2 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 295

Laws Order, 1951, only applied to all sales of goods r96o
delivered and consumed in the State of first destina- c
.
t ion. If th e goo d s were del'!Vered lOr
r .
consumpt10n, .
It
1 ndian opper
Corporation Lit>.
is immaterial whether they were in fact conilFmed in v.
the State where they were delivered.· The power of The state of
the State to levy sales tax relying upon the territorial Bihar & Others
nexus between tbe taxing power of the State and the Shah ].
sale, is impaired for reasons already set out to the
extent to which it is restricted by the incorporation of
Art. 286(l)(a)(i) and the Explanation thereto, in that
Act. Therefore, sales effected on or after J a.nuary 26,
1950, where goods a.re as a direct result of the sale
delivered in another State for consumption in that
other State, are not liable to be taxed.
The directions issued by the High Court will there-
fore be modified as follows:
The order of the Superintendent of Taxes is set
a.side. He is directed to grant refund of tax pa.id in
the light of this judgment. The appellant will be
entitled to exemption from payment of tax if the
goods are, a.s a direct result of the sale, delivered in
another State for the purpose of consumption in that
State.
Appeal dismissed subject to mod~fication.

M. PENTIAH AND OTHERS

v. November 7.
MUDDALA VEERAMALLAPPA AND OTHERS.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. SuBBA RAO, K. N. WANCHOO and
J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Municipality-Committee constituted under old Act continued
by repealing Act-Term of office-Power-If can effect sale of
municipal land - Interpretation of statute - Power of Court-
H yderabad District Municipalities .Act, r956. (Hyd. XV I II of
1956), SS. I6, I7, I8, 20, 32, 34, 35, 76, 77 and 320.
The respondents were the elected members of the Vicarabad
 296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961]

Municipal Committee, constituted in 1953, under the Hydera-

bad Municipal and Town Committees Act, l95L That Act was
111'. Pentiah repealed bys. 320 of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act,
& Others 1956, which came into force in 1956. That section provided
v. that the committee constituted under the repealed enaclment
Muddala was to be deemed to have been constituted under the Act and •
Veeramallappa the members thereof should hold office till the first meeting of
&· Others the committee was called under s. 35 of the Act. No election
was held under the new Act; the old committee, which continu-
ed to function, after duly passing a resolution ahd obtaining the
necessary sanction from the Government, sold certain municipal
lands to third parties. The appellants, who were rate-payers of
the said Municipality, moved the High Court for the issue of a
writ of quo warranto challenging the said sales under Art. 226 of
the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the petition. The
contention of the appellants in this Court was that the members
of the said committee were functus officio on expiry of three
years from the commencement of the Act for s. 34 of the Act
prescribed a term of three years and s. 320 of the Act did not
provide any definite term for them. But if s. 34 was held to be
inapplicable, neither could the first general election under the •
Act, for which s. 16 of the Act was the only provision, be held,
nor could the first meeting of the committee called under s. 35 '
of the Act and the result would be that the old committee would
continue indefinitely.
Held, that the contention must be negatived.
The word ' committee' in s. 320 of the Hyderabad District
Municipalities Act, 1956, did not mean a committee elected
under the Act and the term of three years prescribed by s. 34 of
the Act could not, therefore, apply to it. (.
Construed in the light of well-recognised principles of
interpretation of statutes and the scheme as envisaged by
ss. 16, 17; 18, 20, 32, 34, and 320 of the Act, s. 320 of the Act
could be no more than a transitory provision and it would be
unreasonable to suggest that the Legislature which repealed
the earlier Act with the express intention of constituting com-
mittees on broad-based democratic principles, intended to per-
petuate old committees constituted under the repealed Act.
Section 16(1) of the Act, properly construed, was clearly
inapplicable to the first general election under the Act and
could apply only to subsequent elections. So far as the first
general election under the Act was concerned, ss. 17 and 20 of
the Act provided a self-contained and integrated machinery •
therefor independent of s. 16(1) of the Act.
Canada Sugar Refining Co. v. R., [1898] A.'C. 735, referred to.
...
The Legislature in enacting the new Act assumed and
expected that the Government would, within a reasonable time,
issue notifications for holding the first ·general election under
s. 17 of the Act and its failure t6 do so and thus implement the
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 297
Act, and not any inherent inconsistency in the Act itself, pro-
longed the life of the old committee.
M. Pentiah
Since s. 77 of the Act expressly authorised the Municipal
b Others
Committee to sell municipal property subject to the conditions
specified therein, no prohibition could be implied from the pro- v.
visions of s 76 of the Act and the impugned sales, effected in Muddala
conformity with the conditions precedent laid down by s. 77 Veeramallappa
of the Act, could not be said to be ultra vires the powers of the b Others
committee.
Elizabeth Dowager Baroness Wenlock v. The River Dee Com-
pany, (1885) IO A.C. 354 and Attorney-General v. Ft~lhan Corpora-
tion, (1921) I Ch. D. 440, considered.
Per Sarkar, J.-It is. well settled that where the language
of a statute leads to manifest contradiction of the apparent pur-
pose of the enactment, as the language of s. 16(1) does in the
present case, the Court has the power so to read it as to carry
out the obvious intention of the Legislature. ·
The intention of t.he Legislature in enacting the new Act
clearly was that elections should be held and committees con-
stituted under it.
Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 All E.R. 155.
referred to.
Section 16(1) is the only section of the Act which authorises
the holding of a general election but, since the requirements as
to time in s. 16(1) of the Act could not apply to the first gene-
ral election, that section must be read to carry out the obviol!s
intention of the Legislature as if there was no such requirement
in the case of the first general election under the Act. Although
this would not indicate when that election was to be held, the
obvious implication would be that it must be held within a
reasonable time of the commencement of the Act. Section 20
of the Act does not authorise the holding of a general election.
Salmon v. Duncombe, (1886). 11 App. Cas. 627, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 387 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave Jrom the judgment a.nd
order dated February 12~ 1960, of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court, in W_rit P.etition No. 5 of 1960.
P. A. Choudhuri and K. R. Choudhuri, for the
appellants.
P. Ram Reddy, for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 6
to 11.
1960. November 7. The Judgment of Gajendra-
gadkar, Subba. Rao, Wanchoo and Mudholkar, JJ.,
38
 298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961]
was delivered by Subba Rao, J. Sarkar, J., delivered
M. Pentiah
a separate judgment.
& Others SuBBA RAO J.-This appeal by special leave is
v. directed ag,,,inst the judgment of the High Court of
Muddala
Veeramallappa Judicature at Hyderabad dismissing the petition filed
&- Others by the appellants under Art. 226 of the Constitution
to issue a writ of quo warranto against respondents 1
Subba Rao } . to 10 directing them to exhibit an information as to
the authority under which they are functioning as
members of the Vicarabad Municipal Committee and
to restrain them from selling certain plots of land
belonging to the Municipality to third parties. Vica-
rabad was originally situate in the Part B State of
Hyderabad and is now in the State of Andhra
Pradesh. The Municipal Committee of Vicarabad was
constituted under the Hyderabad Municipal and Town
Committees Act (XXVII of 1951). In the year 1953
respondents 1 to 10 were elected, and five others, who
are not parties before us, were nominated, to that
Committee. On November 27, 1953, the Rajpramukh
of the State of Hyderabad published a notification
under the relevant Acts in the Hyderabad Govern-
ment Gazette Extraordinary . notifying the above
persons as members of the said Committee. Presum-
ably with a view to democratize the local institutions
in that part of the country and to bring them on a
par with those prevailing in the neighbouring States,
the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act, 1956
(XVIII of 1956), (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
was passed by the Hyderabad Legislature and it
received the assent of the President on August 9,
1956. Under s. 320 of the Act the Hyder11bad Muni-
cipal and Town .Committees Act, 1951 (XXVII of 1951)
and other connected Acts \Yere repealed. As a tran-
sitory measure, under the same section any Committee
constituted under the enactment so repealed was
deemed to have been constituted under the Act and
the members of the said Committee were to continue
to hold office till the first meeting of the Committee
was called under s. 35 of the Act. Under that
provision respondents 1 to 10 and the five nomi-
nated members continued to function as members
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 299

of the Municipal Committee. In or about the year

1958 the said Committee. acquired land measuring M. l'entiah
acres 15-7 guntas described as "Varad Raja Omar & Others
Bagh" for Rs. 18,000 for the purpose of establishing v.
a grain market (gunj). For one reason or other, the Muddala
Municipal Committee was not in a position to cons- V eeramallappa
& Others
truct the grain market and run it departmentally.
The Committee, therefore, after taking the permission Sitbba Rao ].
of the Government, resolved by a requisite majority
to sell the said land to third parties with a condition
that the vendee or vendees should construct a build-
ing or buildings for running a grain market. There-
after the Committee sold the land in different plots to
third parties; but the sale deeds were not executed in
view of the interim order made in the writ petition
by the High Court and subsequently in the appeal by
this Court.
In the writ petition the appellants contended, inter
alia, that the respondents ceased to be members of
the Municipal Committee on the expiry of three. years
from the date the new Act came into force and that,
therefore, they had no right to sell the land, and that,
in any view, the sale made by the Committee of the
property acquired for the purpose of constructing a
market was ultra vires.the provisions of the Act. The
respondents contested the petition on various grounds.
The learned Judges of the High Court. dismissed t.he
petition with costs for the following reasons :
1. 'The old Committee will continue to function
till a new Committee comes into existence.
2. "Section 76 contemplates that property ves-
ted in it under s. 72(f), 73 and 74 should be transferred
only to Government. Here, the transfer is not in
favour of the Government. That apart we are told
that in this case sanction of the Government was
obtained at every stage. It cannot be predicated
that the purpose for which the properties are being
disposed of is not for a public purp.>se. It is nob dis-
puted that the properties are being sold only to per-
sons who are required to build grain market".
3. The act now opposed is not in any way in
conflict with the provisions of ss. 244, 245 and 247.
 300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961)
4. "It looks to us that the petitioners lack in
bona fides and that this petition is not conceived in
M. Pe1tliah
& Others
the interests of the public".
v. The present appeal, as aforesaid, was filed by special
Muddala leave granted by this Court. '
Veerumallappa Mr. P. A. Chowdury, learned counsel for the appel-
& Others
lants, convassed the correctness of the findings of the
Subba Rao ].
High Court. His first argument may be summarized
thus: Under s. 320 of the Act any Committee consti-
tuted under the repealed enactment shall be deemed
to have been constituted under the Act and the mem-
bers of the said Committee sha.11 continue to hold office
till the first meeting of the Committee is called under (
s. 35 of the Act. Under s. 35 of the Act, the first
meeting of the Committee shall not be held on a da.te
prior to tho date on which the term of the outgoing
members expires under s. 34. Section 34 of the Act
provides that the members shall hold office for a term
of three years. Therefore, the term of the members
of the Committee deemed to have been constituted
under s. 320 is three years from the date on which the
Act came into force. If the term fixed under s. 34
does not apply to the members of the said Committee,
the result will be that the said members will continue
to hold office indefinitely, for the first meeting of the

~
Committee could not be legally convened under the
Act ass. 16 which enables the Collector to do so impo-
ses a duty on him to hold a general election within
three months before the expiry of the term of office of f
the members of the Committee as specified in s. 34,
and, as no definite term has been prescribed for the
(
members of the Committee under s. 320, the election
machinery fails, with the result that the members of
the" deemed" Committee would continue to be mem-
bers' of the said Committee indefinitely. On this inter-
pretation learned counsel contends that the section
would be void for the following reasons: (l) s. 320(l)(a)
of the Act would be ultra vires the powers of the State
Legislature under Art. 246 of the Constitution, read
with entry 5, List II, VII Schedule; (2) the said section
deprives the appellants of the right to equality and
equal protection of the laws guaranteed under Art. 14
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 301

of the Constitution ; (3) s. 320 would be void also as

inconsistent with the entire scheme of the provisions '1. Pentiah
of the Act. & Others
Let us first test the validity of the construction of v.
s. 320 of the Act suggested by the learned counsel. Muddala
The material part of s. 320 reads : V eeramallappa
& Others
"(1) The Hyderabad Municipa.l and Town Com-
mittees Act, 1951, (XXVII of 1951):...................... . Subba Rao ].
(is) hereby repealed; provided thii.t :-
(a) any Committee constituted under the enact-
ment so repealed (hereinafter referred to in this sec-
tion as the said Committee) shall be deemed to have
been constituted under this Act, and Members of the
said Committee shall continue to hold office till the
first meeting of the Committee is called under sec-
tion 35 ;".
The terms of the section are clear and do not lend any
scope for argument. The section makes a distinction
between the "said" Committee and the Committee elec-
ted under the Act and says," Members of the said Com-
mittee shall continue to hold office till the first meet-
ing of the Committee is called under s. 35 ". Though
the word "Committee" is defined in s. 2(5) to mean a
Municipal or Town Committee established or deemed
to be established under the Act, that definition must
give way if there is anything repugnant in the subject
or context. As the section makes a clear distinction
between the " said " Committee . and the Committee
elected under the Act, in the context, the Committee
in s. 320 cannot mean the Committee elected under
the Act. The term fixed for the members of the Com-
mittee constituted under the Act cannot apply to the
members of the Committee deemed to have been con-
stituted under the Act. Section 32 which provides
for the culminating stage of the process of election
under the Act says that the names of all members
finally elected to any Committee shall be forthwith
published in the official Gazette. Section 34 presoribes
the term of office of the members so elected .. Under
it, " except as is otherwise provided in this Act, mem-
bers shall hold office for a. term of three yea.rs."
Section 320(l)(a.) provides a different term for the
 302 SUPHEME COUHT REPOHTS [1961]
members of the Committee deemed to have been consti-
Jl.1. Pentiah
tuted under the Act. Thereunder, the term is fixed ·
& Others not by any number of years but by the happeuing of
v. an event. The Committee constituted under s. 320
Muddala clearly falls under the exception. But it is suggested
V eera1nallappa that the exception refers only to s. 28 whereunder a.
& Otlu:rs
member of a Committee ceases to be one by a. super-
Subba Rao ]. vening disqualification. Firstly, this section does not
fix a term but only imposes a disqualification on the
basis of a term fixed under s. 34; secondly, a.ssu!lling
that the said section also fixes a. term, the exception
may as well cover both the deviations from the nor-
mal rule. That a.part, sub-s. (2) of s. 34 dispels any
doubt that may a.rise on the construction of sub-sec-
tion (1) of the section. Under sub-s. (2), the term of
office of such members shall be deemed to commence
on the date of the first meeting called by the Collector
under s. 35. Section 35 directs the Collector to call a
meeting ·after giving at least fiv.e clear days notice
within thirty days from the date of the publication of
the names of members under s. 32. This provision
clearly indicates that the members of the Committee
mentioned in s. 34 are only the members elected under
the Act and not members of the Committee deemed to
have been elected under the Act, for, in the case of
the latter Committee, no publication under s. 32 is pro-
vided for and therefore the provisions of ·s. 35 cannot
apply to them. It is,~therefore, manifest that the term
prescribed in s. 34 cannot apply to a member of the
" deemed " Committee.
Let us now see whether this interpretation would
necessarily lead us to hold that the members of the
"deemed" Committee under s. 320(l)(a) would have
an indefinite duration. This result, it is suggested,
would flow from a correct interpretation of the rele-
vant provisions of s. 16 of the Act. The judgment of
the High Court does not disclose that any argument
was addressed before that Court on the basis of s. 16
of the Act. But we, allowed the learned counsel to
raise the point as in effect it is only a. link in the cha.in
of his argument to persuade us to hold in his favour
on the construction of s. 320.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 303
Before we consider this argument in some detail, it
will be convenient at this stage to notice some of the
M. Pentiah
well established rules of construction which would & Others
help .us to steer clear of the complications created by v.
the Act. Maxwell "On the Interpretation of Statutes", Muddala
10th Edn., says at p. 7 thus: Veeramallappa
" .............. .if the choice is between two inter- & Othets

pretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve Subba Rao ].

the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should
avoid a construction which would reduce the legisla-
tion to futility and should rather accept the bolder
construction based on the view that Parliament would
legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an
effective result."
It is said in Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., at p. 82-
" Manifest absurdity or futility, palpable injus-
tice, or absurd inconvenience or anomaly to be avoid-
ed."
Lord Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Oo. v. R. (1)
provides another useful guide of correct perspective to
such I!- problem in the following words :
" Every clause of a statute should be construed
with reference to the context and the other clauses of
the Act, so as, so fa.i: as possible, to make a consistent
enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes
relating to the·subject-matter." '
To appreciate the problem presented and to give an
adequate answer to the same, it would be necessary
and convenient to notice the scheme of the Act as
reflected in the relevant sections, namely, ss. 16, 17,
18, 20, 32, 34 and 320. The said scheme of the Act
may be stated thus: Under the Act, there are
general elections and elections to casual vacancies.
The general elections may be in regard to the first
election after the Act came into force or to the subse-
quent elections under the Act. Section 5 imposes a .
duty on the Government to constitute a Municipal
Committee for each town and notify the date when it
shall come into existence. Section 17 enjoins on ·
the Government to issue a. notification calling upon
all the constituencies to elect members in accordance
(1) [1898] A.C. 135·
 304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961]
with the provisions of the Act on or before such date
A1. Pentiah
or dates as may be specified in the said notification.
c~ Others
Section 16 imposes a duty upon the Collector to hold
v. · a general election in the manner prescribed within
Mtuldala three months before the expiry of tbe term of office
Veera.niallappa of the members of the Committee as specified in s. 34
<'.;. Others of- the Act. Sub-section (2) of s. 16 provides for a
Subba Rao j.
bye-election for filling up of a casual vacancy. Section
18 enables the Collector with the approval of the
Government to designate or nominate a Returning
Officer. Section 19 impOS!JS a duty upon such an
officer to do all such acts and things as may be neces-
sary for effectually conducting the election in the
manner pr.,7ided by the Act and the rules made there
under. Section 20 authorizes the Collector to issue a
notification in the Official Gazette appointing the
dates for making nominations, for the scrutiny of
nominations, for the withdrawal of candidatures and
for the holding of the poll. After the elections are
held in the manner prescribed, the names of all the
members finally elected to any Committee shall be
published in the Official Gazette. Except as ·other-
wise provided. in the Act, s. 34 prescribes the term of
three years for a member so elected. As a transitory
provision till such an election is held, s. 320 says that
the members of the previous Committee constituted
under the earlier Act shall be deemed to be consti-
tuted under the Act and the members thereof shall
hold office till the first meeting of the Committee is
called under s. 35 of the Act.
It is clear from the aforesaid provisions that the
I
Government notifies the dates calling upon all the
constituencies to elect the members before such date
or dates prescribed ; the Collector holds the election
and fixes the dates for the various stages of the pro-
cess of election ; the Returning Officer appointed by
the Collector does all acts and things necessary for
effectually conducting the election.
On the general scheme of the Act we do not see any
legal objection to the Collector holding the first elec-
tions under the Act. The legal obstacle for such a
course is sought to be raised on the wording of s. 16( l ).
Section 16( l) reads :
 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 305
" Every general election requisite for the purpose
of this Act shall be held by the Collector in the man-
M. Pentiah
ner prescribed within three months before the expiry & Others
of the term of office of the members of the Committee v.
as specified in section 34." Muddala
The argument is that the Collector's power to hold Veeramallappa
a. general election is confined to s. 16(1) and, a.sin the & Others
case of the members of the Committee deemed to have Subba Rao ].
been constituted under the Act the second limb of the
section cannot apply and as the Collector's power is
limited by the second limb of the section, the Collector
has no power to hold the first general election under
the Act. If this interpretation be accepted, the Act
would become a. dead-letter a.nd the obvious intention
of the Legislature would be defeated. Such a construc-
tion cannot be accepted except in cases of absolute
intractability of the language used.
While the Legislature repealed the earlier Act with
an express intention to constitute new Committees on
broad based democratic principles, by this interpreta.
tion the Committee under the old Act perpetuates
itself indefinitely. In our view, s. 16(1) does hot have
any such effect. Section 16(1) ma.y be read along with
the aforesaid other relevant provisions of the Act. If
so read, it would be clear that it could not apply to
the first election after the Act came into force, but
should be confined to subsequent elections. So far as
the first general election is concerhed, there is a. self.
contained and integrated machinery for holding the
election without in a.ny way galling in aid the provi-
sions of s. 16(1). Section 17 applies to all elections,
that is, genera.I as well as bye-elections. It applies to
the first general election as well a.s subsequent general
elections. The proviso to that section says that for
the purpose of holding elections under sub-s. (1) of
s. 16 no such notification shall be issued at any time
earlier than four months before the expiry of the term
of office of the members of the Committee as specified
in s. 34. The proviso can be given full mea.ning, for
it provides only for a case covered by s. 16(1) and, as
the first genera.I election is outside the scope of s. 16(1),
39
 306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961]
it also falls outside the scope of the proviso to s. 17.
Al. Pentiah
,Under s. 17, therefore, the Government, in respect of
G- Other$ the first general election, calls upon all the constitu-
v. encies to elect members before the date or dates fixed
Muddala by it. Under s. 20, the Collector fixes the dates for
Veeramallappa the various stages of the election. The Returning
0- Others Officer does all the acts and things necessary for con-
Subba Rao J.
ducting the election and when the election process is
completed, the names of the members elected are pub-
lished. All these can be done without reference to
s. 16(1), for the Collector is also empowered under s. 20
to hold the elections. In this view, there cannot be any
legal difficulty for conducting the first election, after
the Act came into force. If so, the term of the members
of the Committee deemed to have been elected would
come to an end when the first meeting of the Com-
mittee was called under s. 35. The Legislature in
enacting the law not only assumed but also expected
that the Government would issue the requisite notifi-
cation under s. 17 of the Act within a reasonable time
from the date when the Act came into force. The
scheme of the Act should be judged on that basis; if
so judged, the sections disclose an integrated scheme
giving s. 320 a transitory character.
It is conceded by learned counsel that ifs. 320(l)(a.)
is constructed in the manner we do, the other points
particularised above do not arise for consideration.
Before leaving this part of the case we must observe
that the difficulty is created not by the provisions of
the Act but by the fact of the Government not pro-
ceeding under s. 17 of 'the Act w_ithin a reasonable
time from the date on which the Act came into force.
This is a typical case of the legislative intention being
obstructed or deflected by the inaction of the execu-
tive.
Mr. Ram Reddy, learned counsel for the respon-
dents, states that there are many good reasons why
the Government did not implement the Act. There
may be. many such reasons, but when the Legislature
made an Act in 1956, with a view to democratize
municipal administration in that part of the country
so as to bring it on a par with that obtaining in other
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 307
I

States, it is no answer to say that the Government

had good reasons for not implementing the Act. If the M. l'entiah
Government had any such reasons, that might be an & Others
occasion for moving the Legislature to repeal the Act 'v.
or to a.mend it. If the affected parties had filed a writ Muddala
of mandamus in time, this situation could have been Veeramallappa
& Others
a.voided; but it was not done. We hope and trust that
the Government would take immediate steps to hold Subba Rao ].
elections to the Municipal Committee so that the body
constituted as early as 1953, under a different Act
could be replaced by an elected body under the Act.
Even so, learned counsel for the appellants contends
that the Municipal Committee had no power to sell
the land acquired by it for constructing a market. To
appreciate this contention it would be convenient to
notice the relevant provisions of the Act. Under
s. 72(f) all land or other property transferred to the
Committee by the Government or the District Board
or acquired by gift, purchase, or otherwise for local
purposes shall vest in and be under the control of the
Committee. Section 73 enables the Government, in
consultation with the Committee, to direct that any
property, movable or immovable, which is vested in
it, shall vest in such Committee. Section 74 empowers
the Government on the request of the Committee to
acquire any land for the purposes of the . Act. Under
e. 76, the Committee may, with the sanction of the
Government, transfer to the Government any property
vested in the Committee under ss. 72(f), 73 and 74,
but not so as to affect any trust or public right subject
to which the property is held. Learned counsel con-
tends that, as the land was acquired by the Committee
for the construction of a market, the Committee has
power to transfer the same to the Government only
subject to the conditions la.id down in s. 76, and that
it has no power to sell the land to third parties. Thie
argument ignores the express intention of s. 77 of the
Act·. Section 77 says: .
"Subject to such exceptions as the Government
may by general or special order direct, no Committee
shall transfer any irµmova.ble property except in
pursuance of a. resolution passed at a meeting by a
 308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19611
majority of not less than two-third of the whole num-
M. Pentiah
ber of members· and in accordance with rules made
& Others
under this Act, and no Committee shall transfer any,
v. property which has been vested in it by the Govern-
Muddala ment except with the sanction of the Government:
Veeramallappa Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to
& Others leases of immovable property for a term not exceeding
Subba Rao ].
three years "-
This section confers on the Committee an express
power couched in a negative form. Negative words
are clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a
legislative device to make a statute imperative. If the
section is recast in an affirmative form, it reads to the
effect that the Committee shall have power to transfer
any immovable property, if the conditions laid down
under the section are complied with. The conditions
laid down are: (1) there shall be a resolution passed at
a meeting by a majority of not less than two-third of
the whole number of members of the Committee; (2) it
shall be in accordance with the rules made under the
Act; (3) in the case of a property vested in it by the
Government, the transfer can be made only with the
sanction of the Government; and (4) the sale is not
exempted by the Government, by general or special
order, from the operation of s. 77 of the Act. It is not
disputed that_ the relevant conditions have been com-
plied with in the present case. If so, the power of the
Committee to alienate the property cannot be ques-
tioned.
Learned counsel contends that the provisions of
s. 76 govern the situation and that s. 77 may apply
only to a property vested in the Committee under
provisions other than those of ss. 72(f), 73 and 74, and
that further, if a wider interpretation was given to
s. 77, while under s. 76 the transfer in favour of the <'
Government would be subject to a trust or public
right, under s. 77 it would be free from it if it was
transferred.to a private party. The first objection has
no force, as there are no sections other than ss. 72, 73
and 74 whereunder the Government vests property in
a Committee. The second objection also has no
merits, for the trust or public right mentioned in s. 76
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 309
does not appear to relate to the purpose for which the
property is purchased but to the trust or public right M. Pentiah
existing over the property so alienated by the Com- & Others
mittee. Further the proviso to s. 77, which saxs, v.
" nothing in this section shall apply to leases of Muddala
immovable property for a term not exceeding three Veeramallappa
& Others
years ", indicates that the main section applies also .to
the property vested in the Committee under the pre- Subba llao ].
vious section, for it exempts from the operation of the
operative part of s. 77 leases for a term not exceeding
three years in respect of properties covered by the
preceding section and other sections. This interpreta.
tion need not cause any apprehension that a Com-
mittee may squander away the municipal property,
for s. 77 is hedged in by four conditions and the
conditions afford sufficient guarantee against improper
and improvident alienations.
In thi11 context learned counsel for the appellants
invoked the doctrine of law that an action of a statu-
tory corporation may be ultra vires its powers without
being illegal and also the principle that when a statute
confers an express power, a power inconsistent with
that expressly given cannot be implied. It is not
necessary to consider all the decisions cited, as learned
counsel for the respondents does not canvass the
correctness of the said principles. It would, therefore,
be sufficient to notice two of the decisions cited at the
Bar. The decision in Elizabeth Dowager Baroness
· Wenlock v. The River Dee Company (1) is relied upon
in support of the proposition that when a corporation
is authorised to do an act subject to certain condi-
tions, it must be deemed to have been prohibited to
do the said act except in accordance with the provi-
sions of that Act which confers the authority on it.
Where by Act 14 & 15 Viet. a. company was empower-
ed to borrow at interest for the purposes of the con-
cerned Acts, subject to certain conditions, it was held
that the company was prohibited by the said Act
from borrowing except in accordance with the provi-
sions of that Act. Strong reliance is placed on the
decision in .Attorney-General v. Fulham Corporation (2 ).
(I) (1885) Io A.C. 354• (2) (1921) I Ch.D, 440,
 310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1961]
z960
There, in exercise of the powers conferred under the
M. Pentiah Baths and Wash-houses Acts, the Metropolitan Bor-
&.. Others ough of :iJ'ulham propounded a scheme in substitution
v. of an earlier one whereunder it installed a wash-house
Muddala to which persons resorted for washing their clothes
V e1ramallappa bringing their own wash materials and utilised the
& Others
facilities offered by the municipality on payment of
Subba Rao ]. the prescribed charges. Sarjant, J ., held that the
object of the legislation was to provide for persons
who became customers facilities for doing their own
washing, but the scheme provided for washing by the
municipality itself and that, therefore, it was ultra
vires the statute. In coming to that conclusion the
learned Judge, after considering an earlier decision on
the subject, applied the following principle to the facts
of the case before him :
" That recognises that in every case it is for a
corporation of this kind to show that it has affirma-
tively an authority to do particular acts; but that in
applying that principle, the rule is not to be applied
too narrowly, and the corporation is entitled to do not
only that which is expressly authorised but that which
is reasonably incidental to or consequential upon that
which is in terms authorized."
The principle so stated is unobjectionable.
The ·correctness of these principles also need not be
canvassed, for the construction we have placed on
the provisions of the Act does not run counter to any
of these principles. We have held that s. 77 confers
an express power on the Municipal Committee to sell

I
property subject to the conditions mentioned therein.
Therefore, the impugned sales are not ultra vi res the
powers of the Committee. In view of the said express
power, no prohibition can be implied from the provi-
sions of s. 76.
Learned counsel further contends that the statutory
power can be exercised only for the purpoB\lB sanction-
ed by the statute, that the sales of the acquired land
to private persons were not for one of such purposes,
and that, therefore, they were void. The principle
that a statutory body can only function within the
four corners of the statute is unexceptionable; but the
 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 311
Legislature can confer a power on a statutory corpora-
tion to sell its land is equally uncontestable. In this M. Pentiah
case we have held that the statute conferred such a & Others
power on the Municipal Committee, subject to string- v.
gent limitations. Many situations can be visualized Muddala
when such a. sale would be necessary and would be to V eeranzallappa
& Othets
the . benefit of the corporation. Of course the price
fetched by such sales can only be utilised for the Subba Rao ].
purposes sanctioned by the Act.
The last point raised is that the learned Judges of
the High Court were not justified in holding on the
materials placed before them that the appellants
lacked bona fides and that the petition filed by them
was not conceived in the interests of the public. We
do not find any material on the record to sustain this
finding. Indeed, but for the petitioner-appellants the
1
' extraordinary situation created by the inaction of
the Government in the matter of implementing the
Act, affecting thereby the municipal administration
of all the districts in Telangana area, might not have
been brought to light. We cannot describe the action
of the appellants either mala fide or frivolous.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed but,
in the circumstances, without costs.
SARKAR, J.-The first question is whether the first Sarkar ].
ten respondents are still members of the Municipal
Committee of Vicarabad. These persons had been
elected to the Committee in the elections held in 1953
under the Hyderabad Municipal and Town Commit-
tees Act, 1951 (Hyderabad Act XXVII of 1951), here-
after called the repealed Act. That Act was repealed
by the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act (Hydera-
bad Act XVIII of 1956), hereafter called the new Act,
which came into force in August 1956. The appellants,
who are rate-payers of the Municipality, contend that
on a proper reading of the new Act, it must be held
that these ten respondents have ceased to be members
of the Committee, and they seek a writ of quo warranto
against the respondents. ·
Section 320 of the new Act provides that any Com-
mittee constituted under the repealed Act shall be
deemed to have been constituted under the new Act
 312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961]
and its members shall continue to hold office till the
M. Pentiah
first meeting of the Committee is called under s. 35 of
&> Others the new Act. The ten respondents contend that as
v. admittedly the meeting under s. 35 has not been
Muddala called, their term of office has not yet expired.
Veeramallappa Now s. 35, so far a.s is material, provides that the
&- Others
first meeting of the Committee shall be called by the
Sarkar ]. Collector within thirty days of the date of publication
of the names of members under s. 32. Section 32
states that the names of members finally elected to
any Committee shall be forthwith published in the
official Gazette. It is quite clear, therefore, that the
Committee mentioned in this section, is a Committee
constituted by an election held under the new Act.
It would follow that the meeting contemplated in
s. 35 is a. meeting of a. Committee constituted by an
election held under · the new Act. The provisions of r
that section put this beyond doubt.
In order, therefore, that a meeting of the Committee
contemplated in s. 35 may be held, there has first to
be an election under the new Act to constitute the
Committee. No such election has yet been held. It is
the provision concerning election in the new Act that
has given rise to the difficulty that arises in this case.
Section 16, sub-s. (I), gives the power to hold the
•
general elections. It is in these words :
" Every general election requisite for the purpose of
this Act shall be held by the Collector in the manner
prescribed within three months before the expiry of
the term of office of the members of the Committee as
specified in section 34 ".
Section 34 in substance states that except as other-
wise provided members of the Committee shall hold
office for a term of three years and that term of office
shall be deemed to commence on the date of the first
meeting ca.lied under s. 35. It would therefore appear
that the members whose term of office is s9ught to be
specified by s. 34 are members elected under the new
Act, for their term is to commence on the date that
they first meet under s. 35 and as earlier stated, the
meeting under s. 35 is a. meeting of members elected
under the new Act.
I
 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 313
The contention for the appellants is that if s. 34 is z960
construed in the way. mentioned above, the first Al. Pentiah
general election under the new Act cannot be held & Othe,s
under s. 16, for an election can be held under that v.
section only within three months before the expiry of Muddala
the term of office of members elected under the new Veeramallapp{I
Act and in the case of first election there are ex hypo • . & Others
.r thesi, no such members. It is said that as there is no Sarllar ].
• other provision in the new Act for holding a general
election, the Act would then become unworkable, for
if the first general election cannot be held no subse-
quent election ·can be held either. The result., it is
contended, is that the Committee elected under the
repealed Act would continue for ever by virtue of
s. 320. Such a situation, it is said, could not have been
intended by the new Act. It is.therefore suggested that
s. 34 should be construed as specifying a term of office
.• of three years from the commencement of the new Act
for members elected under the repealed Act who are
under s. 320, to be deemed to form a Committee cons-
!
tituted under the new Act. If s. 34 is so construed,
then the first general election under the new Act can
properly be held under s. 16. It is on this basis that
the appellants contend that the ten respondents' term
of office expired in August, 1959, and they are in
possession of the office now without any warrant.
There is no doubt that the Act raises some diffi.
culty. It was certainly not intended that the members
• elected to the Committee under the repealed Act should
be given a permanent tenure of office nor that there
would be no elections under the new Act. Yet such
a result would ·appear to follow if the language used
in the new Act is strictly and literally interpreted. It -
is however well established that " \Vhere the langu·
age of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and gram·
matical construction, leads to a manifest contradic·
tion of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to
some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injus-
tice, presumably not intended, a construction may be
put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words,
and even the structure of the sentence ................ ..
 314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961]
r960 ........................................................................
M. Pentiah
Where the main object and intention of a statute are
& Others clear, it mu8t not be reduced to a nullity by the
v. draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law,
Ii1uddala except in a case of necessity, or the ·absolute intract-
Veeram.allappa ability of the language used. Nevertheless, the courts
&- Others
a.re very reluctant to substitute words in a Statute,
Sarkar ]. or to add words to it, 11-nd it has been said tha.t they
will only do so where there is a repugna.ncy to good
sense.": see Maxwell on Statutes (10th ed.) p. 229.
In Sea/ord Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (' ), Denning,
L. J., said,
"when a. defect a.ppea.rs e. judge cannot simply
fold his hands and bis.me the dra.ftsma.n. He must set
to work on the constructive task of finding the inten-
tion of Pa.rliament.............. a.nd then he must supple-
ment the written word so a.s to give " force and life "
to the intention of the legisla.ture ............... A judge
should a.sk himself the question how, if the makers of
the Act had themselves come a.cross this ruck in the
texture of it, they would have straightened it out?
He must then do as they would have done. A judge
must not alter the material of which the Act is woven,
but he can and should iron out the creases."
I conceive it my duty, therefore, so to read the new
Act, unless I a.m prevented by the intractability of the
language used, e.s to make it carry out the obvious
intention of the legislature. Now ihere does not .seem
to be the slightest doubt that the intention of the
makers of the new Act was tha.t there should be
elections held under it and that the Municipal Com-
mittees should be constituted by such elections to run
the a.dministra.tion of the municipa.lities. The sections
to which I have so far referred a.nd the other provi-
sions of the new Act make this perfectly plain. Thus
s. 5 provides for the establishment of municipal com-
mittees and s. 8 sta.tes that the. committees shall
consist of e. certe.in number of elected members. The
other sections show that the Committees shall he.ve
che.rge of the administration of the municipalities for
the benefit of the dwellers within them. It is plain
(•) [•9•9] • AU E.R. •ss. 16•.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 315
that the entire object of the new Act would fail if no
general election could be held under it. M. Pentiah
The question then is, How should the Act be read so & Others
as to make it possible to hold general elections under v.
it? I agree with the learned advocate for the appel- Muddala
lants that the only section in the new Act prt>viding Veeramallappa
& Others
for general elections being held, is s. 16(1).. In my
view, s. 20 does not authorise the holding of any Sarkar ].
general election ; it only provides for a notification of
the date on which the poll shall, if necessary, be
taken. There is no doubt that under· s. 16(1) the
second and all subsequent general elections can be
held ; in regard to such general elections, no difficulty
is created by the language of the section. It would
be curious if s. 20 also provided for general elections,
for then there would be two provisions in the Act
authorising general elections other than the first.
Then I find that all the sections referring to general
elections refer to such elections being held under
s. 16(1) and not under s. 20. Thus s. 31 provides that
if at a general election held under s. 16, no member is
elected, a fresh election shall be held. It would follow
that if in an election under s. 20, assuming that that
section authorises an election, no member is elected, no
fresh election can be held. There would be no reason
to make this distinction between elections held under
s. 16 'and under s. 20. Again the proviso to s. 17 re-
quires a certain notification to be issued within a pres-
cribed time for holding elections under s. 16(1). If an
election can be held under s. 20, no such notification
need be issued for there is no provision requiring it.
This could not have. been intended. For all these
reasons it l!leems to me that s. 20 does not confer any
power to hold any election. ·
I have earlier said that the suggestion for the
appellants is that the best way out of the difficulty is
to read s. 34 as specifying a term of office of three yea.rs
commencing from the coming into force of the new
Act, for the members elected under the repealed Act
who are to be deemed under s. 320 to be a committee
constituted under the new Act. It -seems to me that
this is not a correct solution of the problem. First,
 316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961]
the object of continuing the members elected under the
M. Pentiah repealed Act in office is .clearly to have, what may be
& Others called a caretaker committee to do the work of the
v. Municipality till a committee . is constituted by elec-
Muddala tion under the new Act. It could not have been
F eeraniallappa
& Others
intended that the committee of the members elected
under the repealed Act would function for three years
Sarkar ]. after the new Act has come into operation nor that
such members would have the same· term of office as
members elected under the new Act. Secondly, I do
not find the language used in s. 34 sufficiently tract-
able to cover by any alteration, a member elected
under the repealed Act. To meet the suggestion of
the appellants, a new provision would have really to
to be enacted and added to s. 34 and this I do not
think is permissible. It would be necessary to add to
the section a provision that in the case of members
elected under the old Act the term of office of three
years would start running from the commencement of
the new.Act, a provision which is wholly absent in the
section as it stands. Lastly, so read, s. 34 would come
into conflict with s. 320 which expressly provides that
the term of office of the members elected under the
repealed Act would continue till the first meeting of
the committee constituted under the new Act is held
under s. 35. This portion of s. 320 would have to be
completely struck out.
It seems to me that the real solution of the diffi-
culty lies in construing s. 16(1) so as to authorise the
holding of the first general election under it and
remove the absurdity of there being no provision
directing the first general election to be held. Now
that section applies to "every general election requi-
site for the purpose of this Act." It therefore applies
to the first and all other general elections. The clear
intention hence is that the first general election will
also be held under tkis provision. But such election
cannot be held within the time mentioned therein for
that time has to be c&lculated from the expiry of the
term of office4:>f the Committee elected under the Act
and in thep'ase of the first general election under the
new Act, there is no such Committee. The requirement
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 317
a.s to time cannot apply to the first genera.I elec-
tion. The section has therefore to be read a.s if there M. Pentiah
was no such requirement in the case of the first & Others
genera.I election. It will have to be read with the v.
addition of the words " provided that every general Muddala
election excepting the first general electicin shall be Veeramallappa
& Others
held" between the words" prescribed" and" within".
That would carry out the intention of the legislature Sarkar J.
and do the least violence to the language used. So
read, there would be clear power under the Act to
hold the first general meeting. There would of course
then be no indication as to when this election is to be
held but that would only mean that it has to be held
within a. reasonable time of the commencement of the
new Act.
The course suggested by me is not without the
support of precedents. Thus in Salmon v. Dun-
combe (1), the Judicial Committee in construing a
statute omitted from it the words " as if such natural.
born subject resided in England " because the reten-
tion of those words would have prevented the person
contemplated getting full power to dispose of his
immovable property by his will which it was held, the
object of the statute was, he should get.
With regard to the other point argued in this
appeal, namely, whether the Municipal Committee
even if properly constituted, has, power to sell the land
men~ioned in the petition, I agree, for the reasons
mentioned in the judgment delivered by the majority
of the members of the bench, that it has such power
and have nothing t,o add.
The appeal therefore fails.
Appeal dismissed.

(1) (1886) u App. Cas. 627.