17 Dimatulac vs Villon GR 127107

PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA DIMATULAC, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SESINANDO VILLON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga, Branch 54; HON. TEOFISTO GUINGONA, in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice; MAYOR SANTIAGO YABUT, SERVILLANO YABUT, MARTIN
YABUT and FORTUNATO MALLARI, respondents.
G.R. No. 127107
October 12, 1998

FACTS: Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus on December 28,
1996, arguing that the killing of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was attended by treachery, as private
respondents tricked the victim into coming out of his house and shooting him while he was going
down the stairs. They claim that private respondents manipulated the rules on administrative
appeals to evade prosecution for the non-bailable offense of murder. The case involved several
events, including Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores downgrading the crime to
homicide, respondent Mayor and his companions returning to Minalin after the killing, and the
information for homicide being filed despite notice to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the court is valid despite the pendency of an appeal to
set aside arraignment
RULING: Alarmed by the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed, on 27 May 1996, an Urgent
Motion to Set Aside Arraignment, citing the resolution of 30 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 which, inter alia, deferred resolution on the application for a
temporary restraining order "until after the required comment is submitted by the respondent;"
stressed that the filing of the information for the lesser offense of homicide was "clearly unjust
and contrary to law in view of the unquestionable attendance of circumstances qualifying the
killing to murder;" and asserted that a number of Supreme Court decisions supported suspension
of the proceedings in view of the pendency of their appeal before the DOJ. It is settled that when
the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case is void, hence
double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in those cases, so must it be
where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as above discussed.
The petition is GRANTED. The orders of Judge Reynaldo Roura of 26 March 1996 denying the
Motion to Defer Proceeding and of 12 April 1996 denying the motion to reconsider the denial of
said Motion to Defer Proceedings, and the orders of respondent Judge Sesinando Villon of 3
May 1996 resetting the arraignment to 20 May 1998 and of 25 October 1996 denying the Motion
to Set Aside Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) are declared VOID and SET
ASIDE. The arraignment of private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and
Martin Yabut and their separate pleas of not guilty are likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE.
Furthermore, the order of public respondent Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996 is SET ASIDE
and his order of 7 June 1996 REINSTATED.
18 People vs Dela Cruz GR 137967
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO DE LA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 137967
April 19, 2001
FACTS: The accused allegedly had sexual intercourse with Sinclaire De Guzman, a 14-year-old
girl, on July 13, 1998, in Barangay Dumpay, Pangasinan, Philippines. The Regional Trial Court
in San Carlos City, Pangasinan, found accused-appellant Pedro De la Cruz guilty of rape and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. With the appeal of Accused-appellant makes the following
assignment of errors: 1. the honorable court a quo erred in its findings of facts which, had they
been in accordance with the evidence adduced, will suffice to support a judgment of acquittal for
accused-appellant; and, 2. the honorable court a quo erred in convincing accused-appellant for
rape. The accused-appellant argues that Sinclaire De Guzman's story is incredible and difficult to
believe, citing his 20-year blindness and the complainant's ability to escape. Courts follow
principles in adjudging rape cases, which include making an accusation with facility, scrutinizing
the complainant's testimony with extreme caution, and ensuring the prosecution's evidence
stands on its own merits. The credibility of the complainant's testimony is crucial, as only
participants can testify about the crime. The court has held that the lone uncorroborated
testimony of the complainant is sufficient to warrant a conviction, provided it is credible, natural,
convincing, and consistent with human nature. However, the court may re-evaluate evidence to
determine if a fact or circumstance has been overlooked or misinterpreted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of Regional Trial Court may be reversed and accused-
appellant is acquitted of the crime of rape
RULING: The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, San Carlos City, Pangasinan is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime of
rape as charged and is ordered immediately released unless there are other legal grounds for his
continued detention. The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to report
to the Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
Although an absolute guarantee of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person of a
crime, there must at least be moral certainty that each element essential to constitute the offense
and accused-appellant's identity as the person who committed the same were established by the
prosecution. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is meant to be that, all things given, the mind of the
Court can rest easy on the certainty of the guilt of accused-appellant. In this case, doubts have
arisen not only as to the culpability of accused-appellant but as to the occurrence of the crime
itself.
19 People vs Padica GR 102645
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO PADICA y LORICA, LESLIE GANS y MELENDRES, FLORENTINO
FABRIGAS, ROMEO PRADEZ, LEONARDO MARAJAS, LEOPOLDO MARAJAS and
LEON MARAJAS, JR. y RAMOS, ** accused. LEON MARAJAS, JR. y RAMOS,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 102645.
April 7, 1993.

FACTS: Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos appeals a judgment from the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch CXVI, which found him guilty of kidnapping for ransom with murder. The case
involves a conspiracy to kidnapped Francis Banaga in 1978, detained him for three days,
demanded P500,000 for his release, and unlawfully shot Banaga, causing his death. The true
identities of the suspects remain unknown. The appellant was found guilty of kidnapping for
ransom with murder after eight years of trial, with a penalty of reclusion perpetua and P30,000 as
indemnity for the death of his child. The appellant is arguing for a reversal of the conviction,
claiming the court erred in ruling the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, giving full
credence to Padica's testimony, and disregarding defense inconsistencies. The crime of
kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered a component felony to produce a complex
crime of kidnapping with murder. The appellant and his brothers intended to kill the victim from
the beginning, and there was no evidence that they intended to exchange his freedom for ransom
money. The demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping since no detention or
deprivation of liberty was involved. The kidnapping for the purpose of ransom raises the
imposable penalty to death under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Francis Banaga, a
fourteen-year-old high school student, was not forced or coerced unlawfully into going along
with his killers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to charge him as an accused in the original
information is a fatal defect
RULING: The complaint or information must sufficiently allege the name of the accused, as
failing to do so would render the complaint invalid. The test of sufficiency is laid down in
Section 7, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, the appellant was arraigned under
the original information and entered a plea of not guilty under the name of "Leonardo Marajas."
The appellant should have raised the error as to his identity by filing a motion to quash on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person, as explained in People vs. Narvaes. However, he
voluntarily appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty under a different name, thereby
acquiring jurisdiction over his person and rendering a valid judgment of conviction based on the
original information. The subsequent amendment to insert Leon Marajas, Jr.'s real name involved
merely a matter of form and did not alter the nature of the offense charged. The amendment to
include Leon Marajas, Jr.'s real name in the complaint was a formal amendment, not depriving
the appellant of a fair defense opportunity. The amendment did not alter the nature of the offense
charged, as the prosecution's theory remained unchanged. This amendment is allowed under
Section 7 and Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, and any irregularities in the inclusion of the
appellant's name were waived by his subsequent plea.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is
rendered CONVICTING accused-appellant Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos of the crime of murder
and IMPOSING upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is further
ORDERED to pay the heirs of the late Francis Banaga the sum of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, in line with current jurisprudential policy, and likewise to pay the costs.

20 People vs Perreras GR 139622

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO PERRERAS @ PEPOT and BOY FERNANDEZ (at large), accused.
PEDRO PERRERAS @ PEPOT, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 139622
July 31, 2001
FACTS: On July 21, 1998, Pedro Perreras and his nephew Boy Fernandez approached Leonardo
Salazar in Bacayao Norte, Dagupan City. They asked if Manoling Pastoral was home and
Leonardo walked to Estanislao Salo's house. They approached Joel, the son of Estanislao, and
asked him for Manoling's house. The accused-appellant approached Estanislao's house and fired
at him, hitting him on the head. Leonardo, fearing for his life, hid behind a chair. Accused-
Appellant Pedro Perreras alias "Pepot" was found guilty by the court a quo of murder for the
killing of Estanislao Salo and sentenced to death. He was ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
P75,000.00 for civil indemnity, P91,803.59 for actual and compensatory damages,
P1,728,000.00 for lost earnings and P100,000.00 for moral damages. His conviction is now the
subject of this automatic review
ISSUE: Whether or not death penalty be imposed
RULING: The death penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant in light of our recent
rulings in People v. Arrojado and People v. Gano where Secs. 8 and 9 of The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure were given retroactive application where favorable to the accused. The Rules
now require that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the
aggravating circumstances, otherwise the same cannot be properly appreciated. Since dwelling
was not alleged in the Information, it cannot be considered to raise the penalty to death.
Consequently, there being no more modifying circumstances to be appreciated, the penalty for
this murder is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. 63 in relation to Art. 248 of The Revised Penal
Code, as amended by RA 7659.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 98-02303-D finding
accused-appellant PEDRO PERRERAS alias "Pepot" guilty of murder, imposing on him the
death penalty and ordering him to pay the heirs of ESTANISLAO SALO P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P91,803.59 in actual and compensatory damages, P1,728,000.00 in lost earnings, and
P100,000.00 in moral damages is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant PEDRO PERRERAS is found
guilty of murder and sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of
ESTANISLAO SALO P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P61,813.15 as actual damages,
P1,080,000.00 in lost earnings and P50,000.00 as moral damages. No costs.

21 People vs Del Mundo GR 132065

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORBERTO DEL MUNDO, SR. Y ONGOCO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 132065
April 3, 2001

FACTS: Michelle del Mundo, born in 1981, was raped by her father, accused-appellant, in 1996.
She was fetched from her cousin's house in Malitlit, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, and later raped her father
in San Pedro. Michelle's mother worked as a domestic helper in Hong Kong, and her father
forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. Michelle claims she had been raped by the accused-
appellant since she was eight years old, and her mother was unaware of the abuse. Michelle was
threatened not to tell anyone or face death. Michelle filed a rape complaint against the accused-
appellant, and her health officer found healed lacerations and eight months of gestation. She gave
birth in Urdaneta, Pangasinan in March 1997.
ISSUE: Whether or not the information must allege the qualifying and modifying circumstances
to impose the death penalty
RULING: In particular, not only must the information allege the minority of the victim but it
must also state the relationship of the offender to the offended party. For purposes of qualified
rape under Republic Act No. 7659, the concurrence of minority of the victim and her relationship
to the offender constitute one special qualifying circumstance which must both be alleged and
proved. In case of failure to specify these qualifying circumstances in the information, the
accused cannot be subjected to the death penalty. Otherwise, his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him will be infringed. The fact that it
was proven during trial that the victim was only fifteen years of age, hence a minor, and that
accused-appellant was her own biological father does not suffice.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Criminal Case
No. 0463-SPL, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and sentencing
him to pay private complainant the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed on him is
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

22 People vs Lopez GR 135671-72

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MONTANO LOPEZ @ JUN, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 135671-72
November 29, 2000

FACTS: Montano Lopez was charged with raping his 16-year-old niece twice in two separate
criminal cases. The charges were filed in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, on February
14th and 27th, 1997. The charges were based on lewd design, force and intimidation, and willful,
unlawful, and felonious carnal knowledge against her will and consent.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the accused-appellant was clearly charged a crime of rape in the
information filed
2. Whether or not court erred in imposing the death penalty
RULING: 1. While it may appear that Cristina did not resist accused-appellant when he first
raped her on February 14, 1997, the use of force and intimidation under the circumstances was
not necessary because of Cristina's mental condition which effectively deprived her of reason to
ward off the bestial attacks of her uncle. Time and again we have held that if the mental age of a
woman above 12 years old is that of a child below 12 years old, even if she voluntarily submits
herself to the bestial desires of the accused, or even if the circumstances of force or intimidation,
or of the victim being deprived of reason or otherwise rendered unconscious, are absent, the
accused would still be liable for rape. Moreover, accused-appellant's asking for forgiveness and
the dropping of the cases against him is an act undeniably indicative of guilt. For if he so
believed that he did not commit any wrongdoing against Cristina, why ask for forgiveness?
2. The court erred in imposing the death penalty on accused-appellant because both the victim's
age and her relationship to the accused were not alleged in the Information. This Court has
consistently held that the death penalty may be imposed only if the information alleges and the
evidence later proves both the age of the victim and her relationship to the offender. As
explained in the earlier case of People vs. Ramos, the reason for the rule is because relationship
and minority partake of the nature of special qualifying circumstances which have the effect of
increasing the prescribed penalty by degrees. As the qualifying circumstances of relationship and
minority were not alleged in the Information, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of qualified
rape, and accordingly, the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED except for the modification that
the accused-appellant MONTANO LOPEZ @ JUN is hereby adjudged guilty of two counts of
SIMPLE RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each
count thereof, and except for the awards of civil indemnity as well as moral and exemplary
damages above-discussed.

23. Gabionza vs CA GR 140311

DENNIS T. GABIONZA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 140311
March 30, 2001
FACTS: Denis T. Gabionza is seeking a review of the Court of Appeals' decision in Crim. Case
No. Q-93-505522, which dismissed his petition for certiorari assailing the Regional Trial Court's
order to amend an Information charging him with violating RA 1161. The Information alleged
that Gabionza, President of the Manila City Bus Corporation, failed to remit Social Security
System contributions for SSS, Medicare, and Employee Compensation. The public prosecutor
filed a motion to amend the Information, which Gabionza opposed, arguing it would violate his
right to be informed and prejudice his defenses.
ISSUE: Whether or not an information be amended to change the material dates of the
commission of the offense after the accused had been arraigned
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49098-SP affirming that of the trial court which allowed the
amendment of the Information charging petitioner with violation of RA No. 1161, as amended, is
AFFIRMED. Considering the delay already incurred in the process, the trial court should
immediately act on this case with deliberate dispatch upon its remand, which this Court
DIRECTS. Costs against petitioner.
The proper procedure for the amendment of an Information is governed by Sec. 14, Rule 110, of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure -Sec. 14. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court at any time before the accused pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court,
when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused x x x x After the
accused enters a plea, amendments to the Information may be allowed, as to matters of form,
provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of
an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a Complaint or Information is when a defense
under the Complaint or Information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to
the Complaint or the Information as amended.
Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as: (a) it does not deprive the accused
of the right to invoke prescription; (b) it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense
originally charged; (c) it does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to
require the accused to undergo any material change or modification in his defense; (d) it does not
expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty; and, (5) it does not cause
surprise nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and not of substance.
The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form, unless time is a material
ingredient of the offense. It is not even necessary to state in the Information the precise time the
offense was committed unless time is a material factor. It is sufficient that the act is alleged to
have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed
as the Complaint or Information will permit.