors were at work in the

Philippines which would limit both the yield and quality of

abaca there: plant diseases, particularly the "bunchy-top" and

rapidly falling yields in old plantations which would make

further maintenance unprofitable.® In addition, these experts

were beginning to cast wary eyes toward the experimental work

In the East Indies, as well as British Borneo, which if success­

ful would exert a serious depressing action on the value of

Philippine abaca.

While these facts were recognized by experts, others in

the industry were reluctant to face facts. They, along with

representatives of the other export items, presented a plea to

the members of the Joint Preparatory Committee, for the amend­

ment of the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law affecting

their industry. They declared that so long as no substitutes

SDomingo B. Paguirigiua. (ed.): "Philippine Monopoly of

Abaca More Apparent Than Real," The Commercial and Industrial
Manual of the Philippines. 1937-1938. p. 283.
 199

existed, raw abaca fiber’s position In the American market would

be secure "because thus It shall always remain in America’s

free llst."^ Manufactures of abaca, however, consisting al­

most wholly of cordage, would barely survive, they believed,

the last year of the Commonwealth. This inevitable loss could

only be avoided with the favorable amendment of the Law. Unless

a preferential rate were established, three major adverse

effects would be produced in the Philippines: " (a) The Common­

wealth will lose about 1*50,000 of revenue yearly. (b) More

than one-half...of the people now dependent upon cordage manu­

facture must look for other means to earn their livelihood.

(c) The reduction of abaca production by more than 10 per

centum will mean also that a quarter of a million people now

dependent upon abaca plantations must look for other crops to

plant."-*-® Also, they asked, since the United States imported

great quantities of cordage and twine in addition to raw fiber

(the Philippines supplying 12 to 32 per cent), would it not be

"just and proper that America should at least continue to

tolerate this, if for no other reason than that the cordage

supplied by the Philippines, is equivalent to about one-half

only of the output of American-owned cordage factories?" And,

lastly, in the same vein as the others, they stated: "Like the

sugar centrals the Philippine cordage factories are relatively

young and were developed through American encouragement.

9"Brief", presented to the Committee, in: Ibid., p. 287.

10Ibid.
 200

Consequently, they should be given every opportunity at least

to recover the capital invested in them.

Tjfeje industry and every other Filipino would have been

much better off had the people dependent upon abaca plantations

looked for other crops to plant, especially rice and other food

items.

12
Executive Order Mo. 36, (3 June 1936) allocated the

cordage allotments for 1936-1937, to four cordage companies.

The allocation was made to off-set the surplus shipment during

the previous fiscal year of 1,538,600 pounds over the permitted

6,000,000 pounds. The quota for the next year was thus reduced

to 4,461,400 pounds. Later, Mr. H.T. Edwards, of the U.S.

Department of Agriculture, predicted a bright future for Philip­

pine abaca and expressed the opinion that it would not suffer
13
the same fate as sugar and other local products. That this

prediction was not far-fetched was seen as the allotment plan

continued to allow Philippine abaca producers to sell six

million pounds in the American market, duty free, being extended

14
on a yearly basis until the passage of the Tydings-KocialkowskL

i:LIbid. 12M.0.P.. Vol. 2, Pt. 1, pp. 658-660.

ISpp. cit.. p. 302.

^ E x e c u t i v e Orders 101, 4 June 1937, and 150, 28 April,

1938.
 201

Act of August 7, 1939. This Act provided for the continuation,

until July 4, 1946, of the annual quota of six million pounds,

duty-free, and exempted abaca from the payment of any export

tax. While this undoubtedly was a reduction from what the

industry had hoped in its appeals to the Joint Preparatory Commit­

tee, it was much more than they would have received had the

Independence Law gone unamended, and provided them with at

least an assured market at a fixed rate for the remainder of the

Commonwealth period. Their plea had been answered and the

major aid to the industry came again from the United States

rather than the Commonwealth Government, despite the latter's

reiterated promises for future aid. Some halting steps, how­

ever, were taken.

The first of these steps was taken by President Quezon

when on November 9, 1937, he created the Advisory Abaca Commit­

tee composed of eleven members, in addition to the Secretary

of Agriculture and Commerce, the Director of Plant Industry and

the Manager of the Fiber Inspection Service. This committee

was to serve in an advisory capacity to the Government, and Its

duties were "to study and submit recommendations as to best

economical method of stripping and preparing abaca fiber for the

market; (b) To study foreign market requirements as to quality

and classification of fiber; (c) To serve as liaison between

local abaca dealers and foreign buyers...; and (d) To study and

submit recommendations on all other matters affecting the abaca

industry."^5

15M . Q . P . , Vol. 3, Pt. 2, 1938, p. 769

 202

In April, 1938, Mariano Garchitorena, Manager of the

Fiber Inspection Service, expressed alarm over the Increased

production of abaca, saying that It might lead to a situation

"worse than communism" unless remedial measures were taken.

He observed that, with high costs of production, the excess

would lead to lov/er prices and producers would be faced with

possible ruin.!6

In the same month, a special committee of the National

Assembly, headed by Assemblyman P.B. Asanza, held hearings on

the hemp situation, which indicated that the industry was In

grave danger of extinction unless remedies were forthcoming.

Various proposals were advanced. One was the organization of

a National Hemp Corporation, with a capital of 1*20,000,000, to

be financed by the Government. Another was the establishment

of hemp centrals controlled by the Government and employing

laborers at a wage of 1*1.00 per day instead of the usual low

wages paid in the industry. These centrals would, it was

suggested, control the production and sale of the fiber, thus

eliminating the middlemen. Members of the committee were

inclined to favor the abolition of the assessment tax on lands

planted to hemp and shift the burden of taxation instead from

the producer to the exporter.

Another suggestion was that the Government establish its

own merchant marine, or at least charter bottoms for the exporta

16PJC. XIV, No. 4 (April, 1938), p. 18.

 203

tion of the fiber. This, it was argued, would bring about a

reduction In freight rates charged by foreign carriers which

amounted annually to some ^10,000,000. It was pointed out that

the hemp industry had sunk from first to fifth place In the

country1s exports, while the Industry was fast passing into the

hands of the Japanese, who were reported to control some 60 per

cent of the output.

On June 10, 1938, in a speech in Tacloban, Leyte, the

President assured the people of that province that he would do

all he could to bring relief to the industry. "In its last

session," he stated, "the National Assembly passed a law

designed to help the hemp industry. Although I am not sure

that the bill will remedy the situation, yet I will approve it

in an effort to do something to help the hemp industry in the

Philippines. We must do something for this very important

industry."!7 Two days later, speaking in Maasin, Leyte, the

President referred to the expenditures he planned for public

works, particularly the construction of roads. This was to

serve two purposes, he said* "Aside from the fact that roads

in themselves constitute the best means of promoting the material

development of a country, at this particular time appropriations

for roads and public works for Leyte are of great significance

in that you need employment because of the bad price of hemp."

He went on, however, by pointing out the necessity of meeting

the problem by otha* means than appropriating money for public works.

17M . 0 . P .. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, 1939, p. 80

 204

The problem, he said, was to find means of aiding the

industry to "get a better price." This was, he admitted, a

hard problem to solve. He mentioned that the assemblymen from

the abaca regions had secured legislation authorising the use

of "several million pesos" to aid the Industry. But he was

not sure, in fact he had “very serious doubts", that the

corporation to be created would produce the expected results.

However, despite these doubts, he would sign the bill and

organize the corporation since he wanted to see whether the

project would be successful. It was quite possible, he said,

that they might lose “a few million pesos" but it was worth it

since the hemp Industry, in his opinion, "is the most important

Industry In the Philippines.” In fact, he declared, it was

"much more important than the sugar industry" and was at least

as important as the copra and rice industries. The reason for

this was, he said, because the sugar industry, "by its very

nature, tends to accumulate money in the hands of a few and

leave very little to the workingmen." This resulted in a

situation in which the "owners of the sugar centrals make more

money than the owners of the land, and the owners of the land

make more money than the men who work the land." The hemp

industry, however, was differently organized. The ownership of

the land was hot confined to the few as In the case of sugar

land, but was "divided among small landowners who work on the

land themselves." This insured a wide prosperity when prices

were good -- the benefits accruing to more people "than do the

 205

benefits from the sugar industry•"■*-8

Making allowance for the facts that he was speaking not

to sugar producers but to hemp producers, and that this was a

political speech, we still may see one of the reasons for the

tremendous popular appeal of President Quezon. His frankness

in expressing whatever opinions he held, whether based on any­

thing more than subjective reasons or not, appealed as much to

the people as his promises and his tremendously effective

oratory. His observations on the differences between the sugar

and hemp industries were not only effective but had much truth.

We might mention, however, that the sugar industry was far more

pampered by the Government than the hemp industry (despite

Quezon's expressed belief that it was "more important than the

sugar industry"),^9 withstood the ravages of the War better,

and in 1950, was in a far more favored position than the hemp

industry. It is, of course, true that the individuals in policy­

making positions in the Government have been those individuals

more closely connected with the sugar industry than with any

other.

-*-Q Ibid.. pp. 89-90, passim.

■*-9For example, despite the unstable condition of the

hemp industry, the City of Manila, In March, 1938, proposed
the Imposition of a fee on the storage of hemp. This was
protested vigorously by hemp dealers and the various chambers
of commerce, who said the proposal "involves excessive taxation,
both at present and possible (sic) still more In the future it
is discrimination; it is without adequate reason from fire or
other risks; and it will result in a restraint of trade which
at present needs encouragement instead of repression." P J C .
Vol. XIV, No. 3 (March, 1938), p. 30. No such action was taken
against the sugar industry which was far wealthier and better
able to absorb such an additional tax.
 206

The President continued, speaking in Maasin:

Well, that Is the advantage of the hemp industry.

If the price of hemp is good, those people who own
small lots can make money, be prosperous relatively,
and contented and happy.... 20

He then ventured on to more precarious ground*

In two ways at least, I believe that this law

will be beneficial. For one thing the corporation
can buy the hemp directly from the farmers them­
selves, and thus offer competition to the middlemen,
-- those merchants who are exploiting the farmers.
Then there is another thing that we can do through
this corporation. The freight rate on hemp from
Manila to Europe or America is very high. This
corporation after buying a sufficient quantity of
hemp, could export it directly. By getting Its own
ships the corporation would save in transportation
expenses, which would redound to the benefit of the
farmer himself.21

The original doubts the President had about the effective­

ness of this bill were well-founded. The corporation had

difficulties in buying the fiber directly and in offering

effective competition to the merchants, and never was able to

secure its own ships.

The following day, June 13, President Quezon spoke to

the people of Ormoc, Leyte. He told them much the same thing

but added another detail omitted In his two previous speeches.

"We are going to do the best we can to help you. But you know

hemp is sold outside the Philippines and the purchase price of

hemp dutside does not depend upon us. In one way we can be of

help to you. We are going to organize in this province agencies

2 0 0p. c l t .. p. 91. Italics supplied. 2 1 Ibid.

 207

through which we can buy hemp so that your local merchants, if

they pay too low, may pay a little bit better with our competi­

tion." And then concluded by sayings "With regard to roads

and schools, this is Santa Claus time for the Philippines—

you will have more money for roads and schools than you have

ever dreamed of. (Applause) This will b e one way of solving

the employment problem, and I expect the engineer, the governor,

and the municipal mayors, to give work to everybody without

discrimination as to party affiliations."22

The bill passed by the National Assembly was Common­

wealth Act No. 332 which established the National Abaca and

Other Fiber Corporation. In his message of approval, the

President mentioned his doubts concerning the effectiveness of

the act but stated that since the industry was in need of help

he was approving it. However, he continued, "The Secretary of

Finance is of the opinion that it may take some time before it

can be certified that there are funds available in the National

Treasury for this purpose. And, until this certification is

made, the company as provided in the law will not be organized.

However, the National Development Company might organize a

Q%
subsidiary company along the lines provided in the measure."

The interesting point here is that despite the fact that the

National Treasury had enough funds to make it "Santa Claus tf.me"

22Ibld., p. 103. This last expectation of the

President was never fulfilled. Many of President Quezon’s
speeches are valuable to us for the things they leave unsaid.
23_, . , _
Ibid.. p. 491.
 208

for public works, and despite his eloquently expressed interest

in the hemp industry, despite the shaky condition of that

industry and the passage of an act which the National Assembly

considered the best method of remedying the situation, there

were no fluids available for the purpose. Had the National

Assembly believed that a subsidiary company of the NDC would

have been able to accomplish the ends of the NAPCO, it seems

reasonable to suppose they would have so provided.

The NAPCO was formed With a capital stock of 1*20,000,000

and was to have the same powers over abaca as the NARIC possessed

over rice and corn. It was also authorized to prevent specula­

tion and to stabilize prices. The corporation was to have

three aims: (1) to assure a permanent and sufficient produc­

tion of abaca for domestic consumption and export; (2) to

prevent speculation in the fiber and to stabilize prices in

such a manner as to cover cost of production, plus a reasonable

profit; and (3) to improve the conditions of the producers and

laborers, dependent upon the industry for their livelihood. To

attain these purposes, the NAPCO was given the power to purchase

sell and export abaca as well as to grant loans under reason­

able conditionsto producers.24

The importance of this corporation to the industry lay

24PJC, XIV, No. 6 (June, 1938), p. 8.

 209

in the fact that the plight of the industry was due to internal

rather than external causes. The industry itself was respon­

sible for the condition in which it found itself. A Bureau of

Commercle fiber agent spoke of "the antiquated practice of

producing hemp by Philippine farmers, their haphazard and lazy

plantation methods, resulting in low yield, inferior fiber and

unnecessary waste.”25 Figures were presented to show the

tremendous disparity, in the production of damaged grade fibers,

between Albay and Leyte on the one hand, and Davao on the

other. Where the first two produced, in 1937, some 21,000 and

81,000 bales, damaged fiber, respectively, Davao produced but

1,367 bales. It seemed clear that the alien producers in

Davao would soon wipe out the producers in other parts of the

country unless the local farmers did away with their old

methods and turned to an emulation of the Japanese. The point

that the principal problems of the industry were agricultural

and industrial was emphasized. The farmers paid little

attention to breeding better fiber and to the research work

conducted by the Government along other lines of production.

Three things that should be accomplished before the ameliora­

tion of the industry could be achieved were, according to Mr.

Lomat: ”The organization of cooperative marketing association

of Filipino planters, granting of credits by a governmental

agricultural bank, the organization of a national abaca company."

25Venancio Lomat: "The Abaca Industry -- Its Funda­

mental Problem,” Ibid.. p. 13.
 210

These, the writer believed, might "alleviate the conditions

temporarily but for these entities to succeed, the agricul­

tural and industrial defects must first be surmounted." He

too, brought out the point that the fiber was an export

product and for it to sell successfully in the world it would

have to meet the growing competition of other fibers, such as

sisal, and the increasing production threat of hemp in Borneo

and Java. The low prices of the day, he added, were causing

the farmers to complain, particularly because of the high

cost of production.

"But," he asked, "do we hear any complaints from the

Davao planters? No, because at the present level they can

still make a profit because of their low production costs due

to modern and advanced farming methods.*1 The Government, then

should first attack the problem from the agricultural and

industrial phases before going on to the secondary problems of

marketing and distribution.*^

In July, upon the recommendation of Mariano Garchitorena,

the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Commerce created a fiber

improvement section in the Fiber Inspection Service. This was

to take complete charge of all activities concerned with the

instruction of fiber producers and dealers with regard to the

proper manner of grading and preparation for sale. It also

was to advise on the improvement of the grade and quality of

2 6 j b i d . , p. 38. Italics supplied.

 211

fibers through the introduction of modern methods as provided

by sections 1786 and 1796-B of the Revised Administrative Code.

On the fifteenth of July, President Quezon ordered

the transfer of £5,500,000 from the NDC to the hemp and ware­

housing corporations to be established a few days thereafter.

&y the twenty-fourth, the NAPCO had a paid-up capital of

£1,275,000 out of the subscribed capital stock of 1*2,000,000,

and the following day the U.S. Department of Commerce announced

that the NDC had been authorized to allocate £5,000,000 of a

3*17,000,000 cash balance to organize the NAPCO. The twenty-

sixth saw the approval of the Warehousing Corporation by the

President, who, however, (as mentioned above) delayed action

on the fiber firm.

President Quezon, on September 15, released a state­

ment to the press with regard to this corporation. The reason

for the delay in the organization was "the designation of

former Governor Locsin of Albay by the National Development

Company to first make a study and submit a report as to the

best means of helping the hemp i n d u s t r y . T h i s , in spite

of the numerous studies completed by various agencies of the

Government and interested i n d i v i d u a l s .28 in his "State of the

87M.0.P.. Vol. IV, Pt. 1, 1939, p. 703.

28cf.: Gregorio Anonas; "The Role of the National Develop­
ment Company in Our Economic Readjustment." P J C . Vol. XIV, No.
12 (December, 1938), p. 16. The personal aouETfrs the President
held as to the effectiveness of the NAPCO were undoubtedly factors
in the delay. The reason given, a shortage of funds, is surpris­
ing, in view of the fact that at the end of the year 1937, it
was reported by Auditor-General Jaime Hernandez to the President,
that the Philippine Commonwealth Government had ended the year
with a surplus of £=117 ,525,814.45. P J C . Vol. XIV, No. 3 (March,
1938), p. 29.
 212

Nation” address to the National Assembly, January 24, 1939,

President Quezon mentioned the work of the Joint Preparatory

Committee on Philippine Affairs and their recommendations with

regard to future Philippine-American trade relations. One

recommendation was ”to bind copra and abaca free of United

States duty during the Commonwealth period."**® He suggested

that the Assembly formally endorse the recommendations so that

the U.S. Congress would early approve legislation effectuating

them ”in order to place American-Philippine trade relations on

a more fair and equitable basis, and to permit the Philippines

properly and intelligently to plan its economic adjustment in

preparation for independence."3®

The following month, he addressed the convention of

coconut and hemp producers in Manila upon their problems. He

told them that the Government could do little with regard to

world prices since these ”are influenced wholly by the laws

of supply and demand, and by the competition offered by

substitute articles•"31 There was an "abundance of fibers

competing with hemp" and when hemp prices rose its users

utilized these substitutes "thereby forcing...prices down to

the competitive level." However, the Government might control

the speculatory activities of dealers and brokers. "Proposals

have been made for the establishment of a single agency...so

as to eliminate objectionable speculatory transactions....

89M.O.P.. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, 1941, p. 251

30Ibld.. p. 252. 31Ibid., p. 34.

 213

The question of excessive transportation rates...is also

being considered."38

There were, he pointed out, steps the producers could

take to aid themselves. These were improvement of the quality

of the products and the introduction of greater efficiency.33

"This field," he continued, "is entirely within our control;

and we can effect improvements through our own initiative and

effort.” He then mentioned the fate of the NAFCO. "I have

refrained from authorizing the organization of the National

Abaca and Other Fiber Corporation until the studies and

Investigations now being made should reveal the practical steps

that ought to be taken not only to remedy some of the problems

facing the hemp industry but also to lay out a specific

program of activities for the corporation.... I am prepared

to aid these industries, upon the formulation of a workable

plan which would insure a substantial and permanent benefit to

producers."®4

The chairman of this convention a day or two later

referred inadvisably to the President as one of the Horsemen

of the Apocalypse. This was with specific reference to the

President's program for the expenditure of the coconut excise

tax fund. The coconut industry was not to be aided by this

tax, and Assemblyman Lavides of Batangas ascribed the plight

of the coconut and hemp industries to the President's attitude.

38 Ibid. 55I b l d .. p. 35.

3 4 Ibid. Italics supplied.

 214

Quezon's reply was sharp. He pointed out that the use of the

excise tax in the coconut industry was specifically prohibited.

Discussing what the attitude of the U.S. Congress would be

were he to allow any of the ^80,000,000 to be thus expended,

he asked: "Is there any one here who dares assert that he

would rather see enacted a bill which, in my judgement, might

be construed by the United States Government as a violation of

the law?" He continued: "I am responsible. My conscience

alone, not that of others, is responsible for whatever I do."

Turning his attention to the industries under discus­

sion, he said: "The Philippine Government stands ready to

aid the two following industries: the copra and the hemp....

From the standpoint of the nation, it is evident that the

hemp and coconut industries are more important than the sugar

industry.... The Government is interested in both the hemp and

coconut industries, but so far the most effective way of

aiding you has not been found."36 He then placed the onus for

this situation on the individuals concerned.

You are to blame in the first place. You blame

us for aiding the sugar industry. But the sugar
growers know how to organize, while you do not.
Assemblyman Kalaw has quoted me as being opposed to
blocs. I have not changed my mind on that score, and
when I say that you ought to organize, I have in mind
an organization like this. I mean this organization,
and not the one in the Assembly. (Laughter) This
association should have been formed earlier. You
should do more than merely hold conventions. Nothing
is accomplished in these conventions except speeches,

3 5 Ibid., pp. 40-41. 3 6 Ibld

 215

promises, no more.... You must organize yourselves in

your own provinces in the same way as the sugar
growers have done.... We have been unable to do any­
thing for you because you are not organized and you
have not presented the problems confronting you....
In order to force your assemblymen, you do not have to organize.
These assemblymen are interested in the needs of their
respective districts. They are not going to forget
you. But the first thing you ask from them is the
condonation of your land taxes. Do you take this
petition seriously? Can there be anything more terrible
than this? Do you mean by this that the salvation of
the industry lies in the nonpayment of the required
taxes? Gentlemen, land taxes are the most equitable
of all taxes. I trust you will not make such a
petition again. It Implies a terrible psychology....
It seems as if the impression proposed to be created
is that your worst misfortune is to be obliged to pay
taxes.... Do not fight your assemblymen: fight me
over this question of taxes.

Returning to the plan for the excise tax, he stated

that it was the most important part of the report of the Joint

Preparatory Committee. 11If this portion of the Report be

approved,** he promised, "the money will be spent for your own

good; that is, the hemp and coconut planters.... More for the

coconut than for the hemp planters. I am in favor of helping

the coconut planters more because they pay the taxes....'1

Speaking directly to the hemp planters, he mentioned the

probable effect of the act passed to control the price of hemp.

I now reiterate my statement made at the time I

signed the Act, that the same would not guarantee
the rise in the price of hemp. To be able to control
it, we would be compelled to have a huge capital
available, which we do not have. You, hemp and coco­
nut planters, forget that the Government has lost a
great deal of money in helping you out. The Philip­
pine National Bank lost millions of pesos when It
attempted to maintain hemp prices at a high level....

37
Ibid., pp. 41-44, p a s s i m .
 216

I am still ready to carry out the idea of the abaca

corporation.... We are deeply interested in extend­
ing aid toiyou, but you must not expect us to do the
impossible. You must forget all about tax-delin-
quency condonations. You all know that the Tayabas
students gave a party at the Manila Hotel one night
and I suppose each one of them spent 3^25 and upwards.
Not even their parents can afford to spend so much
for a party. In order to be able to be present at
this convention, many of you have had to spend more
than enough to enable you to pay your taxes. The
Government will help you, but you must try to convince
us that you are ready to help yourselves.38

When the President had finished, the applause was polite

but unenthusiastic.

The President mentioned that, if necessary, he would

send abroad individuals to study the situation with regard to

the abaca industry. Subsequently, on May 17, he sent a short

message to the National Assembly suggesting that two of its

members go on separate missions to investigate abroad the best

means of promoting the abaca and coconut industries in the

Philippines.®9 This was necessary, he believed, because the

solution of the problems confronting these industries required

a knowledge of foreign markets.

The President continued to assure those dependent upon

abaca that the Government was trying to alleviate their plight.

The omission of any export tax on hemp (and copra) in the

Tydings-Koclalkowski Act was mentioned as one of the urgent

reasons for the acceptance of this act by the National A s s e m b l y . 40

5eIbid.. pp. 44-45, passim. Italics supplied.

®9Ibld.. p. 306. 40Ibld.. pp. 328 and ff.

 217

Speaking of the NAPCO, he said that he could not offer any

guarantee that this corporation would give relief to the hemp

provinces.41 Yet, he believed, that the creation of this

corporation was an earnest and intelligent attempt to place

the industry on a stable basis, and "it is certainly a duty

which the Government of the Commonwealth cannot s h i r k . H e

expressed confidence that somehow the hemp industry could be

placed on a profitable basis, for this had already been

achieved in Mindanao.4® He appointed Assemblyman Sabido to

head the corporation because he was familiar with the trials

of the hemp farmers.44

On November 25, he sent a message to Mr. Sabido notify­

ing him that he had just authorized the release of 1*2,550,000

as the initial payment from the sum of 1*10,250,000 subscribed

by the Commonwealth Government, and reminding him that the

corporation was expected to alleviate the "precarious situation

of the Filipino abaca producer" and "was not organized for

purposes of profit.”4® He urged the producers to organize

themselves as soon as possible to improve the industry and

eliminate undue manipulations.46

41Ibid., p. 209. 48Ibid. 4® Ibid.. p. 210.

44Ibid., "Address of His Excellency Manuel L. C&iezon...

on National Abaca and Other Fiber Corporation and the Hemp
Industry, delivered during the Induction into office as Manager...
of Hon. Pedro Sabido, at Malacafian, November 4, 1939." Pp.
208-210.

45I b i d .. p. 217. 46Ibld.. p. 218.

 218

Placed on its own the NAFCO immediately set to work.

It sent observers abroad (and did so after the War, the most

recent appointee being sent to Costa Rica on a UN scholarship,

60 per cent of the expenses paid by the organization and 40

per cent paid by the Government) to study foreign methods of

production, grading and preservation. Meanwhile, it addressed

Itself earnestly to the problems at home. In a statement of

Its aims addressed to the ^’Ilipino Abaca Planters47 It declared

that their abaca plantations which had been in previous years

a source of wealth and happiness had "ceased to be so, because

of your indifference and inaction." This indifference had

permitted others to "reap the fruits of your labor and exploit

the precious heritage" of their forefathers. Coupled with

this Indifference, the planters instead of fighting “the

forces which oppress you" had been contented "with merely

complaining and reciting your grievances."46

However, this lost heritage could be regained if the

planters would work with the NAFCO and form cooperatives.

They would "gain nothing by just folding" their arms, "doubting

and vacillating." They were warned not to ally themselves

with private traders but to concentrate their energies upon

helping the c o ^ v . - f ion,

The purposes of the corporation were fourfold. It was

47Reproduced inj The Commercial and Industrial Manual

of the Philippines. 1940-1941. (Manila: Publishers Inc., 1941),
pp. 846-859.
48Ibld.. p. 846.
 219

first of all to insure the producer the maximum share in the

value of abaca after considering the world market prices.

Secondly, it was to provide the producer with facilities

leading to the improvement of his plantation and the methods

of harvesting. Thirdly, it was to "make of the Filipino abaca

planters real farmers and organize them solidly under the

leadership of the Corporation, so that, the thousands of abaca

plantations may be managed and operated as one single planta­

tion and the millions of Filipinos who depend upon this

industry for their livelihood, may be directed in their

activities as one man, insuring in all their moves UNITY OF

PURPOSE, UNITY OF ACTION AND UNITY OF MEANS." And, fourthly,

to arouse a sense of fairness and justice in the minds of

consuming nations who had arbitrarily created boards of control

over the prices of abaca.

In attempting to achieve the last two objectives, the

Corporation was moved rather by optimism than by realism. To

attain a spirit of oneness among the myriads of small, indepen­

dent (and independently-minded) producers, scattered from

southern Luzon, through the Visayas, to the southermost shores

of Mindanao was certainly a task of enormous and extraordinarily

complicated proportions. And to create a sense of "fairness

and justice" in the "mind of consuming nations" was a task

which the League of Nations could not achieve and which the

United Nations has found difficult.

4 9 I b l d .. p. 847.
 220

The NAFCO believed there were t hree major problems

facing the abaca industry. The producer actually did not

receive the share to which he was entitled from the price paid

by the consumer. Secondly, "due to the shortage of labor caused

on the one hand by the low prices...and on the other by the

increased rate of wages fixed by certain Corporations many

abaca plantations are rapidly deteriorating, causing great

losses to the owners." And, thirdly, few "are the abaca

producers who are real farmers.1' ^

It recognized that these were complicated problems

There were, it was discovered, five causes for the first

problem: unscrupulous middlemen; unreasonably high freight

charges; lack of liaison agencies in the world markets between

producer and consumer; a lack of organization among the

producers and "the absolute absence of a sound constructive

leadership, the apathy of some and the lack of understanding

by others of the economic dislocation which the world has

suffered...the last few years"; and "the arbitrary control of

abaca prices by the boards of control created by England and

Japan to protect their interests, absolutely disregarding the

interests of the abaca producers•"®1

Unscrupulous middlemen had flourished, the Corporation

stated,because the abaca producers were small farmers "who are

unorganized and more often than not are without resources."

50Ibid. 51Ibid.
 221

They were compelled to turn to the middlemen for working

capital to develop their plantations. Since the interest on

such loans was generally one hundred or two hundred per cent,

compounded annually or semi-annually, the producer was never

able to emerge from debt. This situation the corporation had

power to change and the justification for its continued

existence lay in the fact that it was able, in many areas, to

liberate the producer from these usurious middlemen.

To reduce high freight charges the corporation stated

it would appeal to the sense of justice of the shipping

interests. A formidable task! It stated that "we are mindful

of the difficulties Involved in trying to secure renunciation

of privileges and advantages which time, practice and above

all, acquiescence of the abaca producers have sanctioned in the

last six years," but "we have faith in the justice of our cause

and shall fight until the end to correct this injustice."

The corporation intended to establish agencies in the

principal abaca markets of the world. In this it was partial­

ly successful, having (by 1949) branches In the United States

and England.

The organization of cooperative associations was

expected to meet the evils springing from lack of unity.

Because of sad experience and the impelling force of necessity,

the corporation was confident that every abaca planter would

understand the necessity of joining solidly together, with full

 222

faith in the management of the Corporation, and of placing all

their material and human resources at its disposal for more

effective direction. "I know,** the head stated, ’’that many

persons will grin skeptically when they read this. I would

ask them, if I may, to give the Corporation sufficient time

to evolve and carry out its plans." If readers of the article

did grin, their skepticism was justified by events. "Once

bitten, twice shy," is the attitude of the average Filipino

to cooperative ventures. Too many times in the past had he

entrusted his savings and labor to such enterprises, only to

see them dissipated by dishonest or inept leaders.

In dealing with arbitrary foreign control of prices,

the corporation showed naive optimism and an unrealistic

appraisal of the situation. It said:

Against the illegitimate speculations and unjust

control of the prices of abaca by the nations
consuming our product we should bring into play the
combined forces of the organized planters on the one
hand, the economic help of the Corporation and un­
wavering support of the government on the other.
In a struggle of money against money, in other
words, of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corpo­
ration on one side and the powerful exporting
Corporations on the other, backed by their respective
governments, the Corporation is bound to lose. But
with the backing of our government and the solid
determined support of th e abaca planters, the strength
of the Corporation will b e evenly matched with that
of the elements of the other side, and it will not
then be difficult to obtain a just and equitable deal
for our abaca.bS”

The "other side" mentioned here were the governments and corpo­

rations of England and Japan.

^ Ibid.. p. 851. Italics supplied.

 223

The second problem, the shortage of labor coupled with

the rise in wages in other industries, would, the Corporation

stated, "automatically solve itself" as soon as the problem

with regard to the price situation was solved. "This does not

mean...that t h e . . .Corporation will patiently wait for the

prices of abaca to go up before tackling the problems of the

lack of workmen." A cause forthe lack of labor was the low

wages of fifteen centavos a day. To solve the labor problem

the Corporation would use mechanical strippers. How this

would benefit the individual workmen, receiving fifteen cent­

avos a day, was not mentioned. The Corporation said it would

pay the stripper operators, "if possible, from 40 to 50 cent­

avos a day," and hoped to "carry out this plan with the un­

selfish cooperation of the abaca producers."^® Since mechanical

strippers would deprive many thousands of individuals, depen­

dent upon plantation labor, of their livelihood, the solution

of this problem, then, would result in the creation of another.

This, however, is rather academic, since few mechanical

strippers were ever put into operation in the areas of concern

to the Corporation.

The solution of the third problem (too few producers

were real farmers) was expected to b e found in the establish­

ment of model plantations and an attempt by the Corporation to

secure loans for planters from the Agricultural and Industrial

53ibid.. p. 852.
 224

Bank Tor the improvement of their lands. Unfortunately, the

mere granting of loans, highly speculative under Commonwealth

conditions, could hardly result in producing automatically

farmers from non-farmers. It would seem that education had a

role to play but this was not considered in the analysis of

the situation by the Corporation. In 1950, most plantations

were still being operated in the age-old fashion and the

problem was still far from solution. The following statement

was as true in 1950 as in 1941, and, until the basic socio­

economic problems of the nation approach a satisfactory solu­

tion, will remain true.

Under existing circumstances, it is utopic to

expect abaca planters in the old regions to invest
money in the improvement of their plantations. No
man would spend his money and exert his energy
without well-grounded assurance that he would obtain
a fair return. If the Corporation were to advance
money for the improvement of these abaca plantations,
we are certain that the planters or producers will
spend the money in any other activities than in the
development of their plantations.54

S u m m a r y :-

We have attempted to relate in this chapter the major

developments in the abaca industry during the years of the

Commonwealth immediately preceding the War. It should be

apparent that the pattern presented in the early chapters on

the rice industry of the serious problems confronting this

basic industry and attempts to meet these problems, is duplica­

ted in an almost Indentical fashion in attempts to meet the

54Ibld.. p.853
 225

the problems in the abaca industry. It should also b e apparent

that these problems are also almost identical to the problems

of the former. As we proceed with this analysis we shall note

that similar patterns and similar problems are to be found in

the remainder of the subjects under discussion.

It was early suggested —that a special abaca advisory

committee be formed to investigate conditions within t h e

industry and make recommendations which would become the basis

for Government plans and programs. Such a body was created

after many similar requests by the industry for aid were made.

The members of the industry also requested the Government to

form a special corporation to look after the industry and to

raise the general level of prosperity within the indus­

try. We have noted that there existed throughout t h e

Commonwealth a large amount of misunderstanding as to the exact

position of the industry in the world, with some prominent

officials reiterating the old cliche of the Philippine monopoly

of abaca and others attempting to point out the fallacy of

this belief. During this period, when many in the industry

were comfortably ensconced behind this fallacious belief,

specialists in other countries such as Borneo and Indonesia,

were conducting experiments in the production of the fiber in

those regions. Happy in their ignorance of this or blind to

its meaning, the members of the industry made no attempts

during this period to meet a probable future competitor.

The representatives o f the government encouraged

 226

individuals In the industry.to associate themselves together

for purposes of unified action, in groups similar to those in

the sugar industry, promising if this were done Government

aid and assistance. At the same time, warnings by government

specialists that grave internal dangers of disease and falling

productivity of old plantation lands were spreading throughout

the industry, were Ignored. Instead, members of the industry

appealed to the United States, through the Joint Preparatory

Committee, for the extension of the status quo in exports to

America. In answer to this appeal, there was passed the

Tydings-Kocialkowski Act which permitted the continuance of

duty-free exports in a specified generous amount to the United

States until July 4, 1946. This additional aid granted the

industry was in contrast to the passivity of the Commonwealth

Government. The real tragedy lay In the fact that while the

legislators in the United States believed they were aiding the

Philippines, they were, in reality doing the reverse since

this aid encouraged the abaca planters to continue iron-clad

patterns of poor production methods, satisfied with their

immediate profits and content to let the future care for itself.

Hearings were held by the National Assembly leading,

it was hoped by some, to solutions to many vexing problems.

As a result of these hearings, proposals were made for the

creation of an abaca corporation similar to the National Rice

and Corn Corporation, the establishment of government-owned

abaca centrals and the establishment of a domestic merchant

 227

marine. These were notable for their theoretical rather than

practical or effective nature.

President Quezon continued to reiterate throughout the

Commonwealth period his assurances to the people that something

would be done for the industry and expressing his personal

desire to help the people in the industry. He expressed, how­

ever, grave doubts as to the effectiveness of what was to

become the National Abaca and Other Fiber Corporation although

he said that he would bring it into existence if only as an

earnest of the desire of the Government to aid. The President

also warned representatives of the industry that much of the

faults of the industry could be laid at their doors and demanded

that they begin thinking of self-help. It was up to them, he

believed, to solve the major portions of the problems facing

their industry and that he would refrain from implementing

programs and plans until he was convinced that they were work­

able and practical. 'These were never provided the Government

by members of the abaca industry and with the creation of the

NAFCO, they believed that there remained nothing for the

Industry to do. This the NAFCO deplored but It, itself, un­

fortunately, suggested a program that was distinguished more

for its unrealistic appraisal of most of the industry’s prob­

lems and h o w they were to be solved than by Its achievements.

In addition, there was created, within the Fiber Inspection

Service of the Government, a Fiber Improvement section whose

program unnecessarily duplicated what should have been some of

 228

the major aims and objectives of the Corporation. This costly

and inhibiting duplication of effort was to become a character­

istic of the Commonwealth Government and, indeed, of the

Republic.

It was repeatedly pointed out by a few government

experts that the major problems facing the abaca industry were

internal, with particular emphasis on the weak marketing

practices and poor or destructive production methods. Their

accurate recommendation that the major necessity was to meet

these agricultural and industrial defects before proceeding

to secondary problems was ignored. As a result, by 1941, the

Industry was in the midst of a decaying phase, with a highly

problematical future and with no actual working plans or

programs to meet this condition. In addition there was no

cooperation by the planters themselves with even the preliminary

program of the NAFCO. The period of preparation for indepen­

dence In the abaca industry, then, was spent in idleness and

vague dreams of future prosperity.

 CHAPTER VII

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COCONUT INDUSTRYi 1934-1941

During the early years of the Commonwealth, unit

prices of copra continued to rise until, by 1938, they had

reached the highest annual level since 1930. The quantity of

copra exported was lower, but the total shipped to the United

States was greater than at almost any time in a decade.

The United States, however, continued to legislate

against Philippine oil, altering its competitive position

adversely, with the Revenue Acts of 1935 and 1936. According

to the Joint Preparatory Committee Reports

The Revenue Act of 1935 amended that of 1934 so

as to place a compensatory tax on imported articles
manufactured or produced in chief value from taxable oils.
The rates were substantially the equivalent of the
excise taxes which would have been collected had the
oil ingredients been imported Into the United States
in the form of oil. The principal effect of this
law on the Philippines was to subject Philippine-made
fatty acids, vegetable lard, soap and other products
made from coconut oil to the equivalent of the excise
tax imposed on coconut oil.
The Revenue Act of 1936 amended both of the pre­
ceding revenue acts. The most important changes,
from the standpoint of the Philippines, were the
extension of the list of taxable oils and the increases
in rates on some of the oils already taxed. The rate
on coconut oil was not changed.1

The Joint Preparatory Committee also pointed to the

fact that the so-called preferential position accorded Philip­

pine coconut oil did not work "as much to its advantage as

1 Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs,

Report of May 20. 1938. Vol. I, pp. 63-64. The change in the
act of 1935 went into effect September 30, 1935, and the second,
August 21, 1936.
229
 250

might appear to be the case11 since "it is still obliged to sell

in the world market...."*2

Although the Revenue Act of 1934 did not change the

status of Philippine copra, experts believed that its effect

had been favorable because it tended to equalize the competi­

tive position of copra and oil "relative to other articles on

which new or higher taxes have been imposed."^

During 1936, for the first time in some years, the

European buyers were very active and offered better prices

than the United States* market. However, uncertainty prevailed

and the market fluctuated widely, with speculative buying and

selling controlling the situation to a large degree. After

May, a general rise in price took place reaching levels which

had not been considered possible earlier in the year, with a

peak in October of a monthly average price of 1=14.25 for

resecada (dried). The market for coconut oil was much quieter

with little business for bulk shipments. Price fluctuations

occured over a narrow range, with quotations at 10 .20 for

January and 10.36 for December. Copra cake and meal showed

substantial increases, with the continued drought in the United

2 Ibid.

^"U.S. Revenue Act Boosts P.I. Oil," Philippine Journal

of C o m m e r c e . XIII, Ho. 1 (January, 1937), p. 13. The subtitle
of this article reads "Revision Apparently Gives Advantage to
a Number of Products." The reservation was well taken in view
of later developments. See also: "Review of Coconut Products
for 1936," The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philip­
pines . 1 9 3 7 - 1 9 3 8 . p. 250.
 231

States driving prices for foodstuffs to new highs. While

this normally would have meant a boom to planters, disturbing

factors entered the picture. With the boom in prices, due to

the sanctions applied against Italy, and the consequent heavy

demand for Philippine oils, many planters, in order to take

advantage of the high prices while they lasted, harveste'd all

the nuts possible, Including green ones which they converted

into low quality copra. This practice usually results in

injuries to the trees and lowers the bearing capacity.4 In

addition, a severe typhoon in December swept across South­

eastern Luzon causing extensive damage to trees in Albay,

Sorsogon, and Camarines. These areas had barely recovered

from the severe typhoon of 1934. Also, Pacific coast crushers,

in the United States, faced difficult days because of the

great shipping strike which paralyzed both current and future

operations.

In an effort to aid the shaky coconut industry, the

National Assembly, on October 14, 1936, passed Commonwealth

Act No. 50, "directing the Secretary of Agriculture and Com­

merce, the Philippine National Bank and the National Develop­

ment Company to establish, operate and maintain warehouses for

copra and other marketable products," Any municipality wishing

such a warehouse erected was directed to apply to the Govern­

ment through these agencies which would examine the request

and, if justified, invest funds in the enterprise. The

4Ibid.
 232

municipality would make the proper arrangements with the Bank

or the NDC for reimbursement of the money invested. The

problem of adequate storage plagued the coconut producer

throughout the period. It had always been a source of dis­

satisfaction, since so much of the planter's profits were

eaten away by storage charges, and with the unstable conditions

facing planters during the Commonwealth period, it added fuel

to discontent. The problem was never solved.

In 1937, ohe better prices the industry hoped for were

not forthcoming because of a shipping strike on the Pacific

Coast. The bulk of the copra exports to the United States

normally went to these Pacific Coast ports. It so happened

that at that time stocks on the coast were low and prices were

gradually rising. The benefits to be derived from the situa­

tion, however, were denied the Philippine producers as they

were unable to get their shipments to the buyers. Hemp and

cordage were little affected by the strike since the demand

for lower grades of fiber generally came from Europe and from

the eastern United States.

It is diffucult in the United States to appreciate

the tremendous importance of a single crop in the life of the

people of the Philippines. Americans could not understand

why such an outcry was raised in the Philippines over the

control of coconut oil and copra. It should be realized that

at the time of the beginning of the commonwealth, there were

 233

some 115,312,400 coconut trees In the Philippines, of which

about 75,414,200 were bearing and were distributed over

608,360 hectares or about 15 per cent of the total cultivated

area of the Philippine lands. when we say that about four

million people were wholly or in part dependent upon the coco­

nut industry it is difficult to grasp just what this means to

the country. It may be better appreciated if it is realized

that over 75 per cent of the taxes of the province of Tayabas

(now Quezon) came from the assessment on coconut lands and

trees; between 50 and 75 per cent for Laguna, Marinduque,

Masbate, Oriental MIsamis, Romblon and Zamboanga; and between

25 and 50 per cent for Agusan, Bohol, Camarines Norte, Camarines

Sur, Gapiz, Cotabato, Lanao, Mindoro, Palawan and Surigao. The

government assessment, in 1933 amounted to ^327,099,255, from

which the government derived a direct land tax of 1*2,872,599,

excluding revenues from industries resulting therefrom. It

was estimated that over 4 million pesos was derived from the

coconut industry annually by the government. To a large extent,

inter-island shipping depended upon the coconut Industry.®

Imagine, for a rough comparison, seventeen of the

states, of the United States, containing some 33,000,000 of

the population of the country in 1940, with all rail, truck,

bus and water lines of transportation between New York and Los

Angeles, wholly or in part dependent upon one crop. Imagine

^"Philippine-American Trade Relations," Bureau of

Commerce, P J C . XIII, No. 2 (February, 1937), pp. 12-13.
 234

further what the fate of these states, transportation facil­

ities, and people would be were their future dependent upon

Europe as the major buyer for the crop (sone 96.5 per cent).

Imagine still further that while-this crop, corn for example,

was selling in the American export centers at ten to fifteen

cents a bushel, a tax was imposed in Europe of eight cents a

bushel, this tax then being remitted to the United States

Government with the proviso that it was not to be used, in any

way, to aid the corn producers or those engaged in the corn

business, directly or indirectly.

This, in effect, was the fate of the coconut producers

In the Philippines. Coconut producers, in 1937, were making

a profit of $0.0006 per pound on coconut oil. A five per cent

export tax was provided by the Tydings-McDuffie Law (Section

6), to be levied during the sixth year following the inaugura­

tion of the Commonwealth Government, which amounted to $0,001

per pound. It was further provided that, in the tenth year,

the export tax would amount to 25 per cent or $0,005 per pound.

The reason for the panic in the coconut-growing regions when

these provisions were announced should be self-evident. They

believed that, with the imposition of this export tax, their

industry was faced with extinction. The situation was sadly

ironic in that the industry had been developed largely through

the Initiative of buyers in the United States who were now

attempting to destroy it — each of which actions taking place

with no thought, of resultant effects upon Philippine economy,

either in the United States or In the Philippines.
 235

In order to meet a highly uncertain future, the old

Philippine Coconut P l a n t e r s 1 Association was reorganized into

the Philippine Coconut Association, including for the first

time exporters, millers and industrialists. The new organiza­

tion petitioned the Government for the reservation of £=1,000,000,

from the proceeds of the excise tax fund, for research,

educational promotion of the industry and publicity in the

United States. Their hopes, however, were thwarted. This

Association was formed at the initiative of the Bureau of

Plant Industry who had arranged a meeting of interested parties

at the time of the 1937 Philippine Exposition. Its aims were

to improve generally the industry through seed selection,

fertilization, cover-cropping, research into methods of

improving the quality of copra and to encourage industrializa­

tion and commercialization of the numerous by-products.

Another purpose was to keep members informed about developments

in the industry and, of course, one of its major objectives

was to fight and eliminate the objectionable provisions in the

Independence haw and other American tax legislation. The

Director of the Bureau, Hilarion Silayan, instructed field men

in the Bureau to aid in all possible ways in the organization

and direction of local chapters of the Association.

On October 18, 1937, President Quezon addressed a

message to the National Assembly. In the course of this

famous speech, dealing primarily with the demand for indepen­

dence in 1939, he touched upon the subject of social justice

 236

under the Commonwealth and the means of carrying out this

program. Since the main problem was one of finance, he

mentioned that "fortunately for us a new source of income has

come to our hands that will facilitate the carrying out of our

program of social justice and economic readjustment." This

was the proceeds of the excise tax (amounting to §=95,507,227.30

at the end of June , 1937) in the American Federal Treasury,

"the transfer of which amount to the Treasury of the Philip­

pines I had secured before I left America on my last trip."®

He stated that the sum was then ready for appropriation.

The final decision as to how the fund shall be

spent is, of course, yours. But in the exercise of
my constitutional prerogatives I shall take the
liberty of making some suggestions regarding the
purposes for which this money should be spent.
The first thing that we must bear In mind is
that this fund does not constitute an ordinary in­
come of the Government upon which we may depend for
recurring obligations. When independence shall
have been granted, this source of our income will
cease. Were we to defray from this fund services
that we cannot maintain once this Income is
terminated we would have thrown away this money
thus spent. ’
We must therefore limit the use of
this fund for what might be termed capital invest­
ments or for self-supporting enterprise. Above all
we should use this fund for national objectives,
for purposes where the greatest good may be derived
by the Filipino people.
Concretely, I recommend that this fund be
devoted to the following p u r p o s e s :
1. To improve the sanitary condition of centers
of population by constructing water systems
or artesian wells.
2. For combating malaria where there is
assurance that it can be done at reasonable
expe n s e .
3. For the prevention of tuberculosis and the

®P J C . XIII, Nos. 10-11, (October-November,1937), p. 15.

This was not accurate. The transfer of funds was automatic.
The President had nothing to do with the transaction.
 237

establishment of more sanatoriums, as it is well

known the white plague Is the worst scourge
afflicting our race.
4. For the building of leprosariums....
5. For extending free dispensary service to the
poor not only in centers of population but
also in outlying barrios....
6. For building public schools in every barrio
where there is a sufficient number of
children justifying the opening of the school.
7. For opening national highways and helping in
the construction of provincial and even
barrio roads whenever the respective
provinces and municipalities pledge themselves
to maintain the roads constructed, and in the
case of barrio roads, where the volume of
traffic on said roads also justifies their
construction.
8. For construction of office buildings for the
National Government so as to reduce, if not
eliminate, the continued expense in rents.
9. For the purchase of large landed estates and
their resale in small lots to the actual
occupants thereof.
10. For the development of water power, the
reforestation of denuded areas, the coloniza­
tion and development of Mindanao; and
11. For the financing of a long range program of
economic adjustment necessary to prepare the
country for the new industries which at the
same time will give work to the unemployed.?

The disposition of these funds was to provide many

heated discussions for the remainder of the Commonwealth

period. Q u e z o n ’s eleven objectives were never reached, nor,

with the exception of a few enterprises touching immediately

upon the benefits to a few branches of the government and the

construction of one highway in Mindanao, were they ever

seriously started.

7
I b i d . Italics supplied. W'e may consider that the
money was thrown away since the services organized were unable
to continue in operation without extensive appropriations by
the Government, k great portion of such services, begun with
these funds, have long since disappeared.
 238

There was much objection to using the funds for the

redemption of the nation's bonded indebtedness as had been

suggested by many in the Government. Secretary of Finance

Antonio de las Alas, Auditor General Jaime Hernandez, and

Executive Secretary Jorge B. Vargas, suggested that the funds

be set aside for the creation of a merchant marine. The Auditor

General stated that all Philippine bond issues had fixed dates

of maturity, and were provided with sinking funds adequate

for the purpose. Suggestions were made by the others also

that the funds to establish the capital stock of the National

Development Company would probably come from the excise tax

funds. The Company was to be capitalized at ^20,000,000, half

of which had been provided. However, even the entire amount

would be insufficient, some stated, to meet the demands of a

merchant marine, necessitating application of excise tax funds.®

A Filipino columnist in America, Vicente Villamin,

claimed that the application of the excise tax upon Philippine

copra was beneficial and would prove a godsend to the industry

and the Government.® The Secretary of Finance, however, felt

differently, and immediately began laying plans to initiate

strengthening measures for other industries as well as remedial

measures for the coconut industry itself. His first plan was

the establishment of abaca and coconut centrals which would be

charged with research and other activities leading to a general

improvement in the respective industries. He instructed

®Tha Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philip­

pines. 1 9 5 7 - 1 9 3 8 . p. 270.

9 Ibid.
 239

Dr. M.L. Roxas, Agricultural adviser in Malacafian, to proceed

to the Bicol and Tayabas to select localities.

The B u l l e t i n , in an editorial of May 8, 1937, suggested

that a large portion of the funds be used to strengthen and

rehabilitate the government pension system to reward faithful

and suffering employees.^® President Quezon never considered

this suggestion.

High Commissioner McNutt counselled the wise spending

of the funds whatever was done with them, and Assemblyman

Felipe Jose and former Representative Francisco Varona

suggested that a portion of the funds be utilized for the

development of agricultural colonies in Mindanao. 'This

suggestion, too, received short shrift.

The Department of Interior announced that it would

submit a plan to the cabinet suggesting the use of P=10,000,000,

of the fund, for the improvement of sanitary facilities in

various communities throughout the nation. This worthy plan

was also Ignored.

Secretary Vargas, replying to requests of planters,

stated definitely that the President would not approve the use

of any portion of the funds for aiding the coconut Industry,

either directly or indirectly. One definite plan, he stated,

would be the extension of the railroad lines to Legaspi, Albay;

10Ibid., p. 271
 240

since this line would extend rail service for planters, he

believed it would be of benefit to them. In addition, he

suggested that some way might be found to use a portion of the

funds for the introduction of new drying methods for copra.

If this proved impossible, he thought that perhaps a portion

of the funds provided by the New Industries Act could be made

available for that p u r p o s e . ^

Manuel de la Fuente, president of the Manila city

board, advanced an excellent suggestion for the disposition of

the funds. This was to provide a revolving calamity fund of

1*10,000,000, for the improvement of housing conditions in

Manila, the extension of small loans to laborers and low

salaried employees, with preference to be given to victims of

calamities. Councilor Hermenegildo Atienza declared that the

proposal was "one of the most progressive measures to amelio­

rate conditions of masses" yet advanced. "We cannot talk of

social justice and reform," he said, "without taking the first

step essential to any program of this nature — the improve­

ment of the housing conditions of the m a s s e s . " ^ Councilor

Jose Advincula declared that such a fund would be "providential"

and Councilor Celestino Ramos said that it was "a right step

in the right direction." He was supported by Councilor Vicente

Alindada who declared that it was an excellent investment

"from which not only the government but the nation may profit

considerably in the form of a healthy and contented populace.

11Ibld.. p. 272. I2 Ibid. 15Ibid.. pp. 272-273

 241

The city councilors, however, spoke In vain.

Secretary Eulogio Rodriguez, of the Department of

Agriculture and Commerce, stated that the funds accruing from

the excise tax belonged to the people at large and would be

spent for the economic development of the country as a whole,

the funds being apportioned to the different provinces. He

believed that the plan to use 1=23,657,000, for the realization

of a five-year road and highway construction program in

Mindanao and Sulu, was excellent, and should be supplemented

b y aid to the fishing industry and other infant industries.14

The Philippines Herald pointed to a danger not

thoroughly understood by most observers of the time. This

fund would accrue to the Government only so long as Philippine

copra and oil were sold in the American market. As early as

1937, signs were apparent that exports to the United States

were decreasing in value. If this trend were to continue,

naturally the amounts accruing to the fund would decrease.

Since the end result would be the crippling of the coconut

industry as well as bringing serious injury to the financial

structure of the government, the paper counselled full support

to the Filipino members of the Joint Preparatory Committee in

their struggle to adjust satisfactorily the economic relations

between the two nations.

, In September, 1937, the Philippine-American Joint

14Ibid., pp. 273-274. 15Ibid.. p. 274

 242

Preparatory Committee returned to Manila after a tour of

inspection and investigation in the Bicol, Visayan and Mindanao

provinces. It then conducted its third and last series of

public hearings. Various briefs, prepared by the different

chambers of commerce, were submitted, supplemented by oral

arguments delivered by the authorized representatives of these

organizations. fhe general tenor of the pleas was for an

indefinite continuation of the free-trade relations. If this

proved unacceptable, men advocated a reasonable period of time

for readjustment before the free-trade period was terminated.

The first day of hearings was given over to the coco­

nut industry, the representatives of which pleaded for a

fairer treatment through the abolition of the excise tax and

the continuation of existing trade arrangements between the

two countries, even after independence.

The Philippine Coconut Association recommended that

copra should continue on the free list; that no excise tax

which did not apply equally to Philippine and foreign products

be levied; and that a duty-free quota of coconut oil and

desiccated coconut, after independence, be established to

continue as lone; as the United States needed to import these

commodities. Mr. Maximo M. Kalaw, acting president of the

Association, appealed to the committee, saying: "We do not

wish to infringe upon the American farmers or upon the profits

derived by them, but in view of the fact that the United States
 243

does not and cannot supply its own industrial oils and fats,

the Philip p i n e s ... should be entitled to even more advantageous

position than that of any competing oils and fats produced in

other countries not under the American flag."16

Mr. Kenneth B. Day, spokesman for the industrialists,

said:

The Philippine coconut oil industry is before

you today to fight for its life. Ours is not a
question of increased advantages--we ask none. It
is not a question of special privileges. It is
rather a question of non-discrimination. Our busi­
ness is already limited in volume by the Tydings-
McDuffie Act. All we are asking is the right to
continue to operate on this limited basis, not only
through the period of the Commonwealth but thereafter.17

The coconut oil mills recommended the annual admittance

of two hundred thousand long tons of coconut oil to the United

States "under the same conditions and terms as those given to

oil made from duty-free copra shipped...to the United States."

This meant that such oil would be free of export taxes and

import duties. They also suggested "a readjustment of the

excise taxes to permit Philippine coconut oil to recover its

position as American oil in the American market, which position

had been adversely affected by the products of American agricul­

ture rather than by competing vegetable oils and fats imported

from foreign countries.rt They concluded by advocating "a

continuation of this arrangement not only during the Common­

wealth period, but also indefinitely thereafter."-1-8

160p. cit.. p. 61. 17Ibid. 18Ibld

 244

The condition of the local market during the last

quarter of 1937 was very quiet the Bureau of Commerce stated,

"as traders' ideas drifted far apart under the influence of

two factors: the absence of encouragement from the American

oil market which prevented the mills from raising bids

materially, and the higher copra market in Europe which enabled

exporters to offer better prices than the mills."-*-9 Europe

continued to outbid America, but the industry gained little

advantage thereby because of the great lack of shipping. The

market was a source of disappointment to those who had believed

that year-end trends would be better. They drew their idea

from market activities in 1936 and did not consider the opera­

tion of entirely different factors. The previous year had

seen a shortage of fats and oils in the United States arising

from a larger demand due to the industrial revival and greater

purchasing power. This was also true in Europe . At the same

time, the local supply was materially restricted aiding in the

rise of prices. While this was temporarily beneficial, it had

the ultimate effect of encouraging buyers in the States to

look elsewhere for such cheaper oils as palm, kernel, and babasu

oil from Brazil, Europe, and European dependencies. By the

middle of the year, consumers had bought coconut oil, as well

as cheaper oils, heavily, to last them through the year. So

adequate were the stocks that large soap manufacturers held

19PJC, XIII, Nos. 10-11 (October-November, 1937),

p. 54.
 245

aloof from the Philippine market from July forward. In

addition, large cotton and corn crops in the United States

hit Philippine oil heavily, with cotton-seed oil in abundance

and its price dropping considerably below coconut oil. The

outlook, then, was far from bright, despite the rosy picture

painted by Bureau of Commerce in its review of business

conditions for the year.2^

The Bureau of Plant Industry pointed out to the indus­

try the importance of coir (coir is the dried outer husk of

the coconut) as an additional source of income, able to bring

21
in annually over three million pesos. It was important to

consider such other products E.E. Cruz, the Bureau spokesman

said, "in the face of the impending ruin of the coconut indus­

try which is brought about by world competition, recurring

typhoons, pests and diseases, excise tax, plus the present

pp
limitation and forthcoming export taxes that will be levied....”

Some coir was consumed locally by furniture factories and auto­

mobile industries. The foreign market, if properly developed,

would undoubtedly take the remainder of the annual production,

2*3
or so the Bureau predicted. The many uses of coir, if the

industry had developed them, would have provided a considerable

cushion for the tired industry. Actually, despite the abun­

dance of coir in the Philippines, the country imported coir mats

from other countries.

20S u p r a . pp. 176-177

2 ^Eugenio E. Cruz: "Coir Industry of the Philippines'’

P J C . XIV, No. 1 (January, 1938), p. 9.

2 2 Ibld. 2 3 Ibid.
 246

The rising discontent with the condition of the indus­

try was brought’ to a head in the convention held by the hemp

and coconut producers in February, 1938. President Quezon

urged an educational program to acquaint the public, both in

the Philippines and the United States, with the problems facing

the industry thus removing the indifference or hostility

directed against it. He went on to say, however, that although

the government was prepared to give as much aid as possible,

the main task was the industry's and the salvation of the

industry lay within itself.24 Cornelio Balmaceda, at that tirae

acting manager of the National Produce Exchange, told the

convention, that the elimination of the middlemen "would tend

to increase the prices which the local producers will get If

the plan for an organized system for handling local commodi­

ties presented to the convention is carried out."2 ^ He pro-

posed a system which would place the producers, large or small,

close to the exporters or manufacturers; the small farmers

being organized into effective groups for the cooperative

selling of their products. A system of farm credit would

enable these small producers to get loans at low interest

enabling them to meet the demands of the market. The system

would necessitate a chain of warehouses for the convenience of

the small producers. At the top, the National Produce Exchange

would act as an organized central market. While not enthusias­

tic, the convention was interested. It adopted a policy of

wait-and-see, and the program was never effectively carried out.

24Supra. pp. 214-216.

25PJC, XIV, No. 3 (March, 1938), p. 38

 247

The Coalition Platform, in 1938, had promised that

"we shall support the organization of the producers of abaca,

coconut, tobacco, rice, and other articles for the defense and

promotion of their interests...* We shall help industries

based on the coconut and its derivatives, and we shall continue

w o r k i n g for the elimination of unjust burdens imposed in the

United States upon those products. We shall exert our utmost

wi t h a view to finding a sure and profitable market for...

c o conut...and other important p r o d u c t s ...and if necessary with

the financial assistance of the government.

In his budget mes s a g e to the National Assembly, In

1938, President Quezon stated, however, (referring to the

excise tax): "This means that not only the proceeds of the

said excise tax, but even the funds derived from the local

revenue of this Government cannot be used for aiding the coco­

nut industry as long as we continue receiving the benefits of

the coconut oil excise tax."2^ He concluded by saying that he

was transferring, from the proceeds of the excise tax,

1*26,840,000, for the purpdses of "replenishing the current surplus,”

to certain "extra-ordinary purposes." These were: Subscription

of stock of the National Development C o m p a n y ,1=10 million; sub­

scription of stock of the Manila Railroad Company, f=l million;

for the acquisition of land and construction of building for

laborers, 1*250,000; a loan to the Manila Railroad Co., 1*9,990,000;

o ft
^ Messages of the Presi d e n t . Vol. I (rev.ed.), pp.
250-251. Italics supplied.
27
M.O »P.. Vol. 3, Pt. 1, p. 234. Italics supplied.
 248

for the purchase of homesites, 11 million; for reforestation

and afforestation, 1250,000; for organizing the National Power

Corp., 1*250,000; a revolving fund for the construction of

water works, 1*2 million; for stabilizing prices of buntal

fibers, 1=500,000; for a survey and subdivision of public

agricultural lands, 1=100,000, and, for the new census,

11,500,000.2 ® He concluded, by emphasizing the need for

continued economy.

The excitement and anger of the coconut producers,

expressed in their convention, in February, 1938, can be readily

understood. They saw the appropriation of twenty-six million

pesos, for enterprises many of which were considered needless,

and they were unable to touch a centavo of it, either directly

or indirectly.

President Quezon addressed a tea party of coconut

planters and municipal mayors at Malacafian, on February 19.

Here he discussed the resolution passed by the planters asking

for the abolition of the excise tax. He did not believe that

Congress would act on the resolution but continued; "I am

willing, nevertheless, to support you in your request.... I

have not changed my attitude in this respect although I confess

that I am not as positive today as I was before that the tax

had done any harm to the industry, or that If it did, the harm

was not so much as I had thought it to b e . " 29 He stated that

28Ibid., pp. 249-251. 29M.0.P.. Tibi. 4, Pt. 1, p. 27

 249

he thought it was unfair to those who were taxed not to

derive benefits from their taxation and promised to support a

movement aimed at the abolition of the proviso prohibiting

the use of excise tax funds to aid the coconut industry, were

they unable to secure the abolition of the entire tax. But,

he continued, "as long as the law exists, I will continue

complying with the law honestly and strictly."30

The storm of indignation and discontent that arose

throughout the country grew so intense that President Quezon

went to some pains to explain the situation, particularly in

his home province of Tayabas, a large coconut-producing region.

He told his people of the difficulties facing him in this

problem, saying frankly that there was little he could do.

The solution, he said, lay in part with the planters. He was

particularly interested in seeing that the people learned new

uses for the coconut and that they increased their consumption

of Its products. The President believed there were great

possibilities for the coconut industry in utilizing coconut

for bukayo (the meat of the nut cooked with sugar) and matamis

3a bao (coconut jelly).3^ "The trouble with us Filipinos,"

the President said, "is that we forget what is truly our own.

We have so many needs and uses for our coconut. Why don't we

rediscover them so as to increase not only our export but also

30 I b i d . , p. 30.
3 -*-The first has become a specialty of Pangasinan province
and is eaten with relish by Americans in the Philippines. The
second has extraordinary possibilities as it tastes like honey
when spread on warm toast.
 250

our local consumption of coconuts? The National Development

Company has several expert chemists studying the different

uses of the coconut; more important, however, is to have our

ii 3 2
coconut planters take full initiative in this matter.

During the Japanese occupation, with food a major problem,

many Filipinos rediscovered the coconut, and the consumption

of its fats and oils staved off starvation for countless

thousands living in areas where the nuts were available.®®

In April, 1938, the National Assembly, fearful that

the coconut Industry would suffer complete destruction,

created a committee to study means of improving it, with

Assemblyman Lavides of Tayabas as Chairman. The committee was

charged with conducting a survey and recommending measures for

Increasing production. The Assembly hoped that immediate

action would be taken. It was pointed out that the industry

had but one good year (1936) since 1930, and the warning of

H.B. Pond, In 1934, was recalled; he had stated that under the

provisions of the Independence Act and the Revenue Act of 1934,

coconut profits would be eliminated after the fifth year of

the Commonwealth or surely after the sixth year.®4

5 8 Ib id.. p. 213.
33
That the industry is capable of great extension is
unquestioned but Filipino capital will have to lose Its
timidity and its desire for high returns on Investment before
the industry can stand steadily on its own feet.

34,,The Future of Our Basic Industries,11 The Philip­

pines Herald Y e a r b o o k . 1954-1955. pp. 101, 110.
 251

The Philippine Coconut Association, in May, called a

meeting of two hundred planters in Siniloan, Laguna. Governor

Bonifacio extolled the advantages of the association and urged

the planters to take united action to meet the crisis. He

stated that the problem could be solved only if the planters

pledged, before adjourning, a contribution of two centavos per

one hundred kilos of copra sold, for a working fund.

The same month it was reported that Governor Bonifacio

was starting a campaign to educate the people of his province

to look for a new industry to replace the coconut, the major

source of their inconB . With representatives from the Bureau

of Commerce, Bureau of Plant Industry and the Bureau of Fores­

try, he visited some twenty-eight municipalities for this

purpose and at the same time initiated a study of the economic

conditions existing in the province. This was believed

essential since the continuing poverty produced a rising trend

In discontent and lawlessness and weakened the Government's

general economic program.

On May 20, the Joint Preparatory Committee released

its report, in which it made the following recommendations;

Coconut oil should be exempt from Philippine

export taxes but, in lieu thereof should be subject
to annually declining duty-free quotas commencing with
200,000 long tons (of United States imports) for the
calendar year 1940. This amount should be reduced
by 5 per cent for each succeeding calendar year until
it equals 150,000 long tons for the calendar year
1945. For the period January 1, 1946, through July
3, 1946, the quota should be one half of the quota
for the preceding year, or 75,000 long tons. Ship­
ments in excess of the aforementioned quotas should
be subject to whatever United States duty may be in
force at the time.
 252

The Committee also recommends that the Imposition

of full United States duties should be postponed from
July 4, 1946, to January 1, 1961, during: which
interim United States imports of coconut products,
except coconut oil, should be subject to preferential
tariff r a t e s , commencing with 25 per cent of the
United States tariff rates in force on July 4, 1946,
and increasing on each subsequent January 1, by 5 per
cent of the then-existing rates. Coconut oil should
be subject to the above duties only on those amounts
In excess of declining, duty-free quotas, fixed a s
follows; for the period July 4, 1946, through December
31, 1946, the quota should be 75,000 long tons; for
the following calendar year,it should be 140,000 long
tons; and thereafter it should be reduced annually by
10,000 long tons (5 per cent of 200,000 long tons)
until 1961....
The Committee believes that if the above recom­
mendations were adopted, the Philippine Coconut indus­
try would have an adequate opportunity to adjust i t ­
self to a position independent of the preferential
tariff and excise tax treatment in the United States
m ar k e t .35

The Report met wi th an unenthusiastic reception in the

Philippines.

By October, 1938, some P128 million in coconut oil tax

money had been placed to the credit of the Philippine Common­

wealth in the United States Treasury, a sum which excited the

politicos in the Philippines to a fever pitch. Elaborate

plans were laid for spending It, but little of permanent value

resulted. The money was used to develop the future capital

site, Quezon City (at the end of the war, a wasteland and no

money for development), a new legislative building, a Jai Alai

palace, the hemp industry, the NARIC, cooperative enterprises,

the purchase of the Buenavista estate, the Koronadal Valley

settlements,a fruit and fish cannery,a textile mill, two sugar

550p. eft., pp. 66-67.

 253

refineries, and others. In 1950, the Quezon City capital site

was still largely on paper, the war-ruined legislative building

was being rebuilt, the Jai Alai palace (in sharp contrast to

the rest) had been the first repaired and started in operation,

the hemp business was almost prostrate, the NARIC a practical

failure, cooperatives in their fetal stage, the Buenavista

estate still in the courts, Koronadal settlements barely begun,

the fish and fruit canneries but fond memories, the textile

mill at a standstill facing disposal, and the sugar refineries

producing spasmodically, and likewise facing disposal.

A sharp critic of the Commonwealth at that time had

*2£
this to say of the oil money:

® 6 In a message to the Second National Assembly, on the

budget for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1940, President
Quezon referred to the fund, in a special section. He stated
that, at the end of 1937, there existed a cash surplus in this
fund of 1*82,669,860.82, and with additions and interest, the
total amount available for 1938 amounted to over 3*103 million.
The unexpended cash balance for 1938 was over P=71 million, with
total outstanding balances of authorized appropriations made
against the fund as of that date being ff lO million, which was
3*39 million greater than the available balance in the fund.
However, no deficit was incurred, he said, because he had
authorized the release of only some 1=44 million. The total
income expected for the six months ending June 30, 1939, was
3*21 million, the total amount available for release at that
time being ^=48 million. The estimated income from the fund
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1940 would amount to 3^25
million. iSIth authorized expenditures, In the budget for that
year, there would remain, he said, only a n unappropriated
surplus of 3*6 million. Therefore, he concluded, there could
be no further appropriations made from the fund, especially
when It was realized that the fund Income would not be avail­
able until it was actually accredited to the Philippine
Treasury. For this reason, he stated, to maintain the balanced
budget presented, it was necessary to effect substantial
economies, "limiting salary increases as well as creation of
n ew positions to only those found to be absolutely necessary
to insure the efficient operation of the government." M . O . P ..
Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 274-275, p a s s i m .
 254

In the opinion of some critics, the money should

be used to pay off all the bonds of the government-
owned Manila Railroad,37 and all the Commonwealth's
public debt--which is not large.... However, Manuel
Quezon is a politician, and he may want to be Presi­
dent again after this term is over. It is normal
for politicians, in any country, to use available
funds in the showiest possible way. Building an army
and paying off the public debt are gestures that do
not impress the electorate half as much as public-
work3 funds scattered liberally In the proper
geographical places.... When the President of the
Commonwealth is asked about the probable shrinkage in
the government budget after 1946, he cooly answers
that it won't shrink. He or his successor will soak
the rich by heavy taxation. (The rich, unhappily,
will be fewer and less rich). Quezon also says that,
beginning in 1946, he (or another) can make his own
tariff, unhampered by the U.S. He will then put
heavy import duties on all sorts of things--and
thereby tax his people in other ways. He seems to
have extremely optimistic ideas about the capacity of
his people to pay....38

Although there was some truth in what Miss Horn had to

say, few of these predictions were validated by events. The

rich increased in numbers and wealth and the budget continued

to -exp a n d . „ The question of taxation remained unresolved.

On May 17, 1939, the President requested the National

Assembly to send an observer abroad to study foreign coconut

industriesThe Assembly approved Resolution No. 23, and

Maximo M. Kalaw was designated as observer. Five days later,

37
By 1950, a steady money-loser.
38
Florence Hornj Orphans of the Pacific. (New York,
1941), pp. 230-231. See also, J.R. Hayden: The Ph il ip pi ne s.
(New York, 1947), pp. 157-160, and note 23, pp. 888-889.
59Supra.
 255

the President discussed briefly the excise tax. He repeated,

by implication, what he had to say earlier, on February 22,40

and then gave his opinion with regard to the repeal of the

excise tax. The proposal was that the tax be collected only

for coconut oil to be used for edible purposes. He expressed

the opinion that this would complicate the situation for the

large American buyers would purchase only non-edible oils and

"pocket the difference in prices." He continued; "In other

words, the benefit to be derived from the elimination of this

tax, instead of aiding the producers of copra, will only go

to the pocket of the purchaser in the United States. The

benefit may go to the soap distributor in America and, in turn,

to the consumer: but I am not sure that it will b e of any

h41
good to the producer in the Philippines.

The President, it is evident, had now lost his enthu­

siasm for abolishing the excise tax, despite his promises to

producers that he would support any movement to do away with

it. The returns from the United States were too great to be

thrown away carelessly. He presented the other side of the

picture skillfully;

On the other hand, what will be the result if

that tax is removed? Our income will be reduced
annually by over ^20,000,000, an amount that comes
from the excise tax. This yearly income, after
1940...or after seven years, will mean a loss of
3r140,000,000 in our income. How will such reduction
affect our finances? In the first place, I will be
forced to veto a large proportion of appropriations
for public works, and I may have to suspend many of

40Supra. 41M.0.P.. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 129-130

 256

the constructions under way which are for the improve­

ment of our means of communication and the economic
development of the country. And I want you to remember,
gentlemen, that I will not leave my successor in office
empty-handed, much less leave the government of the
Philippines...with a problem in its hands; the lack of
funds in the Treasury. No matter how much it may
affect the success of my administration, even if it
should mean the difference between a successful Presi­
dent and a failure, I would prefer to leave my office
and be pointed out as a man who had failed rather than
have t h e future of the Philippines exposed to
bankruptcy. (Applause)42

As a result of this statement, the campaign for the

removal of the excise tax was conducted with little vigor,

except by a few die-hards in the coconut industry. The Govern­

m e n t ’s position was clear: it would like to help the coconut

industry but not to the detriment of the country as a whole.

Twenty million pesos annually was a sum to be regarded with

appreciation.

This rather equivocal campaign (equivocal in the sense

that the industry was promised aid but not at the expense of

the excise tax fund) was continued throughout 1939.43 President

Quezon returned to his home province to allay the fears of his

constituents, showing them the benefits to be derived from the

excise tax fund. He pointed to the roads being constructed,

and said that it was important that such work be done for the

benefit of the country at large. Nothing should be done, he

4aibia.

4^ C f . telegraphic correspondence between Quezon and

Roosevelt during February and March with reference to proposed
legislation in the U.S. Congress leading to an increase in the
excise tax. M . O . P .. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, p. 432.
 257

believed, which would benefit a section of the nation at the

expense of other sections. He suggested that it was important

to seek means of stabilizing the economy. "The Filipino must

be taught to be self-reliant. We must know that we can

realize profits if we have exportation, and we export those

products whichwill give us profit even if a tariff duty or

excise tax is levied. That is what we should ponder upon.

Hence we must look for other native products which we can

profitably sell abroad, even if they are levied a tariff duty

or an excise tax."44 Such words were cold comfort to a region

dependent upon the coconut industry for its livelihood. It is

difficult for the people of a certain section, even in the

United States, to accept a diminution in their prosperity on

the ground that it is good for t h e whole nation.

What was wrong, then, with the c o u n t r y ’s economy? The

middlemen, according to the President. "One of the reasons

why the Philippines remains poor," he stated, "is the fact

that the man who tills the soil does not receive his just

profits from the sale of his crops. Take the copra producers,

for insta.nce. The lack of proper commercial facilities compels

them to pass their copra through the hands of many middlemen

before they finally sell it. Each one of these middlemen

engaged in the copra trade derives profit therefrom, and their

profits, combined, take so much away from the amount that should

44M.0.P.. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 164-172, 158-163, passim.

 258

go to the copra producer. Likewise, it is not only the poor

sales made by the planter from his copra which gives him

financial difficulties, but also the fact that he pays more

for his daily purchases than city r es id e n t s ...because every­

day commodities pass through so many middlemen.... To end

this, I have caused a thorough study of the best plan by

which small farmers may form cooperatives so that they can

sell their products direct to the dealer without passing them

through many middlemen. I have also advised the study of the

means by which trading in commodities of prime necessity in

the Philippines could be handled exclusively by Filipinos.

(Shouts of ' M a b u h a y ! ’ )11.45 While this may have been a popular

analysis of the c o u n t r y ’s economic ills, it was far from

being completely accurate. If nothing more than the existence

of many middlemen plagued the nation, the solution of its

problems would have been immeasurably simplified. Basic ills

demanded remedy, and while the middlemen contributed to the

uncertain state of the economy, ills arising from antiquated

traditions and techniques needed attention before much lasting

good could be accomplished.

There was no lack of information as to these ills.

In January, 1940, Assemblyman Kalaw, who had been selected by

the National Assembly, to go abroad to study foreign methods

45M .0.P.. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, p. 214. Speech on the

occasion of the fourth annual celebration of the establishment
of the Commonwealth, New Luneta, Manila, November 15, 1939.
 259

of coconut production, submitted his report to the Assembly.

He presented seven "salient points." He noted that "one of

the greatest economic wastes of the Philippines is the poor

preparation of our copra.*1 He stated that despite the fact

that the Philippines was the largest copra-producing country

in the world, its quality of copra was among the worst and as

a result the country lost an estimated ten million pesos every

year. He pointed to the waste of over three hundred thousand

tons of coconut fiber with a value of 1*75,000,000 each year.

The Ceylon planter, he said, produced smaller nuts than his

Filipino counterpart but received from nine to sixteen pesos

more per thousand nuts than the Filipino planter. "The

reason is that he produces very good copra and utilizes the

by-products." He mentioned the well-known fact that, in 1939,

the Philippines was the fifth best customer of the United

States, and the United States would continue to need coconut

products, thus maintaining a market for Philippine products.

He suggested that "if there is to be some further reciprocal

agreements effective after independence, coconut products should

be given favorable treatment" in the American market. He

predicted that the coconut industry would withstand the shock

of independence much easier than others and that, if the

necessary steps were taken by the Government, it would be "our

greatest bet in the open markets of the wor ld .” Finally, he

referred to the fact that the diet of the Filipinos was

deficient in fats, a situation w h ich would be remedied wit h an

 260

increased home consumption of coconut products. The force of

this statement was illustrated by the experience during the

Japanese occupationvhen the population, in many parts of the

country, existed largely on coconut products.

The solution of these problems, the Assemblyman believed,

lay in industrial!za t i o n , socialization and cooperation of and

in the industry. "The Government must lead the way," he said,

"but the cooperation of the planters themselves is indispensable."

He specifically recommended that after the creation of a

government body similar to the National Coconut Corporation

(which was then before the Assembly for approval) six steps be

taken by that or another corporation. These steps were: the

establishment of drying plants and coconut centrals aided by

government standardization to improve the n a t i o n ’s copra; the

utilization of husks and shells and other b y-products, through

industrialization; the establishment of cooperatives with the

purpose of eliminating middlemen and improving credit facil­

ities for the benefit of planters; establishment of "regular

freight and shipping service to foreign countries"; establish­

ment of a research and experimental station devoted exclusive­

ly to problems facing the coconut industry, preferably on a

Government-owned plantation; and the "fostering of a greater

home consumption of coconut products". If these steps were

taken, he believed, the industry would "stand the shocks of

political and economic separation from America" and would fur­

nish the c o un tr y’s leading export. The cost of this program

 261

he estimated at 1*20,000,000 for the remainder of the Common­

wealth period. This was to be spent on 5,500 copra driers,

twenty provincial centrals, five national centrals, the coco­

nut research institute, and loans to planters, the last item

bulking the largest, amounting to ^9 million.

On May 7, 1940, the National Assembly passed, and the

President approved, Commonwealth Act No. 518, creating the

National Coconut Corporation (known as the NACOCO). The

corporation was to be organized within six months to exist for

thirty years. It was to "establish, keep, maintain and operate

or help establish, keep, maintain and operate drying plants,

or copra driers, or coconut centrals with a view of adjusting

the coconut Industry to a position independent of trade

preferences In the United States and to provide facilities

for the better curing of copra products and the proper utiliza­

tion of coconut by-products, provided that no subsidy, direct

or indirect, shall be paid to producers, or processors of

c o p r a . coconut oil and allied products."4^ Section 2 of the

act also provided that the corporation was "to afford facilities

for bona fide production loans to Philippine coconut planters

and copra producers." In addition, the act provided for a

"Coconut Industry Promotion Fund" which was to be derived from

the coconut oil excise tax collected after January 1, 1939,

4 ®Maximo M. Kalaw: The Coconut Industry, (Manila,

1940), pp. vii, ix, p a s s i m .

4^ The L a w y e r s 1 J o u r n a l . VIII, No. 22 (November 30,

1940), p. 882. Italics supplied.
 262

two million pesos of which was appropriated with the approval

of the act and the total not to exceed twenty million pesos.

This fund was to b e utilized hy the directors as provided by

the act and all moneys accruing to the corporation were to

flow Into it.

The stipulation with regard to subsidies to producers,

was included with an eye to the American Congress which had

imposed the excise tax at the insistence of the American farmer.

In the years following the imposition of this tax, there was,

in the words of Grayson Kirk, a "steady increase In American

Imports of coconut oil..i'which proved that the Philippine oil

was "not Interchangeable" with any American oil.4 ® Professor

Kirk demonstrates that the result of the tax was only a

charge to the American public of seventeen million dollars a

year which benefitted neither the public nor th e farmer. The

sole benefits derived from the tax went to the Philippine

Commonwealth as a "windfall,” which enabled the Commonwealth

to balance its budget at the expense of the American housewife.

The suspension of this tax was asked by Commissioner Elizalde,

in 1940, and was so provided in the bill introduced by Senator

Tydings on June 11. The bill, however, was not passed until

after the outbreak of the War.

According to the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 (the Bell

48
Grayson Kirks "Philippine-American Relations:
Recent Trends," Political Science Quarterly. LIV, No. 3
(September, 193 9), p. 336.
 263

Act),to anticipate events for a moment,the amount of duty-free

coconut oil exported to the United States was set at 200,000

long tons and "during the effectiveness of the agreement the

United States will not reduce the preference of 2 cents per

pound provided in section 2470 of the Internal Revenue Code...

except that It may suspend the provisions of...such section

during any period as to which the President of the United

States, after consultation with the President of the Philip­

pines, finds that adequate supplies of neither copra nor coco­

nut oil...are readily available for processing in the United

States.4® This hostile attitude of the United States toward

the Philippine coconut industry, expressed in all legislation

between 1933 and 1941 (and 1946), was directly responsible for

the critical situation which arose at the outbreak of the war

in the American supply of coconut oil. Since more than half

of the U.S. imports of fats and vegetable oils came fr om the

Philippines, the prices of edible coconut rose to fifteen cents

a pound in December, 1941, more than twice the price of the

preceding December. The price of oil rose proportionately,

while coconut meal Increased almost five times during the same

period.®®

4®Public Law 5 7 1 . 79th Congress, 2nd session, H.R.

5856, Chapter 244, Section 403, subsection (d). The tax is
still collected but is, of course, not returned to the Philip­
pine Government.
50
Britanniea Book of the Y e a r . 1941. p. 178; 1942.
p. 186.
 264

Summary

Coconut industries were generally profitable during

the early years of the Commonwealth but remained at the mercy

of disease and natural disasters which, with important foreign

developments, slowly ate away the high returns hoped for by

planters. In general, the major profits were gained by proces­

sors and shippers. In an effort to aid planters, the G o v e m ­

inent began a move to provide warehotises for cheap storage. It

had little effect, however, on the situation since the ills

of the industry centered around poor production habits and im­

proper drying and processing methods.

Since so much of the prosperity of the Philippines

depended upon a prosperous coconut industry, the many adverse

factors - uncertain legislative practices in America, shipping

strikes in America, natural disasters and disease, lack o f

well-directed research or, indeed, any research, passivity of

producers in remedying the manifold problems, excessive

dependence upon the American market, confusion within the

industry, confusion in the Government as to programs of solu­

tion - which were characteristics during this period led to

a general retrogression within the industry with a resultant

decay throughout the nation's economy.

Associations were formed and re-formed in feeble

attempts to m e e t an increasingly uncertain future but the

members had a general lack of understanding as to proper

procedures for action and, indeed, disagreement as to what was

actually needed. As a result, they became more and more

 265

concerned with securing assistance from the United States and

the Commonwealth Government. Their meetings soon fell into

the usual pattern of forums for complaint and passing of

meaningless resolutions although the expenditure of more funds

and energy in research was needed.

The enthusiasm for ending, by the Government, un­

certainty that existed for the industry, was soon dissipated.

This occurred when individuals in the Government began to

appreciate what the oil excise tax would provide in cash for

the Government. Although the representatives of the Government

had loudly protested the imposition of this tax, they soon

realized that the treasury would be increased each year by

^20,000,000, a sum whose magnitude eventually obscured the

vision of Philippine legislators. Many proposals were made as

to the expenditure of these funds but no concrete steps were

taken to utilize them in solving the basic economic problems

of the nation. The industry, therefore, had to rely upon the

uncertain generosity of the American Congress.

Members of the industry, realizing this if nothing

more, appealed to the United States, through the Joint Prepara­

tory Committee, for succor by the extension of free-trade

relations for an indefinite period or a longer Commonwealth

period of transition. They failed to secure this objective,

through the opposition of politicos at home and '*anti-

imperialists" in America, and were urged to bear up under adverse

conditions since their sacrifice was made, they were told, in

 266

the interest of the whole country. Actually, only a few

benefitted and these only temporarily.

The President suggested that the difficulties were

caused by the activities of middlemen and told the members of

the coconut industry that he had directed a study be made with

regard to the development of marketing and cooperatives. How­

ever, the difficulties of forming such cooperatives were

either not appreciated or were ignored. In any event, it was

the exception to the rule which succeeded.

A n observer was sent abroad to study production and

marketing methods in competing countries but his report, pub­

lished after his return, was largely ignored. The only result

was the establishment of the National Coconut Corporation

which was to prove to be one of the most dismal of failures.

The industry, then,was hardly in any position to face

the disruption of a major war and its pre-war weaknesses fore­

shadowed the dark developments of the post-war period. One

can not escape the conclusion that the industry continued to

wait passively for some foreign miracle to occur to bring the

industry back to prosperous days and preferred domination to

determination.
 CHAPTER VIII

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY J 1934-1941

The sugar Industry was the subject of much the same

plans and objectives on the part of the government as others

treated. It received much the same treatment as the others

and received much the same hasty action. The United States,

asking the sugar producers to limit their production, remit­

ted to them relief under the Agricultural Adjustment Adminis­

tration, amounting to 3^30,719,000, by 1936, in which year the

AAA in the Philippines was liquidated. This large sum, which

could have benefitted the industry in turning the sugar lands

to food crops, in preparation for the promised liquidation of

the industry, found its way an American observer stated,

"mainly into the mining share m a r k e t . T h i s happened, he

believed,because the payment was made "largely to a class of

people who were already in good financial condition and who

had no incentive to expand their productive capacity...."2

Prior to November 15, 1935, all sugar limitation

authority was supervised b y the Governor-General. He adminis­

tered exports to the United States as a representative of the

Secretary of Agriculture, exercising his authority by virtue

of the Jones-Costigan Act. He also administered the sugar

^■J. Bartlett Richards, "Philippine Economic C ondi­

tions, Annual Report for 1936", Cornejo's Commonwealth
Directory of the Philippines. 1 95 9-1940. p. 608.

2 Ibid.

267
 268

produced for local consumption and reserve. After the establish­

ment of the Commonwealth, the High Commissioner continued to

administer the allotments and shipments of sugar to the United

States, but the administration of local consumption and

limitation was transferred to the Commonwealth Government.

The Government, to meet this change, created, on January 21,

1936, the Domestic Sugar Administration to take charge of

domestic allotments and release of sugar for consumption and

reserve. This administration came under the Office of the

President and under the control and supervision of the Secretary

to the President who became "Domestic Sugar A dm in is tr at or .

The President of the Philippine Sugar Association stated;

"So far these two governmental agencies have worked in very

close cooperation and, except for the slight additional work

involved in working with two agencies instead of one, this

division of authority has caused no disturbance whatsoever in

the sugar industry."^

The Sugar Limitation Act of December 4, 1934, had

declared a state of national emergency resulting from the

provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act and other Congressional

legislation. Section 19 of that act, provided for a three-

year period of enforcement. Section 15 provided that all

^Messages of the President. Vol. 2, Pt. 1, pp. 794-

798. This was created by Jixecutive Order No. 14, of that date.
4
Rafael Alunan; "The Sugar Industry Under the Common­
wealth," The Philippine Commonwealth H a n db oo k. 1936, p. 264.
 269

sugar produced in excess of the allowed amounts was to be seized

and destroyed by the government. In September, 1956, President

Quezon sent a message to the Assembly urging the passage of a

bill which would amend the Sugar Limitation Act because he said

the "state of national emergency declared in Act No. 4166

continues to exist, in view not only of the limitation imposed

by the Gostigan-Jones Act, but also of the possible application

of the limitations contained in the Tydings-McDuffie Law."6 The

President also believed that the lifting of limitations would

bring about "such an over-production of this commodity as to

result in a huge surplus of unmarketable sugar here with the

consequent reduction in price, to the great disturbance of the

national economy." He also requested the Assembly to amend

section 15 and give the Office of the President the necessary

authority to dispose of the excess sugar. "I believe," he

stated, "that the seizure and destruction of such excess sugar

is a great economic waste, considering that such sugar may

profitably be devoted to other useful purposes not inconsistent

with the policy contained in the A ct."6 He urged the granting

of permission to dispose of excess stocks "in a manner not in­

consistent with such policy." On September 23, and October 7,

he sent messages to the Assembly to speed up their work and

enact "several measures of importance and of urgent necessity

to the welfare of the country as a w h o l e . . .and...as the Assembly

5
Messages of the Pr es id en t. Vol. 2, Pt. 1, pp. 242-243.

6Ibid.
 270

has only a few days of session left, I hope that special

attention will be given to these measures with a view to their

immediate consideration."7 Among these measures, was this Bill

No. 2305, which was passed and approved, October 26, 1936.

The following year, 1937, President Quezon went to the

United States. While there, he made several famous speeches

on the future of the Commonwealth, and asked for an easing of

the economic restrictions imposed on the country by the various

Congressional acts since 1934. He also proposed, if such

amelioration was not forthcoming, that the United States grant

independence to the Philippines in 1939, rather than in 1946,

as provided by the Independence Act. On April 3, 1937, the

President spoke at a luncheon of the Foreign Policy Association

on the "Phture of the Philippines.11 During the course of this

luncheon, various Individuals spoke on the subject, among them

Major General William Rivers, Oswald Garrison Villard, and Dr.

Stephen P. Duggan, Director of the Institute of International

Education. Dr. Duggan, in the course of his speech, mainly

concerned with the economic aspects of the situation, said, with

regard to the American policy at the times

Now, to carry out that policy at the present time

simply means the doom of the Philippines....
The reason for that is, as I said in the beginning,
and as President Quezon said, that the sole market at
the present time is the United States.... There is no
other, and moreover, there c a n ’t be any other. We have
raised wages in the Philippines. We have introduced
a standard of living in the Philippines in such a way

7Ibld. . pp. 250-257, 304-312, passim.

 271

that the cost of production of practically everything

that is p ro du ce d. ..is higher than that of surrounding
territories....
The result of that is...that there is no market
for thb Philippine products outside. Now, for this
policy to be followed, therefore, it simply means un ­
employment for the thousands of tens of thousands of
Filipinos employed in producing the goods that we have
wanted in this country.
Unemployment means unrest. For the first time
since we were in the Philippines, last year there was
an uprising..., that was due to the depression and the
results of the depression. But consider what might
happen if this policy that we have introduced were to
be followed and the depression multiplied manyfold as
a r e s u l t . ...8

President Quezon spoke in support of the statement by

Dr. Duggan, saying "that is not only in the Interests of the

Philippines to have these trade relations with America; it will

also be profitable to the United States. For as we sell to

you, we buy from you, and the Philippines is a growing country.

The Philippines In time to come, will mean in terms of trade

for the United States, if you were to get that trade., ten times

as much as Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Cuba combined."®

In the question period that followed, a question was

asked of Dr. Duggan! "Does he believe that we should make a

permanent trade treaty with the Philippines similar to one we

have with Cuba, which means a preference position in the A m e r ­

ican market, or does he believe In gradually cutting them off

altogether?" Dr. Duggan's reply mirrored the uncertainty in

the minds of many who were to make American policy with regard

to the Philippines.

8M . 0 . P .. Vol. 3, Pt. 1, p. 77. 9Ibid.. p. 78.

 272

It would' be very difficult to say what would be the

best policy that should be adopted. All I contend for
is this one thing, that having developed the peculiar
relationship that exists between the Philippines and the
United States to da y . ..whatever policy we are going to
adopt ought to take into consideration a long-range policy.
The sugar interests in this country are primarily
the cause of the Independence Act. Now, no long-range
policy was adopted by our sugar interests, namely, the
beet sugar interest....
Now, what I mean is that whatever policy is going
to be adopted at the present time, it should take in a
long enough range so that the destruction of Filipino
standards of living and the resulting destruction of
Filipino civilization should not follow.10

The following day, President Quezon addressed the Philip­

pines, by radio, on the subject of woman suffrage and indepen­

dence. He disposed of the former in one paragraph; the second

was the heart of the speech and demonstrated fully his reasons

for advocating early independence. He felt that his people

should not have been surprised at his stand on early indepen­

dence since, to anyone who had followed his career, it should

have been expected. He then stated that the Filipino people

accepted the Independence Law '’upon the assumption that none of

its provisions would be amended except with the consent of the

Filipino people.” Since, he said, immediately following the

acceptance of the law, the American Congress began to amend the

law freely, “it would a p p e a r ...that Congress feels that it has

the right at any time to amend the trade r e la ti on s...regardless

of the provisions of the Independence Act." Such a course,

should it continue, would mean economic ruin to the Philippines

and necessitated the placing of trade relations on a more

10Ibid., p. 83
 273

stable basis. This could be achieved, he was convinced, only

by making a treaty "between the Governments of the United

States and the independent Philippine Republic. So long as the

Philippines remains under the American flag, Congress will

always feel at liberty to amend any of those laws affecting the

Philippines."

He referred, then, to the opposition to his proposal by

sugar men who believed that such a step would ruin them. His

analysis of the situation was exact.

...I want to say that this present status affords

them no guaranty that during the transition period...
they will be allowed to sell in the United States the
amount of sugar that is allowed free of duty.... Even
now there is pending before Congress a law taxing the
sugar coming from the Philippine Islands--a tax which
is greater than the tax which has been levied hereto­
fore and which, under the previous Act, was to return
to the Filipino farmer and sugar producer. The tax
has not only been raised but also there was no p ro vi ­
sion in that bill for this tax to be returned to the
Philippines.
Who can assure you, sugar barons of the Philippines,
who are now protesting against what I am doing, which
is for your own protection--who can assure you that
next year the Congress of the United States will not
further increase the tax on your sugar? iliho can assure
you that next year the Congress of the United States
will not further reduce the amount of sugar that you
can sell free of duty to this country? The suggestion
that we should remain under the present status is
tantamount to an economic suicide on your part. It is
only under my proposal that you can find safety and
security in your investments. But do not forget that
I am prepared, if necessary, to get independence for
the Philippines even if I fail to secure for our
products the benefit of the market of the United States.
The time has come when the Filipino people must decide
whether they shall be masters of their own destiny or
not. If we are not willing to assume all the responsi­
bilities of a free people, then let us quit talking
about freedom and independence and let us sell our birth-
 274

right for one million tons of s u g a r . H

The sugar producers continued to confuse the situation,

either deliberately or through honest error. Accurate statis­

tics, In the Philippines, have been difficult to secure, even

by the Government. It was noted, by the Domestic Sugar Adminis­

tration, in 1937, that there was a great discrepancy between

the statistics of the Philippine Sugar Association and the Con­

federation of Sugar Planters Asso ci at io ns . The Administration

sought to fix the quota for domestic consumption and called in

the representatives of these two organizations for advice. The

former stated that domestic consumption amounted to 70,000 short

tons, which production would be sufficient only to operate

centrals at five per cent capacity^2 while the second gave a

figure of 100,000 short tons. The Sugar Administration, seeking

to find the causes for the fall in prices, soon discovered that

the actual domestic consumption was nearly 150,000 short tons.

Representatives of the two organizations were then called into a

conference to explain the great variance between their figures

and those indicated by the Administration. A satisfactory

explanation was never received, the respective representatives

of each claiming their statistics to be accurate while those of

the other were f a u l t y . T h e activities of these organizations,

I bi d.. pp. 88-90, p a s s i m .

1 2 The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philippines.

1 937- 19 38 . p.~24l'. -----
l^The Philippine Sugar Association was interested, possibly,
in showing that domestic consumption could be insufficient to
maintain the Industry - hence the expressed desire for retention
of free trade. See I b i d .. p. 51 and ff., and 242.
 275

through the Commonwealth period, hardly brought credit to them­

selves and increased the restiveness of the people who bore the

brunt of a difficult situation.

This restiveness was felt by the President who had

expressed as one of his major concerns, for the Commonwealth

period, the institution of a program of social justice. He took

occasion to remind landlords and other wealthy men, who held so

much of the economy of the country in their all too-grasping

hands, of the seriousness of the situation -- with little effect,

however. At the inauguration of the City of Iloilo, August 25,

1937, he spoke to the sugar men directly:

We must all cooperate to find the means and to use

them to improve the lot of the working classes in the
Philippines. Particularly should the provinces enjoy­
ing the benefits of the sugar industry immediately and
substantially raise the wages of labor. No industry
in the Philippines is being benefited by our trade
relations with America nearly so much as the sugar indus­
try. There have sprung in Negros, Iloilo and Pampanga,
in the last few years, millionaires as we have never
had before. They have palaces, automobiles, and live
a life of comfort and luxury here and abroad. I am not
criticizing them; it is their privilege to spend their
money as they please. I am merely stating a fact, for
I want to point out that we are doing everything we can,
not only to prevent the collapse, but to maintain in
full blast, the prosperity of the sugar industry. But
the government demands that this prosperity be shared
with the workingmen in the sugar fields and inthe sugar
centrals. Very little, if any, of the immense profits
of the sugar industry, has gone into the pockets of labor.
I say, in all earnestness, to the owners of sugar
centrals and to the proprietors of sugar lands, that
unless they raise the wages of their laborers and treat
them better, the Government and the country may lose
Interest in the defense of the sugar industry.
We cannot be the servants of a privileged class.
We are the servants of the whole people and weshall not
permit an injustice to be done, much less perpetuated,
against any constituent part of our community. Unless
the sugar Industry, of its own accord, increases
 276

immediately the wages of its workingmen, I shall ask

the National Assembly to enact legislation that will
compel that industry to do so.
We are living in an age in which civilized society
can only endure If justice Is accorded equally to the
rich and to the poor. Those who have can only hope to
keep their possessions indefinitely, if they share
part of their profits with those who work for them.
This is a question of justice, not of charity. A man
Is more entitled to the fruits of his labor than the
proprietor to the rent of his property.14

Had these words been taken seriously by the men to whom

they were addressed, the organizations of the PKM, the Communist

Party, and, after the war, the Hukbalahap, might never have

attained the strength they did nor have appealed with so much

force to so many people. The history of the early years of the

Third Republic might have been far different and its future far

more secure. But these words were ignored and the backs of the

people continued to provide a cushion for t he barons who could

not understand why dissatisfaction, growing unrest, outright

rebellion and lawlessness were the characteristics of the Philip­

pine social scene.

The words of President Quezon bore bitter fruit in

1938-1939. The workers in Pampanga, Iloilo, and other sugar

areas presented wage demands, peaceably at first. They were

encouraged In this action by the President's words, immediately

quoted above, as well as similar statements he had made from

the time of his inauguration. They were also encouraged by

Pedro Abad Santos, Socialist leader in the Philippines, and

1*Ibid.. pp. 119-120.

 277

representatives o f •the growing Communist Party. These demands

were not met by the centrals and landowners who refused even

to listen to the demands. Failing to gain any response, the

workers went on strike and, with emotions running at fever pitch,

burned the cane fields. Governor Baluyot, of Pampanga, then

known as the "General Franco of the Philippines," and later

Secretary of Interior under President Roxas and President Quirino,

called on the President, to report on the serious situation in

his province--a situation which was not helped by his attitude

to the strikers. It was reported, in the press, that President

Quezon "assured Governor Baluyot that he will receive all the

help and support of the National Government in his efforts to

stop the burning of sugar cane and every other violation of the

law In his province."1®

The social justice program was hardly Implemented by

the statement also made by the President who told the governor

"to inform labor people in Pampanga that the Government will

not be in a position to help them so long as they use violence

or any other kind of unlawful means to secure redress for their

alleged grievances." He continued, by advising the governor,

"to reassure the laborers in Pampanga of the desire of the

government to improve the lot of the workingmen, not only In

Pampanga but throughout the Philippines, by every means at the

command of the Government, but that the cause of labor will be

15M.O.P.. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, p. 615.

•^Ibid. Italics supplied.

 278

prejudiced, rather than promoted, should the working people

resort to violence; and that the Government must, above every­

thing else, maintain peace and order, and suppress violence

and lawlessness 7 The people who had heard this story over

and over, were impatient and restless and now felt that the

Government neither understood their complaints nor meant to do

anything about them. They were threatened into submission, and

their complaints and grievances went unheard. The situation

was far from solved, although the Government believed It to be

so, which fact was highlighted by the very serious strike, in

the same area, the following year.

The strike of 1939 was the most serious in the history

of the Philippines after 1900, and was far-reaching in its

effects, since the complaints of the people were again ignored.

This fact caused much satisfaction to the communists, and other

less extreme political and economic agitators, in the province,

who made capital out of the situation, resulting in the organi­

zation of a movement which, in 1942, became the Hukbalahap.

The situation was not confined to Pampanga. As the President

had indicated, in his speech of August 25, 1937, the "millionaires"

of Negros and Iloilo brought down upon themselves, by their

actions, the wrath of the people In those areas. The general

attitude toward the situation, particularly in Pampanga, was

revealed in an editorial of the Philippines Herald (which

generally supported the Administration) entitled, "investigate

17Ibid.
 279

the Situation:”

From some quarters comes the suggestion that while

the government should be firm with the Pampanga strikers
and agitators, some concessions should be made to them
Immediately. Nothing more short-sighted than t h i s
could be adopted as a policy. For if the agitators and
working men alike see that violence pays, then they
will adopt the policy of violence for all it is worth.
The contrary lesson should be taught to our citizens
who are inclined to take the law into their own hands;
namely, that this course of action does not pay. We say
this without necessarily believing that the strikers and
agitators have no cause. They may, Indeed, be right and
the landowners and the government all wrong. But under
our laws, citizens, individually or in band, are not the
judge of right or wrong. The courts have been set up for
this purpose so that grievances may be properly aired and
redressed. Any one who takes the law into his own hands
places himself beycnd the pale of the law— becomes a public enemy.
We indorse the policy of using the power and strength
of the government to uphold peace and order in Pampanga.
But we also urge that a thorough and impartial investiga­
tion of the situation be undertaken by a commission especial­
ly appointed for the purpose with a view to arbitrating
the differences of the contending parties. The government,
if it must preserve the harmonious relationship between
labor and capital in the future,cannot do less than this.
The troubles in Pampanga constitute, the first mani­
festation of mass unrest under the Commonwealth. It is
Important that the situation be so handled that the con­
fidence of both parties in the government will be Increased
rather than lessened. This is, so to say, a test of the
ability of the Commonwealth to preserve peace and order
on the one hand, and to assure all elements of the popu­
lation their rights on the other. It is urgent that the
situation be met as such.
The most unwise way of handling the situation would
be to ifake concessions to the strikers first and arbitrate
afterwards. Before we know it, violence will break out in
all the provinces because labor everywhere will have been
convinced that it pays to resort to v i o l e n c e . 18

This is rather a remarkable editorial for readers of

today but we must remember the attitude of many people in t h e

18
Reproduced in Progressive Farming. Vol. II, No. 1
(January, 1938), p. 44. Ihis journal was an organ of the
planters and landowners and was far from "progressive."
 280

United States toward labor unions in 1937. Opinion, in the

Philippines, among Americans as well as Filipinos, was always

well behind that of' the United States. It lags farther in

certain of the ideological fronts and, in labor ideas, at least

a generation. In many ways, the above editorial was quite

progressive, i . e . . in its expressed idea that perhaps the

laborers had some right on their side, -- not much, the

editorial believed, hut enough to demand an investigation. At

least, the editorial refrained from suggesting that the govern­

ment should give the strikers a "whiff of grapeshot", as so

many others -- notably most planters and many Americans in the

Islands -- had suggested angrily.

The strikers replied, not only to this editorial, but

to others like it, that, before they would consent to risking

their fortunes further, they demanded a formal quid pro quo

from the government or the owners. They replied that they

recognized the dangers of force and violence, that they wanted

to avoid them bub that they were protecting not only their

lives but their future since they were attacked by private

guards as well as the forces of the governor; that if the

strikers received no guarantees they would lose their jobs at

the conclusion of the strike and their families be rendered

homeless. They said that the courts were denied them, as

individuals and as a group. As individuals they were coerced

or threatened to drop whatever suits they wished to press

against harsh and abusive landlords; as a group their petitions

 281

before the courts went unheard with opposing lawyers, who many

times were government officials, winning postponement after

postponement from the courts while their cases went unsettled.

These charges were true. The opposition was never able to deny

them to the satisfaction of an impartial observer. The people

were losing faith in the government and in the courts. The

President, had, on January 22, 1937, a year before, directed

the Court of Industrial Relations, to conduct a survey "of all

the facts relating to the sugar industry and to determine the

necessity of adopting a minimum wage or share of laborers or

tenants working in the sugar producing areas."-*-® At the time

of the strike, the people had seen no results from this survey,

and many were coming to the conclusion, borne out by fact, that

such surveys dragged on at length for interminable periods, and

some, were never finished apparently. The laborer could not be

blamed for casting a jaundiced eye at the promises of the

government and of President iuezon--great promises of sweeping

social changes, a vast social justice program which would

completely change the face of the Philippines. In the three

years of the Commonwealth, the laborers could not point to one

instance which one could call an implementation of "social

justice." Their sense of injustice continued to rise, and was

never stilled, even by the war, for it was during the Japanese

occupation, with the organization of guerilla bands, armed, for

the first time, that they struck back actively at their former

1Q
M.O.F.. Vol. 3, Pt. 2, p. 1154. Executive Order No. 32.
 282

masters and drove the landlords from the haciendas to the

shelter offered by the Japanese.

The laborers could point to the fact that the "impartial"

investigations mentioned in the editorial were always made by

individuals having an interest in the industry investigated.

It is a fact that as Ihr as can be determined from existing

records and the memories of individuals concerned, every

investigation body appointed to survey this and similar situa­

tions, was always composed of representatives of the "illustrados",

with never a representative that could be called "popular"-- a

representative of the people. Many were said to be such but in

each case they owed their position to the individuals most

concerned with retaining the status q u o , or were politicians who,

by no stretch of the imagination, could be called representatives

of the people. The appointment of a survey board was always

regarded by people, and was in 1950, as a method of delaying

the proceedings until the public had lost interest or had forgot­

ten completely what the shouting was about. The board then

brought their "investigations" to a close and the subject was

never heard of again, unless those most concerned once again

took the law into their hands for a redress of their just

grievances. If one became a "public enemy" by taking the law

into his own hands after all else has failed, as the editorial

brings out so clearly, then the Founding Fathers of the Amer­

ican Federal system were public eneraies--certainly the British

crown so considered them. It has been axiomatic in Western

 283

political thought that the people delegate their authority to

selected individuals and to the State but always retain the

right of rebellion, referendum and change. Rousseau, for

example, believed that, since the people were sovereign, revolu­

tion was an inalienable right and the people could revoke the

contract existing between them and their government. Elizabeth

A. Weber has stated that "Jefferson felt that rebellion is a

medicine essential to the health of a government and that there

is nothing so dangerous to the general welfare as 'the dull

lethargy that creeps upon and paralyzes the public spirit.1 He

felt that it is not possible to preserve the liberties of the

people unless those who govern are made aware of dissent and

resistance among the citizens against policies which they con­

sider detrimental to their good."2®

When the people begin to feel that the courts are being

denied them, and this was a growing conviction under the Common­

wealth and was in 1950 an established belief, they tend to

ignore the courts and the law. One scholar brings out the

essential point that "a law must first be fixed as a group habit

of conduct before it can command obedience, and any law which

violates this principle is certain of defeat."21 The government

20Elizabeth A. 'Weber; "Political Ideas and Folklore,"

Introduction to Poli ti cs . Roy V. Peel and Joseph S. Roucek (eds.),
(New York, 1946) p"I 45. The present author in repeating these
views, is not advocating the violent overthrow of the governments
or political systems of the United States or the Philippines, and
is not a member, nor ever has been, of any Communist party anywhere
in the world.
21Ibid.. p. 56.
 284

did not preserve the "harmonious relationship between capital

and labor" and in the early years after independence was still

unable to do so because it failed to understand the needs of

the people and their desire for immediate aid and not attractive
Op
plans for a future not certain of attainment. ° The fiasco

brought about by the mishandling of the Hukbalahap situation in

1947 and 1948 drove deeper the wedge between capital and labor--

the communists unfortunately the only group which profited from

the situation.

Herald was only partly correct in saying that the

Pampanga troubles constituted the first manifestation of mass

unrest. (The isakdal rising of 1935 was the first but it was

not primarily a labor question). It was important that the

situation be handled to increase the confidence in the govern­

ment but the corollary was too true: this confidence was

lessened because of the way the situation was treated. The

Commonwealth passed its test with regard to maintaining peace

and order but failed miserably in assuring "all elements of the

population" their rights.

22
During 1948-51, Manila newspaper columnists and
Nacionalista opponents of the Liberal Administration asserted
numerous times that the government will continue to fail in
this respect until it understands the above principle of the
operation of belief and law in a people and understands the
necessity of bringing about the desired changes in the social
order by taking definitive steps in that direction. The people
must be given concrete proof that the government is sincere in
its expressions of sympathy for the "masses"— which proof was
sadly lacking.
 285

To the amazement of workers and students of labor in

the Philippines, the Negros sugar planters, in a report submit­

ted to Malacafian, stated that they had long been pursuing a

program of social justice -- even before the policies advocated

by President Quezon early in the Commonwealth. They spoke of

the most "commendable generosity" towards their workers, whose

wages had, they said, been improved commensurate with the rise

of sugar prices. The wages, they said, had risen from twelve

and a half to fifteen centavos a day to thirty to fifty centavos

a day.^ This, the planters said, had worked a great hardship

for them as they paid higher interest rates for capital invest­

ment than central owners; were handicapped in marketing facil­

ities, and did not receive premium prices for their produce

since they were unable to ship their sugar directly to the

United States. Since they felt that they were receiving lower

prices than their high cost of production warranted, they

believed that the lot of the planters and the laborers would

not be benefited were the situation to continue. They thus

demanded "that any measure adopted hy the government to raise

the wage standard for sugar laborers should be accompanied by a

readjustment of milling contracts so as to increase the planters'

milling share."24

The workers apparently were in disagreement, f or, on

January 25, 1938, President Quezon received a telegram from

2 5The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philip­

p i n e s . 1 9 37 - 1 9 3 8 . p. 235.
24
Progressive Farming. Vol. I, No. 5 (October-November,
1937), p. 26.
 286

Jose M. Nava, of the Labor Federation from Iloilo, announcing

the existence of a strike which was in the words of his telegram,

"due miserable situation laborers for many years neglected by

authorities so that earning forty centavos daily many working

fourteen hours a day and are subdued and exploited."2 5 Since

the complaints, mentioned in this telegram, were standard and

typical, it is worth reproducing.

Laborers sugar centrals in Barotac Nuevo and

Janiuay have declared strike last Tuesday which
remains unsettled.... Strikers all members Labor
Federation ask only minimum wage of one peso and
social justice as sponsored by you. These centrals
do not comply labor laws on wages eight hours free
medicine and others. Although conflict unsettled
central in Janiuay resumed milling yesterday due
terrorism constabulary policy headed by Governor
Confesor who employed strike-breakers (esquiroles)
and defied strikers who until now eight day strike
have maintained peace without provoking any disorder.
Abuses constabulary police reached such extreme in
which they throw away inoffensive placards and appro­
priate federation flags which is provoking disorder but
strikers submit. We ask protection and explanation
whether to ask peacefully minimum salary and social
justice the constabulary police and governor are
justified to ignore our grievances hurt without motive
and protect capitalists not complying laws by facil­
itating them with strike-breakers protected by
Government. With this inquisitorial procedure
laborers do not get support of Government and social
conflicts and mass discontents aggravating. Oppres­
sion exploitation Barotac Nuevo Janiuay confirmed
Labor Bureau and resumption milling Janiuay increases
discontent aggravating strike. ’
We would like to get
minimum salary and social justice as preached by Your
Excellency and we are losing faith in local authorities
who cripple your great program.2 ®

President Quezon replied:

Answering your telegram... I have ordered Governor

25Messages of the President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, p. 626.

2 6 Ibid., pp. 626-627.

 287

Confesor and Provincial Commander to desist from inter­

vening strike laborers and above all not to aid central
find (s i c ) strike-breakers while strikers not using
violence or* provoking disorder. I advise you tell
labor strikers not commit any act of violence or in any
manner violate the laws. As you have assured me that
strikers are maintaining peace Government will take
immediate action to investigate causes strike and
protect rights laborers if damaged. Inform the strikers
that any public disorder or violence or threats commit­
ted by them damages their cause.

To Governor Confesor, the President sent the following telegram;

Nava telegraphed me complaining of terrorism on

your part and that of Provincial Commander against
strikers sugar centrals.... You are directed not to use
Government forces unless acts of violence or violation
of law are committed by strikers. You should be im­
partial in this conflict until the Department of Labor
has had occasion to Investigate and the Court of Indus­
trial Relations determine which side is in the right.
Adopt a policy of watchful vigilance and warn strikers
as well as owners of centrals against any use of force
or threat of public disorder. I am directing the
Provincial Commander not to use Constabulary force
except in case of public disorder or actual violation
of law.28

The President sent a similar telegram to the Provincial

Commander warning him against the use of force against strikers.

The same day, the President received a telegram from Governor

Confesor which said:

Nava complaint terrorism unfounded. I mobilized

State Police with Constabulary cooperation only after
several sugarcane fields were set on fire. Full detail
my actuation on strike will be forwarded your office
by air mail tomorrow. Strike situation under full
control. Peace and order prevail strike area.2 ®

President Quezon then sent a telegram to Nava quoting

C o n f e s o r 1s reply and warning against use of violence on the part

2^ Ibid. 28lbid.. p. 628. 2 ® Ibid.

 288

of strikers. He then sent a final telegram to Confesor:

Upon receipt of your report I will send representa­

tive of National Government to investigate and report
on whole situation. Of course no violation of law must
be tolerated but at same time you should bear in mind
that the right to strike Is recognized by existing laws.

The facts of the case were contrary to the governor's

telegram. Terrorism on the part of the Provincial Government

did occur and cane fields were not set a f i r e . S t r i k e r s

claimed that if the fields were burned it was done by other

parties seeking to place the onus on the strikers and thus

justifying the use of force to restrain the strikers. Strike­

breakers were hired by the central. The charges, in N a v a ’s

telegram, with regard to the position of the centrals, were

true. The complaint of central owners that such strikes were

instigated by racketeering labor leaders, while true in many

instances, in this case was not borne out by facts.®2 Racketeer­

ing labor leaders have been all too common In Philippine labor

but the strike at Janiuay grew from the rising discontent of

the workers, whose position was stated with force and clarity

by Runes (in the report mentioned above) and who were angered

at the statement of planters and owners that Q u e z o n ’s social

justice program was being fully implemented in their haciendas.

N a v a ’s statement with regard to the fact that Q u e z o n ’s program

®°I b i d . . p. 629. 3 ^Quezon, I b i d .. p. 21.

3 2The author, in May, 1949, talked personally with

individuals who, at the time, were representatives of the Depart­
ment of Labor. They are responsible for the last statement.
 289

33
was being sabotaged by local leaders was all too t r u e . ^

President Quezon appointed Judge Manuel V. Moran, then

of the Court of A p p e a l s , as special investigator of the Janiuay

strike. This action was attacked, in the press and elsewhere

as improper and illegal. The L a w y e r s r Journal charged that it

was unconstitutional "as it seeks to charge a member of the

judicial branch of the Government with the performance of duties

non-j ud ic ia l.*34 claimed that such a task was executive in

nature and such an appointment of a member of the judiciary

"removes him...from the bench where the Constitution contemplates

he should stay with permanence." Such an act, the article

continued, "places the investigator judge in a position where

he has to make conclusions and recommendations that vitiate his

consideration of industrial and labor cases that may come up

before him to judge.... It is radically inconsistent with the

independence of that judicial power which is vested in the

courts, and, consequently, with that important principle of the

separation of powers consecrated in all republican constitutions."

President Quezon, in a letter to Chief Justice Avancefta,

requested an official statement "to serve as a guide for future

3 3It is difficult to assess, in 1950, the main factors

in the failure of this program but present members of the Govern­
ment as well as individuals, now no longer with the Government
who were connected in varying capacities with various govern­
mental agencies during the Commonwealth, all indicate with vary­
ing degrees of intensity that local officials were hostile to
Quezon's program and either ignored or militated against it when­
ever possible.

3 4Vol. VI, No.7 (March 10, 1938), p. 220. This is a

professional journal of generally high calibre. Many times during
the Commonwealth period it became one of the most effective
critics of governmental programs.
 290

action" with regard to the exchange of views on the subject bet­

ween the Justice and the P r e s i d e n t . ^ Whatever the legality of

the act, the President acted with dispatch with regard to the

strike. There were no significant results from the investigation.

On February 14, he sent a letter to Secretary Quirino

dismissing the chief of police of Janiuay and a secret service

agent. This letter is of great value to a student of labor in

the Philippines and of the social justice program advocated by

President Quezon. It presents a picture of the great forceful­

ness of the President in such matters as well as the character

of local (and sometimes national) activity with regard t o

strikes and labor. Because many of t h e things mentioned in the

?.etter occurred with monotonous regularity from 1934 to 1950

and because it lays down the program President Quezon wished to

see followed by his country, we quote at length:

After careful consideration of the complete report

of Investigation of the complaint against the Chief of
Police of Janiuay, conducted under my instruction by
Judge Enage, I have concluded that the facts of the case
are as follows:
On January 22nd a strike by laborers was declared
in the centrals of Janiuay and 3arotac, Province of
Iloilo. Upon learning of the strike, the Governor...
proceeded a t once to order the mobilization of the
State P o l i c e , of seven municipalities and requested the
Provincial Commander of the province to give him a
Constabulary force--all for the purpose, according to
the Governor, of maintaining peace and order.
The Provincial Commander Iloilo gave the soldiers
as r eq u e s t e d , and these, together with the State Police,
were placed around the two above-mentioned centrals. A
man who was not one of the strikers, for he was not a
laborer in any of those centrals, was found with a bolo

55M.0.P.. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, p. 567.

 291

and thereupon arrested by Captain Tando, Chief of Police

of the City of Iloilo, and a secret service man by the
name of Crispin Adelantar. By order of Captain Tando
the arrested man, whose name is Leonardo Diaz, w a s
turned over to Paclfico Abordo, Chief of Police of
Janiuay.
While secret service man, Crispin Adelantar, had
Leonardo Diaz under his custody, he struck Diaz twice.
After Leonardo Diaz had been t\irned over the Chief of
Police of Janiuay, he was kept in the municipal jail....
By order of...Abordo leg irons were placed on him.
According to Leonardo Diaz, during the whole time that
he was in the municipal jail, he was made to wear leg
irons day and night....
It is immaterial whether leg Irons were placed on
this prisoner all the time or only while he was out of
jail. In either case the prisoner was treated with
cruelty. The length of time he had on the leg irons
is merely a question of degree of cruelty inflicted.
The Government cannot afford to have in the service a
Chief of Police so inhuman as the Chief of Police of
Janiuay....
The same thing Is to be said of the secret service
man.... I am therefore, of the opinion, and I so order,
that both the chief of police and the secret service
man be immediately dismissed from office. You will
please execute the order by telegraph....
I may state that, in my opinion, the Governor of
Iloilo allowed himself to be unduly excited by this
strike. The mobilization of the Constabulary and the
State Police...was unnecessary and ill-advised. The
right to strike has not been declared illegal either
by the Constitution or by any act of the L egislature.
In cases of strikes where public interest is not
directly or indirectly affected, an untimely interven­
tion by the armed forces of the Government, even if only
for purposes of preventing violations of the l a w , places
the Government in a position that would justify the
belief that armed forces have been called in the
interest of one or the other side. The Governor of
Iloilo should have been on the alert, but he did not
have to mobilize the State Police...as the police of
the City of Iloilo and the Constabulary...were more
than sufficient to maintain order and suppress lawless­
ness in the region where the strikes were taking place.
Knowing the Governor of Iloilo personeLly, I have no
doubt that he acted In good faith. It is his vigor and
energy that impelled him to act hastily.
If there is going to be faith in the justice and
impartiality of this Government in cases arising between
capital and labor, or between the different constituent
parts of the community, we must at all times not only
act justly and impartially, but also be careful that our
 292

actions have no appearance of partiality. Social justice

can only mean .justice on each and every social group. If
my administration is placing special emphasis on the need
for ameliorating the conditions of the laboring class, it
is not because we are against the capitalists or the rich,
but it is because the laboring class in the Philippines
has not received its due, and therefore stands in need of
the help and protection of the Government in order that
its rights may be properly recognized and acco r de d.
It would be national suicide to persecute capital. In
our age, capital, and in large amounts, is necessary for
the economic development aTnd the social welfare of the
people. Capital is entitled to a reasonable profit, and
this reasonable profit must not be denied ic under any
pretext. So long, as capital is not unmindful of the
social purposes and duties of property, so long will our
Government give it wholehearted support and protection,
but not otherwise.
In the case of the strikes in Iloilo, especially
considering the abuses actually committed by the Chief of
Police of Janiuay and a secret service man, as well as
the negligence of the fiscals of that province in not
properly Investigating and reporting these abuses, it would
not be surprising if the people of that province came to
the conclusion that the Government, before it was estab­
lished which side was right, had taken the side of the
sugar centrals as against the"strikers. c

The second from the last paragraph is a noteworthy state­

ment, by the President, on the meaning of' his social justice

program--noteworthy in that it was, unfortunately, observed In the

breach. ^

At the same time that the President suspended the

individuals mentioned in the foregoing letter, he also suspended

the provincial fiscal and the assistant provincial fiscal of

^ ^ I b i d .. pp. 562-565. Italics supplied.

37
That little progress In thinking took place since Quezon
wrote this letter, may be observed readily by reading decisions of
the Court of Industrial Relations and the opinions and actuations
of employers in 1947-1950. The reaction, to strikes, did not
change. Force was yet the only a p p a r w n t answer. Intimidation and
maneuvering close to the edge of Illegality were yet the hallmarks
of Industrial relations. ihe words of Quezon were forgotten and
the handwriting on the wall ignored.
 293

Iloilo for negligence in the performance of their duties.

Quezon said, "if I were to be very strict in passing judgement

upon the conduct of Fiscal Blanco, I should declare him guilty

as an accomplice of the same offense committed by his assistant,

but I think the interest of justice will be served sufficiently

by merely declaring Fiscal Blanco negligent in the performance

of his duties, and ordering, as I hereby order, that his resigna­

tion be demanded with the understanding that upon his refusal

to submit it, he would be removed from office.1'^® President

Quezon was shocked, he said, "to learn of the defense presented

by the fiscals...to the effect that they give no importance to

the illegal and cruel treatment given to a prisoner accused of

only such a crime as carrying a bolo." Their conduct, he

declared, "reveals an attitude of mind towards defenseless

people who may be arrested for some offenses that can not be

tolerated.

It was noticed that, despite the large production of

^®In a letter to Secretary Yulo, February 14, 1938.

I b i d . . p. 561.

^®This "attitude of mind", so shocking to Quezon, was

apparently of great persistence since the papers, throughout the
year 1949, were full of repeated such instances, and worse, on the
part of local officials whose sympathy, an observer would imagine,
should lie with the people from whom they have sprung and for whom
they have pledged their service and protection. Despite the fact
that these instances were fully documented and proven to the satis­
faction of the most disinterested observer, official documents of
the Republic presented no evidence that any action, not even an
official reprimand, was taken to remedy a situation growing more
serious. The Free Press for the years 1949 and 1950 is a storehouse
of such unrsmedied instances of brutality and callousness to a
long-suffering people.
 294

sugar in 1938, local consumers paid more for their sugar than

those in the United States which was one of the reasons advanced

for the low per capita consumption in the Philippines. This

fact, it was believed, was due to faulty methods of distribution

which were controlled by middlemen seeking the highest profit

possible. It was felt that local consumption could be increased

with the institution of a more efficient system of distribution

and control, bringing about a reduction in price and thus

enabling the working people to buy greater quantities. A plan,

therefore,of a selling agency operated by the Government, was

conceived by Rafael Alunan, then Sugar Administrator. This

agency was to have control over the local distribution of sugar.

This, it was felt, could be achieved only through the purchase

of a sugar refinery. This resulted in the purchase of the

Insular Sugar Refining Corporation and the Malabon iiugar Company.

The f\mction of t h e agency would also include endeavors to

establish foreign markets outside the United States and the

establishment of an institute to conduct research for the

benefit of the industry and the country. It was recognized

that these activities would require large sums of money, which,

it was believed, could be secured through the estimated earnings

of the refineries. The sum paid for the refineries, which was

to have been repaid before July 4, 1946, from their earnings,

was 1*4,200,000.

This step was not regarded with much favor by the press

nor by other sugar refineries, and was characterized as a

 295

reckless waste of public funds. A statement, criticizing this

action, was published by the opposition which said the sum

invested in the refineries "would have been sufficient for the

establishment of coconut centrals and of factories for the

manufacture or production of coconut products which find ready

acceptance in the outside market."^® The opposition stated

that "instead of employing the money for the stabilization of

the sugar industry, which is already enjoying a reasonable

margin of profit, why was not the money invested to bolster up

the coconut industry or such other industries as the abaca and

tobacco which need just as much if not more protection?" The

opposition claimed that, despite the protestations to the

contrary, the administration was favoring the sugar industry

and the barons, who Quezon claimed were not running the govern­

ment, and pointed to the fact that it was even grooming a

speaker of the Assembly from the sugar regions. They pointed

to the fact that the coconut industry was providing the Govern­

ment with large revenues and received nothing in protection or

services in return, while the sugar industry, which Quezon had

stated was not so important as the coconut and abaca industries,

was at the peak of its prosperity. The opposition asked: "Are

the sugar men the only children of God In this blessed earth

of ours? And what mysteries are involved in this deal of the

sugar refineries in which the government apparently paid double

40 h why Does Not the Government Speak?", The Lawyers 1

Journ al . VI, No. 32 (November 20, 1938), p. 1021.
 296

what they were really worth? Who recommended the purchase of

these refineries by the National Development C o . ? " ^ The

opposition pointed to the fact that this act showed "that while

there is enough money wasted in doubtful investments...while

there is money to maintain a luxurious government, money to

cover the transportation expenses...fabulous salaries, of high

public officials who make pleasure trips to Europe, all at the

expense of poor Juan de la Cruz, there is no money to remedy

the precarious situation of 160,000 people who are without work

and live in misery and p r i v a t i o n . C o n s i d e r i n g it only from

a business point of view, they claimed, it was wasteful and ill-

considered, since, after the transaction had been completed,

it was discovered that the Government could not operate these

refineries without violating the provisions of the law limiting

the production of sugar in the Philippines. Their interpreta­

tion of this was held to be correct by High Commissioner McNutt,

in that, while the refineries were purchased with the end in

view of increasing the cultivation of cane, the law provided

that no such increase in assigned quotas could be made. The

Journal in its editorial, supported the opposition saying that

it was the duty of the Government to reply to its critics,

especially because of the grave nature of the charges as well

as the fact that the people had a right to "know whether they

are supporting a wise and responsible administration whose pre­

occupation for social justice is sincere and real, or whether

a reckless and irresponsible administration who plays with

41 4?
Ibid. Ibid
 297

favorites and sacrifices the general interest for the sake of

a favored few."45

These charges were never answered to the satisfaction

of the opposition nor to that of other more impartial observers.

They remained, in 1950, unanswered, and it is of interest to

note that late in 1949 the Government expressed the desire to

sell its central and refinery.

Throughout the remainder o f t h e year 1938, efforts were

made to establish effective policies with regard to the sugar

industry. President Quezon, on August 12, 1938, sent a message

to the National Assembly on the situation of the industry and

suggested remedies. He stated that there were two problems

facing the industry: its preservation, and the distribution of

profits In a more equitable fashion. To achieve this, he r ecom­

mended that the Assembly enact a law, or laws, to eliminate from

the industry unsuitable lands and uneconomic centrals. He

suggested that such a law should compel the central and planters

to pay higher and more appropriate wages to laborers; give

benefit payments to planters not receiving the share they should

from their cane; provide funds for the amelioration of social

and labor conditions in the industry and carry out a sound

program for its adjustment and stabilization. He concluded by

certifying the necessity of immediate enactment of such legislation.44

On August 17, he issued a press statement with regard to

45Ibid. 44M.0.P.. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 535-538.

 298

45
the creation of the National ougar Board. He stated that,

since the industry itself evinced little desire to solve the

problems facing it, he was creating this board to make a survey

of the industry and recommend measures to the Government for a

remedy of the situation. Five days later, he made a speech, at

the oath-taking of the members of this board at Malacanan, in

which he advised them that they must investigate the industry

and recommend measures which would enable the Government and the

industry to adjust itself to the situation, with regard to the

future loss of a free market, and to effect an equitable

distribution of profits.4 ® The President was particularly con­

cerned over the latter because of the rising tide of discontent

among the laborers in the industry which came to a head the

following year.

Later in the year, certain quarters in the country

produced a rumor to the effect that the Government was seeking,

and would probably receive, a larger free quota of refined

sugar for export to the united States. The President angrily

received this rumor by issuing a statement to the press that the

rumor was groundless and that the Government was not seeking an

increase either in the amount of refined or raw sugar to be sold

in the United States market. He stated also that the Government

had purchased the two refineries for the purpose of protecting

45Executive Order No. 157, (as corrected and amended by

Executive Order No. 168) same date. Ibid.. Vol. 4. Pt. 1. -d p .
689-690; 1332-1334.

46Ibid., pp. 158-160.

 299

consumers from the unfair practices of the speculators (who he

believed had a hand in the rumor) and to assist in the readjust­

ment of the industry.4?

On October 19, 1938, President Quezon made a speech, on

the occasion of the Inauguration of the City of Bacolod, Occiden­

tal Negros, in which he reiterated his stand with regard to the

sugar industry and its contributions to his program of social

justice. He told the people of Bacolod that they should con­

sider themselves fortunate, In that they lived in one of the most

prosperous regions in the Philippines. Yet, he said, "it is

through the sweat of the working man that Negros is now one of

the richest provinces in the Philippines.... But not all those

who live in Negros now can say that they are living in plenty.

On the contrary, while there are some F H i p i nos and foreigners

here who make big amounts every year from the sugar industry,

yet the men in the fields are not getting their due share."48

He went on to analyze the industry and warned the

planters and central owners of their duty to their laborers and

c ou ntry:

In the business of the sugar centrals, there are

three parties~-the capital, represented by the central;
the capital and the land, represented by the hacenderos
or the planters; and the labor, represented by the
workingmen. The centrals have been getting the most
out of the sugar business. It is true that in the begin­
ning those who invested in these centrals took some
risk.... But, during all these years, these centrals
have been making money in enormous amounts; some sugar
centrals have already recovered their Investments; it

47Ibid., p. 707. 48Ibjd.. p. 233.

 300

is, therefore, time for chem to give greater partici­

pation to the men who administer the land and to those
in the field--the laborers. It is my hope that the
board, which I have created to get the central, the
hacienda owner, and the laborer to agree on an equit­
able distribution of the profits among themselves, will
succeed in Its all-important mission. But if these
entities do not do it voluntarily, it is my intention
to recommend to the next National Assembly the imposi­
tion of a tax for centrals which will be used by the
Government to serve the interests of the workingmen. (Applause)
The people of Occidental Negros are the most
privileged people of the Philippines today, mainly
because you have the only basic industry that is still
making money. My own province is in a terrible plight;
for In Tayabas we have only copra to sell, and the price
of copra has gone down so much that we do not even
have enough money to buy a rope with which to hang our­
selves. This is also the situation of the people who
live in the hemp-producing regions--they are in the
same plight. On the other hand, you can still make
money, as you are actually making money, in the sugar
industry. You are blessed, exceptionally blessed! Now
you must use the wealth that you have to benefit the
p e o p l e . Make everybody in Negros happy and contented;
let Negros be the paradise of the Philippines.49

The year 1939 saw the outbreak of the greatest strikes

and unrest in the history of the sugar regions. This will be

treated later In more detail. Suffice it to say here that the

mis-handling of the situation in Pampanga, In 1939, by the

Government and the wealthy resulted in the formation of a semi

secret organization known as the PKM (Kalipunang Pambansa Ng

Ibid., pp. 234-235. Negros, in the elections of

November, 1949, was the scene of the greatest frauds, intimida­
tions, disorder and strife, with a private police force of some
three thousand well-armed, young, irresponsible men, under the
Governor of the Province. fven inspectors of the Nacionalista
Party apparently voted Liberal, for in many areas, despite their
presence as required by law, no votes were cast for the defeated
party. The fraud and anomalies in the province were so well
established that the President himself mentioned the fact that
"even without" the votes in that province he still would have
won. See Manila press for November-December, 1949.
 301

Ivlga Magbubukid sa F il ip in a s; National Association of Farmworkers

of the Philippines) and the AMT (Aguman Ding Maldang Talapagobra;

Association of General workers), in Pampanga and Bulacan. Later

in the year, these organizations went underground and formed

themselves on a military basis, into a group, which later in

1942, was called the Hukbo Ng Bayan Laban sa H a p o n , the Hukbalahap.

The Governor, Sotero Baluyot, had organized a group

pledged to oppose strikes, clothed in a blue-grey uniform set

off by a cap and bugle made from carabao horn. During the

strike, the constabulary worked in cooperation with this organi­

zation but were unable to check the movement completely despite

the terrorism that occurred. The strike, which was led by

Pedro Abad Dantos, became so widespread and so serious that the

President went to Pampanga to investigate. On February 14,

1939, he addressed a mass meeting of laborers and farm tenants

at San Fernando, Pampanga, in his usual brilliant style. He

deplored the necessity for a strike and reminded the workers of

his sympathy for them and his desire to use the full implementa­

tion of his social justice program.

He stated, in agreement with them, that he did not

believe that the laborers in the Philippines received a share

of profits which corresponded to their labor, "especially in

the sugar industry" where of all the industries the laborers

should receive good pay. This was because of all the industries

it was the one making the greatest profits. These profits came

to the industry not only from capital invested by local

 303

individuals but also from the aid and protection extended to it

by the Government which permitted them to export duty-free to

the United States. He mentioned the fact that the industry had

a permanent representative in the United States whose duty it

was to work toward the granting of protection to the industry.

It was recognized, the President said, that at the time he was

speaking,the entry o f Philippine sugar into the United

States should not be stopped suddenly and for that reason, he

believed that it was only just that the Government should

expect the sugar owners and landlords "to give a decent share

of their profits” to workers since these profits were obtained

through the aid of the Government. This statement received

applause from the assembled workers. He went on to say that he

had once before reminded the central owners on Iloilo of their

duty with regard to the well-being of their laborers.

Yet, the solutions to the problem were not all simple.

He mentioned, for instance, the vexing problem of the share

plan in the industry and explained its operation to his

listeners. He stated that the share which the central owners

remitted to landowners in Pampanga was smaller than that given

in Negros, being only fifty per cent, although, he said that he

had heard "long ago" that it would be increased "eventually” .

He believed it necessary, therefore, for new contracts to be

drawn up but it was not yet possible to renew these contracts

"even by order of the court or by using the powers of the Govern­

ment." It was, he stated, the duty of the Government to respect

 303

these contracts but also he believed that the central owners

should take initiative and should "of their own accord" increase

the planters' and landowners' share. These individuals in turn

should then increase the share of the laborers. He mentioned

that there were other provinces where "those who work the land

hardly get a share sufficient for their subsistence"; this

statement was applauded by his audience who well knew the situa­

tion. So, while he could not force the centrals to renew their

contracts nor the landowners to improve immediately the treatment

of their workers, if they did not take the initiative he was

"ready to ask the National Assembly to pass a law increasing

their taxes, from which will be taken what I would give you."

He then spoke of the situation then existing in Pampanga

and addressed the strikers and their leaders directly. He

earnestly pleaded with them to "have a little patience." He

pleaded with them not "to resort to the burning of sugar-cane

fields" or to harvesting a crop and taking it as they wished—

including portions which did not rightfully belong to them.

Instead, he asked, 11give another his rightful share." He asked

them, in order to avoid strikes which were harmful to the indus­

try and to the workers, to allow him some time -- "at least six

months" -- "to study all the means which could solve your

problem and remedy your situation." If that were done they

would then be able to receive their "rightful share" and he

promised them that he would utilize the powers of the Government

to "induce" the centrals to increase the shares of the landov/ners

 304

so that they in turn could increase the pay of the w o r k e r s . He

promised them that before the "close of the present session of

the National Assembly, we shall enact a law increasing taxes,

and collections therefrom will be used by the Government to

help ameliorate the conditions of the laborers."

He concluded his long address with the following words;

I wish to state once more what I said a while ago;

may all the sugar centrals in Pampanga, at their own
initiative, increase the share of the planters or land­
owners, so that the latter...may voluntarily increase
the wages they pay the laborers. Enough of this practice
of charging usurious interest on loans to laborers 1
What interest can a person pay when he is hungry and has
nothing to eat? (A p p l a u s e ) May the landowners in Pampanga,
as well as throughout the Philippines, grant you what you
rightfully deserve in your livelihood without waiting
for the law compelling them to do so; and may this be
their constant thought, so it could be shown in deeds
that they also have hearts which are charitable to the
suffering of the laborers in our country.50

But it was too late. When nothing concrete was done and

the President merely reiterated these vague promises in another

speech, Pedro Abad Santos declared that the President's speech

was "plainly reactionary" and disclosed no constructive program.

He stated that now more than ever "workers and peasants must

unite and stand together in their struggle for amelioration of

their living and working conditions...and to shake off the bonds

of feudal landlordism and peonage under which they are oppressed

ii51
and starved. The workers were convinced that the centrals

50
Ivi.Q .P.. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 20-32, passim.

^ Philippine Magazine . XXXVI, No. 4 (April, 1939),

p. 150.
 305

would not Increase the share of the landowners. They were also

convinced that the National Assembly would not pass new tax

legislation or new legislation leading to better collection of

existing taxes. They were convinced that the centrals, the

landowners, the Government, would not do anything ,rvoluntarily"

for the workers. Whether or not they were justified in these

beliefs, they maintained them and it is interesting to note

that the centrals did not increase the shares to landowners;

the landowners did not increase the shares to workers; the land­

owners continued usurious practices; the Government did not

pass legislation remedying the revenue system; and wages were

not increased. While the workers applauded the speech of their

President, respectfully, their leaders as well as the words of

Quezon himself had convinced them that they were not receiving

their just dues, that they would in all likelihood never receive

them -- and for that and that alone they would hold out. They

were not seeking charity. They wanted at least ten per cent

of the profits of the centrals since they claimed the sugar

industry was at a peak of prosperity to which point their labor

had contributed the major share. The President for once had

underestimated the temper of his people. They had had enough

of plans, programs and promises; they wanted action, immediate

and just. They received neither in the years before the War,

so the movement spread throughout the province as well as

neighboring provinces.

The month after the speech by the President, an encounter

 306

between five hundred tenants and ’'vigilantes" sent by the

Governor to "maintain order", resulted in injuries to twenty of

the strikers. On hay 9, the President placed two municipalities

under the conorol of the constabulary and later made a trip to

his own hacienda in Pampanga to make a speech of conciliation

and appeasement--to which the tenants listened with scant

courtesy. The movement spread to Bulaean, especially to the

Buenavista hstate where the tenants claimed ownership of some

70,000 acres. In the same month, it was announced that Filipino

labor was to be organized under a single governing unit, the

National Commission of Labor. This was done under the leader­

ship of Jose Avelino, then Secretary of Labor, who, on July

16, announced the formation of the National Commission of

Peasants. These organizations accomplished nothing, due,

primarily, to the opposing ideas represented between them and

the others mentioned above. The workers were further convinced

of the hopelessness of the situation the following year, after

the elections returned to office Governor Baluyot, whose

temporary suspension had been asked by the strikers in Pampanga

as a condition which would ease the situation. The defeated

candidate, their leader Pedro Abad Santos, ascribed his defeat

(by some seven thousand votes) to the tightly-controlled

governmental machinery as well as the lack of eligibility of

his supporters who, he claimed, were largely illiterate. The

danger inherent in such a situation, which should have been

obvious to the most insensitive observer, was ignored by the

 307

Government and central owners who, thus sowed the seeds of

dissension which were to bear* such bitter fruit in the years

1945-1S50.

In August, the national Sugar Board submitted its report

to the President, who, the following month, sent a letter to

Placido L, hapa, President of the Philippine Sugar Association,

with regard to an equitable adjustment of "participation ratios*1

This had been suggested by the Board, the President stated, so

that the centrals would "adjust their participation ratios with

their planters' share to 60 per centum of the sugar m i l l e d . ...

By so doing, the President said, "it would greatly facilitate

the proper solution of this phase of the Philippine sugar

problem...” and suggested that he be informed as to whether the

centrals "would agree voluntarily to revise t h e i r ... contracts

with their planters along the lines indicated by t h e ... Board."

This problem remained unsettled during the remainder of the

Commonwealth period and through the first years of the Republic.

Late in 1950 talk was resumed on the subject.

Throughout the rest of the Commonwealth period, until

the outbreak of the dar, unrest continued to grow in sugar and

rice-producing regions, being most acute in the provinces of

Pampanga, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. The Department of Labor was

kept busy investigating complaints from both sides, and the

picture continued to be one of the laborers demanding better

treatment and the landowners and central owners resisting as

520p_. cit., p. 417.

 308

as much as possible these demands. In many instances, the

courts found for the laborers but difficulties were encountered

in enforcing the decision of the courts or of the Department

of Labor. The sugar men grew in wealth, some building residences

which became showplaces in the Orient while underneath was the

constantly rising pressure of unrest and discontent.

The only noteworthy event by the United States, before

the War, affecting the sugar industry, was the passage of the

Tydings-Kocialkowski Act, amending che Independence Act. This

was done, partly in response to President Roosevelt's promise

that the imperfections and Inequalities of the Independence

Act would be remedied, and partly in answer to a desperate

appeal by the Government, backed by the recommendations of the

Joint Preparatory Committee. Under the new law, the all-

inclusive export tax was dropped substituting, instead for the

four principal exports, a quota arrangement, beginning January

1, 1940, with the quota to be decreased by five per cent each

succeeding year.

The Philippine .Sugar Association, in its report to the

Joint Preparatory Committee, had introduced three propositions

with regard to any future American legislation directed at

Philippine sugar. These were:

Free trade between the United States and the Philip­

pines in the volume permitted by the Tydings-McDuffie
Law is of such advantage to both parties, and Its termina-
tion would work such disaster upon the people of the
Philippines, that it should be continued, in at least
that volume, indefinitely.
As a corollary to the foregoing, raw and refined
 309

sugar produced in the Philippines should have free

access to the American market in at least the amount
permitted by the Tydings-McDuffie Law, because the
United States unquestionably fostered the developr® nt
of the Philippine sugar industry, and because of the
importance of that industry in the export trade of
the Philippines.
The graduated export taxes upon the Philippine
sugar, as well as upon other Philippine exports to
the United States, imposed under the terms of the
Tydings-IvIcDuffie Law during the last five years of
the Commonwealth period for the purpose of providing
a sinking fund for the payment of principal and
interest on uhe bonded indebtedness of the Philippines,
its provinces, municipalities and instrumentalities,
should be abolished.53

Under the first proposal, the Association pointed to the

lack of reciprocity in trade relations as provided by the

Independence Lav/, by which American articles could enter the

Philippines subject to duty, whereas Philippine articles would

enter the United States subject only to "quantitive limitations."

The Association stated that there was a complete unanimity of

opinion upon this proposition -- this opinion being that these

provisions would be a "death penalty for the Philippine sugar

industry, as well as for most of the other leading industries

of the Philippines."

The United States was limiting the entry of Philippine

sugar Into its market. 1Yiiho had encouraged the phenomenal

development of the industry by che imposition of free trade?

"It is of record," the Association stated, "that this status

was imposed by the United States over the protest of the Philip­

pine Assembly." This protest was due to the belief that free

5sTjie Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philip­

pines . 1937-1938. p. 51 and f f .
 310

trade would mean the establishment of an economy so dependent

upon the American market that the stability of the economy

would be questionable to say the least.^4 What then would be

the result of the new provisions? The Association stated flat­

ly: "It Is thus not too much to say that after 1940,the principal

effect of the Tydings-McDuffie law will be to destroy approxi­

mately 60 per cent of the present export trade of the Philip­

pines because that trade is dependent upon free trade with the

United States." This,it believed, would result in "disastrous

economic, social and political consequences to the people of the Riilip-

pines."

Therefore, the obvious step would be to continue free

trade relations.

Under the second proposition, the Association stated

that the argument advanced, suggesting the reduction of costs

so as to enable It to compete in unprotected markets of the

world could be met with "several complete answers." They

mentioned two. "One is that the unprotected sugar markets of

the world are and probably will be fully occupied. Another is

that such a radical reduction In costs of production would in-

g c
volve reducing wage scales to an impossible extent."____

Since, as it stated, the United States had fostered the

sugar industry»s development making possible thereby a higher

standard of living in the country, did the United States

54
It may be, of course, that this protest was more
vocal than meaningful.

®5Italics supplied.
 511

then wish this admirable aim to be abandoned? Did the United

States wish the standard of living to sink to the level prior

to American occupation? It asked: "Lust schools be abandoned,

roads to go into disrepair, and all the public services

deteriorate and perhaps disappear? Must all that has been done

by America in the Philippines be undone?"

If the answer to these questions were "No", then, the

Association believed, it had sacrificed enough in the reduction

of its export (from 1,428,000 long tons to 850,000 long tons)

so should be permitted free access of 850,000 long tons in the

fu ture.

As far as the third proposition was concerned, the

Association stated simply that if adequate sinking funds "are

maintained through ordinary appropriations" the purpose for

which this provision had been inserted would be accomplished

"without endangering any Philippine industry." It therefore

requested the abolition of the graduated export taxes imposed

by the Independence Law.

Manuel A. Roxas, at the time a member of t h e National

Assembly, in discussing the economic future of the country, was

concerned with the problem of lowering production costs to meet

competition. This, he believed, "should be attempted and

systematically pursued."^® However, he warned of the danger

inherent in the usual process of cutting production costs by

56Ibid.. p. 172.
 512

lowering wages, stating that in doing so, "there often arise

social and economic problems of greater gravity than those

sought to be remedied." Above all, the maintenance of the

standard of living of the people could not be overlooked,

particularly in the case 01 the majority of Philippine indus­

trial workers whose wages were "already below what may be

considered sufficient to supply the minimum living requirements...."

In any event, no matter what was done or planned, it

would have to radically change the economic picture in the

Philippines, which, he believed, was not in any position to

stand economic separation from the United States.57

Despite the passage of the Tydings-Kocialkowski Act the

two years immediately preceding the War saw a continued collapse

of the Philippine economy. On June 10, 1941, Resident Commis­

sioner xilizalde, appealed in a letter to Senator Tydings, for the

suspension for a year of the collection of export taxes on

Filipino products imported Into the United States. The reasons

given to support this request were: "(1) the war then current

in Europe and the unsettled conditions in the Far East which

disrupted the economic readjustment program of the Philippines;

, (2) the war in Europe and the fact that the resultant loss to

the Philippines of European markets had accentuated the depen­

dence of the Islands on the American market; (5) the extension

'Ibid., p. 175. However, whenever suggestions are

advanced for lowering costs, the first item approached is wages.
Salaries, of management, are never reduced.
 315

to the Philippines of the export control law which dealt a

death blow to trade with Japan; (4) the acute shortage of ship­

ping in the Pacific, which raised freight rates and insurance

charges to prohibitive proportions thereby threatening Philip­

pine trade with the United States, the very lifeblood of the

Islands, and (5) the fact that the money originally intended

to fortify the economic structure of the country was diverted

to other channels."^8 This interesting admission has apparent­

ly slipped the attention of most observers who have sought

reasons for the failure of the Commonwealth in more attractive

but less accurate activities.

The action that was finally taken on this request, after

months of Congressional wrangling, came too late -- the War had

come .

Summary

It is in the prosperity of the sugar industry, in the

manifold activities of its members, in the protection and

interest offered it by the Government, in the reactionary nature

of its members' beliefs and actions, in their wrong headedness

and blindness, that we discover most easily the seeds for the

almost inevitable collapse of Philippine economy and society.

No other industry maintained its prosperity for so long a time

and no other industry was so reluctant to share its prosperity.

^®Pedro E. Abelarde, American Tariff Policy Toward the

Philipp ine s. 18S 8-1946. (New York; 1947), p. 186, italics
supplied.
 514

t'jo31 of the labor problems in the Philippines can be traced to

this reluctance on the part of the large producers to permit

their workers a more reasonable share in the profits of the

industry. It was in the areas controlled by the sugar industry

that the most serious labor troubles of the Commonwealth

originated and it was these areas that produced the worst

excesses of the Hukbalahap and the armed private groups opposed,

during the opening years of the Republic.

Coupled with this blindness was the industry's endless

optimism with regard to its future. The course of the future

was made very clear by American legislation after 1933 but the

members of the industry continued to hope and even expect that

the United States would, ultimately, never actually impose the

restrictions provided by every piece of legislation referring

to the Philippines. As a result, nothing was done, during the

Commonwealth, to prepare the industry to meet the great changes

that would come with Independence. That the industry would not

prepare could be expected. That the Government did not prepare

is the tragedy. Too, despite ius enunciation of a "social

justice" program, it is quite clear that, by 1941, with special

reference to the sugar industry, the government's policies had

produced no change either in bringing a better life to the

workers or in preparing a new future for the industry.

 CHAPTER IX

THE RICE IKDUS TRY : 1941-1950

Despite all these efforts to solve the situation, general

economic conditions went from bad to worse, and, in the years

immediately preceding the outbreak of the War, cultivation of

rice actually decreased from a maximum hectarage in 1935-1936

of approximately 2.05 million to 1.9 million in 1939. In the

following two years, production increased to 2.20 million in

1941, but the value of the product dropped from P I 52,000,000

in 1939 to 5151,000,000 in 1941. Production figures, for

periods after that year until 1947, cannot be relied upon.

In methods of production, there was little change as

late as 1949. In 1939, but 20 per cent of the lowland rice

hectarage was irrigated by a technical irrigation system,-^- and,

indeed, by 1949 this figure had declined due to the effects of

the war upon the system in operation. The f,pri mitive” systems

in use in the mountain Province and other areas were badly

damaged by the war, and as late as 1950 were not back into

adequate operation.

Up to the War, the average yield, per hectare, was some

23 cavans (of 44 kilos), with some minor exceptions in parts of

^Karl J. Pelzer: Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic

T ropics . Studies in Land Utilization and Agricultural Coloniza­
tion in Southeastern Asia. American Geographical Society,
(New York: 1945), pp. 52-54.

315
Mueva hcija (36). According to recent figures (1947), prod u c ­

tion with the institution of double crops in some portions of

the country had reached some 25 cavans.^

Other factors -- tenant-landlord relations, marketing,

credit, etc. -- will be discussed l a t e r . ^

The 0 c cup a 1 1o n :-

The outbreak of the war came at a critical period in

the agricultural development of the country. None of the plans

laid down had time to become effective (if effective they ever

would have become because of other than agricultural factors);

the economy was unsteady, and the people unprepared. The openin

campaigns were devastating in certain areas and the ps ycholo­

gical upheaval ac companying defeat was equally crushing. feany

people, for several crucial months, laid down their tools, fled

their homes, and pursued anything but a settled agricultural

existence. 'The pr o g r a m the Japanese followed was equally

destructive. They looted and burned, homes, farms and all the

little possessions the people had acquired. They confiscated

crops, in fields and warehouses, and imposed ne w restrictions

wi th regard to every aspect of daily life. The economy was

drained to feed the occupation troops as well as the mainland

of Japan itself. The contrast between the declarations of the

^ Journal of Philippine S t a t i s t i c s . Vol. IV, Nos. 1-6

(Januar y - J u n e , 1949), p. 15.

5In Part II.

 317

Japanese -- that they had come to stay -- and their policy of

taking everything, movable and shipping it to Japan became all

too clear to the Filipino populace. Those who planted export

crops saw them taken by their masters; if they planted food

crops to stave off starvation, these too were appropriated. It

soon became clear that the Japanese realized their stay was to

be short, and they wanted to take as much as possible.

The Japanese introduced a new species of rice, called

H o r a i . but few ever tasted it. Rice fields were burned by

troops to smoke out guerrillas and to deprive them of badly-

needed food. By 1943, starvation faced the majority of the

populace, and at the time of liberation fully ninety per cent

of the population was malnourished and half-starved. In addition,

some were always ready to take advantage of their f e l l o w s '

need. Profiteering was rampant, encouraged by the Japanese

who saw to it that the profits passed through their ever-ready

hands. In mid-November, 1944, the Rice and Corn Ad min istration

was organized, supplanting the Bigasang Bayan (National Rice

Corporation, the "NARIC" of the early Occupation), as the

control agency of the Government over all staples -- par ticular­

ly rice. The reason given by an observer writing in a semi­

official publication, was that this step had become ne ce ssar y

in view of the critical situation, but it was also true that

the Japanese felt that it would enable them to reap larger

benefits. It was estimated that the crop for that year in

Central Luzon would amount to some 450,000 cavans, plus an

 318

additional hoarded amount of some 50,000 cavans.^ The author

of this article advanced two reasons for che hoarding of rice.

One was "the steady and swift climb of prices," and the other

was "the difficulty of transporting the grain from farmer to

buying center due to risks on the road." These risks were of

two kinds: the guerrillas and the Japanese, each wanting the

rice for his own needs. The farmer was threatened with p u n i s h ­

ment by the guerrillas if he gave the rice to the Japanese, and

the Japanese threatened the farmer if he aided the guerrillas.

Caught between the two, the farmer led a miserable existence,

ending all too frequently in tragedy.

P o s t - W a r :-

For one reason or another, the rice hectarage had

decreased some 1.5 or 2 million hectares. By 1946, the figure

had risen to some 1.64 million hectares, still far below the

1941 figure of 2.3 million. The production in 1948 was some

2.24 million metric tons, an increase of 382 thousand metric

tons over 1936, but still far b elow the min imu m requirements

for the country. By the end of the War, the pop ul at ion had

increased some two million over the last census of 1939, and

the fact that the rice hec tarage was inadequate even for the

earlier population indicates the critical situation at the end

of the War. In 1949, many rice fields wdiich had been tilled in

4Antonio Paulino: "Our Staff of Life," Philippine

R e v i e w . Vol. II, No. 10 (December, 1944), p. 38 and p a s s i m .
 319

1941 were not yet restored because of the uncertain conditions

in Central Luzon and elsewhere.

The situation in 1946 was almost desperate, wi th an

estimated shortage of some 6 million cavans. The original

estimate had been some 12 millions, which, however, was reduced

by UN RRA importations. President Roxas requested an allocation

of 4.5 million cavans from the International Emergency Food

Council, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture stated that the

country would have to depend almost completely upon imported

stocks until November. However, the appraisal was in reality

an understatement, since it left out of the re ckoning those

variable factors which always determine the situation. The

typhoon that swept northern Luzon in July destroyed some 85 per

cent of the crops in the Cagayan Valley and in the province of

La Union. In the words of a reporter, "what remained of the

1,619,950 hectares of upland rice of both provinces after the

storm, was n e g l i g i b l e . " 5 In Central Luzon the situation was

even more serious, the frequent clashes betwe en Huks and

Constabulary and "civilian guards" driving the farmers from

their fields. As a result, in Pampanga only 197 out of the

79,768 normally arable hectares (which is less than one-third

of one per cent) were planted to rice; in Tarlac, 1,342 out of

77,145; in Bulacan only 237 of 78,561 hectares, and in Nueva

Ecija less than one per cent (1,699) of the 215,200 hectares

^"The Rice Shortage," Sunday Post M a g a z i n e , Vol. I,

No. 46 (August 4, 1946), pp. 3, 22.
 320

of arable land was cultivated. Even Pangaslnan,which had been

comparatively undisturbed by the Huk problem, cultivated only

about one-ninth of its total hectarage of 260,246.® An alLevia-

ting factor in the otherwise gloomy picture was an increase in

the hectarage of c o m and camotes (or sweet potatoes),the latter

an important item in the diet and almost a substitute for rice.

The price of rice, per ganta, had increased ten times

over the price before the War, retailing at £2.00 per ganta in

the city of Manila. As a measure of relief the Government re­

instituted a rationing system, giving the NARIC charge of

apportioning some 240 grams per person per day to 200,000 needy

families in Manila. This revival of the rice rationing system,

which a reporter said was "ironically reminiscent of the

occupation," was a recognition by the government of the serious­

ness of the rice problem. The next logical thing to do he said

was "to restore peace and order in Central Luzon soon so that

planting may be undertaken Immediately...."7

Two and a half months following the printing of the

article above, a dispatch from Cagayan stated! "People...are

eating camotes, tubers and grasses as substitute for rice. The

prevalent stomach ache and beri-beri in some places is attribu­

ted partly to tagulao. a wild grass grain. As a consequence of

the existing famine in the whole province, mortality has Increased.

6 Ibld. 7 Ibid
 321

In Cattaran alone, a local doctor reports that about fifty to

sixty deaths occur every da y . . . . 11®

The Government and private individuals rep eat edl y

announced that conditions would improve as soon as conditions

returned to normal. But how "normal" was the prewar normal?

J.E. Spencer writes! "Examination of the figures for rice im­

ports in the late 1930s m i .ht convey the impression that the

basic food deficiency then was unimportant and that its present

liquidation is merely a question of re turning to pre-war

'normalcy'. But when the general increase in food imports,

partic ula rly of wheat flour, is examined the nominal deficit of

the 1930s is seen to be very real. In 1938 the rice equivalent

to the wheat flour import had risen to approximately 275,000,000

pounds.... The 1946 wheat flour import was equivalent to about

380,000,000 pounds of rice."^

A common error with regard to diet in the Philippines

should be noted here. Professor Spencer stated that food

products shared in a general price increase and that although

"prices are mu ch higher than in prewar years, most of the people

are eating better than ever b e f o r e . This last statement may

run counter to subjective opinion, of course."^0 Taking beri-

^"They Eat Grass in Cagayan," This h e e k , The kanila

C h r o n i c l e . Vol. II, No. 32 (November 24, 1 9 4 6 ) , ~p. 14. A re­
print fr om the Evening News of November 11.

®J.E. Spencer! "The Philippine Rice Problem," Far

,
E a s t e r n .S u r v e y , 18 Mo. 11 (June 1, 1949), p. 125.

-^I b i d . Italics supplied.

 322

beri alone as an example, objective statistics, however, show

us the following picture. A m ong adults, the rate of death

from beri-beri increased fro m 4,365 (or 29.65 per 100,000) in

1934, to 8,276 (or 45.67 per 100,000) in 1946 .11 By 1948, the

number of deaths had dropped to 7,687, which, however, is still

3,322 over the 1934 figure and in 1949 the death rate was 43.59

— almost double that for 1934. A m ong infants, the deaths f r o m

beri-beri present an even more tragic picture. In 1934, out of

18,691 cases of infant beri-beri, 17,054 (or 115.85 per 100,000)

resulted in death. In 1946, out of 20,913 cases, 18,583

resulted in death. By 1948, the picture for infants had

brightened somewhat since despite the increase in cases (22,419),

only 18,130 (or 96.95 per 100,000) resul ted in d e a t h , ^ the

drop in mortality being due to the excellent educational

prog ram of the Institute of Nutrition. However, note that the

number of cases increased and, in 1949, the rate was still

99.64 per 100,000. Since beri-beri is a disease of malnutrition,

it hardly seems possible that "most of the people are eating

better than ever before."

It may be true, quantitatively, that; if an individual

was accustomed to eating one bowl of rice and one fish and n ow

eats one bowl of rice and two fish, he may be eating better,

but hardly from a qualitative point of view. One of the

Bureau of He alth S t a t i s t i c s . Table II. Copy given the

author by Dr. J u a n " S a l c e d o , Jr., Direc tor of the Institute of
Nutrition.
12
See Health Tables, Appendix.
 323

inescapable facts in Philippine society is the fact that the

great majority of the popu l a t i o n live dangerously nea r the

starvation level. In some areas, such as the I ountain Province,

for instance, starvation lies much nearer than in other regions

but throughout the na ti on the last meal of the day is many

times the prelude to hunger

Objactive : Increased P r o d u c t i o n .-

In August, 1947, the Under-Secretary of Agric ult ure and

Commerce, Jose Camus, stated that "Self-sufficiency in rice

for the country's population beginn ing with next year's harvest

Is certain at the rate the rice industry is getting r e h a b i l ­

itated."^^ F o rgettin g the Increase in population, he stated

.that the 7,000,000-sack shortage of the previous year, some 12

per cent below the point of self-sufficiency, was certain of

Improvement in the coming year. This was, he said, because of

the "recent arrival of 3r6,000,000 wo rth of UNRRA agricultural

machineries and equipment...." Whether the im provement would

be due to the "arrival" or the machi ner y itself is not clear.

In any event, the statement itself seems tinged with magical

significance.

He mentioned also that a "five-point p r o g r a m for the

rehabi lit ati on of the rice industry towards self -sufficiency has

■^"Next Rice Yiel d Enough, Camus," ACIL, IX, Wo. 8

(August, 1S47), p. 34.
 324

been going on for some time now.... It includes the following;

(1) rapid use of machineries instead of work animals; (2) p l a n t ­

ing of better-yielding varieties of rice; (3) repair of

Irrigations; (4) importation of work animals to supplement

machineries and depleted work animals during the war; and

(5) control of p e s t s . A s i d e from some of the inconsistencies

in the statement, it can hardly be considered as something new,

since the identical p r o g r a m had b e e n in progress since 1934,

with minor variations, with little effect toward reso l v i n g the

problem. It must be noted here that the rice yield for the

fol lowing year was not enough.

'This same pu bli cation noted, in the same m o n t h in 1948,

that the "big problem" was still rice. A shortage had been

hinted in July, but in August it became "fr igh ten ingl y real."

Rice prices climbed steadily to the ceiling of 1*1.60 a ganta and

the NARIC hastily stepped in to arrest the climb at f*1.30.

Profiteers, it was noted, who had considerable stocks In their

possession hoping “to corner the market w i t h the coming of the

rainy season", withdr ew these stocks and panicked the people.

NARIC resumed rationing, the Government confiscated stocks, but

the situation, the magazine believed, was a cause fo r concern

and demanded correction. As a step in this direction, they

called for the b u i ldi ng of a "nation of in dependent f a r m e r s . " ^

Since this would require a complete impl emen tat ion of the social

•^I b i d .
"I C
"Across the Editor's Desk," ojd . ci t . . Vol. X, No. 8
(August, 1948), p. 1.
 325

justice pr o g r a m -- something the Commonw eal th found impossible

in times of peace -- the semi-paralyzed condition of the

Republic Indicated the staggering task facing the nation.

An editorial in the public ati on examined the pr o b l e m in

greater detail. The cause, it believed, for the recurrent rice

shortage lay in the "dislocated economy" of the nation and

especially In the "unsettled peace problem." It noted that In

Central Luzon, considered the rice granary of the country, men

who should have bee n tilling the fields were "conspicuous by

their absence". These men, the editorial stated, were either

"spending their time in idleness" or were w i t h the "Huks and

PKMs" who were engaging in an "obvious sit-down strike" until

"the government could carry out its social amelioration pr o g r a m

as enunciated by President Quirino." It expected that the

situation, if uncorrected, would "dog our footsteps again next

year". Stat ing that it was too late to till these idle fields,

the editorial bluntly said that it was not too late, however,

to realize that "we have noth ing but ourselves to blame" for

all these difficulties. One thing that the na t ion failed to do,

it said, was to carry through the food p r o duction campaign of

the late President Roxas, ascribing the re as on for this to a

pr eocc upation wi th other "more important" things -- "politics;

for Instance." It stated bitterly that the government k n e w

that Central Luzo n wo uld not be able to produce its normal

quota of rice and should have launched a campaign for the pro duc ­

tion of supplementary food items. But, the editorial stated,

 326

"nobody seemed to care" since "whether we produce enough food

or not, the high officials in the government will always have

enough to eat." It was this attitude, it stated, that was

responsible for the continuing deterioration in peace and order

which would continue until the government realized that the

country "is for the r i c h and the poor, the high and the low."^-6

Such bitter editorials continued to appear in the

various newspapers and magazines throughout the succeeding

years. They curiously compare in many details wit h editorial

comment In the Commonwealth period.

The above editorial contrasts sharply with the re as­

surances given the people, earlier in the year, by President

Roxas in his annual message to Congress. He at that time

denied the validity or persistent reports of an impending rice

shortage, and declared that the Government had in storage over

a million bags, emphasizing that he expected no shortage in

the "foreseeable future." Chairman De la Cruz, of the NARIC,

echoed the President, stating that this quantity would be

sufficient to meet the short term requirements until the arrival

of foreign shipments. Despite the loss of some three million

cavans of p a lay from typhoons, he expressed optimism over the

increase in area planted. A bright rice prospect was envisioned

16
Ibid., p. 18
 327

for every Filipino for one year 1S48.^^

During 1948, however, the Philippines experienced, di f ­

ficulty in securing foreign rice because of shortages in

countries supplying the cereal, so, as a result, President

.yiir ino issued Executive Order bo. 184, on November 19, 1948,

creating the Rice Emergency Board. This board was directly

under the Office of the President and was composed of the

Se cretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as Chairman,

the Secretary of Commerce and Industry, the Secretary of Labor,

the President of the National Rice G r o w e r s ’ Association, and

a private rice-g rowi ng citizen. As happened during the Comm on­

weal th period, the two latter places fell to hacenderos f r o m

Central Luzon who could hardly be considered representatives

of the people. The Order abolished a free market and placed

complete government control over procurement and distribution.

1 *7
Pedro S. de Jesus: ’’Ticklis h R i c e ” , Evenin g News
Saturday M a g a z i n e , Vol. 3, No. 22 (February 21, 1948), pp. 10-
11, 26-27. By March, 1950, Placido L. Mapa, Sec ret ary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, viewed the situation then
thus: "Impressive as the rate of i n c r e a s e ...has been, n e v e r ­
theless, we are still far fr om catching up with our consumption
requirement w h ich increases at the rate of 1,380,000 cavans a
year. For instance, while our 1948-49 production was 56,620,000
cavans, our present requirements aggregated 61,000,000 showing
a deficiency of more than 8,000,000 cavans.... This accounts
for the fact that despite this rapid increase in production, we
still had to import rice -- valued at 1*46,000,000 in 1S48 and
1:49,000,000 In 1949. Beginning 1950, however, importation is
expected to be substantially redu ced each year." Mani la B u l l e t i n .
Vol. 141, No. 73 (March 27, 1950), Section 6. p. 3. Anoth er
factor not mentio ned here was the Increasing rise in the importa­
tion of flour which had increased steadily to a figure of 5.8
kilograms per capita during the period 1936-1940, and at a mu ch
greater rate during 1945-1950. (See graph 18.) Importation of
flour in the latter peri od increased 500 per cent. Since the
consumption of flour is a substitution for rice consumption, the
true picture is obvious.
 328

The Board was to utilize the NARIC for its operations and was

empowered to establish prices and issue licenses to millers and

dealers.

Professor Spencer observed that this might "serve very

well as a purely temporary m e a sure,” but that doubts existed as

to its longterm value. He noted three major defects in the plan;

First, the sheer insufficiency of rice will continue

for at least some years. Second, the p r o g r a m seems
geared to the interest of the large land-owning produce r
group of Central L u z o n . ... The ceiling price for gove r n ­
ment purchase of rice is defined at fourtee n pesos per
c a v a n ... second g r a d e .. . (U. S. £7.00 per nin ety -sev en
pounds unmllled). This will set the retail price for
clean rice at a ceiling of about 1.32 pesos per ganta
(equivalent to about b.S. £<0.13 per pound), w hich will
provide the large Central Luzon rice growers wi th a
handsome profit, since the chief market zone is near to
hand and the price is higher than for imported rice.
Purchase prices set for small farmers in the surplus
regions of Mindanao, southeastern Luzon, or Panay are
theoretically prop erl y adjusted, but in actual fact they
leave these areas at a disadvantage. Retail prices are
too high, and the p r o g r a m is not defined in terms of the
small-town and urban consumer, or for the farmer who
raises commercial crops and buys his rice supply.
Third, the NARIC, the operating organ of the n ew
program, was pre viously unable to cope w i t h the rice
problem, and its staff and facilities n o w are quite in­
adequate to handle the whole of the crop that should go
through government monopoly ma chi ner y without loss, leak-
age, graft, or a serious black market.... An y failure
will open the way for serious rep erc uss ions socially,
economically, and politically, since the rice pr o b l e m
will continue for several years under ideal conditions.... ®

This acute analysis was borne out by the events of 1949-

1951, when unrest continued to mount, net only over other

socio-economic problems, but over the rice prob lem itself w h ich

18
Spencer, op. c i t . . pp. 127-128, passim.
was called, in 1949, one of the "colossal failures" of the
19
adrnini s t r a z i o n .

A Pro g r a m Suggested and Influencing Factors :

Professor Spencer discusses six steps required to solve

the p r o b l e m of adequate rice production. "First," he states,

"is a series of steps in the improvement of rice varieties

grown by the general farmer.... Second is a progr am of pest

elimination.... Third is the broa den ing and diversification of

general agriculture.... The fou rth is the question of m echaniza­

tion by whic h the very great volume of human labor now being

used in rice culture can be turned to other ends.... The fi fth

need is for the development of irrigation systems to provide

the water for most of the lowland rice acreage not no w being

irrigated.... Sixth, and last... concerns the fertilizer problem.

This is two-fold, teaching its pr op er use and pr ovi ding the

volume and variety needed...."

Other observers recommended the following: (1) Use of

mechan iza tion especially in those areas best adapted to such

farming; (2) the improvement of varieties through breeding;

(3) the introduction of leguminous crops into rotation w i t h

■^"Even in Apo's Own Province 'Q,uirino Rice' Finds No

Buyers," The Star R e p o r t e r . Vol. V, No. 93 (October 28, 1949),
pp. 1 and 3. This newspaper throughout the early years of the
Republ ic was a sharp critic of the Administration.
 330

rice and corn; (4) a more extensive use of fertilizers; and (5)

the development of a grain drier using locally available fuel.^

Both these prescriptions generally agree on what i s

needed. A portio n of the recommendations has been embodied in

a p rogram for action by various government entities, part i c u l a r ­

ly the Department of Agriculture and Natural R e s o u r c e s but,

unfortunately, very little of the p r o g r a m was ever effectuated

to the degree necessary or with the required technical base.^^

Experiments conducted by the De partment and its agencies all

pointed to the feasibility of its plan, but outside its

various experiment stations little, w i t h certain later-noted

exceptions, was actually accomplished by 1951. 'Ihis was not

due to any special lack of energy with in the Department but to

the increasing lessening of appropriations with which to carry

out its program and the pre sum pti on of man:/ of its functions by

other more political and less technically pro ficient bodies.

One other step is necessary before the chronic rice

shortage can be met satisfactorily, and that is pro vis ion for

proper distribution. Transportation and communication were di f ­

ficult in the Philippines of 1945-1950, and constituted a major

21
R e p o r t of the Ph ilippine-United States Agricul tur al
fission, p. 4-2.

See its Reports, 1935-1939.

23
C f . the observations commenting on the failure of the
RIPCA p r o g r a m by Leon 0. Ty. "So Par - So Bad," The Philip-
pines Free P r e s s . XLI, No. 17 (April 29, 1950), pp. 4, 57; No.
18 (May 6, 1950), pp. 38-40; No. 19 (May 13, 1950), pp. 16, 52;
No. 20 (May 20, 1950), pp. 16, 40.
 331

barrier to the free flow of goods. In 1938, there were 19,174

kilometers of roads in the Philippines, of which 10,408 kil o­

meters were classified as first-class. By 1946, this latter

figure had risen to 12,709, but as a result of the War, they

could ha rdly be classified as good. The estimated cost for

recons tru cti on was some $100,000,000. If we measure the miles

of road per 1000 square miles of territory, the Philippines

falls below Korea and Palestine, both smaller in area. By the

same measurement, the Philippines stands below British Malaya,

Ceylon, and Formosa, all smaller, and considerably below Japan,

with an area some 30,000 square miles greater (the Philippines:

approx. 102 per 1,000; Japan: 3,623 per 1,000). The quality of

roads in the Philippines in 1950 was considerably be low what

it should have been. Travel was still a hardship and costs

were h i g h . 2 ^

Durin g the Commonwealth period, no agency of the Go vern ­

ment was more conscientious in its labors or more productive

of good than the Dep artment of Ag riculture and Natural Resources.

It was well-est abl ish ed and well-directed, and its personnel

had a high morale and level of efficiency. Its labors were

truly herc ulean even If they fell below their objectives. One

P A.
Public La w 370 of the 79th A m e rican Congress set
aside $40,000,000, for reconstruction of Philippine highways
and bridges. This was matched w i t h $12,000,000, bjr the Phi lip­
pine Congress. The program, which was to have been completed
by June 30, 1951, was to provide for a total of 81 highway
projects totalling 580 kilometers of bituminous and concrete
pavement; 218 bridges totalling 36 kilometers, and 226 small
bridges. By March, 1950, 99 per cent of the pr o g r a m m i n g had
been completed; 82 per cent of the plans; 70 per cent of bids
taken; 28 per cent completed projects; and 35 per cent under
construction.
 332

of its most effective branches was the Bureau of Plano Industry,

composed of six divisions: administration, agronomy-horti-

culture research, agricultural extension, farm management and

seed production, plant pest and disease control, and plant

utilization. The Bureau in 1950 had seventeen experiment sta­

tions and seed farms and forty- sev en provincial and municipal

nurseries and demonstration stations, situated ac strategic

points throughout the Islands. The functions of the various

divisions have been the following:

a. To undertake the investigation of soil and

climatic conditions in relati on to crops adapted to
these conditions and the methods of pr oducing and
hand lin g agricultural products;
b. To introduce, raise and distribute improved
seeds and plants;
c. To establish, equip, maintain, operate and
administer agricultural experiment stations for p u r ­
poses of agricultural research;
d. To control and eradicate plant pests and
diseases; and
e. To per form all tasks pres cribed by law or
regulation as essential for the pr omotion and develo p­
ment of the agricultural resources of the Philippines.
The activities of the Bureau may be grouped as
follows:
a. Rese arc h work, in agronomy, horticulture plant
breeding, plant pathology, entomology, plant physio-
logy, soil, agricultural chemistry, plant utilization,
rural economic, and agricultural engineering.
b. Ex tension work al ong extensive and intensive
crop pro duction and improvement, control of plant
pests and diseases, betterment of rural conditions
through f ar m and home improvement, soil maintenance
and improvement with f a r m and green manures, cover
crops and fertilizers, crop diversification, crop
rotation, establishment of new plant industries
development of home industries, operation of demonstra­
tion farms, gardens and orchards, organization of
agricultural fairs and cooperative farmers' associations,
rural relief work and findi ng of markets wh ere to sell
the c r o p s ;
c. Regulatory work whic h consists of the enf orc e­
ment of laws and regulations affecting agriculture,
 335

especially foreign and domestic plant quarantine and

inspection activities, special drives against locusts,
leaf-miners, and other outbreaks of pests and diseases
of major importance;
d. Establishment and operation of experiment
stations, seed farms and nurseries for purposes of
propagation and distribution of improved seeds and plant
materials ;
e. Industria liz ati on and utilization of farm products. ®

Possibly the major factor inhibiting its earnest work

has been the apathy or resistance on the part of individual

farmers, to the introduction of new rice varieties and methods

of production.

The Bureau experimented constantly wit h new varieties

of rice, seeking a species which would give a higher yield per

hectare and bear earlier in the season. It was believed that

if such a variety could be developed and placed in wide use,

the planting of a second crop in many areas would be possible,

thus enormously increasing the annual production. Informa­

tion wi th regard to the introduction of such varieties during

the Commonwealth period Is difficult to obtain, but a recent

report mentions the major varieties introduced generally since

about 1919, some 13 in all.*'®

The chief importance of this work lies not merely in

26
"A Guide to Visitors to the Bureau of Plant Indus t r y , ”
Bure a u of Plant Industry, Manila, 19 48, 5 pp. (Mimeo.), pp. 2, 3.
26
fo. Manas y Cruz and Fabian 0. Solpicio; Plant
Exploration and Introduction Work of the Bureau of Plant Indus­
try," MS copy loaned author, Novembe r 28, 1949, 10 pp.
 334

the introduction, but ir the establishment of the variety.

This, in many instances, is another story. Ivajor varieties

introduced and established include the following: Ra m a i .

which was introduced from Cochin-China in 1919, is considered

the heaviest yiel din g variety in the Philippines, producing

in 195 days, a yield per hectare of 77 cavans (average). It

requires much water, its product is considered as second class

rice, has a fair eating quality, and is "extensively grown

in the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and

some parts of Pangasinan". Seraup KechiJ^ 36, is a "recently

introduced" variety from the Federated Malay States, maturing

in about 200 days, yi elding from 50 to 90 cavans per hectare,

excellent eating quality and resistant to drought, and is

extensively grown in Laguna, Pampanga, Pangasinan and Isabela.

Others are Seraup Besar 1 5 . K hao Bai Sri (Siam), K ra-Suey

(Siam-"floating rice"), Malagkit Sungson (China), Delhinla

(Siam), Ketan Koet oek (Siam), Taichu 65 (Formosa), Taichu Q.46

'(Formosa), Taichu Q.62 (Formosa), Tosa Mo chi (Formosa), and

Kokkukko hochi (Formosa). The last three but one are used

generally in the pr eparation of native delicacies and pastries.

This experimentation with n ew varieties and their sub­

sequent introduction into the culture are really two distinct

processes, since many farmers are reluctant to change from

their old methods and their old varieties. The economic factor

enters at this point, since if farmers and tenants had to

purchase the n e w seed varieties, they would be unde rstandably

 355

reluctant to take the risk attached to the cultivation of a

new and unknown variety at their own expense. Were seeds

fu'rnished the farmer free of charge by the Government, the

situation would be different, as has been shown in areas where

this has been done. As a general rule, the establishment of

new varieties in the culture has been accomplished on large

estates or haciendas rather than on small plots owned by

individual farmers.

By 1949, the replacement of old varieties with new

h i g h -yielding ones was about one-fourth of the goal, with some

675,000 hectares of lowland, upland and palagad areas replaced

out of a total of 2,164,100 hectares planted. The Bureau

stated; "The average produc tio n of lowland and upland fields

of these productive varieties was in order of 3 to 8 cavans

Or?
according to variety per hectare, more than ordinary v a r i e t i e s . 1

It was hoped that this pointed to the achievement of self-

sufficiency in five years. The goals in rice pr oduction were

as follows: area; 2,176,910 hectares; production: 64,255,570

cavans; yield per hectare: 29.5 cavans. By June, 1949, progress

was reported as follows: Area: 2,164,100; production: 56,620,200

cavans; yield per hectare: 25.6 (approx.).^e

27
An nual Report of the Bureau of Plant Industry
Including Progress in the R eh a b i l i t ation of Plant Industries
for the Crop Year binding June 50. 1949. MS file copy loaned
the author by J.CJ. Dacanay, September 21, 1949. Typescript,
pp. 3, 6.
OD
Ibid . , p. 4, and Plant Industry Digest, Vol. XII,
No. 5 (May, 1949), cover.
 336

While optimistic of the future, the Bureau was realistic

in its appraisal of the existing situation.

During the year (19 48-1949) under review, there was

a shortage of roughly, 10,959,000 cavans of palay on
this staple food and this was made up p a rtl 3^ by rice
importations from abroad and partly by making use of
supplementary food crops. With the present prod uction
of 56,620,200 cavans there would be around 52,656,786
cavans available for consumption after deducting the
seeds, wastes, etc. Consid eri ng our consumption require­
ments of 62,763,980 cavans for 1949-50 based at 340
grams clean rice per capita per day, there will be a
shortage of about 10,107,194 cavans for the next yea r. ...^ ®

Three hundred and forty grams of clean rice per person

per day is the equivalent of 10 . S troy ounces, and the

nutritional requirements demand a minimum of 360 grams, if not

supplemented by other foods. This amount would give less than

1300 calories which is quite insufficient to maintain good

health. In the city of Manila, many families have been found to

be existing on as low as 405 calories per d a y . ^

One of the most difficult steps in the solution of the

rice problem is the elimination of control of pests and diseases

which annually take a h e avy toll of production. During 1949 a

great infestation of army worms (Spodoptera mauritia Boisd.)

invaded some forty provinces. Hardest hit were the provinces

in Central Luzon, Mindoro, Antique, Batangas, Cavite, Laguna,

Quezon, Aorsogon and Camarines S u r . Of 75,760 hectares infested,

some 58,000 were reported freed and the rest were either

30
Dr. Juan Salcedo Jr., Philippine Institute of
Kutrition, in conversation with author, January 21, 1950.
 337

pa rtially or completely destroyed. Some 60 per cent of the

damaged crops was estimated to be recoverable if normal ra i n­

fall was experienced, and a greater percentage if extensive

fertiliza tio n occurred. This out-break was the most damaging

ever recorded. Rice seedbeds, sugarcane plantations and corn

fields were destroyed, as well as pasture areas. The Bureau

exerted heroic efforts to bring it under control, using every

method from hand-p ick ing to dusting by helicopter, and fo llo w­

ing the campaign carried on an extensive education p rogram

encouraging farmers to request aid and information wi th regard

to methods of control and destruction. Much yet remains to be

done in this matter and the Bu reau is seeking constantly cheaper

and more powerful insecticides and means of making them a v a i l ­

able to farmers.

The third step, that of b roade nin g and diversifying

agriculture, is more difficult. The utilization of leguminous

plants on idle fields has been stressed repeatedly by the Bu rea u

but wi th little general success. In 1950 mu ch of the Phi l i p ­

pine land still lay Idle for a great portion of the year between

the harvest and the next planting. Rotatio n of crops, and the

ins titution of cottage industries alone would enormously

increase the food potential of the country. However, unless

the basic social and economic problems of the general Philippine

system were radically changed, there could be little productive

development.

Mech ani zat ion is pro po sed as the fourth step, but it is
 338

hardly feasible wi th the present system of land ownership. On

large haciendas, mechanization has pr ove d successful, but in

such regions as the Ilocos with its farms of an average si^e

of a hectare or less, and in Central Luzon wi th its tenancy

problem, the story- is quite different. Individuals who cannot

afford a carabao can hardly afford a tractor and other eq uip­

ment, and for small farms (and Philippine farms are small), the .

cost far o u t w e i g h s the advantages. Since the present trend

is away from large haciendas towards individual ownership, the

prospects for a considerable development of mechanized farming

would seem remote indeed. One technical writer states:

But mec hanizing a primitive system of tropical

agriculture requires not only know-how, but also wi sdom
and patience. For instance, it would do no good to
dump tractors, plows, harrows, combines and the like,
let us say, in Bulacan province and elsewhere in Central
Luzon and expect to mechanize the pro d uction of lowland
rice there. Bot h social and technical problems are
involved.
In the first place, It is not a wise policy to
displace labor, particularly peasant labor, suddenly
and without giving a chance to those men whose labor
will be displaced, an opportunity to readjust them­
selves. In the second place, the areas of the average
rice paddies and their water supply are such that
prese nt- day mechanized equipment are not suitable in
working them economically.... It may be considered,
therefore, that the effort to substitute the small
tractor for the carabao is not yet a definite p o s s i b i l i t y . ...31

The w i s d o m in this analysis is obvious.

Irrigation, the fifth step leading toward a solution of

the rice problem, being more expensive and more subject to

^ D r . Santiago R. Cruz: "Essentials in PI Fa rm

M e c h a n i z a t i o n , ” Plant Industry D i g e s t . Vol. XII, ho. 6 (June,
1949), pp. 15, 17, p a s s i m .
 339

political pressures, has barely begun in the Philippines. On

October 26, 1936, an act was passed by the First National

A s s embly "giving the President authority tc administer the

irrigation systems constructed by trie g o v e r n m e n t ...and to effect

adjustments in the payment of irrigation charges, to suspend

pendi ng judicial proceedings for the collection of unpaid

charges and penalties, and to grant the right of repurchase."

This authority was sweeping since he could, ”by executive

order, effect such changes and reforms In the administration

of the irrigation systems, increase or decrease the irrigable

area of any Irrigation system or close any or all of those that

are already existing, fix the rate of the irrigation charges and

the manner of payment thereof, and exempt from payment of

irrigation charges any land or lands included within the irriga­

tion systems} Provided, however, that on fixing the annual

irrigation charge per hectare, which shall include the cost of

operation, maintenance, equipment, insurance and reasonable

amortization on the cost of construction, the President shall

take into consideration the economic situation and ability to

pay of the persons owning land wi thin a given irrigation system. »33

Such an act gave the President all the powers needed to

extend as far as was possible the nee ded Irrigation system in

the Philippines. Since the President repe atedly spoke of his

great interest in seeking all poss ible solutions to the vexing

•^ Co mmonwealth Act No. 87, M.Q .P. . Vol. 2, Pt. 2, p. 749

33
I b i d .. pp. 749-750.
 340

problems facing Philippine agriculture, upon which the future

of the Commonwealth and the Republic rested, it is surprising

that so little was accomplished through executive action.

In vetoing Commonwealth Bill No. 1536, which provided

for the extension of the Angat irrigation system, President

Quezon wrote; "When it is intended to construct irrigation

systems for the benefit of landowners, it has been the policy

of the Government to float bonds for the purpose of financing

such projects with the idea that the Government will be re­

imbursed by the landowners of at least the cost of the operation

and maintenance of such irrigation systems (Act 4185). The

proposed measure is a departure from that policy as it seeks to

extend the Angat River Irrigation System in Bulacan to certain

barrios in the Municipality of Malolos at the direct expense

of the National Government in the amount of .

f 8,000. I do not

see any special reason in the present instance to justify depart­

ing from the established policyr of the Government In the matter

of construction of extending irrigation systems. If it is

intended to extend the Angat Irrigation System, as proposed in

the bill, resort should be made to the Irrigation fund

established under the Irrigation Act and not to the general

funds of the National Treasury which are needed to finance more

urgent government activities.

The National Assembly, on November 13, 1936, also

passed an act^° providing for an irrigation insurance fund,

54M . Q . P ., Vol. 2, P t . 1, pp. 381-382. Italics supplied.

35
Commonwealth Act No. 176.
 341

from which damaged irrigation systems would draw funds for

repairing and reconstruction, so that owners would not be
charged for such repair work. Unfortunately, this fund never
acquired the appropriation to meet the provisions of the act.
Since the act provided that if at any time irrigation works
"constructed by the National Government" shall be damaged or
destroyed, "or shall be in danger of destruction, or serious
damages by earthquake, fire, lightning, flood, tornado, typhoon,
hurricane, war or by other fortuitous events or force majeure.
the same shall b e ...repaired", and since these were of common
occurrence and the works constructed by the Government were only
a small percentage of the total irrigation facilities in opera­
tion, the total effort of the Government contributed little to

the solution of this aspect of its agricultural program.

Over a period of years, the Government acquired rather

extensive land holdings through confiscation of land for reason
of non-payment of irrigation charges. On August 24, 1937,
President Quezon issued Executive Order No. 108, authorizing
the repurchase of lands levied and sold for failure to pay
irrigation charges. Owners of such land could repurchase them
by payment of a price "which shall not be less than the total
of all the unpaid irrigation charges, and the penalties due on
the land...and the costs of judicial proceedings, with interest
at the rate of four per centum per annum," provided that the
repurchase "shall be made within one year from the date of the
promulgation of this Order, and that at least ten per centum
 342

of the repurchase price shall be paid within thirty days..."

and that the "balance of the repurchase price shall be paid in

cash or in not more than two annual installments."

Further, Quezon directed that "all installments due

and payable shall draw interest at four per centum per annum"

and if the purchaser failed to pay any installment "within the

period of six months from the time it Is due," all amounts

would be forfeit to the Government and the sale c a n c e l l e d . ^

From a business point of view, this was an excellent order but

it hardly was In the spirit of the social justice program

promulgated by the Government. It was actuations such as this,

contrasting so sharply with the promises of the Government,

that lost the Government support and cooperation on the part of

the people concerned.

President Quezon, in May, 1938, received a petition

from the people of Nueva Ecija requesting; an irrigation system

and the sale, to the tenants, of the oabani Estate landholdings.

On June 1, 1938, the President sent a letter to the Hon. Felipe

Buencamino, Jr., in which he expressed his regret that the

pressure of official business compelled him to decline the

invitation to meet with these people. "I hope you will under­

stand and will present my excuse to the people who expect to

meet me there on that day." He continued:

With regard to the petition of the people of several

towns of Nueva Ecija for an irrigation system, please

56M.O.P.. Vol. 3, Pt. 2, p. 643.

 343

tell them that I am in thorough sympathy with their

desire, as I have set forth in a former letter to you.
kith respect to the petition of the tenants of
Sabani Estate that the Government sell to them on
installment plan their present holdings, you may assure
them that their petition meets with my approval, and
that I have conferred with h r . Anonas, manager of the
National Development Company, who will give early
attention to this subject. Only bona fide tenants
will be given preference to have the land they are
occupying sold to them.37

The tenants in 1950 were still awaiting their irrigation

system and the sale of the Estate, which was owned, at that

time, by the National Development Company.

Before the Jar, some 670,000 hectares of rice land were

irrigated, of which 370,000 hectares were covered by private

systems owned by individuals or by communal irrigation. Portions

of this communal irrigation, largely found in the Mountain

Province, particularly among the people of Bontoc and Ifugao,

have been in operation for many hundreds, possibly thousands,

of years. The systems operated by the Bureau of Public Works,

TO
as late as 1938, served only 75,000 hectares. Thus, of the

total lowland areas, 60 per cent depended solely on rainfall

for irrigation purposes, and an adequate good irrigation system

was to be found on only 20 per cent.*-*9

The Bureau of Lands administers the irrigation system

57 m .P.P.. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, p. 577.

38
Erich H. Jacoby; Agrarian Unrest in Southeast A s i a .
(New York; Columbia University Press , 1949), p. 177.

39Ibid.
 344

contained within the former Friar Lands, -which were purchased

by the Government, but the total of such lands amounts only to

some 30,000 hectares. These are to be found in Cavite, Laguna,

Rizal and Buiacan provinces, planted to rice and sugar. In

Ilocos Norte there exists an interesting organization, a hold­

over from the period of Spanish regime. This system is called

zanjero (ditch owner) and consists of privately-owned irriga­

tion systems. The zanjero operates and maintains the systems

but in most cases, does not own the land irrigated. For their

services, they are permitted to cultivate and sell the produce

of usually one-half the land served, the landowner being

furnished water free for the remaining portion. Heedless to

say, the landowners are far from satisfied with this situation

and have been agitating for its elimination for many years.

The method of operating irrigation systems by the Govern­

ment was originally established in 1922 with a twenty-million

peso bond issue. Charges were fixed so as to amortize this

issue, funds accruing through the charges to repay the cost of

construction, the amortization charge, and a contingency charge.

This was developed so as to turn over, to the landowners, after

amortization, the irrigation systems removing them from the

control of the Government. This resulted in the construction

of eleven systems, with two that were built during the Japanese

occupation (the Rizal system in Nueva Ecija and the Hanagdung

in Quezon, both constructed of semi-permanent materials). The

collection of irrigation charges became exceedingly difficult

 345

during the Commonwealth period, and the National Assembly

passed several amendments to the original act of 1922. The

most important was one which abandoned the idea of turning the

systems over to the landowners, the Government retaining them

and charging owners a flat assessment rather than an amortisa­

tion fee. This fee was fixed at six pesos per hectare in 1935,

but collections lagged. It was for this reason that Commonwealth

Act No. 87 was passed giving the President authority to

administer the systems.

During the Commonwealth period, day laborers were paid

a maximum daily wage of one peso; thus, according to the

Government, the six-peso fee was barely sufficient to cover

the operation and maintenance costs and far below the amortiza­

tion needs. Following the war, laborers' wages increased some

four times making it even more difficult to meet operating

expenses. Shortly after assuming office, President Roxas, on

July 22, 1946, fixed the annual fee at twelve pesos per hectare.

The size of the tracts within Government-owned systems

is very small, the average holding being 2.9 hectares, and, in

the Ilocos regions, within the Laoag-Vintar, the Dingras, the

Amburayan River and Tagudin systems, the holding averages six-

tenths of a hectare. McNutt and Fernando stated, in an article

in a Manila newspaper that "before the war, with the low price

of rice, the l/2 (s i c ., should read 12) paid by the landowners

as Irrigation fee to the Government represented the equivalent

of over 2 cavans of palay, or 10 per cent of the average difference

 34-6

in production between irrigated and unirrigated lands. Today

it takes only 1 cavan of palay or 5 per cent of the excess

production attributable to the irrigation service, to cover the

new 12 peso irrigation f e e . " ^

Realizing the importance of irrigation to the future

of Philippine agriculture, Congress in 1947 set aside eighteen

million pesos, in the Public Works Appropriation Act, for

irrigation purposes. The problems, however, were still far

from solved. The agricultural experts brought over by the

Government presented the best analysis of post-war irrigation

systems in the Philippines. t'diatever progress to be made in

the future, must be directed from these observations of the

situation and the recommendations for a successful program

embodied in the Repor t . They stated:

Interest in irrigation was found in all parts of the

Islands. The principal interest was in large gravity
systems. The Mission observed that the systems already
established had rarely been provided with adequate
storage, that usually an attempt had been made to irrigate
too much land, and that the water had not been properly
distributed. The construction of large gravity systems
with supporting reservoirs is expensive. A number of
small systems privately operated were observed, but many
small streams desirably located, with a year-round flow
of water, were not being used. The primary interest in
the utilization of irrigation water appeared to be
through construction by the Government. Not a sin gle
instance of ground-water resources being utilized through
pumping was noted, and yet there was evidence of an
abundance of ground water.
For an irrigation system to be most satisfactory, it
must be possible to remove the water at will. This cannot

40
Paul V. McNutt and Isaias Fernando: "Irrigations in
the Philippines," The Sunday Post Magazine. Vol. II, No. 38
(June 8, 1947), pp. 21-22, p a s s i m .
 347

be done without drainage. The Mission heard many com­

plaints of irrigation systems that flooded the land in
some seasons and dried up during others. While it may
be too expensive to modify systems already established,
in all future construction the drainage aspect should
be given equal consideration with that of water supply.
There are also areas of good land that need drainage
for maximum crop production. Some of these lands are
very fertile.
It is recommended that:
CL ) Every encouragement possible be given indivi­
duals or corporations^ bo develop small gravity-irriga­
tion systems: (2) a program of research be instituted
to determine the relative costs of gravity systems
versus pumping from ground water; (3) a program of
research be instituted to determine the most economical
use of irrigation water; and (4) if drainage equipment
is available In the army surplus, the Bureau of Public
’
Works should consider the advisability of establishing
an experimental drainage system.41

Coupled with irrigation was the encouragement which the

Bureau of Plant Industry gave farmers to practice what is called

palagad production of rice, i.e., second planting. This

program met with some success in areas containing efficient

irrigation facilities or where new irrigation was introduced.

The crop year ending June 30, 1949, saw an increase of almost

two million cavans (from 2,596,511 to 4,006,500) on a hectarage

that increased from 121,197 to 191,496 hectares.42 If this

progress can be continued, and it can be continued only with

increasing irrigation and fertilizer facilities, the Philip­

pines will be well started on the road to self-sufficiency in

rice.

4-^-Report of Philippine-United States Agricultural

Mission, pp. 21-22.

42Report. 1949, Bureau of Plant Industry, p. 5.

 348

In the past, little fertilization could be found in the

Philippines. After harvesting a crop of rice, the stubble was

burned or otherwise destroyed and not left to enrich the soil.

As a resiilt of this practice, and of the ever-increasing use of

the land, fertility was greatly weakened in many places, with

a dropping yield or even total exhaustion. home lands cannot

now be reclaimed for rice cultivation, but, fortunately, these

represent less than half the acreage. The Bureau of Plant

Industry accomplished the most in this respect. Through Its

efforts, and its efforts alone, the Filipino farmer was gradual­

ly educated in many districts to the necessity of using

fertilizers. In some instances, as often happens, fertilizers

were used where they should not have been, or the wrong kind

was used.

Striking evidence of the truly magnificent work of the

Bureau was revealed in 1949, when 61,000 hectares of rice fields

were fertilized with commercial fertilizer, comparing most

favorably with the previous y e a r ’s total of but 18,200 hectares.

This use of fertilizers was almost wholly confined to a few

provinces. They chiefly employed ammonium sulphate, although

the use of guano, principally in the VIsayas, was gaining in

popularity. The guano is obtained locally, a few islands in the

west VIsayas being particularly rich in deposits.4^

Jose Armando Villegas: "Boosting the Guano-Mining

Industry," ACI L i f e . Vol. XI, No. 10 (October, 1949), pt>. 24,
26; "Guano Fertilizer," Ibid.. Vol. X, No. 10 (October,
1948), p. 15.
 349

Perhaps one reason for ohe increased use of fertilizer

was the high price of palay. Although fertilizers In the Philip­

pines have been almost beyond the reach of the majority of small

farmers, the recent high prices of palay (ten times prewar, 1946

-1950), permitted such expenditures and gave them a profit at

the same time. <»hen the establishment of fertilizer plants, one
of the projects of the Government, becomes a reality, it is
hoped that prices will fall within the reach of all farmers.

The rice problem, as Professor Spencer stated, can be

solved: "If all-out effort went Into almost any one of the
shorter-range Items listed above,44 self-sufficiency as a temporary

measure could be reached in a very few years. 'The mere cultiva­

tion of all possible rice land could do it, given social co­
operation and good weather. Distribution of even a small volume
of commercial phosphate of fertilizers by the government could
do it. Growth of high-yield rice varieties could provide the
needed yield. Taken alone, however, each of these steps is but
a temporary prop to the crop total, as Indicated by the falling
per-acre yields on many kinds of land. Only the combined and

well-integrated efforts of the government and the farmer along

all the above lines will produce a real solution.1,45

In 1950, it appeared that "social cooperation" and

"well-integrated efforts" were still to be achieved since the

basic social, economic, and psychological problems were as yet

not fully realized.

44Spencer, o p . c i t .. pp. 127-128.

4^Ibid., p. 128. Italics supplied.

 CHAPTER X

THE ABACA AHD COCONUT INDUSTRIES J 1941-1950

The War proved disastrous to the abaca industry, with

the plantations lying idle or being overrun by guerrillas

harrassing the Japanese and the Japanese burning the fields to

smoke out the guerrillas. Losses suffered by the industry

during the Occupation are estimated at £>79,000,000, with some

103,783 hectares of land destroyed through effects of war,

abandonment, neglect, depletion and the replanting to food

crops.^ In June, 1947, 150,000 was set aside for a campaign to

improve the fiber and disseminate instructions on new methods

of stripping. The estimated production in 1947 was 730,000

bales worth about JT52,000,000, or 60 per cent of the average

prewar productions.^

In Davao, before the War, the Japanese held some 60,000

hectares of land, about two-thirds of the cultivated area, of

which it was estimated that 32,000 hectares were held illegally.^

At the end of the War, these former Japanese lands were

expropriated by ex-guerrillas (and "guerrillas’1)4 who occupied

^Antonio Lejano: "Premium on Quality Hemp," evening Hews

Saturday Magazine. Vol. II, No. 47 (August 16, 1947), pp. 14-15, 29.
2
C f . Karl J. Pelzer: "Philippine Abaca Industry," Far
Eastern Survey. Vol. 17, No. 6 (March 24, 1948), pp. 75-76.

3 "There is a Davao Problem," (Editorial), Philippine

M a g azine. Vol. XXXIII, No. 7 (July, 1936), p. 338.

4We use the word "guerrilla" to Indicate individuals in the

Philippines similar to the "P-X Commando” in the United States Army.

350
 351

them and immediately began stripping operations on the plants

available for the operation. This was the major factor in the

large production for 1947, but It seriously Injured the planta­

tions since stripping was carried too far. Many plants that

should have been allowed further maturation were rendered u s e ­

less. As lace as November 30, 194-9, a writer warned that the

toleration by the Government of these inexperienced squatters

was spoiling the plantabions and unless it corrected the situa­

tion soon the abaca industry in Davao would sooner or later be ■

paralyzed.°

Pelzer stated that."the havoc that has beset Philippine

abaca... during the last six years has made it questionable

whether the industry will be able to regain Its prewar strength."®

If one takes into consideration the increasing competition

offered by Indonesian and Central American fiber, the future of

the industry becomes even more questionable, m/ith the destruc­

tive exploitation practiced in the Philippines, replacing what

Pelzer calls "the principle of an economy of sustained yields",

many observers foresaw the doom of the industry. The Govern­

ment observers 'were more sanguine but thej^ gave the impression

of whistling in the dark. The Ghta Plantation, a former ’

Japanese holding owned as a subsidiary of the N A P O O , was held

up as a model of what could be done in rehabilitating the industry

but t h i s plantation comprises on ly 1,016 hectares and is

5
Lincoln A. Manapat: "This Valuable Abaca," The Manila
Times Mid w e e k . Vol. 4, No. 13 (November 30, 1949), p. T~.

6 0p. c i t . , p. 75.
 352

far from typical.1''

It was announced on December 5, 1S49, that 2,500 hectares

of the Davao Penal Colony land, owned by the NAFCO would be

converted Into productive abaca land by a corporation under the

leadership of Jan H. Marsman, a local financier. hars m a n ’s

corporation would lease from the NAFCO some 7,500 hectares,

clearing the forest, planting, cultivating and developing this

land, which is a portion of 10,000 hectares allotted to the

NAFCO. For the privilege of developing it, Iv.arsman would pay

the NAFCO two pesos per hectare annually, and when the land

reaches productivity, fifty centavos per picul of processed

abaca. Governor Miguel Cuaderno of the Central Bank hailed the

plan for its utilization of local capital and initiative, and

expressed the hope that other capitalists would imitate it.

Senator Cabili, however vigorously opposed the plan as ’'un­

constitutional'1 and typical of alien exploitation of Philippine

natural resources.® This objection was quite contrary to the

Government's expressed desire to regain its leading: position

in the world market,® as stated by President ^uirino, and the

7
For an excellent and authoritative discussion, with
regard to the postwar conditions characterizing the industry,
see Pelzer, l o c . ci t . Also see: G-ervacio C. Acay: ’‘Davao Abaca
Can Come Back’j11 The Philippines Free Press. Vol. XXXIX, No. 1
(January 3, 19487, p p .34, 35, for a contrasting, more subjective
view; Leon 0. T y : “N A F C O : Lore Dead Than Alive," Ibid., Vol.
XLI, No. 18 (May 6, 1950), p. 4.
O
Teodoro F. Valencia: "2 500 Hectares of Davao Penal Area
to be Converted into Productive Land,” The Philippines Herald.
Vol. 83, No. 102 (December 3, 1949), pp. 1, 4. See below, Note 16.

®The Manila T i m e s . Vol. 5, No. 113 (December 8, 1949), p. 3.

 353

confusion caused by similar hasty objections on the part of

various officials was not calculated to attract the capital,

both Filipino and foreign, so urgently needed to rehabilitate

the Philippine economy in general and the abaca industry in particular.

It was estimated that, for the three years of’ Japanese

occupation, the value of fiber production was roughly some

eighty million pesos. As a result of damages to plantations,

during the three years following the War, the Industry suffered

a forty per cent reduction, amounting to some thirty million

pesos. The estimated amount needed to restore the plantations

to their prewar productivity was forty million pesos. The

property destroyed included warehouses to the value of six

million pesos; five thousand stripping sheds, with a value of

one million pesos, five thousand spindle machines, valued at

five hundred pesos each; and hemp presses valued at one million

pesos. Cordage factories were also destroyed, representing a

loss of five million pesos, with other factory and warehouse

equipment valued at five million pesos. 'The loss in government

revenue for the three years following the War was some six

million pesos. The total damage to the industry, including

funds necessary for rehabilitation, amounted to 3^176,500,000.

Progress in the industry following the War was slower

than in any other major industry with the possible exception

of tobacco. Since Davao had been the major producing area, the

-*-^Placido L, Mapaj "Abaca: Our No. 2 Export Industry,"

ACIL, Vol. XI, No. 5 (May, 1949), p. 15.
 354

situation in that region was the determining factor. It was

complicated by the land system. Before the War, the Japanese,

limited by the Philippine land laws in the amount of land they

could own, hired Filipinos to act as “dummies” and acquire land

for their use. The Bureau of Lands and other agencies became

exercised, and a tempest in a teapot occurred just before the

War, with the Bureau ordering the cancellation of the lease and

sales applications. The commonwealth Government never seized

the lands because, some say, of the intervention of the American

State Department 'which was nob disposed to displease a potential

enemy.H

Following Liberation, these lands, as well as other

alien holdings, were turned over to the Philippine Government

by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States. They

represented two-thirds of the b e s t land In Davao. The former

Japanese “dummies" re-occupied them and reasserted their titles;

veteran guerrillas (and "guerrillas") also sought to occupy them,

both by right of conquest and as a reward for their efforts

during the Occupation. In addition, new settlers from the

Visayas also attempted to settle on them. Complicating the

situation was the lack of activity on the part of various

government agencies. As a result, bitter quarreling broke out

among the interested parties and resulted in some bloodshed.

The situation became so serious that President Roxas appointed

Jaime N. Ferrer: "Tug of rfar in Davao,” The Saturday

Evening News Magazine. Vol. 3, No. 38 (June 12, 1948), p . 6.
 355

Ruperto T. Lstanislao of Bataan as a special investigator. He

spent a considerable period in Davao and eventually submitted

his report to the President. In accordance with it, the Presi­

dent on February 10, 1947, issued an order designating the KAFGO

as the exclusive agency to administer the properties in question.

At the same time, he announced that she protection of the

Philippine GI Bill of Rights (Republic Act No. 65) was to be

extended to individuals seeking Davao lands and that veterans,

former guerrillas, and tenants who were actually workin'; the

lands on or before December 12, 1946 should be given preference

in occupying and purchasing public and alien lands.

It seems, however, that a number of elements both in and

out of the Government silently attempted to undermine the policy

laid down by the President.^ Much was said of the activities

of former "dummies’* in seeking to regain these lands. In 1946,

the Bureau of Lands, had ordered the Immediate seizure of lands

the application for possession of which had been cancelled in

1934. A lessee ("dummy") filed a motion for reconsideration,

but it was disapproved by the Bureau. He appealed to the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who sustained

the B ureau’s decision. The lessee then asked the courts for a

preliminarj7- injunction against the Bureau and the Secretary to

enjoin them from seizing the lands. This case was still pending

in 1950. Meanwhile, about two hundred and fifty veterans had

settled and tilled the plantation in question.13 The lessee,

13Ibld. 13I b i d .
 356

according to reports, the*, formed an association, composed, it

was said, of relatives and laborers who supposedly falsely

claimed they were occupying and working the land in question

before December 12, 1946. Armed men were also employed and

maltreated veterans working on the plantations.**-4

The :.Ax Cu came in for bitter criticism for the manner

in which they administered the lands under their jurisdiction.

NAFCO managers were said to be importing civilians, recently

arrived from the Visayas, as old tenants. The veterans also

protested against the terms for the lease of the lands, the

practice being to require a share of seventy-five per cent for

the NAFCC, with all expenses for working the land borne by the

tenants from the remainder. This, the veterans asserted was

excessive, since they received but five per cent gross profit

while the NAFCO, acting only as administrator, received 25 per

cent.

According to NAFCO officials, in 1950, the situation

was that these lands were sold to the veterans who were to pat­

ten per cent down, the rest payable in ten years. As soon as

the title was cleared, the Philippine National Bank and the

Rehabilitation Finance Corporation were to give loans of 1*800

per hectare as each hectare was developed. The joker is,

apparently, that the 33,000 hectares of abaca land occupied by

these veterans, was worn out land which would, in all likelihood,

14Ibid.
 357

repay neither their labors nor the loans received -- if such

loans were received. In addition, the stipulation with regard

to the clearing of titles deepened the pessimism of many, since

this process, tenants claimed, all too frequently extended over

a long period of years.

In February, 1949, abaca men from Davao and Cotabato

came to Lanila to appeal for more aid to the industry. They

specifically requested that, in addition to the loan for develop­

ment of each hectare, they be granted a crop loan of twenty

pesos per picul on strippable abaca. This meant an Initial

loan of from seven to ten million pesos for the ten thousand

hectares owned by members of this Mindanao Abaca Planters

Association, which hoped to absorb all of the five thousand

independent planters in Davao and Cotabato. The great need for

the rehabilitation of the industry, as for so many others, was

capital. It required approximately 1700 to plant a hectare of

land to abaca and 18 months of hard labor to get it into shape

for the first stripping. Following the first stripping, the

plants may then be stripped for a period of from fifteen to

twenty years, yielding annually an average of from thirty to

fifty piculs per hectare based on prewar experiences. The

return for this labor is large, amounting to as much as three

thousand pesos per hectare per year.

Because of the need for capital and labor, many indivi­

duals in the Government and the NAFCO, welcomed Karsman's offer

with regard to developing the penal colony lands. Placido L.

 358

Mapa, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, wrote in

1949 that the plan "deserved the sympathetic consideration of

the Government;, if only the conditions were modified to give

the Government a larger share in the profits. President Quirino

stated that the proposed agreement was not in violation of the

Constitution as it followed a pattern established in 1939 by a

contract between the National Development Company and the

Philippine Packing Corporation with regard to the operation of

a pineapple plantation in Mindanao (one of the largest in the

world--one field containing fifteen million pineapple plants).

Secretary I.apa endorsed the President's view, stating that it

was the President’s plan that any contract which might be ap­

proved between NAFCO and Marsman would serve as a model for

additional investments by others interested in the abaca industry.

The major opposition came from Senator Cabili, of Lanao,

who in 1949 said that the plan was unconstitutional and unneces­

sary. The senator declared that the lease would be in excess

of the 1,024 hectares allowed an individual or corporation,

and would violate the constitutional restriction against the

exploitation of the nation's natural resources by aliens. He

said that the proponents of the plan "have cleverly cloaked

the transaction under the guise of operational management" which

"could be the initial wedge that alien interests might drive

^ Manila Bulletin. Vol. 140, No. 74 (December 26, 1949),

p . 5.
-|g
Jesus Bigornia: "Cabili Hits Abaca Land Lease Plan,"
Manila Bulletin, Vol. 140, No. 69 (December 8, 1949), p. 1.
 359

into our protective laws." ’’Before you know it, we will wake

up some fine day to find that we are strangers in our own

country." He held that the NAFCO could well carry out the plan

of t h e administration to rehabilitate the industry17 and that

the §*2,500,000 advanced the NAFCO with an indicated loan of

some 1*9,000,000 from the RFC, would be more than adequate for

rehabilitation. The industry, supported by the Department of

Agriculture and Natural Resources estimated, however, that at

least forty million pesos was needed; so that that the senator’s

statement, while undoubtedly patriotic, was in contradiction to

his Government’s stand.

Veterans' groups also opposed the plan, stating that

1 fi
it would virtually exclude native capital which, however,

has shown a marked reluctance to invest in any enterprise in

which profits are separated from investment by any considerable

period of time.

Conclusion:-

The Joint Agricultural Mission recommended in 1947 that

"large holdings in the hand of competent operators with sufficient

capital to employ efficient decorticating equipment should not

17
For a critical view of the N A F C O 's ability to carry
out the administration's plans, see Eugenio Boadoj "Bad Manage­
ment Responsible for Projects' Failure," Philippines H e r a l d .
Year 30, No. 87 (January 20, 1950), p. 2. This was one of a
series of three articles on Davao, with particular regard to
anomalies in the rehabilitation of the government-owned abaca
plantations. Also see: Ty, l o c . c i t .. Note 7.

•^Manila Bulletin. Vol. 140, No. 74 (December 26, 1949), p. 5.

 360

be discouraged."19 It also advocated a long-range program for

the rehabilitation of the industry, a part of which should be

devoted to intensive research. Such research and such a program

demand large capital investments and the elimination of marginal

lands and producers. Unless such investments come from native

capital (which seems unlikely in view of its reluctance in the

past) or unless foreign capital is encouraged to enter the field

with assurances of reasonable profits and tenure, the industry

will not be able to meet the goals set by the Government and

regain ics once commanding position in the world market.

The plan advocated by the Department of Agriculture and

Natural Resources, of sub-dividing 10,000 hectares of public

lands into lots of twenty, fifty and one hundred hectares, to

be distributed to individuals under the close supervision of

the Department, is sound if carried through with vigor, honesty

and imagination. The Department hoped that if the plan carries,

such grant-holders would form cooperatives for the development

of lands assigned them, with a minimum holding of hectares.

But the past history of such movements offered slight encourage­

ment that such a plan would work to the benefit of the industry,

and, with rising labor costs, rising costs of equipment of all

kinds, the competition offered by Central American and Javan

abaca, the necessity for large capital investment was recognized

by all observers in and out of the (hvernment.20

190p. cit., p. 17.

20The industry has a bright future, nevertheless, but
half-measures will not do. The high mortality of past olans,
drawn up with eagerness and enthusiasm, offers a plain warning.
 361

The outbreak of the European ear In 1939-1940 dealt a

serloua blow to the coconut Industry. The Philippines had
such large stocks of coconut products that copra prices In
August of 1940 dropped to an all-time low. Copra cake, normal­
ly exported for cattle feed, was used for fuel, the require­
ments beingfhr below the supply. The normal American market
for copra and oil was greatly reduced by an abundance of domestic
oils and the export trade to Latin America was hurt by lard
exports from the United States. In addition, the great increase
in ocean freight charges restricted shipments abroad. Rates,
for copra, from Manila to American Pacific coast ports, in­
creased from $9.50 to $13.50 per ton; for copra meal, from $8.00
to $11.50 per ton, and, for oil, from $15.50 to $20.00 per ton.
This, naturally, cut sharply the profits of local producers.
The Japanese reaped the benefit of this situation when they
entered the Philippines, acquiring at one stroke a considerable
portion of the oil needed for the year 1942. With the outbreak

of the War with Japan, the United States, which had already
felt a need for oils and fats because of defense preparations,
found Itself cut off from its largest and most faithful producer
of these necessities. During 1941, the United States had
increased its consumption of Philippine oil through the new
federal regulations (the McNutt standard) which encouraged
margarine producers, oil consumption increasing some three
 362

million pounds in one year.2^ Had the United States taken

advantage of the low prices for Philippine coconut products

after 1939 (a step which was never considered by Congress) it
might well have faced December 7, 1941, with more confidence
than was the case.

In 1946, the United States, returning to its position

as the world’s largest consumer of coconut products, signed an
agreement with the Philippines by which it agreed to buy all
the surplus copra and coconut oil for the year beginning July
1, 1946 at $103.56 per long ton for copra and 7.1 cents per
pound for coconut oil.2® During the first six months of that
year, the Philippines exported 190,000r000 pounds of copra in
terms of oil, about two-thirds going to the United States.
While this meant prosperity for the long-suffering coconut
products producer, the iniquitous economic system, as usual,

robbed the small producer and enriched the middlemen and the
large producers.

The outbreak of the War halted plans for carrying out

Assemblyman Kalaw's recommendations for stabilizing the industry.
As provided in the act creating the NACOCO, most of his recom­

mendations would have had to be executed by other agencies than

that provided by the Government. The end of the War gave a

second chance for the stabilization of the industry which, as

had been predicted, weathered the conflict more easily than the

21Encvclopaedla Brltannlca Book of the Year. 1942.

p. 186.
S2Ibid.
 363

other major industries* While some damage was suffered by

equipment and buildings, the trees still remained* There was
a world-wide demand for coconut products at the end of the War
and prices soared to unbelievable heights*

During the transition period, between the end of mil­

itary rule and the beginning of private trading, the American

need for coconut products was illustrated by the special

arrangements made by the Foreign Economic Administration for
the procurement of coconut products in 1945* The FEA announced
the signing of an agreement between the U*3. Commercial Company
and the Copra Export Management Company, a corporation formed

by representatives of five producing companies engaged in the

business before the war.**® This agreement gave an impulse to

the rehabilitation of the industry which enabled it to achieve

an early prosperity not shared by other Philippine exports*

Prosperity was not immediately achieved, however.

International agreements, following the War, had placed the
price at P12.00 per 100 kilos of resecada (which Is the dried
husked flakes of meat)* TheGepra Export Management Co. (called

the CEMCO) authorized buyers to pay no more than P10.50, with

the result that few producers would sell at this price claiming,
with justice, that the price did not cover the cost of produc­
tion. Late in 1945, buyers offered as high as P15.00 per 100
kilos, but most producers continued to hold their stocks* In
February, 1946, CEMCO then announced that copra would be paid

23Reported in Far Eastern Survey* 114-,, No. 15 (August 1,

1945), p. 214.
 364

for on the basis of 35 to 40 per cent cash, 30 per cent in

textiles, 20 per cent in rice, and 15 per cent in beans, canned
fish, milk, sugar, flour, etc. This offer was attractive
enough to bring into the market increasing quantities of copra,
the price rising to around P16.00 per 100 kilos. Buyers,
during this period, paid higher than the authorized price;
because, according to one source, they were selling the products
on the black market at prices high enough to cover the high
copra costs.

In August, 1946, the Copra and Coconut Oil Agreement

was signed between the Philippines and the United States fixing
the price at $103.50 per long ton in bulk. In October, it was
announced that the copra ceiling was $116.20 per short ton at

Atlantic and Gulf ports. This fixed the price at around P20.00
per 100 kilos, buyers' prices in Manila being about 3P16.00 per

100 kilos, delivered. This agreement also stipulated that the

Philippines should sell its entire crop to the United States
at these OPA ceiling prices, the Philippines to receive in
addition, a loan of $2,000,000 to be used in the rehabilitation
of the hemp plantations. The United States also agreed to
transfer to the Philippines some is ,500,000 worth of trade
goods, including textiles, rice and sugar. The American embassy
announced that the Commodity Credit Corporation in the United
States would allocate shares of copra from the Philippines and
Java to other foreign nations, and would appoint companies in
the United States as authorized buyers of Philippine copra.
 365

This agreement was basically unfair to copra producers

in the Philippines, who were thus deprived of an opportunity,

quite necessary for the stabilization of their Industry, to

sell their stocks in the open world market where they could
get higher prices than those provided in the Agreement. It is
difficult to understand the motives of the President of the
Philippines, who was quite conscious of the necessity of finding
world markets for Philippine products to prepare the country
for the day when the protected market in the United States would
be closed. Producers and exporters in the Philippines raised
loud outcries, but with little immediate effect. They realized
that free trade would have a marked effect upon the development
of their industry.in the crucial years following the War, and
were faced with the fact that the United States, although
stating that it was working toward the establishment of free
world trade, was engaged in activities exactly opposite in

practice to its announced policy. The copra producers hoped to

be able to sell enough stocks in the free world market to acquire
sufficient strength to meet an uncertain future when prices might
again tumble to the level of 1934.

Evidently the Philippine Government hoped to receive

concessions from the United States of a general nature, even

at the expense of one of its hard-pressed industries. Its

eagerness to rehabilitate the hemp industry, while laudable,

should not have obscured the need of stabilizing the vital
coconut industry. The Government replied, to domestic critics,
 366

by saying that it was duty-bound to share with other nations

the commodities it had in abundance in order to receive such
needed supplies as sugar and rice. It pointed to its member­
ship in the International Emergency Food Council and the neces­
sity of abiding by international agreements. The producers,
however, suggested that a food emergency existed in the Philip­
pines, and that it could partly be met by raising the prosperity
of one industry, thus benefiting others and the people as a
whole•

One author, writing in the Philippines, pointed to hard

facts as proof that the Government's argument was specious.
The Emergency Food Council had allocated, in 1946, 145,000 tons
of rice for the Philippines, 45,000 tons of which was to come
from Siam and the remainder from the United States and South
America. However, 1946 saw a serious shipping strike in the
United States, the result of which was to deprive the Philip­
pines of rice supplies for a period of over three months. In
addition, the price of rice rose in South America, to a point

where NARIC officials stated they would lose money by selling

at the ceiling price in the Philippines. Since the country was
in dire need of rice, it had to continue buying the cereal from
South America necessitating either a rise in the celling price
at home or the assumption of a loss in the operations of the
NARIC: "There is no parity," this observer stated, "In the
prices of the commodities we export and those that we badly
need in terms of the i n d e x of the cost of living
 367

in either c o u n t r i e s . S i n c e the Philippines had no control

over the prices in the American countries it was at their
mercy, for the United States held the balance of trade through
the pegged prices of copra. Thus, the Philippines continued
to ship copra to the United States disadvantageously a n d

received in exchange consumer goods which, however, remained

1 argely on paper because of the great delay in shipping
articles to the Philippines.

Then, on October 29, 1946, the OPA decontrolled all

fats and oils, with the result that the price of coconut oil
soared from eight cents a pound to twenty cents a pound. A
great rush of buyers scoured the world market for available
supplies. Copra dealers demanded, and received, as high as
twenty-two cents a pound. The planters, however, were bound
to continue selling at prices ranging from *17.00 to *20.00 per
100 kilos, which meant a price of eight cents a pound for oil,
whereas the actual market value of the product, on the basis
of twenty cents a pound for oil, was *46.00 per 100 kilos.
Thus the individuals who benefited were not the planters, but
the exporters and middlemen. It was quite clear that if the

stabilization of the industry was to be achieved,it only could

be done through the abrogation of the Agreement.

On November 22, 1946, abrogation was announced, with

the result that buyers* bids rose 76 per cent over the level

®*Domingo C. Abadllla: "Confusion in the Copra market,"

The Sunday Post Magazine. Vol. II, No. 8 (November 10, 1946),
p. 24.
 368

of mid-October. The price reached ?30.00 per 100 kilos, and,

with the release of controls on fats and oils, domestic bids

topped quotations in the United States.

During 1931-1936, the average exports to the United

States were 64.9 per cent of the total. In the period up to
December 31, 1946, of the total shipment of 599,000 long tons,
74 per cent went to other countries, such as the United Kingdom,
Prance, Poland, Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada,
Sweden, Denmark and Panama. The percentage of price Increase
in copra was the second highest of the four major export products,

being 376 per cent.^®

During the first six months of 1948, copra prices

reached an all-time high of 1*65.00 per 100 kilos and coconut
oil reached &1.10 per kilo. By the end of July, copra dropped
to ^40.00 and oil to ^0.90. During the first half of the year

export sales dropped more than 30 per cent indicating that the
goose was dying. Although the value was higher than in the
preceding year because of the increase in prices, it was feared
that the producers and sellers had priced themselves out of the
market. American Importers stated that costs were too higjh for
soap and margarine and the United States forbade the sixteen
nations then using ERP funds to purchase Philippine copra.

American importers, affected by the high prices, had requested

25
Sugar rose 654 per cent, hemp 279 per cent, and leaf
tobacco 150 per cent over prewar levels. Since sugar had
practically disappeared from the export market, copra by 1950 re­
presented the greatest export item in quantity as well as value.
 369

the Government to take this step*

In addition, a new and disturbing factor entered the

copra and coconut oil picture* With the loss of copra and oil
during the War, American manufacturers had turned in Increasing
numbers to use of soy bean oil, cotton-seed oil, and tallow.

New techniques developed by American research enabled manufac­

turers to utilize oils which a few years earlier they used with
reluctance* This meant eventually a declining demand for coco­
nut oil, since its price was determined by prices of other oils.
Demand slackened also as a result of the American development
of synthetic detergents and substitutes for soap, made previous­
ly with coconut oil. While soap-makers of the United States
before the War utilized 70 per cent of imported coconut oil,
the post-war period showed a drop of from 10 to 15 per cent be­
cause of synthetic oils* This was expected in 1950 to continue,
thus presenting a gloomy prospect to Philippine copra producers.

Complicating the situation was the activity of certain

exporters who, in 1947, were found to have misrepresented the
weights of their shipments and their classification. Some

foreign importers had complained of shortages of as much as 25

per cent in actual received weight compared to manifests. In
addition, fresh copra had been deliberately classified as
resecada. When it is realized that prewar shrinkage in weight
was allowed a maximum of 5 per cent, the seriousness of the

complaints can be understood. The Philippine Coconut Planters

Association adopted a resolution requesting President Roxas to
 370

order the prosecution of these exporters.^® Many foreign im­

porters expressed dissatisfaction year after year with the poor

quality of Philippine copra, and the planters feared that un­

less the unscrupulous exporters were curbed, great harm would
befall the industry. IfVhile the situation was ameliorated
slightly by the threats of the Government, few individuals were
actually prosecuted and the Bureau of Commerce in 1950 was still
seeking means of controlling the classification of the product.
The NAC0C0 was supposed to exert efforts with regard to this

problem, but complaints of this body's inefficiency and ineffec­

tiveness were widespread throughout 1948 and 1949.

Although the NAC0C0 met with some success in stabilizing

copra prices, it encountered sharp criticism from many quarters
for its apparent inability to handle its work to the benefit of
the industry and the nation. In January, 1948, for instance,
local copra dealers were loud in their complaints that it had
failed to make deliveries on contracts for September and October;
this had "adversely affected commitments of large amounts of
the product to buyers abroad and disrupted dealings in this
Philippine export product."^ Five large dealers were hurt, and

one began court proceedings for damages suffered as a result of

NACOCO's failure. One dealer who was reported to have made a

commitment of son* $345,000 had been waiting since October for

NACOCO to make the delivery. Dr. Kalaw, general manager of the

26
Manila Chronicle. Year 3, No. 207, (December 12, 1947),
p. 11.
^ Manila Bulletin. Vol. 133, No. 6 (January 7, 1948), p.1.
 371

NACOCO, admitted the failure In deliveries, which he said was

caused by typhoon damage to NACOCO stocks* While there was
some truth In this statement, it did not wholly cover the
situation* A Canadian representative reported that confidence
in the corporation had suffered severely in the Dominion as a
result of the "ragged business methods" of the NACOCO. He
mentioned that, In one transaction with the corporation,
involving 2000 tons of copra at $165 a ton, the delivery was
delayed over a month, and It was discovered that a shrinkage
of 13*84 per cent had occurred. In addition, he said, the
company experienced difficulty In obtaining a rebate on the
freight charges* The whole transaction was considered highly
unbusinesslike, with the result that his company would have no

further dealings with the NACOCO.

Later in 1948, the trading activities of the NACOCO were

suspended because of the heavy losses incurred in buying,
selling and research. Its personnel was reduced 70 per cent
and its agencies in the provinces were closed. The corporation,
in the three years following its resumption of business in

1946, in the words of an outstanding Manila reporter, had

"squandered more than three and a half million pesos of the
people's hard earned money,"28 it was charged that Kalaw had

been dealing in futures, entering into contracts with foreign

buyers during a period of constantly rising prices* He failed

®®Leon 0. Tyj "Another Kalaw Fiasco," The Philippines

Free Press. Vol. 39, No. 26 (June 26, 1948), p. 4.
 372

in deliveries because he could not secure stocks from producers,

who refused to sell at the low early price. To remedy the

situation, it was charged, Kalaw bought stocks at the higher
price and sold at a loss of one and a half million pesos nto
save his face...."9® It was further charged that large amounts
were paid as commissions. One broker was to receive nearly
¥“20,000 when payment was stopped by the Government Enterprises
Council as being "anomalous.”®® The director replied that he
could have made a profit for the corporation had the Philippine

National Bank granted him a requested loan. The Bank replied

that it had refused to grant the loan because the corporation
was "mismanaged.” Since the function of the NACOCO was not
to act as a dealer and exporter, Mr. Kalaw’s defense of his
position was assailed by many critics; among them former
Representative I. Vameta, one of the authors of the bill

creating the corporation.®^-

The critics of Kalaw and the NACOCO continued to search

for evidence of mismanagement. Eventually, the Philippines
Free Press’s reporter, Leon 0. Ty, secured a copy of the report
of the Jimenez Committee which had been appointed by Malacafian
to investigate the Corporation. T y ’s findings stirred the
entire reading public. He stated flatly that the bankruptcy

of the NACOCO was caused directly by the mismanagement of Maximo

g9Ibld. 30Ibid.
®-l "N o Fiasco Says Maximo Kalaw," Philippines Free Press.
Vol. 39, No. 28 (July 10, 1948), pp. 26-277 Cf. "Kalaw Stresses
NACOCO Services," Manila Times. Vol. 4, No. 32 (September 18,
1948), pp. 1, 12.
 373

Kalaw and by "acts that were not only reprehensible but also
of questionable legality." It was charged by the paper that
Kalaw had been selling, through his daughter, large quantities

of copra to the NACOCO; the amount sold between December 6,

1946 and March 26, 1947 being a total of 776,324.12 kilos of
copra with a value of 1*333,120.79.

The Jimenez investigation revealed that Miss Kalaw had

apparently shipped copra from Mindoro at a time when copra was
priced at ¥37.00 per 100 kilos, yet she was paid ¥44.00 per
100 kilos for her shipment. The committee charged that the

seller requested liquidation of her shipment at the higher

price although according to regulations such a liquidation was

forbidden by Resolution No. 166 which stated that copra

deposits should be valued at the prevailing price at the time
of shipment. Yet, the records revealed, on April 10, 1947,
Director Kalaw Issued a general circular letter authorizing
the liquidation applied for by his daughter. It was stated
further, by the committee, that the director had been selling
copra regularly through his daughter to the NACOCO. Had the

copra sold been all his, the transaction would have seemed
regular, but the committee disclosed that the quarterly produc­
tion of Kalaw»s trees amounted to no more than 240,000 kilos,
while copra deposited in the NACOCO warehouse in the period

under question by Miss Kalaw amounted to 776,324.12 kilos.3®

520p. clt.. Vol.39, No.39 (September 25, 1948), p. 4.

®®Ibld.. pp. 4-5, passim.

 374

Mr Kalaw*s response to this article was a declaration

of intention to file a suit for libel against reporter Ty.

The case was set for hearing. Mr. Ty appeared, and while
waiting for the complainant filed a motion to subpoena eighteen

witnesses, together with documents and official papers relating

to the case. Mr. Kalaw and his lawyer failed to appear in

court. Mr. Ty received support from all over the country, with
offers of bail and of free legal assistance from many indivi-
•ZA
duals as well as the entire Cebu Bar Association. This case

was never pursued by the complainant. On September 28, a news

story appeared in Manila papers to the effect that Director
Kalaw had submitted his resignation to Malacafian because,
among other reasons, he had been unable to secure the necessary

funds to "revitalize" the corporation.

While this sordid story was little different in nature

from other scandals In the Government and its agencies through­

out 1948 and 1949, It differed from the others in the fact

that it concerned a very important Government Corporation

charged with the direction of one of the most important Philip­

pine industries. It strengthened the opponents of government

participation In business, and deepened the disillusion of many

observers with the post-war policies of a government which

could not afford to waste even the most insignificant funds.

The cause of the Hukbalahap and the Communist was thereby aided,
and the cynicism of the citizen made more profound.

®40jd. cit.. Vol. 39, No. 41 (October 9, 1948), p. 26.

 375

By contrast, the activities of one of the few success­

ful private cooperative business enterprises In the country
made cheerful reading for those interested in the healthy growth
of Philippine economy. The CAPCA (Camarines Norte Copra and
Abaca Producers Cooperative Association), of Daet, Camarines
Norte, in the words of its supporters, belled "the charges
that no cooperatives can prosper without government support

and that no Filipino business enterprise can succeed in a field

dominated by aliens."35 jts activities were successful in

bringing a good life to the people it served. It aided In the

stabilization of copra and rice prices and broke the alien
monopoly of rice. It ended the hoarding of gasoline, and
attacking the age-old problem of usury, opened credit facil­
ities to tenants and landowners alike. Its activities in the
copra field have been noteworthy. Small as it was, according
to one writer, it could have aided NACOCO in its difficulties
had "Dr. Maximo Kalaw...been farsighted."®6 The CAPCA had
repeatedly asked financial assistance from the NACOCO but In
each Instance such assistance was denied and Instead the
activities of NACOCO were "entrusted...to personnel of doubtful

ability in Tabaco and Legaspi." Hie writer pointedly referred

to the fact that NACOCO spent "millions for the Improvement of

the quality of copra," whereas the CAPCA, with a fraction of

the capital of the corporation, achieved the utmost in such

35Julio Q. LIwag: "CAPCA— A Great Success," The Philip­

pines Free Press. Vol. 39, No. 45 (November 6, 1948), p. 18.
®6Ibld.
 376

improvement, according to statements of various Bureau of Com­

merce inspectors in the region.

Conclusion
The drop in copra prices early in 1949 caused some
apprehension among producers and sellers. Many observers
believed, however, that the situation would be of material
assistance in the devebpment of better methods of production
and the eventual stabilization of the industry. Local business­

men repeatedly pointed to the fact that the industry could not

be aided as long as its raw materials were shipped out of the

country for processing. They hoped that the 1949-1950 slump

In prices would encourage producers and capitalists to improve

methods of production and the quality of the products, leading
to a standardization of product that would bring continuing
better prices in the world market.

One writer accurately stated, in 1949, that "if we are

really set upon industrialization, we should first learn to

discard antiquated agrarian concepts, accept transitory dis­
locations and prepare to fight for world markets against
established industrial nations. "37 country and its

businessmen were not prepared to do that, he added, "let us

stop kidding ourselves and chasing the rainbow of industrial

competency." "Let us instead concentrate on our traditional

3*7
Hernando G. Cosio: "Cushioning Copra Prices," Manila
Times Midweek Review. Vol. 2, No. 27 (February 2, 1949), p. 5.
 377

agricultural economy and do a good job of producing raw

materials from our bountiful natural resources for the endless­

ly hungry machines of the Industrial w o r l d . N o more
accurate observation has been made with regard to any of the
country*s industries and It should have been taken as a motto

by a Government seeking a pathway out of the tangled jungles

of its economy.

Since the hectarage of coconuts was constant since

1948, and since production steadily declined because of disease

and other factors, and since no decisive steps had been taken,
up to 1950, to meet the situation, most observers predicted
that no change could be expected for at least five years.

58Ibid.
 CHAPTER XI

THE SUGAR INDUSTRY: 1941-1950

Occupation, and post-war developments were much the

same in the sugar industry as in the others. The fields and

centrals continued to operate, if not at full strength, through­

out the Japanese occupation. Many of the "collaborators"
were to found in the ranks of sugar men, which fact increased
the hatred felt by the peasants toward these individuals.
Whether or not they were all "collaborators of the tongue,"
the average Filipino--guerrilla or not— believed that they
were traitors to their country and oppressors, under a new
aegis, of the people. They pointed to the fact that many of

these sugar men continued to live in ease and comfort through­

out the trying days of the occupation and claimed that many

even increased their fortunes by dealings with the Japanese

and in dealings on the black market. Observers have stated

that a great majority of the largest centrals were undamaged

by the Japanese during the War and even after Liberation, with
its attendant destruction, many particularly In certain portions
of Negros remained relatively undamaged. Old hatreds die
slowly and many were fanned into bright, burning blazes by the
War and the early days of the Republic, and the embers still
burn despite the quenching attempts during 1949-1950.

A Continuing Pattern:-
Liberation was hard, generally, on the centrals. Vast

378
 379

stretches of cane fields on Negros, Cebu, Leyte and In Pampanga,

Bulacan, Laguna, Panay, Tarlac, Pangasinan and Batangas were
laid waste. One writer states that thirty-three centrals were

burned and thirteen damaged heavily .^ Despite the fact, stated

time and again by observers, Filipino and American, that the
country should attempt to wean itself away from its heavy
dependence upon the industry, which faces hard days following
1954, rehabilitation was begun and encouraged by the Govern­
ment as soon as possible following the war. In February, 1948,
the National Congress of Sugarcane Planters met in Manila and

received from the Government its assurance for aid in the full
rehabilitation of the industry and the stabilization of prices
and controls. President Roxas, who spoke on the opening day,
assured the planters of full government support and announced
the Governments plan to construct a fertilizer plant costing
some twenty-two million pesos. This was suggested by the
Westinghouse Electric International Company which had been

called in by President Roxas to draw up a power program for

the Philippines. The erection of this plant hinged upon the

harnessing of the Maria Cristina Falls and the Agus River, in

Mindanao. Since the completion of this program lies yet in

womb of the distant future the benefits to be derived therefrom
will not occur for the immediate need of an industry faced with

^Rosendo Balinas s "What of Our Sugar Industry?" This

Week Magazine. Manila Chronicle. Vol. 3, No. 12 (March 21,1948), p. 10.
^Electric Power Program for the Republic of the Philip­
pines . (New York, December, 1947).
 380

declining production from a soil characterized by erosion and

costly loss of fertility. This fertilizer plant, the Presi­
dent believed, would make it possible for the sugar men to
purchase essential fertilizer material at a low cost thus
lowering the price of their sugar. Similar plans, so many of

them, drawn up in the past all nod their ghostly heads upon

hearing these words. The President also mentioned the fact

that the Philippines had been approached by SCAP in Japan with

regard to a purchase of 150,000 tons of sugar at a cost

approaching §*30,000,000. The light in the eyes of the sugar

men dimmed at the great, outraged cry of the people who were
appalled at the idea of dealing with a former enemy for whom
they felt nothing but the deepest hatred.

Senate President Jose Avelino, Speaker of the House

Eugenio Perez, Secretary of Interior Zulueta, Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources Garchitorena, Secretary of
Labor Magsalin, Secretary of Commerce and Industry Mapa, Jose
Yulo, President of the Philippine Sugar Association (and,
interestingly enough, a governor of the RPC) and Vicente

Carmona, of the Philippine National Bank (which still carries

77 per cent of its total loans, overdrafts and advances in

sugar money), all spoke to the convention assuring it of their

interest, promising financial and other aid. They also pleaded
for harmony and cooperation among the various elements in the
industry. The people watched, glumly.
 381

The planters recommended to the Government the creation

of a special body, to be called the Sugar Reconstruction Comis­
sion which would have powers "to undertake an exhaustive study
of the problems present and future, of the industry, to recom­
mend measures for their solution and make the measures
effective,"3 This plan was endorsed by the Beyster Report
which expressed the belief that the time was propitious for
"insuring the position of all phases of the sugar industry by

the institution of a sound, well planned and efficiently

executed overall policy."4

To achieve this, they made three suggestions: First,

the Sugar Administration should work in close cooperation with
representatives of the Philippine Sugar Association and the
Confederation of Planters and form a special committee whose

function would be to study needs of all the domestic phases of

the industry. The object of this study would be the "accel­
erated rehabilitation and expansion" of the industry as well
as to survey accurately its future potential with regard to
"world conditions, United States and world markets, future
price possibilities, new inventions and sugar substitutes."

Secondly, as a result of this survey and study, the

Government should enter into conferences with the survey group

2
Balinas, op. cit.. p. 11.
4
Proposed Program for Industrial Rehabilitation and
Development of the Republic of the Philippines, prepared bv the
technical staff of the National Development Company under the
supervision of the H.E. Beyster Corporation, Consulting Engineers,
Detroit, Michigan, USA. (Manila, October 28, 1947), pp. 167 and ff.
 382

and "other members of the Sugar Association and Confederation"

to establish a definite plan "equitable and agreeable to all

regarding expansion of the industry, production control,
licensing of centrals, quotas, price control, marketing
procedures, reparations and war damage claims, financial
assistance and future policy."

Thirdly, this projected policy should be "kept current

by the continuance of a survey group whose responsibility"
would be the recommendation of all measures, "legislative and
otherwise," which were believed to be in the best interests
of the industry and the government. If all these were done it

was "sincerely felt that the cooperative attitude and the joint

assuming of responsibility will be of definite and incalculable

value to each and every phase of the industry and to Philippine

economy in its entirety."

No word with, regard to labor in the industry. Else­

where,® the report suggests a labor truce for a three-to-five
year period during which labor would agree not to strike.
Management apparently was not to agree to anything. The belief

expressed in the Report with regard to labor is well summarized

in the following paragraph:

"A plan has recently been formulated for the unifica­

tion of all the trade unions into a Philippine Federation of
Labor, indicating that some responsible leaders recognize the

5Ibid.. pp. 59-60.

 383

necessity for a unified labor organization. There is no

doubt that such an organization may become a stabilizing force
providing it formulates policies which are founded on sound

economic principles in the best interests of national unity.

The mere indication that labor will abide by contract agreements
and the maintenance of discipline within its ranks is a funda­
mental which it must assume for the realization of the
industrialization program."®

This remarkable paragraph illustrates many things in

the Philippine scene not the least of which is the assumption

that the best interests of capital are in the best interest
of "national unity" and that a maintenance of discipline should
result in no demands and no strikes. As far as abiding by
contractual agreements is concerned, labor would welcome such
a condition wholeheartedly.

The general weaknesses of the Report are well illus­

trated by the above as well in its unrealistic appraisal of a

situation based wholly upon known potentialities and not upon

possibilities.7 Miss Jenkins, of the Institute of Pacific

g
Italics supplied.
7See, for example, discussions by N.V.M. Gonzalez,
"The Beyster Report," Saturday Evening News Magazine. Vol.
Ill, No. 7 (November 8, 1947); Shirley Jenkins, "Financial
and Economic Planning in the Philippines," Pacific Affairs.
Vol. XXI, No. 1 (March, 1948), pp. 33-45., esp. 43-44, for
an excellent discussion of the Report. as well as the
"Hibben Memorandum," a more realistic appraisal of the
situation. See also, V.D. Wickizer’s review of the Report,
Far Eastern Quarterly. Vol. IX, No. 1 (November, 1949), pp.
103-106, for a further discussion of the weakness of the Report.
 384

Relations, whose various authoritative articles on this and

similar subjects, with reference to economic planning In the

Philippines, are in great contrast to the general run of poorly

based and developed analyses of the subject, points out that

the Report advocates the complete rehabilitation of an Industry
which cannot be considered well-adjusted to its parent economy.®

The 1948 convention went on to approve the organization

of a body called the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters

which was formed to handle the sale and distribution of all

sugar produced and pooled by Its member centrals and planters.
It was hoped that the activities of this organization would
stabilize prices and insure good profits for the industry by

eliminating "alien middlemen who are held responsible for the

high cost of domestic sugar sold to the general public."® Ap­

parently the hope expressed by the Government when it purchased

its refineries In 1938 was never realized for here the same

old complaint is voiced and additional action taken to remedy a

situation the basic cause of which still remained unknown and untouched.

O
It is believed, by those whose understanding of Philip­
pine problems goes beyond the headlines of newspapers, that if
the economic program of the Philippine Republic is based upon
such shaky ground as exemplified by the Beyster Report and
similar hastily and inadequately drawn plans, the future economy
of the nation will be little benefited or rehabilitated with any
hope for a good life for all its Inhabitants.
Q
Balinas, op. cit.. p. 23.
^®If these "alien middlemen" are the cause for high pricey
as claimed, then their opponents must, in the future, organize
themselves and their businesses as efficiently as the whipping-
boys have done and, in addition, must work as earnestly.
 385

An article In the Free Press, is of interest in this

connection. PRATRA General Manager Coscolluela had been sharply
criticized, In 1948, for selling some 70,000 sacks of sugar to
a Chinese firm, Kim Kee Chua Yu, following which transaction,

the price of sugar in the markets rose to seventy centavos a

kilo. Then, in the spring of 1949, a similar transaction,
involving some 50,000 bags, occurred. Approached by a reporter
of the Free Press, the Manager denied anything anomalous in the
sale (a denial fully verified by subsequent Investigation).

Why, the reporter inquired, were these sales made only to the
Chinese retailers? The manager replied that Kim Kee was the
largest sugar dealer in the country and “complied with our
requirements." The reporter inquired as to the nature of the
requirements; these, the manager replied, entailed merely the
submission of a list of the dealer retailers and the posting
of "a performance bond equal to 20 per cent of the entire cost

of the stock...." The reporter then inquired why this large

amount was sold to Kim Kee and but five thousand bags were sold

to Filipino dealers. The answer is illuminating: "Because

Kim Kee is a big distributor. He has an excellent retailing

system and can pay the price of 50,000 sacks at any time. If
there are Filipino dealers who want to buy...I am ready to
deal with them. But the trouble Is that they don't come to us.

And when they do, they fail to comply with our rules. For

Instance, many of those who have applied...could not prove to

me that they had ready retailers. If I allow them to buy with­
out the list of retailers, I'm sure that tha sugar will go
 386

straight to the bodegas of hoarders and blackmarketeers." He

then revealed that PRATRA was able to sell directly to the
public no more than 5,881 bags of refined sugar, in three months.
The reason, according to the manager, and other authorities
questioned, was that Kim Kee extended credit to customers,
taking a chance on the repayment which enabled him to dispose
of his sugar faster than the Government. "On the other hand
PRATRA sells only on cash basis. Then there is the government
red tape that you must consider. To sell even just a bag of

sugar entails many requisites. The public hates red tape and

delay. At Kim K e e ’s there’s no delay.

Conclusions: Problems and Plans.

The sugar industry, in 1949-1950, was almost wholly

devoted to the production of centrifugal sugar and efforts to

restore it to Its prewar status had the end in view of satis­
fying the export quota of 16,000,000 piculs and domestic needs

of over 2,000,000 piculs. Rehabilitation, in contrast to other

basic industries,was not as slow as has generally been believed.
The production, for the crop year 1946-47 was but 13,000 short
tons, which increased, for the crop year 1948-49, to 705,000
short tons, an Increase of more than 5,400 per cent. Area

planted to cane in 1949 amounted to 117,000 hectares, represen­

ting 72 per cent of the prewar hectarage. Production amounted

to about 75 per cent of the average prewar production. It was

■^Leon 0. Ty: "Another Sour Note on Sugar," Philippines

Free Press. Vol. 40, No. 20 (May 14, 1949), pp. 10-11, passim.
 387

believed, by the Bureau of Plant Industry, that, by the end of

1940, the industry would be totally rehabilitated in the Visayan
producing regions and the industry, as a itiole, would be complete­
ly recovered In less than three years. This prediction is based
upon the assumption that peace and order will have been sufficient­
ly restored by that time to permit rehabilitation to continue.

The 1949-1950 wholesale price was placed at thirteen

pesos per picul, for export sugar. This meant that, for a few
years at least, the question of markets would be no problem to
the industry. With the exception of marginal producers, the
Bureau stated, most producers enjoyed a comfortable margin of
profit at the stated price level, "although the producers them­

selves would not say so...."^® Also, the combined quota for
export and domestic consumption was still only 64 per cent
filled at the volume of 705,000 short tons. The wholesale
price, In addition, of sugar in the local markets was no less
than seventeen pesos per picul, a price which insured a profit
for even marginal producers. However, a few producers were
worried about the future of the Industry when it will be faced

with a gradually Increasing import duty in the United States

(beginning July 4, 1954). This will Increase the local cost

by the equivalent amount of duty-protection removed in the U.S.

market. The industry Is thus faced with the problem of survival,

without protection, In the markets of the world.

^ B u r e a u of Plant Industry, Annual Report for Crop

Year Ending June 30. 1949. typescript p. 46, MS copy.
 388

There are seven major problems facing the Industry, in

addition to the above: The renewal of milling contracts between
planters and central which are due to expire shortly; the
ownership of the sugar quota; the need for an overhauling of
the operational organization of the Industry; the reduction in
the cost of production; the control of pests and disease ; the
development of subsidiary industries; and the development of
markets outside of the U.S.^3 The first has become a thorny
problem because of the inability of the parties involved to
agree as to terms relative to the division of the finished
product and by-products. The planters, during the post-war

period, insisted upon receiving no less than 75 per cent of

the main product. Planters insisted that, in the case of the
Central Azucarera de Bais, the central owners had fully re­
covered their capital Investment so that their production
represented only accumulating profits. Thus, the central owners
need no longer carry depreciation and interest charges In their
operation, enabling them, were they willing, to return a
larger share to the planters--who, President Quezon had hoped,
would do the same to their laborers. There seems to be no
question but that the central owners enjoyed a greater degree
of prosperity than the planters.

Another problem associated with milling contracts was

the refusal of some of the centrals to renew such contracts or,

13Ibid., pp. 47-51

 389

if willing to renew, to do so for a few years only. The

planter was clearly at a disadvantage here, since he was at
the mercy of the central which made the agreements only on
its own terms. Thus, the planter was hindered from making any
definite long-range plans for future production, In the dif­
ficult times that are to come.

At present (1950), the sugar quota is divided and

allocated among mill owners as well as planters. The planters
claim that they should be the ones to receive any allocation
made. The outcome of this struggle will determine the bargain­
ing position of the planters with the centrals over the
question of larger shares. Logically, the planters are correct
in their position which, however, is no guarantee that they
will receive their demands.

The operational organization of the industry, at

present, is inefficient and costly with two capital entrepreneurs

dividing the profits. In order to make a larger profit, under

this system, costs are cut at the lowest level, that of the
workers. It is essential for the future stability of the

industry that this situation be changed to a single operating

system in which both the milling and planting falls under a
single ownership. Coupled with this, Is the necessity for a
more efficient and centralized operation of marketing, to

eliminate the high costs caused by the great number of middle­

men through whose hands the sugar passes before reaching its market.
 390

The p ro blem of reducing costs of operation is a serious

one and the most difficult of satisfactory solution. In the

Philippines, reduction of costs is generally accomplished when

it is accomplished, by cutting wages of workers, a process which,

eventually, produces only more problems. It Is the exception

rather than the rule, that lowering of costs is attempted by

l owering the salaries of high-paid management. This is equally

true of Government Corporations, which, with few exceptions,

operate at a loss, and of private enterprise. In American-owned

business, for example, the salaries of management in 1949-50 were

extraordinarily dis proportionate to the wages and other benefits,

if any, of laborers and other w o r k e r s . T h e more effective means,

of achieving a lowered production cost would lie in the elimination of

marginal and sub-marginal areas and the consolidation of mills into large

14
In thirty-eight businesses, total remuneration was
between P=l,100 to 1^3,290, per month, for senior married staff
members. For junior staff members, the pay was between
3r880.00 to fr2,250.00 per m o n t h (1949). These salaries included:
average base pay, high-cost-living allowance, rent allowance,
special allowances for wife and children, transportation a l l o w ­
ance, commission allowance, home leave, home leave pay, and
was b a se d on the estimated cost of living for single and married
men. The United States State Department estimated that a m i n i ­
m u m of 3r800.00 per month was necessary for an Am erican family
of three, the preferred average being around 1*1500.00. Since
Americans are generally accustomed to living surrounded by
accepted means of enjoying life, at a much higher level than
even their Filipino counterparts, these salaries are necessary
if businesses are to attract qualified employees. The point
may be raised that the pay of Filipino employees should be based
on comparative estimates. Businessmen, however, point wi th
some justice, to the fact that the average Filipino employee is
m u c h less productive in his labor than his Amer ic an counterpart.
Several busines sm en have told the author that they are willing
to raise salaries of Filipino employees as soon as their p r o d u c ­
tivity justifies an increase in income. The pr o b l e m is a
thorny one, and would provide an interesting field for r esearch
for any A m e r i c a n student interested in labor-relations and
Ame ri ca n foreign enterprise.
 391

units to secure greater economy of operation. In addition,

extensive mechanization methods should be adopted coupled with
the planting of superior varieties of cane, such as the
Hawaiian 37-1933. The present average yield is around a
hundred piculs per hectare which is insufficient to enable the

industry to compete in an unprotected market, unless labor

costs were kept at a permanently low level. The Bureau of
Plant Industry has shown that, by planting new and improved
varieties, the yield may be doubled over the present average.

Pests and disease control, while not serious, if allowed

to go unchecked through motives of false economy may seriously

affect the Industry. Recently (late 1949), an outbreak of
"Fiji disease" was noted in Negros and while not serious at
present requires vigilance and cooperation with the Government.

The development of subsidiary industries may well

determine the future prosperity of the industry if accomplished
with vigor and imagination. The production of alcohol for
motor fuel would Increase the value of the industry, aid it in

meeting an uncertain future and benefit greatly the general

economy of the country which, In 1948, imported motor fuel in

the form of gasoline, kerosene and fuel oils to the value of

£■106 million. This figure will increase with any advance in

mechanization which will mean a serious drain in foreign ex­
change, now a subject of planning and control. This drain

could be minimized with the development of fuel oil from sugar.

Were only half of the nation’s requirements for fuel met in
 392

this fashion, the stability of the industry would b© increased

comfortably.

The final problem, of finding other foreign markets,

lies entirely in the hands of the Government, "Success in
this endeavor will depend a great deal upon the ability of the
industry to reduce its cost of production."^®

Whatever plan is adopted for saving the industry would

have to include the following factors to be sound and practic­
able: The rehabilitation of the industry should have the end

in view of enabling it to compete on a stable and permanent

basis in the unprotected open markets of the world; as an
export dollar producing crop, attempts should be made to make
of it a dollar-saving crop, the organization of the industry
should be modified accompanied by an increase in the share of
the profits by labor; great attention should be paid to the

improvement of the living standards of labor which, in the past,

has given no evidence that it has shared in the prosperity of
the industry; that, since the industry is one of the very few
that would respond to mechanization, such a program should be
started at the earliest opportunity; the fact should be borne
in mind that other sugar producing countries in the Orient
will, in all likelihood, succeed in rehabilitating their indus­

tries and thus enter into serious competition with many

prospects of success, and, despite the present high standards

of living of workers in this country (when compared to workers

15Ibld.. p. 51
 393

in other Oriental countries), this should not be taken as a

motive for lowering wages of Filipino workers who are faced

with a higher cost of living; the fact must be realized that
the Income derived from the industry is greater per unit than

any of the major crops; that Government aid, in some form,

should be made available coupled with a close supervision and
it should also take steps to open other foreign markets; and,
that immediate use should be made of the "Sugar Readjustment
and Stabilization Fund" created by Commonwealth Act No. 567.

Thirty per cent of this fund should be granted to the

Bureau of Plant Industry for study and research in cane; thirty
per cent should be granted for research leading toward the

development of subsidiary industries utilizing major products

and by-products. The remaining forty per cent could be used

for research in problems affecting the manufacture and utiliza­
tion of sugar, the main purpose of which should be the reduc­
tion in the cost of its manufacture.

The initiation and continued operation of these plans,

undisturbed by political and self-seeking interference, if

carried through with vigor and maintenance of policy, will

enable the industry to achieve a stability which will bring
prosperity to it and to the country at large. It Is to be
hoped that past history will not repeat itself in this respect.
 CHAPTER XII

THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY.* 1934-1950

At one time, the Philippines produced the best cigars

in the world. Authorities, such as the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
claim that the Cuban leaf is unexcelled for aroma, which may
be true, but to enthusiasts of Philippine cigars the flavor
of the latter is considered far superior to any other leaf,
especially when utilizing the fine wrappers produced in Java
and Sumatra. While there is no disputing of tastes, it must
be admitted that the Philippine cigars have found a world-wide
reception and the large quantities of five cent cigar 1 consumed
in the United States were products of the Philippine market.
Tobacco growing has an ancient and honorable history in the
Philippines, Pigafetta giving the earliest account of its
introduction by the Spanish from Central America as early as
the last quarter of the 16th Century. Some believe that a
variety of tobacco was already present in the Philippines since
N« suaveolens. and related species, are native to Australia.
Whether this species was to be found in the Philippines, and
whether it was utilized by the peoples there in any fashion is
another question that remains lost in the misty sbaiows of the past.2

^Encyclopaedia Brltamlca. 1947 edition, Vol. 22, p. 260.

2Pipe» have been found and tentatively dated at Ca.
1480 by H.Otley Beyer. These show such find workmanship and are
so sophisticated in design and detail as to suggest a consider­
able period of development. Whether they were used for tobacco
or some other plant, such as hemp, is an intriguing question
for further study and research.

394
 395

During the Spanish period, the production of tobacco

was a state monopoly until the year 1882, after which many
tobacco companies sprang up, the most prominent survivors to­
day being the Compafia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabaca-
lera) and La Insular Cigar and Cigarette Company. These two
companies still produce some of the finest cigars procurable
anywhere in the world. The original production of tobacco
was limited to the cigar-filler type but, in the years pre­

ceding the Commonwealth, the Government sponsored research and

experimental work which led to the development of the wrapper

and aromatic cigarette leaf tobacco industry. The production

of the last two types, however, was unable to supply local

demand, necessitating the Importation from the United States
of large quantities of this type of tobacco. The principal
manufactures, in the order of their importance, based on yearly
averages, 1925-1935, were} cigars (310,000,000 units),
cigarettes (4,306,000,000 units), chewing and smoking tobaccos
(650,000 kilos). Major exports were cigars, leaf and semi­
manufactured tobacco in the form of stemmed leaf, cigar butts,
cutting and scraps (yearly average, same period, 1,500,000 kilos).

Various sections of the country, with their varying

climatic characteristics, produce the distinctive tobacco of

each climatic region. Sun-grown wrapper types are produced In

Mindanao, the BIcol, and southern portions of Laguna. Shade-

grown wrapper types are produced in the Ilocos and the Tagaytay
region of Batangas. Cigar-filler types are produced in the
 396

Cagayan Valley which is the greatest area of production in the

Philippines, and the aromatic fillers are produced In the
Central Luzon provinces.

The tobacco industry was the chief source of direct

governmental revenues, nearly 50 per cent of taxes being
collected from it alone. The average yearly collection, 1930-
1935, was ^8,858,689.20, which represented only direct collections
from specific and sales taxes and did not include revenues
indirectly derived, such as land and income taxes since these
were difficult to determine.^ Perhaps some 600,000 people were

dependent upon the Industry which had a capital investment of

between PBO million and 3NS0 million ranking third in capital

Investment in the country with its products exported to 44
foreign countries, more than any other export Item (abaca went
to 25, copra to 10 and sugar to 2).4 While It represented but

two per cent of the total cultivated area, it occupied the

fifth place in the export list, It ranked first as employer
of labor in the city of Manila, with about 50 per cent of the
industrial laborers In the city being employed in the Industry,
and some 80,000 agricultural laborers in the provinces. It
paid the highest average monthly wages of any industry in the
Philippines despite high costs and taxes.

3
Domingo B. Paguirigan (ed.)j "Philippine Tobacco Indus­
try ....", The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philip­
pines. 1937-1948. p. 287.
^Department of Agriculture and Commerce, The Tobacco
Industry in the Philippines. (Manila, 1939), pp. 3-11, passim;
and, Manuel V. Gallegot Economic Emancipation. (Manila, 1939),
p. 257; 0 £. cit., p. 288.
 397

The production of cigar filler tobacco generally was

a losing proposition with profitable enterprise dependent al­

most exclusively on the vagaries of the weather. When floods
and typhoons reduced the crop, prices rose, but, normally, the
selling price barely covered the cost of production. The
relatively high prices of 1936, for example, only brought the

producer a net income per hectare of 3*20.20, or Tsarely a 4

per cent profit on investment. Cigar wrapper tobacco, in
favorable season, of either the shade-grown or open varieties
were more profitable, returning to the producer about §=308.00,
per hectare for the former and §=148.25, per hectare for the
latter. Aromatic cigarette filler production realized a normal
profit of §29.60 per hectare, while batek tobacco was always
profitable since the minimum price per picul of §20.00,

provided a profit of some 10 per cent on investment, with the

net income per hectare being §17.50.^ The costs, from which
these profits were derived, were very high. Filler tobacco

production costs averaged §220.00, per hectare, sun-grown

wrapper, §704.00, shade-grown wrapper, §200.00, aromatic
cigarette filler, §174.50, sun-cured Virginia, §200.00, flue-
cured Virginia, §250.00, and miscellaneous types, §172.00.

These are pre-war costs and are considerably lower

than post-war averages. These costs did not include Interest
on capital nor depreciation of equipment. The crop was general­
ly sold at the farm, so baling and marketing expenses were

5Paguirigan, o£. cit.. p. 289.

 398

nominally not borne by the farmer. In actual practice, however,

these costs were included since the buyer added them to the
price paid the farmer for his product. The gross value of
§5,000,000, for the 1938 crop was considered by some government
theorists and In other quarters as being a direct income for
the planters. However, if the labor costs are taken into con­
sideration, which was infrequently done, and translated into
actual cash value, It becomes quite clear that the grower re­
ceived barely enough to carry him through the year. Needless to
say, the average farmer-producer made little if any profit. In
the case of the cigar-filler growers, this is particularly true
since the market quotations for this product were alarmingly low.®

The Philippines ranked seventh In the world in produc­

tion of tobacco, producing, in 1935, 623,160 quintals from
61,600 hectares with a gross value of §5,000,000.7 During the
same yeatf, the ranking provinces were: Isabela, Cagayan, Panga-
sinan, La Union, Cebu, Oriental Negros, Iloilo, Ilocos Norte,
Occidental Negros, Leyte, Ilocos Sur, Nueva Ecija, Cotabato,
Surigao, Abra, Nueva Vizcaya,and Occidental Misamis. Isabela and
Cagayan alone produced in the same year around 300,000 quintals
which was 42 per cent of the total. By 1935, the leaf tobacco
production had dropped from 64,000,000 kilos in 1920, to but

g
See comment of Governor Fortuna to M. Bulan of Isabela
on this in Ibid., pp. 338-339.
7A quintal is 46 net kilos
 399

28,665,360 kilos. It ranked sixth among crops in amount of

area cultivated, following palay, corn, coconuts, abaca, and

sugar.

In addition to the cigar filler, cigar wrapper and

aromatic cigarette filler varieties produced, four other minor

varieties were raised. However, they were important only

locally, with the exception of the Ilocano batek, grown
especially in La Union, which had risen to some importance be­
cause of the demand on the Japanese market.

The cigar filler was the most important product,

especially the varieties Marogue. Viscaya. and Repollo from
the Cagayan Valley. The product from the Cagayan valley was
the best, being of the mild sub-type.

Growers habitually continued producing the same

quantities of tobacco year in and year out, with the result

that by the beginning of the Commonwealth there wassurplus

of stock which accounted partly for the very low prices then
current. Isabela alone produced some 233,500 quintals a year,
which was just 45,000 too much. There was, in addition, in
other areas, an over-production of some 94,000 kilos. "Over­
production" here was precisely the case, since the market as

then organized was in no position to absorb that much tobacco.

However, the production of cigar wrapper tobacco was

still short by five or six thousand quintals of the demand.
The Bureau of Plant Industry made attempts to encourage the
 400

further developments of this type in those areas where the

filler was in over-production, but with little success through

the Commonwealth period.

The best varieties &>r Philippine production were the

Sumatra for "open culture", and the native Vlscaya and Marogue

for shade grown cultures. The latter was the most dependable

since it was less influenced by the vagaries of the weather.

Sfilth respect to the production of aromatic cigarette

filler tobacco, the picture was not good. Local factories had

consumption requirements of over 25,000 quintals, but produc­

tion barely reached 200 quintals -- and this largely on an

experimental basis.

Some 113,160 quintals were grown of the minor types,

such as the Sulcok grown in the Ilocos regions, the batek (a

spotted variety) grown in La Union, Pangasinan, and some

Visayan regions, and the Romero from the Itawis district in

southwestern Cagayan province. All these varieties were

strong, dark and heavy and had only local importance.

The inception and gradual adoption of cellophane wrap­

pers was a step forward in some ways in the progress of the

industry, since they preserved the freshness of cigars for

longer periods of time and insured the sabker of a hygienic

product. On the other hand, when cigars ar © stored for any

length of time in cellophane they lose their flavor and

fragrance since tobacco requires slow "ageing" with each cigar

 401

imparting and extracting flavor from all the others in the

box* For this reason, cigar enthusiasts prefer the unwrapped

cigar which because of the vagaries of fashion is usually

obtainable also at a much lower price than the others.

Philippine cigarettes are produced in a great variety

of shapes and sizes with both white and licorice paper, as

well as certain varieties which are specially flavored for

local demand. Smoking and chewing tobacco are completely

different from American varieties since the smoking tobacco

is the same cut tobacco used in manufacturing Spanish-style

cigarettes, while the chewing tobacco is nothing more than a

flattened cigar using the coarser, and therefore the stronger,

leaves*

For the ten-year period 1925-1936, the United States

took 84 per cent of the total production of cigars, 89 per

cent of fillers and scrap, 10 per cent of cigarettes, less

than one per cent of leaf tobacco and smoking tobacco, and

13 per cent of all others. Cigars, which constituted the vital

item in the trade, were therefore largely dependent upon the

American market. As a result of an increase in the importa­

tion of American tobacco products, particularly cigarettes,

the value of Philippine tobacco exports declined steadily

after 1927, from 1*18,000,000, to PO.0,500,000, in 1933. Since

this was parallel to exports to the United States, the health

of the trade was obviously dependent upon the American market*

The value of this trade declined from i?9,000,000 in 1927 to

 402

barely over 15,000,000, in 1956. Obviously, if the situation

would not improve, it would be necessary for the country to

increase its exports to some of the remaining 43 nations.

Cigars were shipped, in addition to the United States, to

China, France, the Straits Settlements, England aid Spain;

leaf tobacco to Spain, Korea, Japan, China, France and North

Africa; scraps to Holland, China, Gibraltar and Belgium;

cigarettes to China, Japan, the Canary Islands and France;

and smoking tobacco to the Canary Islands, Gibraltar and China.

Despite the large production of tobacco, the Philip­

pines was a heavy importer of tobacco products. The average

yearly imports far the period 1927-1936 continually Increased,

with the United States supplying 85 per cent of leaf tobacco,

worth 11,087,938, 74 per cent of cigars worth 1976.00, 99.51

per cent of cigarettes worth 1=4,062,495, 99.99 per cent of

chewing tobacco worth 1=739,495, 60 per cent of smoking

tobacco worthl75,470, and 96 per cent of all other imports

worth 12,340.00. A limited quantity (15 per cent) of leaf

imports came from the East Indies. The value of these imports

from the United States rose from 15,0p0,000 in 1927 to

17,400,000, in 1936.

The balance of trade had been in favor of the Philip­

pines until 1935, when it shifted to the United States and

remained there for the remainder of the Commonwealth period

and the early years of the Republic. By 1936, the balance

in favor of the United States amounted to 12,722,141, and

 403

with the usual invisible items included the figure would

rise to 53,389,871. That the trade was more heavily weighted

in favor of the United States than the figures indicate, can

be seen from the fact that the United States in 1934 imported

a total of 71,748,699 pounds of tobacco of which only 7 per

cent came from the Philippines, ifith the imposition of the

provisions of the Independence Act, those cigars which had

been selling in the United States at two for five cents would .

be raised to about twelve cents a piece. Since costs were

high, any additional burden imposed by duties and special

imports would automatically wipe out the Philippine trade.8

In their appeal to the members of the Joint Prepara­

tory Committee, the representatives of the Philippine tobacco

industry, cited these as well as numerous other facts to plead

for consideration. They were convinced that the full applica­

tion of the Independence Law provisions would mean the extinction

of their industry which would reduce hectarage in the Philip­

pines by 13 per cent, affecting 65,000 planters and their

dependents, throwing out of work some 65 per cent of factory

hands and 65,000 provincial laborers, and reduce by 54,000,000,

the annual revenues of the Philippine Government. For these

reasons, as well as the fact that the tobacco trade between

the United States and the Philippines was "mutually advants^geous"

®Seej M.V. Gallego: "The Paradox of the Tobacco

Indus try," The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Philip­
pines. 1937-1938. pp. 337-338.
 404

aa well as the fact that the balance of trade had shifted

definitely in favor of the United States by nearly three

and a half million pesos yearly, the industry requested the

maintenance of the status quo. They stated that there was actual­

ly no competition since nAmerica supplied the Philippines

with Virginia and wrapper leaf tobacco and aromatic cigarettes...

while the Philippines supplies America with cigars and

«Q
stripped filler which she must import anyway from other countries"*^

Since the tobacco industry provided the Philippine

Government with tax funds which amounted to almost 20 per cent

of its annual expenditures, the possible extinction of the

industry was a problem the Commonwealth had to solve quickly.

The industry was faced with three major problems: over-produc­

tion of cigar filler, excessive taxation of cigarettes, and

inadequate knowledge with regard to the proper methods of

treating cigarettes to prevent molds. There werd also three

possible ways in which the standards of the industry could be

raised: limiting the area planted by individual farmers

(under Spain each family was limited to planting 6,000 plants),

strict enforcement of regulations with regard to classifica­

tion, and, coordination of government activities with regard

to promotion.^-®
9paguirigan, oja. clt.. p. 293.
1° Jose C. Ramos: ”E canonic Aspect of the Tbbacco Industry In the
Riilippines," Ibid.. pp. 293-299; Department of Agriculture and Commerce,
opuolt.. p.12; and, Gallego,(1939). op. clt.. p. 259. The present observer
might also suggest the fact that a stable 'industry requires the extension
of wider credit and marketing facilities, for smaller producers, a more
definite classification of varieties, research into the development of
better varieties, establishment of more practical classificatory and re­
gulatory measures, and the utilization of mare modern culture and
curing methods.
 405

The industry, then, faced in general almost the same

problems which were approached in much the same way by the

Government, as the other major export items.

A major problem was represented by the American

attitude. The United States was the best customer as in other

products and the imposition of the provisions of the Tydings

-McDuffie Act, Tydings-Kocialkowski Act, various U.S. Revenue

Acts, brought confusion and despair to the industry which,

by 1941, was in such precarious situation that the future was

despaired of by even the most optimistic. The war decimated

the industry. No other major export industry was so badly

damaged. Of all the major export items, the tobacco industry,

following the war made the least progress and faces the most

uncertain future.

The tobacco industry was also one of the most heavily

taxed -- the taxes amounting to actual discrimination. Each

time a factory processed a hundred pounds of leaf tobacco it

paid to the government at least 139.00. Since the price of

leaf tobacco during most of the commonwealth period was about

1=12.00 per hundred pounds, the factory paid about one-third

of the tax for its supply of tobacco. In addition, the

specific tax was based on the selling classification of 1,000

cigarettes, which applied to all sizes, large and small. The

income to a factory owner was 117.50 (or 30 per cent of the

selling price) per one thousand packages, and 118.50 per 1,000
 406

cigars. While the cigarette producer made ¥0.33 per thousand,

the Government earned ¥39.00, thus collecting for Its efforts,

sixty-seven times more profit than the manufacturer, who paid

70 per cent of the total cost of manufacturing in excise

taxes. From cigars the Government received three times the

income of the manufacturer who received but 11 per cent of

the net profit from his investment.H

The following typical cases of cigarette and cigar

costs of manufacture are illustrative of the uneasy position

of the industry during the Commonwealth. The factory price

for 1000 packs (30,000 cigarettes) was ¥=56.00; expenses were

as follows; specific tax of ¥1.30 per 1,000 cigarettes,

¥39.00; cost of leaf tobacco, ¥11.25; two rolls of paper,

¥2.20; machine and hand packer’s labor, ¥2.02; cost of

package paper, ¥0.05, and cost of lithographed pack, ¥1.15.

The total expense, then, was ¥55.67, leaving ¥0*33, as a

balance for overhead, interest, and profit. Class A cigars,

selling in the United States at two for nineteen centavos,

returned a balance of ¥2.70 for overhead, interest, and

profit. Higher profits were returned from higher priced

shapes or brands but the sale of these was not large.

It was thus possible for foreign cigarettes, largely

imported from the United States, to enter into serious

^Ma n u e l V, Gallego: "Problems of the Philippine

Cigarette Industry," The Philippine Journal of Commerce.
Vol. JCCII, No. 1 (January, 1937), pp. 15-16, 20.
 407

competition with native Philippine brands which, being heavily

discriminated against through taxation, could only be manu­

factured and sold clandestinely (i.e., to avoid the high taxes). 12

Critics of the Government tax scheme protested against

the discrimination against Philippine cigarettes as well as

the price differential between cigarettes and cigars. The

Government responded by passing Commonwealth Acts 95 and 203.

The first authorized the Philippine National Development

Company and the Secretary of Agriculture to establish and

maintain warehouses for tobacco and "other marketable products.

The second, increased the fixed tax on retail leaf tobacco

dealers from twenty to thirty pesos per annum.^4 The first

was to benefit the entire industry, the second was to lower

the differential between cigarettes and cigars, and, at the

same time, eliminate dishonest trading in the commodity. The

Collector of Internal Revenue, in 1936, pointed to the fact

that retail leaf tobacco dealers paid to the government

¥72,000.00 in taxes. At the rate of ¥20.00 per dealer, there

were about 3,000 dealers who, if they handled a conservative

estimate of 20 quintals of tobacco each, the total volume

handled would amount to 60,000 quintals. dince the 170,000

quintals handled by licensed manufacturers netted the govern-

12 Ibid.

•^Messages Qf the President. Vol. 2, Pt. 2, pp. 763-764.

14Ibld.. p. 1263.
 408

ment 3^5,000,000 in revenue, the amount handled by the retail

dealers would have brought in an additional ^2,000,000.00.

This represented both a discrimination against manufacturers

and increased possibilities of illicit manufacture. This is

not the entire picture since many cases went unreported due

to the lack of men in the field of the Bureau of Plant Indus­

try and Internal Revenue, the latter, In many cases, being

represented in the province by only one man. Thus, the

manufacturer, with a restricted market, could 111 afford to

pay good prices for the product, with the result, that the

farmer suffered. In 1936, It was estimated that the tobacco

Industry paid 55.8 per cent of its earnings in taxes to the

Government, while the sugar industry paid but 1.18 per cent.

The need for better legislation was evident to the critics

who attacked the Government for Its weak handling of the problem.

The critics also called for a new appreach to the

cigarette problem, one authority demanding uniform, equitable

and lighter taxes; production of cheaper and better aromatic

tobacco; protective legislation for cigarettes; higher

standards for local brands, and effective propaganda for native

cigarettes through Government Intervention and finance.1®

It was generally conceded that labor, In the tobacco

^5Isayas R. Salonga, The Present Problems of the

Tobacco Trade. (Manila, 1938), p. 18, quoting from The Tribune.
July 16, 1935.

•*-6Gallego, op. cit.. p. 20.

 409

industry, received fair wages, running near the one peso-a-day

mark. Of course, this was really not sufficient upon which

to live a good life, but it was considered high for the

Commonwealth period. The main problem here seemed to be un­

employment rather than low wages. The great and continuing

importation of foreign cigarettes meant a continuing drop in

employment which brought about dissatisfaction among labor in

the industry. President Quezon believed that "the cigar-

makers do not earn enough," but that if wages were to be in­

creased, "there will be no money available for the purpose."^7

He suggested that they "wait for the ultimate solution of

this matter by the Government" — hardly encouraging to workers

face to face with unsatisfactory living conditions. He had

no objection to the cigar-makers striking for better wages

but wondered what they would get out of it. "Though you

demand higher wages, if the employers cannot meet them

financially, you will not get anywhere.” The capitalist, he

said, invested his money to make a profit and sine e he could

not make the profit he wanted under the conditions in the city

the manufacturers "send their tobacco to the provinces...

because the wage scale there is low..,." He suggested that,

to solve the situation, the laborers migrate to Mindanao and

^ Messages of the President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 22-23.

Speech on Social Justice for the Laborers, delivered at a
luncheon in honor of the representatives of labor under the
leadership of Mr. Cresenciano Torres, Malacaflan, Manila,
February. 17, 1938.
 410

work on Government roads there. If they did this, he promiied

to increase their wages, "because I have set aside £2,000,000

for such public works projects." He also suggested that a

reason for the difficulty facing cigar-workers was the large

number of women employed in the industry "and this is not

easy to solve." He did not explain this rather ambiguous

statement further, beyond saying that he had mentioned it

because "I am in the habit of broaching only those questions

which are capable of solution and not of being simply spoken

about, or of making promises which I would not be able to

keep."'*’8 One need not be a confirmed sceptic to raise eye­

brows at this statement.

The basic problems facing the tobacco industry could

not be solved in such a fashion. A more definite and energetic

program was demanded, a program such as the sugar Industry

men p l a n n e d . T h i s program was not forthcoming during the

Commonwealth, despite the creation of the National Tobacco

Administration, which had been sponsored by the Special

Tobacco Committee of the National Assembly In 1938. It was

sponsored by municipal councils, provincial boards, and The

Tribune -- and the cigar workers agreed to check a general

strike pending the passage of the bill. There was a definite

need for such legislation since the previous laws enacted to

18Ibid.
l3Domingo Paguirigan: "Problems and Adjustment in
Philippine Tobacco Production," National Research Council,
Bulletin. No. 1 7 . (September, 1938), pp. 21-24.
 411

aid the industry had not brought the needed results. Observers

pointed to the fact that the country produced a surplus of

cigar filler leaf tobacco amounting to some five million kilos

which was due to unrestricted production in some 10,000

hectares. The country imported annually some six million

pesos1 worth of Virginia and wrapper leaf tobacco used by

local manufacturers. It was pointed out that, with the

termination of the trade relations with the United States,

the tobacco export trade in cigars, stripped filler and

cigarettes the equivalent of four million kilos of leaf tobacco,

was likely to disappear completely. Prices of leaf tobacco

had dropped so low that the producers were unable to recover

costs of production. The bill was introduced, by the comit-

tee, with the hope that its operation would promote, reha­

bilitate and regulate the Industry as well as to promote

President Quezon’s social justice campaign insuring the well­

being and economic security of the people engaged In the

industry. It was hoped that the bill would foster the growth

of only leaf tobacco of the best quality at a quantity

insuring the equilibrium of prices and orderly, efficient

trading.

In creating the National Tobacco Corporation^0 the

former Tobacco Board, created by Act No. 2179, amending Act

No. 2613, was abolished and its functions, duties and porers

20cA N o . 5 1 9 , 1 9 4 0 . The creation of this body had

been recommended by the National Tobacco Administration.
 412

were transferred to the Corporation, for which seven million

pesos, together with collections received from the activities

of the Corporation, was provided* This was later modified

so that a "Tobacco Industry Promotion Fund", with an initial

appropriation of 1*2,000,000, with possible further appro­

priations to a maximum of §=10,000,000, was to carry out the

provisions of the act. The Corporation was to deal in leaf

tobacco and its m a n u f a c t u r e s ; operate transportation facil­

ities, establish warehouses, purchase machinery and equipment

for storage, handling, utilization and selling of manufactures;

provide credit facilities to planters, and organize cooperatives

supplying them with capital and assisting them in selling.

This corporation suffered the same fate as others

similarly created and the industry continued to decline to the

point of stagnation although President Quezon said that "tobac­

co exporters are comparatively better off than our copra or

sugar exporters,"22 a statement which displeased the indivi­

duals referred to. i/hether this was true or not, the tobacco

planters' condition was deplorable, with no relief during the

remainder of the Commonwealth period.

The Post-gar Period:-

The war proved disastrous to the Industry, planting in

Andres V. Castillo: Philippine Economics. 1949,

pp • 230-231•
22
Messages of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, p. 166,
July 23, 1939, his speech on the ^Benefits Derived from the
Coconut Oil Excise Tax."
 415

1945 being 40 per cent below prewar production. The original

12,125,000 working capital of the National Tobacco Corpora­

tion, was greatly depleted, causing it to adopt a wait-and-see

policy. The Corporation made strenuous representations to

the Government for aid, resulting in the passage of Republic

Act No. 302, which provided the sum of 13,000,000 as additional

capital. This enabled the corporation to resume its activi­

ties which, however, are still far from even the meagre

goals established in 1948. It provided for more provincial

branches and buying stations which, it was hoped, would be

able to secure at least 20 per cent of the crop. Out of the

total production, in 1947, of 17,654,800 kilos, it was able

to secure only 1,146,805 kilos.

Conclusioni-

Ihe industry faces a definite crisis. This is due

to many things: the conservatism of growers and capitalists;

the fact that the bulk of leaf production is in the hands of

small independent growers and tenants having little or no

capital; persistent inequalities among various elements of

the industry; its sole dependence upon cigar filler tobacco;

lack of understanding of the changing trends and demands of

the smoking public; enormous influx of American cigarettes

worth 1=57,000,000 in 1948; unfavorable weather for the last

three years reducing by one-third to one-half the normal

23
Vicente Formoso: "Tobacco: Its Rehabilitation,"
Evening News Supplement. Vol. 140, No. 6 (September 30, 1949),
pp. 4, 22.
 414

production; and the desire of most growers to produce food

crops to get cash (since tobacco is no longer a cash crop

for them) .^4 prospect, says the Bureau of Plant Indus­

try, for the Industry during the next few years, ”13 gloomy.

The industry must produce more wrapper tobacco, more

Virginia aromatic, must regulate more closely the growing of

native tobacco, must introduce the manufacture of cigars by

machinery to make cheaper cigars while retaining hand-manu-

facture for the better classes, and must receive more

adequate aid from the government. The restriction of importa­

tion of American cigarettes is vital necessity, both for the

rehabilitation of the industry as well as a conservation

measure for dollar reserves. The present import control laws

are Ineffective despite the restrictions placed upon dollar

expenditures in December, 1949. The present (1950) result

of the latter step has been to encourage a black market in

American cigarettes and an enormous increase in their prices,

without diminishing their consumption and without concomitant

increase in the consumption of native brands. Much remains

yet to be accomplished before the situation can be considered

well In hand.

More funds should be allotted by the Government to

the Bureau of Plant Industry for research in tobacco varieties

and methods of production, and the National Tobacco Corporation

^ Annual Report. Bureau of Plant Industry, 1949,

p. 31.
 415

must engage in a more active and energetic program of aid to

growers and the elimination of the many inequalities existing in

the industry. The Corporation should buy tobacco stocks from

small planters directly and by classes, offering bonuses for the

best classes and establishing a descending scale of prices for

lesser grades. The Corporation should also engage in a well-

integrated program of seeking more foreign markets and should

encourage the production of Virginia cigarettes which could be

sold at more reasonable prices throughout the sterling areas as

well as to the United Kingdom. In addition, the various govern­

ment agencies charged with activities in relation to the industry

should be consolidated under the Tobacco Administration Office.

The Tobacco Inspection Service and the Tobacco Agency in the

United States, now under the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the

Tobacco Research Section of the Bureau of Plant Industry should

all be administered by the Tobacco Administration Office. Tobac­

co promotion abroad should be handled, in cooperation with this

office, by the foreign service, of the Republic. The special

inspection fees collected for the promotion of the Industry,

should be supplemented by a fund derived from five per cent of

the collection of internal revenue and specific and privilege

taxes. This should be allotted as an additional fund to support

the Tobacco Administration Office.

If these, and other measures which have been proposed by

various government agencies and observers, are carried out
vigorously and with imagination, the industry may once again
regain its important position in the Philippine economy.
 CHAPTER XIII

CERES’ HORN:
COTTON-RUBBER-VEGETABLES AND OTHER PLANTS-
FRUITS-COFFEE-THE ROXAS FOOD
PRODUCTION CAMPAIGN

Although the economy of the nation rests upon the five

bases treated above, the rich resources of the country produce

many other crops necessary in the livelihood of the people.

One important item in the diet of the people is the camote. or

sweet potato. Almost a million people consider this their main

item of diet, and although enough camotes are raised to feed

these people, an extension of this crop is necessary if the

Philippines is to achieve a certain degree of self-sufficiency.

Realizing this, in 1940-41, the Commonwealth Government attempted

to encourage the cultivation of sweet potatoes and corn, but its

efforts were largely nullified by the outbreak of the War.

During the Occupation, many people were forced to exist on

camotes. since so many other footls were lacking. Today, many

have no liking for the crop. The camote is generally grown in

those areas in which the winds are too strong for the production

of corn and, in some areas, the camote is a cash crop before

rice planting.

The importance of cash crops to the Philippine economy

cannot be over-estimated, but many experts feel that they should

be planted in conjunction with the main food crops. Uiis has

not yet been done to any great extent. Catherine Porter has

noted that "about one-third of the cultivated land was planted

 417

to cash crops, most Important of which was sugar, next in

importance, coconuts and hemp. Comparatively good prices paid

for these commodities in the past made it far more rewarding for

the farmer -- or his landlord -- to concentrate on them, rather

than to devote his land and time and energy to raising food

crops. If the large number of rice tenants or small landowners

had had more land of their own on which to work, and if they

would have been assured of enjoying the fruits of its product,

the whole agricultural situation would have been far different

today.Because of the high cost of agricultural land there

has been a tendency to cultivate cash crops rather than to rotate

crops for the greatest good both of the farmers and the country.

Although the country grows a great variety of vegetables, fruits

and nuts, production has been far from adequate for domestic

needs, let alone for export.® Miss Porter points out that, with

the exception of wheat, dairy products, and beef, which have

been generally imported from the United States and Australia,

the Philippine land and waters could supply the entire food

needs of the nation.

Cotton

The Government and its major economic planners seem to

have recognized the serious situation into which Philippine agri­

culture had fallen by the time of the Commonwealth and, in order

to alleviate the situation, hoped to introduce various cash crops

which the average farmer could produce in addition to rice or com.

^Porter, op. cit.. p. 67. 2Ibid.

 418

The cash crops these planners had in mind were cotton and rubber.

Since the Government had established several textile mills, it

was hoped that the farmers would be able to cultivate the 7,000

acres needed to supply them. In 1939, however, less than 2,000

hectares had been planted to cotton and although later the acre­

age increased, there was still too little to supply the demands

of the local cotton industry.® The Japanese organized the

Philippine Cotton Association, shortly after the beginning of

the Occupation, and large cotton companies in Japan came to the

Philippines to aid in the development'of the industry. It was

hoped that this would make the country self-sufficient in clothing

which, in the past, had represented an import of some 1*40,000,000

worth annually.^ April, 1943, saw the first crop in the five-

year plan for the industry, which was manufactured at the

National Development Company's mill near Manila. Locally-grown

cotton was said to compare favorably with that of other comtries,

being, the reporter stated, '’decidedly better than American-

grown varieties.”5

The cotton industry has had a respectable history in the

Philippines. Weaving has been a major cottage industry of the

women since the most ancient times and, in Mohammedan areas, the

5 Ibid.

^See Cornelio Balmacedaj "The New Philippine Economy,"

Philippine Re v i e w . JTol. 1, No. 1 (March, 1943), p. 53.

5Shln Seiki (New Era), Vol. I, No. 10 (July, 1943), re­

verse of cover. Pages 1-5 were devoted, in this number, to a
pictorial story on the cotton industry revived by the Central Adminis­
trative Organization "at the instance of the Japanese Military
Administration."
 419

men have produced a fine cloth universally worn by both men and

women in the South. Woven cloth has been found in the Philippine

Iron Age sites by Professor H. Otley Beyer, wrapped around short,

dagger-like swords of bronze. There seems little doubt that

the Chinese (at least the Southern Chinese) received their first

cotton stuffs from the Philippines as early as the 3rd Century

A.D. It is, of course, true that Sir Aurel Stein found the

earliest-known Chinese woven, patterned stuffs, dating from

around the 2nd to the 4th Centuries B.C., in the Lop Desert of

Chinese Turkestan, but there is a gap between that period and

the next reference, in the T'ang Dynasty, when woven stuffs

achieved a real artistry.® It is quite possible that the southern

Chinese received their cotton from the Philippines during this

period and we know certainly that throughout most of the pre-

Spanish period the Chinese came regularly to the Philippines to

trade for raw cotton and cotton cloth.7 The region contiguous

to Lingayen Gulf, the western shores of Luzon facing the

China Sea and the Eastern s h o r e s, on the Pacific, have

since time Immemorial seen the bulky Chinese junks come

to trade. The Ilocos region, Abra and F a n g a slnan,

today, are r i c h in remains of this great trade, and

®A.F* Kendricks "Textiles and Embroideries," Japanese

A r t . Britannica Booklet Ho. 6, Encyclopaedia Brltannlca. 14th
Edition, 1933, p. 59.
7See Berthold Laufer:
Laufer: P f t fre Cblpf a e tp
, Reprinted from the Smithsonian Miscel-
>tember 13,
~ Series XV,
— - — — , Beyer,
unpublished MS on the "Pre-Spanish History of the Philippines,"
ana C.O. Houston, Jr., unpublished MS on "Some Suggestions on
Southern Influences In Chinese and ifepanese History."
 420

the culture of this general area still reflects the influences

felt during the long trading period.

Filipino women have long been noted for their skill in

weaving, despite the fact that their looms and equipment have

altered little through the centuries. The legislature In 1936

proposed a bill appropriating funds for the manufacture of improved

hand looms for distribution to weavers throughout the country.

This was vetoed by President Quezon on the grounds that funds

were not available, and that the ends desired could be achieved

by the "Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce by using either

the fund appropriated by Act No. 3953, or the Fiber Research Fund

under section 1796-B of the Revised Administrative Code."8

Since the greater development of cottage industries was one of

the goals of the economic program of the Commonwealth, and since

It could have saved many millions of pesos for the Commonwealth,

this was false economy. Dr. Vicente Aldaba, Chief of the

Fiber Research Section, Bureau of Plant Industry (now Manager of

the NAFCO), developed an improved hand loom which increased the

efficiency of the industry wherever it was adopted, but, un­

fortunately it did not have a distribution wide enough to bring

lasting benefits to the industry and the people. The textile

industry was a treasure house for Japanese business during much

of the Commonwealth period.

Through the efforts of the "NEPA" campaign, during the

8M . 0 . P .. (Vetoing Bill No. 332, Nov. 7, 1936), Vol. 2,

Pt. 1 (rev.ed.), p. 360.
 421

Commonwealth period, instituted to encourage home industries,

many women turned to wearing the "patadiong" and the "carabaya."

These garments, generally home-made, composed the dress of the

rural women, and were comfortable and attractive despite their

ankle-length. Known during the Commonwealth period as the "Nepa"

dres3, this was increasingly worn by the socially "elite.”

Victoria L. De Araneta, a member of one of the most influential

and industrious families in the Philippines, appealed to women

to adopt the native dress to aid the protectionism instituted

by the National Economic Protectionism Association (known as

the ”N E P A " ) s

Once a flourishing industry...is the weaving of

sinamay, of jusi, of pifia; it is now slowly dying out
and we are not lifting a finger to save it. Nay, daily
we contribute to the death of this industry, and to the
death of our ’forgotten w o r k e r s ’ there, as daily we
help the textile workers of Japan, China, England and
Prance whose products we buy....
Many of us do not care to wear our native materials
because they have not the shine nor the sleek appearance
of satin, the softness of crepe...*
We thus fail, I am sure, not because we are selfish,
but only because in our own atmosphere of ease and
comforts, we fail to realize that other people are
suffering.... It is high time that we awake to the fact
that we and not foreigners, should benefit from our
national heritage, and this will come to pass only if
we daily remember and act to patronize it in full measure....9

The Iloeano "cambaya” and the Tagalog and Visayan "patadiong"

becoming popular, demand rose to unprecedented heights. Un­

fortunately, the great benefits went to Japanese textile dealers

who began to sell imitations of these articles. While the cloth,

9The Philippines Herald Yearbook (14th Anniversary

Supplement), September 29, 1934, p. 95.
 422

like most Japanese textiles, was of good quality, the floods of

cloth produced on machine-looms greatly restricted the home

manufactures. During the Commonwealth period, the Japanese

textile trade increased enormously, largely at the expense of

American textiles. In 1936, for example, imports from Japan

amounted to 48,669,638 square meters, while imports from the

United States fell (from 35,250,190 square meters in 1935) to

27,583,336 square meters. This drop in the imports of American

textiles, of course, was also due to the terms of the Tydlngs-

McDuffie Act. The cotton-seed interests in the United States

had been one of the major groups demanding independence for the

Philippines and the accompanying restriction on Philippine oil

exports.

The above figures do not include textiles transshipped

from Japanese-owned mills in Hongkong, amounting to an additional

11,336,505 square meters. In an agreement signed with the United

States, the Japanese agreed to limit their export of textiles to

the Philippines to 45,000,000 square meters a year. This they

easily evaded by selling through Chinese and "dummy” firms.

Those principally aided by this agreement, which was designed to

benefit the American textile manufacturers, were the Hongkong and

Chinese cotton industry and the Japanese rayon industry. With

the restriction of the purchasing power of the Filipino by the

Tydings-McDuffle Act and subsequent laws, the Japanese, under­

selling American textiles with ease, practically pre-empted the

market. By 1941, they were in practical control of textiles In

 423

the Philippines, and had peace lasted a few more years,

American textiles would have disappeared.

Hie big mistake Japan made in 1941 was going to war.

Had she refrained from violence, she would have attained her

objectives by economic penetration.-1-® The American attempts

to restrict the Japanese trade had only the effect of turning

the Japanese away from the American supply of cotton to other

regions — particularly India and Brazil. The loss of these

markets during the war encouraged the Japanese to Increase

cotton lands in the Philippines.

Plans were made by the National Development Company to

erect a modern cotton mill to attempt to meet the domestic

demand for cheaper cotton goods. This plan was doomed from the

start. Dr. Aldaba pointed out that the cost per spindle for a

modern mill capable of weaving and finishing, including equip­

ment, buildings and power, would be approximately ^180. He

further estimated that to replace imported stocks alone would

require almost 400,000 spindles. To raise the cotton necessary

to supply these spindles would require 200,000 hectares of land.

To train the agricultural force, the personnel for the mills and

distributors, would also require many years and the outlay of

•^This was apparently the original plan proposed in the

"Tanaka Memorial" which was taken by the militarists and twisted
to suit their own designs. This was revealed In a conversation
between Count Tokugawa and several Americans in the Philippines
in the late f20s, or early '30s, at the time that the Count
visited the Philippines. Related to the author by one of the
participants in that conversation. This was later confirmed by
a Japanese "cultural" official sent to the Philippines during the
Occupation in conversations with Filipinos then in the "cultural
affairs" section of the Government.
 424

millions of pesos. In 1937, there was but one domestic mill

turning out coarse cotton goods, with 323 looms and 8,000

spindles. Maximum capacity was reported at 10,000 yards daily,

but, in actuality, it produced not more than 4,800 yards, the

equivalent of 1,500,000 yards anually. Thus, to meet domestic

requirements for textiles, the development of widespread cottage

industries would be the prime necessity. This the Commonwealth

was unable to achieve and, so far, the Republic has ignored the

entire question.

R u b b e r ;-

Rubber production has even a sadder history than that

of cotton. Experts had declared that nearly five million acres

of land in Mindanao were suitable for the production of rubber,

but by 1939, only 3,640 hectares were planted. The Goodyear

Plantation in Bukidnon is at present nothing but a wild jungle.

Carmi A. Thompson had suggested in 1926 that the rubber In the

Philippines could be at least as profitable as In Java, Sumatra

and the Malay Peninsula. He mentioned, however, that before

it could be brought into profitable production, the Philippines

would have to alter Its land laws and its attitude toward

foreign e n t r e p r e n e u r s A l t h o u g h this step is absolutely

For an excellent picture of the situation in 1937, see

Troadio Millora: "Cotton and Textile Industry," The Commercial
and Industrial Manual of the Philippines. 1957-38. pp. 307-309;
Hilarion S. Silayans "Philippine Cotton Facts and Figures,"
I b i d .. pp. 310-312; and shorter notes, pp. 312-321.
12
Appendix VI, Dean C. Worcester, The Philippines Past
and Present. 1930, pp. 827-828.
 425

necessary, any suggestions along such lines produces a storm,

of protest and oratory from members of C o n g r e s s . W i t h

adequate capital and a sympathetic attitude by the Government

toward foreign investors, the rubber industry could be extended

to provide amounts sufficient for the domestic needs of the

nation. A suggestion was made several years ago that in areas

suitable for rubber trees, each farmer, by planting three or

four close to his home, could provide himself with an increased

income and the nation with a comfortable supply of raw material.

Hilarion Silayan, then Director of the Bureau of Plant

Industry, stated that Mindanao and Mindoro could produce some

200,000 tons of raw rubber a year. He pointed out that a

capitalization of only ^845 per hectare would be necessary,

including modern equipment, working capital, and care for stocks

at full maturity. This compared with the !P914 to ^1,235 per

hectare a year required in the Federated Malay States. Para

rubber seeds had been introduced as early as 1904, but progress

was slow. He advanced four reasons: the land laws which made

it difficult for corporations to acquire the holdings they

desired; Increased production from the British and Dutch East

Indies, causing rubber prices to decline; the difficulty of

marketing raw rubber in the Philippines; and the erroneous

impression that rubber could be produced profitably only on

I S c f . statement by Senator Cabili with regard to the

Marsman abaca plan above.
1^"P.I. Potential Source of Rubber," The Philippine
Journal of Commerce. Vol. XIV, No. 12 (December, 1938), p. 12.
 426

large plantations. At the time he spoke, there were three large

rubber plantations In operation: the American Rubber Company,

at Latuan, Isabela de Basilan, Zamboanga (949.3 has., capitalized

at 1*500,000); the Rio Grande Rubber Plantation, Kabansalan,

Zamboanga (1,024 has., capitalized at ¥=13,230) and the Basilan

Plantation Company, Isabela de Basilan, Zamboanga (1,024 has.,

capitalized at ¥500,000), the oldest operating plantation in

the country, having begun in 1914.

It has been estimated that the Philippines could pro­

duce enough rubber to supply one-fifth the requirements of the

United States, and this could replace much marginal sugar land

and other weak export Items as an excellent source of r e v e n u e . ^

There is no doubt that, with Government sponsorship and research,

rubber could become an Important item in the economic life of

the Philippines.

Vegetables and Other P l a n t s :-

Other crops can well be developed as part of the Philip­

pine economy. The principal vegetables are cow peas, lima

beans and soy beans, which with some sixty fruit and tree crops

had a value, in 1939, of ¥35,615,068. This figure represents

one-tenth of all crops, livestock and poultry, by value, in the

country. In addition, many fiber plants and root plants are

important to the diet of the people and represent a large portion

of the national Income. Maguey, known also as the century plant

15Gallego, 0 £. c l t .. p. 214.
 427

or* agave, was introduced by the Spanish from Mexico. It is of

some importance in those areas where the soil is less productive

of the major crops, as in Ilocos Norte, Cebu and Bohol.

Maguey suffered the same reverses of fortune as abaca during

the Commonwealth, dropping from a production of 21,281,730

kilos worth 13,538,030, in 1929, to 6,460,917 kilos worth

1=340,000, In 1939. Like abaca it was sold largely in bulk to

Japan. It Is supplemented by sisal, kapok and pifia (the fiber

woven from tne pineapple plant). Cassava is grown extensively

in the Sulu Archipelago, and represented, in 1939, a production

value of one and a half million pesos.

The peanut is of some importance. Its production in­

creased from 6,441 hectares producing 3,638,680 kilos worth

1345,420, in 1934, to 12,173 hectares producing 6,528,524 kilos

worth 1537,777, In 1939. In 1939, it was estimated that some

20,000 people were engaged in field production, manufacture and

traffic in peanuts, with Lanao, Leyte, Pangasinan, Cagayan, La

Union, Isabela, Nueva Ecija, Ilocos Norte, Batangas and Cebu

as ranking areas of production. The main problems facing this

potentially important industry, are inadequate supply and high

cost of production. These may be solved by extending the area

of production to regions most suited for successful cultivation

and to marginal lands in sugar-producing areas, by the intensive

use of green manures on worn-out soils, and by mechanizing

production.16 Because of its high food value and its importance

16Department of Agriculture and Commerce: The Peanut

Industry in the Philippines. (Manila, 1939), p. 10.
 428

as a source of valuable oil, the peanut should be encouraged

by the Government--partieularly in view of the low nutritional

standards of the people*

Fruits:-

There is no reason why the Philippines should not be

able to produce all the fruits and vegetables needed, and,

indeed, be able to export to other less fortunate countries.

The soil is fairly good in most places, and produces vegetables

fully as good as those from such fabulous vegetable-producing

areas as California and Texas. The people, not realizing the

importance of vegetables, have produced them only spasmodically,

in an off-hand fashion, as they were needed. Before the war,

the best were grown by the Japanese around Baguio, in the

Trinidad Valley. Since the war, the lands have been reappro­

priated by the natives of that region (Benguet and Kankanai

peoples) whose standard of living, as a result, has risen

wonderfully. Baguio is still famous for its vegetables and

fruits. A traveler through the Mountain Province as a whole is

struck with the excellence of the vegetables, fruits, and

poultry, produced there, largely by graduates of the La Trinidad

Agricultural School, one of the most efficient institutions in

the P h i l i p p i n e s * ^

Despite the ability of the country to produce all needed

l^From an educational point of view, its work in the

total has not been so successful, through no fault of its own.
We will attempt to treat this in more detail later.
 429

vegetables and fruits, before the war it imported quantities

of both, its annual imports amounting to over 1*3,000,000.xo

Citrus fruits, apples, grapes, etc. were the main items of

importation. In the case of vegetables, beans, particularly

the soybean, was the main item of import, Als o imported were

considerable quantities of onions, Irish potatoes, garlic,

cabbage and a few minor vegetables,^9 The Philippines is

particularly adapted to fruit raising. Mangoes are highly

esteemed by fruit lovers, and could form a valuable item for

export, either fresh or canned. A goal has been set of 760,000

trees, or 30,000 hectares, attainable only if extensive research

is conducted to determine causes for low yield and irregularity

in bearing and the selection of the best strains for propagation

purposes.PO

Citrus fruits also grow well in the Philippines and

their production should be increased. The culture already has

become quite profitable, with present market prices in excess

of 550.00 per 100 kilos. Orchards, in Batangas, the major

source of the mandarin orange in Luzon, return 1*4,000 to 1*5,000

per hectare per year. Costs run between 1*400 and 5=500 per
hectare per year.2 -*- The production should be extended and

•*-®1949 Re p o r t . Bureau of Plant Industry, p. 55.

1 9 Ibid., pp. 55-56.

2®Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines: Philippine

Business Guidebook. 1 9 4 9 . p. 141. This book is an excellent
source of information with regard to various aspects of Philippine
economy, and it is hoped that it will be published regularly by the
Chamber•
21I b l d .. p. 144.
 430

r e s e a r c h should be conducted by growers in cooperation with the

Bur ea u of Plant Industry, leading to a general improvement in

the industry. The Government could well engage in a broad e d u ­

cational pr o g r a m informing interested citizens of the profits to

be derived from the industry, and the best methods of production

and distribution. The annual food bill could easily be reduced

by the increased consumption of local fruits. The Bureau has

done excellent work in its experimental station at Lipa, Batangas,

e stablished in 1931.

Other fruits gro w in profusion. The papaya, of which

there are many excellent varieties in the Philippines, is one of

the queens of fruits. It is delicious and has the virtue of a i d ­

ing digestion. Bananas are found throughout the Islands, in the

backyards of homes and beside roads and h i g h w a y s . No other fruit

is more ubiquitous, b ei ng eaten b y r i c h and po or alike. Indeed

the banana and the papaya are the basis of the fruit diet of the

people. P r o m 1928 to 1939, an average of 110,000 hectares was

p la nt ed to the banana, the average yield per year during the same

p e r i o d being 49 million bunches w o r t h P 8 , 500,000. Despite this

app ar en tl y large production, the per capita consumption was but

one banana every two days. It Is often extremely difficult to

find bananas in the markets. There are five ma in commercial

varieties, the Latundan, Saba, Lacatan, Bongolan and Tomok.

A me ri c a n s generally prefer the Bongolan and Tomok, although a

n e w variety recently introduced from Java,

the Ambon, has been growing in favor. The peop le general­

ly eat the Saba and Lacatan, whic h have a drier, tarter
 431

flavor than the others. As in other Oriental countries, the

people prepare the banana in a great variety of ways — boiling,

frying in strips as fritters, and so on. Mindanao is considered

the ideal location for the commercial prod uc ti on of the banana

because it is relatively untouched by typhoons. The banana

cannot be considered a commercial crop in the Philippines, in

the strict sense of the word, and represents me re ly another

petty cash crop for the farmer who happens to have a few plants

around his home. But even as a household crop it has large

possibilities for expansion, and could provide an excellent

source of income for many families. One hectare pl anted at

present prices returns the owners fr om 3^918 to iKL,836 per year,

and there is no apparent danger of saturating the market for

22
years to come.

M a n y other fruits might be mentioned: the pineapple

(important as well for the luxurious cloth woven from its leaves),

caimito, avocado, muskmelon, watermelon, pili, ka soy (cashew —

a source for native cocoa as well as the nut), and so on. The

fruit industry only needs extensive planting to repla ce destroyed

plaints as well as extensive pla n ti ng of short-season crops,

r ejuv en at i on of old plantations, the establishment of large-

scale regional orchards to assure a steady supply the entire

year, and extension of research.

Coordinate in importance w i t h an increase in the produc-

22P.A. Rodrigo i "The Lowly Banana," ACIL, Vol. XI,

No. 4 (April, 1949), p. 22.
 432

tlon of these and other foodstuffs Is the p r oblem of p r e s er va ­

tion. As early as 1937, Dr. Manuel L. Roxas, then Chairman of

the National Research Council, insisted upon the early consi­

deration and Initiation of canning and other methods of

preservation saying that no "consideration whatever must delay

their e s t a b l i s h m e n t . He pointed out r ig htly that the majority

of Imported canned comestibles figured very low in the diet of

the average Filipino, with the exception of condensed milk,

dried beans and canned meat. The development of a local

canning industry was not only necessary to reduce the u n f a v o r ­

able balance of trade, but was also most essential to reduce

and eventually eliminate the great waste of valuable food items

through the lack of methods of preservation. Such an Industry,

Dr. Roxas believed, should cater to the needs and tastes of the

people and he declared that many local vegetable dishes were

susceptible to sale in preserved form.

The principal limitation upon such an industry would be

the supply of raw materials. This would necessitate the

institution of scientific plans to elasticize local produce so

that Immediate, daily needs would be met and a regular flow

would also be assured to provide quantities insuring the running

at normal capacity of packing units.

Three major items demanded p r es ervation methods and

each of the three w o ul d provide great future possibilities.

2 ^"Sanitary Canning and Pr es ervation of Philippine Foods,"

The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the P h i l i p p i n e s . 1937-
1 9 3 8 . p. 323.
 433

These were: hogs, fish, and vegetables. In 1932, it was

pointed out, the entire hog p op ulation of the country was around

two and a half million heads, with 670,527 heads of this

number being slaughtered. This r esulted in a per capita con­

sumption of 2.4 kilos of pork per year for the entire population

and less than four kilos per capita per year for the adult

population. This was a very low figure considering the fact

that the rice diet should have been supplemented with twenty-

four kilograms of meat a year for the normal Individual. These

figures suggest one of two things: either the government

figure was badly out of balance (which would mean that the

total number was higher and slaughtered animals, as recorded

by municipal t r e a s u r e r ^ did not reflect the possible home

slaughtering by barrio folk), or, the people depended m u c h more

on fish as a source of protein f ood.24 It is possible that

b ot h these conditions were true.

Dr. Roxas po inted to the fact that if pork canning were

Instituted it would utilize only a small percentage of the

total hog population, since packing plants could handle 100

hogs daily w hich would hardly effect the flow of hogs for fresh

meat purposes (700 daily, 80 per cent slaughtered), but would

materially meet the demand for processed meat. Yet that figure,

he warned, should not be taken as a m a x i m u m since nutritional

requirements were such that a further consumption of meat should

be encouraged by all possible means.

2 4 Ibid.. p. 324
 434

As far as the consumption of fish was concerned, canning

would be of even greater service. At the beginning of the

Commonwealth period, the nation was importing some 25,000,000

cans of preserved fish annually while the average consumption

per ye ar of fis h was about a half million tons, using as a

base the estimated consumption of 40 kilos per person. It is

thus apparent that the amount of imported fish was but a fraction

of the total consumed.

As far as vegetables were concerned, the possibilities

for the development of a canning industry were and are enormous.

Coffee and Cocoa

W it h the investment of around five million pesos, the

coffee and cacao p r o b l e m in the Philippines could be met ad­

equately. Cocoa should be consumed by a larger group who are

n o w dependent upon the native variety made from the roasted,

crushed kasoy seeds (a bitter beverage for a Westerner). The

area planted to cacao in 1939, was 4,558 hectares, producing

548,999 kilos w o r t h 3^327,674, a decrease from the h i g h of 1930

(3=*1,240,000). It has profitable opportunities for production,

the provinces of Mindoro, Cagayan, Bicol regions, Mindanao,

Batangas, Tayabas, Leyte, and Negros Oriental being most suited

for its production.

Coffee was apparently introduced Into the Philippines

f r o m Brazil in 1740, legend having it that a Franciscan friar

was the responsible party. It was first produced in Batangas,

 435

and shortly after this friar's death, it became so popular

there that in the space of four years almost 25 per cent of the

total area of LIpa was covered with plantations. By 1779, al ­

most every town in Batangas produced coffee in such quantities

that the demands of the nation were easily met. Before the

end of the Spanish period, the coffee industry was fourth in

importance among Philippine Industries, following tobacco. It

represented over seven per cent of the entire value of exports

in 1888, w i t h 7,136,303 kilos w orth 11,354,547, exported to

Spain and the United Kingdom.

The years between 1880 and 1890 were bo om years for the

industry. However, at the end of that period, a great blight,

coupled wi th pests and diseases springing fr om careless p r o d u c ­

tion methods, practically wiped out the industry in a few short

months. By 1909, the export of coffee totalled but 1,454 kilos

w o r th only F I , 138, and by 1911, the country exported only 610

kilos w o r t h 1576.00. In the years 1935 and 1936, the Bureau of

Customs recorded shipments w o r t h only §=332 and 1 1 6 8 r e s p e c t i v e ­

ly. This naturally resulted in an enormous increase of imports,

1910 seeing the importation of 1,150,928 kilos valued at 1558,988,

mostly f r o m the United States and Hawaii. Imports continued to

rise until, by 1936, 3,712,829 kilos valued at 1=1,302,200, were

Imported. The average annual pr oduction for the pe ri od 1927-

1936, was 1,205,770 kilos while, during the same period, the

average annual Importation amounted to 2,612,988 kilos.

The Bureau of Plant Industry, in 1934, suggested two

 436

major steps in a program of reviving the industry. These werej

(1) It should be industrialized to the extent of satisfying

local demand since it was and is doubtful whether it could meet

foreign competition; (2) the government should inaugurate a

p ro gr am having as its purpose the following! (a) greater selec­

ted hectarage, (b) better organized management, especially in

the control of pests and diseases, (c) improvement of the

product for export, (d) p lanting of the same variety In a

district in order to achieve uniformity; and (3) the standardi­

zation of product according to grade.

The planting of but 6,000 hectares w ould meet local

consumption requirements.

The area planted to coffee, in 1939, was 7,093 hectares,

producing 1,969,365 kilos worth ^678,011. Leading coffee-growing

provinces are Batangas, the Mountain Province, Iloilo and

Tayabas. To increase local consumption, Dr. Andres Castillo

says, "disease-resistant varieties must be introduced."26

Batangas produces an excellent local variety (from Arabia), but

it must be ground and roasted by the consumer, since retailers

grind it m u c h too coarsely and roast it to the point of burning.

It Is sometimes possible to get excellent coffee in the Mountain

Province, if the consumer grinds and roasts his own, the

varieties grown on the slopes of the mountains, in the Ambura ya n

2 5 Ibld.. p. 327. 26Castillo, ojd. cit.. p. 208.

 437

River range, being especially good. It is difficult to purchase

good ready made coffee in restaurants in the Philippines, since

the makers invariably produce a mixture one-third coffee,

one-third milk, and one-third sugar. In some places in the

provinces, the coffee is placed in a pot along wit h milk and

native sugar and then boiled. A n extensive educational p ro gram

should be undertaken to teach the population the best method of

p reparing cocoa and coffee.

The fruit and vegetable industries are faced wit h

problems tending to limit their culture and p r o d u c t i o n . 2,7 In

the words of the Bureau, "the most important of these problems

relate to the planting materials and seed supply, absence of

standard and superior varieties and strains, and the abundance,

of repressive agencies."2 ® The Bureau of Plant Industry, as

the only source of p lanting materials, has performed heavy

labors to get the best seeds to the farmers. There are no

commercial seed or supply h o u B e s . This one agency of the

Bu re au would be of immense economic and social value to the

nation were it to receive the funds and facilities needed.

Since the budget of 1951 p rovided only .38 per cent for plant

and animal Industries, it is not surprising that plans of the

a dministration for b ringing about economic security fell far

short of realization. The budget for 1951 provided, that 16.62

per cent be spent on "national defense" (although it had been

27
Bureau of Plant Industry, R e p o r t . 1949, p. 58.

2 8 Ibid.
 438

officially stated that peace and order had been attained through­

out the country), yet provided only .63 per cent for the develop­

ment of natural resources and .38 per cent for the plant and

animal Industries. For food production, only ?500,000 was

provided although the "peace and order fund" of the President

was to be increased to some four million p e s o s . ^

A number of vegetables are grown in the Philippines

whose seeds must be imported, such as the cabbage, cauliflower

and onion. The Bureau of Plant Industry has endeavored to select

the best strains for growth, finding, for instance, that only

two varieties of onion flourish, the Yellow Bermuda and the Red

Globe. It also has pointed out constantly, in its reports and

educational programs, that as in other agricultural crops,

truck farming requires extensive fertilization, stating flatly

that "quality is directly associated with the use of fertilizers."

Through experimentation, the Bureau has been able to report that

the locally grown seed of the Red Globe onion, in Ilocos, produces

better than the imported variety. Its research and experimenta­

tion In vegetables and fruits has been truly something of which

the country can be proud. For instance, it has developed a

"carabao mango" which bears seedless fruits (a most important

discovery in view of the fact that the ordinary mango is two-

thirds seed.)

W i t h the recognized need for expansion of food crops,

29
Hon. Arsenio Lacson, The Star Reporter. Vol. V, No. 171
(February 14, 1950), p. 2.
 439

the importance and value of this Bureau cannot be over-emphasized

At the very least, its annual appropriation should be doubled

if the goals that the administration has established are to

become more than mere dreams.

The Roxas Food Production C a m p a i g n :-

The activities of the Roxas administration in increasing

the food supply of the nation were apparently forgotten during

the following administration. The critical situation, in 1946-

47, brought to the attention of President Roxas the fact that the

country, after all, was agricultural, and should be able to

solve its own food problems without importation. Therefore, on

June 17, 1S46, President Roxas officially launched the National

Pood Production Campaign.

He declared that the entire forces of t he Government

would be mobilized in the food drive and enjoined all govern­

ment officials, employees and workers to cultivate their own

home gardens to set an example for the country. He hoped that

the mass of the population would aid in the p r o g r a m and that

''rapidly improving conditions in Central Luzon would help

improve the critical food situation...."*^ He urged schools to

extend the idea throughout the nation, and instructed the

Department of Agriculture to instruct the people as to the

n e ce ss it y and methods of the campaign. To set a n example,

^ " P r e s i d e n t Roxas Leads in Nation's Pood Campaign,"

This Week Magazine. Manila C h r o n i c l e . Vol. II, No. 10 (June
2 3 , ” 1946), p. 3.
 440

President Roxas (like President Laurel during the Occupation)

began work on his own plot of ground across the Pasig from

Malacafian. Witnesses to the ceremony included Secretary of

Agriculture G-architorena, Presidential adviser Julius Edelstein

("who kept on whispering 'You are an excellent farmer, Mr.

P r e s i d e n t '") and Malacafian Press Secretary Modesto Farolan

(later editor and publisher of the Philippines H e r a l d ) who

later informed the press that the President would continue his
31
gardening work.

Pressure of work, however, prevented the President from

carrying on the garden. However, he had not forgotten the

necessity of saving food supplies. The following week he ordered

that Malacafian would serve only one-course meals which had the

effect, also, of reducing kitchen expenses fifty per cent. He

also ordered that the daily allowances for flowers be stopped,

saying: "The nation needs all the money it could have for its

vital functions. We cannot afford to waste money in unimportant

things.Mrs. Geronima Pecson (later Senator), the palace

social secretary, was asked to convert linen tablecloths into

napkins for the July 4th celebrations. Old curtains, purchased

during the Quezon administration, were remodeled, and washed.

Frayed chairs and sofas were re-upholstered with old curtains,

and the President refused to allow the installation of new

carpets on the palace stairs and new rugs in his study. Up on

51Ibid.

5^Manlla C h r o n i c l e . This Week M a g a z i n e . Vol. II, No. 11

(June 30, 194 6), p"I 3^
 441

the tragic d e at h of President Roxas, the "austerity" campaign

was discarded and the palace was refurbished from top to bottom

with fair taste, but at great expense.

The food campaign achieved some success. Jose Camus

stated that "the area planted to beans was 122 per cent of the

prewar area and that planted to other vegetables, 248 per

cent."^ In the course of the campaign, 422,960 home projects

and 940 commercial projects in chicken-production were established

15,611 home projects, and 1,001 commercial projects concerned

with ducks; 26 4,606 home and 401 commercial projects with swine;

and as many concerned wi th turkeys, goats and s h e e p . T h e

Bureau of Plant Industry, during the period May, 1946 to May,

1948, purchased (locally) a total of 79,233 seeds worth

3^90,233 and 19,692 kilos (abroad) w or th 1*155,457. These were

either sold to farmers at cost or loaned, to be paid in k i n d

upon h a r v e st in g. 35 in one year, the production of sweet potatoes

amounted to 556,173 tons; cassava, 363,512 tons; peanuts,

8327; gabi, 68,311, and other roots 29,745 tons. The aggregate

amount of beans produced amounted to 21,451 tons, of w h i ch

5,573 tons were mongo; cowpeas, 5,446; soy, 3,440, and other,

6,992. Despite this good showing, prices were still high, a

33
Jose Camus, "One Year of Our Food Production Campaign,"
ACIL, Vol. IX, No. 7 (July, 1947), p. 15.

54Ibid.

3 ^J.J. Bunag: "Highlights in Food Production," ACIL.

Vol. X, No. 10 (October, 1948), p. 31.
36
I b i d . (The mongo is a ty^e of bean.)
 442

fact ascribed to the activities of middlemen. It was shown,

for example, that the wholesale price of cabbage, in Baguio,

was 8 centavos per kilo. Transportation costs amounted to 2 to

5 centavos per kilo, yet the retail price in Manila was never

be low 50 centavos per kilo.'-*7

The Bureau of Plant Industry conducted research into

the fuller utilization of farm products. Projects were planned

for the utilization of several native fruits for wine; ut i l i z a ­

tion of kasoy pulp for vinegar; extraction and preservation of

calamansi juice; conversion of native tomato into ketchup;

preservation of mangoes; and soon the Bureau b egan studies of

the quick freezing of fruits and vegetables; studies of dehydra­

tion of fruits and vegetables; studies of the utilization of

tobacco wastes for insecticides; further studies of utilization

of fruits for liquors, and studies of extraction of citrus

juices, and the possibilities of popping glutinous, aromatic

rice for breakfast c e r e a l s . ^8

C o n c l u s i o n ;-

Yet the food p r od uction campaign, by 1950, was still

far from its goal. Following the death of President Roxas, the

campaign fell into the background and the Quirino administration,

by 1950, had failed to rejuvenate this most vital aspect of the

n a t i o n ’s economy. With an appropriation of only P=500,000 for

37Ibid.

Philippine Business Guidebook. 1949, p. 143. See

alsos Bureau of Plant Industry, R e p o r t . 1949, pp. 59-62.
 443

food production and funds amounting to only .38 per cent for

the plant and animal Industries, the administration seemed

entirely unconscious of the need for solving the basic problems

before it could hope to achieve the goals outlined by President

Q,uirino in his "State of the Nation" and "Budget" messages to

Congress.

It was clear, by 1950, that the future of the Republic

would bedim indeed unless the serious food problem, together

wi th other basic factors in a na ti on which can be characterized

only as agricultural, was faced and solved. Mi li ta ry assistance

loans from the United States, the participation In a "Southeast

Asia Union", establishment and maintenance of import controls

and currency restrictions -- these would have no effect in a

n ation of half-starved, restless and rebellious people. Before

the Republic could hope to achieve prominence in the councils

of the world and stability at home to enable it to face the

challenge of communism sweeping East and Southeast Asia, it has

first to solve its Internal basic economic problems. The words

of Panglosse should form the motto for the Philippine Republic:

"Let us cultivate our garden."

 CHAPTER XIV

THE TWO BOWERS

1. The Livestock Industries

The Philippines has available some forty per cent of

its land for grazing purposes, and the Bukidnon highlands of

Mindanao, before the war, was the scene of efforts to produce

cattle on a large scale. This was largely the work of a few

wealthy ranchers, the most prominent of which was the Fortich

family. In 1939, the value of all livestock and poultry was

^142,138,260, of which sum the carabao represented a value of

ir-78 million. (No recent figures are available with regard to

value.) The principal items of importance, following the cara­

bao, are: hogs, cattle, chickens, horses, goats, ducks, buf­

faloes, sheep, turkeys, pigeons, geese and guinea fowl. The

stocks of each were greatly depleted by the war and this was

a contributory factor in the retarded progress of Philippine

farming in the post-war period.

Animal production was first undertaken by the Govern­

ment in 1768, when a Royal Order was promulgated requiring each

family to tend 2 pigs and a flock of 12 chickens. During the

A m e r ic an period, the first steps were taken in 1903, with the

^Livestock was lost,in percentage to prewar population

as follows: carabaos, 47%; horses, 57%; cattle, 80%; h o g s ,
61.5%; chickens, 70%. Report of the Philippines-U.S. A g r i c u l ­
tural Mission, p. 4. Most of the livestock breeding stations
of the Dept, of Agriculture were also destroyed, in addition to
Its other facilities. It was estimated, by the Department, that
it would require 1*51,830,267 for the rehabilitation of its
p l a n t and equipment. I b i d .. p. 5.

444
 445

importation of two Jersey bulls and five Jersey cows, two

Chester White and two Berkshire boars from the United States,

and one Jersey and one Shorthorn bull from Australia. The

origin of the horse is lost in antiquity, some authorities

stating that it was brought from China, some stating that there

had been a native breed in the Philippines f r o m early times,

and others stating that the Spanish first introduced the breed.

Pr om the prese nt characteristics of the breed, many observers

lean toward the China theory since the Filipino horse is of

small s i ze and short-coupled, with other features reminiscent

of the horse to be found in Western China today. However, the

short stature may well be attributable to diet. D u r i n g the

early A m e r ic an period and the Commonwealth, Ar a b i a n stallions

were imported to improve the breed, and this work was stepped

up by the popular interest in the National Charity Sweepstakes.

Local fanciers of horseflesh, as well as followers of the track,

were instrumental in importing Ar a b i a n stallions fr om time to

time. The results of this breeding are interesting in that,

while the offspring possess the beauty and grace of Arabian

ancestors, the stature has remained below 57 inches. The horse

is used largely by calesa owners and almost never for draft p u r ­

poses. It furnishes a means of transportation in the Mountain

Province where distances are great and roads few. A non­

productive function is the races run in Manila and polo--although

the prewar polo enthusiasts (particularly the Elizalde brothers)

have not as yet resumed this sport.

 446

The breeding of improved strains of cattle has been

difficult. Despite the efforts of the College of A griculture

of the University of the Philippines, w h ich from the bi bl io ­

graphy on the subject seems to have done the most work in the

introduction and improvement of foreign breeds, the work has

b e e n proceeding slowly. This is because in every instance in

w h i c h a breed was introduced from a temperate country such as

o
the United States,it did not long survive its introduction.

The breeds were easy prey to diseases, lost weight under the

h i g h humidity, became weak, and eventually died. The most r e ­

sistant strains came fr om India, particularly the Nellore

breed which were better foragers and more hardy than the native

stock. The Bureau of Animal Industry conducted a campaign to

upgrade the stocks, attempting to retain the blood of the Im­

ported stocks and to improve the animals w i t h which they were

bred. Fairly good results were obtained by using the Nellore,

Ayrshire and Sussex breeds. A n e w breed was developed, called

the Philamin, the aim of which Dr. Villegas said was "to blend

into one breed the hardiness, good grazing qualities and r e s i s ­

tance to disease of the Nellore; the docility, efficiency as

work animals and prolificacy of the Philippine Native; and the

rapid rate of maturity and excellent beef conformation of the

Hereford.

O
Valente Villegas: "Animal Husbandry Investigations
in the Philippines," Bulletin No. 6 . National R e s e a r c h Council,
Annual Report for 1 9 3 4 - 1 9 5 5 , p . 542.

^Villegas, I b i d . . p. 543, quoting Miguel Manresa: "A

quarter century of work on animal improvement," 1934.
 447

To further improve cattle, the B u r e a u worked through a

process of br eeding by selection, using for this purpose a dairy

breed, the Scindi, f r om India. To aid In this work, studies

were conducted on forage feeds--the local cogon grasses and

other upland grasses being unsuited for dairy herds (due largely

to the hig h acidic character of such grasses). Feeds fr om corn

and sugar cane tops, prawns (Palaemon lanceifrons Dana, commonly

called shrimp in the Philippines), palay, mongo (a bean), copra

meal, fish meal, snails, etc., have been studied and developed.

A growing body of literature on the subject attests to the

yeoman work carried through by the Bu re au of Animal Industry.

Studies were made on the methods of w eighing and selecting large

farm animals; height, age, weight, conformation of horses in

Laguna and Batangas; the feeding and man ag e me nt of calesa and

race horses on the performance of the latter at the San Lazaro

track; the f e r t i l iz in g value of solid excreta of horses; the

breeding habits of the horse, ox, carabao, sheep, goat, chicken;

the dentition of carabaos and cattle in relation to their age;

the duration of service of work cattle; inheritance of color in

cattle; dairy qualities of native cows and goats; crossing the

zebu w i t h carabao; chemical composition of the milk of native

carabaos and Indian buffaloes; on contro l li ng intestinal parasites

of sheep and goats; growth and m aturity of swine and

chickens; improvement of Philippine swine; the construction

of s t r u c t u r e s and equipment for f a r m

 448

animals, etc., etc.^

Similar work has been conducted with regard to chickens,

swine, goats, sheep and other livestock and poultry. Scattered

results have been excellent although the bulk of work remains

yet to be accomplished. A n important portion of the work

devoted to livestock and the animal industry in general is re­

search leading to a fuller utilization of animal by-products.

Official Ac t i v i t l e s : -

In December, 1929, the former Bureau of Agriculture was

divided into a Bureau of Animal Industry and a Bureau of Plant

Industry. The latter bureau received all extension personnel.

The ravages of communicable diseases throughout the Islands

soon pointed to the fact that an extension service was most

necess ar y for the Bureau of Animal Industry. On July 1, 1937,

this was organized, with funds to be appropriated under Common­

wealth Act No. 118, known as the Livestock Promotion Fund. In

1938, this section was converted into the Livestock Extension

Division. The main purpose of this division was to acquaint

the people with its services and place at their disposal the

results of its research. The Division established a fourteen-

^ I b i d . , p. 545. See also; Bulletin No. 2 . NRC Report

for 1934-35, pp. 36-40; ’’The Livestock Industry in the Philip­
p i n e s , ” The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the P h i l i p ­
pines . 1 9 3 8 - 1 9 3 9 . p p . 197-212; Gregorio San Agustin, nMaking
the Country Self-sufficient in Farm C o mm od it i es ,” The Com­
mercial and Industrial Manual of the P h i l i p p i n e s . 1 9 4 1 . p p .
892-894; C a s t i l l o . op. clt.. pp. 237-244; Annual R e p o r t s . Bureau
of Animal Industry, 1934-1941, 1947, and various periodicals
such as the Philippine Journal of C o m m e r c e , Progressive F a r m i n g .
Agricultural-Commercial -Industrial L i f e . etc. It Is hoped that
a bibliography on this and allied subjects will be forthcoming
within the near future.
 449

point program;

1. Make a detailed survey of livestock conditions

in each province.
2. Select centers suitable for livestock raising
in connection with extension work.
3. Encourage the establishment of different back­
yard units of poultry, swine, and milk goats by m ak i n g
house-to-house visits and by frequent follow-ups to
check...the progress and improvements made.
4. Help those who engage In commercial, backyard
and farm p r o d u c t i o n . ..by guiding them in the selection
.*.oi s t o c k . ...
5. Stimulate the improvement of horse and cattle
r a n c h e s ....
6. Assist the people in the purchase of good l i v e ­
stock feed and equipment.
7. Help disseminate information to prevent the
spread of animal diseases.
8. Help the people...In selecting and culling stock....
9. Show them the need of k ee pi ng records....
10. Suggest means to improve the marketing of l i v e ­
stock, poultry and animal products.
11. Deliver lectures in community assemblies or by
radio to keep the people in touch w i t h the progress in
animal science....
12. Participate in livestock exhibits in nation,
provincial, and municipal fairs....
13. Distribute pamphlets and other printed matters....
14. In general, to help increase the income and thus
enable the people to make homes, especially f a r m homes,
more pleasant to live in.5

The Division was partly successful in some parts of this

program, but m u c h remains to be done, and the road is difficult.

During the Commonwealth period, the Government aided the in dus­

try, largely by providing the authority and facilities ne ed ed by

the Department of Agriculture an d Its subsidiary bureaus. Some

measures were questionable with regard to long-range development.

For example, on July 29, 1936, the Secretary to President Quezon,

5llThe Livestock Industry in the Ph il ippines,1* The C o m -

mercial and Industrial Manual of the Philippines. 1 9 3 8 - 1 9 & 9 .
pp. 211-212.
 450

Jorge B. Vargas, transmitted a memorandum to the Secretary of

Agriculture and Commerce, in which he expressed the desire

that small landholdings be interspersed between large areas of

public land used as pasture. The reason was, he said, to

"prevent the pasture permittees or leasees from extending

their h o l d i n g s .. .in violations of the area requirements on

the Public Land Law and the Forest Law and also to provide

available areas for small pasture landholders." Since normal

requirements for grazing per head demand at least one and a

half hectares of land (improved land could support an average

of one and a half head per hectare), this restriction would

limit, to the detriment of the industry, its proper development.

The land laws of the Philippines, while laudable in

intention, too often defeat the various programs for the

development of the Philippine economy drawn up by private as

well as governmental parties. Commonwealth Act No. 100

authorized the Director of Forestry with the approval of the

Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, to lease forest lands

or vacant public lands "not declared agricultural land" to

the amount of two thousand hectares for pasture land.7 On

June 21, 1938, an Animal Utilization Service was created in

the Bureau of Animal Industry, to further strengthen its

6M . 0 . P . . Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 423.

7,1A n Act to further amend section 1838 of Act No. 2711

known as the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No.
3820," First National Assembly. First Session, M.O.P., Vol. 2.
Pt. 2, pp. 773-774. October 28, 1936.
 451

extension service and aid in the widening of far m income.® On

June 8, 1939, 1*500,000 was appropriated for the promotion of

the livestock industry, authorizing the Director of Animal

Industry to "equip, maintain, and operate br eeding stations

and stock farms...and to carry on compulsory castration of

undesirable livestock unfit for breeding purposes."®

The same day, the National Assembly, passed the Pasture

Land Act, which assessed a rental of three p er ce n t u m of the

appraised value of the land, for not more than two thousand

hectares, applicable only to Philippine citizens or corporations,

sixty per cent of the stock of w hich belonged to Philippine

citizens. Su ch leases were to run for twenty-five years, r e n e w ­

able for an additional twenty-five years. At the expiration of

the required time-limit, "all immovable and other permanent

improvements made on the land" were to revert to the Government.

The disposition of such lands was placed under the Director of

Forestry.-1-® On the day of the passage of these two acts,

President Quezon sent a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture

and Commerce stating that "no steps be taken to carry out the

provisions of this law without the previous approval of my

Office.Truly, the ways of the powerful are strange I

®CA No. 340, First National Assembly, 4th Special

Session, M . O , P .. Vol. 4, Pt. 2, pp. 902-903.
9
CA No. 450, Second National Assembly, First Session,
M . O . P .. Vol. 5, Pt. 2, p. 458.

-*-®CA No. 452, Second National Assembly, First Session,

I b i d . . pp. 462-465.

.P.P.. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, p. 402, italics supplied.

 452

The final step of the National Assembly, before the

war, was the passage of an act requiring the b r a n di n g of all

cattle privately owned. Itprovided that "large cattle kept by

the National Government need not be branded or registered,"

and all large cattle in private hands should be branded and

registered, except those Imported for immediate slaughter.

A primary reason for this act lay in the activity of cattle

rustlers, who were causing serious depletion of some stocks,with

no method available for proving the theft or for recovery.3-2

The war was particularly destructive of livestock since

the Japanese lived off the land as m u c h as possible, a n d

there was no importation of foreign food stuffs. At the end of

the war, the people were destitute, and a critical situation

existed In the absence of work animals as well as food stock.

Through the heroic efforts of Professor Carlos X. Burgos, Chief

of the Livestock Extension Service, important steps were taken

in the rehabilitation of the industry. Dr. Burgos as soon as

possible following the end of hostilities, journeyed to the

United States and on December 29, 1946, through the aid of the

Philippine Purchasing Agency, he sent the first post-war ship­

ment of 84 Berkshire hogs. Airborne chicks were brought in by

the hundreds of thousands on January 18, 1947, and 76 Berkshires

out of 84 arrived on the SS Marine S t a r . On M a rc h 7, 1947, the

SS St. Angelo Victory unloaded about 200 Berkshires and Duroc-

1 2CA No. 632, Official G a z e t t e . Vol. 40, No. 1 (July 5,

1941), pp. 52-53.
 453

Jerseys, 100 goats, 40 sheep and 40 broad-breasted turkeys.

These were followed by scores of Poland Chinas and a dozen

Hampshires on the SS V i t o , The freighter h e w Zealand V i c t o r y ,

on April 5 brought pigs and gamecocks. L ea ving America, after

his purchasing mission, Professor Burgos brought wi th h i m pigs,

rabbits, a prize Hereford bull, goats and an A r ab ia n stallion.

Dr. Estafano C. Farinas, of the Bureau, was sent to India and

purchased there Red Scindi and Tharpakar cattle and Murrah

buffaloes.

Additional shipments were brought from Australia. The

Bureau requested an allotment of 1*5,000,000 for the importation

of breeding stocks, and received §=500,000 (the usual meagre

response of the Government to the agencies devoted to solving

Philippine economic problems.) As of September, 1947, this

sum was sufficient to buy only 100,000 day-old chicks, 284 head

of cattle, 50 buffaloes, 869 pigs, and a few other animals.

Many attempts have been made b y the Bureau to improve

the swine in the country, with particular emphasis on native

stocks. However, these hogs are allowed their freedom and are

penned only before killing, the result of which is the transmit­

tal of trichinosis and other diseases. The finest por k in the

Philippines, excepting imported breeds, is to be secured on

the island of Palawan, where large numbers of wi ld pigs subsist

in the countryside, largely on fruits. The only individuals

1^
Celso Dans j "The Long Voyage H o m e , 1' E v e n i n g Mews
Saturday M a g a z i n e . Vol. II, No. 51 (September 13, 1947), p. 29.
 454

who obtain the benefits from these excellent pigs are the

inhabitants of the island and the few sportsmen who journey

there for that purpose.

The number of chickens is great. Eggs are small because

a great portion of the breeding has been confined to a small,

tough chicken which has more value as a combatant than for the

diet of the farmers. Additional stocks, introduced by the

government, have raised the quality of many chickens and some

produced in the Mountain Province from Rhode Island Red strains,

thrive particularly well and provide a welcome addition to the

diet of those fortunate enough to secure them. During 1947-48,

590 chicken projects wit h 47,779 purebred and grade chickens

were established, and a large scale production of eggs is now

being carried through in Bulacan and RIzal provinces. For

breeding purposes, during the same period, the Bureau of Animal

Industry loaned to farmers 22 bulls, 5 bucks, and 550 boars.

From the 9,453 breeding services of the latter, 22,629 pigs were

produced, and granting that each pig gained a value of 3^15.00,

the Bureau gave to the people ^339,430 worth of pork during that

period. Over 600,000 head of animals were vaccinated during

the same period and a total of 959,429 doses of fourteen kinds

of veterinary biologic&Ls and chemical preparations were dis­

seminated. A survey showed that 20 provinces had sufficient

stocks of carabaos, 15 experienced shortages, and 5 had surplus.

The strict enforcement of Republic Act No. 11, p rohibiting the

slaughter of carabaos still fit for work and bree di ng purposes,

 455

aided greatly in increasing the stock of this invaluable animal.1^

C o n c l u s i o n ;-

The increase in the livestock industry will benefit the

country in two ways: it will reduce the enormous sums spent

for imported foodstuffs and raise the standard of living of

farmers engaged in the industry. The Joint Agricultural Mission

in 1947 observed that farmers "who no rmally include livestock

in their farming program, appeared to have better homes and a

higher level of living than was common e l s e w h e r e • It sugges­

ted that the "dairy industry and the production of other live­

stock products" should receive special consideration from the

Government to aid in the reduction of several millions of pesos

in import items. The Mission suggested five objects:

(1) To increase support for the livestock-

improvement pr o g r a m of the Bureau of Animal Industry
and the animal-breeding progr am at the College of A g r i ­
culture; (2) to institute a pr ogram of research on
pasture and range development and management; (3) to
encourage private breeding work in order to make a v a i l ­
able larger numbers of superior livestock for breeding
purposes than can be supplied by the Government; (4) to
expand research and extension programs on the control
of insects and diseases, particularly on cattle ticks;
the development and use of minerals in livestock feeding;
and in the use of molasses, copra meal, etc., in feeding
both on the range and in the feed lots; and (5) to study
the possibilities of canning m e a t . 16

As we have mentioned above, the Government by 19 50 had

failed to implement the p r o g r a m recommended by the R e p o r t .

l^Vicente Ferriols: "important Post Liberation A c c o m p l i s h ­

ments of the Bureau of Animal Industry, A C I L . Vol. X. No. 10
(October, 1948), p. 14. See also: Alfonso L e c a r o s : The Need to
Rehabilitate Cattle Raising," The Evening News (Supplement), Vol.
5, No. 6 (September 30, 1949), p. 6.
15Report. p. 20. 16Ibld.. p. 21.
N
ti -
- 4?(.-a

LEGEND U. S. C O A S T AND GEODETIC SURVEY

PHILIP PINE I S L A N D S
MEMMGSAMD
mackerels
t
H P 1 MINOR S I A PRODUCTS
® Jm ?A r t N K i S . P EA R LS

SPORT PIS H E S
(SAN. PISM. t w o s o P m ,
u u m u i . SPANISH
• M C H iS lL S . tA V A U A S ) CP
G O BIES A N D
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MULLETS
C R O A K E R S AND
GRUNTS

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C A T R IS H E S

G O B P IS H
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ROUNDscads
SEAWEEDS
(ij)^S_TUATLE
 456 *k

2. The F i sh in g Industry

The Republic of the Philippines is composed of 7,083

islands, containing about 115,000 square miles having a co ast­

line of about 11,444 miles (slightly less than that of the

United States). The territorial waters of the Philippines

contain about 705,000 square miles, or about six times the total

land area. These waters are inhabited by about 2,000 kinds of

fishes, one-tenth the total known fishes in the world. These

fish are sufficiently large and abundant (until recently in

some parts) to have great commercial and industrial p o s s i b i ­

lities. They range in size f r o m the smallest fish in the world

found in a lake In Camarines Sur province (sinarapan, L. B u h i )

to the great aquatic mammal, the whale, sometimes found in

Philippine waters.

One of the favorite and most important f is h is the so-

called milkfish, kn own to the people as b a n g o s . It represents

an important element in the diet of those who can afford it and

more than 58,000 hectares of foreshore land is devoted to its

culture, representing, in 1939, an Investment of over 1*60,000,000.

Anchovies are caught in great numbers especially off Samar and

Mindanao and are called d i l i s . They are sold largely in the

l^Since whales have been considered long extinct in

the Philippines, for the benefit of the sceptical, the author
can supply proof of having seen two whales in the waters off
the southern shore of the Island of Luzon near the Island of
Burias, the last week of July, 1948, aboard the De La Rama
ship Doha Anicefca. The Second Officer, Mr. Salih, and Mr.
Stig Nordberg, of the Swedish East Asiatic lines, Gothenburg,
Sweden, were with the author at the time.
 457

form of a salted product known locally as b a g o o n g . Some twenty

species of sardines and herring are caught in large quantities,

but are eaten largely in the cured and dried state be ing known

locally as tuyo and t i n a p a . The mackerel is very important as

food and game, local varieties known as hasa-hasa and alumahan

being moderate in size and found in large schools. The ta ng i n g u e .

also a mackerel, is quite large and is undoubtedly one of the

greatest game fishes In the world. The sea bass, or grouper,

known locally as l a p u - l a p u , is found in great size and forms

an important item for all banquets and special occasions. The

snapper, known by various names (such as m a y a - m a y a , iso or a l s o .

dolesan and b a m b a n g i n ) . is widely distributed and in prewar

years was caught by Filipinos with native gear and by the

Japanese with the beam-trawl and "muroami" nets. The pampano

family, including the talakitok of local importance, is a

first-class fish for the table and is an exciting game fish

generally encountered in the ocean.

The l o c k - b r e a k e r s , or barracudas, are widely distributed,

are great fighters and favorite food and are a danger to the

unwary reef swimmer, although they are generally found In open

sea in large schools. The mullet (known as a l i g a s i n . banak

balanak, a g u a s ) is an excellent food b e i n g largely free of

bones and is found generally in fresh and brac ki sh water. The

tunas, which include the bonito, skip-jack, yellowfin and

albacore, are strong, carnivorous pelagic fish (known locally

as tulifigan). are found In enormous quantities off the Davao

coast near the great Mindanao Deep, and have great industry
No 3082 r *-.i a

MAJOR SPORTFISHING AREAS PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

U. S. C O A S T AND GEODETIC SURVEY

SPORTFISHING AREAS
I CASIGURAN PENN.
PHILI P P I N E I S L A N D S
E POLILLO IS.
3 FORTUNE is! B SIMO BANKS
4 LEGASPI PENN
9 GATO, CHOCOLATE. CARNASA IS
• LEYTE GULF
T MALAMPAYA SOUND
6 TUBATAHA REEF
9 CAGAYAN IS
10 TAWITAWI. SIBUTU IS.
II JOLO IS. 1
IE SARANGANI IS

; Iy .
 458 -lo

possibilities for table use, both fresh and canned.

Others, such as the slipmouths, surgeon fishes, gobies,

dorabs, catfish, are found in great numbers in all the waters

surrounding the islands, in addition to a great abundance of

sharks, ranging from the small sand sharks to the fierce tiger,

leopard and hammer-head, all dreaded by the pearl diver in the

Sulu Sea.

The waters surrounding the Philippines offer the best

game fishing in the world, Dean Worcester calling them a

fisherman's paradise. Most game fishing has been done by trol­

ling from small launches or from sailing bancas using a spoon

hook. A small but enthusiastic group of sport fishermen,

organized into a rather informal club, represent the only

major group devoted to this sport. Most of their activities

are confined to the waters in and around Manila Bay, but

occasionally they make a journey to the greatest game fishing

waters in the world -- San Bernardino Straits and the bays off
1Q
Legaspi. ° Sailfish, measuring as much as nine feet in length,

and swordfish w eighing as much as five hundred pounds, have

been hooked in the waters around Al bay Gulf. To sportsmen who

have fished in the famous waters off Florida and Bermuda, the

waters and fish of the Philippines offer a real challenge.

Since game fish are not disturbed by the all-too-prevalent

I®The aubhor had the thrilling experience of watching a

school of blue ma rl in sporting in the waters off San Bernardino
Strait, one of the rare experiences that can come to man. Seven
or eightfin the excitement of the moment It was Impossible to
make an accurate count) plunged and leaped about forty feet from
the side of the ship, one monster in particular leaping into the
air at least twenty vertical feet. They ranged in length from
six or seven feet to over fifteen, and the beauty of their p o w e r ­
ful grace was never to be forgotten.
 459

dynamiting, they offer opportunities for years to come to those

who enjoy seeing the best that nature offers at the end of a

rod and line.^9

Since so mu ch of the livelihood of the people is

dependent upon the sea, the Filipinos have developed a wide

variety of gear and methods for fishing. Much of It is unsuited

to commercial fishing on a large scale and the Bureau of

Fisheries has devoted m u c h time and energy to the question of

new and efficient methods of catching, preserving, and culture.

Oysters are also widely distributed (there b e i ng twenty-three

known species, four of w h i c h are of economic importance) and

the Bureau has attempted to educate the people in the proper

methods of culture and preparation. By-products as well as

pearl fishing, medicinal and edible s e a w e e d s , trepang, turtle

and tortoise shell, and sponges are all of some economic

importance in the economy.

Problems of the I n d u s t r y t-

The major problems of the fishing industry fall general­

ly under two heads: during pre-war years it was conducted on a

"folk" basis, and in post-war years It suffered at the hands of

monopolists.

At the opening of the Commonwealth period, there were

19
D ea n C. Worcester and former Governor-General W.C.
Forbes initiated game fishing in the Philippines and Worcester
has an excellent chapter on the subject (Chapter XXVII, 1930).
Enthusiasts are u rg ed to write the Bureau of Fisheries, Manila,
as to the best locations and optimum months for sport fishing.
 460

but 1,000 licensed fishermen in the Philippines (contrasting

sharply w i t h the 1,483,000, in Japan), with 150 boats engaged

In off-shore and deep-sea fishing (while, at the same time in

Japan, there were 361,000 of such boats). Capital, too, was

small; it was estimated that at this same period, Japan had

more than 48,000,000 pesos Invested in its fishing indus­

try (or over 1=0.68 per capita) whereas in the Philippines

there was less than 2,000,000 pesos so invested (or less than

10.13 per capita). Despite the continuous growth in p op u l a ­

tion, the former methods of fishing had not changed, with old

implements which were inefficient as well as destructive being

used over and over again in the same waters that had provided

fish in diminishing numbers for many hundred of years. As a

result, many bays, rivers and lakes, formerly well supplied with

fish life were p ractically depleted; this was due not only to

the over-fishing but to a lack of knowledge of matters a f f e c t ­

ing conservation as well as to the almost universal disregard

20
for official rules and regulations aimed at preventing depletion.

^°Since “comparisons are invidious" it might be well

to point out that the difference in investment b et we en Japan
and the Philippines would be little affected by establishing
a point with regard to the difference in population, nature of
government or industry of the peoples. Despite the large sub­
sidies provided by the Japanese Government, at no time during
the period 1934-1941, did they have available in "hard" cur­
rency the funds the Philippines received as a result of the
coconut oil excise tax. Too, the figure referred to here was
that of private investment since official p ar ticipation in the
industry, on the part of the Japanese Government, was largely
in the nature of intelligence surveys of the Navy. It is true
that it is rather difficult to separate "private" investments
from official "subsidies" during this period but it seems
reasonable to state that the result of the comparison made is
not injudicious as a characterization of the emphasis toward
a basic industry important Internally and externally.
 461

The problems of proper fish handling, transportation

and prese rv at io n were acute demanding immediate and definite

action. In addition, while along the coastal towns fish sup­

plies were generally available in one quantity or another, the

interior towns and districts subsisted largely on either canned,

imported fish or locally dried fish. Proper refrigeration

facilities as well as proper handling and transportation would

eliminate the shortage of fresh fish in those areas badly

needing this important protein food. Hilario A. Roxas, then

Chief of the Pish and Game Administration, Bureau of Science,

in 1937, called the attention of the Government to many of these

problems and suggested that the Government create a central

agency w h i c h should have two aims: the p l a c i n g of the a d m in is ­

tration of fishery resources on a "basis of established facts"

and to coordinate the direction of various enterprises "so that

all shall be wisely and harmoniously developed, av oi di n g the

p romotion of any of them to the detriment of others." Dr. Roxas,

immediately before the .iar, felt that the possibilities of the

country ever produ ci ng enough fis h were h i g h l y problematical al-

21
though, if an energetic p r o g r a m was established, not impossible.

To develop the industry further, m od e r n and sanitary

units for salting, drying, smoking and p i c k li ng fish were needed

in those areas of abundant supply as well as factories for the

u ti li za ti on of f i s h by-products such as fi sh meal, oil and

fertilizer. All these have been barely begun. It is a sad fact

pi
The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the Phi li p­
p i n e s . 1 9 3 7 - 1 9 5 8 . p. 329, 1 9 4 1 . pp. 870-872.
 462

that by the end of the Commonwealth period, immediately prior

to the War, few changes for the better had taken place.

O fficial A c t i v i t i e s :-

In 1957, the total annual consumption of fresh fish was

approximately 959,719,230 kilograms; based on a mi n i m u m price

of ten centavos per kilo, this represented 1*95,271,923. In

addition, the country imported 1*3,152,196 w o r t h of fish and

fish products since p ro duction was Insufficient to meet the

demand.22 Prewar fishing was not on a commercial scale outside

the Japanese ventures in the Islands, As in most other aspects

of Philippine economy, fishing on a "folk” basis, represented

the occupation of a few to support their own needs. If a

surplus existed, it was sold in the market, but an industry as

such did not exist until after the War. The growth of the

post-war industry was due almost entirely to dy n amiting which,

while highly profitable, was wasteful and damaging to the

ultimate development of the industry. As pointed out by Dr.

Roxas, even in the p re -w ar years the fishing p r o b l e m was not a

happy one with the constant depletion of resources growing apace.23

On February 1, 1933, the F i s h and Game Ad mi ni stration

was organized as a distinct agency u nder the De partment of

Agriculture and Commerce. It took over the work of the Division

of Forest, Fauna and G ra zi ng of the Bureau of Forestry, with

2 2 I b i d . . p. 328; 1 9 3 8 - 1 9 5 9 . p. 212. The average y e a r ­

ly importation for thirty-three years was 3*2,343,015.

2 3 Loc. cit.
 463

regard to the conservation of wildlife. The Fi sh and Game

A dmin is tr a ti on operated under the prov is io n s of Act No. 4 0 0 3

(known as the Fisheries Act), and Act No. 2 5 9 0 , as amended,

entitled "An Act for the protection of game and fish. On

September 1 7 , 1 9 3 4 , this A dm in istration was placed under the

B ureau of Science.

The Fisheries Act ( 4 0 0 3 ) divided the national fisheries

into three sections; insular, municipal, and reserve. Since

the Philippines is an island nation, most of the fisheries came

under the administration of municipalities and, despite the

fact that the Government shouldered the expenses of promoting

the industry, the bodies charged w i t h carrying out the necessary

measures were powerless, Dr. Villadolid said, to "prevent

wasteful and destructive methods of exploitation of our aquatic

resources because of the dual auth or it y. "^ 4 He continued by

saying: "A centralized control and ad mi ni stration of our

fishery resources is the best remedy for the apparent anomalous

situation."^5 To achieve this, the Second National Assembly,

First Session, passed two acts; No. 4 7 1 , amending 4 0 0 3 , empower­

ing the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce to "issue instruc­

tions, orders, rules and r e g u l a t i o n s . . .as may be neces s ar y and

p r o p e r ...." an{j 4 9 1 ^ amending 2 5 9 0 , empowering the same

07
individual to protect game fish.

24 it
Deogracias V. Villadolid; Government Activities in
the Promotion of Philippine F i s h e r i e s , " I b i d . . p. 3 3 0 g Dr.
Villadolid is now D irector of the Bureau of Fisheries.

25Ibid. 26M . 0 . F . . Vol. V, Pt. 2, p. 88.

2 7 ibid.. pp. 951-955.

 464

The Secretary was given power to deputize additional

personnel to carry out the provisions of the a c t and enforcing

agencies were widened to include the Philippine Constabulary,

municipal district police, secret service men, the customs,

internal revenue, officers of the coast guard cutters, light­

house keepers and "other competent officials" "as might be

designated in writing by the Secretary of Agriculture and Com­

merce." It specifically prohibited dynamiting, except for

certain specific purposes, to be determined by the Secretary,

and established penalties for the possession and sale of dynamited

p p
fish as well as establishing fees and licenses for fishing.

In spite of the difficulties due to lack of adequate

personnel, the old Insular government had encouraged its p e r s o n ­

nel in planning and executing programs that would be of ultimate

benefit to the nation. In the Philippines, as in any country,

a Government bureau is only as efficient and vigorous as its

director, and the Philippines was fortunate in having as

directors of its Bureau of Fisheries extraordinarily able men,

during the American period, the Commonwealth and the Republic.

^®It had been pointed out by Dr. Hilario Roxas that Act
No. 4003 had serious defects in the protection of fi sh and game,
and had the particular defect of giving authority to municipal
councils to impose taxes on fishing. This, he said, brought
about grave abuses, and he pointed to the fact that, in many
places, the councils had pl ac ed a tax of 1*200 a quarter for one
f is hing boat. This placed such a burden upon the individual
fisherman that he was forced to use dynamite to rega in even the
cost of his license. He also pointed to the great lack of
wardens, there being at that time only 10 provincial wardens to
cover the entire Philippines--a patent impossibility. P J C . Vol.
XIV, No. 2 (February, 1938), p. 10. This situation had not im­
proved to any great extent in the early years of the Republic.
 465

The fact that the fisheries program fell short of the goals

these men established was not due to any lack of ability or

planning. It is generally true In the Philippines that if able

men are appointed to important Government bureaus, these bureaus

function well. Failures are due to two other factors beyond

the control of many directors: lack of understanding on the

part of the National Assembly and the Congress, and the con­

sequent lack of appropriations ; and, secondly, the use by

individuals in the Government of the various bureaus as political

footballs. In too many instances during the Republic, for

instance, were bureau directors hampered by the appointment of

protegees and untrained constituents. Indeed, it is difficult

for the observer to point to any bureau du ri ng the early years

of the Republic which was not overloaded with "dead" personnel.

In many cases this became too m u c h of a millstone for efficient

operations of the bureaus concerned, with the disastrous results

in managing the economy of the nati on so m u c h discussed,

deplored and protested by Philippine n e ws me n and observers of

all political casts and affiliation. A large proportion of the

work accomplished was done so despite r a n d o m appointments or

was the result of the m o m e n t u m of a p r o gr am w h i c h carried

through until Inertia set in. '

While the Bureau of Fisheries failed to receive all the

help needed for an optimum program, they carried through as best

they might on various projects, with more or less success.

Fish farms, for experimental purposes, were opened as funds

 466

permitted, one important one b eing located at the Estancia

Station in one of the richest centers of the Visayas. Another

Pish Preservation Station was opened, in 1934, at Catbalogan,

Samar, and various regulations established by the F i s h and Game

Administration were enforced as funds permitted to protect

y oung and breeding fish.

The Bureau of Science continued to add to its ichthyo-

logical collection, having in the early years of the Commonwealth

no less than 1,700 distinct species and about 100 specimens of

economic crustaceans. Some surveys of fishing banks were u n d e r ­

taken and investigations were conducted into fishing methods

so that further regulatory measures for pres er va ti on could be

established. Sources of water pollution were examined. In

addition, the Bureau of Science as funds permitted from time to

time, introduced n e w species, such as ornamental fish, carp

and gourami (in the years immediately preceding the Commonwealth).

The Bureau of Science conducted experiments in the production

of milkfish as well as various varieties of oysters, mullet,

shrimp, crabs, and edible seaweed.

All the activities with w h ic h the Bu r e a u of F'Isherles

was charged were financed from a fund of but !*100,000, ap pro­

p ri ated by the National Assembly annually, f r o m funds accruing

to the Treasury through fines and forfeited bonds. This

meagre appropriation was to accomplish the f o ll ow in g ends:

scientific and economic r e s e ar ch relative to fishes, sponges

and other resources; the "diffusion of knowledge" among fishermen;

 467

the study, improvement and propagation of fishes and aquatic

resources; the establishment, maintenance and operation of

experimental stations, farms, aquariums, and fish culture

laboratories; for all other purposes the object of wh ich was

to foster, propagate and protect fishes, shells, sponges and

other resources. The fund would be available, also, for: the

construction, maintenance and repair of buildings, vessels, dams

and other necessary structures; the leasing, purchase or r e ­

servation of necessary land and buildings; the purchase of

apparatus, instruments, chemicals, supplies and other necessary

material; the salaries, wages and traveling expenses of the

necessary personnel, and such other expenses as were deemed

necessary "to carry out the purposes of this Act in an effective

and adequate manner: P r o v i d e d . that any unexpended balance of

the fund collected and herein appropriated at the end of each

year shall not revert to the National Treasury but shall be

used for the purposes for w hi ch it was ap pr op ri at ed ." ^ 9 All

this on f a 00,000!

We have said that the second major p r o b l e m was the

control of the industry b y monopolists. This is clearly shown

in p ost-war activities within the industry. Since dynamiting

was the great danger facing the industry, the Dir ec to r of the

Bureau of Fisheries (Deogracias V. Villadolid) conducted an

intensive campaign to eradicate this destructive practice.

pQ
^ C o m m o n w e a l t h Act No. 471, Second National Assembly,
First Session, M . O . P .. Vol. 5, Pt. II, p. 899. Approved,
June 16, 1959.
 468

Progress was slow. Individual fishermen were at the mercy of

those controlling the distribution of fish in markets, who

demanded large stocks which were to be obtained by any means.

Since these individuals controlled all nets and equipment, as

well as explosives, and since the price of fish paid to the

f ishermen was very low, the latter were entirely dependent

upon the capitalist who would supply these materials and then

direct his work. Individuals who attempted to compete were

driven out, one particular instance being two veterans who

p urchased an airplane, refrige ra ti ng facilities in Albay, and

subsidized individual fishermen. As soon as their shipments

reached respectable p r o p o r t i o n s , they found the markets closed

to their.fish w hich rotted on their hands. They were forced to

sell their equipment at exceedingly low prices, quit the i n d u s ­

try, desert their fishermen--thus strengthening the hold of the

fishing czar over the entire supply of fish for the Manila and

Luzon markets.

In attempting to control dynamiting, the Bureau of

Fisheries made many arrests, only to see the culprits go free

or be let off with light fines. Sums involved were large,

profits were great, and fines were no protection for the indus­

try. The major violators of the fishing laws were well known,

but action seemed difficult to obtain, and It was the general

impression that these individuals were well protected. The

number of licensed fishermen steadily declined, in the years

after 1947, when there were some 7,000. It had fallen, in 1949,
 469

for Instance, to 4,430, the majority of w h o m in L uzon were

controlled by one man. Investments In fishing boats of over

three tons increased, and were valued at ^4,137,298, in the

same year.

The rehabilitation of the fishing industry procee de d

slowly. The problem was acute since the po pulation was in dire

need of this important source of protein. Their fishing boats

had been sunk in the War, fish-ponds were neglected, nets and

other equipment destroyed. In July, 1946, the Philippine

Institute of Fisheries Technology was established to train men

and women in the various techniques and phases of the industry.

The Government appropriated 1*400,000 annually for this purpose.

In three years, the Institute graduated sixty-eight; fifty-five

were granted scholarships to study in the Un it ed States (in

cooperation with the U.3. F i s h and Wildlife Service, which did

y e o m a n service in the Philippines, particularly after L i b e r a ­

tion) ; and some of these trained Individuals are n o w serving

the Government In many fields.

A demonstration school for fisheries was established at

Catbalogan, Samar, a n d Republic Act No. 412 authorized the

establishment of a similar school in Tabaco, Albay. The co­

operation between the Philippine Fishery Program and the U.S.

Wildlife Service was of tremendous importance to the Philippine

economy. Ne w fishing grounds were discovered, n e w methods of

30
Figures kindly supplied by Mr. J. Montilla, Bureau of
Fisheries.
 470

capture were demonstrated, and some experiments were successful­

ly completed with regard to the economic utilization of fish and

by-products. The Uni te d States Government, by 1 9 5 0 , had sent

1 0 1 students to the United States for training; b y that year,

forty-three had returned, of wh om twenty-six were employed In

the Bureau of Fisheries, seven in the U.S. Fi sh and Wildlife

Service, and eight with private companies as master fishermen

and technologists.

Efforts continued to be made to stamp out dynamiting,

and a bill was Introduced in Congress (S. 3 8 4 ) p ro vi d i n g heavy

penalties for this practice. By 1 9 5 0 , the House had yet to act

on the bill, which was of the most vital n ec es si ty if the Philip­

pine Fishery Program was to meet w i t h success. It was hoped

that the appropriation for this vital bu re au would be doubled

in succeeding budgets, but the pu blication of the 1 9 5 1 Budget

gave little encouragement to those interested in the sound

development of the Philippine fishing i n d u s t r y . 31

31
AA measure which would be of great benefit to the
Philippines would be the extension of the period of service of
the U.S. Fis h and Wildlife Service, whose term of service was
to expire, July, 1 9 5 0 .
 CHAPTER XV

NUTRITION A N D PUBLIC HEALTH

The progress of the country rests not only on a c hi ev e­

ments in economic affairs but upon the general standard of

public health. It has been a common error of Amer ic a n observers

to assume that the Philippines, wit h its '’h i g h ” standard of

living, has had a satisfactory health standard. Advances have

bee n made over conditions existing in 1898, but they are far

from satisfactory. A 1949 survey by the United Nations shows

that the Philippines in 1939 was only on a par, in h e a l t h

standards, wi th the rest of Asia.l The advance in control of

epidemics has been notable, but basic nutritional problems

have yet to be solved to the satisfaction of the Philippine In­

stitute of Nutrition. Public he al t h has been in the hands of

bo th governmental and private agencies. A m on g the public

entitles are the Bureau of Health, the Bureau of Quarantine

Service, the Philippine General Hospital, and the Bureau of

Public Welfare. A m on g the semi-public and private o r g a n i z a ­

tions, the most prominent arej the Philippine An ti - Tuberculosis

Society, the Philippine National Red Cross, the National Federa­

tion of Wonen's Clubs, and the A s s o c ia ci on de Damas Filipinas.

On January 2, 1934, the first health center was

^Peter K i h s s : "Food and Pe o p l e , ” Current A f f a i r s .

No. 86, August 6, 1949, (A UNESCO Project), London, Map,
pp. 10-11.

471
 472

established in Manila, followed in 1936 by two others in Manila,

one in Iloilo, one in Cebu, four in Negros Occidental, and one

in Zamboanga.2 In 1936, there were 154 hospitals in the Philip­

pines, 54 of w hich were maintained by private organizations, 93

by the Government and 7 supported by the U.S. Government. The

number of beds available was 9,782. Out of this total, 4,429

were general and 5,553 special. The number of beds per 1000

population, therefore, was 0.34, or one bed for each 3,000 of

population.^ As a result of this inadequacy, Dr. Jose Fabella

has stated, "over 60 per cent of all deaths occur without proper
i»4
medical assistance." A sanatorium for the treatment of tuber­

culosis, a great destroyer in the Philippines, was erected In

the suburbs of Manila with provision of 300 beds. Since the

annual deaths fr om tuberculosis amounted to over 30,000 (in 1936),

the p r ob le m is self-evident. Facilities for the treatment and

care of the insane were scanty, provi di ng for the care of but

1,000. Leprosaria were established in Manila, one in Albay, one

in Iloilo, one in Cebu, one in Zamboanga, and one each in

Lanao and Jolo, in a ddition to the main colony at Culion.^

The inadequacy of funds was the greatest handicap to

the solution of health problems, municipalities allotting but 5

or 10 per cent of their general funds for he al th work. This was

supplemented (theoretically) by an equal amount from the

2Dr. Jose Fabella: "Public Welfare." The Philippine

F o r u m . Vol. I, No. 4 (March, 1936), p. 43.

5 Ibid. 4 I b l d . . p. 44. 5Ibld.

 473

Provincial government and represented the total amount for

h ealth in the province.® Dr. Fabella concluded that "unless,

therefore, a more stable fund is made available, centralized

and placed under the direct control of the insular authorities,

no effective health work can be o bt ained."7 The Government

appropriated an average of P 3 million annually for h ea l t h work,

supplemented by an additional 1*1,500,000 from the provinces but

Dr. Fabella stated "the ideal amount that should be made a v a i l ­

able is 1*9 ,000,000."8 One of the complicating factors in the

hospital p r o g r a m of the country was the initial reluctance of

provincial people to go to the hospital when they needed

attention. The educational work carried on through the Common­

we al th period by various Government entities bore fruit after

Liberation. The great response n o w is a severe burden on the

national he a l t h service since 90 per cent of all cases are

charity in the Government h os p i t a l s . 9

The death rate in 1896, 34.60 per 1,000, was reduced

by 1934 to 25.49; infant mortality, 421.69 per 1,000 to 150.19.

As result of increasing health facilities, as well as the

natural vigor of the population, the popu la ti on increased from

a bare six million in 1896 to 13,099,405 In 1934, and 19,000,000,

in 1949. All elements need greater health services, however.

Miners, for instance, are susceptible to hookworm, w h i c h can

only enter the system through the foot. With proper foot protection

and disposal of human waste this disease could easily be

6I b i d .. p. 47. 7 I b i d . . p. 48. 8 Ibid.

^ r o m a conversation with the Director of Hospitals, May.

1949.
 474

eradicated from this one group. Mu ch of the population is

infested with intestinal parasites w hich are introduced through

polluted water or infected foods. Sanitary toilet facilities

are conspicuous by their absence, largely because of the absence

of running water in most localities.

Malaria is also a great destroyer in the Philippines,

annual deaths amounting to some 10,000. At a prewar evalua­

tion of fifty centavos per work-day, the loss to the nation fran

this cause in terms only of money was ^ 2 0 m i l l i o n . ^ Certain

sections of Mindoro, for example, have bee n practically u n ­

inhabitable because of this disease. A study conducted In the

Naujan-Calapan area of Eastern Mindoro disclosed that malaria

had caused more deaths than any other prevalent disease in the

preceding five years. It was found that no home was free f r o m

the disease, and that It was the real hindrance to the a g r i ­

cultural development of that portion of Mindoro. Homeseekers

were forced to sell their holdings at great losses when they

were no longer able to endure its ravages. Despite the proximity

of that region to a heavily populated area of southern Luzon,

the entire area was spar se l y populated. The disease was found

to be hyper-endemic in the Naujan-Ca la pa n plain, traversed by a

first-class road. Of the 55 families surveyed (comprising 305

persons), who had migrated to that region either on their own

■^°Dr. Regino G. Padua: "Some Fundamental Health P r o b ­

lems," The Philippine F o r u m . Vol. I, No. 7 (June, 1936), p. 34
and p a s s i m .
 475

or* through Government aid, 181 persons, or 59 per cent had

died (in the period observed). Thirty-two per cent were

complete orphans. In spite of the general use of nets, the

volume was still insufficient to offer proper protection against

the mosquito (Anopheles minimus var. flavirostris the principal

carrier, supported by Anopheles m a n g y a n u s ). A l t h o u g h malaria

control stations were being established f o r easy access, it

was recommended that malaria-proof ho using be encouraged by the

Government. It was further recommended that agricultural

settlers be concentrated in townsites and barrio sites to facil­

itate the institution of hea lt h measures,-1-'1-

Malaria-free regions did not go unaffected by this

scourge. In a study made of a non-malarious barrio in Talim

Island, Binahgonan, Rizal, it was discovered that an epidemic

involving 200 persons was caused by an infection traced to a

far locality where the people had been going to work on

caifigins for several years pr ior to the outbreak of the disease.

Fr om 1933 to 1936, on the estate of the Sacred Heart Novitiate

in Novaliches, Rizal, experiments were conducted in malaria

control, since scientists were aware that the agricultural

development of the country was being restricted seriously by

11
Cornelio M. Urbinos
„
"Malaria: Its Problems and Control
in Relation to the Agricultural Development of Eastern M i n d o r o , ”
NRC, Bulletin No. 2 3 . December, 1939, pp. 129-130, abstract.

^ A m a d o r P. P a h a t i : "The Epidemiology of Malaria in a

Non-Malarious Barrio of Talim Island," I b i d . . p. 130, abstract.
 476

malaria. Despite the application of control measures, it was

discovered that the disease had not bee n eliminated success­

fully at the end of the third year. The density of the m o s q u i ­

to population was reduced, however, and morbidity among the

novices was thus decreased. The reductions were achieved by

the destruction of adult harborages and the gradual agricul­

tural development of the estate. The report pointed to the

necess it y of nation-wide utilization of nets and wire screening.

These, however, are to be found only in limited use in the

c o u n t r y .IS

Another preventable disease of great destructiveness is

beri-beri. In 1939, it was taking 20,000 lives a y e a r ; ! 4 by

1949, approximately 25,000 were ill with the d i s e a s e . I t

ranked second to pulmonary tuberculosis, during 1946 and 1947,

as a cause of death, with a mortality rate of 148,21 per 100,000

population. Dr. Salcedo, of the Institute of Nutrition has

observed that "about two-thirds of the deaths are infants." The

cause, he said, has be en found in the "consumption of large

quantities of highly polished rice," and it is "endemic in

certain a r e a s .. .where rice is the chief staple food" wit h the

1
Cornelio M. TJrbino! "Malaria-Control in Agricultural
Settlements", Proceedings of the F ou r t h Philippine Science C o n ­
v e n t i o n . NRG, Bulletin No. 19, November, 1948, Abstract No.
271, p. 115.
14
Padua, op. c i t .. p. 35.
15
Juan .Salcedo, Jr.; E.O. Carrasco, F.R. Jose and R.C.
Valenzuela: "Studies on Beriberi in an Endemic Subtropical Area,"
reprint from The Journal of N u t r i t i o n . Vol. 36, No. 5 (November,
1948), p. 561.
 477

mortality "highest in those provinces where rice is grown most

intensively."16 Some believe that the disease takes more lives

than are known, since many hospitals and physicians fail to

report cases of beriberi to the health au th orities.1^ An

experiment was conducted in Bataan Province, an endemic area,

between July 1, 1947, and June 30, 1949, to determine the

influence of artificially enriched rice on mortality from b e r i ­

beri. Two areas were studied, one given enriched rice on

October 1, 1948 (Area "A") and the other given ordinary polished

rice throughout the experiment (Area " B " ). The results were

significants In Area "A", the mortality rate between July 1,

1947, and June 30, 1948, showed an increase of 5.66 per cent;

during the period July 1, 1948, to June 30, 1949, after the

introduction of enriched rice, the mortality rate showed a

decrease of 72.40 per cent! These findings are not considered

final and the investigators stated that they would have to be

"strengthened with the findings of the clinical beriberi r e ­

survey now going on, studies on food consumption as well as

income levels w h ic h are to be undertaken in the near future...."

"However, the present authors would like to invite attention to

the apparently favorable influence of artificially enriched

rice on beriberi mortality in Bataan P r o v i n c e . 1,18

16Ibid. 1 7 I b i d . . p. 569.
18
Juan Salcedo Jr., E.O. Carrasco, F.R. Jose and R.C.
Valenzuela: "The Influence of Artificially Enriched Rice on
Beriberi Mortality in Bataan Province." Read before the Manila
Medical Society Monthly Meeting, September 14, 1949. MS copy
given the author by Dr. Juan Salcedo Jr., September 21, 1949.
 478

This survey was supplemented by another, in the same

province, with relation to the thiamine content of rice, vege­

tables and other foods. It was noted that 30 per cent of the

rice consumers washed the rice twice before cooking, 55 per

cent washed it three times, and 15 per cent four times. In 81

per cent of the surveyed groups, the rice washingswere d i s ­

carded; two-thirds used meat only once a week; fish was eaten

by 90 per cent of the families six or seven times a week, and

vegetables were used by more than half not more than twice a

week.

Dr. Salcedo, pointing out the value of enriched rice

in the diet of the Filipino, stated that in all studies made

before and after the War it was discovered that 33 per cent of

the population had a deficiency of thiamine in their diet.

However, enriched rice in itself is not the only method of

improving the nutritional standard of the population. The use

of brown rice, undermilled, parboiled, and malekized rice would

be of great value. ‘
This is true because not all the vitamins

removed by milling can be restored by artificial enrichment;

the "Hoffman-La R o c h e ” process provi di ng only thiamine, niacin

and iron p y r o p h o s p a t e s . However, the efficacy of enriched rice

has been amply shown by experiments outside the Bataan study.

19
Juan Salcedo Jr., Isabela Concepcion, Araceli F.
Guerrero, E.C. Pascual and R.C. Valenzuela: "Studies on The
Thiamine Content of Rice, Vegetables and Other Foods in Bataan
Province." Read before the 42nd Annual Meeting of the P h i l i p ­
pine Medical Association, Bacolod City, May 1, 1949, and r e ­
printed from the Acta Medica P h i l i p p i n a . Vol. V, No. 4 (April-
June, 1949). Given the author b y Dr. Juan Salcedo Jr.
 479

It was provided in the diets of children at Welfareville, and

of Philippine Army personnel. In the Philippine A r m y ,beriberi

was cured and a great increase in the height and weight of

children fed on the rice was achieved in Welfareville and among

the families of Government employees. Thus, in the words of

Dr. Salcedo, "clear reasoning and practical demonstration in­

dicate that artificial enrichment of white rice Is the rational

and logical solution to the beriberi problem and thiamine and

iron deficiency in our country."20

The deficiency of iron in the Filipino diet is serious.

Detailed studies of Philippine vegetables show that they are

poor sources of iron as used in present diets. Results from 25

vegetables produced locally show that 14 give Iron values

comparable to those In lettuce and spinach. While this may

seem contradictory, Drs. Geronimo and Bendafia-Brown found it

interesting to note that the amount of available Iron, which is

the important factor from a nutritional standpoint, "does not

always parallel the total iron content and thus it is impossible

to draw accurate conclusions from the total iron values."®^

Other sources are available, particularly for Vitamin

A, which could be of great benefit to the population. The devil

2 0 Juan Salcedo, Jr.: "Rice Enrichment as a Practical

Nutrition Measure in the Philippines," MS given the author by
Dr. Salcedo, September 21, 1949.
21
Felicidad Geronimo and Adelaida M. Bendafia-Brown:
"The Total and Available Iron Content of Some Typical Philip­
pine Foodstuffs," NRC, Bulletin No. 23. December, 1939, p. 157.
 480

ray (sometimes known as the "sea bat") has been found to be an

excellent source of this vitamin. Its liver was found to

contain 2,400 U.S.P. XI Vitamin A units per gram, whose potency

compared favorably with that of several brands of medicinal cod

liver oils and exceeded by four times the m i ni mu m required by

22
the U.S. Pharmacopoeia for cod liver oils. The excellent

work formerly conducted under the Bureau of Science could be

continued and would undoubtedly provide many further answers to

nutritional problems in the Philippines, were the Bureau to

receive adequate appropriations.

Tuberculosis, the major killer in the Philippines, is

a disease also derivative in part from poor nutrition. Rough­

ly 40,000 lives are taken each year by this dread ailment. The

prewar situation, while serious, cannot be compared to the

ravages of the disease during and following the Occupation. In

1947, there were not more than 600 beds to accommodate the

500,000 open tuberculosis cases in the Philippines, w i t h in­

fectious cases doubled following invasion and the m or tality rate

trebled.Before the War, there were 350,000 active cases.

The Philippine Tuberculosis Society had 12 regional dispensary

clinics equipped with X-ray and laboratory facilities, operated

a central dispensary clinic in Manila, four small regional

pavilions and the Quezon Institute for Tuberculosis w i t h a

2 2 M. Gutierrez: "The Vitamin A Potency of ’Safiga*

Liver Oil," Ibid., p. 128.

^^Dr. Carmelo P. Jacinto: "The Tuberculosis P ro blem

in the Philippines," The Manila C h r o n i c l e . This Week Magazine.
Vol. II, No. 40 (January" 19, 1947), p. W.
 481

700-bed capacity. In 1941, the number of pneumo refills and

initials performed on 1,547 patients reached 66,959, more than

90 per cent being out-patients. During the 12 months prior

to 1941, a total of 114,620 home visits were recorded. This

campaign had been started only four years prior to the outbreak

of hostilities and progress seemed good. But the War saw the

destruction of 12 dispensary clinics, 2 regional sanatoria, as

well as almost all of the original equipment of the Quezon

Institute with, in the words of Dr. Jacinto, "not even a h y p o ­

dermic needle belonging to the Quezon Institute proper"

remaining. Lore than $2 million w orth of property belonging

to the Philippine Tuberculosis Society was destroyed, along

wit h case records and reference materials.

If the Philippine p op ulation is to retain its vigor

needed to meet the challenging demands of the future, this

dread disease must be checked, and eventually eliminated. The

task ahead is an appalling one, and the country cannot afford

to lose 40,000 of its inhabitants every year if it is to meet

the economic demands of the future. The generosity and skill

of the United States should be drawn upon to aid the P h i l i p ­

pines to meet and destroy this killer. The Philippines can

meet the challenge by seeing that the population's nutritional

standards are raised as much as possible. Education, as well

as governmental action, is one of the answers. The all-too-

prevalent habit of expectoration in public places should be

discouraged sharply, both by punitive measures on the part of

 482

the Government and as an intensive educational p r o g r a m beginn in g

in the primary grades and carried through all levels of the

population, from the ordinary citizen to the highest government

official. Philippine medical men are unanimous in bewai li n g

this nasty habit, which is as prevalent in the halls of the

mighty as in the hovels of the poor.

Undernourishment is a national characteristic. About

42 per cent of children b e tw ee n the ages of 15 days and 2 years

who received a milk allowance from the Associated Charities

(in 1936) were undernourished, and this, Dr. Ruiz stated, ’’may

be taken as an index to the prevalence of under no ur is hm en t. "24

Pour steps were suggested to meet this p ro blem in 1936; the

’’material increase of puericulture and social he a l t h centers,

(2) Nationalization of the Associated C h a r i t i e s ...(3) E s t a b l i s h ­

ment of a dairy farm managed by the Bureau of Prisons w i t h the

cooperation of the Bureau of Animal Industry, to distribute

milk to indigent families at reasonable rates, and (4) More

strict marriage requirem en ts ." 2 ^ Puericulture centers would

be charged with pre-natal and post-natal care as well as

providing basic education on hygiene and sanitation. Strict

marriage requirements are more difficult of attainment, wi th

the prevalent restrictive attitude toward b i r t h control and the

large number of common-law marriages. Needless to say, it would

be pr actically impossible to institute b ir t h control or even

2 4 Juan M. Ruiz; "Undernourishment — A Social P r o b l e m , ”

The Philippine F o r u m . Vol. I, No. 7 (June, 1936), p. 49.

25Ibid.. p. 50.
 483

conduct discussions about the subject in the Philippines -

despite the desire of many women to restrict child-bearing.26

Mr. Ruiz suggested merely physical examinations p rior to

marriage. Dr. Padua states, "birth c o n t r o l .. ,w ould have its

limitations if practiced at all."'^

Mrs. Margaret Sanger attempted to go to the Philippines,

in 1937, for the purpose of lecturing on this subject but was

refused permission by Mayor Juan Posadas of Manila because, as

he said, "I am strongly opposed to birth control."2 ® The mere

fact that the good Mayor was "opposed" seems very weak grounds

for such a step. The Mayor, amplifying his remarks, stated

that he believed "birth control is both Immoral and impractical,

especially for the Philippines," -- a statement, the Editor

p £»
Many instances could be cited. A woman of thirty-two
having borne nine children, of whom three survived; a woman of
forty, having borne fourteen, two of who m survived. 'The author
talked with many women, particularly in the Visayas, who were
desirous of limiting the number of children they bore, since so
many die, and since each one sapped so mu c h of the woman's
vitality, leaving her an old woman at thirty-five. They ex ­
pressed a desire to learn even in secret--which, of course,
would be the only way. This applies, naturally, only to women
in the lower economic brackets, since the women in "society"
have solved this to their satisfaction through the benefits
derived from their economic status.
27
O p . c i t ., p . 38. In March, 1936, the authorities of the
University of the Philippines cancelled a lecture to be given by
Dr. Edith How-Martyn, Director of the International B i r th Control
Bureau of London, which was to be delivered in the auditorium of
the School of Hygiene and Public Health. Dr. Hcw-Martyn delivered
her lecture in the home of Rev. Samuel Stagg. She advocated birth
control as more "civilized than such natural checks as famine,
pestilence, war and infanticide." Dean Calderon stated he had
cancelled the lecture "so as not to bring added worry to President
Jorge Bocobo." Philippine Magazine. X X X I I I . No.5(May, 1936), p. 223.
2 ®Editorial: "Mrs. Sanger and the Mayor of Manila,"
Philippine Magazine. XXXIV, No. 8 (August, 1937), p. 346.
 484

pointed out, which was "obviously confused" since if it was

immoral from the M a y o r ’s point of view it should "make no d i f ­

ference whether it is impractical or not; and why should it be

immoral and impractical, especially for the Philippines, -- more

so than for any other country?" Mrs. Pilar Hidalgo Lim, Presi­

dent of the National Federation of W o m e n ’s Clubs, wrote to Mrs.

Sanger expressing regret for "our inability to cooperate with

you" in spreading the movement throughout the Philippines,

because, Mrs. Lim said, "our objective now is for better and

more intelligent parenthood." Since this was the objective of

Mrs. Sanger, it seems that some confusion existed as to Mrs.

Sanger's p r og ra m in the minds of those individuals who expressed

the same objective.

The general attitude of Filipinos toward such campaigns

as this undoubtedly stems from the stand of the Church, which

believes that the goals of society can be met in other ways.

While the ultimate ends of the Church may well bring about the

good life for the peoples of the world, present conditions

demand more practical action.22

on
This restrictive attitude toward the improvement of
woman's condition was further illustrated in 1949, when the new
Civil Code was before Congress for approval. The Commission
had further improved the lot of Filipino women, in the past e xt ra ­
ordinarily hi gh for the Orient, by pr ov iding for divorce In
certain instances as well as legal separation. Various Church
organizations marshalled their women members and in close-packed
battalions descended upon the terrified legislators demanding the
removal of these provisions. Citing the United States as their
horrible example they predicted the ultimate degradation of the
Filipino family and brow-beat Congress into expunging these
h ig h l y beneficial provisions from the Code.
 485

Nutrition studies are still in their infancy in the

Philippines, although great progress was made after 1934. Stu­

dies were carried along six general lines? general surveys of

nutrition and metabolism of the people; general nature of foo d­

stuffs; vitamin and beriberi studies; mineral and vitamin

content of foodstuffs; preparation and preservation of food,

and dissemination of nutritional information.^® The most d i f ­

ficult relates to the sixth point- -propaganda. This has been,

Dr. Concepcion stated, because the greater part of nutrition

education has been carried on through the medium of the English

language, which "can reach only a relatively small part of the

population, because while a limited amount of knowledge of

conversational English is quite widespread, an intelligent

r ea ding knowledge appears to be quite limited." Therefore, Dr.

Concepcion stated, nutrition information should be more widely

disseminated in dialect. Important strides were taken along

this line and it is true that "the country is now more

nutrition-minded than it has ever been in the p a s t . " ^

Credit for this advance must go to the small group of

quiet, conscientious workers in the various governmental agencies

charged with the work? the Division of Organic Chemistry,

Bureau of Science; the Department of Agricultural Chemistry,

College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines; the

Department of Physiology and Biochemistry, College of IViedicine,

30
Isabelo Concepcion: "The Development of Nutrition Work
in the Philippines," NRC, Bulletin No. 5 . 1935, p. 503.
31
Ibid., p. 506.
 486

University of the Philippines, and, more recently, the Institute

of Nutrition, headed by Dr. Salcedo, under the Office of the

President of the Republic. The author echoes the sentiments of

Dr. Concepcion: "Judging from the past accomplishments, the

future of nutrition work may be considered bright. What is

only needed is more encouragement to those who are devoting

their time and energies to the subject. They should be given

more generous support not only in the acquisition of more facil­

ities and equipment but also in the maintenance of those al­

ready on hand. Furthermore, expectation of Immediate utilitarian

results should not be the main objective for which such support
if ^ P
is to be given. This last statement cannot be overemphasized.

The general attitude in the Philippines toward research work of

all kinds is to expect Some immediate, tangible result which can

be instantly put to work wi th expectations of immediate pecuniary

returns. Appropriations for nutrition work should be doubled,

at the least, and if possible trebled.

The work done in biological chemistry has been signif­

icant and highly important. Early activities in this field

centered around the chemical analysis of agricultural products

particularly food and feeds.^3 These publications contain

information on proximate proteins, fats, carbohydrates, minerals

^ I b l d . . italics supplied.

^ A d r i a n o , 1925; 1929; Adriano, Ramos and Ynalvez, 1932;

Adriano and de Guzman, 1932; Santos and Adriano, 1929; Santos
and Ascalon, 1931; and Hermano, 1934.
 487

and water content or most of the Philippine foods, feeds, and

agricultural products in general. Experiments leading to the

selection of plants rich in specific foods, in sweet potatoes,

were made by Sabayan (1914); in bananas, by Martinez (1932);

certain varieties of rice, Santos (1934.). Since most studies

indicate an important lack of calcium in the Filipino diet,

34
studies were made to locate foods of high calcium content.

Food poisoning, contracted from eating certain varieties of

cassava and patani, was studied and materials published show­

ing safe varieties (Santos, 1S34, Serrano, 1923). Studies were

made with regard to the sugar content of Philippine cane show­

ing that the native varieties were lower in content than

foreign strains which were suggested as replacements for native

stock. Studies were conducted in the utilization of copra

meal as food (Santos, 1920, Derecho, 1921, Sulit, 1926). Basic

nutrition requirements were established by research. It was

found that the average adult P'ilipino requires (for medium

work) 80 grams protein, 40 grams fats and 450 grams carbohy-

drates daily (Santos and Pidlaon, 1933). Many more studies

were conducted along the general lines outlined herein, but a

study of these works indicates that biological chemistry, in

the words of Dr. Santos, "was used more as a tool than as a

science to be developed....”36 -- a useful tool, nonetheless.

34
Roxas and Collado, 1922; Adriano and Tavanlar, 1925.

35F.Q. Santos: "Biological Chemistry in Philippine A g r i ­

culture and Filipino Nutrition,” NRC, Bulletin No. 5 . 1935, p.
396. This article supplies material for this summary of biological
chemistry, pp. 394-400, p a s s i m .

56Ibid.. p. 398.
 488

More significant for our purposes has been the work

conducted in analyzing the nutritive value of food consumed by

various elements of the Philippine population. Since the

studies were made of a cross-section of the population, their

results are important in indicating the general level of nutrition

throughout the country. How, for example, did the Government,

in its national defense p rogram provide for the nu tr ition of

trainees? A study was conducted at Camp Murphy: random samples

of food were analyzed which yield ed an average per capita

intake of 95 grams of protein, 38 grams of fats and 523 grams

of carbohydrates, which together furnished 2807 calories, and

0.481 gram of calcium, 0.74 gram of phosphorous, and 0.004

gram of iron. The values, thus, for proteins and calories were

below the standard specified by Bulletin No. 61 of the P h i l i p ­

pine C o n s t a b u l a r y . The daily per capita allowance was 10.30,

which, however, was not all spent for the purchase of food

mat eria ls. 57

Nutrition standards varied widely throughout the

country. A study of laborers, in Leyte, revealed an average

cost for food of ten centavos daily per man. Rice, corn, and

sweet potatoes were the principal sources of carbohydrates and

the most common viands were ”g u i n a m o s " (a generic term for

salted preserved fish), "soli d-s oil ” (Caesio caerulaureus

S^F.O. Santos and M. G u t i e r r e z : "A Study of the Pood

Served to the Trainees and Enlisted Men of the P.I. Ar my in
Camp M u r p h y , ” NRC. Bulletin No. 2 5 . December, 1939, p. 127
(abstract).
 489

Lacepded), sugar, "mangko" (tulingan or tuna), onions, "bolinao"

(a small dried fish), and tomatoes. Out of the 106 families

studied, 49 per cent had a daily man unit protein intake of 70

grams or above; 18 per cent had a fat intake of 30 grams or

above; 35 per cent had a carbohydrate intake of less than 350

grams, and 42 per cent had an energy intake of less than 2000

calories. Of the calories, 14 per cent were derived from

protein, cereal grains supplying 80 per cent of total calories,

10 per cent supplied by fruits and vegetables and 7 per cent by

meat, fish and eggs. The use of dairy products and milk was nil.^®

In Sta. Catalina, Ilocos Sur, 47 families were studied;

59 families in Paoay, Ilocos Norte, and 182 families in Pototan,

Iloilo. It was found that when compared to other dietaries,

"the percentage of calories from cereal foods was much higher;

and that of the other food materials, lower," Milk and dairy

products consumed was nil; two-thirds of the protein intake came

from plants and one-half from rice a l o n e . A study made in

Calabanga, Camarines Sur, revealed that, in the 165 families

studied, the daily food, per man unit, cost from 6 to 22 centavos,

with an average of 12 centavos. The fat, carbohydrate and

calorie intake was higher than in the previous study. Seventy-one

^ 8F.O. Santos and J.K. Demeterio: "Studies in the Pood

of 106 Families of Laborers in Macrchon, Leyte," I b i d . . pp. 127-
128 (abstract).
39
P.O. Santos, I.E. Villanueva and P. Silvas "Studies of
of the Plane of Nutrition of Families of Laborers in Sta. C a t a ­
lina, Ilocos Sur; Paoay, Ilocos Norte; and Pototan, Iloilo."
NRC, Bulletin No. 1 1 . App endix B . (September, 1936), pp. 32-36,
(five tables; abstract).
 490

per cent of the prote in was from plants, 63 per cent from rice

alone. Cereals furnished 79 per cent of calorie intake; fruits

and vegetables, 13 per cent; meat and fish and eggs, 4 per

cent; sweet and fatty foods, 3 per cent, while meat and dairy

products were almost non-existent. The coconut was a popular

food furnishing 69 per cent of the fat and 11.6 per cent of

the total calorie intake in 92 f a m i l i e s . ^

Other similar studies were made for Lanao, the Tondo

district in Manila, nutrition and cost of Consta bula ry ration,

nutritive value of the n a t i o n ’s fish and rice diet, the

importance of the soy-bean in the diet of the people, and many

others.it was found that the average Filipino was eleven

centimeters shorter in stature than the average American (males,

1939) and weighed ninete en kilograms less. That this was b e ­

cause of the different level of nu trition is amply shown by the

40
F.O. Santos: "Studies on the Plane of Nu trition of
Families of Laborers in Calabanga, Camarines Sur," NRC,
Bulletin No. 1 9 . Proceedings of the Fourth Philippine Science
Convention, pp. 95-96 (abstract, 1937).

^ F . O . Santos and P.S. Hamoy: "The Food of 158

Families in Ramain, Lanao," NRC, Bulletin No. 25. (December,
1939), pp. 173-174; M. Gutierrez: "11The Diet of Low-Income
Families in Tondo District, Manila," Ibid., p. 175; Isabelo
Concepcion: "The Nutritive Value and Cost of the Constabulary
Ration," NRC, Bulletin No. I I . Appendix A, (September, 1936),
pp. 28-31; Isabelo Concepcion; "The Inadequacies of the Polished-
Rice and Fi sh Diet and Recommendations for its Improvement In
the Philippines," Reprint from P r o c e e d i n g s . 6th Pacific Science
Congress, Berkeley, Stanford and San Francisco, 1939, Vol. VI,
pp. 287-298, and by the same author, same source: "Significance
of Soybean in the Dietary of the Fi lipinos," Vol. VI, pp.
437-447.
 491

height and weight of Filipinos born and raised in the United

S t a t e s .^

Florence Horn was too hasty in her a n a l y s i s : "The

Filipino is lazy. There is no blinking the fact. Y o u can

blame the tropics to a certain ex t e n t . ”4^ The Filipino is not

lazy--no more so than any other people. Undernourishment is a'

deterrent to physical and intellectual vigor and the Filipino

is undernourished. There has been too much unscientific talk

on the effects of the tropics on m a n ’s activities. A man is

lazy either because he is constitutionally inclined thereto or

because his diet fails to give hi m the energy so much admired

by A nglo-Saxons in our Western civilization. The tropics place

certain demands upon the human body which can be met by proper

rest and avoidance of the hurry-skurry of America n life. But

the tropics are no more debilitating to the individual who

expends his energy wisely and takes proper precautions with his

diet than the long, cold winters of the northern United States.

Althou gh no studies, to the knowledge of the author,

have been conducted along these lines, the statement can be
easily verified by checking school, university and health
records, particularly in California, where, ac cording to the
a u t h o r ’s observation, the children of Filipino parents are, in
all cases, much greater in height than their parents. In May,
1949, the author learned, in a conversation with Fr. James
Haggerty, the Fr. Rector of the Ateneo de Cagayan, that Filipino
male students showed remarkable growth and weight achievements
after residing in the Ateneo and eating Am erican-style food
according to American nutrition standards. This subject would
be an interesting one for study. See, for height and weight, as
well as other points: Narciso Cordero? "Clinico-Fhysiolcgical
Standards for Filipinos--A Preview," NRC, Bulletin No. 23. pp.
13 4-135.

^Horn, 0£. c i t . . p. 51.

 492

Public health administration in the Philippines was

hig hly centralized and this was both its strength and weakness.

Too many of the public services started during the Commonwealth

were backed by funds accruing from the coconut oil excise tax,

the benefits of which were to last only until the end of the

Commonwealth. The financial and economic retrenchments of the

Republic, naturally, would curtail many of these services to

the great detriment of the population and eventually the vigor

of the Government itself, weakening its position to meet the

challenge of independence and an un cer tai n post-war world.

Many of the prewar public services died quickly in the

Republic and were later incorporated under the general public

welfare work of the President's Act i o n Committee on Social

Ameli ora tio n--w hic h unfortunately became the source of much

log-rolling; during the campaign year 1949, thereby wea kening its

effectiveness and the ultimate solution of both the hea lth and

peace and order situation.

The social welfare work of the Commonwealth was an

integral portion of President Quezon's "social justice"

campaign and as such needed sufficient financial backi ng to

make it effective and thereby aid in the attainment of the

social justice goals. Dr. Hayden pointed out a serious question,

for the Commonwealth: "What would be the effect upon the

pol itical stability of an independent Philippine Government,

 493

should the national income rapidly shrink to a point at whic h

the social justice program, of which the health-welfare agencies

are an essential part, would have to be rigidly curtailed for

lack of financial support?"44 The answer to this question is

to be found in the debacle of 1947-1950.

The data already available, (Dr. Ha yden said) are

sufficient to show that with this 'w in dfal l1 money
the Commonwealth is building up in the field of public
health and welfare a physical plant and administrative
services, the operation of which will require large
and, for some time to come, increasing annual a ppro ­
priations ... figures illustrate the unsound position
into which the Commonwealth is drifting in this one
department of government.... Consideration of these
facts leaves a strong impression that the Commonwealth
is placing itself in a precarious position by b uil d­
ing upon insecure and inadequate economic foundations
a very large and costly superstructure of social,
services which, should independence be attained in 1946,
might have to be abandoned or radically cur tailed.4 ^

Dr. Hayden's acute analysis of the situation was borne

out by developments in the early years of the Republic. Unless

these problems are solved satisfactorily and quickly, in ad di ­

tion to the great host of others as important, the future

stability of the Republic will be questionable. In educating

the populace to expect social- and welfare aids, a tacit contract

is established between the Government and the people that these

aids will be easily available to the populace and will continue

with an increasing degree of permanence throughout the future.

As Dr. Hayd en says, the Government and the people "will

have to effect drastic changes in their national economy and at

4 4 J.R. Hayden, The Philippines. 1942, p. 674.

45I b i d . . p. 675.
 494

the same time increase their p r o d u c t i v i t y and per capita

wealth" in order that they may maintain "their racial and

cultural identity" by a "display of physical and spiritual

vigor" and meet the population and political pressure from the

Chinese, Japanese, and other over-populated countries so near

the shores of the Philippines. "Should they fail to do this,"

Dr. Hayden says, "they will be unable to maintain the govern­

mental establishment and services which have been developed

during the past forty years and would soon be faced with serious
m 4 6
internal dangers, which, in turn, would invite foreign aggression,

The internal conditions of 1950 are amply illustrative of Dr.

Hayden's acute analysis.

The highly centralized nature of public heal th work,

which had been a goal laid down by Dr. Padua (above), worked to

the great disadvantage of the population at the outbreak of the

War. With the collapse of the central government, all the

dependent units in the country collapsed, taking a heavy

eventual toll in the health and stamina of the p eopl e.4 ^ At

the time of the Liberation, the population was in dire straits,

both from the economic and health points of view. So great was

the damage done to individual and national health standards and

levels that the condition, Dr. Cohen stated, "will not be

corrected for years to come."48 The work of the Institute of

46I b i d . . p. 685.

^ N a t h a n i e l A. Cohen: "Public He al th In the Philippines,"

Far Eastern S u r v e y . Vol. 15, No. 6 (March 27, 1946), p. 87.

48Ibld.. p. 90.
 495

Nutrition, under the Office of the President, in the post-war

years has been of great social and material value and its

effectiveness will be a gauge of the stability of the future of

the n a t i o n . 49

The social justice campaign demanded ever-growing

attention to the welfare of the people. A great part of social

welfare work has been carried on by private agencies, such as

the Asso ciated Charities of Manila and various small bodies

organized by "society" leaders. The Government established in

a suburb of Manila, a children's village called Welfareville, for

the care of dependent and delinquent children. Reformation is

carried on by educational and industrial means as well as

medical care for those whose condition was derived from disease.

A probation system was organized under Act No. 3203, and

retained in the revised Penal Code for the rehabilitation of

minors. It achieved some success in Manila but its progress in

the provinces was slow because of the lack of p e r s o n n e l .50

49p0r the work of this Institute, Sees Isabelo Con­

cepcion: "Scientist Discusses Science of Nutrition, Pood
Production," The Manila C h r o n i c l e , This yVeek M a g a z i n e , Vol. II,
No. 16 (August 4, 1946), pp. 8-9; Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr.;
"Educating the Filipino on N u t rition,” popular article, loaned
the author by Dr. Salcedo, 21 September 1949, to be published;
Report of the Institute, July 1, 1948, to June 30, 1949, MS copy
loaned the author by Dr. Salcedo: Nutrition N e w s , monthly (Mimeo),
the journal of the Philippine Association of Nutrition, Vol. I,
No. 1 (February, 1948)---. Dr. Antonio Villarama, as Chief
Delegate of the Philippines to the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the
Second World Health Asse mbl y (WHO), R o m e , June, 1948, delivered
a rather non-informative speech on "Philippine Health", The
Manila Times (Independence Supplement), Vol. IV, No. 321 ("July 4,
1949), p. 16A. Recent material on the level of Philippine
health is scanty.

50Fabella, ojc. c i t ., p. 45.

 496

The traffic in women and children has always been a

serious p roblem in the Orient, and the no w defunct League of

Nations conducted inquiries into the situation existing in 1936,

with regard to it. The United States had agreed provisi ona lly

to join a conference of central authorities with the League on

the subject but later informed the League that its interest had

been predicated upon the situation existing in the Philippines.

After the Institution of the Commonwealth therefore, the League

authorities sent an invitation to the Philippines to join the

conference. The invitation was declined on the ground that

"traffic in women and children is pr ohibited and pen ali zed by

Philippine law..." and "the probl em in the Philippines is a

police rather than a social one..." this being solved by "the

deportation of foreign p r o s titutes."51 Whether this statement

was window-dr ess ing is difficult to say. Welfare leaders were

not all in accord wi th the statement or its interpretation of

the problem. If the traffic in women and children is to be

treated as a police prob lem rather than a social problem, there

would seem little hope for ibs eventual solution.

Relief and Public Welfare A c t i v i t i e s :-

On October 19, 1936, a special session of the National

Asse mbl y was called by President Qpezon to consider relief for

storm-hit provinces and other important matters. Two days later,

the Assembl y pass ed a 3*1,500,000 re lief bill on the second reading.

SlMemor and um on the Work of the League in Rel ation to

the P a c i f i c , prepared for the 6th conference of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, Geneva, 1S36, p. ICO.
 497

In a special message, almost a year before, the President had

requested from the Assembly an appropriation of 3*100,000 for the

relief of typhoon sufferers, this being appropriated in Co mmon­

wealth Act No. 13, December 31, 1935. Such a sum was quite

insufficient, and when, a year later, It became necessary again

to provide this relief, the President was determined bo meet

criticisms and make more systematic preparations for such

emergencies.

He, therefore, on November 3, 1936, issued Executive

Order No. 61, creating a National Relief Board, "For the purpose

of carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered

Ninety, approved October t w e n t y - s i x t h . . . . "52 This board was to

investigate the damages caused by natural disasters and determine

the amounts needed for relief. It was to be aided by provincial

relief boards who would make pr eliminary appraisals and r e c o m ­

mend necessary action. President ^uezon hoped thus to be able

to meet disasters quickly.

Commonwealth Act No. 90 (appropriating 3*1,500,000) and

Act No. 239 (appropriating 3*500,000, November 29, 1937) for

relief work was implemented by President Quezon with Executive

Order No. 139 (January 14, 1 9 3 8 ),53 w h i c h created a National

Relief Administration. This Ad ministration was to consolidate

the various relief activities of the Government and coordinate

52M . 0 . F .. Vol. 2, Pt. 1 (Rev.ed.), p. 878.

55M . 0 . P .. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 1298-1300.

 498

them with those performed bjr private relief organizations. It

superseded t h e National Relief Board and the Nati ona l Unemp l o y ­

ment Board (created by Executive Order No. 122, October 8,

1937). It was empowered to "investigate the extent of damages

caused by typhoons, floods and other public c a l a m i t i e s . . .deter­

mine the amounts needed for relief an d reh abi litation work...to

take a census of all the une mployed and indigent p e r s o n s ...and

ascertain their needs and determine upon ways and means for

ameliorating their condi tio n.1,54

The Commissioner of He alth and Welfare headed this

office as National Relief Administrator, and his posi tio n was

of great importance to the economy because of the frequency of

many types of disasters. He had an additional function as head

of a national placement agency for the unemployed, the creation

of which, President Quezon believed, was "conclusive pr oof that

the Government has the welfare of the masses at heart."

By 1938, most of the amounts appropriated under Acts 90

and 239 had been expended. The President, therefore, requested

the National Assembly to make an additional app rop riation of

^1,000 ,00 0 "or so much thereof as may be ne ce ssary for the re­

lief of communities and indigent sufferers from typhoons and

other public calamities and also for the succor of pers ons in

distress due to unemployment or otherwise deserving of material

aid." "Needless to state," the President concluded, "the a p p r o ­

priat ion of said amount is nece ssary to further the ends of

54I b l d .. p. 303.
 499

ti55
social justice which we are commicted to promote.

To supplement the work of this Relief Administration,

the National Assembly appropriated, from time to time, various

funds at the call of the President, who would designate calamity

areas for relief and commodity price control .^6 It was felt,

parti cul arl y with the beginning of the War in Europe, that the

President would need greater powers for emergency relief and

the control of commodity prices to prevent speculation during

periods of public suffering. To achieve this purpose, the

National Assembly, on September 30, 1939, passed Commonwealth

Act No. 498, which authorized the President "to purchase

articles of prime necessity" and "to store them for the purpose

of stabilizing prices and for distribution to th e public in case

of emergency," appropriating for this purpose, 1^10,000,000.^

By August, 1940, the situation was believed serious

enough to warrant an increase in the P r e s i d e n t ’s powers and as

a result, Commonwealth Act No. 600 was passed on the nineteenth

55
Ibid., p. 304. Executive Order No. 139 was revised
by Executive Order No. 188 (23 February 1939), Executive Order
No. 197 (24 Ma rch 1939), and Executive Order No. 216 (28 July
1939). No. 197 placed the Administration under the Board again.
No. 216 merely added another member to the board. See Ivi.O.P..
Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 895-896; 960-962; 990.
c £*
See for example: Proclamations No. 4-8, 22 November
1935 to 26 November 1935, M . O . P .. Vol. I, (revised edition),
pp. 206-210.
5*7
Asterio Saquing: "Emergency Relief," The Evening
News (S u p p l e m e n t ). Vol. V, No. 6 (September 30, 1949), pp. 18-20.
 500

of that month. This act declared the existence of national

emergency and granted the President extraordinary powers, "among

w h ich was the sole authority to prevent scarcity, monopoly,

hoard i n g and injurious speculation" over the various commodities

c:p
enumerated in the preceding Act. The President created an

Emergency Control Board (Executive Order No. 335, April 1, 1941),

whose duty was to recommend the prices to be fixed on these

commodities. Two months before the Japanese attack, the

President fixed the price of sixty-five commodities by Executive

Order No. 371, and, after the attack, delegated his powers to

the Emer gency Control Administration. The effective life of

the latter body was short, for, after the entry of the Japanese

into Manila, and the extension of their control throughout the

Islands, the control of prices an d commodities passed into

their hands -- although theoretically special boards, estab ­

lished under the Military Government, were to handle the situation.

P o s t w a r :-

The situation, upon Liberation, demanded again a

central authority to furnish relief and control commodity prices,

which had risen to fantastic levels. This authority was

centered in the Philippine Civilian Ad min istration Unit (PCAtl)

of the 1 J . B . Army. President Osmefia, on November 6 , 1944,

issued Executive Order No. 24 which amended the commodity prices

established by President Quezon in October, 1941. The r e ­

instituted Philippine Commonwealth, however, was powerless to

58Ibid.
 501

control the situation, and was forced to rely upon the PCAU for

support in this emergency. This Executive Order was later

amended by Executive Order No. 29 (March 7, 1945), to extend

its effectivity. An Emergency Control Administration, tinder

Tomas Confesor was established on March 2, 1945, to enforce

prices fixed by the Order. This Administration had the power

to commandeer housing, public utilities and prime necessities

and to distribute goods at controlled prices. The ECA was to

succeed the PCAU, taking over the latter!s functions whenever

civil government was re-established.

Executive Order No. 29 also appropriated ^1,000,000 to

finance the operations of the ECA which, however, had to remain

under the PCAU for some time, receiving the bulk of material

from this organization as well as the UNRRA. The ECA organized

seven subsidiary offices to carry out its duties: The Civilian

Relief Supply Distribution (CRSD); the Civilian Emergency Trans­

portation (CET); Petroleum Products Control Administration (PEPCA);

Committee for Control of House Rentals (CCHR); Emergency Relief

Office (ERO); Economic Planning Board (EPB),and a purchasing

office in Tarlac for procuring rice and other cereals. The CRSD

had charge of the distribution of relief supplies; the CET's functions were

to regulate public transportation in Manila and the running of trucks

for relief distribution; the PEPCA rationed gasoline and oil; CCHR

supervised rentals in Manila, the rate being set a t 125 per cent of

the 1941 rates; the ERO distributed relief to destitute indivi­

duals and various relief establishments, and the EPB, which was
 502

still functioning in 1950 under a different structure, was to

CQ
prepare plans for the economic rehabilitation of the country. ^

The ECA was abolished on November 28, 1945, with the

creation, by the National Assembly, of the Philippine Relief

and Rehabilitation Admi nistration (CA No. 718) which was later

(August 1, 1947) changed to the Philippine Relief and Trade

Rehabilitation Administration (PRATAA). The main purpose of

abo lishing the ECA and creating the PRRA was to eliminate the

idea of relief from the minds of the people and to recreate a

sense of individual responsibility toward the critical problems

facing the country.

President Quezon, at the time the country was prep aring

to enter the Commonwealth period, wanted to establish a National

Red Cross, independent of the Am erican Red Cross. However,

according to t h e terms of the Geneva Convention, a nation, to

establish an independent society, had to adhere to an Interna­

tional Red Cross Treaty. Since the Co mmonwealth Government was

not empowered to negotiate treaties, the country had to await

independence before this dream of Quezon could be realized.

Thus, duri ng the Commonwealth period, the American Red Cross had

charge of all disaster relief in the Philippines. This worked

somewhat to the disadvantage of the country during the Occupation,

because the Japanese were reluctant to allow the Society to

operate freely, saying it was an extension of the services of

the United States.

59Ibid. 60Ibid.. p. 20
 503

At the outbreak of the A'ar, the Red Cross had been

incorporated into the Civilian Emergency Administration, and,

in December, the staff of 700 men and women engaged in war

relief. The Philippine Red Cross became responsible for the

evacuation of civilians and the maintaining of public morale.

It evacuated successfully some 90,000 civilians to 40 di f­

ferent evacuation centers in the provinces near Manila, and

undertook the cask of general r e l i e f - d i s t r i b u t i n g food and

medical supplies. It established, for the first time, a

Medical Service Department, installing eight emergency hospitals

in Manila and operating hundreds of first aid units. The

Compana Maritima, a private shipping concern, turned over to

the Red Cross the S.S. M a c t a n , for the transport of wounded

military to Aus tralia and was manned largely by the Phi l i p ­

pine Red Cross. It was faced with the problem of caring for

Americans and other allied natio nali tie s— French, British,

Dutch, Chinese--who were to be interned for the duration of

the war. It undertook the iob of preparing Santo Tomas Uni ver ­

sity for the reception of these individuals, and, until June 30,

1942, supplied all the food for this internment center, sup­

pl ementing this with medical services. In May, 1942, the

Japanese abolished the organization and created an ’’ind epen den t”

Philippine Red Cross, wh ich was now forbidden access to Santo

Tomas. It continued to operate as best as it could during the

remainder of the occupation pe riod--often at great personal

risk to p e r s o n n e l - a i d i n g civilians and, secretly, Ameri can

soldiers and civilians in hiding them from the Japanese.
 504

Liberation saw a heart-breaking task facing the

organization which, however, immediately began the task of r e ­

building, aiding the suffering population, and cooperating with

the Ame ric an Red Cross units attached to the United States

armed forces. The American Red Cross generously extended f i n a n ­

cial assistance and loaned trained personnel to assist in the

re habilitation of the organization.

On February 14, 1947, President Roxas signed the treaty

of Geneva and the Prisoners of War Convention as the first step

in the founding of an independent Philippine Red C r o s s . A

month later the Congress passed an act granting the official

charter for the organization, re ceiv ing presidential approval

five days later. On the same day, an application was cabled to

the International Red Cross for recognition as an independent

society. A week later, Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon, the widow of the

late President, received a cable I n f o r m i n g her of the official

recognition of an independent status for the Philippine National

Red Cross which was proclaimed an independent body on April 15, 1947

The Philippine National Red Cross, had, by 1950, 212,000

volunteer workers and a professional staff of 410 men and women.

It operated 36 chapters, 14 sub-chapters and six sub-offices.

Its membership, in 1948, was 1,376,232. The society, since its

establishment, has rendered valuable assistance to the p o p u l a ­

tion, particu larl y in disaster relief. From March, 1946, to

August, 1949, the Philippines was visited by 1,246 disasters

 505

&X
(in the months of February to hay, 1948, over 400 fires alone).

As a result of these disasters, 1,033,301 individuals and

195,968 families were extended disaster relief, during the

period, by the Red Cross - these figures excluding all socio­

economic cases wh ich are more difficult to tabulate. From the

reconstruction of the Red Cross up to 1948, more than 67,000

families had been given home-relief aid by the organization, as

well as extensive work for the military services, safety

services, nursi ng services and the Junior Red Cross. Another

important service was the institution of a blood bank, which has

f?0
saved countless lives.

61
In the pe riod M a r c h - D e c e m b e r , 1946, 7 fires, 4 typhoons;
January-March, 1947, 26 fires, 1 typhoon; A p r i l - D e c e m b e r , 1947,
87 fires, 16 typhoons, 7 floods, 1 disastrous explosion, 1 land­
slide, 1 tidal wave and 2 shipwrecks; the twelve-month period of
1948, 426 fires; 14 typhoons; 16 shipwrecks; 14 floods; 4 w h irl­
winds; 3 great explosions; 2 hurricanes; 1 cave-in; 1 earthquake;
1 landslide; 1 volcano eruption; Januar y-A pri l, 1949, 442 fires;
5 shipwrecks; 3 explosions; 2 landslides; 1 earthquake; 1 cyclone
and 1 flood; Iviay-August, 1949, 276 fires; 9 shipwrecks; 3 to rna­
dos; 2 typhoons; 2 landslides; 1 flood; 1 waterspout: 1 explosion.
Disastrous fires are the most common--the towns of Tarlac, Cota-
bato and Legaspi being almost totally destroyed by fires as well
as many others— the cause of which seems generally to be careless­
ness and incendiarism. Typhoons always take their toll and are
followed by floods and landslides. Explosions are generally due
to undiscovered bomb caches as well as carelessness around stored
ammunition and explosives. The control of fires is one of the
serious social and economic problems at present and, despite the
heroic educational efforts of the various Fire Departments in the
country, is difficult to eradicate. Many fires are started by
arsonists who are failing in business and hope to recoup their
losses through their fire insurance. These figures were kindly
supplied by Dr. J. Canuto, of the Disaster Relief Service Depart­
ment of the Philippine National Red Cross.
^ Report of the Philippine National Red Cross to the XVI Ith
International fied Cr oss Conference. Stockholm, 1948 18 pp.; Dr.
Manuel Lim: Red Cross 1949 Accomplishments," The Manila Times
(Independence Day Supplement ), V o l . IV, No. 321 (July 4, 1949), p p .
14B-15B, 1SB.
 506

The Philippine National Red Cross, as well as the

Community Chest (established in 1949), has had great difficulty

in securing the financial assistance necessary for optimum

service because the average Filipino has never acquired the habit

of giving to public welfare societies. Since the family system

is so strong in the Philippines, the Filipino has been a c c u s ­

tomed in the past to take care of all needy individuals in the

family without outside assistance. Other, unfortunate, indivi­

duals are left to their own devices since the ordinary individual

feels that he has enough to do to provide for his own family.

This task of educating the Filipino to community welfare work

Is a difficult one, although it has shown some signs of success

In the recent past. The road ahead, however, is a difficult one

in this respect.

The task wit h relation to child and youth welfare has

been difficult In the post-war years. The most critical period

was immediately following Liberation. Widespread poverty, the

psychological release from repression during the Occupation, the

general lowering in public morality as a result of war conditions,

the attractions offered by American soldiers with money--all

these contributed to an alarming increase In juvenile delinquency.

Prostitution, pa rticularly of minor girls, increased at the time

of liberation because of the poverty of the people as well as

the lure of adventure offered by liaisons with Amer ica n soldiers.

The resultant spread of venereal disease offered serious problems.

The year 1945 saw the highest number of cases committed to the
 507

Philippine Training School for Boys and Girls at vtfelfareville.

The total number admitted was 401 (358 boys and 43 girls); in

1946, 381 (336 boys and 45 girls), and in 1947, 361 (313 boys

and 48 girls). These figures reflect only those delinquents

apprehended by social welfare authorities and placed in the

correctional institution in the City of Manila. No figures are

available for the rest of the country.

General criminality has increased sharply over prewar

years (in reported cases). Crimes against persons and against

chastity rose particularly, with 205 cases reported (in the

period Ma y 1945-April, 1947) and 130 arrests for rape, and 2,575

cases of prosti tuti on reported with 5,577 arrests made. The

total number of cases for the period (involving seven major

crimes: murder and homicide, rape, robbery upon persons,

aggravated assault, robbery upon things, prostitution and

commercialized vice and gambling and betting) was 12,607 with

16,976 arrests. P r o m May, 1945, to May, 1946, 39,070 crimes

were committed by males and 7,012 by females; from May, 1946,

to May, 1947, 24,511 by males and 5,146 by females. No recent

figures have been made available but the general impression is

that, during 1949, criminality had a general increase with the

police forces hard pressed to keep abreast of the s i t u a t i o n . ^

63Reported in The Sunday T i m e s . Vol. II, No. 295 (June

8, 1947), pp. 3-5.
64
United Nations, Department of Social Affairs: Annual
Report on Child and You th W e l f a r e . 1948, Lake Success, N.Y.,
based upon information received fro m Member Governments betw een
April 1, 1947, and M a rch 31, 1948, 236 pp. See particularly:
pp. 180-187, for Philippine Report on this subject.
 508

General welfare work, after the inception to the

P r e sidency of Elpidio Quirino, was conducted under the auspices

of the President's Act i o n Committee on Social Amelioration,

k n o w n generally as the PACSA. This was created, by the P r e s i ­

dent, by Executive Order No. 68 (August 3, 1948). The C o m m i s ­

sioner of Social Welfare, Mrs. Asu ncion A. Perez, was named

chairman of the committee, wh ich was composed of one represents

tive each fr om the Departments of Agric ultu re and Natural

Resources, Public Works and Communications, Education, Health,

Justice and Labor, the National Land Settlement Ad ministration

and the PRA'TRA. Mr. Hilar ion S. Silayan, formerly Director of

Plant Industry, was named executive officer. The functions of

this committee were:

1. To coordinate and supervise the activities of

the different branches instrumentalities and agencies
of the government with a view to promo t i n g most
efficie ntl y the welfare of the people in the rural
districts.
2. To administer and supervise the distribu tio n
of governmental aids in order that the funds may be
spent pro pe rly for the purposes for w h i c h they are
intended.
3. To initiate measures in addition to activities
n o w being ixndertaken, calculated to attain the objective
of he l p i n g the small farmer in order to make of h i m a
productive, contented, and peace - l o v i n g citizen.
4. To b r i n g every facility of the government into
p l a y for the purpose of effe cti vely he lping those who
are coming into the fold of law under the President's
A mnesty Proclamation.
5. To administer the funds assigned by the P r e s i ­
dent from tine to time for social ame lioration work.®®

The activities of this committee, especially under point

President's A c t i o n Committee on Social Ameliora tio n:

"Handbook on the President's Acti o n Committee on Social A m e l i o ­
ration," (Manila, February, 1949), p. 14. Italics supplied.
 509

"2" have been the subject of much adverse criticism--not by

many members of the Government, however. The distribution of

governmental aids, as provi de d in that point, has, the critics

said, been mal-administered, since they were used for political

purposes during the campaign of 1949. This claim was not re­

futed by the Administration, and the PACSA coincidentally

found itself critically short of funds at the end of 1949.

The provision in the Budget for 1951 appropriating several

million pesos for this fund came under sharp criticism in

Congress--not only from the opposition but also from many

members of the party in power.

The basic weakness of the PACSA, outside its unfortunate

political aspect, is that it is a costly duplication of the

efforts of the other branches of the Government. The "six-point

program" of the President, which led to the formation of the

PACSA, as expounded by the Executive following a meeti ng of his

cabinet in August, 1948, provi ded the following:

1. The agricultural aspect will include the a c q u i ­

sition of some existing haciendas, the opening of
agricultural colonies, and the furnishing of seedlings,
implements and perhaps worki ng animals;
2. The public works aspect will include the
launching of a full-dress p rogram of road, bridge and
other construction for whic h appropriations are a v a i l a b l e ;
3. The educational pro g r a m whic h will mean the
immediate opening of extension classes for the children
of displaced persons, the organization of vocational
training and the Institution of adult education;
4. The financial aspect which will include crop and
home-buil din g loans from the Philippine National Bank;
5. The relief aspect w h ich will consist of the
distribution of food, clothing and other immediate
assistance to all those who are In need through the
Social Welfare Commission; and
6* The medical aspect w hich will include the r e ­
activa tio n of the mov ing clinic p rogram of the provincial
 510

and national health se rvi ces.66

E a c h of these points duplicates the established programs

of various governmental agencies which are better equipped, have

the necessary trained per sonnel and bett er- organized programs

for the attainment of each of these objectives. The PACSA, in

order to attain these aims, must draw upon these agencies thus

drai nin g their effectivity and already over-worked personnel

down to a point dangerously near stagnation. These agencies

should be strengthened.

The program, under che PACSA, was begun from a political

point of view--not an economic nor social one. The country was

faced with the pro ble m of eliminating, if possible, the ac tivi­

ties of the Hukbalahaps and other dissident groups. The PK3V:

had been outlawed by President Roxas, so President Q,uirino,

"taking a more unde rst andi ng appro ach to the pro bl em of the

H u k b a l a h a p ,"^7 promulgated P roclam ati on No. 76 (June 21, 1948),

giving amnesty to Huks and PKMs who would "register w i t h the

gove rnment and return to their homes." The amnesty program, as

even the most ardent supporters of the A d ministration admitted,

was a pra ctical failure. It merely allowed the leaders of the

organizations time to receive their b ackpay as members of

Congress, and a bre athing spell for more efficient organization

of their armies. ;¥hen this was felt to be su fficiently acco m­

plished, they melted from the purlieus of the powerful and

disap pea red into the an ony mit y of t h e general po pul ation and

6 6 Ibid., p. 13. 67Ibid. . p. 32.

 511

the depths of jungle and swamp -- in which they remain.

Since the relief work of the PACSA was accompanied by

political pressure of one sort or another, its effectiveness

was limited and it was suspect by the very individuals it was

organized to aid. It is to be hoped that the functions of

public welfare and relief may be allowed to re m ain the

province of those best fitted for the task and who have the

confidence and gratitude of the populace.®®

68p 0r a more detailed account of the activities of the

PACSA, seej PACSAj Social Amelio rat ion and Y o u . Report of the
PACSA to the People of the P h i l i p p i n e s , (Manila, October, 1949}^
41 pp."; PACSA: First Annual R e p o r t . TManila, August 31, 1949),
31 pp., 3 appendices, (Mimeo.).
 CONCLUSION

The Philippines lie, like a great "S” , off the eastern

shores of Asia, a part of the great Southeast Asia culture

world. As far as our present knowledge is concerned, the

Philippines were only spasmodically associated hi sto rica lly

with this great Malays ian world In the past. However,

sufficient contacts were established In certain periods, notably

during the Madjapahit and Sri-Vi jaya n empires, to create a

culture whose roots extend back Into early Indian history and

w hic h was strong enough to maintain itself in the Philippines

with few basic changes until the present. The country acted

as a receiver and transmitter of its Indian heritage, as I t

had earlier during one of the great waves of migr a t i o n that

swept the peoples of Asia throughout the Eastern World, Into

the Pacific and on to the Amer ica n continents. Remnants of

this earlier culture are still present in the Philippines and

are at present bein g modified by the action of the later

Hi ndui zed Malayan culture, the S pan ish encomlenda system and

the A m e r i c a n culture wave. The last has swept over the peoples

in the Philippines like a gigantic spray of varni sh adherin g

the least where the oil of the past still clings.

The contribution of Spain has generally been noted as

cons ist ing In the introduction of the Christian r e l i g i o n and

the colonial system which reached its lowest level in Central

and South America. As to the first, mo d e r n scholars must still

512
 513

decide whether the Introduction of Christianity ever became more

than just that. Has it really altered the “world v i e w ” of the

Filipino? Has it really changed significantly the folk-culture

of the past? It has been the custom of Spanish apologists and

Filipino antiquarians to assume that this introduction has had

a lasting, deep ly-ingrained effect upon the life of the people.

Few concrete facts, however, have been presented to maintain

successfully this as su mption whose strength lies in a se nti­

mental na t i o n a l i s m w h ich has attempted to portray the Philip­

pines as the "only Ch ri stia n na tio n in the Orient" -- a popular

catchword with no more meaning than such slogans ever possess.

This has found expression in the publi cat ion of textbooks on

history for Catholic schools w h i c h very fact is expressive of

the nature of the "historical" thinking in the Philippines. In

reality, there is pra cti cally no "historical" thinking among the

majority of peoples in the Philippines, the only exceptions

b e ing found in the so-called non-Christians, and even there it

is weak and becoming weaker with the impact on their societies

by "mod ern” forces.

The people, generally speaking, have little sense of

time-space relationships and live in the present to a greater

degree than is the case in Asia Major. Sup er fici all y this

statement will appear as a "value judgment" but Is certainly

borne out by experience in the educational system of the nation.

There is, at present, as an adjunct of the "new nationalism",

a hearke nin g back to the "good old days" when all Filipinos
 514

were hard-working, honest and possessors of all the virtues

the present generation is said to lack. This has received

official recog nit ion ir. the instructions given to would-be

writers of Philippine h i s t o r y for the public schools In which

the injunction is given to present all the characteristics of

the Filipinos which are, because of the absence of sources,

impossible to ascertain wi th any correctness. Most histories

of the Philippines begi n with the pre - S p a n i s h history In great

detail, the information for which Is derived fro m secondary

sources wr itt en in the main by padres whose training was in

dogma and ritual. The majority of primary sources on the early

Filipinos were all destroyed by missionaries -- Catholic and

Protestant -- and others still remain untrans lat ed from the

Chinese and Arabic. Several years ago, a text wr itten by one

of the most informed scholars in the Philippines contained a

brief reference to this destr uc tion of the old bamboo and bark

writings which resulted in the banni ng of the text fro m schools

until this offending passage was removed. Vi/hat is actually

available Is highly fragmentary in nature and conclusions

derived therefrom are subjective in the extreme. A few ex cep­

tions may be found In the early volumes of Bl air and Robertson^-

which, however, are too scanty for co nstructing a detailed

history of p re-Spanis h times.

The history of the Philippines began wit h the coming of

the first humans but who they were, from whence they came, and

^ The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898. 55 v o l s ., 1903-1907.

 515

at what time is a matter for conjecture only. We k n o w that a

large pop ulation inhabited the Philippines during Iveolithic and

Iron Ag e times, with these terms having specific meanings for

the Philippines not related to those periods in Europe and the

Middle East. A great over-lapping of pre-historic periods in

the Philippines makes it difficult to do more than conjecture

a datum-level for them. The province of Batangas was heavily

populated for long periods during the late Neolithic and Iron

Ages, as was the area around the present locality of Novaliches.

This was discovered by H. Otley Beyer, who has gathered together

some half mill ion artifacts from these localities, the majority

of which remain unclassified. Professor Beyer has estimated

that the po pulation of Batangas during those periods was at the

same level sustained by the province today. Other, perhaps

earlier perhaps later, peoples, members of the jar-burial

culture of East Asia, have left their mark upon numerous, widely-

scattered areas fr om Luzon to Mindanao.

The popul atio n consists of Negritos, whose date of

arrival will perhaps forever remain a mystery, the Malayans

(divided by Pro fessor Beyer into Proto-Mialayan and Malayan),

the Indonesians (divided into "A" and "B" types), some Tibeto-

Burmese stocks, possibly some SInitic and unspeci ali zed

"Mongoloid" types, and some probable Iranian types still un­

classified and tt.urdescribed. The modern popu lat ion contains

also a wide mixture of Papuan, Austronesian, Melanesian,

Polynesian, Caucasian peoples in a bewildering array of languages

(or dialects) and communities.
 516

Upon all these peoples, their customs, traditions, b e ­

liefs, modes of action, societal structure, was Imposed first

a medieval S panish system w h i c h was largely concerned with the

economy of the Islands and the co nversion of the people to the

Christianity of Spain, and secondly, the increasingly complex

system of the United States. For most of the Sp a n i s h period,

the Philippines were ad ministered from Ne w Spain, the auth o r ­

ities of which gradually imposed restrictions upon what could

be produ ced and sold abroad, bringi ng about the first of many

attempts at circumv ent ion of governmental plans, programs and

edicts. Later, the Islands were adminis ter ed f r o m Spain

directly and in the latter part of the Span ish period attempts

were made to derive some pr o f i t from this far-awa y possession.

Whether or not the encomienda sy ste m would have be nefitted the

people, w hich was not con sidered in erecting or adm ini ste ring

the system, it left scars In the eco nomy and the psyche of the

people whic h have never disappeared. Today, the cacique is

still as much a part of the Philippine scene as in days of yore

and gore.

It is amaz ing that the Uni ted States accompli she d as

m u c h as it did. But the leaders were men of vigor and d eter­

mination, if they were weak In kn ow led ge and u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and

they were aided by the desire of the Filipinos to achieve an

independent stabus and an international position. That Is to

say, they were aided by politicos who desired these things.

 517

Whatever the ordinary Filipino believed is impossible n o w to

determine but certainly it is true that they engaged in the

Revolution primarily because of their hatred for the friars and

Spain. Unpubli she d documents clearly indicate what the leaders

of the Revolution were seeking while the works of Rizal present

a picture quite different fro m what is alleged by the nationalists of

today.

An early observer stated: "No serious attempt had ever

been made, at least none at all commensurate with the vastness

of the interests at stake, to lay down those principles whic h

should control in future relations between powerful Western

nations and the primitive savagery or part iall y-c ivi liz ed

inhabitants of the tropical regions. Constructive sta tesman­

ship was n e e d e d . 11^ The United States came to the Philippines

as a result of the operation of forces dominant in the nations

of the world at the end of the Ninetee nth Century with practical­

ly no ideas how such a dependency should be governed but

determined to procee d as an experiment in applied politics.

With a mixture of altruism, self-s eek ing commercial interests

and Congressional bungl i n g it began its task. President

McKinley's desire to " u p l i f t 11 and "Christianize" the Filipinos

found its ex pression in the formation of the First Philippine

Commission w hich arrived in Manila March 4, 1899. It issued

a proclam ati on of friendship to the people and upo n the

p
Homer C. Stuntz, The Philippines and the Far E a s t .
1904, p. 156.
 518

conclusion of its survey recommended to the President that a

territorial form of government be organized with an elected

lower chamber and an upper house partly elected and partly

appointed. It also reported that in the view of the Commission

the people were as yet unprepared for independence. In

December of 1899, President McKinley stated that the United

States would not await the end of the strife then existing but

would continue in its task of opening schools and churches,

f os te ri n g industry, trade and commerce and "in every way in our

power to make these people whom Providence has brought within

our jurisdiction feel that it is their liberty and not our

power, their welfare and not our gain, we are seeking to enhance.'

Our flag, he said, "has never waved over any community but in

blessing." It has b e e n the fashion in following years for many

writers to deride the views held in the early years of the

century by the President and those associated w i t h h i m in this

new task in A m e r i c a n history. These writers have been unwilling,

apparently, to credit the individuals of that day with sincerity

and good-will. President M c K i n l e y ’s appreciation of the

workings of Providence was real and sincere, as it was for many

individuals of that period. The scepticism of our day had not

yet touched the simple faith of our fathers and latter-day

writers have- erred in reviewing the ideals of sincere men by the

standards of another generation.

The Philippine Bill of 1902, sponsored by Congressman

H.A. Cooper, p rovided for the government until 1916. For the day,
 519

it was a good bill and the administration worked under it

successfully and established in the Philippines for the first

time a government of law. It was a government of personalities

a3 well as a personal government but It was primarily a govern­

ment of law and worked well. Certainly the American spirit

has seldom been better expressed than In the administration of

the first fourteen years of the American period.

The Jones Law of 1916 granted self-governing powers to

the Filipinos and it was at that time that the serpent entered

the new Eden. Fr om 1916 until the formation of the Common­

we al th in 1954, American-Philippine relations entered upon a

n ew phase, and one bhat was disturbed frequently by an increas­

ing variance in opinion as to the optimum methods of attaining

the commonly-held objectives. This was heightened by the

controversy centered around the person of Governor G-eneral

Leonard hood, one of the ablest of A merican administrators and

certainly one of the most misunderstood. The student is left

w i t h the impression, after studying the events of that unhappy

day, that this mi su nderstanding was deliberately fostered by

certain individuals as a means of securing more firmly the reins

of control at certain levels of determination of policy. One

of the results of this controversy would become important in

later Philippine history associated with the personality of

Jose P. Laurel.

Of the many errors committed by various Ame ri ca n

administrations, none was more lasting in its effects or more

 520

productive of difficulties than the policy of free trade begun

after 1913. This resulted, briefly, In the establishment of

Philippine industries whose prosperity was dependent upon the

continuation of such a policy. It meant great p ro sperity for

the Filipinos although it benefitted more directly the cacique

class and brought about the growth of a n e w class whose fortunes

were tied to these m ajor industries. This p ro sperity achieved

by the four major export industries, as a result, actually

hindered the normal domestic development and entrenched the

economic problems which were remnants of the S p an is h period and

results of free trade. During the years of prosperity, the

Filipinos continued to seek Independence, sending between the

years 191S and 1934 twelve missions to the United States. A

f ew observers pointed out that independence would have as one of

Its main results the loss of the free trade and preferential

p osition in the Ame ri ca n market, a statement which was always

countered by vague statements with regard to developing new

industries, finding other markets or maintaining the status

quo In one way or another.

W i t h the Tydings-McDuffie Act a n d the establishment of

the Commonwealth, the leaders in the government were at last

confronted with the necessity of provid in g a ne w Philippine

economic structure in pr ep ar a ti on for independence in 1946.

Some experimental steps were taken be tween 1934 and 1938 in

this direction, and their general failure resulted In pi nning

the hopes of the industries in the Joint Prepara to ry Committee.

 681

Its report in 1938 tried to please all elements on both sides

of the Pacific, and provided that economic independence would

not be a reality until 1960, This extension of the dread

day for a period of two decades so lulled the sensibilities of

the planners that for the remainder of the Commonwealth period

the plan ni ng continued to be vague, general and theoretical.

No positive steps were taken to divert the n a t i o n ’s resources

from the four main export items to an intensive development of

domestic industries and even the special report made by a

technical committee appointed by President Quezon in Washington

d uring the war was ignored by the first ad mi ni stration of the

infant Republic.

One of the main difficulties which lay in the path of

the planners of the Commonwealth was their failure to understand

the exact nature of the Philippine economy. It was a colonial

economy whose continued prosperity was to be determined by a

continued close association with the colonial power. The

leaders of the Commonwealth were apparently unaware of the fact

that the severing of the colonial ties would bring problems

which were impossible of solution so long as the colonial nature

of the economy was maintained. Despite their elaborate planning

and programming, which during the pre-war years was more

theoretical than practical, they took, actually, no steps to

alter the nature of the economy. The natural result was that

the Republic was faced wit h the necessity of m a i n t ai ni ng a

complex governmental structure f r o m an economy w hich was still

 522

colonial but which was soon to lose the protection of the

colonial power.

Realizing this finally, the only recourse for the Govern­

ment was take steps to maintain in some fashion the previous

close relationship, secure aids from the United States in reha­

bilitating the war-ravaged nation and to hitch the Philippine

wagon to the American star. This added fuel to the discontent

already present in the nation and was utilized by the Communist-

inspired Hukbalahap, who were fomenting discord rather than seek­

ing a positive way out of the muddle, for their own propaganda

purposes. It Is undeniably true that political independence with­

out economic independence is but half a loaf but half a loaf Is

better than none in what was becoming an increasingly uneasy

world. The old idea of neutrality for the Philippines was revived

by some who did not realize that in mid-century, neutrality, In

the greatest ideological conflict of history, was possible only

for the dead. If one appreciates the nature of the economy, the

events of 1934-1946, the failure of the Commonwealth to produce

a workable plan, it becomes quite clear that the only course of

action possible for the Republic was the one actually taken.

There is no doubt whatever that the fruits of this

course of action would have been more easily attained had the

individuals In the early administration of the Republic been

less concerned with self-aggrandizement and enrichment. The

frauds and corruption which so rotted the fabric of the nation

 523

from 1946-1950, in which Americans, Chinese, Spanish and

others, as well as P'ilipinos participated, were almost insuper­

able deterrents to the establishment of sound economy, sound

government, sound planning and sound thinking

’
w hat was developing from an emergent feudalistic gov er n­

ment was an oligarchic-socialism which, following the withdrawal

of a foreign colonial power, replaced it with Manila, the

capital, as the new colonial power. The rest of the Philippines

became colonies of Manila -- the locus of power -- with

individuals in an out of the central Government receiving

portions of the nation as new encomiendas as rewards for party

fidelity, personal loyalty to the powerful and special services

rendered. Manifestations of this n e w movement are to be found

in the naming of municipalities after certain individuals still

alive and connected in one way or another with the Government.

The sources of wealth and power were cartelized among the

powerful and the provinces became the happy hunting grounds and

special preserves of the elect.

It is doubly tragic that those who should have aided the

Filipinos were tarred with the same brush. It is excusable

perhaps that individuals from the United States should not have

known m u c h about the Philippines; it is inexcusable, however,

that so many Americans in the various hierarchies of off ic ia l­

dom, should have been associated so closely and intimately with

those individuals in Philippine society not representative of

the people and well-known as perpetuators of the iniquitous social

 524

and economic system. One of the greatest tragedies which

emerged from American bungling in East Asia was the identifica­

tion of Americans and America with the very elements in society

and government which the United States should have aided the

Filipino people to eradicate. The propaganda of the Communists

was enriched by the many false steps taken in the early post­

war period by responsible Americans and this disastrous pr o ­

paganda was not destroyed by official United States policies

and programs which being theoretical, based upon insufficient

knowledge and understanding of t h e Philippine (and East Asian)

scene, and vacillating in the extreme weakened the position of

the United States in the eyes of the Orient. Had the policies

been less anti-Communist (which too readily becomes anti-liberal,

e.g. attitude toward Fr. Hogan) and more pro-democratic and

pro-American (in the Jeffersonian not the McCarthy sense), the

Filipino and American peoples would have benefitted a great

deal more. This lack of a sound, well-constructed policy on

the part of the United States was as evident during the Common­

wealth period as during the Republic and undoiibtedly caused a

great portion of the indecision and procrastination of the

Commonwealth Government. The observer of the history of these

years much conclude that the United States failed in its mission

in the Philippines at the very time that success was demanded and
could have been achieved.

That a rocky road lies ahead for the nation cannot be

denied by even the warmest supporter of the Philippines, and many
observers in the years 1949-1951, expressed fears that the vehicle
which must travel this road may not be so sturdy as "The One-Hoss Shay."
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Reference material is scanty, poorly organized,

difficult to obtain and poorly cared for in the Philippines

making general problems of research difficult in the extreme

and presenting a discouraging prospect for the student. The

Pilipiniana Division of the Philippine National Library lost

95 per cent of its collection - some 76,000 volumes, and

countless manuscripts. This loss has not been recovered and,

with the present attitude of the Philippine Congress and the

General A ud it i n g Office, the rehabilitation of the Library in

all likelihood wil3 long be delayed.

Since this loss can be duplicated in most of the

major universities, colleges and academies of the country,

the picture is one of desolation to the researcher. This

necessitated an unending search for surviving materials. Some

were located in a few private libraries that miraculously

remained untouched by the torch of war. Some material was

located accidentally in second hand book stores or on the

counters of small stores where the leaves of the books and

manuscripts were being used for wrapping paper. The picture for

recent, post-war material is not much more encouraging. In the

many government bureaus visited, it was seen readily that govern­

ment employees and directors have little or no appreciation for

the need of preservation of public documents. Materials of

great value to the researcher are carelessly stored and used.

525
 526

M an y public documents are used as scratch paper or for sanitary

purposes. The National Library is greatly handicapped in its

efforts of preservation by the unbelievable inattention and lack

of perspective of the Congress wh ich appropriates money annually

for purposes other than for the repository of the Government

where books are denonimated as "furniture" by the budget commission.

The situation with regard to materials in the United

States Is little better. Important papers with reference to the

Philippines are almost unobtainable. Other materials are

scattered throughout the n a t i o n ’s libraries, the use of w h ic h

places a considerable financial burden on the average researcher.

The L i b r a r y of Congress is several years behind in its task of

sorting collections in which m u c h material on the Philippines

must lie. The valuable collection gathered together b y the

arduous labors of the late Dr. J. R al s to n Hayden and his staff,

during the Aar, has vanished like the snows of yesteryear in

the vast, murky, uncharted wastes of Washington bureaucracy.

Since the author was not able to spend much time at the Library

of Congress because of reasons familiar to every student sans

grant, the bibliography following has b e e n gathered together

from the four corners of the world.

Through the fine cooperation of other individuals

Interested In the relatively untouched area that is the Phi li p­

pines, the author hopes to be able to present in a year or two

a bi bl iography of available material on the Philippines - supple­

menting the bibliographies of Griffin, Pelzer, Kolb and Ann

Du nc an Brown.
 527

The present bibliography has been divided, for the

author's convenience, into sections on books, pamphlets and

other materials, articles, periodicals, official publications,

propaganda, dictionaries and grammars, manuscripts and atlases.

It will be noted that the bibliographic information on the

various periodicals is still limited. This is due to the

h ighly fugitive nature of such material and the spasmodic

nature of their appearance. The author has been unable so far

to locate any library containing all or a great portion of

titles listed. Many serials are published in the Philippines.

Their lives, however, are as evanescent as that of the May fly -

many of them being published but once. Since Philippine

officials write extensively in these publications, many

important articles are to be found in magazines whose births were

their deaths. The author has not attempted to annotate these

publications nor to indicate those materials of more scholarly

nature. The author is aware that this is a weakness, but the

limited time for preparation of this work has precluded the

completion of this task at present; it will be accomplished for

a later publication. Therefore, the reader is requested to

assume that each article cited, or each pamphlet listed, has

some value other than antiquarian. In even the most ’’popular"

of articles in Philippine serials is to be found material of

u tility and scholarly value. This, the author realizes, can be

a ppreciated only by a study of these articles. The author has

endeavored to be as selective as possible in the listing of

articles and has not included in this present work a listing of

 528

about 800 articles w h i c h are of value, in one way or the other,

to one Interested in the shifting currents of the Philippine

stream of e v e n t s .

The author wishes that the listing of primary sources

were more complete. This is difficult in the Philippines b e ­

cause of the methods employed in pre se rv in g public documents.

It has been a source of frustration to others attempting a study

of the Philippines. Many important, unrestricted, public

documents are difficult to secure because "they can not be located"

- a phrase used by clerks, bureau chiefs, etc., etc. This is

naturally very convenient for the individuals treated or

affected by the material but hardly for the serious student.

sShether they will ever be obtainable is questionable.

Secondary sources are numerous and varied. Only a few,

however, are authoritative. The present listing should be

annotated, and the author hopes to accomplish this in a year or

two. This list is merely a preli mi n ar y one.

The reader will note numerous publications in the section

on "Official Publications." They represent really the core of

any study of the Philippines. The old Insular Government and

the Commonwealth took their tasks seriously and in the p u b l i c a ­

tion of circulars, pamphlets, etc, provided the really only

authoritative sources for recent Philippine history. The

p u bl ic at io ns of the various departments and bureaus are all

valuable as sources for official attitudes and programs as well

 529

as much information on events and developments. x'he Republic

so far has failed to measure up to the work of the p as t in this

respect, as well, indeed, in many ethers.

There has been little published of Importance to the

researcher in the Philippines since the War - either in p e r i o d ­

icals or books. One of the extraordinary phenomena w i t h regard

to research in the Philippines, is the lack of material for the

years 1939-1941. The answer probably lies in the fact that

since this material appeared just shortly before the outbreak of

the war, there was no opportunity for a wide distribution.

What is more extraordinary is the disappearance of materials

fr om the old bureau of Insular Affairs, p ar ti cularly the dis­

appearance of Philippine newspapers. They probably lie in some

anonymous warehouses in the Federal district in the trust of an

aged employee kn own only to God.

The graphs have been prepared by Itr. Gil Llanes of the

University of Manila, being gathered by the author from various

reports of the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Bureau of

the Census and Statistics, the Bureau of Commerce and special

articles fro m the press of the Philippines. The author cannot

guarantee the exactitude of each graph wit h the exception of

those on fisheries. They are presented here largely as guides

and Illustrate the statistical work of various Government

bureaus. Statistical information in the Philippines in the past

has been capricious and confusing and, as a science, is still

in its infancy. In analyzing statistics in the Philippines,

 530

the necessity of' striking averages becomes quickly apparent.

The Philippines present a fertile field to a student

interested in problems and methods of statistics.

Sources of Table I on p alay were scattered available

numbers of the Philippine Magazine . Graphs 1 and 2 were prepared

from information contained in the "Rice Supplement" of the

Philippines Herald for October 1, 1949. Graphs 3-17 are re­

produced from Economic Indicators, published by the Central Bank

of the Philippines, Manila, 1949. This latter public at io n was

prepared by the Department of Economic Research whose director

is Leonides S. Virata. Members of this Department arei Horacio

C. Lava, Economist; Cesar M. Lorenzo, Chief Statistician, and

R. Marino Corpus, Economist. This publication states that the

statistical sources used were reports of government bureaus and

offices; "statistics on cost of living index are obtained f r o m

the Bureau of Census and Statistics, with 1941 as the base year

shifted by the Central Bank to 1937 b a s e . ” Wit h regard to units

used, it states: "in consonance with the practice of the

United Nations, all index numbers are p u b l i s h e d ...w i t h 1937 as

base period. Gregorian calendar years and months are used.

Data for fiscal years ending June 30 are properly noted....

Owing to the rounding of numbers, totals do not always tally

w it h their component parts."

W it h regard to the series used by the Central Bank, the

p ublication stated that "in computing the wholesale price index,

the fo ll o w i n g products were taken into consideration: for

 531

export--copra resecada, coconut oil, hemp, almaciga, logs, lumber,

maguey, tobacco, and gum elemi; for domestic consumption products

--palay, rice, sugar, corn, mongo, peanuts and rattan. The

index of wholesale prices are of the weighted aggregative type.

The indexes are still preliminary and are subject to r e v i s i o n . ”

W i t h regard to the cost of living index, in Graph 13, the Bank

states that it is "for Manila only." "There are no indexes for

other cities as yet." With regard to retail prices, it states:

"The 'over-all' index of retail prices of strategic commodities

in Manila is the geometric mean of all the price relatives of

commodities quoted by the Bureau of Commerce. About 100 com­

modities are included in the index."

The Central Bank estimates the average number of persons

in a Manila family at 4.9. "The following weights were used in

computing the 'over-all* index: before 1947: F o o d s t u f f s - -59.15,

House rent--8.43, C lo th i n g - -0*62, Fuel, Light, W a t e r - - 1 3 .94, and

M i s c e l l a n e o u s - - 1 7 .86; from and after 1947: Foo ds tu ff s- -6 3. 43,

House fient--11.96, Cloth in g --2.04, Fuel, Light Water--7.73, and

Miscellaneous--14.84.

With regard to material contained in Gr aph 17, the Bank

states: "The term Gross National Product as understood in the

computation of the National Income is the market value of the

output of goods and services produced by the nation's economy

before deducting allowances for depreciation, maintenance and

obsolescence. The nation's economy in this instance refers to

labor and property supplied by the residents of the nation."

 532

It thus appears that the Bank has adopted the disastrous

"National Income" t h e o r y of Keynes and U.S. Government theorists.

Wage rates refer to a daily wage "derived from pay rolls

of commercial manufacturing and mining firms in Manila and

represent the average rates of pay of all classes of workers in

each group." The "money wage rate is the weighted average

monetary wage rate of eac h group of laborers." The real wage

"is obtained by using the cost of living index as deflators."

Tables 1 and 2 on fisheries were secured through courtesy

of Director Villadolid and Mr. Jose R. Montilla of the Bureau of

Fisheries. Tables I-VII were given the author by Dr. Juan

Salcedo, Jr. of the Philippine Institute of Nutrition. Graphs

18-20 were adapted from information contained in. The Sunday Times

for June 8, 1947, the Annual Report on Child and Y o ut h W e l f a r e .

1 9 4 8 . United Nations Department of Social Affairs, and the

Annual Report of the Social Welfare C o m m i s s i o n . Manila (Welfarevill

1948. Graph 21 was taken from the Manila Tine s Midweek R e v i e w .

December 27, 1950, page 6.

The map on climate is reproduced from Climate of the

P h i l i p p i n e s . published by the Department of A griculture and

Commerce, 1939; the two maps on Philippine fishing were supplied

by Mr. Jose R. Montilla of the Bureau of Fisheries.

 B I B L I O G - R A P H Y

BOOKS

Abaya, Hernando J. Betrayal in the P h i l i p p i n e s . New York:

A.A. VVyn. , 1946, 272 pp.

Abelarde, Pedro IS. American Tariff Policy Towards the P hi l i p ­

pines: 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 4 6 . New York: King's Crown Press,
1947, 233 pp.

Abend, Hallett. Reconquest. Garden City: Doubleday, 1946,

305 pp.

Aldana, Benigno. The Educational System of the P h i l i p p i n e s .

Manila: The Univ er si ty Publishing Co., 1949, 453 pp.

Alejandrino, Jose. The Price of F re edom (La Senda Del

S a c r i f i c i o ) . translated from the Spanish by Jose Pi.
Alejandrino. Manila: Author (?), 1949, 236 pp.

Alvero, Aurelio S. (M. Asa). Moo n Shadows on the W a t e r s . P re ­

face by J.J. Siler. 2nd edition. Manila: Par Eastern
Publishing Co., 1950, 185 pp.

Alvero, R.L. Sevilla de. Critica Sobre El Actual Sistema

Educacional en P i l i p i n a s . Ph. D. dissertation, Sto.
Tomas University, 1935. Manila: Imprenta de Santo
Tomas, 1936, 218 pp.

American-Philippine Trade R e l a t i o n s . TC-1. Report of the

Technical Committee to the President of the Philippines.
Washington D.C. : n.p. 1944, 255 pp. (Iviimeo.).

Anderson, William. ■‘■'he Philippine P r o b l e m . N.Y.: G.P. P u t n a m ’s

Sons, 1939, 338 pp.

A ng 25 Pinakamabuting Maikling K at hang Pilipino ng 1 9 4 5 . (25

Best Filipino Short Stories of 1943). Selected by a
special committee in short stories under the general
direction of G. Kin-iti Isikawa, General editor of
"Philippine Publications," and G. Jose Esperanza
Cruz, Manila: Philippine Publications, 1944, 255 pp.

A n g P i l i p i n o . A d u l t Education in the Philippines. Social

Justice Series (No. 4). Manila? Dep ar tm en t of Public
Instruction, 1940, 107 pp. (in Tagalog, Illus.}.
("On the occasion of the F i f th A nn iv er sa ry of the Common­
w ealth of the Philippines").

533
 534

Arguilla, Manuel E . , Esteban Nedruda, Teodoro Agoncillo (eds.),

Literature Under the C o m m o n w e a l t h . Manila: Philippine
W r i t e r s ’ League, 1940, 131 pp.

Aruego, Jose M. The Framing of the Philippine C o n s t i t u t i o n .

2 Vols., Manilas University Pu blishing Co., 1936,
1094 pp.

_________ . International Documents for the Philippines: Treaty

Series No. 1 . M a n i l a : Uni ve rs it y P u bl i sh in g Co.,
1948, 187 pp.

A sian R e l a t i o n s . Being Report of the Proceedings and D o c u m e n t a ­

tion of the First As ian Relations Conference, New
Delhi, March-April, 1947, New Delhi: Asian Relations
Organization, 1948, 314 pp.

A Survey of the Educational System of the Philippine I s l a n d s .

By the Board of Educational Survey created under Acts
3162 and 3196 of the Philippine Legislature. Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 1925, 677 pp. ("The Monroe Report.").

Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the A merican

P e o p l e . 3rd Edition. New York; F.S. Crofts & Co.,
1946, 937 pp.

Ball, W. Macmahon. Japan: Enemy or A l l y ? N e w York. John

Day and IPR, 1948, 224 pp.

Banas, Raymundo C. Brief Historical Sketches of Philippine

Catholic C h u r c h e s . Manila: Commonwealth Press, Inc.
1 9 3 7 , 9 2 p p .

B a q a i , I.E. Books on A s i a . A Bibliography. New Delhi:

Indian Council of World Affairs, 1947, 111 pp.

Bartlett, Ruhl J. (ed.). The Record of American D i p l o m a c y .

N e w York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947, 731 pp.

Barton. Roy F. Hie Half-Way Sun. N e w York: Brewer & Warren.

1930, 315 pp.

______ . The K a l i n g a s ; Their Institutions and Custom Law.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949, 275 pp.

Bausor, Sydney C., and Teodulo Protomartir. Glimpses of the

P h i l i p p i n e s . Omaha, Nebraska: Lensor Publ is hi ng Co.,
1948, 57 pp.

Bazaco, E. Historla Documentado Del Real Coleglo de San Juan

de Letran. Manila: Santo Tomas Press, 1933. 282 pp.
 535

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. A Diplomatic History of the United S t a t e s .

Rev. ed. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1942, 934 pp.

Bergsmark, Daniel R. Economic Geography of A s i a . New York:

P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Inc., 1944, 618 pp.

Bernstein, David. The Philippine S t o r y . New York: Farrar,

Straus, Inc., 1947, 27 6 pp.

Beukema, Herman, and Geer, Willi am M., et a l . Contemporary

Foreign G o v e r n m e n t s . Ne w York: Rinehart & Co., 1946,
3 62 p p .

Bierce, Ambrose. The D e v i l ’s D i c t i o n a r y . New York: World

Publishing Co., 1942, 376 pp.

Bisson, T.A. Amer ic an Policy in the Far East; 1951-1940.

I.P.R. Inquiry Series. New York: IFR, 1939, 146 pp.

_________ . A m e r i c a ’s Far Eastern P o l i c y . I.P.R. Inquiry Series.

New York: "The MacL'illan Co., 1945, 235 pp.

. J a p a n ’s War Economy. N ew York: IPR, distributed

by The Macmillan Co., 1945, 267 pp.

Blount, James H. The A merican Occupation of the P h i l i p p i n e s :

1 89 8 - 1 9 1 2 . New York; G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1913, 664 pp.

Boeke, J.H. The Interests of the Voiceless Far E a s t . Leiden:

Leiden University Press (Under the joint auspices of
the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Netherlands-
Netherlands Indies Council, IPR), 1948, 92 pp.

Bok, F. (Flaviano P. Boquecosa). Anf

g Palad ni P e p e . C’J o e 1s
Fate"). Manila: VIsayan Book Co., 1937, 320 pp.
(Novel in Visayan).

Buenafe, Manuel E. (ed.). The Voice of the Veteran. Manila:

Republic Promotion Publishers, 1946, 90 pp.

Buencamino, Victor. The National Rice and Corn Corporation.

Annual Report to the U.S. Department"”of the Interior,
Division of Territories and Island Possessions.
Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1940, 134 pp.

Bulosan, Carlos. America is In the Hea r t . New York: Harcourt,

Brace & Co., 1946, 326 pp.

Bufiag, Daniel M. and Lucretia Belting. Philippine Insect

Stories. Manila: Progressive Schoolbooks, 1937,
167 pp. Paper.
 536

Buss, Claude A. War and Diplomacy in Eastern A s i a . New Yorks

The Macmillan Co., 1941, 570 pp.

Bustos, Felixberto G. And Now Ccttnes R o x a s . Manila: C.Z.

Bustos & Sons, 1945, 253 pp.

_________., and Fajardo, Abelardo J. New Philippines. Manila:

Carmelo and Bauermann, Inc., 1934, 530 pp.

Cady, John F., Barnett, Patricia G., and Jenkins, Shirley.

The Development of Self-Rule and Independence in Burma,
Mal a y a , and the Philippines. New York: Institute of
Pacific Relations, 1948, 104 pp. (Mimeo.).

Calderon, Sofronio G. Mga Alamat Ng Pilipinas. (Philippine

Mythology, Traditions and Legends;. Manila: M. Colcol
& Co., 1947, 95 pp.

_________. Ang Mga Kawikaan. (Philippine Proverbs). Manila:

M. Colcol & Co., 1947, 97 pp.

Camus, Jose 5. Rice in the Ph i l ippines. Department of Agri-

Culture and Natural Resources, Bureau of Agriculture,
Bulletin No. 5 7 . Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1921,
87 pp.

Carter, T.D., J.E. Hill, G.H.H. Tate: Mammals of the Pacific

World. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945, 227 pp.

Castillo, Andres. Philippine Economics. Manila: Author, 1949,

778 pp.

Certain Phases of Philippine Relief and Rehabilitati o n . TC-2

Report of the Technical Committee to the President of
the Philippines. Washington, D . C . : n.p., October,
1944, 194 pp. (Mimeo.).

Chapman, James and Ethel. Escape to the H i l l s . Lancaster,

Pennsylvania: The Jaques Cattell Press, 1947, 247 pp.

Chunn, Calvin Ellsworth (Ed.). Of Rice and Mien. Rev.ed. Los

Angeles and Tulsa: Veterans1 Puolishing Co., 1947,
230 pp.

Clifford, Hugh: Further India. New York: Frederick A. Stokes

Co., 1904, 378 pp.

Clyde, Paul Hibbert. A History of the Modern and Contemporary

Far E a s t . New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1937, 858 pp.

_________• The Far E a s t : A History of the Impact of the West

on Eastern A s i a . New York: Prentice-Hall, 1948, 862 pp.
 537

Cohen, Jerome B. J a p a n ’s E conomy in War and R e c o n s t r u c t i o n .

Minneapolis: U ni versity of Minnesota Press, under
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 538

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 539

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 542

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 543

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 545

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________ . Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics, Studies

in Land Utilization and Agricultural Colonization in
Southeastern A s i a . New York: Institute of Pacific
Relations, in cooperation with the American Geographi­
cal Society of New York, 1945, 290 pp.
 549

Perkins, Dexter. The Evolution of American Foreign Pol i c y .

New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, 187 pp.

Philippine Business Guidebook: 1 9 4 9 . Man i l a : Chamber of

Commerce of the Philippines, 1949, 380 pp.

Philippine Economic Association, The. The .lieo non ic Problems

of the Philippines. Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1934, 270 pp.

Philippine Economic Survey Commission. Philippine Agriculture

and Industrial Development Program. Revised, 19 50.
Manila: Bookman, Inc., 1950, 516 pp.

Phillips, Claire and Myron B. Goldsmith. Manila Espionage.

Portland, Oregon: Binfords and Mort. 1947, 226 pp.

Pillai, P.P. Labour in South East A s i a . A Symposium. New

Delhi: Indian Council of world Affairs, 1947, 277 pp.

Poblador, Filemon. Philippine Chronology: January 1 to July

5, 1946. Manila: Philippine Liberal Publishing Co.,
1946, 155 pp.

Porter, Catherine Lucy. Crisis in the Philippines. New York:

Knopf, 1942, 156 pp.

Postwar Problems of Migration. Papers presented at the Round

Table on Population Conference of the Iviilbank Memorial
Fund, October 29-30, 1946. New York: I,ilbank
Memorial Fund, 1947, 173 pp.

Pratt, Fletcher. The Marines* W a r . New York; William Sloane,

1948, 456 pp.

Preger, W. Dutch Administration in the Netherlands Indies.

Melbourne. F.W. Cheshire Pty., Ltd., 1944, 119 pp.

President of the Philippine Commonwealth. Budget for the

Fiscal Year 1941. Submitted to the National Assembly,
February 6, 1940. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1940,
721 pp.

Proposed Program for Industrial Rehabilitation and Development

of the Republic of the Philippines. (’’The Beys ter
Report’1). Prepared by the Technical Staff of the
National Development Company, under the supervision of
the fl.E. Beyster Corporation, Detroit. Manila:
October 28, 1947, variously paged.

Quezon, Manuel Luis. The Good F i g h t . New York: D. Appleton-

Century Co., 1946, 336 pp.
 550

Quirino, Carlos. The Great Malayan. Manila: Philippine

Education Co., 1949, 317 pp.

Quirino, Sliseo (ed.). The Nepa Handbook. Manila: National

Economic Protectionism Association, 1938, 211 pp.

Recto, Claro M. Monroismo Asiatico (Articulos de polemica)

y Otros ensayos. Manila: Imprenta de Juan Fajardo,
1929, 133 pp.

____ . The Law of Belligerent Occupation. (With particular

reference to the Japanese occupation of the Philip­
pines) and the Effect of the Change of Sovereignty on
the Commonwealth Treason Law. Submitted to the Supreme
Court of the Philippines, in support of oral argument,
Manila: Author, 1946, 434 pp.

________ . A Word More on the Law of Belligerent Occupation,

etc"! (Being a Refutation of the Government’s
Contentions.). Manila: Author, 1946, 177 pp.

Three Years of Enemy Occupation. The Issue of

Political Collaboration in the Philippines. Manila:
People's Publishers, 194 6, 189 pp.

________ . Validity of Occupation Payments Made to the

Liquidator of |TEnemy™ B a n k s . Vol". 1*1 Manila: General
Printing Press, April 29, 1947, 242 pp.

________ . Vol. II. (Reprinted from the Counter-Reply Memo­

randum....). Manila: General Printing Press, July
2, 1947, 86 pp.

Report of the Committee on Reorganization of Governtre nt-Owned

or Controlled Corporations. Manila: August 18, 1950,
239 p p ., (Mimeo.).

Report on Destruction of Manila and Japanese Atrocities.

Washington, D.C.: Office of the Resident Commissioner
of the Philippines to the United States, February,
194 5, 114 pp.

Report of the Special Mission to the United States: 1938-1959.

Submitted to President Manuel L. Quezon by Vice
President Sergio Osmeha, November 1, 1939. Manila;
Bureau of Printing, 1939, 334 pp.

Report of the Working Group for Asia and the Far East. By
the Temporary Sub-Commission on Economic Reconstruc­
tion of Devastated Areas. United Nations Econo­
mic and Social Council. Lake Success: March 4,
1947, 42 pp.
 551

Rizal, Jose. The Reign of Greed (El Flllbusterlsmo), translated

from the Spanish by Charles E. Derbyshire. Second r e ­
vised edition. Manilas Philippine Education Co., Inc.,
1949, 367 pp.

_________. The Social Cancer (Noli Me Tangere), translated from

the Spanish by Charles E. Derbyshire. Second revised
edition. Manila: Philippine Education Co., Inc., 1949,
502 pp.

Robequain, Charles. Le Monde Malals. Peninsule Malaise, Sumatra,

Java, Borneo, Celebes, Bali et les Petites lies de la
Sonde, Moluques, Philippines. Paris: Payot, 1946, 510 pp.

Romulo Carlos Pefia. I Saw the Fall of the Philippines. Garden

City: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1943, 323 pp.

_________. Mother A m e r i c a s A Living Story of Democracy. Garden

City: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1943, 234 pp.

_________. I See the Philippines Rise. New York: Doubleday,

1946, 273 pp.

. My Brother Americans. New York: Doubleday, Doran &

Co., 1945, 212 pp.

Roosevelt, Nicolas. The Philippines: A Treasure and a Problem.

New York: J.H. Sears & Co., Inc., 1926, 315 pp.

Roy,D.N. The Philippines and India. Manila: Author, 1930,

2 1 1 "pp. (with an Introduction by Rafael Palma.).

Rubens, Doris. Bread and R i c e . New Yorks Thurston Macauley

Associates, 1947, 235 pp.

Russell, Charles Edward and E.B. Rodriguez. The Hero of the

Filipinos. The Story of Jose Rizal Poet, Patriot and
Martyr. New York: The Century Co., 1923, 392 pp.

Schurman, J. Gould. Philippine Affairs. A Retrospect and Out­

look. New York: Charles Scri b n e r ’s Sons, 1902, 109 pp.

Schurz, Wm. Lytle. The Manila Galleon. New York: E.P. Dutton
& Co., 1939, 453 pp.

Second Yearbook of the Philippine Council in Education. (1937),

The. Manila: 1937, 120 pp.

Security in the Pacific. A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Con­

ference of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Hot
Springs, Virginia, January 6-17, 1945. New York: IPR,
1945, 169 pp.
Semple, Ellen C. Influences of Geographic Environment. New
York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911, 683 pp.

Sevilla, Jose N., and Paul R. Verzosa, Ang Aklat ng Tagalog.

("The Pioneer Bilingual Text-book on Tagalog Philology
and Literature")* Manila: Imprenta y Librerias de
J. Martinez, 1923, 108 pp.

Sexton, William T. Soldiers in the Philippines: A History of

the Insurrection. Published in 1939 as Soldiers in
the S u n . Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1944,
246 pp. Paper.

Sinco, Vicente G. A Primer of the Philippine Constitution.

Manila: Community Publishers, 1935, 27 4 pp.

________ . Philippine G o v e r m e n t and Politics for Liberal Arts

Courses. (revised). M a n i l a : Community” Fubl Ishers,
194-7, 192 pp.

Smith, Warren D. Geology and Mineral Resources of the Philip­

pine Islands. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1924,
559 pp. (Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, Bureau of science Publication No. 19.
A c t u a l l y p r i n t e d April 20, 1925.)

Soliven, Benito T. Parliamentary Law, Procedure and Forms and

Legislative Technique in the Philippines. Hani1a :
Author, 1941, 149 pp.

St. John, Joseph P. Leyte Calling. As told to Howard

Handleman. New York: Vanguard Press, 1945, 220 pp.

Sta. Romana, Osmundo 0. The Best Filipino Short Stories.

Manila: Wightman Printing Co., Inc., 1935, 151 pp.

Stamp, L. Dudley. Chisholm*s Handbook of Commercial Geography

(Re-written edition). London: Longmans, Green" & Co.,
1937, 884 pp.

Stevens, Prederic II. Santo Tomas Internment Camp: 1942-1945.

Limited Private Edition, New York(?): Stratford House,
Inc., 1946, 569 pp.

Stevens, Joseph Earle. Yesterda:rs in the Philippines. New

York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1898, 232 pp.

Storey, Moorfield and Marcial P. Lichauco. The Conquest of

the Philippines by the U.S.: 1898-1925. New York:
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1926, 274 pp.

Stuntz, Homer C. The Philippines and the Pnar East. Cincinnati:

Jennings and Pye, 1904, 514 pp.
 553

Subido, Abelardo. The Term of Office of Civil Service Officers

and Employees. Manila: Editorial Services, 1950,
230 pp.

_________., and Tarrosa Subido. Two Voices. Manila: The

Manila Post Publishing Co., 1945, 104 pp.

Tate, O.H.H. Mammals of Eastern A s i a . New York: The Macmillan

C o ., 1947, 366 p p .

Taylor, Carl K. Odyssey oT the Islands. New York; Charles

Scribner's Sons, 1936, 284 pp.

Ter Haar, B. Adat Law in Indonesia. (Translated by George C.O.

Haas and Margaret HordykTTT Edited with an Introduc­
tion by i£. Adamson Hoebel and A. Arthur Schiller. New
York: Institute of Pacific Relations, in cooperation
with the Southeast Asia Institute, 1948, 255 pp.

Thompson, Virginia. Labor Problems in Southeast A s i a . New

Haven: Yale University Press, under the auspices of
the IPR, 1947, 283 pp.

Thompson, Warren S. Population Problems. New York: McGraw-

Hill Book Co., 1942, -471 pp.

_________. Population and Peace in the Pacific. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1946, 397 pp.

Umali, Agustin P. Guide to the Classification of Fishing Gear

in the Philippines. Research Report 17, Fish and
Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of the Interior.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. (Government Printing Office,
1950, 165 pp.

United Nations, Department of Social Affairs: Annual Report

on Child and Youth Welfare. Lake S\iccess: 1948, 236 pp.

United Nations. Non-Self-Governing Territories - 1947. Lake

Success: 1948, 509 pp.

_________. Non-Self-Governing Territories - 1948. Lake S u c c e s s :

1949, 686 pp.

United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands.

The First Report... covering the Period From November
15. 1955, to December 31. 1 9 3 6 . Washington, D.C.:
U.S. (Government Printing Office, 1937, 138 pp.

_________. The Second Annual Report... covering the Calendar

Year 1957 with a Review of the Government Finances
for the Years 1955. 1936. and 1 9 5 7 . Manila: September
1, 1938. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1939, 184 pp.
 554

________ . Third Annual Report...covering the Calendar Year

1958 and the First Six months of 1959. Mani1a :
October 1, 1940. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1945, 197 pp.

Fourth Annual Report... covering the Fiscal Year

July 1. 1939 to June 50. 1940. Manila: September
1, 1941. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1945, 270 pp.

________ . Fifth Annual R e p o r t ... covering the Fiscal Year

Ending June 50. 1 9 4 1 . 'Washington, D.C.; July 51,
1942. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1943, 147 pp.

_________. Sixth Annual Rep o r t ... covering the Fiscal Year

July 1. 1941 to June 30. 1942. ’ W ashington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943, 228 pp.

_________. Seventh and Final Report... covering the Period

From September 14. 1945, to July 4. 1 9 4 6 . Washing­
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947,
181 p p .

Utinsky, Margaret. “Miss U Tt. San Antonio, Texas: The Naylor

Co., 1948, 172 pp.

Venkatassubbiah, H. Asia in the Modern World. New D e l h i :

Asian Relations Conference, Indian Council of World
Affairs, 1947, 118 pp.

Villa, Jose Garcia. Many Voices. Manila: Philippine Book

Build, 1938, 206 pp.

Villamor, Gayetano IVi. Filipino Courage and Heroism. Cebu City:

The Villamor Publishing House, 1947, 200 pp. Paper.

________ . Senator Cuenco As I Know H i m . Cebu City: The

Villamor Publishing House, 1947, 136 pp. Paper.

________ . Ang Gugma sa Mga Bantugang Lider (The Love of

Famous Leaders). Cebu City: The Villamor Publishing
House, 1948, 200 pp. Paper.

________ . Quezon, Patriyotang Palaran, (Quezon, the Gifted

Patriot). Cebu City: The Villamor Publishing House,
1948, 219 pp. Illus. Paper.

_________. Mga Buruka Sa Yuta (The Agrarian Troubles). Cebu

City: The Villamor Publishing House, 1949, 220 pp.
Illus. Paper.

________ . Pillars of Strength. Cebu City: The Villamor

Publishing House, 1949, 208 pp. Index, Illus. Paper.
 ktc;
u Jc
O;

_________. Criminal Procedure and Legal F o r m s . Cebu City:

The Villamor Publishing House, 1950, 228 pp. Paper.

________ . Mga Sugilanon sa Karaang Panahon (Stories of

Ancient Times). Cebu City: The Villamor Publishing
House, 1950, 208 pp. Illus. Paper.

_________. Osmefla Luba sang Llder (Osmena The Seasoned Leader) .

Cebu City: The Villamor Publishing House, 1950,
180 pp. Illus. Paper.

_________. Your Town Officials and Their Du t i e s . Cebu City:

The Villamor Publishing House, 1950, 208 pp. Paper.

Vincent, John Carter, et a l . A m e r i c a ’s Future in the Pacific.

New Brunswick, N.J.: Kutgers University Press, 1947,
247 pp.

Viray, Manuel A. (ed.). Heart of the Island. Manila; Uni­

versity Publishing Co., 1947, 159 pp.

Vlekke, Bernard H.lvl. Nusantara. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press, 1943, 439 pp.

Mar and Peace in the Pacific. A Preliminary Report of the

Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Rela­
tions on Martin© andPost-War Cooperation of the
United Nations in the Pacific and the Par East.
Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4-14, 1942. New
York: IPR, 1943, 164 pp.

Weinstein, Alfred A. Barbed-Wire Sur.geon. New York: The

Macmillan Co., 1948, 310 pp.

Weissblatt, Franz J. (ed.). W h o ’s Who in the Philippines,

1936-1937. Vol. I. Manila: McCullough Printing Co.,
1937, 175 pp.

Wentworth, Edna Clark, Filipino Plantation Workers in Hawaii.

Studies of the Pacific, No. 7, International Research
Series of the IPR. New York: IPR, 1941, 245 pp.

Wilcox, Harry. The White Stranger - Six Moons in Celebes.

London: Collins, 1949, 384 pp.

Williams, Benjamin Ii. American Diplomacy: Policies and

Practice. New York: Me Draw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1956,
517 pp. —

Williams, D.R. The United States and the Philippines. Garden

City: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1925, 335 pp.
 556

Wilson, Laurence L. Apayao Life and Legends. Baguio: Author,

1947, 195 pp.

Ilcngot Life and Legends. Baguio: Author, 1947,

190 pp.

Winstedt, Sir Richard. The Malays: A Cultural History. (Rev.ed.).

London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950, 19.8 pp.

Wolfert, Ira. American Guerrilla in the Philippines. New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1945, 301 pp.

Wood, Gordon L. and Patricia McBride. The Pacific Basin. A

Human and Economic Geography. 3rd Edition. Melbourne:
Oxford University Press, 1950, 393 pp.

Woodward, G.V. The Battle for Leyte Gulf. Hew York: Macmillan,
1947, 244 pp.

Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present. One

Volume edition, edited by J.R. Hayden. Lev/ York: The
Macmillan Co., 1930, 862 pp.

_________. The Philippines Past and Present. 2 Vols. (New

edition"). New York: The Macmillan Co., 1914, 1024 pp.

‘
Wright, Philip G. The American Tariff and Oriental Trade.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931, 177 pp.

Yabes, Leopoldo Y. A Brief Survey of Iloko Literature. From

the Beginning to Its Present Development, with a Biblio­
graphy of Works Pertaining to the Iloko People and
Their Language. Manila: Author, 1936, 155 pp.

Younghusband, G.J. The Philippines and Round A b o u t . New York;

The Macmillan Co., 1899, 230 pp.

Zulueta da Costa, R. Like the Molave and Other Poems.

Introduction by S. P . Lopez. Ma n i l a : Author, 1940,
100 pp.
 557

Of some value for quick reference; to be used with caution.

Abiva Publishing House: Outline of Oriental History. Enlarged

Edition. Manila: 1950, 189 pp.

________ . Outline of Philippine History. Enlarged Edition,

Manila: 1949, 170 pp.

Alip, Eufronio M. Tagalog Literature: A His torico-Critlcal

Study. Manila: University of Santo Tomas Press,
1930, 164 pp.

________ . Philippine Government: Origin, Development, Organi­

zation, and Functions. Manila: Author, 1938, 450 pp.

________ . Philippine History. Political, Social, Economic.

CBased on the Course of Study of the Bureau of Public
Schools). 4th revised edition. Manila: Alip and
Brion Publications, Inc., 1948, 457 pp.

________ , Political and Cultural History of the Philippines.

(Since the British~Occupation}, M a n i l a : Alip and
Brion Publications, Inc., 1949, 354 pp.

________ Political and Cultural History of the Philippines.

(VoT~, Ti Since Time Began to British Occupation).
Manila: Alip and Brion Publications, 1950, 348 pp.

Eohol, Ernesto D. Outline on Oriental History. Manila:

Bohol Colleges, 1949, 227 pp.

_________. Outline on Philippine History. Manila: .Bohol

Colleges, 1948, 195 pp.

Eckel, Paul E. The Far East Since 1500. New York: Harcourt,
Brace. 1947, 820 pp.

Lynip, Louise G. On Good Ground. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm.

B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1946, 149 pp.

Philippine Book Company. Outline of Oriental History. Manila:

1949, 126 pp.

_________. An Outline of Oriental History. (High School

Outline Series). M a n i l a : 1949, 265 pp.

________ . An Outline of Philippine History. (High School

Outline Series). Manila: 1949, 201 pp.

_________. An Outline of Philippine Social Life and Progress.

(High School Outline Series). ManilaV 1949” 263. pp.
 558

________ . An Outline of Philippine Government. (High School

Outline Series). Manila: 1950, 2 3 2 pp.

________ . Outline of Philippine History. Manila: 1950,

235 pp.

Zaide, Gregorio F. The Philippine Commonwealth. Manilaj

Author, October, 1938, 15 pp.

_________. The Philippines Since the British Invasion. Manila:

R.P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1949, 507 pp.

________ , and Arturo M. Tolentino. The Government of the

Republic of the Philippines: Origin, Development, Organ­
ization and Functions. Manila: R.P. Garcia Publishing
Co., 1948, 415 pp.
 559

PAMPHLETS AND OTHER MATERIALS

A Critical Analysis of the Proposed 1939 Constitutional

Amendments. Manilas Liga Constitucional," Novem­
ber 15, 1939, 48 pp. (Contains speech of Juan
Sumulong, October 22, 1939: "The Two-Party System
as the Mainstay of Constitutional Government"; speech
of Jose Alejandrino, same date: "For a Rational
Interpretation of the Constitution"; speech of Bishop
Gregorio Aglipay, same date: "Reject the Proposed
Amendments"; four resolutions approved at this meeting
sponsored by the League, and one resolution adopted by
the Young Philippines Party, November 1, 1939, xvi pp.)
A New Nation is Born: "The Republic of the Philippines."
Filipino Bulletin. Special Philippine Independence
Edition, Honolulu, T.H.: July, 1946, 140 pp.
A Survey of Reconstruction Problems and Needs. United Nations,
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.
Annexes to Document E/CN. 11/39. November, 1947.
Philippine Republic. Annex "L", 41 pp., (Mimeo.).
Abella y Casariego, Enrique, Jose De Vera y Gomez and
Anacleto Del Rosario y Sales. Estudio Descrlptlvo
de Algunos Manantlales Mlnerales de Flliplnas. Manila:
Administracion Civil, 1893, 156 pp.
Addresses Before the Assembly of Greater East-Aslatlc Nations.
Tokyo: Ministry of Greater East-Aslatlc Affairs,
November, 1943, 65 pp. in English, 97 pp. in Japanese.
Address of His Excellency Egldio Vagnozzl. Archbishop of Mira.
Apostolic Delegate to the Philippines" Delivered to:
The Knights of Columbus, November 30, 1949, Manila.
Printed by the Delegate's Office. This address was
refused space in Manila Newspapers, apparently at the
request of various Knights, (unpaged).
Administration Presents Its Record. The. (Roxas) Record from
May ^8, 1946 to October 4. 1947. Manila: The Liberal
Party (Bureau of Printing), 1947, 36 pp.
Ahern, George P. The Uses of Philippine Woods. Department of
Interior, Bureau ofForestry, Bulletin No. 11. Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 1912, 50 pp.

Aldana, Benigno V. "Curriculum Development of the Public Schools,"

Reprint of Chapter VII of Education in the Philippines,
edited by Antonio Isidro, and others. Manila: University
of the Philippines, 1939, pp. 163-184.
 560

Alicante, Marcos M., et. al. Soli Conservation and Our

Republic. Manilas Bureau of Printing, 1948, 43 pp.
American^Philippine Trade Relations. TC-1. Summary of the
Report of the Technical Committee to the President of
the Philippines. Washington, D.C.: n.p., October,
1944, 12 pp., (Mimeo.).
Annual Report for the Year 1939. Mineral Resources, Inc.,
Myers Building, Manilas February 26, 1940, unpaged.
Apostol, Jose P. Some Effects of the War on the Philippines.
Tenth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations,
Philippine Papers No. 2 . Manila: Philippine Council,
I.P.R., 1947, 16 pp.
________. "The Economic Policies of the United States in
Their Effect on the Philippines." Prepared for the
Sixth Conference of I.P.R., Yosemite Park, California,
August 15 to 29, 1936. Philippine Council Papers q-No. 3.
Manilas Philippine Council, IPR, 1936, IS pp.,(Mimeo.).
Aruego, Jose M. Constitution of the Republic of the Philip-
pines. (Being the original Constitution with the
Amendments integrated therein and with notes.) Manila:
University Publishing Co., Inc., 1947, 32 pp.
Asian Relations Conference. Documents prepared for and
published under the auspices of the Indian Council of
World Affairs. New Delhis March, 1947. (Mimeo.)•:
"Cooperation Among Aslan Countries in Agricultural
Research," By J.N. Mukerjee, 10 pp.
"Cooperative Economic Development of Asian Countries,”
By P.S. Narayan Prasad, 31 pp.
"Cultural Problems of India and East Asia." By O.C.
Gangoly, 6 pp.
"Demographic Trends In Asian Countries." By B.
Ramamurti, 18 pp.
"Filipino Women and the Progress of the Nation." By
Paz Pollcarpio-Mendez, 21 pp.
"Freedom Movement In South-East Asia." The Gokhale
Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona, 56 pp.
"Freedom of Press in the Philippines." By Mauro Mendez,
12 pp.
"Peasant Economy in the Middle East and Southeast Asia."
K.6. Slvaswamy, 12 pp.
"Philippine National Economy." Anastaclo P. de Castro,
12 pp.
"Racial Problems in the Philippine s." Manuel S. Enverga,
14 pp.
Asuncion, Silvestre. The Growing of Sugar Cane in the Philip­
pines . Bureau of Agriculture, Circular No. 167, Manilaji
Bureau of Printing, 1926, 20 pp., 8 plates.
 561

Bailey, Thomas A. America’s Foreign Policies. Past and

Present. Headline Books No. 46. New York: ^reign
Policy Association, 1943, 96 pp.
Beyer, H. Otley. "Outline Review of Philippine Archaeology
By Islands and Provinces." Separate froms The
Philippine Journal of Science. Vol. 77, Nos. 3 and 4
(July-August, 1947), Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1949, pp. 205-374.
________. Early History of Philippine Relations with Foreign
Countries. Especially 6hlna. (Originally printed as
an "Historical Introduction", to E. Arsenio Manuel's
Chinese Elements in the Tagalog Language. Manila,
1948)• Manila: National Printing Co., April, 1948,
17 pp.
________. Origin Myths Among the Mountain Peoples of the
Philippines. Reprinted from fee Philippine Journal of
Science. Vol. VIII, No. 2, Sec. D, General Biology,
Ethnology and Anthropology, April,1913. Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 1913, pp. 85-117.
________ . Philippine and East Aslan Archaelogy. and Its Rela­
tion to the Origin of the Pacific Islands Population.
Reprinted from the National Research Council of the
Philippines, Bulletin No. 29, pp. 1-130. Quezon City:
December, 1943.
________ . Philippine Tektites and the Tektite Problem in
General. From the Smithsonian Report for 1942, pp.
253-260. (Publication 3715). Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1943.
________• Population of the Philippine Islands in 1916.
English-Spanish edition. Manila: Philippine Education
Co., Inc., 1917, 95 pp.
________. Supplementary Illustrations to the "Outline Review
of Philippine Archaeology By Islands and Provinces.111
Supplement No. 1 Manila: Author, 1949, 18 pp., 18 plates.
________. The Non-Christian People of the Philippines.
"Separate from the Census of the Philippine Islands:
1918, Volume Two." Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1921,
pp. 907-957.

Bisson, T.A. American Policy in the Far East: 1931-1940. I.P.R.

Inquiry Series. New York: IPR, 1939, 146 pp.

Blake, Frank R. Selected List of Materials for the Study of the

Tagalog Language. New iTork: Southeast Asia Institute,
Language Series No. 4, 1947, 13 pp. (Mimeo.)•
 562

Blanco, Guillermo J. "Aquatic Resources of the Philippines."

Reprinted from On National Food Production Campaigi.
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1949, 11 pp.
Blanco, Pedro M. The Philippine Problem. A Compromise Proposal
for the Consideration of those in Favor and those
Against the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. Manila: Dominion
Government League, 1933, 30 pp.
The Philippine Problem: A Dispassionate and Non­
partisan Analysis of the realities of Philippine
Independence. Second edition, revised. Manila:
Dominion Government League, 1934, 32 pp.
Book of Needs. II. The. In Education. Science and Culture of
War-Devastated Countries. Paris: UNESCO, 1949, 140 pp.
Bulosan, Carlos (ed.). Chorus For America: Six Philippine
Poets. Los Angeles: Wagon and Star Publishers in
collaboration with H. Parker and Craftsmen, 1942, 39 pp.
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes For the Philippine Islands, The.
Circular of Information. Instructions for Field
Workers. The Museum of Ethnology, Natural History and
Commerce. Manila: December, 1901, 16 pp.
Burgos, Carlos X. Brief Notes on the Carabao. Bureau of Agri­
culture, Circular No. 184, Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1925, 5 pp.
Calip, Jose R. Iloko Ornaments. Manila: Author, 1938, 38 pp.
Caltex Official Philippine Motor Road and Touring Guide: 1948-
1949. 37th Edition. Formerly: "Official Philippine
Motor Road and Touring Guide." Published by Percy
Warner Tinan, in 1911 as the "Philippine Motor Car Blue
Book", later changed to "Mlchelin Guide.” As the
"Official" guide its value was recognlz0^ by the Japanese
in their invasion of 1941. Manila: Caltex (Philip­
pines) Inc., 1948, 218 pp.
Castillo, Andres. Economic Reconstruction Problems in the
Philippines. Tenth Conference of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, Philippine Paper No. 1 . Manila:
Philippine Council, I?R, 1947, 27 pp. (Mimeo.)•
"Catholic Hour" Pamphlets: 1940-1941. Manila: Chesterton
Evidence Guild, 1941. 25 pamphlets bound in one volume.

Cherian, T.O. Handbook of Aslan Statistics. New Delhi: Indian

Council of World Affairs, n.d., 73 pp., 28 tables.
 563

Clapp, Walter C. A Vocabulary of The Igorot Language as

Spoken by the Bontok Igorots. Bureau of Science, Division
of Ethnology Publications. Vol. V - Part III. Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 1908, 236 pp.
Clara, Feliciano M. Culture of Edible Mushrooms in the Philip­
pines. Bureau of Plant Industry Farmers* Circular No.
28. Manila: Department of Agriculture and bommeree,
Bureau of Printing, 1937, 19 pp.
________. Diseases of Tobacco (NIcotiana Tabacum L.) In the
Philippines. Bureau of Agriculture, Circular No. 171,
Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1926, 10 pp.
Clark, E.A. Peoples of the China Seas. Edited by M.S. Stewart.
"Cooperative Project between American Council, Institute
of Pacific Relations and Webster Publishing Co. St.
Louis: 1942, 94 pp.
Commercial and Trade Directory of the Philippines. 1948. "Third
year of Publication.* Manila: "Published Annually" by
The Islanders Publishing Co., 1948, variously paged,
224, 192, 350, 192 pp.
Commonwealth Progress. "Reference Materials to be used in class­
rooms and Public Meetings in Connection with the Annual
Celebration of the Commonwealth Anniversary on November
15." Manila: The Commonwealth Anniversary Committee,
1937, 18 pp.

Conklin, Harold C. Preliminary Report on Field Work on The

Islands of Mindoro and Palawan. Philippines. Reprinted
from American Anthropologist. Vol. 51, No. 2 (April-
June, 1949), pp. 268-273.
Constitution of the South East Asia League. Bangkok South-
East Asia League, September 8, 1947, 19 pp.
Craig, Austin: Gems of Philippine Oratory. "Selections Repre­
senting Fourteen Centuries of Philippine Thought, Care­
fully compiled from Credible Sources in Substitution
for Pre-Spanish Writings Destroyed by Missionary Zeal,
to Supplement the Later Literature Stunted by Intolerant
Religious and Political Censorship, and as Specimens of
the Untrammeled Present-Day Utterances." Manila: The
University of Manila, 1924, 96 pp.

________ . South and Eastern Asia From the Earliest Times to

the Present Day. Manila: The University of Manila,
1926, 80 pp.

Dalisay, Armando M. The Level of Public Spending and National

Prosperity. Manila! Philippine Council, IPR, 1950, 12 pp.
 564

Dalupan, Francisco. Modernize the Philippine Tax System.

Delivered before the Manila Rotary Club, August 31,
1950. Manilas Author, 1950, 12 pp.
Delgado, Francisco A. "Speech Against Compensatory Tax on
Coconut Oil," (Sec. 402, Revenue Bill of 1935), Satur­
day, August 24, 1935. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1935, 16 pp.
________. "Excerpts from the statement b y ...Resident Commis­
sioner to the United States from the Philippine Islands,
on May 16, 17 and 29, 1935, Before a House Sub-Commit­
tee on Agriculture, in Opposition to the Kleberg Bill
(H.R. 5587), which Proposes to Levy an Additional Tax
of 10 cents per Pound on Oleomargarine Containing
Foreign-Grown or Foreign-Produced Fats or Oil Ingredient."
Washington, D.C.ij U.S. Government Printing Office,
1935, 31 pp.
. Memorandum on the Policies of the Commonwealth
Government Regarding the Collaborators of the Japanese.
Presented to Hon. Tomas Confesor, Secretary of Interior,
Manila, April 3, 1945. Manilas n.p., 1945, 26 pp.

Djajadiningrat, Raden Loekman. From Illiteracy to University.

Educational Development in tlie Netherlands Indies.
Bulletin 3 of the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies
Council of IPR, Prepared for the Eighth Conference of
the IPR, Mont Tremblant, Canada, December, 1942. 68 pp.
Doryland, E.D. Green Manure, Soiling and Cover Crops. Bureau of
Agriculture, Circular No. 61, Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1925, 8 pp.
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Lake Success:
United Nations, Department of PublicInformation, 1949,
19 pp.
Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1948. Prepared by the
Secretariat of ECAFE. Lake Success: Department of
Economic Affairs, U.N., 1949, 289 pp.
Events Leading Up to World War II: Chronological History, 1931-
1944. 78 Congress, Second -Sevalon, House Document No.
541. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1945, 421 pp.
Fabia, Aniceto. The Development of the Teaching of History.
Civics, and Current Events in Philippine Schools.
Manila: Imprenta bDia Filipino", 1928, 76 pp.
Fansler, Dean S. Metrical Romances in the Philippines. "Re­
printed from The Journal of American Folk-Lore. Vol.
XXIX, No. CXII., April-June, 1916." Pp. &03-281.
 565

FAQ Community Series. Rice Bulletin No. 1 . Washington: Food

and Agricultural Organization of the UN, May 1948,
32 pp.
Far Eastern Culture and Society. Princeton University Bi­
centennial Conferences. Series 2, Conference 7.
Princeton, N.J., 1946, 35 pp.
Far Eastern Research In the United States. N.Y.j IPR, January,
19487 31 pp. (Mimeo.5•
Filipino Observer. The. Special edition (M.A. Roxas, Birthday
Celebration), Manila, January, 1948, 100 pp.
Final Act and Proceedings of the Baguio Conference of 1950.
Published by the Secretariat of the Baguio Conference
of 1950. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1950, 72 pp.

First Nutrition Conference of the Philippine Association of

Nutrition-! Villamor Hall, University of the Philip-
pines. November 21-22, 1947. Program and Messages.
30 pp.
Fish and Future of the Philippines. Gift of the Philippine
Fisheries Program, u7s. Fish and Wildlife Service.
Manila: American Embassy, USIS, March, 1949,
60 pp., (Mimeo.).
Foley, Walter Brooks. Democracy Expands in the East. Re­
printed by ’’The Committee for Philippine American
Cultural Relations," From the summer number, 1940,
of "Religion in Life."
Food and Agricultural Data for Selected Far East Countries.
Washington: U.S. DEpartment of Agriculture, November,
1947, 45 pp.
Fooklen Times Yearbook. The. 1949. A yearly supplement to
frhe Fooklen times. Manila, September, 1949, 44 pp.
English-Chinese.
. 1950. Manila: The Fooklen Times. September, 1950,
110 pp. English-Chinese.
Forbes, W. Cameron. Notes on Early History of Baguio. "Re­
printed from the Manila Daily Bulletin. 193&." (First
text page says "Reprinted from t!he ’’Baguio Bulletin").
Manila: Krledt Printing Company, 1933, 47 pp.
"Frequency Distribution of Offenses of Minors Admitted in the
Philippine Training Schools For Boys and Girls in 1945,
1946 and 1947." From The Annual Report of the Social
Welfare Commission. Welfareville: 1^48, unpaged.
 566

Galang, F.G. Cultural Directions For Cacao (TheobroiMi Cacao).

Bureau of Agriculture, Circular No. 12fe, Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 1926(?), 9 pp.
________. The Planting of Fruit Trees. Bureau of Agriculture*
Circular No. 180, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1926(?),
6 pp. Contains an excellent list of most Philippine
fruits.
Gallego, Manuel V. The Language Problem of the Filipinos.
Speech delivered...in the House of Representatives,
September 7 and 8, 1932. Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1932, 63 pp.
Garside, B.A. The Effects of the Slno-Japanese Conflict on
American Educational and Philanthropic Enterprises in
China: II. Higher Education. (A preliminary report}•
^For Private circulation only.” New York: IPR, Nov.
18, 1939, 12 pp. (Mimeo.)•
Gibson, lf.B. Skyways of the Pacific. IPR Pamphlets No. 27.
New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations,
1947, 48 pp.

Gourou, Pierre, Joseph E. Spencer and Glenn T. Trewartha. The

Development of Upland areas in the Far East. Vol. I.
New York: IPR, 1949, 82 pp.
Greene, Katrine R.C. "Transportation”, Part II of An Economic
Survey of the Pacific Area. Shanghai: IPR, 1941, 101 pp.
Grove, David L. and John Exter. The Philippine Central Bank
Act. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 1949, 36 pp.
Guerrilla Days in North Luzon. Camp Spencer, Liana, La Union:
USAFIP, NL (Volckmann’s Guerrilla Forces), Historical
Records Section, July, 1946, 123 pp.

Hainsworth, R. G., and R.T. Moyer. Agricultural Geography of

the Philippine Islands. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Depart­
ment of Agriculture, Office of Foreign Agricultural
Relations, 1945, 72 pp.
Hamm, Mbi. S. Purer Salt for the Philippines. Institute of
Science, October, 1949, Special Bulletin. In Coopera­
tion with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Manila:
Bureau of Prihting, 1949, 12 pp.

Handbook for Sarl-Sarl Store Owner. Prepared by: Bureau of

Commerce and Industry, Philippine Executive Commission.
Manila: 1942, 33 pp.
 567

Handbook For the Uae of Workers In Adult Education, Depart-

merit of Public Instruction, Office of Adult Education.
Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1937, 97 pp.
Heine-Geldern, Robert. Research on Southeast Asia: Problems
and Suggestions. Reprint from American Anthropologist.
April, 1946, pp. 149-175 "Based on a Memorandum
written for the Southeast Asia Institute describing
part of the Institute's research program." New York:
Southeast Asia Institute, 1946, 31 pp.
Hernandez, Amado V. Philippine Labor Demands Justice. Manilas
Pilipino, April, 1949, unpaged (13 pp. (Communist
material)•
________ . Progressive Philippines. Manila: Pilipino, July,
1949, 43 pp. (Author was President of Philippine
Congress of Labor Organization, apparently Communist-
dominated. )•
Herre, Albert W. Current Philippine Problems. Manila:
Philippine Council, IPR, n.d. (probably 1939-1940),
7 pp., (Mimeo.)•
Hibben, Thomas. Economic Development in the Republic of the
Philippines^ feeprlnt from Foreign Commerce Weekly.
A U.S. Department of Commerce Periodical, September
13, 1947, 5 pp.
________• Philippine Economic Development: A Technical Memo­
randum. Joint Philippine-American Finance Commission.
Manila: Bureau of Printing, June 7, 1947, 66 pp.
Printed also as a part of the Commission's Report.
Housing and Town and Country Planning. United Nations, Depart­
ment of Social Affairs, Bulletin No. 2, Lake Success:
April, 1949, 61 pp.

Huxley, Aldous and Sir John Russell. Food and People. Current
Affairs Pamphlet No. 77. Sponsored by UNESCO. London:
The Bureau of Current Affairs, April 2, 1949, 26 pp.
(Aldous Huxley, "The Double Crisis", pp. 3-12; Sir
John Russell, "The Way Out," pp. 13-23.).

In Memoriam: Manuel Roxas. Manila: Bureau of Printing, April

19, 1948, unpaged.

Independence Day Souvenir: Republic of the Philippines.

Manila: July 4, 1946, 82 pp.
 568

Institute of Nutrition. Anim na Pangunahlng Pagkain na

Nagblblgay ng Ganap at Wastong Kalusugan. ( T h e Basic
Six Pood Groups that Supply an Adequate and Well-
Balanced Diet). Primer No. 1. "Printed Thru a Grant
From the United States Public Health Service in the
Philippines." Manila: 1949. 31 pp. (In English and
Tagalog). (Illus. in color.).
________ • Fish as You Like It. Prepared for Fish Conservation
Day. Institute of Nutrition Leaflet No. 11, "Printed
Under a Grant from the U.S. Public Health Service in
the Philippines". Manila: 1949, 11 pp.
________ . Mga Paala-ala sa Paggawa ng Talapagkaln (Points in
Menu Making) . Leaflet 4. Manila: 1949, 6 pp•
________ . Nutritive Value of Fish. Manila: 1949, 4 pp.

________• Simplified Artificial Infant Feeding: Leaflet No. 3

(Revised). Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1949, 19 pp.
• Food For the Pre-School Child. Leaflet No. 5.
Manila: 1950, 9 pp.

________ . What Shall We Eat Today? Leaflet No. 10. "Printed

under a grant from the U.S. Public Health Service."
Manila: 1950, 4 pp., 9-1/4 x 12, in colors.
________ • Pointers for Housewives on Conserving Minerals and
Vitamins. Leaflet No. 16. ^Printed under a grant from
the U.S. Public Health Service." Manila: 1950, 4 pp.
8-1/2 x 12-1/g.
________ • Moderate Cost Menus For the Family. Revised Leaflet
No. ""17• Manila: 1950, 2 pp.

________ • Low Cost Menus For the Family. Revised Leaflet No.
18. Manila: 19&0, 2 pp.

________ . Ang Anim na Pangunahang Pagkain (The Basic Six Food

Groups.}• Poster No. 1 (Revised). "Printed under a
grant from the U.S. Public Health Service." 18-1/2
x 24-3/4, in color.
Institute of Pacific Relations. The. Manila: Philippine
Council, 1938, 15 pp.

Invitation Program to the "Ceremonies Accompanying the unveiling

of the Tablet marking the Site of the Inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines." Thursday, November 14,
1940. Printed by the Commonwealth Anniversary Committee,
Rafael R. Alunan, Chairman, and the Philippine Historical
Committee. 4 pp. Contains message by President M.L. Quezon,
on "Preservationcf Our Historic Antiquities."
 569

Janse, Olov R.T.: Archeology of the Philippine Islands.

"From the Smithsonian Report for 1946, Pages 345-
360 (with 15 Plates)", (Publication 3883). Washing­
ton, D.C.s U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947.
Jenkins, Shirley. Trading With Asia. I.P.R. Pamphlets No. 18.
New York: IPR, 1946, 64 pp.
________ . United States Economic Policy Towards the Philip­
pine Republic. "Tenth (Conference. Institute of Pacific
Relations. United States Paper No. 1 . New York*
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947, 72 pp.
Johnston, W.C. The Changing Far East. Headline Series No. 41.
New York: Foreign Policy Association, August, 1943,
96 pp.

July 4th Official Souvenir Program: "Republic*s Commemorative

Guide of Events." Vol. Ill, No. 3. Dedicated to the
Third Anniversary of the Philippine Republic." Manila:
Defender Publishing Co., July 4, 1949, 168 pp.
Kalaw, Pura Villanueva. El Proceso De "El Renaclmlento".
Manila: author: 1947, 48 pp.

Kihss, Peter. Food and People. "U.N. Tackles the Problems,"

Current Affairs. No. 86 (A UNSSCO Project), London:
August 6, 1949, Map, pp. 10-11. Map is entitled:
"A Difference of Calories-1939".

Koneko, Hidezo and Kozo Kaito. Our Mission Today. Nippon Bunka
Kaikan, 1943, 61 pp.

Krieger, Herbert W. Peoples of the Philippines. Smithsonian

Institution War Background Studies N o . 4. Publication
3694. Washington, D.C.: The Smithsonian Institution,
1942, 86 pp.
Lattimore, Eleanor. Decline of Empire in the Pacific. I.P.R.
Pamphlets No. 25. New York: IPR, 1947, 64 pp.
Laufer, Berthold. "The Relations of the Chinese to the
Philippine Islands•" Reprinted from the Smithsonian
Miscellaneous Collection (Quarterly IssueT^ Vol. 50,
1908, pp. £48-284.

Lawrence, Chester H. New World Horizons: Geography for the

Air Age. Maps by Ray Ramsey. Text edition. New York:
Silver Burdette Co., by arrangement with Duell, Sloan
and Pearce, 96 pp., 38 maps.
 570

Lilienthal, Philip E. and Oakie, John H. Asia1a Captive

Colonies. Pamphlet No* 6 (Rev.ed.), New York:
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944, 46 pp.

Living Conditions in Under-Developed Countries and Territories.

UNESCO, Social Commission. Document E/CN. 5/106.
Lake Success: UNESCO, March 11, 1949, 14 pp.
Lockwood, W.W. (ed.). Our Far Eastern Record. Vols. I and II.
New Yorks IPR, 1640, 76 pp.

“MacArthur Reports on National Defense.”Special supplement

to The Philippines Herald. Manila; Friday, June 19,
1931^ 4 pp.
Magtanggol Asa (Aurelio S. Alvero)! A Matter of Nomenclature.
TAGALA. New Bilibid Prison in Muntinglupa, Rizal:
29 November, 1945, 23 pp.

________. Basic For Unity. Manila: M. Colcol & Co., 1947,

22 pp. (Written In New Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa,
Rizal.)•

Majumdar, D.N. and Irawati Karve. Racial Problems in Asia.

New Delhi! Indian Council on World Affairs, 1947,
54 pp.

Manila and the Philippines. 1938 edition. Manila! American

Express, 1938, 128 pp.

Marquez, Severo L. Sugar Cane Smut. Bureau of Agriculture,

Circular No. 176, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1926, 2 pp.
Mead, Margaret; ”The Family's Food." Current Affairs
Pamphlet No. 85. Food and People series, sponsored
by UNESCO. London: The Bureau of Current Affairs,
23 July i'949, 19 pp.
Merrill, Elmer D. A Review of The Identifications of the
Species Described in Blanco's Flora de Pilipinas.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Government Labora­
tories, No. 27, Manila: Bureau of Public Printing,
1905, 126, plus, pages (my copy Incomplete at p. 126.).
Migration. Background Paper No. 41, Lake Success; UN, Depart­
ment of Public Information, Research Section, April
26, 1948, 15 pp.

Moncado, Hilario C. ”100# Cooperation With the United States."

A speech, delivered in Honolulu, June 7, 1941, over
station KGMB.
 571

Nabong, J. Did Rizal Retract? Manilas Villamor Publishing Co.,

Inc., 1950, 8 pp.
Nagata, H. To The Young Men and Women of the Philippine Islands.
Tokyo* May, 1936, 9 pp.
Nannetti, Guillermos Alphabet of the Soil. Current Affairs Pam­
phlet No. 82, second pamphlet in series on Pood and
People, sponsored by UNESCO. Londons The Bureau of
Current Affairs, June 11, 1949, 19 pp.

National Cooperatives Administration. Primer on Cooperatives.

Prepared by the Research and Publicity Section, Promotion,
Organization and Supervision Division, NCA. Manilas
National Cooperatives Administrations 1947, 64 pp.
National Economic Protectionism Association. NEPA Day 1940.
Bulletin No. 12. Manila: 1940, 20 pp.
National Foods. A prospectus of the National Pood Products
Corporation, a subsidiary of the National Development
Company. Manilas 1938, 48 pp.
National Research Council of the Philippine Islands.
Bulletin No. 1. Record of inaugural meeting of the Council,
April 3, 1934, Manila: NRC, 9 pp.
Bulletin No. 2 . Separate from Report No. 1 . Manilas NRC,
February, 1935, 76 pp.
Bulletin No. 3 . Separate from Report No. 1. Manilas NRC,
February, 1935, pp. 77-226.
Bulletin No. 4 . Separate from Report No. 1. Manila: NRC,
February, 1935, pp. 227-358.
Bulletin No. 5. Separate from Report No. 1 . Manilas NRC,
February, 1935, pp. 359-507.
Bulletin No. 6 . Separate from Report No. 1 . Manilas NRC,
February, 1935, pp. 508-609.
Bulletin No. 7. Separate from Report No. 1. Manila* NRC,
February, 1935, pp. 611-902d. (Contains bibliographic
data of members to that date).
Bulletin No. 8 . Separate from Report No. 1. Manila: NRC,
Feb*fcary, 1935, pp. 903-994.
Bulletin No. 9 . Separate from Report No. 1 . Manilas NRC,
February, 1935, 42 pp. Proceedings. Second Philip­
pine Science Convention, February 14-18, 1935.
Bulletin No. 11. Second Annual Report, 1935-1936, Manilas
NRC, September, 1936, 42 pp.
Bulletin No. 14.Manila: NRC, December, 1937, 88 pp.
Bulletin No. 15.Manila: NRC, December, 1937, 85 pp.
Bulletin No. 16.Manilas NRC, September, 1938, 101 pp.
Bulletin No. 17.Manilas NRC, September, 1938, 169 pp.
Bulletin No. 18. Manila* NRC, November, 1938, 41 pp.
Bulletin No. 19. Manila: NRC, November, 1938, Proceed­
ings of the Fourth Philippine Science Convention,
February 23-27, 1937, 154 pp.
 572

Bulletin No. 20, Manila*NRC, November, 1938, 285 pp.

Bulletin No. 21. Manila:NRC, December, 1938, 101 pp.
Bulletin No. 237 Manila*NRC, December, 1939,
Proceedings of the Fifth Philippine Science Convention,
February 21-26, 1939, 210 pp.
Bulletin No. 25. Manila:NRC, December, 1940, 119 pp.
Bulletin No. 29. Quezon City* NRC, December, 1948,
130 pp. (Contains * H.O. Beyer, Philippine and East
Asian Archaeology....).
Bulletin No. 30. Quezon City: NRC, July, 1950, 184 pp.

The Proceedings and Abstracts of the Philippine Science

Conventions are compiled and published. The Bulletins
said Reports present contributions and reports other than
proceedings. The bulletins and reports are published
irregularly; an annual report was published each year be­
fore the War. Since the War, the Council has been
practically inactive.

Nicholson, Marjorie. Self-Government and the communal Problem.

London* Fabian Publications and Victor Gallancz Research
Series No. 125, 1948, 45 pp.

Octubre, Francisco P. A Catechism on Mongo Production. Bureau

of Agriculture, Circular No. 164, Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1926, 6 pp.
Official Program Second Anniversary Celebration of the Republic
of the Philippines. Manila, July 4, 1948. Manila*
Bureau of Printing, 1948, unpaged.
Official Souvenir Program. "Republic^ Commemorative Guide of
Events, Vol. I, No. 1, July 4, 1947. Manila* Defender
Publishing Co., 152 pp.
Orosa, Maria Y. Rice Bran: A Health Food and How to Cook jt.
Bureau of Science, Popular Bulletin 15, Manila. Bureau
of Printing, 1932, 22 pp.

Otanes, Faustino <Q. Rice Cut Worms. Bureau of Agriculture,

Circular No. 83 (Revised), Manila* Bureau of Printing,
1925, 6 pp.

________• "The Toy Beetle.” (Leucopholls Irrorata Cheor.) In

the Philippines. A Serious Pest. Bureau of Agriculture,
Circular No. 166 (Supplementary to Circular No. 135).
Manila* Bureau of Printing, 1926, 4 pp.

Pendleton, Robert L. Training for Agricultural Research in

Humid Tropical Asia. N.Y. Southeast Asia Institute,
1 9 4 7 , 1 0 p p . ( M i m e o •)•
 573

Perez, Gilbert S. From the Transport Thomas to Sto. Tomas.

The History of the American Teachers in the Philippines.
Manila: Author, n.d. (1949), 30 pp.
Philippine Economic Association, The. The Economics of the
Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. An Analysis. "Reprinted from:
The Herald. (April 21. 1933)." 42 pp.
Philippine Exposition Commercial and Industrial Fair.
January 30-February 14, 1937, Manila: Commercial
Handbook, 1937, unpaged•
Philippine Independence Day Supplement. Printed by The China
£ress, in Commemoration of the Second Anniversary of
the Republic of the Philippines. Published under the
Auspices of the Filipino Community Association of
Shanghai. July 4, 1948, 36 pp.
Philippine Research Bureau. The Philippine Islands and the
United States. The Philippine Research Bureau,
New York, in cooperation with the Royal Institute of
International Affairs, London: 1935, 49 pp.

Philippines1 City Directory. Manila: Pan-Oriental Publishing

Co., 1946, 140 pp., (Mimeo.).
Phillips, George. lfWhat Price Philippine Independence?” New
York: New Century, 1946, 32 pp.
Porter, Catherine LUcy. Filipinos and Their Country. IPR
Pamphlet No. 13, New York: Institute of Pacific
Relations, 1944, 64 pp.
Prautch, A.W. "Co-operative Marketing of Tobacco." Lecture,
broadcast, October 12, 1927. Manila: Bureau of
Agriculture, 4 pp., (Mimeo.).

President Quirlno^ Birthday Commemorative Green Book. On the

occasion of his birthday, November 16, 1949. "Published
Annually." Vol. II, No. II (November 16, 1949),
Manila: Defender Publishing Co., 160 pp.
President Sergio Osmefia. The Highlights of a leadership un-
equalled by that of any living Filipino. Manila:
Nationalists Party(?), 1946, 22 pp.

Price and Exchange List of Philippine Bird Skins In the Collec­

tion of the Bureau of Science. Manila. P.I. "The
Philippine Journal of Science." Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1911(?), 12 pp. "This list contains the
names of all Philippine birds known at date of issue."
 574

Problems of Economic Reconstruction In the Far East* Report

of the Tenth Conference of the Institute of Pacific
Relations, Stratford-on-Avon, England, September 5-20,
1947. New Yorki IPR, 1949, 125 pp.
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. Presented
at the Annual Meeting, November 12, 1947. Vol. XXII,
No. 4 (January, 1948). New Yorks Academy of Political
Science, Columbia University, 124 pp.
Proceedings of the Second Philippine Science Convention, held
under the auspices of the National Research Council
of the Philippines and the Philippine Scientific
Society, Manila, February 14-18, 1935. Bulletin No. 9 .
separate from Report No. 1 . Manilas National
Research Council, 1935, 42 pp.
Proceedings. Fourth Philippine Science Convention...February
23-27, 1937. Bulletin No. 19. Manilas National
Research Council, November, 1938, 154 pp.
Proceedings of the Fifth Philippine Science Convention..•
February 21-26, 1939. Bulletin No. 23. Manilas
National Research Council, December, 1939, 210 pp.
Program of the Silver Jubilee Anniversary Celebration of the
Philippine Library Association. November, 1948-August,
1949. Biennial Conference, Manilas Benipayo Press,
August 22-25, 1949, 76 pp.
Qulrlnos The Leader...The Statesman. Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1948, 59 pp.
Razon, Benito. NEPA Bulletin. "Report of the Work and
Activities of the NEPA for the Year 1935." No. 3,
January 31, 1936. Manilas 12 pp.
Recto, Claro M. The Philippine Constitution. And other
Addresses delivered in connection with the 22nd
Commencement Exercises of The University of Manila,
March 24, 1936. Manilas The University of Manila,
1936, 45 pp.

Regala, Roberto. Neutralization of the Philippines. Prepared

for the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific
Relations, Yosemlte Park, California, August 15 to 29,
1936. Philippine Council Papers. No. 2 . Manilas
Philippine Council, IPR, 1936, 9 pp. TMimeo.)•
 575

Report and Recommendations on Training of Technical Personnel

In the Economic Field and the Use of Expert Assistance
by Governments, United Nations Economic and Social
Council, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East,
Document E/CN. 11/83, May 26, 1948, 122 pp.
Report and Recommendations Regarding Trade Promotion. UNESCO,
ECAFE, Document E/CN.11/84. Lake Success; UNESCO,
April 30, 1948, 103 pp.

Report of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes of the Philippine

Islands For the Year Ended August 51. 1902. (From the
Report of the Philippine Commission). Bureau of
Insular Affairs, War Department, Washington, D.C.t
n.d., pp. 679-688, 5 plates.
Report of the Mission to the Philippines. UNESCO Educational
Missions. UNESCO Publication 669. Paris: UNESCO,
1950, 75 pp.
Report of the Philippine National Red Cross to the XVIIth
International Red Cross Conference, Stockholm, 1948.
Manila: 1948, 18 pp.

Report of the Philippine-United States Agricultural Mission.

International Agricultural Collaboration Series. No. 3 .
June, 1947. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office
of Foreign Agricultural Relations. Washington, D.C.:
1948, 50 pp.
Report of the Secretary-General on Establishing United Nations
Research Laboratories! United Nations Economic and
Social Council. Document E/620. January 23, 1948,
356 pp. (Mimeo.).
Report of the Survey Mission to the Far East (Other than China).
International Children's Emergency Fund, Programme
Committee. Document E/lCEF/72. Lake Success: UNESCO,
July 1, 1948, 83 pp.

Report of the Third Session of the Economic Commission For Asia

and tke Far East. Document E/839. Lake Succelrs:
UNESCO, July 1, 1948, 77 pp.

Report of the Working Group for Asia and the Far East of the
Temporary Sub-Commission on Economic Reconstruction "of
Devastated Areaa. Lake Success: UNESCO. Document
E.30^/Rev.l, March 4, 1947, 81 pp.
Reyes, Jose S. Legislative History of America's Economic Policy
Towards the Philippines. Studies in History, Economics
ani Public Law, Edited"by the Faculty of Political
Science of Columbia University. Vol. CVI, No. 2, “Whole
Number 240", New York: Columbia University, 1923, 205 pp.
 576

________• What American Policy In the Philippines would Do

Most to Relieve Potential Sources of International
Friction? Prepared for the Sixth Conference of the
IPR, Yosemite Park, California, August 15-29, 1936.
Philippine Council Papers,, Number 1, Manila:
Philippine Council, IPR, 1936, 4 pp. (Mimeo.).
Reyes, Jose de los: Biography of Senator Isabelo de Los
Reyes. Father of Labor and Proclalmer of the Philip­
pine Independent Church. Manila: Nueva Era Press,
April, 1947, 33 pp. TaIso published in Spanish).

Robinson, C.B. and Dean C. Worcester. Rubber Growing Industry

of the Philippine Islands. Manila: probably Bureau
of Printing, 1910 (?), §*4 pp. (Monograph is in
form of letter written to Mr. M.E. Springer, Secretary
of the Manila Merchants' Association.).

Rodrigo, P.A. "A General Review of Research Work on Philippine

Crops with Special Reference to Vegetables." Separate
from: The Philippine Journal of Agriculture. Vol.
IV, No. 1, First quarter, 1949. Manila, pp. 85-94.
Rodriguez, Eulogio B. The Philippines and Mexico. Documentos
de la Biblloteca Nacional de Filipinas. Manila;
National Library, 1941, 52 pp.
Romualdez, Eduardo Z. A Critique of Post-War Financial
Policies in the Philippines. Tenth Conference,
Institute of Pacific Relations• Philippine Paper No. 3 .
Manila: Philippine Council, IPR, 1947, 70 pp.
Romualdez, Norberto. The Culture of the Filipinos. Baguio:
Catholic School Press, 1925, 74 pp. Title page has
title: "The Psychology of the Filipino." Lecture
delivered at Ateneo de Manila, February 13, 1924.
Author was associate justice of the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands.
Romulo, Carlos P. The East and West Have Met. "A reprint of
the article which appeared in the June issue of the
Red Barrel, house magazine of the Coca Cola Company."
No date, unpaged.
Rosinger, Lawrence K. "The Philippines: Problems of Indepen­
dence," Foreign Policy Reports. Vol. XXIV, No. 8
(September 1, 1948), pp. 82-95.

"Roxas Can't Be Replaced - Quezon". 4-page leaflet, 8 x 12 Inches,

purporting to show that the subject was needed by the
Philippine Government so should be cleared of charges
of collaboration. Probably printed by Liberal Wing of
Nationalist Party, 1946.
 577

Roxas, Manuel A. (Pres.) and Salvador Araneta: The Parity

Question: A Presentation of Arguments For and Against
This Momentous Issue in Our National Life. Manila:
Philippine Journal of Education, January, 1947, 64 pp.
(Reprinted.).
Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Training of
Volunteer Guards and the Air Raid Wardens Service.
Civilian’Emergency Administration^ Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1941, 60 pp. (Contains Executive Order
Creating the C.E.A.).
Runes, D.T. General Standards of Living and Wages of Workers
in the""Philippine Sugar Industry. Manila: Philippine
Council, Institute of Pkcific Relations, September,
1939, 42 pp. 5 tables.
Salcedo, Juan, Jr., Carrasco, E.O., Jose, F.R., and Valenzuela
R.C. Studies on Beriberi in an Endemic Sub-tropical
Area. Reprinted from the Journal of Nutrition. Vol.
36, No. 5 (November, 1948)7 pp. fe(Si-578.
Salcedo, Juan, Jr., Concepcion, I., Guerrero, A.F., Pascual,
E.C., and Valenzuela, R.C. Studies on the Thiamine
Content of Rice. Vegetables, and Other Foods in Bataan
Province. Reprinted from the Acta Medlca Philippina.
Vol. V, No. 4 (April-June, 1949), Read before the 42nd
Annual Meeting of the Philippine Medical Association,
Bacolod City, May 1, 1949. Manila! 1949, 19 pp.
Saleeby, M.M. Kapok Culture. Bureau of Agriculture. Circular
No. 21, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1924(?), 14 pp.
Saleeby, Najeeb M. Studies in Moro History. Law, and Religion.
Department of the Interior, Ethnological Survey Publica­
tions, Vol. IV, Part. I, Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1905, 107 pp.

. The History of Sulu. Department of the Interior,

Ethnological Survey Publications. Vol. IV, Part II.
Manila! Bureau of Printing, 1907, pp. 109-376.

Sands and Coral. Literary Magazine of Slliman University.

Dumaguete City, 1950, 66 pp.
Santos, Joseflna L. and Amparo R. Asuncion. A Manual For
Teaching The Filipino National Language in Grade One.
Department of Instruction. Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1946, 120 pp.

Scheerer, Otto. Kallnga Texts From the Balbalasong Glnaang

Group. Separate from ftbe Philippine Journal of Science.
Vol. 19, No. 2 (August, 19&1J, 175-667. Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 1921.
 578

. The Batan Dialect as A Member of the Philippine

Group of Languages (Fart I ). and. HFb< and HV In
Philippine Languages (Part II), by Carlos fe. Conant.
Bureau of Science, Division of Ethnology Publications,
Vol. V - Parts I and II. Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1908, 141 pp.

Security in the Pacific. A Preliminary Report of the Ninth

Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations,
Hot Springs, Virginia, January 6-17, 1945. New York:
IPR, 1945, 169 pp.
Seeman, Bernard, and Salisbury, Lawrence. Cross-Currents in
the Philippines. IPR Pamphlet No. 23, New York:
institute of Pacific Relations, 1946, 63 pp.
Series of Three Letter^, during February and March, 1947,
printed in a magazine entitled Adventure. issue of
April or May, on the subject of the Hukbalahap. Cor­
respondence is between Sgt. Blair Robinett and E.
Hoffman Price. Letters are printed on pages 135-137
of that issue. No other bibliographic information.
Serrano, F.B. Banana Diseases in the Philippines. Bureau of
Agriculture, Circular No. 176, Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1926, 8 pp.
Silayan, H.S. Practical Suggestions for Rural Improvements.
Bureau of Plant Industry Farmers ' Circular No. 36
(Revised). Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1938, 35 pp.

Simmons, Pauline. Chinese Patterned Silks. New York: The

Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1948, 40 pp.
Sinco, Vicente G. Alien Sovereignty in the Philippine Republic.
Manila: Author, 1947, 61 pp. ’

Sitsen, Peter H.W. Industrial Development of the Netherlands

Indies. Bulletin No. 2 of the Netherlands and Nether­
landsIndies Council of the Institute of Pacific Rela­
tions. Batavia(?): 1940(?), 65pp.

Smith, Warren D. The Mineral Resources of the Philippine

Islands For the Year 1911. Bureau of Science, Division
of Mines. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1912, 99 pp.
Souvenir Philippine Baguio Conference of 1950. Baguio:
Division of Cultural Activities, Department of Foreign
Affairs, May, 1950, 37 pp.

Sprout, Harold. "America's Problem of National Defense."

Alumni Lectures. Princeton University. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1939, 22 pp.
 579

Stein, Gunther. American Business with Ea3t Asia. Tenth

Conference of the IPR. United States Paper No. 3 .
New YorkI IPR, 1947, 36 pp. (Mimeo.).
Study of Future Organization In the Field of Inland Transport
In Asia and the Far East! United Nations, Transport
and Communications Commission. Second Session,
Geneva. April 1948. Document E/CN.2/34. February
18, 1948, 57 pp. (Mimeo.).
Sullivan, E. Poetic Memoirs of Manila. Manila* n.p., n.d.
(probably 1945), 15 pp. 4-1/4 x 5-1/2 inches, paper.

Supplement to Major Economic Changes in 1948. Lake Success s

United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 1949,
119 pp.
Swerling, B.C. International Control of Sugar. 1918-41.
Stanford! Stanford University Press (for the #ood
Research Institute), 1949, 69 pp.
Tagle, Salvador P. Dei The Reconstruction of Lost and
Destroyed Documents and Records. (Act 4il6; Philippine
Legislature)• "Cum Notes Variorum". Manila* Author,
1945, 72 pp.

Teodoro, Nicanor G. Aeglnetla Indlca In Cane Plantation.

Bureau of Agriculture, Circular No. 157, Manilas
Bureau of Printing, 1925, 2 pp.

________ • Coconut Diseases and Their Control. Bureau of Agri-

culture, dlrcular No. 179, Manilas Bureau of Printing,
1926, 13 pp.

. Rubber Tree Diseases and Their Control. Bureau of

Agriculture, Circular No. 187, Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1927, 11 pp.

Ter Braake, Alex L. Mining in the Netherlands East Indies.

Bulletin 4 of the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies
Council, IPR. New Yorks IPR, 1944, 110 pp.

The Case of Madame Marie Louise Fernandez. Manilas Far Eastern

University, August 5, 1949, 14 p p .

The Economic Situation in Indonesia. The Netherlands Government

Information Service. The Hague* General State Printing
Office, 1948, 32 pp.

The Filipino Great. Released by the Division of Cultural

Activities, Department of Foreign Affairs, July 4, 1950.
Manila* Bureau of Printing, 1950, 50 pp.
 580

The International Trade of Rice with Special Reference to Asia

and the Far East, UNESCO, ECAPE, 3rd Session,
Ootacamund, India. Document E/CN.11/94. Lake Success,
UNESCO, June 3, 1948, 37 pp.
The Japanese Student P y t y Visiting the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, tinder the auspices of the Osaka Manlchi
and the Tokyo Nichl Nichl. Summer, 1936. 4 pp.
Contains list of 81 visiting students.

The Philippine Weather Bureau and the United States Weather

Bureau Working together to provide You an efficient
Weather Service. Manilas n.d. (probably 1948), 6~pp.,
5 x 8 inches.
The Philippines (A Brief Historical and Factual Survey).
Philippine Embassy, Washington, D.C.: 1946, 21 pp.
Reprinted from* Trade Directory of the Philippines.
The Philippines. 1948. A Handbook of Trade and Economic Facts
and Figures. Manila: Department of Commerce and
Industry, 1948, 73 pp.
The University of the Philippines Presents An Historical
Pageant at the Manila Carnival Commercial and Industrial
Fair. Manila: February 8, 1922, unpaged program. The
Committee Chairman was H. Otley Beyer; the plan of H.
Fernandez. Pageant represented the reception of
Legaspi by Manila in 1571.

Thibert, Marguerite. Training Problems in the Far East.

Geneva: International Labour Office, 1948, 160 pp.
Thompson Virginia and Richard Adloff. Empirefs End in South­
east Asia. Headline Series Number 78. New York:
Foreign Policy Association in cooperation with the
IPR, November-December, 1949, 62 pp. Contains also:
Blair Bolles, "U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia."

Treacy, Gerold C. (S.J.). Industry at the Crossroads. New

York: The Paulist Press, 1946, 32 pp.
Tuason, Alfonso. Poultry Notes. (third Revised Edition).
Bureau of Agriculture, Circular No. 94, Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 1925, 38 pp.
Umali, Agustin F., and Werfel, H.E. Reef Fishing. U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, Philippine Bureau of Fisheries,
Manila: USIS, July, 1949, 36 pp.
 581

United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Par East.
Interim Report and Recommendations on Industrial
Development by the Working Party. Document E/CN
11/82. May 6, 1948, 75 pp., (Mimeo.).
UNRRA Activities In and For the Far East. First Quarter 1947.
Washington! United Nations Relief & Rehabilitation
Administration, 1947, 27 pp. (Mimeo.).
UNRRA in the Philippines. 1946-1947. Operational Analysis
Papers, No. E>0. Washington! United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration, April, 1948, 5 pp.
Valkenburg, S. Van. Pacific Asia! A Political Atlas. Head­
line Series No. 66. New York! Foreign Policy
Association, 1947, 62 pp.

Van Naerssen, F.H. Culture Contactg Social Conflicts

in Indonesia. Translated by A.J. Barnouw. (Through
the courtesy of J.M. Meulenhoff, Amsterdam). South­
east Asia Institute Occasional Papers No. 1 . New
York! Southeast Asia Institute, 1947, 18 pp.
Verzosa, Paul Rodriguez. Ang Pambansang Wlka! The National
Language. (In English)• Manila! Author(?J 1940,
22 pp.
________. The Psychology of Tagalog Proverbs. Introduction
by Lope K. Santos. "Polyglot Eldition." Manilas
Author, 79 pp., (Mimeo•)•
Villanueva, Francisco Jr. Brief Commentaries on the War
Damage Law. Manila! Author, 1946, 102 pp.

War and in the Pacific. A Preliminary Report of the

Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations
on Wartime and Post-War Cooperation of the United
Nations in the Pacific and the Far East. Mont Tremblant,
Quebec, December 4-14, 1942. New York! IPR, 1943,
164 pp.
Wester, P.J. Pineapple Culture (Revised). Bureau of Agri­
culture, Circular No. 16, Manila! Bureau of Printing,
1923, 19 pp.

________ • Shade Trees For Streets and Roads. Bureau of

Agriculture, Circular No. 132, Manilas Bureau of
Printing, 1926, 7 pp.

.. The Pill Nut. Bureau of Agriculture, Circular No.

44, Manila! Bureau of Printing, 1925(?), 5 pp.
 582

What Lies Ahead For the Philippines? EM 24, GI Roundtable.

Prepared for the U.S. Armed Forces by the American
Historical Association. Washington, D.C.i] War
Department, 1945, 49 pp.
What to Read About the Philippines. A Bibliography. N.Y.
East and West Association, 1943.
"What Will Your Country Be? If you Vote ’NO' - If You Vote
’YES' in the Plebiscite on October 24, 1939."
Cartoon Broadside,8x 11, issued by Office of Adult
Education, 1939.
White Book of the Coalition. Coalition Headquarters. Manila:
1935, 60 pp. Back page contains "Coalicion Marcha".
White Book of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Published
by the National information Board for tide-Common­
wealth Anniversary Committee. Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1937, 142 pp.

Why Teachers Should Support the Coalition. National Coalition

Headquarters. Manila: Rivera Bros., August 15,
1935, 14 pp.

Windows on the Pacific. Biennial Report of American Council,

institute of Pacific Relations, 1944-1946. New York:
1946, 63 pp•
Worcester, Dean C. "The Philippine Islands", The Mentor.
Department of Travel, Vol. 3, No. 13 (August 16, 1915,
Serial No. 89), 12 pp. (Published twice a month, by
the Mentor Association, New York.).

World Economic Report: 1948. Lake Success: United Nations.

Department of Economic Affairs, 1949, 300 pp.

Wright, Philip G. Trade and Tariffs of Certain Pacific Countries.

Proof Edition. Honolulu: IPR, 1933,' 279 pp.
Wright, Quincy. The Existing Legal Situation as It Relates to
the Conflict in the Far Eas*t^ I.P^R. inquiry Series.
New York: 19&9, 129 pp.

Yabes, Leopoldo Y. The Ilocano Epic. Manila: Carmelo and

Bauermann, Inc., 1955, SO pp.

Zaide, Gregorio F. The Philippine Commonwealth. Manila:

Author, 1938, 15 pp.
 583

ART I CLES

"Abaca”. Encyclopaedia Brltannlca. Vol. I. Chicago* Ency­

clopaedia Brltannlca, Inc., 1947 edition, p. 5.
Abadilla, Domingo C. "Confusion in the Copra Market." The
Sunday Post Magazine. Vol. 2, No. 8 (November 10,
1946), pp. 5, 24.

Abitona, Fabian V. "The Beyster Report - A Proposed Program

for Industrial Rehabilitation and Development." The
Philippine Educator. Vol. II, No. 2 (February, 194§7,
pp. 39-41.

Ablang, Leandro. "The Corral Method of Fishing in the Ilocos,"

Agricultural-Commercial-Industrial Life. Vol. IX,
No. 3'(March, 1947), p. 16.

Acay, Gervacio C. "Davao Abaca Can Come Back," Philippines

Free Press. Vol. 39, No. 1 (January 3, 1948), pp. 34-35.
"Across the Editor's Desk," Editorial: ACIL. Vol. X, No. 8
(August, 1948), p. 1.

Adams, Inez. "Rice Cultivation in Asia," reprinted from:

American Anthropologist. Vol. 50, No. 2 (April-June,
1948), pp. 256-282.

"A Denial of Some Statements by J.S. Allen," Pacific Affairs.

Vol. XI, No. 4 (December, 1938), pp. 493-495.
Adevoso, Terry. "The Customs Patrol Service." Service Journal.
Vol. I, No. 2 (October, 1949), pp. VIII, XVI, XX.
Agbayani, Adeudato. "The Century-old Filipino Colony In the
United States," Journal of the Philippine Historical
Society. Vol. I 7July, 1941), pp. 54-64

Agorilla, Amado L. "Adult Schools in Action," Philippine Life.

Vol. I, No. 2 (November, 1938), pp. 31-34.
"Agriculture," The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the
Philippines. 1957-1958. pp. 156-165.

Allen, James S. "Agrarian Tendencies In the Philippines,"

Pacific Affairs. Vol. XII, No. 2 (June, 1939), pp. 191-
193. ’
 584

Alunan, Rafael R. "The Sugar Industry Under the Commonwealth,”

pie Philippine Commonwealth Handbook. 1936, pp. 261-
269. (Set citation under De la Liana.)•
________. "Philippine Sugar Industry Must Live," The Philip­
pine Forum. Vol. I, No. 1 (December, 1935), pp. 71-74.

________. "The Problems of the Sugar Industry," Bulletin No.

17, Manila: National Research Council, September,
1938, pp. 160-164.
Alvarado, Eduardo R. "The Scope of Activities of the Depart­
ment of Agriculture and Commerce," ACIL. Vol. IX,
No. 4 (April, 1947), p. 13.
Anonas, Gregorio. "The Role of the National Development
Company In Our Economic Readjustment," The PJC. Vol.
XIV, No. 12 (December, 1938), pp. 15, 16, 34-35, 43, 44.

Araneta, Salvador. "Basic Problems of Philippine Economic

Development." Pacific Affairs. Vol. XXI, No. 3
(September, 1948), pp. 280-285.
________. "Our International Trade Problems," Philippine
Rehabilitation Journal. Vol. I, No. 7 (September,
1949), pp. l2, 34,'"35, 36-37. Speech delivered before
the Harvard Club, August 25, 1949.
Araneta, Victoria L. De. "Use of Native Dress Urged Upon
Women to Help Economic Protectionism," Philippine
Herald Yearbook. 1954-1935. p. 95.
"A Report on Abaca," The Manila Times Mid-Week Review. Vol. 3,
No. 2 (March 9 7 1949), p.' 3.

Arguelles, A.S. "Scientific Research Applied to Industry and

Natural Resources," Philippine Rehabilitation Journal
of Philippine Problems? Vol. I, No. 10 (December,
1949), pp. 28, 50-51, 52-53.

Arizabal, Antonio L. "Enriched Rice Experiment Successful,"

ACIL. Vol. XI, No. 4 (April, 1949), p. 16.
Asis, Zoilo B. "The Evils of Dynamite Fishing," ACIL. Vol.
XI, No. 8 (August, 1949), p. 8.

Aquino, E.G. "An Outline of Our Economic Objectives and the

Present Governmental Set-Up," Bulletin No. 17.
National Research Council, Manila, (September, 1938),
pp. 139-148.
 585

Balinas, Rosendo, "What of Our Sugar Indus try?1* This Week

Magazine. The Manila Chronicle. Vol. 3, No. 12
(March 21, 1948), pp . 10- 11~“23.
Balmaceda, Comello. "Review of Business Conditions in the
Philippines." Progressive Farming. Vol. II. No. 1
(January, 1938), p. 30.
________ . "The New Philippine Economy," Philippine Review.
Vol. I, No. 1 (March, 1943), pp. 49-53.
________ . "The Rehabilitation of Philippine Commerce and
Indus try," Philippine Rehabilitation Journal of
Philippine Problems. Vol. I. No. 10 (December. 1949),
pp. 18, 66-67.
Balmaceda, Cornelio and Eduardo L. Romualdez. "The Terms of
Foreign Capital Investment in the Philippines,"
Philippine Rehabilitation Journal. Vol. I, No. 7
(September, 1949), pp. 10-11, 30, 32, 33, 34. Speech
delivered at the Round The World Town Meeting of the
Air, August 24, 1949.
Bautista, Ambrosio. "The Planting of Palagad Rice," ACIL.
Vol. XI, No. 8 (August, 1949), pp. 14-15, 31, 35, 38, 39.
Bekker, Konrad and Charles Wolf, Jr., "The Philippine Balance
of Payments." FES. Vol. 19, No. 4, (February 22, 1950),
pp. 41-43.

Belshaw, H. "Races, Lands and Foods," Review article of

book by that title, by R. Mukerjee, New York: Dryden
Press, 1947, 107 pp. Pacific Affairs. Vol. XX, No.
1 (March, 1947), pp. 71-80.

Benitez, Conrado. "The Human Factor in Our Economic Readjust­

ment," Bulletin No. 17. National Research Council,
Manila: September, 1948, pp. 165-168.
Bernardo, Gabriel A. "Sungka - Philippine Variant of a Widely
Distributed Game," The Philippine Social Science
Review. Vol. IX, No. ~1 (March, 1937), pp. 1-36.
Bernstein, David. "America and Dr. Laurel," Harper1s Magazine.
Vol. 197, No. 1181 (October, 1948), pp. 82-88.

Bernstein, Joseph. "The Future of the Philippines and the

Netherlands East Indies." Amerasla. 7 (October 25.
1943), pp. 354-362.
 586

Bigornia, Jesus. "Cablli Hits Abaca Land Lease Plan," The

Manila Daily Bulletin. Vol. 140, No. 59 (December 8,
1949), pp. 1, 20.
Bisson, T.A. "The United States in the Pacific," Pacific
Affairs. Vol. V, No. 12 (December, 1932), pp. 1047-
10&6 .
Boado, Eugenio. "Bad Management Responsible for Projects
Failure," Philippines Herald. Year 30, No. 87,
(January 20, 1950), p! 2.

Bocobo, Jorge (Secretary of Public Instruction). "Streams in

Philippine Education," The Teachers College Journal.
Vol. II, No. 1 (July-September, 1940), pp. 1-5.
Boericke, William F. "Philippine Mines: Recent Progress,"
FES. Vol. 17, No. 17 (September 8, 1948), pp. 202-205.

________ . "Philippine Mine Labor," FES, Vol. 15, No. 3

(February 13, 1946), pp. 37-39.

_____ . "Rehabilitation of Philippine Mining," FES. Vol.

16, No. 10 (May 21, 1947), pp. 113-115.

Borromeo, Horacio Q. "The 100 Decisive Days," Manila Times

Mid-Week Review. Vol. Ill, No. 25 (February 22,
1950), pp. 4-5.

Buaken, Manuel. "Our Fighting Love of Freedom," Asia. Vol.

43 (June, 1943), pp. 357-359.
Buencamino, Felipe, Jr. "Greater Rice Output Goal," The
Philippines Herald (Rice Supplement), Vol. 87, No. 48
(October-1, 1949)", pp. 1, 2, 6.

Buencamino, Victor. "Problems and Adjustments in the Rice

Industry," Bulletin No. 17. National Research Council.
Manila: September, 1938, pp. 46-49.

. "The NARIC and the Nationalization of the Rice

Industry," The Commercial and Industrial Manual of
the Philippines. 1937-1938" pip. 334-335.

Bunag, J.J. "Highlights in Food Production," ACIL. Vol. X, No.

10 (October, 1948), pp. 4, 31.

"Bureau Backs Copra Rules," Manila Chronicle. Year 4, No. 36

(June 1, 1948), pp. 9-10.

Bureau of Commerce. "Philippine-American Trade Relations," The

PgC.J o l . XIII, No. 2 (February, 1937), pp. 4-18,
 587

"Business Conditions In the Provinces During 1937," PJC.

Vol. XIV, No. 1 (January, 1938), pp. 11-12, S?P29.
Buss, Claude A. "The Philippines in Ibrld Politics," World
Affairs. Vol. 5, No. 1 (January, 1951), pp. 37-47.
"Busuanga Island: Leading Source of Philippine Manganese."
The globe (Shanghai), Vol. I, No. 5 (November 15, 1941),
pp. 31—35.

Calderon, Fernando. "Why Not a Dominion Status?" Commonwealth

Advocate. Vol. 7, No. 5 (June, 1941), pp. lT'-'le, 37.~
Calinisan, Melanio R. "The Tambolilid Coconut," Philippine
Educator. Vol. IV, No. 2 (August, 1949), pp. “
51-53.'
(Reprinted from the Plant Industry Digest. Vol. VI.
No. 7, July, 1948.).

"Camarines Sur Has No Food Problems," Administration Magazine.

Vol. I, No. 4 (December 15, 1948), pp. ^3, 74.
Camus, Jose S. "One Year of Our Food Production Campaign,"
ACIL. Vol. IX, No. 7 (July, 1947), pp. 15, 34.

________ . "Aerial Survey of Philippine Lands," The Philip­

pines Herald (Rice Supplement), Vol. 87, No. 48 (Oc­
tober 1, 1949), pp. 6, 7, 11.

________. "Next Rice Yield Enough, Camus," ACIL. Vol. IX,

No. 8 (August, 1947), p. 34.

________ . "Of Filipinos and Fisheries," ACIL. Vol. XI, No.

9 (September, 1949), pp. 9, 34.
Cariaga, Roman R. "Rice Economy: A Private View," The
Philippines Herald (Rice Supplement), Vol. 87, No. 48
(October 1, 1949), pp. 1, 9, 11.

Castillo, Andres, "Central Banking In the Philippines."

Pacific Affairs. Vol. XXI, No. 4 (December, 1948),
pp. 360-371.

________ • "Economic Upbuilding of the Philippines." In:

New Philippines. 1934, pp. 65-81. (See citation:

________ • "Important Economic Accomplishments of the Common­

wealth. A Resume of Notable Achievements during the
Last Five Years " The Campus Leader. Vol. 10, No. 7
(December, 1940), pp.-7, 29. (The organ of The
University of Manila).
 588

________ . "The New Economic Policy of the Philippines," The

Philippine Commonwealth Handbook (1936), pp. 157-177.
(See citation under De La Liana.).

Castillo, Teofilo del. "The Dawn Civilization," The Teachers

College Journal. Vol. II, No. 1 (July-September, 19407,
pp. 57-64. (Continued article).
Celeste, Jose L. "The Economic Bases of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines." UNITAS. Vol. XIV, No. 7 (January,
1938), pp. 405-410. (The Organ of Santo Tomas
University.).
"Cellulose Manufacturing Prom Abaca Fiber is Urged," PJC. Vol.
XIII, Nos. 10-11 (October-November, 1937), p. 4.
Clmazala, C*0. "The Legal Personality of Philippine Labor
Unions," Philippine Law Journal, Vol. XX, (October,
1941), pp. 138-153.

"Coco Planters Wage War on Bad Copra Exporters." Manila

Chronicle. Year III, No. 207 (December 12, 1947), p. 11.

"Coco-nut Palm." Encyclopaedia Brltannlca. Chicago? Ency­

clopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1947 edition, Vol. 5, p. 950.
Cohen, Nathaniel A. "Public Health in the Philippines," FES,
Vol. 15, No. 6 (March 27, 1946), pp. 87-90.
"Commonwealth Economic Review," Progressive Farming. Vol.
II, No. 1 (January, 1938), p. 28.

Concepcion, Isabel and Juan Salcedo Jr., "A Rational Food

Program For the Republic," Journal of the Philippine
Pharmaceutical Association. VolY XXXIII7No. 6 (December
15, 1 9 4 6 ) , (Author should be: Isabel Concepcion.).
Concepcion, Isabelo. "The Development of Nutrition Work in
the Philippines," Bulletin No. 5. National Research
Council. Manila: 1935, pp. 563-507.

________ • and M. Ocampo. "The Normal Pelidin Index of the

Filipinos," NASB. Vol. II, No. 1 (January, 1932),
pp. 33-42.

________• "Nutritional Requirements of Filipinos," Journal

of Philippine Medical Association. Vol. XIII, No. 1
(January, 1933).

________ • "The Physical Growth of Filipinos." Bulletin of

San Juan de Dios Hospital. Vol. 8, No. 5 (May, 1934).
 589

. and Juan Salcedo, Jr. and E. Bulatao. "Studies

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Affairs. Vol. XiV, No. 3 (September, 1941), pp. 287-
299. Also Ini The Commonwealth Advocate. Vol. VII,
No. 5 (June, 194l), pp. 9-11, 28, 30-32.

Valencia, Teodoro F. "2,500 Hectares of Davao Penal Area to be

Converted Into Productive Land," The Philippines Herald.
Vol. 83, No. 102 (December 3, 194977 P P • 1* 4.
Venkatasubbiah, H. "The Place of Asia in History and in the
Contemporary World, Asian Horizon. Vol. I, No. 1
(Spring, 1948), pp. 23-31.

Vllladolid, Deograclas. "Problems In Philippine Fisheries

Including Icthyology and Herpetology," Bulletin No. 5 .
National Research Council, Manila: 1935, pp. 437-446.

________. "Government Activities in the Promotion of Philippine

Fisheries," The Commercial and Industrial Manual of the
Philippines. 1937-1938. pp. 329-333.
 614

"Problems and Adjustment In the Fishing Industry,"

Bulletin So. 17. National Research ^ouncil, Manila*
September, 1938, pp. 25-29.
_. "What You Shoiili Know of the New Bureau of Fisheries,"
ACIL. Vol. IX, No. 7 (July, 1947), p. 14.

"Let Us Stop the Use of Explosives and Poisons in

Fishing," ACIL. Vol. No. 3 (March, 1948), pp. 7,
29, 31.
Villanueva, Jesus H. "Our Presidential Candidates," Service
Journal. Vol. I, No. 2 (October, 194S), pp. 33, 67.
Villarama, Antonio C. "Medical and Dental Activities in the
Scheme of Philippine Rehabilitation," Philippine
Rehabilitation Journal of Philippine Problems. Vol.
I, No. 10 (December, 1949)^ pp. 22, 89.
"Villarama Informs WHO Assembly of P.I.’s Health Accomplish­
ments, The Manila Times (Independence Day Supplement),
Vol. IV, No"/ 321 (July 4, 1949), p. 16a.
Villa-Real, Antonio (Justice). "Labor Legislation In the
Philippines," Philippine Law Journal. Vol. XIX, No. 8
(February, 19407^ pp. 357-367.
Villegas, Jose Armando. "Boosting the Guano Mining Industry,"
ACIL. Vol. * 1 , No. 10 (October, 1949), pp. 24-26.

Villegas, Valente, "Animal Husbandry Investigations In the

Philippines," Bulletin No. 6 . National Research
Council Annual Report for 1934-1935. Manila* 1935, p.
542. (A portion of Bulletin No. 2 . February, 1935.).
VInacke, Harold M. "Implications of Japanese Foreign Policy
For the Philippines and Southeastern Asia." AAAPSS.
226 (March, 1943), pp. 50-61.

________ • "United States Far Eastern Policy," Pacific Affairs.

Vol. XIX, No. 4 (December, 1946), pp. 351-363“.

Vivencio, Macario T. "Prospects of Our Tobacco Industry,"

The Manila Times Midweek Review. Vol. 2, No. 20
(December 15, 1948), p . <22.
Weber, Elizabeth A. "Political Ideas and Folklore." Intro­
duction to Politics. 1946, pp. 34-61. (See citation
under Peel.)•

Why Does Not the Government Speak," Editorial, The Lawyers1

Journal. Vol. VI, No. 32 (November 20, 1938), p p . 1021 -
1022 •
 615

Wickizer, V.D. Review of ’’The Beyster Report," FEQ, Vol. 9,

No. 1 (November, 1949), pp. 103-106. -

Wilk, Kurt. "The International Sugar Regime," The American

Political Science Review, Vol. XXXIII, No. 5 (October,
1939), pp. 860-878.

Yenko, F.M. "Certain Industrial Possibilities of Coconut and

Nipa Sap," Bulletin No. 9 . National Research Council.
Manila: February. 1935, p. 5 (Separate from Report
No. 1, 42 pages.)•

Zelinsky, William. "The Indochinese Peninsula: A Demographic

Anomaly," F E S . Vol. IX, No. 2 (February, 1950),
pp. 115-145.
 616

PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS

Administration Magazine. Vol. I (1948). Published monthly

In Manila.
Adult Education in Action. Monthly. Manila. Vol. I, No.
1 (January, 1939) — --— ? (Mimeo.). By the Office
of Adult Education.
Agr i cultural-Commerclal-Indus trial Life. Vol. IX, No. 1
TJanuary, 1947) (First volume and number
after the war. Formerly Agricultural Life. February,
1934 -— to war.) Published monthly in Manila.
American Chamber of Commerce Journal. The. Monthly: Manila:
Vol. XXI, No. 1 (December, 194 5 V , ------ .
Asia. Monthly. New York. Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (January, 1933)
Vol. XLVI, No. 12 (December, 1946). Variant
title: Asia and the Americas. (Began publication as
United Nations World. February, 1947).
Baguio Midland Courier. Vol. I, 1947 Weekly. Baguio.
Baguio Reporter. The. Baguio, Quarterly. ? - Christmas Number
(December, 1948 - January, 1949) ?
Bulletin of the South Sea Association. Vol. I, No. 1 (Septem-
b a r V 1938) ------? Tokyo: No. 6 Marunouchi 3-Chome,
Kojimachi-ku.

Business Digest and Buyer's Guide. Vol. I, No. 1 (May, 1947)--

Campus Leader. The. Vol. I, No. 1 (1931) ------ .

City Gazette. The. Published Fortnightly by the Office of the

Mayor of the City of Manila. Vol. I, No. 1 (October
10, 1 9 4 2 ) ------?

Commerce. Monthly: Published by Chamber of Commerce of the

Philippines (Manila) Vol. 40, No. 8 (October, 1946)----
Commerce and Industry Bulletin. Published quarterly by the
Department of Commerce and Industry. Manila: Vol. I,
No. 1 (Third Quarter, 1 9 4 9 ) ------ .

Commonwealth Advocate. The. Monthly (Manila): Vol. I, No. 1

(February, 1934)

Critics Review. The. Vol. I (1947) ? Monthly, English-

Spanish.
 617

Current Affairs. Published by the Bureau of Current Affairs,

United Kingdom, for UNESCO.

Current Events Review. Monthly except May and June. Manila.

Vol. I, No. 1 (November, 1945) — .

Dally Mirror. The. Vol. I, No. 1 (May 2, 1949)

Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources News Bulletin.

Issued bi-monthly. Manilas Vol. I, N o . 1 (January-
February, 1946) --
Employee, The. Official organ of the Philippine Government
Employees Association. Monthly. Vol. Ill, No. 1
(July, 1947) (Notes Entered as second class
mail Matter in Manila Post Office, July 12, 1947.)
Far East Advertiser. Monthly, New York. Vol. I, No. 1 (July,
1946| .

Far Eastern Survey. Published fortnightly by the American

Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. Vol. I, No. 1
( 1932)------ .

Farming and Cooperatives. Monthly. Official organ of the

Philippine Farmers' Association. Vol. I, No. 1
(January, 1946) ------.

Fillpina. Monthly. Manilas Vol. I. No. 1 (July, 1944) ----

Vol. I, No. 4 (October, 1944?? In English and Tagalog.
Flliplnlana Reference Shelf : A compilation of Selected
Speeches, Orations, Debates, Articles and Essays about
the Philippines. Vol. I, No. 1 (December, 1 9 4 0 ) --- -
Vol. I, No. 10 (September, 1941). Ed. by Federico
D. Sales. (Periodical, ended with last issue).

Filipinos Contemporary Verse and Prose. Number 1, Manilas

September, 1946. Only issue.

Filipino Observer. The. (Quarterly) January, 1948, Manilas

special edition. (Vol. I, No. 29 (December 7, 1945) ---?
Weekly. Possibly another publication.)
Filipino Teacher. The. Manila. Monthly. Vol. I, No. 1
(September(?), 1946) ---- .

Filipino Youth. English-Tagalog, intermittent. Vol. I, No. 1

(October, 1946) ---- ?

Fookien Times. Pie. Daily, except Sunday. Manilas Vol. I, No. 1

August *23 ( 1 9 4 7 ) -- - . Post war numbers. English
edition is weekly.
 6X8

Free Worker. The. Official organ of the Federation of Free

Workers. (Anti-Communist Union). Vol. 1, No. 1
(March, 1951) ------.
Geographical Review. The. Quarterly. New York. Vol. XXIV,
No. 1 (January, 1934) --- -.
Graphic. Vol. XII, No. 13 to Vol. XII, No. 29 (September 1,
1938, to December 29, 1938). Weekly. Generally
unavailable.
I.P.R. Bulletin. Published by the Philippine Council Institute
of Pacific Relations, Manila. (No. 1, 1937.) Began
publication as monthly with No. 3, January 20, 1938.
(Mimeo.) ------?
Labor. Quarterly Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor. Manilas
Vol. I, No. 1 (June, 1 9 1 9 ) ------?
Labor Bulletin. Manila. Monthly. Published by the Department
of Labor. Vol. I, No. 1 (October, 1945)----- ? (Mimeo.).
Lawyers* Journal. The. Vol. VI, No. 1 (January 10, 1938)----
Vol. VIII, No. 23 (December 25, 1940); Vol. X, No. 1
(September, 1945) — --— .
Local Government Review. The. Vol. I, No. 1 (January, 1949)
------? Manila: Monthly.

Manila and the Philippines. Published by: The American Express.

(1938 edition) 128 pp.
Manila Bulletin. The. Vol. 126, No. 1 (February 25, 1946)------.
________. 51at Anniversary Edition. Vol. 145, No. 73 (March
26, 195^), 5 SectionsJ Section I, "Looking to the
Future, 32 pp.; Section II, "A Year of Reexamination,"
32 pp.;' Section III, "Barometers of Advancement,"
32 pp.; Section IV, "Filipinos at Work and Play,"
32 pp.; Section V, "Enterprise and Point Four," 32 pp.
Manila Chronicle. The. Vol. I, No. 1, (April 21, 1945) ------ .
Manila Times. The. Vol. I, No. 1 (September 5, 1945) -- —
Marsman Magazine. The. Monthly. Manila. Vol. I, No. 1 (July,
1936) — -- ?

Mindanao Times. The. Davao. Published every Wednesday and

Saturday. Vol. I, No. 1 (1946 - January ?)

Mining Newsletter. Bi-monthly, published by the Philippine

Society of Mining, Metallurgical and Geological Engineers.
Manila: Vol. I, No. 1 (September-October, 1949) -— — -.
 619

Minlsphil Tokyo Fortnightly. Official organ of the Philippine

Mission in Japan, Tokyo, Vol. I, No. 1 (March 10,
1950) .
Monthly Review of Philippine Business Conditions. Bureau of
Commerce. Manila: (Scattered numbers, 1940-1941.)•

Newspaperman. The. Monthly. Published by Philippines News­

paper Guild. Vol. I, No. 1 (July, 1947) --- -?
Nippon Times Weekly. Tokyo. Scattered numbers for 1944.

Nutrition News. Vol. I, No. 1 (February, 1948) ----- • Issued

monthly by the Institute of Nutrition, Manila. (Mimeo.)
Official ■Souvenir Program. Third Anniversary of the Republic
of the Philippines. Vol. Ill, No. 3, (July 4, 1949),
P.D. Aveo, Publisher: Defender Publ. Co., Manila,
168 pp.
Pacific Affairs. Monthly, from 1927 to 1933 (Honolulu).
Quarterly, from First Quarter (Vol. VII), 1934
(March) ------ . (New York).
Pacific Discovery. Bi-monthly. California Academy of Sciences,
Berkeley. Vol. I, No. 1 (January-February, 1948)------ .
Pacific Frontiers and the Philippines. Monthly. Los Angeles,
Vol. I, No. 1 (April, 1945) -----.

Panorama. Vol. I, No. 1 (January, 1936).

People’s Review. The. Fortnightly. (Formerly published in
Iloilo City as a weekly newspaper.) Vol. I, No. 43
(November, 1946). (First issue, post-war.) ------?
Philippine Accountants1 Journal. The. Monthly: Official Organ
of the Philippine Institute of Certified Public
Accountants. Vol. I, No. 1 (January, 1938) --
Vol. I, No. 10 (October-November-December, 1938).
Philippine Agricultural Review. The. Manila: Vol. I, No. 1
(January, 1907) — — Vol. VII, Nos. 10, 11, and 12
(October, November, December, 1914). Published quarter­
ly beginning with first quarter, 1915. Later: The
Philippine Journal of Agriculture.

Philippine Almanac: 1958-1939. M. Farolan, ed. Manila. (1939),

18, A456 and A140 pp. Business and General Reference
Book on the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Philippine-American. T h e . Vol. I, No. 1 (September, 1945)— --- ?
 620

Philippine Armed Forces Journal. Monthly, Camp Murphy,

Quezon City. Vol. I, No. 1 (November, 1947) -—

Philippine Bank of Commerce Monthly Letter. The. Manila:

Philippine Business Digest. Vol. I, (1946) ----- ? (Weekly)
Manila.
Philippine Business Journal. Fortnightly. Vol. I, No. 1
(September 15, 1945) ------? Manila.
Philippine Commerce Magazine. The. (Monthly) Manila, Vol. I,
NoV 1 7August, 1947) — ?

Philippine Congressional Recorder. Monthly. Manila: Vol. I,

No. 1 (August, 1946) — — — ?
Philippine Educator. The. "Organ of the Philippine Public
School Teachers Association." Vol. I, No. 1 (July,
1 9 4 5 ) ------ .
Philippine Forum. The. Vol. I, No. 1 (December, 1935)
Philippine Leprosy News. Monthly. Manila: Vol. I, No. 1
(July, 1928) — --- ?
Philippine Life. Monthly. Manila: Vol. I , No. 1 (October,
1938) --- Vol. I, No. 3 (December, 1938).
Philippine Magazine. Vol. XXX, No. 1 (June, 1933) ----
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 12 (December, 1941). Monthly, Manila,
A.V.H. Hartendorp, ed.
Philippine Minins News. Monthly. Manila. Vol. I, No. 1
(October, 1 9 3 2 ) ......?
Philippine Newspic. Vol. I, No. 1 (December, 1946) — -?
(Monthly).
Philippine Outlook. Published monthly excepting February and
March which are combined in one issue: The "Anniver­
sary Issue". Vol. I, No. 1 (January, 1948) — —
Philippine Progress. Vol. I, No. 1 (July, 1947) ----- ?
(Official organ of the Philippine Contractors Associa­
tion, Inc.) Monthly.
Philippine Relief and Trade Rehabilitation Administration
Journal. Shorter title: Philippine Rehabilitation
Journal. Variant title: PRATRA Philippine Rehabilita­
tion Journal of Philippine Problems. Official journal
of that Administration. Monthly. Manila: Vol. I,
No. 1 (March, 1 9 4 9 ) ------?
 621

Philippine Review, Vol. I, No. 1 (March, 1943) ----- Vol. II,

No. 10 (December, 1940).
Philippine Social Science Review. The. Vol. I, No. 1 (January,
1929) . CJuarterly, Manila. Intermittent, post­
war. First published by The Philippine Academy of
Social Sciences. Now published by the University of
the Philippines, College of Liberal Arts, as The
Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review.
Philippine Trader and Investor. The. Weekly. An economic
bulletin published by Securities Service Corporation,
Manila: Vol. I, No. 1 (June 7, 1 9 3 7 ) ----- ?
Phlllppines-China Cultural Journal. The. Published monthly by
the Philippines-China Cultural Association. Vol. I,
No. 1 (February, 1 9 4 7 ) ------?
Philippines Free Press. .Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 2, 1 9 4 6 ) ------ .
Weekly.
Philippines Herald Yearbook. The. (14th Anniversary Supplement).
Vol. II, September 29, 1934, 160(?) pp.
________. 1935-1936. Vol. Ill, (November 1, 1935), 224 pp.
Philippines Herald. The. (Rice Supplement). Vol. 87, No. 48
(October~T^ 1949)•
________. Year XXX, Vol. 87, No. 1 (August 9, 1 9 4 9 ) ------ .
(evening edition). (Formerly, morning and evening).
Phi 1lppines-Japan♦ Monthly. Tokyo: Vol. I, No. 1 (January,
1935) -----?

Philippines Today. The. Vol. I, No. 1 (April, 1 9 4 6 ) ------?

Bi-monthly.
Popular Newspic. Vol. I, No. 1 (July, 1947) ----- ? Monthly.
Post. The. Manila. Vol. I, No. 1 (March 6, 1945) ---- Vol.
Ill, No. 275 (November 23, 1947). Published daily as
the Manila Post. Sundays as the Sunday Post, with
magazine section.
Post Yearbook. The. 1945-1946. 1st Anniversary edition of the
Manila Post. 134 pp., Manila, (1946). Now defunct.

Progressive Farming. (Combined with The Philippine Tobacco

JournalJ (begun about 1935). Year I, No. 1, (June,
1937) “-----?
 622

Promenader. The. Manila, weekly (entertainment). Vol. I, No.

1 (July 21, 1945) ------ ?

Recorder: The Magazine the Nation Knows. Quarterly. "Depart­

ment of Finance Special Number." Manilaj Recorder
Publishing Co., Vol. XII, No. IV (December, 1947),
202 pp. "The National Mouthpiece of Governmental
Affairs," "Devoted to Publicizing the Activities and
Achievements of the Government. Prewar publication,
reissued after the ifar with the issue of May, 1946,
"The Special General Douglas MacArthur Number,"
Followed by: "Office of the President of the Philip­
pines Special Number"; "Yuletide Special Number" (1946);
"Philippines Special number" (Philippine-American
Relations); a special issue for the first anniversary
of the Republic; and, the "President Roxas and His
Cabinet Special Number", 1947.

Saturday Graphic Magazine. Weekly, Manila. (Scattered numbers,

1935-19397)

Service Journal. Manila, quarterly. Vol. I, No. 1 (July, 1949)

Shin Selki (New Era). (August, 1942 - November 1, 1944).

South East A s i a . Monthly. Published by South East Asia

Association. Manila. Vol. I, No. 1 (October, 1949) — .

Star Reporter. The. Vol. I, No. 1 (June 9, 1945) ---- — .

Teachers College Journal. The. Published by the National Tea­

chers College. Quarterly. Manila; Vol. I, No. 1
(July-September, 1939) ------ ?

Tokyo Gazette. Monthly. Published by the Foreign Affairs

Association of Japan. No. 1, July, 1937 ------ ?

Tribune. The. XIV Anniversary Number (June 17, 1939), 161 pp.
(TVi Corporation, Manila).

U.M. Law Gazette. The. Published monthly by the College of Law,

The University of Manila. Vol. I, No. 1 (September,
1939) Vol. I. No. 6 (February, 1940); Vol. II,
No. 1 (July, 1940) ---- Vol. II, No. 9 (March-April,
1941). No Numbers after the war.

United Nations World. Monthly. New York. Vol. I, No. 1

(February, 1947) ------ .
Weekly Business News Review. Central Bank of the Philippines, Depart-
ment ^ f alconomic Research. No. 1, June 10, 1949 ---- .
World Today. The. Published monthly by the Royal Institute of Inter­
national Affairs, London. Vol. I, No. 1 (January, 1944)------.
 623

OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

Administrative Report of the Commission of the Census.

December 4. 1936 - December 51. 1940. Manilas 1941,
392 pp., typescript.

Alphabetical List of Political Subdivisions. Census of the

Philippines. 1939. Special Bulletin No. 2 . Manilas
Commission of the Census, 1940, 138 pp.

Annual Report of the Bank Commissioner of the Philippines to

the Honorable the Secretary of Finance, for the Fiscal
Year Ended June 30, 1940. Department of Finance,
Bureau of Banking. Manilas Bureau of Printing, 1941,
66 pp.

Blue Book of the First Year of the Republic. Manilas Bureau

of Printing, July 4, 1947, 405 pp.

Bureau of Agriculture. Suggestions for the Selection and

Saving of Garden S e e d s . Circular No. 40, Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 1925, 5 pp.

. A Descriptive List of Some Forage Grasses for Dis­

tribution by the Bureau of Agriculture for Trial
Planting. Circular No. 162, Manila: Bureau of Print­
ing, 1926, 3 pp.

. A Descriptive List of Some Sugar Cane Varieties

Recommended for Trial Planting by the Bureau of Agri­
culture. Circular No. 163, Manilas Bureau of Printing,
1926, 6 pp.

________ . Cultivation of H a n g - H a n g (cananglum adoratum).

Circular No. 59, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1925, 2 pp.

________ • Descriptive List with Cultural Directions of Tobacco

Varieties Grown and Distributed by the Bureau of Agri­
culture . Circular No. 186, Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1926 (?), 7 pp.

_____ • How to Select and Store Seed Corn by the ”Halayhaytt

Method. Circular No. 58, Manilas Bureau of Printing,
1925, 2 pp.

________ • Increasing Rice Crop by Seed Selection. Circular

No. 41, Manilas Bureau of Printing, 1925, 5 pp.

________ . Instructions for Planting Lowland Palay. Circular

No. 4V, Manilas Bureau of Printing, 1925, 2 pp.
_________. Instructions for Planting Upland Palay. Circular No.
46, Manilas Bureau of Printing, 1925, 3 pp.
 624

________ . Pointers on Goat Raising. Circular No. 185. Manila:

Bureau of Printing, 1925, 7 pp.

________ . Propagation of Peanuts and Their Preparation for

Market (arachis Hypogea). Circular No. 52 (Revised),
Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1925, 1 p.

________ . Selected Radio Lectures on Agricultural Topics.

Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1925, 54 pp. Contains:
"Some Suggestions for Eruit Growers," by Jose S. Camus;
"The Importance of a Nursery,” by Marcelino Constantino;
"Improvement of Livestock in the Philippines," by Alfonso
Tuason; "The Swine Industry in the Philippines, by
Jose G. Guevara; "The Soil Fertility Problem in the
Philippines," by Gregorio Santos y Ciocon; "Insects and
Their Control,” by Faustino Q. Otanes, and "Locust
Pest and Its Control," by Nicanor G. Tpodoro.

_________. The Most Common Dangerous Communicable Diseases of

Animals in the Philippines and Their Prevention. Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 1929, 16 pp.

_________. Valuable Forage Crops For the Philippines. Circular

No. 50, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1925, 6 pp.

Bureau of Animal Industry. Annual Reports. 1934-1949. Depart­

ment of Agriculture and Commerce. Manila.

Bureau of Census and Statistics. A .Social Census of Vigan.

Ilocos Sur and Llpa. Batangas. A study of Postwar Human
Resources of the PhilippinesBased on Data secured from
the Population of Two Communities December, 1947.
Conducted jointly as an Inter-Governmental Project with
assistance of three consultants on social welfare from
the United Nations, Lake Success. Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1948, 167 pp.; 52 tables. (Mimeo.).

. Bulletin of Philippine Statistics. Vol. II, No. 1

_

(March, 1946), 267 pp.; 113 tables. (Mimeo.). (First

post-war number). Published quarterly by the Bureau,
under the Office of the President. (This number apparent­
ly the only number after the War).

• Facts and Figures about Economic and Social Conditions

_

of the Philippines. 1948-49. Manila: Bureau of Print­

ing, 1950 , 303 pp.

Bureau of Commerce. Trade Directory of the Philippines: 1946.

Manila: 1946, 298, A-108 pp.

Bureau of Health Statistics. 1949, 7 tables. (Mimeo.). Secured

from Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., Institute of Nutrition,
Manila.
 625

________ . Journal of Philippine Statistics. Vol*. IV, Nos. 1-6

(January-June, 1949J. Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1949, 267 pp.; 186 tables, (Mimeo.). (First Post-war
edition). Published irregularly.

________ . Yearbook of Philippine Statistics: 1940. Manila:

Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1941, 485 pp.

________ . Yearbook of Philippine Statistics. 1946. Manila:

Bureau of Printing, 1947, 4§&,_pp_^_;__ 291_tables; 2
appendices. Published irregularly.

Bureau of Commerce. Trade Directory of the Philippines: 1946.

Manila: 1946, 298, A-108 pp.

Bureau of Health Statistics. 1949, 7 tables. (Mimeo.).

Secured from D r . Juan Salcedo, Jr., Institute of Nutrition,
Manila.

Bureau of Plant Industry. Report for August. 1946. Manila:

November 1, 1946. Unpaged, typescript, MS File copy
loaned by Mr, Jose <q. Dacanay and M. Manas y Cruz,
September 21, 1949.

_________ . A Guide For Visitors to the Bureau of Plant Indus­

try! Manila: 1949, 5 pp.", (Mimeo.)•

________ . Annual Report for Period ending June 30. 1947.

Manila: 1947, 30 pp., typescript. MS File copy loaned
by Jose Q. Dacanay and M. Manas y Cruz. September
21, 1949.

________ . Annual Report for Year ending June 30. 1948. Manila:
1948, unpaged, typescript. MS File copy loaned by
Jose Q. Dacanay and M. Manas y Cruz.

________ . Annual Report. Including progress in the Rehabilita­

tion of Plant Industries for the ^rop Year ending June"
30. 1949. Manila: 1949, 86 pp., typescript. Loaned
by Jose q. Dacanay and M. Manas y Cruz, November, 1949.

Census of the Philippines: 1939. 5 volumes.

Vol. I. Census of Population. Reports by Provinces Part
I. Abra to Camarines .Sur; Part II. Capiz to Lanao;
Part III. Leyte to Palawan; Part IV. Pampanga to Zam­
boanga. Manila: Bureau of Printing, September 16, 1940.
Variously paged.
Vol. II. Summary for the Philippines and General Report
for the Census of Population and Agriculture. Manila:
Bureau of Printing, May 2, 1941, 1752 pp.
 626

Vol. III. Reports by Provinces for the Census of Agri­

culture. Manila; Bureau of Printing, December 16, 1940, ISIS pp.
Vol. IV. Reports for‘Economic Census. Forestry. Transportation.
Fisheries. Mines. Electric Light and Power. Washington.
D . C . * 1943, 678 pp. Photo reproduction. Paper.
Vol. V. Census Atlas of the Philippines. Manila; Bureau
of Printing, January 14, 1941. 42 maps; 13 and 95 pp.;
and various lists.

Central Bank of the Philippines. Statistical Bulletin December.

1949. Vol. I, No. 1. Prepared by the Department of
Economic Research. Manila: 1949, unpaged, (Mimeo.).

_________. Economic Indicators. Manila; 1949, 55jp., Photo-offset.

Civil Code of the Philippines. .(Republic Act No. 386). Manila;

Bureau of Printing, 1949, 426 pp.

Debate on Philippine Independence. "Extract from Congressional

Record of Tuesday. January 17. 1933." 72nd Congress,
Second Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1933, 18 pp.

Department of Agriculture and Commerce. Annual Reports. 1934-

1949. With the institution of the Republic, in 1946,
the Department was reorganized into two: The Department
of Agriculture and Natureal Resources, and The Depart­
ment of Commerce and Industry. Each Department published
its own reports after 1946, beginning in 1949.

. Atlas of Philippine Statistics. Manila; Bureau of

Printing, 1939, 42 pp.; maps.

_________. Climate of the Philippines. Manila; Bureau of

Printing, 1939, 31 pp., 10 plates and 4 tables.

_________. Perris Industry in the Philippines. Manila: Bureau

of Printing, 1939, 10 pp.

_________. Economic and Social Conditions of the Philippine

Islands: 1955^ Special Supplement to the Philippine
Statistical Review. Vol. 2. Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1935, 84 pp.

_________. Facts and Figures About the Philippines. Manila:

Bureau of Printing, 1939, 102 pp. Revised Edition;
Information Division, Office of the Resident Commissioner
of the Philippines, Washington, D . C . ; 1942, 64 pp.

. Fish and Game Resources of the Philippines. Manila:

Bureau of Printing, 1939, 38 pp.
 627

________ . Forest Resources of the Philippines, Manila: Bureau

of Printing, 1939, 46 pp.

________ • Land Resources of the Philippines. Manila: Bureau

of Printing, 1939, 28 p p .

________ . Mango Industry in the Philippines. Manila* Bureau

of Printing, 1939, 10 pp.

________ . Mining Industry in the Philippines. Manila: Bureau

of Printing, 1939, 22 pp.

________ . Peanut Industry in the Philippines. Manila: Bureau

of Printing, 1939, 10 pp.

________ . Philippine Statistical Review. No. 4. Manila:

Bureau of Printing, 1936.

________ . Rice Industry in the Philippines. Manila: Bureau

of Plant Industry, 1939, 18 pp.

________ . The Abaca Industry in the Philippines. Manila;

Bureau of Printing, 1939, 12 pp.

________ . The Coconut Industry in the Philippines. Manila:

Bureau of Printing, 1939, 19 pp.

________ . Tobacco Industry in the Philippines. Manila: Bureau

of Printing, 1939, 12 pp.

Department of Commerce and Industry. First Annual Report of

the Secretary of Commerce and Industry: October 21,
1947, to June 30, 1948. Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1949, 56 pp.

Department of Interior. The Philippines. Second Edition.

National Information Office. Manila: Bureau of Print­
ing, January, 1939, 111 pp.

Director of Education. Thirty-fifth Annual Report. For the

Calendar year 1934. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1935,
210 pp.

________ • Thirty-sixth Annual Report. For the Calendar year

193£u Manila; Bureau of Printing, 1936, 232 pp.

________ • Thirty-ninth Annual Report. For the Calendar year

1938. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1939, 185 pp.

Hoover, Herbert. Veto Message Relating to Philippine Independence.

72nd Congress, Second Session, House Document No. 524.
"January 13, 1933.-ordered to be printed, with bill." Vfeishing-
ton,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933, 13 pp.
 628

Institute of Nutrition. Report for the Period July 1. 1948 to

June 30. 1949. Manila: 1949. MS. File copy loaned
by Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr.

Memorandum No. 1. s. 1940. "Suggestions gathered by President

Quezon1s Committee on Earthquake Study." Signed by G.R.
Maflalac. Office of Private Education, Department of
Public Instruction. Manilas February 1, 1940, 8 pp.,
(Mimeo.).

Memorandum of Secretary Rafael R. Alunan Defining His Policies

in the Department of Agriculture and Commerce. Manila:
Office of the Secretary, September 16, 1941, 4 pp.

Message on Fishing. Fish Conservation Day Program, October

29, 1949. Manila: 1949, 14 pp. ( "Proclamation No. 101").

Messages of the President. 8 volumes. Manila: Bureau of

Printing, 1935-1951.
Vol. I, (1935), 786 pp.; (Revised edition, 1938, 344pp.).
Vol. II, Pt. 1, (rev.ed.), (1938), 987 pp.
Vol. II, Pt. 2, (1937). 1373 pp.
Vol. Ill, Pt. 1, (1938), 409 pp.
Vol. Ill, Pt. 2, (1938), 1192 pp.
Vol. IV, Pt. 1, (1940), 1754 pp.
Vol. IV, Pt. 2, (1939), 1247 pp.
Vol. V, Pt. 1, (1941), 1373 pp.
Vol. V, Pt. 2, (1941), 1071 pp.
Vol. VIII, (1951), 285 pp.

The Office of the President has apparently assumed that

the collection of public addresses by President Roxas
(The Problems of Philippine Rehabilitation and Trade
Relations) forms Vol. VI. and the collection of public
addresses by President Quirino (The New Philippine
Ideology). forms Vol. VII. The most recent volume, Vol.
VIII, contains only public addresses of President Quirino,
a departure from the pre-war policy of the Commonwealth
which printed all public statements of the President, as
well as Acts of the National Assembly. The attempt is
made to justify this new, unsatisfactory policy "owing to
lack of sufficient funds." The patent absurdity of this
is obvious and the observer is left with the impression
that in actuality the creeping paralysis affecting the
Executive Department is responsible.

National Cooperatives and Small Business Corporation. Philip­

pine Laws on Cooperatives. Manila: International
Printing, 1948, 259 pp.
Official Program. Third Anniversary of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, November 15, 1938. Commonwealth Anniversary
Committee. Unpaged.
 629

Fourth Anniversary of the Commonwealth of the

Philippines, November 15, 1939. Commonwealth Anniver­
sary Committee, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1939, 32 pp.

Philippine Journal of Agriculture. The. Issued Quarterly by the

Department of Agriculture and Commerces 1933-1941;
1947---. Third Quarter, 1947, Vol. 13, No. 1 - - First
issue after 6 years. Last issue before war was 3rd
quarter, 1941, Vol. 12, No. 3.

Philippine Journal of Animal Industry. Issued Quarterly by the

Department of Agriculture and Commerce: 1933-1941;
1947-— . Vol. 9, No. 1, (July-September, 1947)---. 1st
issue since Vol. 8, No. 5, (September-October, 1941).

Philippine Journal of Commerce. The. Vol. X, No. 1 (January,

1934) ---- Vol. XVII, No. 6 (June, 1941). Issued
monthly (sometimes 2 numbers one month), published by
the Department of Agriculture and Commerce.

Philippine Statistical Review. Manila, 1934 -----? Published

quarterly by the Department of Agriculture and commerce.

Philippines. (Monthly or intermittently): Published by:

Department of Information and Public Relations, Common­
wealth of the Philippines. Vol. I, (1940) -----?

Philippines. The. Second edition. Published-by: The National

Information Office, Bepartment of Interior. Manila,
(January, 1939), 111 pp., (Pamphlet).

Plant Industry Digest. Vol. I, No. 1 (January, 1933) --- Vol.

VII, No. 11 (November, 1941); Vol. VIII, No. 10
(October, 1945) ----- . (1st vol. after war.) Published
monthly, in Manila, Bureau of Plant Industry. Preceded
by Fortnightly News. Vol. I, No. 1, (September 16, 1930)
which was generally circulated only within the Bureau.

Population by Provinces and Municipalities. Census of the

Philippines. 1939. Special Bulletin No. 1 . Manila:
Commission of the Census, 1941, 9 pp.

Population of the Philippines. Special Bulletin No. 1, Bureau

of the Census and Statistics. Manila: Bureau of Print­
ing, October 1, 1948, 84 pp. Supplement to Special
Bulletin No. 1, 32 pp. The Supplement preceded, in
publication, Special Bulletin No. 1 . The date, October
1, 1948, is used In these publications as the basisfor
the population figures.
 650

President's Action Committee on Social Amelioration. First

Annual Report. August. 1948 to July 51. 1949. Manila:
1949, 51 p p .; 5 appendices, (Mimeo.f.

________ . "Handbook on...." Manila: February, 1949, 59 pp.,

8 appendices.

________ • Social Amelioration and You. Report of the PACSA to

the People of the Philippines. Manila: August 51,
1949, 41 pp.

President of the Philippines. First Annual Report... to the

President and Congress of the United States covering
the Period November 15. 1955. to December 51. 1956.
Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1958, 79 pp.

______ Second Annual Report.. .Covering the Period January

1 to December 51. 1957. Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1958, 55 p p .

________ . Third Annual Report.♦.Covering the Period January

1 to December 51. 1958. Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1940, 64 pp.

________ . Fourth Annual Report...Covering the Period January

1 to June 50. 1959. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1940,
69 pp.

Public Law Ho. 511. 72nd Congress, H.R. 7255. "An Act To
enable the People of the Philippine Islands to adopt
a Constitution and form a government for the Philippine
Islands, to provide for the independence of the same,
and for other purposes." Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1955, 11 pp., (overriding
veto of President; passed in House of Representatives,
January 15, 1955, in the Senate, January 17, 1955.).

Quezon, Manuel Luis (President). Proclamation Nos. 4-8.

November 22 to 26, 1955: Designating calamity areas.
Messages of the President. Vol. I (rev.ed.) pp. 206-210.

________ • Proclamation No. 11, November 50, 1955: Lifting

the tariff on rice imported by the Government as a
relief measure. Messages of the President. Vol. 1
(rev. ed.), pp. &14-215.

________ • Message to Legislature: Creation of National Economic

Council, December 18, 1955. Messages of the President.
Vol. 1 (rev. ed.), pp. 79-86.

________ . Message to Legislature: On the Hice and Corn Problem.

December 19, 1955. Messages of the President. Vol. 1
(rev. ed.), p. 97.
 631

Letter to the High Commissioner, Prank Murphy.

January 11, 1936: Benefit Payments to Sugar Planters
of the Philippines Affected by the Sugar Limitation
Act of the United States Congress. Messages of the
President. Vol. 2, Pt. 1, (rev. ed.T]] (1938), p • 400.

Executive Order No. 14, January 21, 1936: Creating

a "Domestic Sugar Administration." Messages of the
President. Vol. 2, Pt. 1 (rev. ed.), (1938), pp. 794-798.

_. Executive Order No. 18, February 17, 1936: Creating

"a Rice Commission for the purpose of studying and
making recommendations on ways and means to solve the
present rice crisis and to insure a permanent supply of
rice at reasonable prices. Messages of the President.
Vol. 2, Pt. 1 (rev. ed.), p. 610.

Proclamation No. 58, April 23, 1936: Designating

“the National Rice and Corn Corporation as a Relief
Organization to import rice, free of duty. Messages of
the President. Vol. 2, Pt. 1 (rev. ed.), p. 610.

Memorandum, July 29, 1936: Interspersion of small

“landholdings between large areas of public land applied
for pasture purposes. Messages of the President. Vol.
2, Pt. 1, p. 423.

Executive Order No. 52, September 8, 1936: Consoli­

dation of Official Warehouse Receipt-Permit for Domestic
Consumption or Emergency Reserve Sugar. Messages of the
President. Vol. 2, Pt. 1, (rev.ed.), (1938), p. 8&9.

JExecutive Order No. 54, September 14, 1936: Domestic

Consumption and Emergency Reserve Sugar Allotments for
1937. Messages of the President. Vol. 2, Pt. 1, (rev.ed.)
CL938), pp. 861-869.

Message to First National Assembly: "Disposal of

Excess Sugar." Messages of the President. Vol. 2, Pt. 1,
(rev. ed.), (1938T, pp. 242-243. September 15, 1936.
Amendment of Act 4166, the Sugar Limitation Law, which
had been approved on December 4, 1934.

Message to Legislature: Vetoing Bill No. 332,

“providing for appropriation of funds for the manufacture
of improved hand looms and accessories. November 7,
1936. Messages of the President. Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 360.

Message to Legislature: Vetoing of Bill No. 1536,

providing for extension of the Angat Irrigation System,
November 29, 1936. Messages of the President. Vol. 2.
Pt. 1, pp. 381-382.
 632

_. Executive Order No. 75, December 7, 1936;

Authorizing the Domestic Sugar Administrator to Issue
Necessary Rules and Regulations. Messages of the
President. Vol. 2, Pt. 1 (rev. ed.T^ (1938), p. 912.

Administrative Order No. 32, January 22, 1937s

Directing the CIR to conduct an immediate investigation
of all the facts relating to the sugar industry and to
determine the necessity of adopting a minimum wage
or share for laborers or tenants working in the sugar-
producing areas. Messages of the President. Vol. 3, Pt.
2, p. 1154.

Speech: Philippine Constitution and Policies of the

"Commonwealth Government, April 3, 1937, Hotel Astor,
New York City, at a Luncheon Meeting of the Foreign
Policy Association on "The Future of the Philippines,"
Messages of the President. Vol. 3, Pt. 1, (1938),
pp. 64-87.

_. Speech* Woman Suffrage and Philippine Independence,

April 4, 1937. Radiocast from Washington, D.G., to
Philippines. Messages of the President. Vol. 3, Pt. 1,
(1938), pp. 88-92.

Press Statement, July 6, 1937: Quota of Domestic

"Consumption Sugar for 1937. Messages of the President.
Vol. 3, Pt. 1, (1938), p. 324.

Administrative Order No. 41, August 24, 1937* Author­

izing the Tabacalera Insurance Company to Become a
Surety Upon Official Recognizances, Stipulations, Bonds,
and Undertakings. Messages of the President. Vol. 3,
Pt. 2, pp. 1166-1167.

Speech* Creation of Chartered Cities and Social

Justice, Delivered Upon Inauguration of the City of
Iloilo, Iloilo City, August 25, 1937, Messages of the
President. Vol. 3, Pt. 1, (1938), pp. 115-120.

_• Executive Order No. 118, September 16, 1937* Creating

a "Philippine Sugar Administration." Messages of the
President. Vol. 3, Pt. 2, (1938), pp. 663-665.

Speech* Early Independence, October 18, 1937* National

Assembly, 2nd Session. Manila, Bureau of Printing, (1937),
32 pp. Reprint.

Executive Order No. 127, November 9, 1937* Creating

"an Advisory Abaca Committee. Messages of the President.
Vol. Ill, Pt. 2, (1938), p. 6791
 633

Executive Order No. 139, January 14, 1938: Creating

a National Relief Administration. Messages of the
President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 1298-1300.

Press release: January 27, 1938: Alleged terrorism

against strikers in the sugar centrals of Barotac Nuevo
and Janiuay, Iloilo. Messages of the President. Vol. 4,
Pt. 1, pp. 626-629.

Message to the B’irst National Assembly: Legislation

Confirming the International Agreement Regarding the
Regulation of Production and Marketing of Sugar, February
10, 1938. Messages of the President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1,
(1939), pp. 290-291.

Speech: Government Policies and Relation Between the

National Government and the Provinces, February 14, 1938,
Malacaftan, Manila. Messages of the President. Vol. 4,
Pt. 1, pp. 3-16. Delivered before provincial governors
and city mayors.

Speech: Social Justice for the Laborers, February

17, 1938, Malacaftan, Manila, Delivered at a luncheon
given in honor of the representatives of labor under
the leadership of Mr. Cresenciano Torres. Messages of
the President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 17-25.

. Letter: Secretary of Justice Jose Yulo, February 14,

1938: Removal from the Service of provincial Fiscal
Blanco and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Debuque of Iloilo.
Messages of the President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 559-561.

Letter: Secretary of the Interior, Elpidio Quirino,

February 14, 1938: Dismissal of the Chief of Police of
Janiuay, Iloilo and of a secret service agent of the
city of Iloilo. Messages of the President. Vol. 4, Pt.
1, pp. 562-565.

_• Speech: Excise tax on coconut oil, National Language,

and Social Justice.... Malacaftan, Manila, at tea party
in honor of coconut planters and municipal mayors....
Messages of the President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 26-38.

_. Message to Legislature: Additional Appropriation for

relief work, March 3, 1938. Messages of the President.
Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 303-304.

. Letter: Ramon Avancefia, Chief Justice. March 9,

1938: Designation of Judge Moran as special investigator
of Labor Conditions in the sugar industry. Messages of
the President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 566-567.
 634

Executive Order No. 146, April 1, 1938s Enforce­

ment of the London Sugar Agreement. Messages of the
President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 1308-1309.

_. Letters Hon. Felipe Buencamino, Jr. June 1, 1938;

Petitions of people of Nueva Ecija for an irrigation
system and of tenants of the Sabani Estate on sale of
the landholdings to them. Messages of the President.
Vol. 4, Pt. 1, p. 577.

_. Speech: Hemp Industry and Government Policies...

"June 12, 1938, Public Plaza, Maasin, Leyte. Messages
of the President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 88-95.

Message to the First National Assembly: Situation

of the Sugar Industry, August 12, 1938. Messages of
the President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 535-538.

m. Press statement, August 17, 1938s Creation of the

"National Sugar Board. Messages of the President. Vol.
4, Pt. 1, pp. 689-690.

Executive Order No. 157 (as corrected and amended by

"Executive Order No. 168.). August 17, 1938; Creating
the National Sugar Board. Messages of the President.
Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 1332-1334.

Speech; National Sugar Board and the Sugar Industry,

"Malacaftan, Manila, Delivered at the oath-taking of the
members of the board. Messages of the President. Vol.
4, Pt. 1, pp. 158-160.

Speech: Excise Tax on coconut oil, the coconut in­

dustry, and the rice situation... September 20, 1938,
at Tayabas provincial capital, Lucena, Tayabas.
Messages of the President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 209-217.

Press statement; October 7, 1938; Larger free

quota of refined sugar for exportation to the U.S.
Messages of the President. Vol. 4, Pt. 1, p. 707.

Speech; Government policy, progress of Occidental

Negros and the sugar industry, October 19, 1938,
Bacolod, Occidental Negros, Inauguration of the City
of Bacolod, Occidental Negros. Messages of the Presi­
dent, Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 229-236.

_. Message to the Second National Assembly; National

"Budget for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1940, February
7, 1939. Messages of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1,
(1941), pp. 263-275.
 635

Speech: Labor Conflicts, Social Justice, and the

Amelioration of the Laboring Class, February 14, 1939,
San Fernando, Pampanga, Delivered before a mass
gathering of laborers and farm tenants. Messages of
the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, (1941), pp. 20-32.

Message: Solution of Problems Confronting the Hemp

and Coconut Industries, February 18, 1939. Messages
of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, (1941), pp. 33-35.
Read at the convention of coconut and hemp producers
held in Manila.

Speech: Government Aid to Coconut and Hemp Indus­

tries, the Coconut Oil Excise Tax, and Payment of Land
and Income Taxes. February 22, 1939, Philippine
Chamber of Commerce Building, Manila. Delivered before
the joint convention of coconut and abaca producers.
Messages of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 36-45.

Executive Order No. 188, February 23, 1939: Revising

"Executive Order No. 139 (January 14, 1938), creating a
National Relief Administration. Messages of the Presi­
dent . Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 895-896.

Press statement, March 8, 1939: Support of President

Roosevelt on Proposed Legislation to Increase the Coco­
nut Oil Excise Tax. Messages of the President. Vol. 5,
Pt. 1, (1941), p. 432.

Executive Order No. 197, March 24, 1939: Revising

"further Executive Order No. 139 (January 14, 1938)
creating a National Relief Administration, as revised
by Executive Order No. 188 (February 23, 1939).
Messages of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 960-962.

Proclamation No. 393, March 29, 1939: Reducing

"during a certain period the import duty on husked (non-
glutinous) rice from 5 to 4 centavos a kilo. Messages
of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, p. 560.

Proclamation No. 401, May 9, 1939: Reducing during

a certain period the import duty on husked non-glutinous
rice from 5 to 4 centavos per kilo. Messages of the
President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, p. 575.

Message to the Second National Assembly: Sending of

Two Members of National Assembly Abroad to Study Best
Means of Promoting Abaca and Coconut Industries, May
17, 1939. Messages of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1,
(1941), p. 306.
Speech: Cooperation between the chief executive and
"the National Assembly; coconut oil excise tax; and consti­
tutional amendments.... May 22, 1939, Malacafian, Manila,
Delivered at the farewell banquet for Quintin Paredes.
Majority leader of the 2nd National Assembly. Messages
of the president. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 125-135. ---- ~—
 636

. Letter: Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,

June 8, 1939, Approval of bill providing for promotion
of the livestock industry through establishment of
breeding stations and stock farms. Messages of the
President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, p. 402.

Speech: Significance of rice planting day.... July

9, 1939, Buenavista, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, on the
occasion of 1st rice planting day. Messages of the
President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 141-146.

. Proclamation No. 418, July 13, 1939s Reducing

during a certain period the import duty of husked non-
glutinous rice from 5 to 4 centavos per kilo. Messages
of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, p. 598.

• Speech: Benefits Derived from the Coconut Oil

Excise Tax, Antimonan, Tayabas,"July 23, 1939. Messages
of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 164-172.

Speech: Effect of the Excise Tax on Coconut Oil on

the People of Tayabas, July 23, 1939, Quezon National
Park, Antimonan, Tayabas, Delivered at the inaugura­
tion of the Quezon National Park. Messages of the
President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, (1941), pp. 158-163.

Executive Order No. 216, July 28, 1939s Composition

of the National Relief Board, created by Executive Order
No. 197, (March 24, 1939). Messages of the President.
Vol. 5, Pt. 1, p. 990.

_. Message to the Second National Assembly: Tydings-

Kocialkowski Act, August 15, 1939. Messages of the
President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 326-332.

_. Proclamation No. 449, September 6, 1939: Reducing

during a certain period the import duty on husked non-
glutinous rice from 5 to 4 centavos per kilo. Messages
of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, p. 698.

_. Proclamation No. 453, September IS, 1939: "Publishing

the Proclamation, dated September 11, 1939, of the
President of the United States Regarding the Suspension
of Operation and Title Two of the Sugar Act of 1937.“
Messages of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 713-714.

Letter: Placido L. Mapa, President of Philippine

Sugar Association: Equitable Adjustment of Present
Participation Ratios of Sugar Centrals with Planters,
September 16, 1939. Messages of the President. Vol. 5,
Pt. 1, pp. 417-418.
 637

_________. Proclamation No. 475, October 27, 1939* Reducing

during a certain period the import duty on husked non-
glutinous rice from 5 to 4 centavos per kilo.
Messages of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, p. 791.

________ • Address: National Abaca and Other Fiber Corporation

and the Hemp Industry, November 4, 1939, Malacafian,
Manila, Delivered during the induction into office as
Manager of the NAFCO of Hon. Pedro Sabido. Messages
of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 208-210.

_________. Speech: Accomplishment of the Commonwealth and

Government Aid to Philippine Industries and Business,
New Luneta, Manila, Delivered on the occasion of the
fourth annual celebration commemorating the establish­
ment of the Government of the Commonwealth, November
15, 1939. Messages of the President. Vol. 5, Pt. 1,
pp. 211-216.

________ . Message: Improvement and Stabilization of the Abaca

Industry, November 25, 1939. Messages of the President.
Vol. 5, Pt. 1, pp. 217-218. Sent to Mr. Pedro Sabido,
manager of the NAFCO, on the occasion of the conference
of the abaca producers, at Legaspi, Albay.

Real Property. Census of the Philippines. 1939. Special

Bulletin No. 5 . Manila: Commission of the census,
1941, 635 pp.

Report of the Special Mission to the United Statess 1938-59.

Manila, bureau of Printing, (1939), 334 pp.

Social Welfare Commission. Annual Report... for the Fiscal Year

1948-1949. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1950, 57 pp.
 638

PROPAGANDA

A Christmas Message From President Qsmefia to President Roosevelt.

Leaflet, with "A Christmas Message Prom President
Roosevelt to President Osmefta” on reverse. 5 x 7
inches (app.). 1944.

A Dedication to the People of the Philippine Republic. Pro­

bably an insert in The Tribune. Issued, September 24,
1944, celebrating the day of the "Declaration of War
by the Philippine Republic.” Signed: "The Editorial
Staff." 8 x 12 inches.

A Government of Law. Speech by Sergio Osmefia delivered over

11The Voice of Freedom", November 23, 1944. Leaflet,
5 x 7 inches.

"America Challenged! The Philippines Accepted!1", Leaflet,

5 x 7 inches, Filipino artist, cartoon shows bombing
effects.

Asia is Combined. Poster, in colors, 16 x 22 inches, by M.

Tsurui.

Blackout First For Safety First. Poster, 15 x 22 inches,

probably 1944.

Ever Victorious Nippon Paratroops - Winged Knights of Liberation.

Large photographic broadside, 14 x 22 inches.

First Anniversary of the Republic of the Philippines. Broad­

side, 6 x 11-l/2 inches. Reverse contains: "Our flag
is calling, red above blue,/ To ev'ry Filipino true./
The time has come for all to stand/ To defend our
motherland.

Forever Shall It W a v e ! Broadside, in color, 8 x 12 inches.

Issued by the Bureau of Information and Public Security,
Manila, 1943, in English, Sugbuanon, Ilocano, Pampango,
Bicol, Samar-Leyte, Ilongo (Iloilo dialect) languages -
possibly others.

45 years Ago "The Filipino Congress at Malolos declared War

against the United States in 1899 for the defense of
the Philippines from American invasion." Contains
photograph of that session, and further text referring to
September, 1944. Photopics No. 122. Broadside, 10 x 15
inches.
 659

Free Philippines (airborne Edition) For the Provinces. Pub­

lished every Wednesday and Saturday by the U.S.
Information Service. Vol. I, No. 1 (September 15,
1945) -----? Published originally in photo offset,
2 pages, 8 x 11 inches.

Free Philippines (airborne Edition). Published weekly by

P.W.B., G.H.Q., O.W.I. Unit. Vol. I, No. 1 (March
25, 1945) ---— -? Photo offset, 2 pages. Manila.
7 x 10 inches.

Fundamental Japanese For Filipinos. Manilas The Department

of Information, Imperial Japanese Forces, July 7, 1942,
92 pages.

Handbook For the Organizers of "Kabataang Pangarap ni Rlzal".

Manilas Bureau of Printing, 1944, 66 pages.

Ideals of the New Philippines. "Edited by the Propaganda

Corps, Imperial Japanese Forces." Manilas 1942 (?),
37 pages.

Inaugural Address of Jose P. Laurel, delivered October 14,

1943 at the Legislative Building, Manila. Printed in
major dialects and English. English pamphlet contains
16 pages.

Japanese leaflet addressed to American soldiers in Philippines

threatening them with loss of supply lines.

Ki KImura. Aguinaldo’s Independence A r m y . Kanda, Tokyo:

Daitoa Shuppan Kabushlki Kaisha. 1943, 41 pages.

Kokuroin Slngun Ka (The Song of the Nation’s March). Issued

as broadside, 5 x 7 , words with Music, on face, in
Japanese with "red ball" superimposed. Words in
English on reverse.

Koodoo Seisin, by Lieut. Mochizuki. Contains two articles, the

second entitled, "The Nippon Spirit: The Fundamental
Motivating Force." Author was apparently a certain type
of Shinto-Christian. Uses Tenno Helka as personifica­
tion of Christian God. Probably 1943, 32 pages.
Issued probably by Bureau of Information and Public
Security, Manila.

Large Broadside, 12 x 17 Inches, of Philippine Flag. Reverse

contains Injunction to respect the Flag, and paste it
on front of residence. Issued for First Anniversary
of the "Republic",, 1944.
 640

Let There Be Peace-Join the Constabulary. Large poster, in colors,

28 x 35 inches. Issued by "Republic of the Philippines,
Board of Information." Probably issued in 1943.

Many small leaflets, 2 x 3 inches to 8 x 1 0 inches, in Japanese,

dropped by U.S. planes in Japanese-held territories.

Martza ng Bagong Pilipinas (The New Philippine March). By

Ismael Blanco and Lucie D. San Pedro. In Tagalog.
Issued as broadside 8 x 12.

Mochizuki, S. The Function of the "Bun" or Definition of One's

Position in Nippon Spirit. ("Second lecture delivered
at the Philippine Normal Institute, Philippine Public
Officers' Institute, On November 4, 1942. ) Manilaj
1942, 19 pages.

New O r d er: Short Assays (Parts I-II). "Edited by the Imperial

Japanese Forces in the Philippines.11 Manila: 1943(?),
117 pages.

1943 Calendar. Japanese-Tagalog. Contains listing of official

holidays or special events. Days of the week in Kata-
kana, Arabic numerals, months in Tagalog and Kanji.

1944 Calendar, in color, by A.S.Vel. Message from President

J.P. Laurel on bottom border of picture: "Our Salvation
Lies in the Soil. We Must Plant, Sweat and Work."

1944 Calendar, in quarters. Excellent art work by four Japanese

artists and A.S.Vel. Japanese artists: M. Tsurui, Kazu,
Nonaka and (illegible). Calendar cover contains Message:
"Without the Victory of Japan, the Independence of the
New Philippines Can Not Exist," by President J.P. Laurel.
Each quarterly page contains hortatory captions: "The
New Philippines Like the Bright Sky"; "To Work Hard
makes You Happy and Gives Glory to Your Country"; "Chil­
dren are the Jewels of the Country. Let's Look after
them to Be Healthy” ; "Close cooperation with Japan
Makes Our Country Prosperous and Happy".8 x 10 inches.

One Nation. One Heart. One Republic. "Speech delivered extem­

poraneously by Hon. Jose P. Laurel, President of the
Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence, at
the special General Assembly of the KALIBAPI, held at
the Session Hall of the Legislative Building, Manila,
on September 7, 1943." Manila: Bureau of Information
and Public Security Ministry of the Interior, 1943."
18 pages. Also printed in dialects and Japanese.
 641

Pambansang Awlt N r Pilipinas, by Julian Felipe and the Surian

NgWikang^Painbansa (Institute of the National Language).
Issued as a four-page leaflet, 1943, in color. Cover
by Tony Velasquez.

Photoplcs No. 124. Contains selected passages from American

magazines illustrating shortages in U.S. "Increasing
shortage of Both manpower and material Has Driven
America to a Desperate Attempt to Bring the War to a
Quick Termination. Nippon Calmly Awaits the Enemy to
Fall into Death Traps.” Ca. August, 1944. 10 x 16
inches.

Presidential Proclamation of Independence. Broadside, 8 x 12-1/2

inches. Designated: BIPS-Sp 4. October 14, 1943.

"Speech Delivered by the Commissioner of the Interior, Honor­

able Benigno S. Aquino before the Officers of the
USAFFE in Camp Stotsenburg, Pampanga, on July 31, 1942."
Issued probably by Bureau of Information and Public
Security, Manila, 1942. 13 pages.

The Phllippine-Nlppon Alliance. Broadside, 8 x 12-1/2 inches.

Designated: 4016-BIPS-H3 (English). Issued probably
about November, 1943.

The Propagation of the Filipino Language. Published by the

"Kalibapi". In English and Tagalog.Manila: Bureau
of Printing, 1944, 85 pages.

The Voice of the New Philippines. A Collection of Lectures on

Current Topics. Manila: Department of Information,
November, 1942, 73 pages.

"To Deal the Foe the Fatal Blow" - Photopics, No. 123. Large
photographic broadside, no date.

United States and Nine-Power P a c t . Broadside, 12 x 16 inches,

published by The Shlun-So. Tokyo, November, 1938.
Also published in "four leading vernacular newspapers
in Japan."
 642

DICTIONARIES AND GRAMMARS

Arte D e La Lengua Tagala. y Manual Tagalog. Pray Sebastian De

Totaries. Binondo (Manila): Imprenta de Miguel
Sanchez y Cie., 1865, 131, 166 pages.

A Tagalog-English Vocabulary. Published by the Institute of

National Language, Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1940, 180 pages.

Calderon, Sofronio G. Tagalog-English Vocabulary and Manual

of Conversation. 4th Edition! Manila: M. Colcol &
Co., 1947, 163 pages.

Del Mundo, Clodualdo and Amor Tablan. TalatInigang Panlukbutan

(Pocket Dictionary: Tagalog-English. Engllsh-Tagalog),
Manila: Abiva Publishing House, 1949, 144 pages.

Dlcclonario Bisaya-Espaflol« by Fr. Juan Felix De La Encarnacion.

3rd Edition. Manila: Tipografia De "Amigos Del Pais,"
1885, 437, 349 pages.

Enriquez, Jacobo P. and Maria Odulio Guzman. Pocket Dictionary

An JBnglish-Tagalog Vocabulary. Manila: Philippine
Book Co., 1949, 156 pages.

Enriquez, Jacobo, P., Jose A. Bautista and Francis J. Jamolangue,

Jr. Pocket Dictionary: Engllsh-Tagalog Visayan
(Cebuano-11ongoT! Manila: Philippine B00k Co., 1949,
249 pages.

Gramatica Hispana-Visaya-Panayana. by Fr. Raymundo Lozano (San

Miguel, Iloilo). Valladolid: Imp., Lib., Heliografia
y Taller de Grabados De Luis N. De Gavira, 1892,
278 pages.

Vocabulario De La Lengua Tagala. edited by P. Juan De Noceda

and P. Pedro De Sanlucar. Manila: Imprenta De
Ramirez y Girandier, 1860, 642 pages.
 645

MSS

Abe, Terukichi. MRice Cultivation in the Philippines."

Manila: Spring, 1942, 10 pp., typescript.

Adams, D. Inez. The Role of Rice Ritual in Southeast A s i a .

Ph. D. dissertation submitted to Faculty of Political
Science, Columbia University, New York, 1949. 158
pp., typescript.

’’Articles of Incorporation of the Philippine Institute of

International Affairs.11 Manila: 19 October, 1940,
3 p p ., (Mimeo.).

Balcos, Simplicio S. The Filipino Fight Against Communism.

MA. Thesis in Political Science, College of Liberal
Arts, The University of Manila. 1949-1950. 199 pp.

Barcelo, Angel J. The Foreign Relations of the Philippines:

A Historical Study. MA. Thesis in Political Science,
College of Liberal Arts, Graduate Studies, The Uni­
versity of Manila, 1949-1950. 153 pp.

Beyer, H. Otley. Pre-Spanish History of the Philippines.

Manila.

________ . ’’Notes on the Bearing of Recent Investigations Into

Philippine History and Racial Origin on the Question
of the Present and Future Status of the Philippine
Peoples.” Appendix A to "Wood-Forbes Report, un­
published. Manila: August, 1921, 29 pp., typescript.

________ . ”Notes for Fr. Ewing Regarding Burial Caves in the

Philippines.” Manila: October 24, 1940, 11 pp., typescript.

________ . ”The Christian Population of the Philippines in

1939." Revision of 1916 study printed in Census of
1918. Manila: 63 pp., typescript, with one map.
Published only in Japanese.

"By-Laws of the Philippine Institute of International Affairs."

Formed from membership in Philippine Council, IPR.,
Manila: December 2, 1940, 4 pp.. typescript. (To
supersede the Philippine Council.;.

Castillo, Andres V. "What is Expected of the Philippines

Economically?" Manila: n.d. (1942 ?), 16 pp., type­
script.

Cumulative Index to Commonwealth Acts Nos. 1-669. University

of Manila, n . d . , i>4 pp. , typescript.
 644

•'Description of Organization of Philippine Council, Institute

of Pacific Relations." Manila: Philippine Council,
1957(?), 7 pp., typescript.

"invitation" by the Department of Information The Nippon

Imperial Army in the Philippines, to a Conference,
held at the Manila Hotel, September 11, 1942 "to
create and to accelerate the general culture movement
in the New Philippines...." (Lt. Col. Katuya).

I.P.R. Public Opinion Survey. June.1959. Philippine Council,

IPR. "Not-For" Publication.h Manila: 5 pp., type­
script.

Jimenez, Damian L. The Political Development of the Philip­

pines. MA Thesis in Political Science, College of
Liberal Arts, Graduate Studies, The University of
Manila, 1949-1950. 145 pp.

Lerma, Deogracias E. The Evolution of Agrarian Laws in the

Philippines. Ll.M. Thesis submitted to the Faculty
of the Graduate School, College of Law, The University
of Manila: March 27, 1948, 116 pp., typescript.

Letter of Edward C. Carter to Conrado Benitez, dated April

2, 1941, on subject of Change of Status of the
Philippine Council, IPR, and character of its work.

Manas y Cruz, M., and Fabian 0. Solpicio. Plant Exploration

and Introduction Work of the Bureau of Plant Industry.
Manila: 1949, 10 pp., typescript. Loaned by Mr.
Jose Q. Dacanay, November 28, 1949.

Marte, Gonzalo S. Foreign Relations of the Philippines Under

the Puppet Republic. M.A. Thesis in Political Science,
College of Liberal Arts, The University of Manila,
1949-1950, 99 pp.

"Minutes of the 57th Meeting of the Board" (Philippine Council,

IPR), June 27, 1958. Contains: "Proposal for the
Formation of Groups in some Philippine Cities under the
Auspices of the Philippine Council," unpaged, type­
script. Also contains letter from E.C. Carter to
Vicente Madrigal, dated, June 28, 1958, on subject of
forthcoming 1959 Conference.

Montilla, Virginia. The Educational Ideas of Manuel L. Quezon.

MA. Thesis in Education, University of the Philippines,
March, 1950. Manila: 1950, 171 pp., (Mimeo.).
 645

Report by a committee of the Philippine Delegation to the

Virginia Study Meeting on business meetings of the
Pacific Council, the International Research Committee
and the International Finance Committee of the
Institute of Pacific Relations. Dated, December 16,
1939, signed by Camllo Osias, Federico Mangahas and
Mauro Baradi. Incorporates alsos "Report of the
Philippine Delegation, Philippine Council, Institute
of Pacific Relations," submitted by Camilo Osias,
dated December 2, 1939, Virginia Beach, Maryland. 13
pp., typescript, submitted to Board Meeting of Feb­
ruary 27, 1940, Manila.

Salcedo, Juan Jr. "Rice Enrichment as a Practical Nutrition

Measure in the Philippines." Secured from author,
September 21, 1949. 7 pp., typescript.

"Educating the Filipino on Nutrition," popular

article, loaned by author, September 21, 1949, 15 pp.,
typescript.

Salonga, Isayas R. The Present Problems of the Tobacco Trade.

Senior Thesis, B. Bus. Ad., The University of Manila.
March 15, 1938, 42 pp., 6 tables, typescript.

Second Annual Report of the Philippine Council, Institute of

Pacific Relations, 1939, Manilas unpaged, typescript.
Containss "Condensed Report of the Philippine Delegation
to the Virginia Study Meeting of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, November 22, to December 2, 1939."

Siayngco, Antonio V. The National Assembly; An Appraisal. MA.

Thesis in Political Science, College of Liberal Arts,
Graduate Studies, The University of Manila, 1949-1950.
14 7 pp., typescript.

Signed letter of Emilio Aguinaldo to U.S. Army CIC, dated 25

April 1945, 7 typewritten pages, comprising General
Aguinaldo's defaise against charges of his alleged collaboration.

SyCip, Juan Z. Sugar Industry in the Philippine Islands.

Senior Thesis, B. Bus. Ad., tfhe University of Manila.
1934, 97 pp., typescript.

Temprosa, Tomas A. Philippine Rehabilitation Reviewed. MA. Thesis

in Political Science, College of Liberal Arts, Graduate
Studies, The University of Manila. 1949-1950. 119 pp.,
typescript.

Villanueva, Mariano B. A Comparative Study of the Citizenship

Laws of the Philippines and the United States. Master
of Laws Thesis, College of Law, Graduate School of Law,
The University of Manila, 1949-1950. 193 pp.
 646

SPEECHES
Sergio Osmefia

Sergio Osmefia (Vice. Pres.). "The Role of Teachers in Nation

Building." Delivered at the Baguio Vacation Normal
School Commencement Exercises, Teacher’s Camp, May
22, 1937. Manila! Bureau of Printing, 1941, 11 pp.

_________. (Vice Pres.). "I am Glad to Be Back," at the

Luneta Grandstand upon His Arrival from the United
States, October 23, 1939. Manilas Bureau of Printing,
1941, 7 pp.

. (Vice Pres.). "The Commonwealth: A Year of Accom­

plishments (1938-1939)." Delivered over Station KZRH,
on the occasion of the Fourth Anniversary of the
Commonwealth, November 14, 1939. Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1941, 15 pp.

_________. (Vice Pres.). "Philippine-Araerican Trade: Its

Relation to Our Economic Problems." Delivered at a
convocation held at the University of the Philippines,
December 12, 1939. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1941,
15 pp.

________ . (Vice Pres.). "Rizal as the Father of Filipino

Nationalism." Delivered at the Rizal Day Program,
Manila, December 30, 1939. Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1941, 11 pp.

________ • (Vice Pres.). "On the Accomplishments of the Common­

wealth." Delivered at the Rotary District Conference,
Baguio, February 23, 1940. Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1940, 22 pp.

________ . (Vice Pres.). "The Moral and Spiritual Influence of

Filipino if/omen." Delivered before the Catholic W o m e n ’s
League, February 25, 1940. Manila: Bureau of Print­
ing, 1941, 11 pp.

_________. (Vice Pres.). "National Defense and Philippine

Democracy." Delivered at the Commencement Exercises
of the Philippine Military Academy, Baguio, March 15,
1940. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1941, 15 pp.

________ . (Vice Pres.). "The Filipino Teacher: His Contri­

bution to Philippine Democracy and Nationalism." Delivered
at the Commencement Exercises of the National Teachers
College, Manila, March 25, 1940. Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1941, 11 pp.
 647

(Vice Pres.). ’’Economic Adjustment and Philippine

Economy.” Delivered at the Commencement Exercises,
Manila College of Pharmacy and Dentistry, June 23,
1940. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1941, 17 pp.

(Vice Pres.). “Social Justice and Institutions of

Higher Learning.1* Delivered at a banquet given by
The University of Manila, on the occasion of its 27th
Anniversary, October 6, 1940. Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1941, 13 pp.

(Vice Pres.). “Philippine-American Collaboration

Past, Present, and Future." Delivered over Station
KZIB, on the occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of the
Commonwealth, November 15, 1940. Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1940, 14 pp.

(Vice Pres.). “Our Forests,” Delivered at the

'Thirtieth Anniversary Celebration of the School of
Forestry, University of the Philippines, Makiling
National Park, Los Barios, Laguna, November 30,1940.
Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1941, 14 pp.

(Vice Pres.). "Cooperation and the Independence

"Program.” Delivered before the Convention of Provincial
Governors and GIty Mayors. Manila, February 17, 1941.
Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1941, 9 pp.

_. (Vice Pres.). “The Architect: His Services to the

Community.” Delivered at the First National Convention
of Architects, Club Filipino, Rizal Avenue, Manila;
February 21, 1941. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1941,
13 pp.

(Vice Pres.). "Francisco Dagohoy: His Place in

Philippine History." Delivered at a banquet in com­
memoration of Dagohoy Day, sponsored by the Bohol
Association, Manila, March 2, 1941. Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1941, 10 pp.

(Vice Pres.). “Manuel L. Quezon: Patriot and States­

man.” Delivered on the occasion of the 63rd birthday
of the President, over radio station KZRM, August 19,
1941. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1941, 10 pp.

_. (Vice Pres.). “The Gity Hall and a New and Beautiful

Manila." Delivered at the Inauguration of the New City
Hall of Manila, August 19, 1941. Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1941, 12 pp.
 648

(Vice Pres.). "Philippine-American Collaboration."

Delivered at the Rizal Day Program held by the Filipino
Community of Chicago, 111., on January 2, 1944. Re­
printed from the Congressional Record of the 78th
Congress, Second Session, Monday, January 17, 1944.
("Extension of Remarks of Eon. Millard E. Tydings.")
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944, 7 pp.

. (Vice Pres.). "Dewey’s Naval Victory and the

American Pioneers in the Philippines." Delivered before
the Naval Academy Women’s Club at Annapolis, Md.,
April 3, 1944. Reprinted from the Congressional Record
of the 78th Congress, Second Session, Thursday, April
13, 1944. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1944, 8 pp. ("Extension of Remarks of Hon. Richard J.
Welch of California in the House of Representatives,
Wednesday, April 12, 1944").

(Pres.). "On the Occasion of the Induction Into

"Office of the Members of His Cabinet." Manila: U.S.
Office of War Information, March 8, 1945, 12 pp.
(In Spanish, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1945, 11 pp.
"A Department of Instruction and Information Publication").

(Pres.). "Message...to the First Congress of the

Philippines, convened in Special Session, June 9, 1945."
Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1945, 24 pp. ("A Depart­
ment of Instruction and Information Publication").

(Pres.). "Manuel L. (Quezon, In Memoriam." Delivered

on the First Anniversary of the Death of President
Manuel L. Quezon on August 1, 1945. In English and
Tagalog. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1945, 14 pp.
("A Department of Instruction and Information Publication").

(Pres.). "On the occasion of President Quezon’s

“Birthday, August 19, 1945, at the City Hall, Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 1945, 10 pp. ("A Department of
Instruction and Information Publication").

(Pres.) "The New Philippine Ideology." "with an

Exposition by Maximo M. Kalaw, Secretary of Instruction
and Information." Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1945,
32 pp. ("A Department of Instruction and Information
Publication")•
 649

SPEECHES
Elpidio Quirino

Elpidio Quirino. (Pres.). ’’Independence Address." Delivered

July 4, 1948. Manila* Bureau of Printing, 1948, 8 pp.

________ . The New Philippine Ideology. Collection of 61

speeches and 4 appendices. Manila: Bureau of Print­
ing, 1949, 312 pp.

________ . "Address to the U.S. Senate." and "Address to the

U.S. House of Representatives." August 10, 1949.
Manila: Bureau of Printing, printing order No. 8358,
11 pp. (Contains also joint statement of Presidents
Truman and Quirino).

________ . "Letter of Instructions... to Hon. Carlos P. Romulo

...and Other Documents on the Proposed Pacific Union."
Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1949, 14 pp.

________ . "Message on the State of the Nation." To the First

Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, Fourth
Session, delivered at the Joint Session of Congress,
Manila, Monday, January 24, 1949. Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1949, 31 pp.

________ • Message delivered at the opening of the Third

Special Session of the Second Congress, December 4,
1950. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1950, 10 pp.

________ • "On the State of the Nation." To the Second

Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, Second
Session, delivered at the Joint Session, Monday,
January 22, 1951. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1951,
15 pp.
 650

SPEECHES
Carlos P. Romulo

Carlos P. Romulo (Res. Comm.}• "The Liberation of the Philip­

pines - A Report to Congress from the Front Line s of
Democracy." Delivered in the House of Representatives,
December 7, 1944. Reprinted frpm Congressional Record.
78th Congress, Second Session. Washington, D.C.s U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1944, 4 pp.

_________. "The New Filipino Genius." Extension of remarks of

Hon. Harry R. Sheppard of California, in the House of
Representatives, December 19, 1944. Speech was
delivered before the National Press Club, Washington,
D.C., December 14, 1944. Reprinted from Congressional
Record, 78th Congress, Second Session. Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944, 2 pp.

________ . (Res. Comm.). "United Nation's Conference on Inter­

national Organization." Extension of Remarks in the
House of Representatives, July 20, 1945. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945, 12 pp.
(Contains also: address as Chairman of the Philippine
Delegation to the United Nations, delivered at Civic
Auditorium, San Francisco, Tuesday, May 8, 1945; Press
statement in relation to debate on the trusteeship
formula, May 30, 1945; Statement of the position of
the Philippine delegation on the trusteeship formula;
Remarks before Committee 4, Commission II, June 18,
1945; Address delivered before Commission II (on
trusteeship), June 20, 1945; Statement on the signing
of the Charter.).

• (Res. Comm.). Philippine Independence and Rehabil­

_

itation. A collection of 8 speeches on the topic.

Delivered in the House of Representatives, September
11 and 12, 1945, January 23, and February 7, 1946.
Washington, D.C,j U.S. Government Printing Office,
1946, 30 pp.

_______ • (Res. Comm.). "The Filipino Veteran"; "A Nation is

Born"; "The Immediate Problems of Asia"; U.S.-Philip­
pine Trade Relations"; "A Filipino Hero"; "The
Filipino Disabled Veterans"; and "The American Conscience
Speaks." Speeches, as Resident Commissioner in the
House of Representatives, September 24 and December 18,
1945, February 27, 28, and March 4, 1946. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946, 19 pp.
 651

(Delegate to UN). ’’On the Southeast Asia Union.”

Delivered at a convocation of' the Student Body of the
University of the Philippines, August 26, 1949,
Manilas Bureau of Printing, 1949, 11 pp.

(Delegate to UN). The Battle for Peace At Home and

Abroad. Contains the text of an address delivered at the
Commencement Exercises of the Arellano University on
April 17, 1950, his address before the Joint Session of
Congress on April 18, 1950, and reprints of various
honors, citations, resolutions and editorials citing
his achievements at home and abroad. Manila: Bureau
of Printing, 1950, 52 pp.

SPEECHES
Manuel A . Ro xas

Manuel A. Roxas (Pres.). ’’Inaugural Address” . Delivered

May 28, 1946, ”at the grounds of the Former Legislative
Building." Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1946, 18 pp.

. The State of Nation Message. Delivered to Second

_

Congress, First Session, June 3, 1946. Manila:

Bureau of Printing, 1946, 55 pp.

. ’’Extracts From the Final Speech on Parity." Delivered

_

March 10, 1947, at Plaza Miranda, Manila. Manila;

Bureau of Printing, 1947, 16 pp.

_________. "Message to the Filipino People Urging Approval of

the Constitutional Amendment on Parity at the Plebis­
cite, March 11, 1947.” Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1947, 34 pp.

________ . On the University of the Philippines. Delivered

April 19, 1947. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1947, 7 pp.

_________. "Important Speeches. Messages and Other Pronounce­

ments." Malacaftan, May 28, 1947. A Collection of 33
speeches and 6 appendices, Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1947, 507 pp.

________ . The Problems of Philippine Rehabilitation and Trade

Relations. Collection of seven speeches, with four
appendices. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1947, 208 pp.

_________. "Message on the State of the Nation." Delivered

before the First Congress, January 26, 1948. Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 1948, 49 pp.
 652

SPEECHES
Others

Araneta, Salvador. "An Outline For a Five-Year Plan." Pre­

liminary Study drafted before assuming Office. Manila:
1950, 22 pp., (Mimeo.).

. "First Statement of Dr. Salvador Araneta Upon His

Assumption of Office as Secretary of Economic Coordina­
tion." Issued as DEC Memorandum Circular No. 11,
September 15, 1950. Manilas Department of Economic
Coordination, 3 pp. (Mimeo.).

. "Policies in the Direction, Supervision and Co­

ordination of Government Enterprises," before Junior
Chamber of Commerce, September 19, 1950. Manila: 1950,
9 pp. (Mimeo.).

_________. "On the Department of Economic Coordination," radio

address, DZFM, sponsored by the Department of Foreign
Affairs, October 5, 1950. Manila: 1950, 8 pp. (Mimeo.).

_________. "On The Bell Report," delivered before the Chamber

of Commerce of the Philippines, October 30, 1950.
Manila* 1950, 9 pp. (Mimeo.).

________ . "We Can Reform Our Country I" Delivered before the
Knights of Columbus, November 8, 1950. Manila: 1950,
10 pp. (Mimeo.).

________ • "On Independence and the Economy," delivered before

the Convocation of the Central Student Organization of
Far Eastern University, November 15, 1950. Manila*
1950, 13 pp. (Mimeo.).

________ . "On Industries," delivered before the Philippine

Chamber of Industries, Manila Hotel, November 24, 1950,
12 pp. (Mimeo.).

_________. "Family, The Foundation of Strength," delivered at

the First Annual Meeting of the Council of Welfare
Agencies, November 25, 1950. Manila* 1950, 7 pp. (Mimeo.).

________ . "The Attitude of Filipino Women in These Troublous

Times," delivered before the Rotary Anns of the Manila Rotary
Club, December 14, 1950. Manilas 1950, 4 pp. (Mimeo.).

_________. "Is Our Temper Attuned to These Parlous Times?"

December 29, 1950. Manilas 1951, 6 pp. (Mimeo.).

_________. "Creating Prosperity Through Taxation," delivered

before the Economics Club of the University of the East,
January 22, 1951. Manila* 1951, 15 pp. (Mimeo.).
 655

. "Practical Implementation of Vocational Education

by the Government," delivered at the Reunion Forum
on Vocational Education of the Graduate School of the
Centro Escolar University, February 3, 1951. Manila:
1951, 9 pp., (Mimeo.).

________ . "Philippine-American Relations," delivered as

Administrator of Economic Coordination, at a Symposium
held by the College of Law, Ateneo de Manila, February
23, 1951. Manila| 1951, 14 pp., (Mimeo.).

Cases, Manuel T. "Road to Economic Recovery, ("suggested

financing program to enable the National Government
carry on its Social, Industrial and other economic
problems"). Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1947, 20 pp.

Garcia, Leon T. "The Meaning of the Flag". Delivered in

Commemoration of the Second Anniversary of the Repub­
lic, July 4, 1948, Shanghai. (Formerly Administrative
Officer, Philippine Consulate General, Shanghai).
2 pp., (Mimeo.).

Gillie, George W. "A Tribute to General Romulo". Extension

of Remarks of Hon. George W. Gillie of Indiana, in the
House of Representatives, Friday, December 14, 1945.
Reprinted from Congressional Record. 79th Congress,
First Session. Iflashington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1945, 1 p.

Lacson, Arsenio H. "The Junsay Case". Delivered in House of

Representatives, January 25, 1950. Manila: Bureau of
Printing', 1950, 50 pp.

Laurel, Jose P. "inaugural Address." Delivered October 14,

1943. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1943, 20 pp.

Paredes, Quintin. "Amnesty Proclamation". In the House of

Representatives, Friday, February 13, 1948. Contains
an extract from a written statement by Representative
Paredes submitted to American C.I.C. on April 23,
1945. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1948, 51 pp.

Zulueta, Jose C. "Inaugural Speech" as Speaker of the House

of Representatives, Special Session, First Congress,
9 June 1945. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1945,
13 pp. (In Spanish).
 654

ATLASES

Atlaa de Fllipinas. Goleccion de 30 Mapas.

*’Trobajades por delineantes filipinos bajo
la direccion Del P. Jose Algue, S.J.,
Director Del Observatorio De Manila. Baltimore:
A. Hoen & Co., Litho, 1899. Published also
as Atlas of the Philippine Islands. Treasury
Department, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey.
Special Publication No. 3. Washington: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1900. In addition to the
30 maps, there is included 24 pages of statisti­
cal data, by the U.S.C.G.S. Some of the maps
were redrawn at the Coast and Geodetic Survey
Office '’owing to the contradiction involved in
the arbitrary scale and projection of the original
drawings.”

Census Atlas of the Philippines. Vol. 5, Census of the

Philippines: 1939. Manila: Bureau of Printing,
January 14, 1941. 42 maps; 13 and 95 pp., and
various lists.

Encyclopaedia Brjtannica World Atlas. G. Donald Hudson,

Editor, Unabridged. Chicago: Encyclopaedia
Britannlca, Inc., 1947, 223 map plates, 284,
8, and 154 pp.
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MANILA PRICES FOR DOMESTIC PRODUCTS: EXPORT PRODUCTS AMD CONSUMPTION GOODS.

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GROSS INCOME FROM AGRICULTURAL CROPS AND THEIR PRODUCTS
 THE NATIONS CROSS AND NET NATIONAL PRODUCT
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT NET NATIONAL PRODUCT
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1948
M

1948 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUGT

0 i0 P fR C lu T
t IT T | r 1 ITT-I M i l l n -TT V l IT T T I | T M ° n H I II I |4n | I | | I | | I5|°l I I I I I I I 1*1
AGRICULTURE
IN C I.U O IM 4
LIVESTOCK 55.6
APRODUCT
FOREST
pr o d uc ts i M 2.. 5
• u ilo ih o

FISHERIES 6.3

MIMIUC H | 0

UARUFACTut-
NC.Mr ELSE* 3.5
WHU*IMUtfCf
VALUE ADOI

servkcs
Mtcupce
 CLASSIFICATIOM OF ARRESTS MADE OKI JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY TO SEX FROM 1945 (SINCE LIBERATION)
TO APRIL OF 1949 INCLUSIVE

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949

 ANALYSIS OF ARREST RECORDS OF JUVENILE
ACCORDING TO OFFENSES OF NION FREQUENCY

(A) ILLEGAL PotiESilON OF FIARAfcW

 CLASSIFICATION! OF ARRESTS ON JUVENILE DELINQUEN­
CY TO ACJE FROM 1945 (SINCE LIBERATION) TO APRIL
OF 1949, INCLUSIVE
wuHftiAi or Anaem M U M 6W OF Afcltgm
legend
MALS
----------- FEMALE
4o 4®®o

3600

3* 3200

41 2-Boo

24 2400

I* 2000

1600

It l2«6

8oo

400

1945 1946 1947 1949 1949 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1945 >946 1947 194$ >949
UNDER. 9 YEARS 9 -1 4 YEARS 15-17 YEARS
1910 1915 ig20 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949
 CHART I

LiCEIvoEij l/’ISKiRLElv

1945 ................. 744 Fishermen

1946 ................ 6,064 "

7
( j1
X77
•/j
_ n

1948 ................. 3,699

1 CAC 4,430

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0 L-a-Uii xjii'iCXi*iL ITiuHxi.^-r SlATio U'JHii xXirCCxj GiiCoG Ci^i-*x

3

1 9 4 5 . . . ....................... 226,505.00

1946 .............................................................. 3,157 ,555.00

1947 .............................................................. 3,486,757.00

1948 ................................ 4,601,109.00

1949 ................. 4,137,298.00

 CHART II

QUANTITY OF F I S H CATCH AT T I E L A L u I L G P OI NT S
' I S I I CAUGHT I N ALL LANDINGS OF BOATS OF THREE TONS GROSS

1948

January ............................. . ............................. 2,636,499

February ........................... 2,407,22?

March. ........................................................ 2,953,836

A pril ........................................ 4,674,925.5

-ay ................. 3,573,004.5

June ....................... .............................................. 3,836,475

July ................................... .. .......................... 3,667,372

August „ .............................................................. 3,178,518

Septem ber ................................... 3,767,265

O ctober ......................................... .. 4,388,871

November ..................... .. 3 ,401,682

December ............................................ 3,599,256

T O T A L ............... 41 , 9 9 5 , 4 6 1

January to June ......................................... 20,081,967

July to December ............ 21,913,434

T 0 T A L ........................... 41,995,461

1949

January ........................................................ 2,73 5 ,8 5 7 .5

February ........................................................... 3,227,544

M arch ................................................................... 4,548,915

A pril .............................................................. 3,832,851

May ......................................................................... 5,152,617

June ...................................................................... 5,975,136

July ........................ .. ........................................... 4,590,627

 f

BUREAU OF HEALTH STATISTICS

Table I

AVERAGE ANNUAL DEATH RkTE PER 100,000

POPULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

FROM BERIBERI (INFANTS AND ADULTS)

Year Number Rate/lOO.OOO

1906 3,541 69.93"

1907 1,752 27.35
1908 3 ,3 8 0 5 2.49
1909 3,620 53.14
1910 5 ,6 0 6 76.47

1911 6,009 78.89

1912 5,462 69.59
1913 8,023 ...... 49.84
1914 5,144 ...... 62.60
1915 5,516 66.03

1916 6,773 79.72

1917 7,953 86.93
1918 12,597 135.29
1919 12,387 130.68
1920 13,036 135.44

1921 15,847 157.19

1922 16,270 154.25
1923 18,100 163.55
1924 19,013 160.07
1925 18,541 152.45
 TABLE II

CASES AND DEATHS AND MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY RATES FROM BERIBERI PER
100,000 POPULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES FROM 1924 to 1940 and 1946

BERIBERI INFANTS BERIBERI ADULTS

Cases Deaths Cases Deaths

YEAR Number R/100.000 Number R/100.000 Number R/100.000 Number R/100.000

1924 - 14,388 121.13 13,193 111.07 7,363 61.99 5,820 49.00

1925 - 14,449 118.80 13,493 110.94 6,969 57.30 5,048 41.51
1926 - 14,486 116.39 14,027 112.70 6,712 53.93 5,182 41.63
1927 - 13,384 105.13 12,575 98.77 6,220 48.86 4,500 35.35
1928 - 13,145 101.00 12,291 94.-44 5,950 45.71 4,492 34.51
1929 - 16,646 125.16 15,141 113.85 6,965 52.37 5,084 38.23
1930 - 18,290 134.65 16,485 121.36 7,291 53.67 5,089 37.4,6
1931 - 16,904 121.89 15,018 108.29 6,522 47.03 4,520 32.59
1932 - 14,963 105.73 13,202 93.99 5,949 42.03 3,871 27.35
1933 - 15,918 110.26 14,720 101.96 5,785 40.07 3,963 27.44

1934 - 18,691 126.97 17,054 115.85 5,968 40.54 4,365 29.65

1935 - 15,733 104.85 14,299 95.29 7,449 49.64 4,315 28.76
1936 - 12,378 80.96 11,316 74.01 5,001 32.73' .'3,506 22.93
1937 - 14,164 90.95 13,004 83'.50 5,603 35.98 3,793 24.35
1938 - 13,871 87.43 13,217 83.94 7,063 44.54 3,834 24.24

1939 - 16,847 104.37 14,612 90.52 9,995 61.92 4,146 25.61

1940 - 14,227 85.32 4,318 26.05
1946 - 20,912 115.39 18,582 102'.54 14,668 80.94 8,276 45.67
1947 - 21,223 115.51 is;163 98.62 16,863 91.56 7,973 43.29
1948 - 22,419 119.88 18,130 96.95 18,345 98.10 7,687 41.10

TABLE III

DEATHS AND DEATH RATES FROM BERIBERI PER 100,000 POPULATION FOR
THE CITY OF MANILA FROM 1926 to 1940 & 1946

BERIBERI INFANTS BERIBERI ADULTS

YEAR Number - R/100.000 Number - R/100.000

1926 495 129.68 31 8.12

1927 258 64.79 30 7.53
1928 340 81.89 28 6.74
1929 519 119.94 33 7.63
1930 286 63.47 40 8.88
1931 173 36.88 23 4.90
1932 200 40.97 22 4'.51
1933 196 38.61 10 1.97

1934 116 21.99 11 2.09

1935 340 62.04 34 6.20
1936 350 61.51 16 2.81
1937 298 50.47 13 2.20
1938 425 69.40 15 2.45

1939 472 74.13 32 5.03

1940 431 65.16 33 4.99
1946 595 79.30 55 ■ 7.33
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 ESTIiiAT-ijD POPULATION, CASES jJ:D FROL SELECTED DISEASES; MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY RATES FSR 100,bOO POPULATION IK THU PHILIPPINES* 1946
(Bureau of Health Statistics)

---- i-------------- s 1
t : CASES , DEATHS
TYPE OF DISEASE : Estinntod : 1 t s
: Population t Number * Rate S Number t Rate
* July 1. 1946 ----- --- !_ _L
t i
Beriberi Adults * ie,132,550 t 14,666 : 60*94 * 6,276 45.67
j _____________ J______ s_____
t t
Beriberi Infants t 16,132,550 t 20,912 t 115.39 * 18,582 102*54
j_____________ 1_________ * _______
Diarrhea ana Ehtcritis t i
Under 2 Years i 18,132,550 * 13,420 t 74.05 « 5,527 30.50
j_________ J,_______ !______
Diarrhea and Enteritis I i «
Over 2 Years : 18,132,550 * 32,065 * 176*93 * 5,295 29.22
j _____________ J________ J_______ L______
I I
Pulmonary Tuberculosis . t 18,132,550 i 44,390 t 244.94 t 30,819 170.06
_____________________ I_______
*
J
S
____ t».___
T.B. of Other Organs t 18,132,550 : 1,809 t 9.98 * 1,460 8.07
J ______ !____ i
TABLE VI
REPORT OF C*SES, DEATHS AND '.iATES FUi 100,000 POPULATION
(FOR TIE '..HOLE PHILIPPINES), FROM SELECTED CAUSES
IN THE YEARS 1947 AND 1948:

t 1947 t 194^
C A U S E S t Cases t Deaths t Cases > Deaths
: No. t Rate t No. t Rate t No. x Rate t No. t Rate
(x) Tuberculosis (all
forms end a/.os) :48.873x265.37*30,983:168.23:27.338x292.36*15.424*164.95
Beriberi (adults and
Infants) i38.O86t2O6.07l26.136tUl.91t4O.764t217.98x25.a7tl38.O5
t 2 t t t I t t
Adults t!6.863t 91.56i 7.973t 43.29x16.345t 98.10t 7.687t 41.10
t t t t t t t t '
Infants t21.223tll5.51tl8.l63t 98.62t 22.419* H9.88tl8.130t 96.95
t 1 t t t t t t
Congenital Debility » — , — 1— *15.8991 85.01
t : 1 t t t t t
Prematurity t — t — t — t t 1 — 1 2.237t 11.96
* t t t t t t 1
(x) Dia^rhea-Ent^ritis
|<i3.087j248.30jlO.499j 57.0o|26.855|286.19! 6.7471 72.15

From Epidemiology Section, Bureau of Health, Manila,

(Blank spaces - no data,)

(x) Data for 1948 arc for first six (6) months only.
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 V I T A

Date of Birth: November 9, 1918

Place of Birth: Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Education: Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio; Miami

University, Oxford, Ohio

Degree: ‘ Bachelor of Arts, 1942

Army Service: U. S. Air Forces, 1942-1945; CBI Theater

Present Position: Dean, School of Foreign Service, The U n i v e r ­

sity of Manila, Manila, Philippines