Extremism as a Religious Norm

Author(s): Charles S. Liebman

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Source: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 75-86
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Extremism as a Religious Norm*
CHARLES S. LIEBMANt

Contraryto prevailingparadigmsof modernizationand secularization,I contendthat extremism

is the religious norm, and that it is not religious extremism but religious moderationthat requires
explanation. Relying on impressions from contemporaryJudaism, extremism is defined here as the
desire to expand the scope, detail and strictness of religious law; social isolation; and the rejection
of the surroundingculture.Religiousextremismis an impulseor an orientationwhich,whenobjectified
in persons and institutions, is invariably moderated.
Religiousmoderationcan be accountedfor by the mixedmotivationsof religiousadherents,either
individualsor groups, who tempertheir "religious"impulsesin orderto achieve"non-religious"goals
at the individualor communallevel. Religious moderationmay be a strategy to persuadeor convert
others, or to protect the religious community itself against a hostile environment.In all instances,
moderationis associated with religious prestige and strong communalcommitments. The decline
of the religious communitypermits the breakthroughof extremist tendencies. This is facilitated by
the decline of the secular culture with which the religious moderates were associated.
This theory is appliedto two types of Jewish religious extremism in Israel, one anti-nationalist
and the other ultra-nationalistin orientation.

This study is an effort to understand the apparent growth of what has been called
"religiousextremism."'My focus is on Judaism in Israel. My assumptionis that the rise,
or perceivedrise of religious extremism is not limited to Judaism in Israel, therefore,the
explanationofferedcannot be peculiarto that religionor that country.On the other hand,
it wouldbe quite remarkableif developmentsin the beliefand behaviorpatternsof religious
adherents,particularlythose most zealousin their attachmentto the religion,wereentirely
accountedfor by developmentsextrinsic to the religion.As David Martinnotes, the ethos
of a church"colourswhatever may be the functionallogic of its social position" (Martin,
1978: 24). Hence, the focus on Judaism is not meant to suggest that this is what has
happenedto every historicalreligionbut ratherto raiseissues throughwhichotherreligious
communities can be compared and distinguished.

WHY STUDY RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM?

The rise of religious extremism was quite unanticipated by modernizationtheories

prevalent a decade ago. (See, for example: Inkeles, 1969; Smith, 1970; or the literature
cited in Creevey,1980:207-208).The explanationto be offeredin this paperis an illustration
of how prevailing paradigms among social scientists lead to the wrong question and a
focus on the wrong sorts of information.But even if the explanation offered here were
incorrect, this study of religious extremism draws attention to an important topic for

*I wish to thank the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities - Basic Research Foundation and the Memorial
Foundation for Jewish Culture for grants under which research for this paper was carried out.

tCharles S. Liebman is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel.

1. I recognizethat this is an unfortunateterm since the connotations arepejorative. But it has the advantage
of being readily comprehensibleto scholars and lay people. Religious zealousness is a morevalue neutral albeit
awkwardterm. Proponents prefer the term "religious revival" or "renewal."

© Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1983, 22 (1): 75-86 75

76 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

the scientific study of religion. Extremism, whatever form it takes, is an affirmationof

"the more the better." Hence, it is helpful to know what it is that the extremists want
"more"of. What elements of religion do different extremist groups focus on? Are they
similar from one religionto another?Can the internal structure of the particularreligion
or of religion in general help account for the particularemphases? Can we distinguish
types of extremist groups within the same religion by the elements they focus on, and
are these groups identifiableby standard social characteristicssuch as age, occupation,
income, education, religious background,etc?

DEFINITION OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

Religious extremism can refer either to a process or to an institution. We can talk

about this or that individual or group becoming more or less religiously extreme or we
can talk about religiouslyextremegroups or individuals.To say that one finds an increase
of religiousextremism can mean that more and morepeople are behavingin a religiously
extrememanner,or that thereis an increasein strengthand/orinfluenceof groupsidentified
as religiouslyextreme.The two phenomenamay, but need not necessarily,be associated.
In theory, strengthening the process of extremism might weaken the attraction of
institutional extremism.
This study assumes that in most contemporarysocieties there is a term comparable
to or interchangeablewith religiousextremism, and that the processes or institutions to
whichit refers arereadilyidentifiable,even if not easily definable.The scholar'sfirst task
is to define religious extremism in a way that correspondsas closely as possible to that
which is popularlyidentified as religiously extreme. The following definitionis based on
my impressions of what Jews in general and Israeli Jews in particularlabel religious
extremism and on the characteristics of those groups whom the public identifies as
extremist (or zealous).
I will propose three dimensionsof religiousextremism. The first dimensioncontains
three components.

Expansion of Religious Law

The first dimensionof Jewish religiousextremismis the drive to expand the halakha
(religiouslaw). Religious law is the set of rules persons are obliged to obey lest they sin
against God.The sin may be a violationof one's responsibilityto God or to other persons.
Its sanction may be a matter of human and/ordivine judgement. This is irrelevant for
purposesof definition.Judaism,like Islam,is definedand distinguishedfromotherreligions
and cultures by its particularcode of law. Because of the prime importanceof the law,
it stands to reasonthat Jewish religiousextremists will express their orientations,at least
in part, in their conception of halakha. Perhaps this is less true among Christians or
Buddhists among whom religious law plays a smaller role. Perhaps law, by its nature,
(objective, clear cut, authoritative)is an especially attractive focus for extermists from
all religious traditions. The question merits further study.
An extremist orientation to halakha has three components. First, extremists seek
to expandits scope. One can conceiveof a continuumof activity fromthe collectiveto the
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM 77

private in which religiouslaw is relevant.At one end of the continuumwouldbe collective

behavior;for example the political or economicstructureof society as expressed in public
law. Furtheralongthe continuumareaspects of publiclaw whichareconcernedwith private
as opposed to collective behavior.Family law is "the last bastion of the religious concept
of law"in the sense of publiclaw imposedon all citizens(Smith,1970:3). But the continuum
of religiousconcernextends furtheralong the continuumto the realmof private behavior
which finds no expression in public law. It is hard to conceive of a religion preparedto
admit that it has nothing authoritative to say to its adherents about education or sex
even if that religion eschews enactment of its injunctions in public law. Extremists are
at the first end of the continuum.They seek to extend the scope of religiouslaw to include
the public as well as the private realm, and to matters of collective as well as private
behavior within that realm. For example, the religious adherents of Gush Emunim
(Sprinzak,1981)believe that the halakhaobliges them to oppose Israeli withdrawalfrom
territory capturedin the Six Day War since all that territory is identified as part of the
biblical boundariesof the Land of Israel which God promised to the Jews. The dispute
betweenGush Emunimand the religiousmoderatesis not over the boundariesof the Holy
Land but over the relevanceof political, security and foreign relations considerations,as
opposed to purely halakhic considerations,in determining foreign policy.
Expandingthe scope of halakhameans that Jewish extremists have a social program
and are critical of existing social institutions; though there may be different groups of
extremists, each with their own program.Extremists may seek to impose their program
on society, thereby necessarily involving themselves in political conflict; or they may
withdrawfrom society, awaiting a morepropitioustime, perhapsDivine intervention,for
the realization of their program. In the latter case, political conflict may be limited to
the defense of the extremists' autonomy. The conquest tendency as opposed to the
withdrawal tendency may be a function of a realistic assessment of the political
environmentand/ora function of the group's ideology. Of course, in some cases neither
option may be feasible, as Ivan Marcus notes (1981:87), and the extremists then live in
but not of the world.
The second componentin the extremists' orientationto halakhais in the elaboration
of the details of the law. For example,religiouslaw requiresmodesty of dress, particularly
among women. The question is: Does the halakha require "modesty" and allow each
individualor each community to decide on its application?Or, as extremists aver, is the
law detailed, requiring,for example, sleeves or hemline of a certain length?
The first two componentsin the extremists' orientationto halakha share a common
characteristic.They emphasize the objective, the ordained,and they limit the authority
of the subjective,the optionaland personalinterpretation.They do not, however,minimize
the importanceof inwardmotivation,to whichextremiststend to ascribegreat significance.
The third componentin the expansion of the law is the question of strictness versus
leniencyin interpretation.The law, even if detailed,might be lenient(forexample,requiring
sleeves to the elbow and hemlines to below the knees) or it might be strict (requiringall
parts of the body to be covered).The term strict does not necessarily mean closer to the
"letter of the law." The "letter of the law" often suggests a lenient interpretation.Strict
refers to the impositionof greaterrestrictionsand hardships,whichis what the extremist
welcomes (see Williams, 1980, for an Islamic example).
78 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

Social Isolation

The second dimension of religious extremism is its attitude toward those elements
of society who do not accept extremist norms. The characteristicapproachof extremism
is one of isolation. However, when coupled with efforts to convert or persuade other
individuals,the isolation is temperedand special safeguards may be erected to mitigate
the dangers which the inevitable contact with outsiders invites. The pure form of social
isolation among Israeli Jews is that found within the Edah Haredit (the Communityof
the Pious) in Jerusalem with a secondary center in B'nei B'rak (Friedman,1975). The
LubavitcherHasidim(Shaffir,1978)arean extremistgroupwhoseconversionistorientation
(aimedat otherJews, not non-Jews)involvesthem in certainaspects of intenserelationships
with non-religiousin which they themselves avoid emotionalinvolvement. The religious
adherentsof Gush Emunimare committedto organizationalactivity in consort with non-
religious Jews, and their ideology legitimates this cooperation. But, this is the most
problematicaspect of their program and has been increasingly challenged by many of
their own religious leaders (Liebman,forthcoming).
Judaism is probablythe most ethnically orientedof all historicalreligions. Whereas
isolation from non-Jewsis encouraged,distancing oneself from other Jews is a problem.
It has only become halakhicallynormativein the modernera (Liebman,1965: 38-40).In
fact, I suspect that one difference between groups of modern and pre-modernJewish
extremists is that the latter had to develop a distinctive program and elaborate world
view to legitimate their isolation from and/orhostility towardthe Jewish community. In
this respect, extremist groups in the pre-modernperiodtended to be sects. In the modern
period,the rise of extremismas a process,for reasonsto be discussedlater, has legitimated
isolation.This is, in fact, the strategy religiousJews as a groupadoptin their relationships
to non-religiousJews. Extremist groups within the religious world need no longer seek
elaboratelegitimationfor theirposition.Non-sectarianreligiousextremismmay, therefore,
be a particularly moder phenomenon among Jews. Thus, an extremist group is not
necessarilysectariannor are sects necessarilyextremists.Sects (andcults)aredistinguished
by their world view or meaning system in addition to their independentorganizational
structure. Extremists don't necessarily have a world view or meaning system which
distinguishes them from the majority of religious Jews, although they give greater
emphasis to one aspect or anotherof the prevailingworldview or meaning system. Over
the long run, extremists may becomesectariansdevelopinga worldview whichelaborates
theirowninterpretationof the religion,protectsthem againsthostileoutsiders,andexplains
their condition, but this is less likely in our time precisely because there is no organized
community of outsiders other than that which the extremists create in their own minds.

Cultural Rejection

The thirddimensionof religiousextremismis the rejectionof culturalforms andvalues

that are not perceivedas indigenousto the religious tradition.Such a position is difficult
to maintain for any but the strictest sects. Pursuing the goals with consistency would
mean the creation of alternate channels for cultural transmission (publishing houses,
newspapers, radio, television stations). Even if the group is small and intimate enough
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM 79

to forego such channels, it must still prohibit exposure to the media in the hands of the
outsiders. This is what the Edah Haredit does. Other groups may be less extremist, less
willing to adopt a public stance of hostility toward the media, or more anxious to use
the mass media to convince others of their cause. However, they protect their own
adherents by so occupying them with all kinds of activity (study of sacred text is an
example), that they have no leisure time for exposure to the mass media.

THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

Religious extremism, as definedhere, is destructive of any communalstructure.The

obvious question is whetherextremism doesn't destroy itself in the long run. The answer
is that it would if it could exist in pure form. Extremism is "pure"religion in the sense
of being totally differentiatedfrom other forms of culture and independentof all social
institutions. That is why it might be best described as an ideal typical impulse rather
than as objectified in individuals or institutions. All historical religions recognized the
destructive capacity of extremism and sought strategies to contain it. In fact, I believe
that Jewish extremism is on the rise because the breakdownof the Jewish community
has weakenedits capacity to checkextremist impulses.But once extremismor extremists
organizeto attain their goals, the process of organizationintroduces the very communal
type constraints from which extremism initially freed itself. Extremism cannot exist in
reality. Metaphorically, it might be said that extremism searches for freedom from
communalconstraints and with success, it begins to restrain itself in order to achieve
the very purposes for which it sought its freedom. This problem merits more rigorous
empirical examination which can draw on the church-sect literature (Troeltsch, 1931;
Wilson, 1973; and Hill, 1973: 47-67 for a good summary of the literature)and other case
studies among Jews as well as non-Jews.

EXPLAINING RELIGIOUS MODERATION

The central argument of this paper is that a propensity to religious extremism does
not require explanation since it is entirely consistent with basic religious tenets and
authentic religious orientations. It is religious moderation or religious liberalism, the
willingness of religious adherents to accommodatethemselves to their environment,to
adapt their behavioral and belief patterns to prevailing cultural norms, to make peace
with the world,that requiresexplanation.As suggested, however,objectifyingextremism
in persons or institutions, distinguishing extremists from non-extremists, leaves the
misleadingimpressionthat there is a pure formof extremismin reality. If our description
of the extremist orientation is correct, then extremism is a tendency to which every
religiouslyorientedpersonis attracted.What are some factors of majorimportancewhich
have mitigated the natural propensity of religion toward extremism?
The most obvious factor is the historical association of religion,culture and society.
Religious institutions arise within a specific culture and society. Religious extremism
assumes a very high level of religiousdifferentiation.Extremismis restrainedwhenreligion
is an organicpart of the society diffusedthroughoutits institutions.Wheredifferentiation
has taken place, the religious institution is often impelledto worldly activity in orderto
80 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

maximizeits automony,controlits environment,protect itself, attract adherents,etc. The

need for the approval of others and the interaction with other economic and political
institutions introduces a compromisingor adaptationist tendency.
Also, the success of religion confers status and material benefits on its leaders and
attracts to its ranks individuals with self interested motivations, orientations and
propensities (O'Dea, 1961) inconsistent with extremism.
Finally, religion is not unidimensional.It not only finds room for, but may even
cultivate, qualities and orientations such as contemplation and study, quietude and
passivity, the searchfor a sense of peace,whichareinconsistentwith extremistorientations.
If, at the presenttime, we arewitnessing a rise in religiousextremism,the explanation
must lie in a weakeningof the very forces that negated extremism in the past. Our case
study is drawn from Judaism in Israel, but to understand the rise of extremism there,
one must begin with the condition of Jewish orthodoxy in the modern period.

THE RISE OF MODERN JEWISH EXTREMISM

The watershed period for all of modern Judaism is associated with Jewish
enlightenment and the movement for political emancipation(Katz, 1973).This begins in
Centraland WesternEuropein the middleto late 18th century,extends to Eastern Europe
by the middle of the 19th century and begins penetrating the Jewish communities in
Muslim lands at the end of the last and beginning of the present century (Deshen, 1979).
The enlightenment and emancipationwere distinctive movements whose combined
impact destroyed traditionalmodes of religious thought and behavior at the individual
level, and the capacityof the Jewish communityto enforceits regulationsat the communal
level. The outcome meant the differentiation of religious and secular authority, the
diminishedcapacityof all Jewish leadersto imposetheir injunctionsuponindividualJews,
and the diminishedlegitimacy of community wide authorities.One consequencewas the
destructionof the most importantforcemitigating religiousextremism:communalunity.
Communalunity was not only a religious value but a necessity for Jews as protection
against a hostile environment.It was facilitated by the medieval world which required
Jewish corporateorganization.The corporateJewish community,its leadersin particular,
were sensitive to the threat whichextremismevoked, howeverlegitimate that extremism
might have beenin religiousterms. It wouldbe most instructiveto note how the community
dealt with extremism priorto the emancipationperiod.Apparently,it utilized techniques
of cooptation as well as excommunication.But it could not leave extremism unchecked,
lest it generate a momentum that would destroy the community.
In the pre-emancipationperiod, extremist tendencies or inclinations were probably
present among many, if not most Jews, rabbinical leaders in particular. But these
tendencies were in tension with and held in check by a sense of responsibility for the
material and physical welfare of the entire community, and by the network of
interrelationshipsbetween morereligiousand less religiousJews as well as betweenJews
and non-Jews. This last point may appearparadoxical.After all, the enlightenment and
emancipationpresumablypermittedJews much freercontact with non-Jews.While that
is true, these contacts occurredin a relatively religiously neutral context. The contacts
in the new perioddid not occurbetweenJew andnon-Jewbut betweentwo personsengaged
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM 81

in business, or between merchant and customer or doctor and patient, one of whom
happenedto be a Jew and one of whom happened to be a non-Jew. As the fact of one's
Jewishness became less and less relevant to the points of contact between Jews and non-
Jews, the interrelationshipitself, at least in some respects, becameless Jewishly relevant.
It certainly freed the extremist from responsibility for the consequencesof his behavior
on interrelationshipsbetween other groups of Jews or Jews and non-Jews.
If this was the case in the pre-emancipationperiod, then one implication is that
orthodoxJewry in generalis moreextremetoday than in the earlierperiod.The pre-modern
period, of course, is hardly cut of one cloth. But if we compareorthodox Jews and their
leadersin the post-emancipationperiodwith the Jewish communityand its religiousleaders
in the pre-emancipationperiod,then most contemporaryreligiousJews aremoreextreme
(accordingto the definition of extremism offered here) than were their predecessors.
The major battle front aroundwhich extremism formeditself was its rejectionof the
enlightenmentand the emancipation,or at least their consequences,for the Jewish polity
and its culture.We will call the consequences"modernity,"althoughit is clearthat relevant
features of modernity have not yet been delineated. Jacob Katz has observed that
traditionalreligiousleaders were alarmedby the accumulationand severity of deviations
fromJewish law and the claim of "the transgressorsthat they were acting fromconviction
and thereforehad the right to go their own ways" (Katz, 1973; 146).The claim that acting
from conviction affords one the right to dictate the nature of one's spiritual life evokes
Peter Berger'sdefinitionof modernconsciousness as "the movement fromfate to choice"
(Berger, 1979: 11).
ThoseJews who rejectedmodernityor its consequencesnow had to developinstitutions
and structures to insulate the tradition from the new environment.The affirmationists
were Jews who remained committed to the religious tradition but welcomed or made
accommodations to the opportunities afforded by the modern age, even if they were
conscious of its dangers. Both affirmationists and rejectionists, to borrowa term Peter
Bergerhas appliedto Christianity'sconfrontationwith modernity(1969:156),werereligious
innovators. The rise of extremism is the story of the rise of the rejectionist and decline
of the affirmationist orientation.
Was affirmationism an authentic religious response? It depends on how one
understandsthe term "authentic."Affirmationismcan be partially accountedfor by self-
interested motivations of religious leaders and adherents to whom religioncontinued to
provide respectability and status well into the twentieth century. An important factor
was the sense of overwhelmingpower and attractiveness which modernculture had for
many Jews, particularlyin the West. Rabbinicalleaders in the west often spoke of the
futility of opposing modernity as though they were reconciledto affirmationismas a
strategy for survival. But many of the same leaderswerethemselves attractedby aspects
of contemporaryculture.The great rabbinicauthoritywho sang Germanoperas after his
Sabbath meal (Ellenson, 1981a: 295) was not reconcilinghimself to modern culture for
instrumental purposes. But there were also those who viewed the political and social
changes wrought by the emancipationas the "beginningof the Redemption"and a sign
that humanity was capable, by its own efforts, of undertaking the tasks that would
culminatein the comingof the messiah.At one point, the rejectionistswereforcedto argue
less against the emancipationitself than against the notion that it had created a novel
82 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

condition in Jewish life when things had never been so good (Salmon, 1981). While the
affirmationistsmay have had reservationsanddoubts abouttheirown abilityto withstand
the forces of modernity,they never doubted that they werein closer touch with the forces
of the future than were the rejectionists.

THE DECLINE OF RELIGIOUS MODERATION

What were the forces that weakened the affirmationists and strengthened the
rejectionists?First of all, economicprosperityhad opposite effects on each group.Among
the former,prosperity and increased secular education resulted in religious laxity, the
adoptionof moreliberalreligiousbeliefs,a rejectionof ritualand the substitutionof ethical
conceptionsof religioncomparableto that foundamongthe non-Jewishpopulation(Argyle
& Beit-Hallahmi,1975: 162-166;Douglas, 1973). But the rejectionists eschewed secular
education,so its impactwas reduced.Economicprosperitystrengthenedtheirindependence
and facilitated their isolation or insulation from the social and cultural environment
(Liebman, 1966; Mayer, 1979). Economic prosperity, for example, permitted the
establishment of an elaborate educational network providing intense socialization to
rejectionist values. Increasedwealth has meant that children(sons in particular)can be
maintainedin such institutions into their late twenties. In Israel, majorsupport for these
institutions comes from the government, a function of both the political influenceof the
religious sector but also of a level of national prosperity which permits the maintenance
of such institutions by the public sector.
The breakdown of the corporate Jewish community, the kehilla (Elazar, 1981;
Friedman,1982),and the substitution of a voluntaristicpluralisticcommunityhas meant
that rejectionists are no longer accountableto the more moderateelements. The path is
now open to the creation of independentrejectionist institutions. The consequences of
voluntarism and pluralism are not pronouncedamong the religious elite, among whom
one would expect to find the strongest propensity to extremism because they are more
religiously committed than the non-elite and because the kind of education requiredto
become a master of religious law socializes the student to a recalcitrantpoint of view.
In addition,the generaldeclineof the status and role of religiousinstitutions in the society
means that people are less attracted to religion for self-interestedpurposes. Hence, the
more worldly,more accommodationist,less principledtype of individualwho might have
once sought a position of religious leadershipnow looks elsewhere.
In the past, rabbinicalauthorities,responsiblefor the entirecommunity,werereluctant
to interpretreligiouslaw in such a mannerthat the vast majority of Jews would find its
observance excessively burdensome. Halakhic authorities have been relieved of this
constraint by their sense that the vast majority wouldn't observe Jewish law regardless
of how they interpretedit. On the other hand, the Orthodoxminority are ready to accept
whateverhalakhicauthoritiesdictate. Furthermore,the voluntarismand pluralismof the
community exposes the affirmationists to the influence of non-Orthodoxand even non-
Jewish conceptions of appropriatereligious belief and behavior.
Cultural institutions built on principles of eternity and inerrancy have difficulty
absorbingthe rapidity of change characteristicof modernity. The rejectionists are not
only unaffected but perhaps even strengthened by the contrast between their own
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM 83

seemingly uninterrupted unchanging culture and that which surrounds them. The
affirmationists, on the other hand, face the dilemma of reconciling their religious
conceptions with this self-consciously changing culture.
Ideological factors also operate to the benefit of rejectionists and the disadvantage
of affirmationists. Among orthodox Jews, there are three ideal typical affirmationist
reponses.None exist in pureform.Virtuallyall religiousJews, even most religiousthinkers
and institutions,reflectelementsof two or even all threeresponses.But most affirmationist
thinkers and institutions are identifiable in terms of their basic tendency to one or the
other of the three models.
The first modelreinterpretsthe traditionin the light of contemporarycultureor values.
The second model maintains that contemporaryculture or values are to be understood
in the light of tradition. In accordance with this model, Zionism was interpreted as
consistent with the traditionand, moreover,the beliefs of avowedlyatheistic settlers were
reinterpretedas "part of the Divine plan destined to bring man to a higher stage of
development"(Luz, 1981: 123). The third model compartmentalizeslife into Jewish and
universalist realms. In the latter realm, which includes political and economic activity,
science, public law and many aspects of culture, the religious Jew is bound by the same
general kinds of commitments and responsibilities incumbent upon the non-Jew.
I have suggested the problems with each of these positions elsewhere (Liebman,
forthcoming).But commonto all is the absenceof widespreadrabbinicalsanction.Religious
commitmentin the context of the Jewish traditionmeans,first and foremost,a commitment
to the observanceof Jewish law as it is interpretedby leading rabbinicauthoritieswhose
own credentialsrest on their mastery of the knowledgeof the law. The legitimacy of the
affirmationists is not only underminedby the paucity of masters of law in their camp,
but also by the presence among them of those elements of the population who seek
legitimacy for what rejectionists condemn as religious deviation. In other words, the
motives of the affirmationists are suspect, and the rejectionists appearmore devout in
the eyes of the affirmationists themselves. (There are, of course, exceptions to these
observations. Outstanding rabbis have been attracted to affirmationism in the past
[Ellenson, 198a, forthcoming]and continue to be found in its ranks today. But they are
a distinct minority and, therefore, can be explained away.)
If one is not necessarily looking for a strategy to affirmmoder culture and values,
affirmationistmodels arenot particularlyconvincing.If, therefore,the rejectionistposition
has gained influence in recent years, the reasons must also be sought in the declining
attractiveness of modern culture and civilization. Indeed, the decline of modernist
confidence,the loss of directioncharacteristicof contemporarywestern culture, and the
declinein ideologicalcertainty has resulted in a declinein that religiousorientationwhich
affirmed the value, or at least inevitable triumph of modern culture. This has special
significancein Israel where secularZionism (the worldviewthat providedthe ideological
and symbolicfoundationfor the state of Israel,its identity, legitimacy,and its relationship
to worldJewry and the Judaictradition)has lost resonance(Liebman& Don-Yehiya,1983).
The declineof Zionismin Israel has meant the declineof a meaningsystem throughwhich
the vast majority of the Jewish populationfound answers to basic questions of collective
existence and through which many also found personal and private meaning. This also
helps account for a new form of religious extremism in Israel.
84 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

RELIGIOUS ULTRA-NATIONALISM

The logic of religious ultra-nationalism,given the assumption that the Zionist

movement and the creation of the state of Israel are steps in the path to Redemption,
is convincing.The alternativesto religiouslyseriousyouth in Israel arenot affirmationism
or rejectionism but ultra-nationalistextremism on the one hand, or the older form of
rejectionism(whichis anti-Zionist),on the other. But why has ultra-nationalistinfluence
only become noticeable after 1967?
Among the backgroundfactors, there was the network of educational institutions
dominatedby the religious ultra-nationalistswhich first developed in the 1950's. Their
graduates began assuming important roles in the religio-socialand political network in
the late 1960's and 1970's. But my central argumentis that religiousmoderationenjoyed
an "unnatural"periodof dominationbecauseof its associationwith Zionist-socialistparties
who were perceived as instrumental in achieving the national goals to which religious
Zioniststhemselves werecommitted.The declinein their status was critical.The religious
moderates defined their position in the context of a national secular enterprise. The
extremists, with their totalistic ideology, provideda meaning system independentof the
ideology of secular Zionism and were thereforeunaffected by its decline.
Israel's victory in the Six Day War pointed to the immediaterealizationof many of
the politicalquests of the ultra-nationalistswhichthe moderateshad, heretofore,dismissed
as utopian. The victory quickenedhopes for Redemptionamong broad segments of the
religious camp. These hopes are basic to the religious tradition. Centuries of defeat,
disappointmentand despairhad transformedthem from the realm of the natural and the
material to the purely metaphysical and supernatural.Thus, it was not the religious
traditionwhich the extremists distorted in their expectation of imminentdeliverance.It
was, rather,the constellationof socialfactorspriorto 1967whichweakenedthe constraints
on an authentic religious orientation in the Jewish tradition.

CONCLUSION

The phenomenonidentifiedas religiousextremismis best accountedfor by the decline

in influenceof those factors whichled to religiousmoderationin the past. A characteristic
feature of religion is the overridingcommitment which it evokes. Indeed, the fact that
religion has this meaning in popularusage (e.g., "it's like a religion to him" or "he does
it religiously")suggests just this association. Such commitment reflects and supports
an extremist orientation.
In the first place, religion claims absolute truth about ultimate reality. It knows the
route one must follow to live one's life in accordancewith that which is ultimately right
and ultimatelyjust. Hence,it is reasonableto expect that religiousadherentswill welcome
the extension of the scope and detail of religious injunctions which heightens their
confidencethat everything they and the society of which they are part does is in accord
with the right way. The searchfor stricteror harsherinterpretationof the law is consistent
with a desire to assure oneself and others that one is indeed living in accordancewith
what one is commandedto do ratherthan simply in accordancewith what one would like
to do.
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM 85

Secondly,whetherunderstoodin symbolicor normativeterms, culturecan be evaluated

in terms of religious truth. The injunction to distance oneself from all forms of culture
which are not consistent with religious truth is entirely explicablewithin the framework
of religiousassumptions,just as religiousknowledgeis a standardby whichone canjudge
and measure other forms of knowledge and other forms of truth.
Thirdly,since religiouscommitmentis a total commitment,and the behaviorit elicits
is by definitionmoralbehavior,religiousadherencebecomesa criteriaby whichotherpeople
can be evaluated. The religiously committedindividualwill experiencemoralrepugnance
in associating with non-religious.Also, other things being equal, religious commitment
leads one to social isolation for reasons of self-protectionfrom the influences (accidental
or intended of others, an orientation that may itself be incorporatedin the religious
frameworkof injunctions.
In short,religiouscommitmentleads to the three characteristicswhichdefinereligious
extrmism. I don't mean to arguethat other implicationscannot be derivedfromreligious
commitmentor that true religious belief and practice invariablylead to extremism. I do
argue, however, that extremism is an understandableand, other things being equal, the
most obvious consequence of religious commitment.

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