C HAPTER 1

The Emergence of Science Diplomacy

Vaughan C. Turekian with Sarah Macindoe, Daryl Copeland,
Lloyd S. Davis, Robert G. Patman, and Maria Pozza

Introduction
Major structural changes in the international system over the last three and
half decades have raised a big question mark over the Westphalian principle
of state sovereignty that assumes that a state — subject to international
recognition — exercises legal, unqualified and exclusive control over a
designated territory and population. The end of the Cold War in the late
1980s and the process of deepening globalization served to profoundly alter
the global political context. These changes seem to make the world a much
smaller and more interconnected place, but one that is seemingly frag-
mented by the erosion of the autonomy of the sovereign state and the rise of
intra-state conflict. These changes seem to make the world a much smaller
and more interconnected place, but one that is seemingly fragmented by
the erosion of the autonomy of the sovereign state and the rise of intra-
state conflict. In this new environment where shared challenges — such
as food security, water availability, health management — require strong
interactions between the science and technical communities across bor-
ders, science has taken on a role of greater importance in the international
system. As a consequence, a globalizing world has eroded the old dichot-
omy between science and diplomacy, and helped to facilitate the emergence
of science diplomacy whereby scientific collaborations among nations are
necessary to tackle increasingly common challenges.
In this introductory chapter, we explore the evolving relationship
between science and diplomacy. The chapter proceeds in five stages. The first
section delineates the concept of Science diplomacy. The second considers

3
4 V. C. Turekian et al.

the historical association between science cooperation and international rela-

tions. In the third part, we examine the international circumstances that have
contributed to the rise of Science diplomacy. The fourth section identifies
three types of activity that are related to Science diplomacy and uses these
categories as an analytical framework for organising the discussion in this
book. Finally, the concluding section provides a rationale for this volume and
outlines the essays that comprise it.

The Concept of Science Diplomacy

The term ‘science diplomacy’ is a relatively new one and reflects the fusion of
two previously distinct elements. Science is an evidence-based form of knowl-
edge acquisition. It is founded upon empirical methods of experimentation
and the repeated verification of results. Science is neither inherently political
nor ideological, but represents a type of universal language, a vector of trans-
national communications that poses fundamental questions about the nature
of things. The scientific ethos of objective experimentation through trial and
error has broad appeal: it promotes merit (through peer review); openness
(through publication); and civic values and citizen empowerment (through
the encouragement of respect for diverse perspectives). In a public opinion
survey reported in New Zealand on 20 June 2011, scientists were identified
as the most trusted people in the country, and science as the most respected
profession (TVNZ, 2011).
Diplomacy is a non-violent approach to the management of international
relations characterized by dialogue, negotiation and compromise, often by a
country’s representatives abroad, and involves the art of dealing with people
or their representatives in a sensitive and tactful way. Diplomats pursue and
deliver international policy objectives on behalf of governments, and it is that
connection to the state which sets diplomatic practice apart from the interna-
tional lobbying, advocacy and public relations activities engaged in by busi-
ness and civil society actors.
Science diplomacy, therefore, is the process by which states represent
themselves and their interests in the international arena when it comes to
areas of knowledge — their acquisition, utilization and communication —
acquired by the scientific method. It is a crucial, if under-utilized, specialty
within the diplomatic constellation that can be used to address global issues,
 CHP 1 | The Emergence of Science Diplomacy 5

enhance co-operation between countries and leverage one country’s influence

over another.1 In this regard, Science diplomacy is a significant generator of
soft power (Nye, 2004) — that potent form of attraction that harnesses
national image, reputation, and brand. More broadly, science diplomacy is
an effective emissary of essential values such as evidence-based learning,
openness and sharing. Science diplomacy is increasingly critical to addressing
many of the planet’s most urgent challenges — such as management of the
global commons, faltering public health systems, and the threat of collapsing
ecosystems. It can also be used to enhance one nation’s interests with respect
to another or to defuse international tensions.
Science diplomacy’s direct relationship with national interests and objec-
tives distinguishes it from other forms of international scientific co-operation,
which are sometimes commercially oriented and often occur without direct
state participation. International scientific co-operation motivated by
advancing science and is typically a win-win proposition, with private sector
or civil society partners collaborating to produce, for example, better medica-
tions, cleaner water, improved hygiene or more disease-resistant crops. All
parties reap the rewards. Science diplomacy is also founded upon mutuality
and common cause, with the relationship being a central motivator for the
cooperation. However, because national interests and the state are often
implicated, motives may diverge and the outcomes may be asymmetrical,
particularly if there are negotiations involved. A whole constellation of inter-
national scientific programs and exchanges undertaken during the second
half of the last century come to mind by way of illustration, as do contempo-
rary international discussions on issues such as the terms and conditions of
resource access or environmental protection. While science itself may be
apolitical, research and development in areas of Science and Technology
(S&T) is often highly politicised, with countries keeping a firm eye on their
scientific investments and on any potentially lucrative results. As Perkins
argues, growing competitiveness — especially surrounding patents for drugs
and new plant and animal varieties or the development of renewable energy

1
A useful synopsis is offered in New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy (The Royal Society, 2010).
This publication sets out three distinct activity areas within science diplomacy: informing
foreign policy objectives with scientific advice (science in diplomacy); facilitating international
science cooperation (diplomacy for science); using science cooperation to improve interna-
tional relations between countries (science for diplomacy).
6 V. C. Turekian et al.

sources — suggests that ‘tensions between national commercial interests and

ambitions for goodwill between nations may not be easy to reconcile’
(Perkins, 2012). For example, the Centre for Global Development reports
that the commitment to development on the part of the US and a number of
members of the EU — particularly Germany and Sweden — is regularly
undermined by attempts to ‘[restrict] the flow of innovations to developing
countries’ by incorporating ‘TRIPS-Plus’2 measures into bilateral free-trade
agreements. US trade negotiators have pressured developing countries to
agree not to force immediate licensing of patents even if this would serve a
compelling public interest, such as with HIV/AIDS drugs (Barder and
Krylova, 2013).
Thus, international science cooperation and science diplomacy are over-
lapping endeavours: they are related, yet analytically separate. International
science cooperation is mainly concerned with the advancement of scientific
discovery per se, while the central purpose of science diplomacy is often to
use science to promote a state’s foreign policy goals or inter-state interests. In
other words, international science cooperation tends to be driven by indi-
viduals and groups, whereas science diplomacy, while it may derive from the
efforts of individuals, often involves a state-led initiative in the area of scien-
tific collaboration. International science cooperation, therefore, may or may
not encompass science diplomacy.
Conceptually, the idea of science diplomacy seems to be characterised by
a potential tension in the relationship between the two key paradigms that
comprise it. Diplomacy traditionally requires that practitioners have a good
general knowledge of concerns relating to state interests, but diplomats
would not typically see their professional remit extending to the details and
complexities of modern science. At the same time, science involves the search

2
The 1995 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agree-
ment) is to date the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property (IP),
and provides a prescriptive regime for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights. With the remarkable upsurge in the number of free-trade agreements being signed
in the past decade, the ‘post-TRIPS’ era has seen efforts to strengthen the protections for IP
beyond those established under TRIPS, creating the ‘TRIPS-Plus’ phenomenon. Developing
countries in particular have come under increasing pressure to enact these tougher ‘TRIPS-
Plus’ provisions in their patent laws. Bilateral science and research and development coopera-
tion agreements constitute an indirect form of ‘TRIPS-Plus’.
 CHP 1 | The Emergence of Science Diplomacy 7

for verifiable knowledge and this process, almost by definition, is a collabora-

tive activity and one which is likely to straddle national boundaries. However,
scientific practitioners are not always sensitive to the diplomatic implications
of their research-led cooperation across state boundaries. In the words of a
2010 joint publication by the Royal Society and the American Association
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), ‘scientists and diplomats are not
obvious bedfellows. While science is in the business of establishing truth, Sir
Henry Wotton, a 17th century diplomat, famously defined an ambassador as
“an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country”’ (The Royal
Society, 2010: 1).

The link between international science cooperation

and international relations
Notwithstanding divergent orientations, there is a long historical association
between science and international cooperation. The post of Foreign Secretary
of the Royal Society was instituted in 1723, nearly six decades before the
British Government first appointed a secretary of state for foreign affairs, and
in 1941 Sir Charles Galton Darwin FRS (the grandson of Charles Darwin)
was appointed Director of the Central Scientific Office in Washington,
becoming the UK’s first accredited scientific representative abroad. Just one
year later, Joseph Needham FRS was made Head of the British Scientific
Mission in China. He actively promoted the formation of an ‘International
Science Co-operation Service’, and his lobbying led to the inclusion of natu-
ral sciences within the mandate of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (The Royal Society, 2010: 1).
The United States also has a long history of involvement in cooperative
international scientific efforts. In the early 1970s, as the country was winding
down its involvement in a controversial war in Southeast Asia that clearly
demonstrated the limits of US hard power, an adviser to then-Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger stated to Science magazine that ‘[the Secretary of State]
thinks that America’s ability to contribute money and run the world in the
old fashioned way … is now over. What we can contribute — and what the
world wants — is our technological capabilities’ (Wade, 1974).3

3
Similarly, in an address to the United Nations session on development in April 1974,
8 V. C. Turekian et al.

This focus on the role of science and technology became a central ele-
ment of US foreign policy outreach to allies and adversaries alike during the
course of the Cold War. In a 1985 address to the nation just days before
meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev for the first time, President
Ronald Reagan stated: ‘We can find, as yet undiscovered, avenues where
American and Soviet citizens can cooperate fruitfully for the benefit of man-
kind… . In science and technology, we could launch new joint space ventures
and establish joint medical research projects’ (Regan, 1985). Two years later,
John Negroponte, the President’s Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), further articulated
the Administration’s view during congressional testimony: ‘It would be short-
sighted of us not to recognize that it is in our national interest to seek to
expand scientific cooperation with the Soviet Union’.4 In many ways, the
Cold War period initiated the beginnings of science diplomacy, as states used
scientific collaboration to build bridges and connections despite the existence
of great political tensions.
While perhaps the interactions between the United States and the USSR
provide the most well-known historical case of linking scientific cooperation
to foreign relations, they are by no means the only example. Throughout the
second half of the 20th century, science played many important roles in
diplomacy. At a White House state dinner for Japanese Prime Minister
Hayato Ikeda in 1961, President John Kennedy made US diplomatic history
by announcing the US-Japan Committee on Science Cooperation, the first
of its kind. Kennedy had followed the advice of his Ambassador to Japan —
the illustrious scholar and Harvard professor Edwin Reischauer — and cre-
ated the committee as part of a broad effort to repair ‘the broken dialogue’
between the intellectual communities of the two countries.5 The National

Kissinger noted that we ‘now apply science to the problems which science has helped to create’,
pinpointing agricultural technology, birth control, weather modification and energy as areas
of particular interest.
4
As quoted in Turekin and Neureiter (2012).
5
In the wake of rising tensions between Tokyo and Washington over the revised Security
Treaty between the two countries, Reischauer wrote an article for Foreign Affairs in which he
pointed to the ‘weakness of communication between the Western democracies and opposition
elements in Japan’ (see Reischauer, 1960). His article so impressed President-elect John F.
Kennedy that he was subsequently appointed United States Ambassador to Japan.
 CHP 1 | The Emergence of Science Diplomacy 9

Science Foundation’s implementation of that cooperative science program

has endured for over half a century, evolving with the times and delivering
great benefits to both countries.
International scientific cooperation, while strongly linked to the Cold
War experience of the United States, also served as an important instrument
in the wider global context. For example, after World War II had divided the
European continent, collaboration on scientific endeavours served as a sig-
nificant ingredient in efforts to improve inter-state relations. In 1954,
CERN, the European Organisation for Nuclear Research, was established. It
was a major project in which the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was
able to work with former European adversaries such as France. According to
a former CERN director, Horst Wenninger, in the aftermath of the Second
World, ‘cooperation between [European] nations was simpler in science than
in other fields’ (Prolavorio, 2013) and helped play a part in Franco-German
rapprochement that culminated in the Elysée Treaty of January 1963.
Similarly, scientific interactions between Israel’s Weizmann Institute and
Germany’s Max Planck Society provided a channel for the first high-level
discussions between the countries after World War II. Originating in the late
1950s, collaboration between the two bodies precipitated a historic agree-
ment in 1964 which facilitated the transfer of German government funds to
Weizmann Institute research projects, hereby fostering a wide range of scien-
tific exchanges between the Institute, the Max Planck Society, and other
German universities. Such ties ‘helped lay the foundation not only for
German-Israeli scientific cooperation, but also for the establishment of dip-
lomatic relations between the two countries one year later’ (Weizmann
Institute of Science, 2013). In January 2012, the two groups announced the
creation of a joint Centre for Archaeology and Anthropology, marking their
more than five decades of scientific partnership. It is hoped that the Centre
will not only strengthen ties between the Max Planck Society and the
Weizmann Institute, but may encourage an expansion of scientific ties
between Israel and its regional neighbours. The Institute’s Professor Stephen
Weiner has expressed enthusiasm regarding the potential political and diplo-
matic benefits of the initiative, noting that ‘just as happened in relations with
Germany, now too scientific collaboration could have a broader impact,
helping to promote peaceful ties in the Middle East’ (Weizmann Institute of
Science, 2013).
10 V. C. Turekian et al.

More recently during the post-Cold War era, science outreach has pro-
vided an important — and often first — step in the EU’s efforts to expand its
diplomatic footprint into such places as post-communist East Europe and an
Islamic country like Turkey. Such efforts are also increasingly taking place in
other parts of the world. Science cooperation has a powerful role in helping
countries as they look to build stronger regional partnerships. Within the
East African Community (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda),
a presidential-level initiative to better align and integrate this diverse, popu-
lous and historically unstable region is drawing on the promise of scientific
cooperation.6 By sharing costs and resources and increasing the interaction of
students and researchers, such technical cooperation can help the region
increase its prosperity while contributing to more sustainable regional links.
However, it must be acknowledged that not all science diplomacy has been
devoted to civilian and diplomatic purposes. A particular area of concern —
exemplified by the A. Q. Khan network — has been covert collaboration in
the field of nuclear weapons technology and the attendant risk of nuclear
proliferation.
On a more general note, scientific advice is crucial for diplomats, and
growing recognition of this need has resulted in the rise of international sci-
entific advisory bodies since the 1950s (National Research Council, 2002: 6).
In 1957 and 1958 a global community of scientists joined together in a
sharing of information and research, naming the period the International
Geophysical Year (IGY). The International Council of Scientific Unions
arranged for much scientific collaboration across borders, and to some extent
did not recognise state borders at all. Sixty-seven states participated in the
IGY by prior international agreements settled by the negotiation of diplo-
mats. Upon the success of the IGY collaboration, other scientific research
programmes arose which have led to institutions such as the Scientific
Committee on Antarctic Research.
While the role of international cooperation in science has a long history,
the interaction between science and the conduct of a nation’s foreign policy

6
Growing recognition of the centrality of science, technology and innovation to econom-
ic growth, development and regional integration has led the members of the East African
Community (EAC) to adopt a number of programmatic initiatives and protocols, such as the
Protocol on Science, Technology and Innovation, to foster broader cooperation in this area.
For more information see Tumushabe and Omar-Mugabe (2012).
 CHP 1 | The Emergence of Science Diplomacy 11

does not have such an intertwined past. However, in recent years there has
been an increased focus on issues at the interface of science and foreign policy,
leading to greater emphasis on the relationship between science and
diplomacy.

Globalization and the Rise of Science Diplomacy

Structural changes in the mid to late 1980s began to challenge a compart-
mentalised, state-centred understanding of global politics. The aftershocks
of the end of the Cold War and intensified globalization were associated
with the growth of international linkages and a reduction in the capacity
of nation-states to act independently. The time of absolute and exclusive
national sovereignty began to wane as the traditional boundaries between
domestic and external policy roles of the sovereign state were blurred by
the impact of globalization (Scholte, 2001: 14). The latter could be broadly
defined as the intensification of technologically driven links between socie-
ties, institutions, cultures and individuals on a worldwide basis. Above all, it
was revolutionary changes in communication and information technologies
in the 1980s — advances in personal computing and the development of
the internet — that effected a compression of time and space by reduc-
ing the time taken to cross geographical boundaries. This process facilitated
‘networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances’ (Keohane and
Nye, 2000). As an upshot, the world began to be perceived as a smaller
place, with issues relating to the environment, economics, politics and secu-
rity intersecting more deeply an at more points than was previously the case
(Clark, 1997: 15).
The advent of globalization initiated a debate over the role of the sover-
eign state in the modern world.7 Three rival schools of thought can be identi-
fied. The hyperglobalists contend that the growing interconnectedness of
states through globalization gradually negates the significance of territorial
boundaries and paves the way for the decline of the sovereign nation-state
(Held and Anthony, 1999: 4). In contrast, the realists or skeptics basically
believe that little has changed in the international arena. The skeptics argue

7
The seminal text on the various approaches to globalisation is Held et al. (1999). In particular,
see the Introduction (pp. 32–86).
12 V. C. Turekian et al.

that the impact of globalization on the sovereign state is much exaggerated.

From this viewpoint, the state is not the victim of this process, but its main
architect (Held and Anthony, 1999: 8).
On the other hand, the transformationalists reject the tendency of both
the hyperglobalists and the skeptics to juxtapose state sovereignty and glo-
balization. For transformationalists, state sovereignty is a dynamic concept
that is simply undergoing a new phase in its evolution as states respond to the
costs and the benefits of the globalization process. This environment is not
only widening the opportunities for many states to interact diplomatically,
but is also obliging states to recognize that many diplomatic challenges they
are now facing are complex and can only be resolved through multilateral or
international action. In this era of globalisation, the most profound chal-
lenges to human survival — climate change, diminishing bio-diversity, pub-
lic health, food insecurity and resource scarcity, to name but a few — are
rooted in science and driven by technology. Thus, according to the transfor-
mationalists, globalization is a ‘mega trend’ that is not only changing the
nature of the sovereign state but is also providing the impetus for the rise of
science diplomacy.
Growing interest in science diplomacy is, therefore, accompanying an
evolution in international relations, and is in some ways a function of such
global change. As a more disaggregated diplomatic system — consisting of
dynamic networks of lawyers, scientific bodies, non-governmental organisa-
tions and the media — takes shape, (The Royal Society, 2010: 3) ‘track II’
diplomacy involving scientists, science and technology based business
groups, and scientific regulatory advisors is acquiring a heightened signifi-
cance. While science has always transcended borders, the growing ease with
which such ‘track II’ initiatives can be accomplished is in large part due to the
unprecedented mobility of ideas, people and information that characterises
the globalisation age (National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of
Engineering, and Institute of Medicine, 2011: 7–9).

The Parameters of Science Diplomacy

The convergence of two words — science and diplomacy — has produced an
umbrella term that according to the British Royal Society and the American
 CHP 1 | The Emergence of Science Diplomacy 13

Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) encompasses at least

three main types of activities:

• Diplomacy for Science

• Science in Diplomacy
• Science for diplomacy

Diplomacy for science

One dimension of science diplomacy — diplomacy for science — seeks to
‘facilitate international cooperation, whether in pursuit of top-down strategic pri-
orities for research or bottom-up collaboration between individual scientists and
researchers’ (The Royal Society, 2010). While scientists and diplomats typically
come from different backgrounds and experience very different training, there are
many areas where their interaction is central to advancing the scientific enterprise.
For instance, while the science and technology community has had great
interest in developing large scale and deployable fusion energy as a way to
produce cheap, clean and abundant energy, the technical challenges have
been formidable, as have the costs. As a result, there has been great interest
within the physics community in developing large-scale multinational
experimental platforms that could support such advanced science without
decimating budgets. Working at the multinational level (at first involving
China, Europe, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States),
the international science community began to plan for such an international
project. As Harding et al. (2012) noted, laying the diplomatic foundations
was as important as overcoming the technical challenges:

In addition to design and cost, there was no agreement on a legal and policy
structure that would be appropriate for creating and sustaining an interna-
tional facility and experiment. New approaches were needed for a form of
agreement and organization that would allow partners with diverse political
and legal systems to work together on a science experiment of this magnitude.

The need for cooperation between the diplomatic and scientific commu-
nities on such large multilateral programs is the principal driver behind diplo-
macy for science. This second dimension of science diplomacy has played a
14 V. C. Turekian et al.

crucial role in enabling many other international scientific initiatives — such

as the International Space Station, the Square Kilometer Array (SKA) project,
the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)8 and the
SESAME synchrotron9 — to get off the ground. Diplomacy is therefore a key
facilitator of science and technology research and development, allowing for
communication and collaboration across and beyond national borders.
The work undertaken by the SKA project members across Australia
and South Africa also illustrates the importance of diplomacy for science.
The projected cost of the project will need to be met by the contributions
of participating countries. Similarly, the project has been expanded to two
locations in order to utilise the benefits both sites have to offer. Australia
has superior radio silence and facilities well suited for low frequency
research, whereas South Africa geographically is the ideal candidate for
medium and high frequency analysis. Flagship international initiatives such
as the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) also rely on the effective utilisation of
diplomacy for science.10 These projects carry enormous costs and risks, but
are increasingly vital in areas of science that require large upfront invest-
ments in infrastructure, which are beyond the budget of any one parti-
cipating country. In this sense, international scientific projects require
diplomatic input.

8
A fusion experimental research facility was first proposed after the standoff over nuclear dis-
armament at the Reykjavik Summit in October 1986, with collective design efforts beginning
in 1988. The final ITER Agreement, signed in November 2006, emphasises the potential for
diplomacy for science to enable large-scale, capital-intensive international projects. For more
information see (Harding et al., 2012).
9
SESAME, or Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle
East, is a major intergovernmental scientific facility hosted by Jordan designed to ‘foster scien-
tific and technological capacities and excellence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean re-
gion’ and ‘build scientific links and foster better understanding and a culture of peace through
scientific collaboration’. Skilful diplomacy and international cooperation have been central
to the early stages of the project’s implementation. For more information see Smith (2012).
10
The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) housed at CERN in Switzerland is the most powerful
particle accelerator ever built, and allows scientists to reproduce the conditions that existed
within a billionth of a second after the Big Bang. 27km long and weighing more than 38,000
tonnes, the LHC is the product of a collaborative effort by 20 countries and an enormous
international community of scientists and engineers working in multinational teams both at
CERN and around the world. See Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC) (n.d).
 CHP 1 | The Emergence of Science Diplomacy 15

But such expansive multinational efforts are only the tip of the iceberg.
Bottom-up collaboration takes place daily between institutions and individ-
ual scientists, and the strengthening of personal and professional relation-
ships at this level is proving instrumental in driving crucial science and
technology research and innovation. As the AAAS and Royal Society argue,
‘the stereotype of the scientist as a lone genius no longer holds true. The sci-
entific enterprise is now premised on the need to collaborate and connect’
(The Royal Society, 2010: 6). Globally, we are increasingly seeing the emer-
gence of ‘an invisible college of researchers who collaborate not because they
are told to but because they want to … because they can offer each other
complementary insight, knowledge or skills’ (Wagner, 2008).

Science in diplomacy
Many of the major challenges facing states are increasingly global in nature
and scale, and have science and/or technology in the fingerprint of their
cause or cure. Science in diplomacy describes the role of science — and
technology — in providing advice to inform and support foreign policy
objectives. The function of science in diplomacy should be to ensure the
effective uptake of high quality scientific advice by policymakers (National
Research Council, 2002). The scientific community would provide policy-
makers with up-to-date information on the dynamics of the Earth’s natural
and socio-economic systems, and identify where uncertainties exist or where
the evidence base is inadequate, in order that informed decisions are made
at both the national and international levels (The Royal Society, 2010: 5).
Science in diplomacy, in other words, is about equipping international
decision-makers with the scientific knowledge and understanding required to
cope with the increasingly complex S&T-related demands of the 21st cen-
tury. More and more foreign policy decisions are drawing on information
that science and the scientific community provides. In looking at current
challenges, such as those related to global health, climate change, weapons
proliferation and economic growth and innovation, it must be acknowledged
that science, technology and knowledge have potentially a central role to play
in providing possible solutions. None of these issues can be fully addressed
without: (1) understanding the science driving the challenge; (2) developing
the technical institutions to disseminate information and knowledge about
16 V. C. Turekian et al.

the challenge; and (3) engaging with technical experts. As such, decision
makers need access to both highly qualified people and timely and relevant
information.
The establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) is probably one of the better known examples of policy-related scien-
tific advice, and is a contemporary illustration of science in diplomacy.
Mechanisms have been established to aid the flow of information regarding
climate change and its potential consequences — from the environmental to
the economic — from global scientific institutions and research bodies to the
policy making community. While the IPCC does not carry out original
research, it reviews and produces periodic assessments of recent scientific,
technical and socio-economic research from around the world, and differing
viewpoints from within the scientific community are reflected in its reports.
These reports have had far reaching effects in the realm of international
relations and on the activities of scientific institutions. Affiliated bodies such
as the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations
Environment Programme (which together established the IPPC in 1988),
also influence international relations. Scientific knowledge informed the
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
1997 Kyoto Protocol, both of which stipulated binding obligations for states
to reduce carbon emissions. The notion of ‘carbon credits’, and the process of
states offsetting the limitations of their pollution by purchasing carbon cred-
its from other states, highlight the impact of science in the policy sphere. In
December 2007, the IPCC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (jointly with
former US Vice-President Al Gore) ‘for their efforts to build up and dissemi-
nate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay the
foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change’
(Nobel Media AB, n.d.).
National and international academies, learned societies and national
scientific advisory bodies are also important sources of independent scien-
tific advice for foreign policy makers. For example, the InterAcademy Panel
on International Issues (IAP) — which represents more than 100 national
science academies around the word — published statements on ocean acidi-
fication and deforestation as part of the UN climate change negotiations in
2009 (The Royal Society, 2010: 6). A decade earlier, a report by the US
National Academy of Scientists concluding that the majority of US foreign
 CHP 1 | The Emergence of Science Diplomacy 17

policy objectives had science, technology and/or health implications led to

the appointment of a science advisor to the Secretary of State and a more
than 15-fold increase in the number of scientists with PhDs receiving fellow-
ships to work in the State Department or USAID. Similarly, the Obama
administration has recruited several Nobel laureates to fill key executive
branch positions, including Secretary of Energy Steven Chu (National
Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of
Medicine, 2011: 8). Such developments have helped the US foreign policy
community build stronger links to the US scientific community and
increased America’s overall scientific capacity to deal effectively with the
many technical issues that arise in contemporary US foreign policy. This
pattern is not replicated to the same degree everywhere in the world, but
there are signs of increased scientific input in policy-making in general and
in diplomacy in particular.
Finally, building stronger inter-agency collaborations, so that foreign
policy makers have easier access to the pool of technical knowledge and com-
munities available in government ministries or departments, and fostering
stronger scientific civil societies that have the ability to formally or informally
advise international policy leaders, will continue to be objectives of key
importance in the future. Ultimately, the ability for science and scientists to
equip decision makers with necessary technical and scientific information
and also the willingness of decision-makers to recognise the need for such
information will help determine the effectiveness of international responses
to some of the world’s most pressing challenges.

Science for diplomacy

Science diplomacy and science and technology cooperation … is one of our
most effective ways of influencing and assisting other nations and creating
real bridges between the United States and counterparts.11

Unlike the categories above, science for diplomacy is the use of science to
help build and improve international relations, especially where there may be

11
Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State (2009) as quoted in (National Academy of Sciences,
National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine, 2011: 8).
18 V. C. Turekian et al.

strain or tension in the official relationship. Science for diplomacy primarily

draws on the ‘soft power’ of science: its attractiveness and influence both as a
national asset, and as a universal activity that transcends national or partisan
interests.
By enabling countries to exercise and express ‘soft power’ in new and
highly effective ways, and fostering the development of trust and agreement
between often-adversarial nations, the science for diplomacy dimension is
increasingly acknowledged to be of real potential significance. In describing
the importance of his country’s research and discoveries in its broader global
strategies, Professor Peter Gluckman, Chief Science Advisor to New Zealand’s
Prime Minister, said: ‘As a small nation we must compete hard to maintain
our relevance in a world where we can easily be forgotten. We have to dem-
onstrate that small countries can indeed, make a difference’ (Gluckman,
2011), in his address at the 1st Annual Meeting of the New Zealand
Greenhouse Gas Research Centre. A country’s attempts to project influence
and importance on a global scale through its national scientific community
provides a fascinating snapshot of science for diplomacy in action. Other
nations are also picking up on this potential power. For example, through its
‘science without borders’ initiative (now known as The Brazil Scientific
Mobility Program), Brazil is not only training future scientists internationally
but is critically using science as a way to reach out to key strategic allies and
important economic partners.12 Other countries, such as China, are using
large investments in science and infrastructure both to build their national
science systems and to reach out to, and attract, top talent from around the
world to their shores (Marcelli, 2013).
Perhaps the real promise of science for diplomacy, however, lies in its
ability to develop stronger links between countries in which the political

12
The programme is part of the Brazilian government’s broader effort to grant 100,000 schol-
arships to the country’s top undergraduate and postgraduate students in the Science, Tech-
nology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) fields to enable them to study abroad at the
world’s best universities. Jointly funded by CAPES (an organisation within the Brazilian Min-
istry of Education) and CNPq (an organisation within the Brazilian Ministry of Science and
Technology), the initiative aims to promote scientific research, increase international coopera-
tion within science and technology, and to engage students in a global dialogue. For more
information see IIE (n.d.).
 CHP 1 | The Emergence of Science Diplomacy 19

environment is tense and official relationships are strained or limited.13 The

emergence of an era of science diplomacy — in which non-governmental
scientists and academics play a key role in diplomacy and international
policy — has already provided US scientists with access to potentially influ-
ential communities in countries such as Cuba, Burma, Iran and North Korea,
despite recurring political crises and the absence of formal government-to-
government relations. In particular, initiatives undertaken by the US
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in Iran, in areas such as earthquake
science and food-borne diseases, have provided one of the few enduring links
between the two countries over a decade marked by particular distrust and
tension.14 Similarly, university partnerships, such as the nearly ten year-long
collaboration between Syracuse University and Kim Chaek University of
Technology in North Korea on standards-based information technology
(Thorson et al., 2008), have enabled people-to-people contacts to persist
despite the near total lack of sustained connections at the official diplomatic
level between their respective nations.
Like other dimensions of science diplomacy, science for diplomacy
comes in many forms. These include, but are not limited to:

• Science cooperation agreements. Agreements, such as that signed between

Libya and the US in 2004 after the former consented to relinquish its
WMDs, are often used to symbolise thawing political relations.
• Creation of new institutions. International academies and institutions,
such as the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN), can be
specifically created in order to reflect and promote the goals of science for
diplomacy.
• Educational scholarships. Educational scholarships and exchanges act as
a mechanism for network-building, and encourage global partnerships.
The Newton International Fellowships, run jointly by the Royal Society,

13
This characteristic helps to explain the current focus within US foreign policy on expanding
science diplomacy with the Arab and Islamic worlds, and it aptly illustrates the use of science
for diplomacy (Lord and Turekin, 2007). For an extraordinary, but all too rare, multilateral
example is the SESAME Synchrotron project in Jordan, see Smith (2012).
14
For more information on the use of science diplomacy to foster US-Iranian engagement see
Jillson (2013) and Albro (2014).
20 V. C. Turekian et al.

the Royal Academy of Engineering and the British Academy, are a case
in point.
• ‘Track II’ diplomacy. In contrast to ‘track I’, or official, diplomacy, ‘track
II’ diplomacy directly involves those — such as scientists and other
academics — working outside of the official negotiation process.
• Science festivals and exhibitions. These events often constitute an effec-
tive platform from which to emphasis the universality and impartiality
of science, and to highlight common interests. Countries such as China,
India and Iran are particularly proud of their historical contributions
to scientific advancement, and are keen to share and celebrate this with
the world.

Exploring the Significance of Science Diplomacy

This book seeks to do more than acknowledge the emergence of Science
Diplomacy in the international arena. It also attempts to examine the sig-
nificance of this development and assess whether the advent of Science
Diplomacy represents a major break from the past. The structure of this book
reflects this central concern.
The first four chapters in this volume focus on the theme of Diplomacy
for Science. Using President Barack Obama’s commitment of June 2009 to
expand science and technology engagement with the Muslim world as a
benchmark, Cathleen A. Campbell outlines specific initiatives taken to
advance US science diplomacy in the Arab world since 2009 and then pin-
points some key lessons of this experience. Sarah Macindoe assesses current
international efforts to manage plant genetic resources for food and agricul-
ture and whether New Zealand can harness science diplomacy to make a
positive impact here. For Gary Wilson, Antarctica has a critical role in
world’s ocean and atmospheric system and it is now imperative for the model
of international co-operation, based on links between science and diplomacy
on the frozen continent, to be extended to counter the threat of global
warming. In addition, Maria Pozza examines the Square Kilometre Array
(SKA) radio telescope project as a case that is not only deepening scientific
links between South Africa and Australia (and to a lesser degree, New
Zealand) but is also expanding diplomatic links between a developing and
developed state.
 CHP 1 | The Emergence of Science Diplomacy 21

Four subsequent chapters deal with various aspects of Science in

Diplomacy or how scientific advice interacts with foreign policy goals.
Manjana Milkoreit explores the fascinating question of how scientific
information is received and used in the minds of diplomats by probing the
belief systems of diplomatic participants in the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations. Drawing on
his own high-level professional experience, Sefton Darby looks at the
international hydrocarbon and minerals extraction environment in two
countries — Chad and Azerbaijan — and, in particular, considers the
relationship between the ‘resource curse’ and science diplomacy. Joan
Leach outlines the problems and possibilities for science communication
in international diplomacy. Science communication is considered as a
form of ‘soft power’ in the three related areas of diplomacy for science,
science in diplomacy, and science for diplomacy that characterise science
diplomacy. In contrast, Daryl Copeland focuses on the role of science and
technology in today’s world and looks at the 2010–2011 WikiLeaks
‘Cablegate’ affair as a case study of the impact of digital communications
technology on contemporary diplomacy (technology in diplomacy).
The final four chapters provide insights into the possibilities and chal-
lenges of Science for Diplomacy. In a chapter concerning the association
between science cooperation and international security, Jeffrey Boutwell
explores the impact of the information and communications revolution on
three 21st century security issues — missile defence, militarization of outer
space, and the geopolitics of the Artic in the era of climate change.
Meanwhile, Edison T. Liu considers global health research as a specific form
of science diplomacy and drawing on three examples — epidemic research,
clinical cancer research and population genetics research — he maintains that
this form of collaboration delivered substantial and diplomatic benefits.
Stephen Goldson and Peter Gluckman consider how a small state like
New Zealand, a predominantly food exporting nation, strategically uses sci-
ence to maximise diplomatic impact in seemingly diverse areas such as bios-
ecurity and pastoral gas greenhouse emissions. Furthermore, Atsushi Sunami,
Tomoko Hamachi, and Shigeru Kitaba analyse a growing recognition in
Japan that science and technology diplomacy has a big role to play if Tokyo is
to remain one of the ‘critical points’ in an expanding global science resource
network.
22 V. C. Turekian et al.

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