AN

EXHAUSTIBLE
RESOURCE
..Responding to Challenges..
..Facing Ohio’s Election Workforce..

All Voting is Local

Contact: Kayla Griffin-Green, Produced in partnership with
Ohio State Director Dean W. Jackson
[email protected] Principal, Public Circle, LLC
Table of Contents

Executive Summary 2

Introduction 6

Methodology 8

Trends in Election Administration 9

Election Administrator Morale 20

Inconsistency in Voting Rules 26

The Demand for Public Communication 32

The “Collaboration Ban” 38

The DATA Act and Public Records Requests 42

Emerging Technology 43

Recommendations 44

Conclusion 61

1
Executive Summary
Every election, across 88 counties, Ohio’s dedicated election administrators sprint to
make sure every vote counts and is counted accurately. Today, these professionals
are straining under the weight of back-to-back statewide special elections and
rhetorical attacks on their trustworthiness, character, and patriotism. Simultaneously
over the years, their workload is becoming more complex as the number of
cybersecurity and public relations components grows. Changes to voting laws have
added to the problem, causing public confusion as boards of election
(BOEs)—typically understaffed, underpaid, and underfunded—implement the
required changes. Meanwhile, the specter of political violence haunts the upcoming
2024 presidential election.

The less county governments and the state invest in Ohio’s election workforce, the
more likely mistakes become. In today’s highly charged political environment, those
mistakes could be costlier to public trust than ever.

There is a political element to elections by their nature, but recent trends toward the
politicization of election administration are a matter of public concern. Debates
about this trend usually occur between advocates for stricter guardrails against
election fraud and advocates for greater access to the ballot. The voices of election
administrators are heard less frequently.

This report draws on interviews with 20 of Ohio’s 88 counties and five other relevant
professionals to illustrate how near Ohio’s election workforce is to breaking, through
no fault of their own, and how that outcome can be prevented. As an educational
resource for policymakers, nonprofits, and other stakeholders, it provides an overview
of Ohio’s elections process, observations on current trends and challenges in the
election administration, and recommendations for improving the bedrock process of
democracy in the Buckeye State.

2
Key Findings:

⇢ Turnover among election workers has accelerated at an alarming rate, leaving an

increasing number of counties with staff who have never worked a presidential
election before to fill the void as experienced election workers leave.

⇢ Election workers are coping with the challenges they face through the support of
peers and the Ohio Association of Election Officials, but this is not enough and
should not have to be.

⇢ New duties, including cybersecurity and public communications, have made

election administration a more demanding job than in the past—but government
pay scales and public perception of the workload have not kept up.

⇢ Allegations of election fraud have damaged public trust in elections

administration and the morale of election workers who face regular accusations
about their trustworthiness.

⇢ Few Ohio election officials reported threats of violence, but the growing sense of
hostility and distrust is palpable.

⇢ Hastily drafted legislation and vague directives from the secretary of state leave
election officials scrambling for operational clarity and to inform the public about
how to exercise the right to vote.

⇢ Few election administrators interviewed for this report have the bandwidth to
think about the risks or potential benefits of new technologies that could pose a
threat to elections or support their work, like generative artificial intelligence.

3
To improve the administration of the 2024 election:

⇢ Legislators and county and state government officials should work with county
BOEs to create emergency mitigation and response plans, including crisis
communications. Advocates should also push for this coordination.

⇢ State and county governments should expand resources and programs for public
engagement, which is essential for combatting election dis- and misinformation
and for informing the public about changes to voting processes.

⇢ State legislators and the Ohio secretary of state should create and enhance
statewide support mechanisms for boards with new staff or other acute needs.

⇢ Advocates and local officials should promote community-based programs to

de-escalate confrontation at the polls.

⇢ Advocates, the Ohio secretary of state, and the Ohio Association of Election
Officials should identify and resolve cross-county trends in provisional ballot
rejection.

⇢ The Ohio secretary of state should consult more closely with election
administrators while implementing the DATA Act.

4
Furthermore, since the work does not end in 2024, to improve the capacity for
public servants to administer future elections, county and state government
should do the following:

⇢ Consolidate the elections calendar, keeping the commitment the legislature

made to end the use of August special elections and reducing the number of
elections more generally.

⇢ Repeal, clarify, or narrow section 3501.054 of the Ohio Revised Code, the
“Collaboration Ban,” so community groups can do more to help.

⇢ Create statewide standards for boards of elections’ budget and compensation,

helping them recruit and retain qualified staff.

⇢ Improve the absentee voting and voter registration processes, and join 42 other
states in making voter registration available online and 19 other states which
allow for online requests of absentee ballots.

⇢ Reduce early voting congestion and mail-in voting delays by allowing counties to
decide whether or not to operate a second ballot dropbox and a second early
vote location, with appropriate security precautions.

⇢ Carefully experiment with pilot programs using new technologies to streamline

elections administration.

⇢ Create programs to educate elected officials about the election process, in order
to inform both their rhetoric and legislative proposals.

⇢ Close schools on election day so they can reliably and safely serve as polling
places.

⇢ Expand and improve on programs to recruit poll workers, a large and aging
component of Ohio’s election workforce.

5
Election administration is a crucial point of failure for democracy and government in
Ohio and the nation writ large. It is the foundation on which everything else stands.
But it is cracking, and it cannot be repaired through security measures alone. Its
sustainability requires increased resources and attention at all levels of government.
Effort and expenditure now will pay dividends in higher public trust, a more
sustainable workforce, and greater administrative efficiency. It is not too late to
invest in democracy.

Introduction
Ohio should be proud of its election system. Elections do not run smoothly on their
own; they are complicated logistical operations requiring skill and experience. Across
Ohio’s 88 counties, dedicated professionals sprint to make sure every vote counts
and is counted accurately. They meet this challenge with the help of a well-regarded
professional association (the Ohio Association of Election Officials, or OAEO); a
nationally recognized, state-specific certification program run by The Ohio State
University (OSU); and rich networks of peer support.

Despite these advantages, this important asset is at alarming risk. The recent
frequency of special elections has exhausted the workforce, many members of
which have not taken a vacation in years. They spend long nights and weekends
away from their families to meet deadlines which are increasingly unpredictable.
Their ironic reward for this hard work is scrutiny, scorn, and sometimes threats from
members of the public—and occasionally elected officials—who question their
trustworthiness when they do not like election results. Despite the long hours, many
officials say this hostile sentiment is the bigger challenge to their morale.
Election administration has also grown more complicated in recent years as new
cybersecurity requirements and other policies have added layers of complexity. More
professionals leave the field every year, either for less-stressful jobs in public service

6
 or higher-paying jobs in the
private sector, where their
“Many people take it
organizational skills, leadership
for granted that our potential, and work ethic are
democracy will carry prized. Others retire, eager to put
on forever, but in truth, the work behind them.

our democracy is only

There is a political element to
as good as the people elections by their nature, but
who administer and recent trends toward the

participate in it.” politicization of election

administration are a matter of
public concern. Debates about this
trend usually occur between
advocates for stricter guardrails

Aaron Ockerman, Executive Director, against election fraud and

Ohio Association of Election Officials, advocates for greater access to
in an interview with OSU’s John the ballot. The voices of election
Glenn College of Public Affairs administrators are heard less
frequently.

This report is meant to serve as an educational resource for policymakers, nonprofits,

and other stakeholders trying to understand the pressures and needs of Ohio’s
elections workforce as the 2024 presidential election approaches. It provides an
overview of Ohio’s elections process, observations on current trends and challenges
in the elections space, and recommendations for improving the bedrock process of
democracy in the Buckeye State.

7
 Figure 1 Methodology
Counties represented The findings and recommendations presented
in this sample: here draw on 29 interviews conducted between
January and April 2024. These included:
Allen
Ashland
⇢ Nineteen interviews with either the
Clermont
director or deputy director of county
Defiance
boards of elections (BOEs).1
Greene
Hamilton
Lorain ⇢ One interview with a public affairs

Lucas professional at a county BOE.

Miami
Montgomery ⇢ One interview with a retired BOE director.

Preble
Warren ⇢ Three interviews with BOE members.
Washington
⇢ And five interviews with relevant
Additionally, seven professionals in other sectors.
counties agreed to
speak anonymously
and are not identified
here. Interview participants were offered the choice to be
on or off the record and, if on the record, to be
quoted by name or anonymously (if at all).

1
One of these interviews included both the director and deputy director; it is counted as a single
interview. Three BOEs agreed to share answers in writing rather than by phone or video call.

8
Every county BOE in Ohio was contacted at least once—and often more than
once—in an attempt to gather their input for this report. Some declined to schedule
an interview due to the demands of organizing the March 2024 primary election.
Others did not respond at all.

This interview sample represents the state regionally and demographically. The
smallest counties in the sample have populations of less than 40,000 people; the
largest include two of Ohio’s most populous cities. It includes counties from central
Ohio as well as the state’s Northeastern, Northwestern, Southwestern, and
Southeastern regions. Based on self-identification during interviews and voter
registration records, we can also confirm that the sample includes both registered
Republicans and Democrats.

Trends in Election Administration

Much of the research and advocacy related to election administration in 2024
focuses on nationwide trends. Comparatively little has focused on Ohio specifically.
As a starting point, this report looks to nationwide trends before exploring the
situation on the ground across Ohio.

The election administrators interviewed for this study were adamant that every
county is distinct and, so, many decisions should be left up to local authorities.
However, they also experience many shared challenges. For instance, the rise of
election denial since 2020 has led many election administrators to spend more of
their time and resources on public communications and education than in the past.
Likewise, recent changes in voting laws mean there is more need to communicate
new procedures and rules to the electorate. In Ohio, this challenge is made more
difficult by an ambiguous statewide ban on “collaboration” between BOEs and
nongovernment partners.

9
A consequence of these trends is the high rate of turnover among election officials
nationwide. This is an old trend that seems to be accelerating: According to an April
2024 report from the Bipartisan Policy Center, “election official turnover has been
increasing steadily” since at least 2004, and it “might be rising more today.” In many
states, a contributing factor is the rising rate of harassment and threats that officials
face from members of the public who question their integrity and the results of
recent elections.

Beyond these changes, election officials also deal with the more routine aspects of
their work. These include recruiting and training poll workers, meeting newly
strengthened cybersecurity requirements, locating space for polling places and
storage of files and equipment, securing adequate funding, and other basic
elements of the electoral process. Many of these, too, have become more difficult in
recent years: Managing technology vendors, for example, is a new element of the job
and has made it more complex.

The sections below summarize how Ohio’s elections workforce is dealing with these
trends. This report concludes with recommendations for how
stakeholders—especially government at the county and state levels—can ease the
strain on one of Ohio’s most important civic resources.

.Ohio’s elections workforce is buckling.

.under the weight of growing demands..

Staff exhaustion was the top concern raised by interview participants. Put simply,
Ohio’s elections workforce is tired. A primary contributing factor is the unusually high
frequency of elections in recent years, owing especially to the unanticipated August
special election in 2023. Election administrators were quick to note they have run ten
major elections in three years, coming off of the election-related challenges in 2020
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

10
This has put them under physical and mental strain. One BOE director said they could
not “emphasize enough how disruptive” it was to have two unscheduled August
special elections in a row.2 As shown in Figure 2, it takes about 120 days to fully plan
and execute an election in Ohio, from candidate filings to final reporting
requirements. When there are three statewide elections in one year, it means officials
are never not sprinting.

This gives them little time for any kind of proactive work, to say nothing of rest and
recovery. Many have canceled family vacations for multiple years in a row and are
afraid to even plan one in 2024. They routinely work nights, weekends, and holidays;
one reflected that they could not count how many Mother’s Days they had worked.
Some have hit their cap on vacation hours. LaVera Scott, director of the Lucas County
BOE, said in an interview that she encourages her staff to look at calendars well in
advance so they can plan to get adequate rest; but when asked when she herself
last took a vacation, she laughed and said, “that doesn’t apply to me … in a crunch, it
has to be me or my deputy.”

Paul Adams, Director of the Lorain County BOE, said that he recalls that before the
late 2000s, Ohio allowed both August and February special elections, typically for
small portions and districts within a county, but he said that the recent, countywide
specials require more staff to work more precincts, making them more strenuous
than special elections held in decades past.

2
The first of these, in August 2022, was originally scheduled for May but postponed after the Ohio
Supreme Court rejected the maps approved by the state redistricting commission. At the end of that
year, the Ohio General Assembly outlawed future August special elections, only to reinstate them in order
to put a constitutional amendment related to ballot initiatives to a popular vote before the 2023
November general election.

11
 Figure 2
How long does it take Requirement Deadline
to run an election in Ohio?
BOEs must publish notices of election and No later than
provide the notices to federal write-in 100 days before
There is a common misconception absentee voters upon request. election
about boards of election that must
Declarations of candidacy must be filed. 90 days before
be cleared up at the outset: They do election
Local questions for primary ballot must be
much more than operate on the certified.

handful of election days each year. Applications for absentee ballots may be
accepted.
While this may sound obvious, several
interview participants reported BOEs must certify validity of petitions to 78 days before
hearing variations of this claim. One appear on the ballot. election

even found themselves explaining to Form of ballots must be certified. 70 days before
a mortgage lender that, yes, running election

the BOE office is a full-time job. BOEs must schedule training for precinct 60 days before
election officials. election

Less obvious is that each election Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 46 days before
Voting (UOCAVA) ballots must be ready. election
represents more than 100 days of
work and planning. In interviews, Deadline for voter registration; early voting 30 days before
begins next day. election
participants from county BOEs
worried that legislators do not BOEs prepare precinct voter registration lists. 14 days before
election
understand the amount of planning
and effort required for this essential Mail-in ballot applications must be received 7 days before
by BOEs. election
function of democracy.
Election Day Election Day

Figure 2 summarizes some of the Mail-in ballots must be returned to BOE. 4 days after

deadlines election officials must meet election

every time voters go to the polls.3 BOEs must begin official canvass of election 5-15 days after
ballots. election

3
A more complete but denser and more complicated calendar of major election deadlines in 2024 is
available from the secretary of state. See “2024 Ohio Elections Calendar,” Office of the Ohio Secretary of
State. Accessed 3/19/2024.

12
Many interviewees stressed that several of the steps in Figure 2 do not scale with the
size of the election. For example, BOEs must recruit poll workers to staff every precinct
whether it is a presidential election or a local-issue election. Nor does the timeline
shrink for smaller elections: Some things must be completed in sequence within
legally required windows of time: for instance, before mail-in ballots can be sent to
voters who request them, the ballot language for each precinct must be approved
and proofed. And then, of course, in-person early voting begins 30 days before the
election.

This is still not a complete picture of the effort behind each election. For example,
before each election, all electronic voting machines must undergo “logic and
accuracy testing” to ensure they count votes properly. Before ballots can be certified,
they must undergo an extensive proofing process to make sure candidate names
match their filings exactly and that the names of candidates are rotated so no one
gains an advantage by appearing at the top of the list in every precinct. After the
election, BOEs are required to audit results to ensure the accuracy of the count. They
must also coordinate the retention and storage of a wide range of materials
determined by the secretary of state. As one official said, after the 100-day march to
the election, there is still a month of work left to do.

.These challenges have led to problems.

.with retention and recruitment..

This exhaustion has workforce-wide effects. Elections administrators who can retire,
do. Others leave for public sector jobs where they are paid the same for less stress, or
for private sector jobs— sometimes with elections vendors—where they are paid
significantly more. In a 2024 report, the Bipartisan Policy Center found that between
2018 and 2022, the BOE director turned over in half of Ohio’s 88 counties.4

4
The comparable rates for Ohio’s neighbors were 64 percent of counties in Indiana, 57 percent in Pennsylvania, 29
percent in Michigan, 28 percent in Kentucky, and 11 percent in West Virginia. The report provides more recent estimates
for 2020–2024 but warns they are “likely an underestimate, as 2024 data was collected in January of 2024.”

13
 According to an
anonymous interviewee,
”It’s a little frightening. It’s not an easy job to turnover among BOE
learn. You don’t learn it in a year. You have members and staff has
to go through different types of elections;
been at a rate of 10-15
every election is a little different. Until you go
percent since 2020.
through that whole cycle, you’re still new … I
worry about [the possibility of] mistakes Typically, board members
being made. turn over at a faster pace
than professional staff,
This will be the first presidential [election] but many interviewees
for half of my staff … When I go to shared the view that the
conferences, I see a lot of new people. It’s a
departure rate for
little worrisome. But election officials in
professional staff has
general are very dedicated.
been accelerating.
Across the state, I am concerned. There has Several remarked on the
been an exodus of very good election number of new faces they
officials … some very good officials have left see at annual
because the culture of elections has
conferences.
changed. The expectations on officials have
increased in reference to what we should
Turnover results in the loss
know [and] what we should be responsible
for, but we haven’t been given all of the of valuable institutional
resources and assistance needed to make memory. Directors with a
elections more efficient. dozen or more years of
experience are leaving.
If one county does something wrong, they
Interviewees said that
are going to assume we are all doing it
some counties have gone
wrong … we succeed or fail together.”
through multiple pairs of
directors and deputies in
Ohio elections administrators on just a few years. Every
turnover in their profession experienced director who
leaves is one less

14
potential mentor for newly incoming directors; the need for mentors is reflected in
the OAEO’s decision to reduce the experience requirement to become a mentor from
two years to just a single year. One county director, who requested to remain
anonymous, said that “more and more counties statewide … don’t have anyone to
guide them.”

In interviews, election administrators openly worried that this would lead to mistakes.
Jennifer Morrell, CEO of The Elections Group, a nationwide organization working to
improve election administration, said helping new and overburdened administrators
minimize mistakes is one of the most important ways organizations like hers can
support administrators this year, explaining that “We’re trying to create resources to
make sure local offices have documented, written procedures [and] templates to
create procedures when they don’t have any, and to create checklists if they don’t
have those.” Morrell credited her military experience and its emphasis on standard
operating procedures for this approach. She also said election administrators should
have a plan for if things do go wrong: “When a mistake or problem does occur,” she
asked, “how are you going to assess it? … Who are you going to call and what are you
going to say?”

One interviewed BOE director recalled that a nearby county had to let a newly hired
director go after it was clear she was in over her head. Miami County had a similar
experience in 2019, when the board of elections fired the director after a computer
error led to more than 6,000 uncounted votes. Miami County Board of Elections Chair
Dave Fisher said that accidents like this are more likely as experienced professionals
leave the field. When the new director, Laura Bruns, began her tenure, “the first thing”
she did was sign up the staff for additional training through the OAEO. She also
advocated to the county for higher pay in order to be able to attract and retain
competent staff. Fisher said that this required significant convincing, recalling that at
one point he had to ask the county commission, “Do you want to be in the news
again?”

15
Recruiting new staff in this environment is also difficult. Few people sign up willingly
knowing what the job entails. Shannon Johnson, director of the Ashland County BOE,
recently hired two new staff; she worried that applicants “didn’t understand the total
scope of the job,” and said she had to offer a higher hourly wage to attract
“good-quality people.” Kathy Meyer, director of the Allen County BOE, said that
recruiting can also be difficult because BOE staff must be bipartisan per resolution of
the board, but it can be difficult to attract a sufficient number of qualified applicants
from the minority party. Laura Bruns, director of the Miami County BOE, wondered if
people were in general reluctant to “take on a job like this in a year like this.”
Tonya Wichman, director of the Defiance County BOE, said that “election officials are
under a constant microscope,” adding additional pressure to an already full
workload. Any free time is spent trying to educate the community on the security of
elections. She described helping train inexperienced staff in a nearby county when
their director and deputy director left and helping them “take care of Northwest Ohio
together.” But she warned that given the demands on her own office, this was
unsustainable. “Eventually,” she said, “you’re going to have to pay companies to
come in and train them.” Were that to happen, it would require a significant effort
from the secretary of state to provide quality control and guardrails against
misconduct or mistakes. It would also require resources that might be preserved if
state and county governments address problems more proactively.

.Election officials prepare for turnover and.

.search for coping mechanisms.

To cope with the risk of turnover and make due with small staffs, many BOEs
crosstrain their employees in multiple functions. Paul Adams, director of the Lorain
County BOE, said his office tries to have redundant processes and additional staff
“ready to go” because it allows them to respond when problems come up. In general,
interviewed BOE staff felt strongly about the importance of professional training and

16
 were proud of their participation in
programs like the Ohio Registered Election
”I have good-
Official (OREO) certification program at The
quality people, Ohio State University (OSU).
and if I don’t
A board member in a larger county spoke
want them to about the responsibility to have succession
leave, I have to plans in place when staff move on. Megan
pay them and pay Hasting, who manages the OREO
certification program at OSU, also raised
them well …
succession planning as an issue—and also
Commissioners as an example of how OSU adapts its
tend to compare curriculum to the needs of professionals.

full-time people Most BOEs said their greatest sources of

here with other support and resilience came from

county staff, but interpersonal relationships. Many expressed

gratitude for the OAEO’s support, not just for
it’s not at all the
its legislative advocacy but also its winter
same. The job has conference, which allows them to meet with
changed so much peers and complements the secretary of

and become more state’s summer conference.

demanding.” “When you’re not around people, it does

make it harder,” said Laura Bruns; “You start
to get a little bit isolated. You need people to
call if you have a question. I can call people
in like-size counties all over the state … There
Laura Bruns, Director, Miami are a handful of people who do this job in
County Board of Elections every county. It’s not like I can go down the
street to find support.” Or more succinctly,
as another director said, “We all help each
other.”

17
.Election officials’ work is more.
.complex than in the past..

Adding to the challenges presented by the recent frequency and unpredictability

of special elections, changes to election administration in recent years have
increased the workload and complexity of the job. Most BOEs do not have
department teams; the smallest are staffed just by a director and a deputy director.
That means any new responsibilities—in cybersecurity, grant reporting, public
communications, or other areas—fall directly on their shoulders.

These new requirements add up: As one said in an interview, “The workload and
stress have probably tripled.” Many BOE staff said that their county government has
not increased their compensation in stride with these new demands.

The most commonly cited example was in cybersecurity, which has been a priority
for the secretary of state’s office for almost a decade. Every official interviewed
recognized the importance of cybersecurity to elections. But they also noted that
while the state offers grants for cybersecurity procurement, with that money comes
reporting requirements which become a time burden on staff. Some counties rely on
county IT departments for support; others hire vendors to provide dedicated support
to the BOE. Each approach has drawbacks: Vetting vendors takes time, and vendors
may work offsite, but countywide IT departments may not view the BOE as a top
priority.

Cybersecurity was not the only area affected by new logistical challenges and
resource scarcity. Administrators also said that recruitment of poll workers has
become a pain point. In an interview, Chris Dennison from the Clermont County BOE
said, “It is a perennial challenge to hire the over 750 poll workers needed to conduct
an election, but our team rises to the challenge.” The increased difficulty in recruiting
poll workers is partially due to the low pay: Workers earn just $133 a day, for days that
can last longer than 12 hours. That can average out to less than Ohio’s hourly
minimum wage of $10.45.

18
On top of recruiting problems due to pay, directors now worry about the risk of rogue
poll workers motivated to sign up by their belief in anti-voter and extremist
conspiracy theories. Such a worker could act in ways that sabotage the election
process. As one interview participant said, in an office that functions like “Noah’s
Ark”—a bipartisan team of two is required for every task—poll workers cannot be seen
casting doubt on the election process or promoting a particular party or viewpoint. “It
saddens me that I have to spend time worrying about what a rogue poll worker
could do,” they said. “[We] used to be desperate for staff, but now you have to
question [people’s] motives. I’ve had to let poll workers go over this.”

The retention of documents and storage of equipment is another challenge: BOEs

can struggle to obtain funding from county governments to procure necessary
space. Laura Bruns from the Miami County BOE put it this way:

“… some of the space I’m asking for would only get used in the month
before election day, but when we have that month we need it, and we
need it all at the same time … Sometimes, it’s going to be empty or not
used. But when we need it, we need it. The amount of equipment, the
amount of storage, the amount of space we need to train people, the
number of people required to operate the early voting center …
sometimes I feel like we’re not taken seriously.”

19
Accusations about trustworthiness and
the risk of violence have crushed morale

Since the 2020 election, accusations of election fraud and wrongdoing by election
officials have become a common feature in American politics. The constant scrutiny
and, worse, the attacks on their trustworthiness have become a major source of
concern for election workers. For their hard work to hold elections during the
COVID-19 pandemic, a postponed primary, and an unanticipated August special
election, they have been rewarded with uncomfortable—even aggressive—
confrontations with voters who
believe Ohio’s elections are rigged.

“I have heard candidates,

Fortunately, few election officials
interviewed for this research reported
and I’ve also heard
threats against their life or person, elected officials … take it
but many described confrontations up to the line and then
with voters in public or even
they stop. Especially our
aggressive interactions between
voters and poll workers. Several said
local folks. When you get
that voter skepticism was their to statewide or the
greatest concern going into the 2024 national side, some of
elections. Some have been accused
those folks are just
of treason or told they should be in
prison by members of the public. outright saying it.”
Many described encounters with
upset voters in BOE offices, or
incidents where voters yelled at poll
workers. One administrator confided David Fisher, Chairman, Miami County
Board of Elections, on election denial
that she had been stared at by
members of the public during her
children’s school sporting events.

20
 When asked to weigh election
”They’re playing to their
denial as a challenge to
political bases. They operations and morale against
don’t care what impact exhaustion from the recent

that has on you.”❜ frequency of elections, most said

the two were roughly equal. One
said that the two challenges feed

Anonymous BOE director into each other: The perceived

politicization of the elections
calendar harms public trust in the
electoral process. This distrust
makes the business of election workers more difficult: Voters become angry to the
point of making threats when faced with common obstacles like delayed delivery of
absentee ballots, regardless of whether or not the election official or worker had any
control over it.

21
”I am extremely
concerned .Officials are preparing for.
that there will .security threats..
be heightened
Officials who remain in the field
levels of threats,
increasingly seek training in subjects like
harassments, conflict de-escalation and leadership in
and intimidation stressful environments. Some have

as this election instituted new security protocols for their

offices and personnel. “[I am] more aware
year progresses.”
of my surroundings at work,” said Karen
Pawloski, deputy director of the Washington
Anonymous BOE director
County BOE. At the end of the day, her team
leaves the office together. ”I started feeling

”I love what I do. this way … between the pandemic and the
chaos of 2020. It seems far away, but it was
I hate what’s being
just madness,” she said. Other interview
done to it.” participants described new security
precautions like security film on windows,
Tonya Wichman, Director,
new protocols for which doors must be
Defiance County Board of
locked, and panic buttons for county
Elections
offices. While these changes began before
2020, they became more urgent that year
and in the years since.

22
The dangers are real. After election officials in Washington state received letters
laced with fentanyl, the Ohio secretary of state sent a letter warning BOEs to change
the way they handle mail and to store Narcan, a medication for reversing opioid
overdoses, in the office. Morale has taken a predictable hit: Dave Fisher, Miami
County’s BOE chairman, asked if staff “really
wanted to work in that kind of situation.” Paul
When voters approach
Adams in Lorain County noted that “the
election officials in Ohio
about false rumors of fraud, people handling the mail are often retired …
those officials often respond They are doing it as a community service …
that they “know how it These people are essentially volunteering
works in Ohio” and that the their time, and now they are placed in that
state requires robust
kind of danger.”
protections for its elections.

Often, however, rumors Interview participants also recalled having to

deal with other states about call law enforcement to deal with incidents at
which officials confess to polling places. Police are not allowed to be
know little. But election stationed at polling places, but they are often
protections across many on alert in case they are needed to respond
states are similar; officials
to a problem. One BOE director recalled an
do not have to concede that
intoxicated voter threatening to punch poll
there may be fraud in other
states. For more details, see: workers for being Democrats. Another
recalled a threatening individual who
“United in Security: How mentioned “something about a gun”—they
Every State Protects Your rushed to the site while their deputy called
Vote” William T. Adler,
the sheriff’s office. Fortunately, no one was
Elizabeth Cassin, Gideon
harmed. But as one interview participant said,
Cohn-Postar, Matthew
they are now more wary of threats than they
Germer, and Chris McIsaac,
Bipartisan Policy Center had to be in the past. They wished there were
(March 25, 2024). greater consequences for threatening
election workers—and that those behind
them could be held accountable.

23
.Social media and elected representatives.
.are sources of false rumors about elections..
Interview participants said that most of the rumors they hear from the public spread
online. But in some cases, elected government representatives make similar claims.
This can be especially damaging to morale, because election administrators make
serious efforts to reach out to local or state elected officials and educate them about
the election process. One recalled offering a tour of their office to an elected figure
who questioned the security of Ohio’s elections during a public meeting. The offer
was declined.

One anonymous BOE director said that many elected representatives seem to lift
talking points about election fraud from the national discourse. This often mirrors
interactions between BOE staff and members of the public: while their local board
may ‘do it right,’ that does not assuage concerns about what happens in other
counties or other states.

.Twenty years ago, “chaos in a different sense.”.

A few long-standing election officials recalled another low point in public trust,
beginning 20 years ago around 2004 (although the recount in the 2000 presidential
election cannot have helped). In 2004, Paul Adams from Lorain County recalled “an
awful lot of concern at the polls in Ohio” as long lines and an election-day ice storm
in the Northeast caused problems. Adams said that political tensions at the time led
to “a change in tone from the extremes of the political landscape” and
confrontations with election officials: “That tone didn’t occur again until recently,” he
observed.

If trends in election skepticism and elevated risks of violence are cyclical, then they
are currently at their highest point. Time and increased investment in trust-building,

24
community engagement, and transparency may bring them back down, if
policymakers make it a priority.

The experience of former Cuyahoga County BOE Director Jane Platten suggests
radical transparency is one place to start. Like Adams, Platten also drew parallels
between 2004 and 2024: “It was the political nature of the circus that was going on at
that moment in time. It was like the dawn of a new era,” she said, remembering an
incident when documentarian Michael Moore visited Cleveland to cover the disparity
between wait times at polls in Black and white neighborhoods. Platten was not yet
director, but she was in charge of media relations at the time; while Moore was in the
BOE’s media room, tensions rose to the point she was afraid someone would assault
her then-director. “Those were the years where this weaponizing of the election
process started to really elevate in the community as a way to gain strategic political
positioning,” said Platten.

Platten became interim BOE director in 2007 after Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner,
a Democrat, asked the entire Cuyahoga County elections board to resign after the
2006 election. That contest was marred by voting machine meltdowns and a
scandal in which two officials were convicted of secretly rigging the post-election
audit to avoid a time-consuming recount (but not to alter the results). “I’ll never
forget,” said Platten, “it was March, [Secretary Brunner] calls me and says she fired all
of my board members and that I was going to report directly to her for the March
2008 election.” Platten doesn’t recall threats of violence against her or her staff, but
the board’s office was a different story: “The environment of chaos is not dissimilar to
now … We had Jersey barriers around the entirety of the building so someone didn’t
drive a car filled with explosives into [it.] Those were legitimate fears at the time … It
was chaos in a different sense.”

Some interviewees shared a sense of optimism that this wave of election skepticism
will pass, just like doubts during the 2004 elections. For Platten’s part, she set about
rebuilding the BOE’s credibility through improved transparency, including the policy
of publicly auditing a sample of ballots by hand after each election. “It was under me

25
that we established that after every election we would say to the community, ‘rest
assured, this election was accurately performed, accurately executed.’” While this is
standard practice in Ohio now, officials at the time were resistant to the idea of extra
work after the election. “It was a fight. People didn’t want the election to be audited,”
she said. In the end, though, Platten won the fight. Election administration in Ohio is
better for it today.

Inconsistency in voting rules is disruptive

On January 6, 2023, Governor Mike DeWine signed House Bill 458 into law. It
introduced significant changes to Ohio’s rules around absentee voting, early voting,
and strict voter ID requirements, among other elements of election administration.

In interviews, election professionals had mixed reactions to these changes (see

Figure 3). On the whole, though, most agreed that many of the changes seemed
unnecessary and that they wished legislators would ask more questions about the
impact of rules changes before passing them into law. Interviewees often repeated
some variation of “I wish legislators would ask how this affects us”; many complained
that changes often feel illogical.

Sometimes, they require guidance from the secretary of state’s office, but high
turnover has made the staff there slower to respond than in the past. If replies from
the secretary of state are a month or longer in coming—as can be the case—it
significantly delays election administrators’ work. Every change in voting law means
downstream changes for the envelopes, ballots, training materials, websites, and
other materials that BOEs procure, maintain, and use. One BOE director said they
used to have all the materials they needed for two years stocked and ready;
changes to voting law mean those materials are now outdated.

26
Figure 3
Consequences of HB 458 Changes to Voting Rules

Change Interviewee Reactions

Photo ID required to vote. Some In many counties, most voters already use a driver’s license to vote.
previously accepted forms of But this change more heavily affects urban counties, where voters are
identification, like utility bills, no less likely to drive and more likely to use a utility bill or government
longer accepted. Voters can check to verify their address.
receive a state ID card for free.
Infrequent voters are also less likely to know about this change.

While voters without ID may cast a provisional ballot and return to the
BOE to cure it, in practice, few do so after the election results are
announced.

Cure period to correct a Shortening the cure period allows elections to be certified more quickly
provisional ballot shortened at the cost of disenfranchising voters who miss this window.
from 11 days post-election to
four.

Shortened the deadline to apply BOE staff said this change makes it more likely that voters will receive
to cast an absentee ballot from and return their ballot in time.
the third day before the election
to the seventh day before the
election.

Absentee ballots received by Most interviewees said that four days is too short a return window,
mail must arrive by the fourth because the USPS does not guarantee delivery that quickly. This is an
day after the election, instead of especially difficult hurdle for overseas and military voters.
the 10th day.. before.

Requires an official form to An online system would be faster and easier for all involved. The
request an absentee ballot; current process is time-consuming and cumbersome for voters and
previously, the request could officials alike, because the form must be printed out or requested from
simply be made in writing. the BOE, then returned either in person or by mail.

BOEs can provide “not more than Some geographically large or more populous counties would welcome
one” secure outdoor drop box on the ability to provide one or more additional drop boxes, properly
the premises of its office. monitored and located on government property, to reduce the
number of late or lost mail-in ballots. This would also reduce
interruptions to the work of BOE clerks during early voting.

27
 Interviewees were not always negative.
”Don’t try to fix
Some administrators believe that the
things that aren’t legislature is becoming more sensitive
broken.” to the impact of voting law changes,
and they generally praised the OAEO as
LaVera Scott, Director, Lucas
an effective vehicle for communicating
County Board of Elections
with the legislature. But they warned
that whenever rules change, it takes
years for voters to adjust, because
“I don’t think these many people vote only every four years.
changes really
For this reason, election professionals
solved any problem expect a larger than normal number of
that existed.” provisional ballots in this year’s
presidential election—even as the
Laura Bruns, Director, Miami
rejection rate for provisional ballots
County Board of Elections
across the state continues to rise
following the passage of House Bill 458.
As one said, “The main impediment to
“Election law voting is not understanding the process
changes are a funny … It is not incredibly difficult, but there
thing. I’ve seen good are deadlines and rules that people are
not always aware of.” While a few BOE
ones and not great
directors said that voters bear some
ones. There’s always responsibility for educating themselves
unintended on these rules, legislative changes can

consequences.” introduce confusion.

Anonymous BOE director The new voter ID requirements were a

common example. Rules like these have
become common sources of

28
nationwide controversy in recent years. They have already had an impact: Ashland
county BOE Director Shannon Johnson noted that in 2023, one Ashland County race
for mayor resulted in a tie vote. The 62 absentee ballots which the BOE received after
the deadline might have flipped the result if any came from the affected
municipality. “Sixty-two votes is a lot for our little county,” she said.

Most interviewees also said that shortening the return time for mail-in ballots to four
days after the election made the deadline unfair and “too tight,” because USPS would
not guarantee that turnaround time. Others cited the impact on overseas and
military voters, who may have more difficulty getting a ballot in on time.

On the other hand, interviewed election professionals praised the decision to move
up the deadline for mail-in ballot applications, saying that mailing ballots which they
knew would not reach voters in time often felt misleading. For example, Sherry
Poland, director of the Hamilton County BOE, said that “Every election cycle … I'm
putting [ballots] in the mail during those final days before election day, knowing it
won’t reach the voters in time ... Now there’s not this false hope.”

But the transition to an official form to request an absentee ballot has caused
confusion among voters, who now have to either print—or if, as is increasingly
common, they don’t have a printer, request the BOE mail them—the form. Then the
form must be returned by mail to the BOE. An online system for requesting an
absentee ballot would save both election officials and voters time.

Even simple changes to forms can cause confusion. This was the case with form 12-B,
the provisional ballot affirmation, which was revised after the passage of HB 458.
After that change, the proportion of provisional ballots rejected because voters
incorrectly filled out their date of birth (DOB) on the form nearly doubled, from 0.4% of
rejections in the preceding three November elections to 0.9% in the 2023 general
election. While it is difficult to compare absolute numbers across elections because
turnout varies significantly each year, at the high end, this represents hundreds of
rejected ballots. This increase was not even across the state; for several years,

29
Montgomery County, the state’s fifth largest by population, was the site of more than
half of all provisional ballots rejected for an incorrect DOB. After the passage of HB
458, this proportion fell—but Hamilton County’s rose to encompass more than a third
of all rejections for an incorrect DOB statewide.

Sherry Poland, the director of Hamilton County’s BOE, said in a phone call that after
HB 458, the provisional ballot form—Form 12-B—was changed to include more text,
which reduced the size of the DOB field. Hamilton was one of two counties who used
a vendor with a smaller slot for ballot envelopes, and as such the field was smaller in
Hamilton than in other parts of the state. Hamilton County has since upgraded to
new equipment with a larger slot, allowing them to increase the form’s size. Poland
said this has reduced the rejection rate. “It’s the same form, but we made it larger,”
she explained.

.Voting rights groups have pointed out discrepancies.

.between the law and the wording on the form….
Hamilton County’s experience does not solve all problems with Form 12-B. What it
does show is how seemingly insignificant changes to paperwork and process can
affect voters. Voting rights groups have pointed out discrepancies between the law
and the wording on the form, lack of standardization for how incomplete forms
should be processed across BOEs, and other problems which individual boards—or
the secretary of state—should address.

30
Figure 4
The percentage of provisional ballots rejected during November general
elections due to incorrect DOB skyrocketed after HB 458 in January 2023.

All calculations based on numbers provided at “Election Results and Data,”

Office of the Ohio Secretary of State. Hamilton County’s BOE said in a phone
call that changes to the form have reduced the rejection rate. Official
provisional ballot counts were not publicly available for the 2024 primary
election at the time of writing.

31
Public communications is
an increasing demand
The increase in public distrust in the election system and changes to voting rules
mean that public communications is a more important part of election
administrators’ jobs. In an interview, one longtime director said that the increasingly
public nature of their work is the largest change they’ve seen in recent years. “We
spend more time in meetings talking about what good social media looks like, how
we can get our messaging out … When I started in this business, we didn’t worry
about public perception … Now, 30 or 40 percent of my time is dedicated to
managing public perception versus administering elections,” they said.

Changes to training curricula reflect this assessment. According to program

manager Megan Hasting, OSU’s OREO program now offers trainings on “powerful
public relations,” engaging with a divided citizenry, de-escalating conflict, and crisis
communications.

However, most BOEs are not staffed to meet this challenge, because their budgets do
not support a full-time communications staffer. One interview participant estimated
that less than a dozen boards had someone dedicated full-time to public relations
or communications. Instead, these responsibilities usually fall on the director and
deputy director, in addition to their other responsibilities. The gap in resources means
that small counties rely on community meetings and local newspapers to reach the
public, while larger counties have dedicated social media presences, offer tours of
their facilities, and engage in other efforts to educate the public.

.Public communications is essential.

.to educate the public about voting rules..

The recent changes to Ohio’s voting process have also required more public
communications from boards of elections. Paul Adams in Lorain County called public
education the “complicated part” of voting law changes, as opposed to

32
implementing the changes themselves.
Boards often rely on earned media from TV
”There’s always a
and print news outlets, inviting journalists on
tours to “look behind the curtain” of
bipartisan team
election administration. While one observer making decisions and
interviewed said they had not yet seen doing work, there’s a
boards using “more aggressive” approaches
lock on my doors that it
like billboards or direct mail, they predicted
this would be a big topic in 2024.
takes a Democrat and a
Republican to open, my
LaVera Scott, Director of the Lucas County board is bipartisan,
BOE, said that she has seen confusion
every decision that is
among voters who previously used utility
bills to vote. She explained that the new made is bipartisan …
voter ID requirements primarily affect Even if they wanted to
seniors, students, and people who can't change the results, they
drive. Scott believes voters are “already
couldn't.”
becoming more accustomed to the rules,”
but those who vote only in presidential years
may not be aware of them. To help inform
Shannon Johnson, Ashland County
voters, the BOE requested advertising money
Board of Directors
from the county commission so it could
raise awareness through local newspapers.

.Election denial has made election administration.

.a more public-facing role..
To confront rumors about the security of Ohio’s elections, many administrators now
spend a significant portion of their time speaking to community groups and posting
to social media. Very few boards, however, have the budget to employ dedicated
communications or public relations professionals; these functions are usually carried

33
out by a staffer wearing many hats, sometimes including the director and their
deputy. One anonymous director explained that they previously preferred to work
behind the scenes, a luxury they can no longer afford in the era of widespread
election denial. Moreover, they said, the starting point of interactions with the public
is now more often negative. Boards of elections find themselves working from a
deficit of trust, through no fault of their own.

Larger counties typically have more resources to devote to public relations. Sherry
Poland in Hamilton County described her office’s social media plan as “very robust.”
Voters in the Cincinnati area can hear from their board of elections on Facebook, X
(née Twitter), LinkedIn, and Instagram. She said they produce short videos
showcasing their processes and team. “We have a series of ‘did you know’ videos,’”
she explained in an interview. “We want people to know we’re not an evil wizard
behind a curtain. We are members of your community, your neighbors, your friends.”
To this end, Hamilton county’s BOE also runs “behind the ballot” tours during which
participants can see where election processes are carried out. Some of these are
specifically aimed at local journalists; others are intended for candidates on the
ballot, Poland explained, so that they are “confident in how [the election] was
administered regardless of the outcome.” They stress that none of the equipment is
connected to the internet, that logic and accuracy testing is conducted on voting
machines before the election, and that results are audited afterward. The idea for
these tours initially came from tours of the BOE for Girl Scouts, who were encouraged
to vote and received a merit badge.

Some interview participants were envious of Hamilton County’s programs and

wished they could be expanded. But for many counties, funding strictly limits the
options for voter education and public communication. Many BOE directors’ public
outreach is largely limited to appearances at Rotary or Kiwanis clubs, other local
community groups, and county political party meetings. Because of the crowded
election calendar in recent years, in small counties, even these can be difficult to
arrange.

34
 .Election denial.
“[We] want people to know
.myths are easily.
we’re not an evil wizard
behind a curtain … .disproved but.
Whenever someone first .hard to debunk..
comes to work at the board,
Debunking rumors of election
the first thing they say is fraud is not difficult because
‘I didn’t know how much they are credible; in fact, most

work goes into conducting are easily disproved by

explanations of the many
an election … I had no idea it
safeguards in place during
worked this way.’” Ohio’s elections. Rather, the
challenge lies in reaching the
Sherry Poland, Director, Hamilton County public with limited resources and
Board of Elections
coping with the small minority
who will never be persuaded by
any evidence.

In interviews, officials seemed

“There are elected officials exasperated by the number of
times they had repeated the
spreading things I wish
many safeguards in place to
they knew more about… prevent fraud. Despite this,
My policy is, if anyone officials interviewed for this

questions me, I invite them report expressed an admirable

commitment to dialogue with
in for [a] tour.”
the public. They viewed
questions as welcome so long as
Anonymous BOE director
they are not accompanied by
hostility, and they tried to create
opportunities for the public to

35
learn more about their work. One tells their critics, “please come to our audit.”
Another invites skeptics to be poll workers or to attend the logic and accuracy testing
which all voting machines are subjected to. Many are impressed, though as one
interviewee put it, “You might have 10 percent who are still doubting Thomases even
after they’ve watched it and participated.”

One major safeguard runs through every part of a board of elections' work: the
requirement that it be staffed bipartisanly. Alisha Lampert, the director of the Greene
County BOE, said that “there are three doors on each [voting] machine. You need a
Republican and a Democrat to unlock all of them,” referring to the system of
requiring two keys—one carried by a Democratic staffer, one carried by a
Republican—to access certain rooms or systems. “I can’t even get into the building
without a Democrat in the morning,” said Lampert. In fact, her personal office is one
of the few spaces in the building she can access without a bipartisan counterpart.
Another BOE director described four such double-locked rooms in their office: one
holding the equipment for election day, another for computer servers, another for
storing absentee ballots, and finally the early voting room.

Administrators often hear from members of the public who insist that election results
should be counted by hand, because they “don’t want machines tabulating” the
vote. Election officials insisted that not only would this take much longer, it would also
introduce more mistakes. Members of the public sometimes repeat rumors involving
foreign hacking of voting machines, or concerns about equipment made in China.
But Ohio law requires that voting machines are never connected to the internet.
Likewise, machine-counted results are audited after each election, and the
machines cannot legally be used for voting if they are not tested for accuracy
beforehand.

36
.Election deniers can gum up the works..
The increase in public hostility has been accompanied by burdensome public
records requests. In September 2022, all 88 counties in Ohio received public records
requests for an expansive set of documents related to the 2020 election, just weeks
before they were scheduled to be destroyed. The requests were identical—many
interview participants described them as having been “cut and pasted” from the
same source—and extremely thorough, involving hundreds of thousands of pages of
material. To some, it seemed as if they requested every scrap of paper from the 2020
election.

These requests were a burden in time and resources. Hamilton County created two
new positions—a compliance officer and a communications officer—to help deal
with the requests. Director Sherry Poland said they were “fortunate” to be able to do
this going into the presidential election, when the extra capacity could also help
educate voters. Smaller counties were left hiring outside firms to wade through the
requests, assemble the requested documents, and redact them as necessary. One
person familiar with the requests called them “a huge resource drain.” In the end, the
cost was borne by Ohio taxpayers.

Election denial can interfere with processes in other ways. This is especially evident
when politics spills over into the board of elections. This happened in Miami County
when candidate for Sheriff Paul Reece filed a protest with the board claiming that the
incumbent Sheriff, Steve Duchak, had violated rules around campaigning while on
duty. The board eventually referred the complaint to the Ohio attorney general,
noting that it did not have jurisdiction over the law in question. When interviewed,
Board Chairman Dave Fisher called this a “big headache” which forced the county to
delay proofing ballots until the attorney general issued a ruling, despite a looming
deadline. “[It] put us in a terrible box,” said Fisher. “It became meeting after meeting
after meeting.”

37
The “Collaboration Ban” is unclear
and inconsistent

Since September 2021, section 3501.054 of the Ohio Revised Code has banned
election administrators from collaborating with or accepting money from
nongovernmental persons or entities for any election-related purpose, with few
exceptions. The rationale behind this “collaboration ban”—the nation’s most
strict—was to prevent wealthy individuals from making grants to boards of election,
as Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg did in 2020. Ultimately, more than 2,100 local election
offices applied for the grants provided by Zuckerberg and his wife, Priscilla Chan,
through the Center for Tech and Civic Life; most applicants worked in jurisdictions
with fewer than 25,000 people. When asked how they intended to spend the money,
the most common responses were supplies for mail-in or absentee voting,
temporary staffing, poll workers, and personal protective equipment.

While many states restrict BOEs from accepting private donations, Ohio is unusual in
its ban of any collaboration for “election-related purposes,” however defined. In
practice, the meaning of collaboration is unclear, and the ban is challenging for local
officials to navigate. Despite limited guidance from the Ohio attorney general, county
prosecutors may interpret the law differently across the state. Most BOEs said in
interviews that this law has not changed their approach to administering elections,
but some said that because of the collaboration ban, it now takes additional time to
determine if they can accept various forms of support. “We put everything we have
into making sure the election is done correctly,” said one. “Now having to work
through this on top of it makes it really difficult.”

38
“You’re allowed to communicate. Guidance is often

A great example for us is that we inconsistent, and officials

have a large university in our can be reluctant to commit

county … We keep open lines of it to paper for fear of being

communication with their voting wrong. For example, some

program on campus. It benefits BOEs have advised not to

accept food donations for
both of us to make that a smooth
precinct workers, even
and informative process. One could
though that is an exception
say that is collaboration. I would
written clearly and explicitly
say it’s just good communication
into law. When one election
between government offices.
administrator asked the
secretary of state if they
Obviously, funding is not allowed.
could use donated space
No one has ever wanted to give us
from a church, they
anything. Suddenly, there was
received the answer as a
funding with no strings attached! So
phone call, not in writing.
I was able to benefit my voters and
“[We] get that a lot,” they
save taxpayer dollars, and
explained. While the “use of
somehow that was viewed as bad.
any building to conduct an
I think that’s unfortunate. We used election” is another
the funding to get a letter-opening exception written into the
machine … we intentionally bought law, county prosecutors are
equipment that could be used not always well-versed in
long-term … that was really our rule election law and are
for it. We’ve had to beg and plead sometimes skeptical of
for everything.” even this clearly permissible
form of support.
Anonymous BOE director
Most interviewees said they
believed they are allowed to

39
go and present information to community groups—an interpretation consistent with
guidance from the Ohio attorney general’s office. It is less explicitly clear that
information can flow the other way—-if election officials can attend events like
trainings or seminars—but it is often presumed this is the case. “We don’t interpret
‘collaborate’ to mean you can’t go and listen,” said one interview participant. Where
the line becomes “blurrier,” said one, is “when they call you and ask about doing a
registration drive” and whether or not the board can provide them with materials.

.The ban prevents some helpful forms.

.of community outreach..
Some interviewees said that they could do even more to inform and educate the
public about elections and voting if this law were clarified or narrowed. While the ban
was allegedly intended to prevent donations from wealthy individuals from
influencing elections, in practice it has chilled and frozen smaller efforts that are
much more inoffensive. This can be especially limiting for smaller counties, which
previously leaned on community groups to help with things that larger counties can
afford to do on their own. One county
BOE director said their board canceled
plans to work with an educational “kids “The DATA Act is the
voting program,” citing the collaboration
newest thing… Some
ban as the reason why. Another was
uncertain whether or not they could things do need to be
have a relationship with a program done… but a lot of
which encourages veterans and their change, fast, is not
families to become poll workers. One
necessarily a good
BOE director said their board told her
she could not proactively reach out to thing.”
community groups to speak to their
members about the election; because Brian Sleeth, Director, Warren
County Board of Elections
of the collaboration ban, she had to be
invited.

40
The ban doesn’t just discourage BOEs from working with community groups; it can
also discourage organizations that specifically exist to support election workers from
engaging in Ohio. Jennifer Morrell, CEO of national organization The Elections Group,
said that organizations like hers have to evaluate state laws carefully, and that
vague rules can cause risk-averse organizations to keep their distance.

At a time when public confidence in the election system is under attack, community
partnerships could also play a stronger role in restoring that confidence. Jane
Platten, former Cuyahoga County BOE director, recalled in an interview her
experience restoring the BOE’s credibility after disastrous scandals in the 2006
election. Platten knew that the BOE “had to blow the doors open” and engage more
consistently with stakeholders outside the BOE. “I started to go back and talk to the
community, to talk to advocates,” Platten explained. Working with the community
was one way in which Platten encouraged the BOE to increase transparency—an
essential ingredient for public trust. In the end, it made the election system as a
whole more resilient:

“If you’re constantly walking into the building in warrior mode to fight
the community, you’ll never be able to focus on the work at hand. But if
you respect the folks who may or may not have a different opinion, may
or may not get on your nerves, if you give them the respect they deserve,
[you can] establish a relationship where you can help each other
achieve the same goal … So I would do community meetings, use that
component, the media too … I would tell them, ‘come on in, see what
we’re doing.’ If you don’t hide things, it makes it so much easier.”

41
Administrators are uncertain about the
DATA Act but hope it will ease vexatious
public records requests
In July 2023, Ohio passed Senate Bill 71—the DATA Act—into law. This bill would require
the retention of electronic election records in a standardized format, accessible
through a central portal. The law was praised by election nonprofits, including the
D.C.-based Bipartisan Policy Center, which said in a statement that “Centralization of
data collection and retention will expedite data reporting for local election
administrators, enabling them to focus their efforts on other critical, more technical
aspects of election administration. The DATA Act will also strengthen public
confidence by requiring the secretary of state’s office to publish election data that is
digestible for voters and researchers.”

Some elections professionals were hopeful that the creation of a central data
repository might lessen the burden of what one called “vexatious public records
requests.” Another interview participant said that the public often requests
“overwhelming amounts of information that they then frequently have trouble
making sense of”; a standardized format for data reporting, while challenging to
implement, could help with this problem. Others were less sure, noting that “a lot of
the requests are local; I don’t think those will go away. People will still come here
because they are familiar with us.”

While it could be beneficial, administrators interviewed for this report were uncertain
about how the DATA Act will be implemented over the coming months. One, from the
BOE in a less-populous county, worried that the automatic daily feed of voting
statistics to the secretary of state would become just “another daily report that
needs to be checked” and said “it’s not always explained what the endgame would
be or why.” Another predicted that “there will be confusion among boards of
elections around this law” and said that so far they have only received a high-level
summary from the secretary of state. They believed smooth implementation will
require more guidance and grant support.

42
More could be done to prepare for, and
take advantage of, emerging technology

Going back to at least 2018, when computer scientists created a convincing—but

fake—video of President Obama saying words he never uttered, academics,
advocates, and journalists have discussed the dangers that artificial intelligence (AI)
could pose to elections. Since then, the public release of ChatGPT and other
generative AI tools have made it trivially inexpensive and easy to produce synthetic
imagery, audio, and video content (colloquially called “deep fakes”). The 2024
elections have already seen several high-profile examples of campaigns, political
consultants, and other actors using this technology in ways both above- and
underboard. AI tools could also enable more-advanced spear phishing operations
and other cyberattacks against BOEs, this year and in the future.

In interviews, participants were asked to discuss potential threats from new

technologies like generative artificial intelligence, their preparations for such threats,
as well as any election-related opportunities afforded by these technologies. Few
participants were in a position to discuss any of these matters in detail. By and large,
they are too strapped for bandwidth to think creatively about the new cyber and
election security risks posed by AI, or the opportunities to use new technologies to
streamline processes like ballot proofing or answering public queries. Megan Hasting,
who manages OSU’s OREO program, said that she has been thinking about the use of
AI for public service, though she doesn’t believe there is yet enough material to
create a full course for elections officials. “We’re just now starting to consider how we
teach this to public service generally,” she said.

43
Recommendations
This report has laid out several challenges facing Ohio’s election workforce. The
challenge of holding elections during a pandemic, followed by two years of
back-to-back unexpected August special elections, has exhausted many
professionals and caused others to leave the field. Attacks on their trustworthiness
have sapped morale and introduced novel public relations challenges. These, along
with increased cybersecurity needs and other elements, have made their jobs more
demanding overall. New laws have added to these difficulties. So might new
technologies—though, with foresight, these could also help.

In short, Ohio’s election workforce is an exhaustible resource. Its current trajectory is

unsustainable, but it is not unalterable. Below, this report offers several
recommendations—for municipal and county governments, state lawmakers, and
the Ohio secretary of state’s office—which can help preserve this resource and
improve elections in Ohio. It breaks these down into two categories: the first contains
recommendations which can be pursued in 2024, either to improve the conduct of
that election or to streamline processes and reduce workforce burdens. The second
category contains longer-term responses requiring more time, larger investments,
and sometimes legislative action.

.RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 2024:.

1. County BOEs should create emergency mitigation and response plans,

including crisis communications.
The number of special elections and other extraordinary events since 2020 have
left election officials little time for proactive work. This, along with the high rate of
turnover among experienced election officials, raises the risk of mistakes during
the election process. In the current political environment, these mistakes could

44
 rapidly become scandals or even crises—
even if they are minor or quickly rectified.
For resources including
Ohio’s collaboration ban does not totally premade graphics that BOEs
prevent election advocacy groups from can use to communicate
with voters over social
working to address this issue. Some of those
media, consider this guide
interviewed for this report say they make
co-produced by the
their resources publicly available online so
National Association of State
that any BOE or member of the public can Election Directors and the
access them. Advocacy organizations could National Association for
then curate and collect lists of these publicly Media Literacy Education:
available materials and provide them to
“Election Communications
BOEs with new staff. To the extent possible,
Toolkit” National Association
procedures should be standardized and
of State Election Directors
reinforced with detailed checklists which (accessed April 26, 2024).
can be provided to less- experienced county
staff. Detailed “what if” crisis communications
plans should also be developed in
cooperation with BOEs that have “lived through” past crises. Those plans should
likewise be made available across the state so that no county starts from square
one in case of an emergency. The Ohio secretary of state should play an
important role in encouraging the creation of these resources and their
distribution to BOEs across Ohio.

2. Expand resources and programs for public engagement.

Constant attacks on the honesty of election officials have become an existential

threat to morale, and changes to voting rules can be vexing for the public and
officials alike. But public outreach by BOEs does not need to reach the most
obstinate election deniers. It is more important and more effective to reach the
“persuadable middle” and to be available to provide them with true information
when they are looking for answers to election-related questions.

45
 Likewise, one of the most
important roles a BOE plays is to
“Hamilton County has a
inform voters of election rules
really nice program, and processes so that everyone
‘behind the ballot.’ My who wants to vote can, and can

office is nothing like be sure their vote counts.

Counties and the state should
theirs … [it’s] way
increase resources for public
smaller. But I would like communications so every board
to take that tour with of elections in the state has

Sherry in Hamilton and capacity to more proactively

inform and educate voters
offer something similar
about their work and the voting
here.” process.

This is especially a challenge for

midsize counties. Lisa Boggs
from Preble County said that
Laura Bruns, Director, Miami County
Board of Elections administrators in small counties
can often use personal
relationships to confront rumors
and get out information about voting. Larger counties, meanwhile, have larger
staffs. But the size of BOE teams in midsize counties varies widely across the state,
and it is more difficult to build personal networks across larger populations.

Sherry Poland from Hamilton said that more training, even refresher training,
would also help. She recalled that at a recent OAEO conference, Hamilton and
Williams counties gave a “back to basics” presentation on how to use social
media quickly and effectively. “Election officials shouldn’t be afraid of social

46
 media,” she said in an interview. “You can do it quickly and effectively without
taking a lot of time.”

County and state governments should make extra resources available for these
purposes. This is especially true when state legislators change voting laws, which
come with inevitable consequences for ballot access.

3. Improve statewide support mechanisms for boards with new staff or other
acute needs.

In today’s environment, turnover is a predictable challenge for election

administration. Not only should state government, county government, and
professional associations like OAEO help BOEs prioritize cross-training of staff and
planning for turnover, the state especially should plan for personnel
gaps—including at the leadership level.

When the majority of a small BOE’s staff leaves in a short period of time, as has
been the case in some counties, their successors are left scrambling to learn and
execute processes simultaneously. Sometimes, they are doing so while
short-staffed as they wait for open positions to be filled. While BOEs in this position
receive advice and moral support from nearby counties, this cannot fill the
capacity shortfall and can only do so much to mitigate the risk of mistakes by
new and overworked administrators. Jennifer Morrell from The Elections Group
said that in states across the country, it is often election administration
associations that fill gaps in capacity by coordinating for staff from one county to
do rotations in another. But without government support, this approach merely
spreads the strain out over enough area to become tolerable. It does not solve
the problem.

The secretary of state’s office could address situations like this by planning for
rapid response in the event of significant turnover in a single county BOE. One
approach might be to send personnel from that office directly to affected
counties. If the Secretary of state does not have or cannot obtain the capacity to
do this, they should explore doing so through vendors or through direct support to

47
 the OAEO. In practice, many new administrators receive training on key processes
from election vendors, not the secretary of state’s office. If contracting is the best
way to bring new teams up to speed quickly while minimizing mistakes, that
process should be expanded and formalized with appropriate guardrails and
quality standards.

Improving response times should also be a priority for the secretary’s office. Many
county BOEs remarked on delayed responses from the secretary of state, which
leads to delayed operations, increased workload, and an overall higher risk of
mistakes. Sometimes this is the result of vague or unclear directives leading to
questions about operationalization which might have been avoided with prior
consultation. While recent turnover in the office has exacerbated this issue, it is
not wholly new: Former Cuyahoga County BOE Director Jane Platten expressed
frustration with delayed communications and decision-making from the
secretary’s office during her tenure, as well, calling it “non-transparent” and “a
fight all the time” while recalling instances where last-minute decisions meant
she had to wait for court rulings late the night before election day.

4. Promote programs to de-escalate confrontation at the polls.

Election violence has the potential to be not just tragic but catastrophic. State
and county governments should encourage community leaders—such as faith
leaders and social workers—to volunteer as poll workers and especially to provide
de-escalation services at polling places.

Such election “peacekeepers” have served in previous cycles; the attorney

general should state explicitly that such programs are allowed under section
3501.054 of the Ohio Revised Code, and county governments should encourage,
promote, and materially support such programs wherever possible.

5. Identify and resolve cross-county trends in provisional ballot rejection.

Even minute differences in counties can be crucial to determining whose vote

counts and whose does not. The example of Hamilton County’s increase in
provisional ballot rejections due to an incorrect DOB is instructive here. Hamilton

48
 County’s BOE believes that simply by increasing the size of a form, it reversed the
upward trend in rejections due to incorrect DOB.

A missed field on a form is a poor reason for a citizen’s voice to be excluded from
an election. This year and in the future, the secretary of state and the OAEO
should look closely at rates of provisional ballot rejection across the state, and
when a county appears to have an unusually high rejection rate, steps should be
taken to ascertain why. Ideally, the causes of provisional ballot rejection should
be addressed at the state level in ways that streamline the process and bring
down the rejection rate; getting one’s ballot to count should not feel like
answering a trick question. But if statewide solutions are not forthcoming, the
OAEO and individual BOEs should work to share best practices between counties.

County BOEs also have some independent discretion in how they process forms
that are incomplete or incorrectly filled out. When necessary, they should act
within their authority to simplify the provisional voting process and avoid rejecting
ballots on purely procedural grounds. When they must request authority from the
secretary of state to improve forms or make other process changes, the secretary
should grant those requests.

6. Consult more closely with BOEs while implementing the DATA Act.

Interviewed election officials said that the rationale behind the DATA Act is not
clear to them and that they have been given only high-level information about its
implications for their day-to-day work. The secretary of state’s office should begin
consulting with BOEs as soon as possible to ensure that required transparency
measures are implemented in the manner least taxing for BOEs. It should also
prioritize webinars and other training to make sure that election officials are
ready to implement new procedures when the time comes. Voter advocacy
groups can also push for this law to be implemented in the least burdensome
manner possible, while helping less-experienced BOEs understand their
compliance obligations.

49
.RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POST-2024:.

1. Consolidate the elections calendar.

The frequency of elections in recent years, and especially the unpredictability of

August special elections, was the chief complaint of election administrators
regardless of political affiliation. The constant churn of elections has worn down
staff, taking them away from their families and driving many from the profession.

To alleviate this pressure, the state should refrain from holding additional August
special elections—in keeping with the spirit of HB 458. It should also encourage
localities in the same county to consolidate municipal primary, special, and issue
elections to the extent possible: As LaVera Scott from Lucas County said in an
interview, local charters often contain decades-old provisions, sometimes out of
step with state and federal law, requiring elections to be held at odd times. One
charter, for example, had an October primary; Scott said it had been in the
charter since the 1950s.

These elections are not just stressful for BOEs; they are costly to Ohio taxpayers.
The Ohio Constitution provides cities with tools to review and amend their
charters. The state, county commissioners, and other government institutions
should encourage charter cities to use those tools to bring election calendars into
greater alignment.

2. Repeal, clarify, or narrow section 3501.054 of the Ohio Revised Code, the
“Collaboration Ban.”
If the collaboration ban cannot be repealed outright, the Ohio General Assembly
should consider clarifying or narrowing the ban against BOEs’ collaborating with
nongovernment entities for election-related purposes. Ohio Secretary of State
Frank LaRose said the language in the ban was drafted “inelegantly” and should
be modified; the Ohio House previously recognized the need to do so in 2022 with
the passage of House Bill 564. The Senate should take up this bill, and both
chambers should explore wider exemptions. At a minimum, lawmakers should

50
 more explicitly exempt a
wider range of voter
“We have five staff,
outreach activities or
should be six. Greene community partnerships
County has about 119,000 meant to raise public

voters; other counties awareness of voting laws,

recruit a bipartisan pool of
this size have 12 to 14 staff.
poll workers, and educate
We can only do so many voters on election
jobs; there are only so safeguards. It seems
draconian that a law
many hours. Our board
ostensibly intended to limit
voted to hire two more billionaires’ political influence
people, but the county has implicated partnerships
administration said no.” with groups representing
veterans and schoolchildren.
Alisha Lampert, Director, Greene County Government at all levels
Board of Elections should not just allow but
encourage these kinds of
collaborations.

Conversely, the state could

“I've never worked a job narrowly ban those activities
with such stress, constant most concerning to

changes to rules, and lawmakers while permitting

others—for example, by
minimal pay.”
exploring commonsense
ways to allow BOEs to receive
Anonymous BOE deputy director supplementary grants. This
would require the legislature
to articulate specific
concerns about how

51
 collaboration impacts Ohio’s elections, which would be healthy for both public
discourse and the election process. It would also allow BOE directors to pursue
cost-saving investments: for example, one anonymous administrator said that
they used private grant money only for equipment purchases which would
streamline their operations for years to come, like a photocopier and a
letter-opening machine. They felt it was unfortunate they were no longer allowed
to supplement taxpayer dollars in this way.

3. Create statewide standards for boards of elections’ budget and compensation.

BOEs are funded primarily at the county level. This leads to widespread
inconsistency in budgets and staff sizes, even in counties of comparable size and
population. Some BOEs described difficulty attracting qualified applicants and
having to “beg” for critical needs. In times of economic hardship, legal
confrontations over election funding can waste time and taxpayer dollars.

County governments and the state should explore ways to provide

more-consistent, sustainable budgetary support for BOEs. Compensation levels,
for example, could be spelled out in the Ohio Revised Code, which specifies the
compensation for board members but not BOE staff. In the absence of
enforceable requirements, though, the secretary of state’s office should at
minimum establish some guidance for appropriate compensation of BOE staff
and benchmarks for what level of staffing and funding is realistically required to
hold elections in counties of various sizes. This would better equip election
administrators to advocate for themselves in budget conversations with county
governments, and stronger compensation benchmarks could help with staff
retention in an era of high turnover.

Governments should also budget for procurement more proactively. Jennifer

Morrell from The Elections Group suggested in an interview that county
governments should create an annual line item to save for large election
equipment upgrades—the way some municipalities do for snowplows and other
investments.

52
The state government could theoretically do the same thing. Interview
participants praised lawmakers for stepping in to provide money for big
infrastructure upgrades when BOEs need it most: for example, in 2018 the state
provided $115 million to replace aging voting machines. These kinds of
expenditures could also benefit from proactive budgeting, but it is important that
the state provide flexibility to counties regarding procurement of equipment and
other major expenditures. Too many strings attached to funding is an undesirable
constraint.

State funding should also not supplant county funds for BOEs; counties should
not, in other words, reduce support to BOEs if the state provides for major
statewide upgrades or expenditures. Sometimes, county commissions use
additional state funding as an excuse to withhold resources from BOEs; for
example, BOEs are able to “charge back” election costs from subdivisions that put
forward ballot initiatives. In some counties, commissions hold that money in the
general fund and do not return it to the BOE. Lawmakers should explore ways to
limit this and other practices with the effect of reducing county commitments to
election administration.

For both county governments and the state, tax windfalls from the sale of
cannabis products following the passage of Issue 2 in 2023 could be a potential
source of funding for elections.

In the end, proper funding for BOEs can be a cost-saving feature. Not only does it
prevent mistakes, but failure to provide the required resources to run elections
can lead to costly legal disputes. During the 2009 recession, when the Ashland
County Commission cut the Ashland County BOE’s budget after a countywide
revenue shortfall, the BOE successfully sued the county commission for failing to
adequately fund the department. The legal fees paid by the county were
ultimately more than the requested funds.

53
4. Improve the absentee voting and voter registration processes.

By and large, election officials believe that every registered voter who wants to be
able to cast a ballot should be able to cast a ballot. No matter what the rules are,
they want them to be clear and consistent to avoid confusing the public and
complicating their work.

For additional resources on how

That said, they identified a few
election professionals around the
country are using and thinking areas where current rules could be
about responsible AI use, see: improved—especially as regards
mail-in voting. The state could
“8 best practices for state election allow voters to request mail-in
officials on AI,” Norman Eisen, Nicole
ballots online, cutting down on the
Turner Lee, and Samara Angel,
time it takes to send, receive, and
Brookings Institution (March 11, 2024).
process applications for absentee

“Safeguards for Using Artificial ballots. It could also create a

Intelligence in Election “permanent absentee” status,
Administration,” Edgardo Cortés and especially for voters who are in the
Lawrence Norden, Brennan Center military, reside overseas, are
for Justice (December 12, 2023).
elderly, or have mobility issues.

Implementing even more-typical As regards voter ID requirements,

technologies can be complicated for one election administrator asked
election officials, who may have to why voting is the point of
field public questions about any confirmation, rather than
changes. For a guide on registration: If a voter’s eligibility
constructive questions citizens
and address are confirmed at
might ask, see:
registration, the state could invest

“A Guide: What to Ask When New in processes to update addresses

Election Technology is Introduced,” of voters who move—-perhaps
Verified Voting (February 9, 2021). through the BMV or the Ohio
Department of Taxation—rather

54
 than doing so at the point of voting, when remedies are least possible.
While interviewed election officials were divided on the impact of shortening the
deadline by which the BOE must receive mail-in ballots to four days after the
election, many felt this deadline was unfair to voters. Voters expect that if they are
able to have their ballot postmarked by the required deadline, it should at least
have a reasonable chance of reaching the BOE on time, but the USPS does not
guarantee mail delivery in four days. The state should reconsider the four-day
deadline.

Some suggested future changes to ease these burdens on voters, such as the
ability to request mail-in ballots online or the ability to request permanent
absentee voter status (especially for seniors, military service members, college
students, or voters with mobility challenges). Online registrations are also much
faster for BOE officials to process.

5. Allow county-by-county additions of a second ballot drop box, with

appropriate security precautions.
Every county is unique. For this reason, local autonomy for county BOEs is a
beneficial feature of Ohio’s system. In this spirit, the state should allow counties
the option to add additional ballot drop boxes, provided they can provide the
necessary security required under state law.

In interviews, some counties said they would decline this option if offered,
because they lack the staff, space, or internet connectivity to provide a second
drop box. But others said that their size or population mean a second drop box
would lessen the number of times a day their clerks are
interrupted from their work during early voting, reduce the volume of mail-in
ballots and the resulting concerns about postal delays, and generally improve
voter access. County BOEs should have the discretion to provide additional drop
boxes in well-monitored, secure locations.

55
6. Experiment with new technologies through pilot programs.
The proliferation of consumer-grade generative AI is a double-edged sword for
election administration. More attention has been given to the increased risk of
AI-enabled hoaxes and cyberattacks during the 2024 elections, and some
secretaries of state have already begun to prepare for these potential threats. But
artificial intelligence can also provide election officials tools to streamline
application review, ballot proofing, voter communication, and other
time-consuming duties.

While a presidential election is not the time for experimentation, in future cycles,
the state government should encourage election officials—and other state
employees—to explore how emerging technologies can improve their work.
Pennsylvania, for example, offers a pilot program for state employees to better
understand “where and how generative AI tools can be safely and securely
leveraged in their daily operations.” Ohio could take a similar approach, piloting
new uses of technology in specific counties before deciding to roll them out
statewide.

This technology is novel, and its adoption requires careful deployment so risks
can be identified and mitigated. Former Cuyahoga County BOE Director Jane
Platten advised caution:

56
 The process of running an election and counting ballots is incredibly
laborious and very manual. When electronic non-paper voting systems
came out, everyone thought it would be the answer to all the problems
of having to touch a piece of paper … There are some things [for which]
the old-fashioned way is just the best way. I would not encourage
hurrying into AI. It is so new. It wouldn’t be something that would be a
quick decision. It is going to take a long time to get to a point where
people should be comfortable … I’m not discouraging the potential,
but let’s be careful, let’s take it slow.

These are wise words. Even though new technologies could ease the burden on
Ohio’s election workforce, the risk of unforeseen consequences suggests the need
for a cautious approach. But few election administrators interviewed for this
report had the time or capacity to consider the benefits or risks of emerging
technologies.

Megan Hasting at OSU’s OREO program and others warned that election
administrators’ limited bandwidth causes them to struggle to roll out existing
technology while managing vendors and complying with directives from the
secretary of state. They have limited ability, logistically or legally, to proactively
prepare or experiment with emerging technology.

57
 A few interview participants did identify potential uses they might embrace. Some
discussed its use in ballot-proofing, a time-consuming, cumbersome process
that is still done manually.5 Alisha Lampert, Director of the Greene County BOE,
said she would “love to be able to scan registration cards and auto-populate”
that information, which would streamline maintenance of the voter rolls. Paul
Adams from Lorain County said he would be interested in better automated
systems for answering routine voter inquiries. “On our Facebook page, we already
have it set up [so that] if you ask [how to] register to vote, it will automatically
reply,” he said. “AI could help take that to another level … We get overwhelmed
with the number of phone calls. Automating this would be very helpful.” Ohio
would not be the first state to pursue this idea, which is currently being
implemented in Idaho.

Artificial intelligence is not magic, and it is not perfect. It is important to test and
audit AI systems used for public administration, and any system should be
implemented with a “human in the loop” to monitor for errors or undesirable
outcomes. But implemented responsibly, AI tools could bring greater efficiency to
cumbersome processes currently performed on outdated machines or on paper.

5
Consider this guidance from the Ohio secretary of state’s office, which lays out the ballot proofing
process in painstaking detail: “When proofreading the ballot, it is a best practice to have one person read
aloud what should be printed based upon the original source material, while another person follows
along on the proof provided by the printing vendor or generated by the central tabulating system to
ensure that what is going to be printed is what should be printed. When proofing candidate names, speak
the candidate’s name and then spell it aloud, letter by letter. When proofing candidate headings and
ballot language, speak any numbers or dates one numeral at a time … Each board also must proof the
candidate contests and ballot questions and issues for each precinct split against its voter registration
system to ensure that each voter is receiving all of the correct combination of offices and districts based
on the voter’s residential address.”

58
7. Create programs to educate elected officials about the election process.

Elected officials are an important source of information about elections for voters,
but many are not familiar with the details of election administration. Programs
encouraging them to tour their local boards of election and volunteer as poll
workers during off-cycle elections would strengthen their knowledge of
democracy’s essential machinery.

This could apply to nearly all elected officials, but it should be considered
especially valuable for county commissioners and state legislators who control
BOE budgets and voting laws. It is also significantly important for BOEs in smaller
or more rural counties, which have important differences from those in large
urban counties but whose challenges are less well understood.

8. Close schools on election day.

Schools are a common polling location: They are designed to accommodate

large numbers of people, vehicles, and equipment, and are accessible to voters
with disabilities. They also often have their own security systems in case of violent
threats. This makes them near-ideal. But some school districts worry about the
safety implications of holding elections while school is in session. As one
administrator noted in an interview, West Virginia closes schools on the day of
primary, special, and general elections; Ohio should do the same.

9. Expand and improve on programs to recruit poll workers.

Recruitment of poll workers is a recurring challenge for election officials. Many

BOEs rely on a workforce of aging retirees; each year, fewer and fewer can
withstand a fourteen-hour shift on election day. While some ask to work a
half-shift, this would effectively require recruiting, training, and managing twice
as many workers.

Government at all levels should invest time and resources into encouraging more
citizens to become poll workers. One example which has won praise is the “Youth
at the Booth” program, which allows 17-year-old students to work as poll workers.

59
Before HB 458, only 17-year-old seniors could do so; with civics classes now
taught junior year in many schools, HB 458 expanded the program to include 11th
graders. Legislators should consider lowering the age further, to 16, and boards of
education should encourage civics teachers to promote this program through
extra credit or other incentives. States and counties should explore programs to
encourage further participation and other demographics, like veterans, who have
been reliable sources of poll workers in the past.

College students are another largely untapped resource: Megan Hasting at OSU
said that the state could do more to encourage college students to study
elections generally. “There is a workforce pipeline challenge across public
service,” she said, and advocates that students who want to improve democracy
should consider signing up as a poll worker or pursuing a career in election
administration. She also said that while most best practices for engaging with
students come from large urban counties like Franklin, there is a lot of opportunity
for smaller counties to encourage student engagement through their local
educational institutions.

Low pay—a maximum of $133 a day, below the minimum wage—also discourages
citizens from taking on this essential role. Some administrators questioned why
there is a maximum wage at all.

Several counties—including Mahoning, Lucas, Cuyahoga, Lorain, and

Franklin—encourage county employees to become poll workers by allowing them
to earn their base salaries while providing this service. Similar efforts should be
replicated by county governments across the state and encouraged by the state
government for government employees at all levels (municipal, county, and
state). Government agencies can also encourage their employees to take
advantage of professional training credits available to social workers and lawyers
who volunteer at the polls, and search for other industries willing to offer similar
incentives.

60
Conclusion
“They’re superheroes.
Recalling the 2020 election, held in the
midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Sherry
Everything we do in
Poland from Hamilton County recalled public service has to do
arriving at her office to find balloons with having democratic
tied to the front door of their facility.
access to the vote
Someone had written “I [heart] BOE” on
one of the balloons. This was unusual. …These people are
“If voters are satisfied with our work, we rockstars of public
typically don’t hear much at all” from service.”
the public, she said. This sign of
appreciation for her team’s effort to Megan Hasting, Program Manager,
maintain democracy through a global John Glenn College of Public Affairs
crisis remains meaningful years later.

Unfortunately, since 2020, this appreciation has waned. In some corners of society, it
has been replaced with hostility and anger toward the essential work of election
administration. Elected officials sometimes echo these calls and use them to justify
changes to voting rules and processes, with unforeseen, but not unforeseeable,
consequences.

Election administration is a crucial point of failure for democracy and government in

Ohio and the nation writ large. It is the foundation on which everything else stands.
But it is under strain. It cannot be preserved with security measures alone. Its
sustainability requires increased investment and concern from all levels of
government.

Despite the grim environment and the demands placed upon them, one anonymous
elections administrator concluded their interview by saying they believe that the
United States will eventually emerge from its crisis of democracy. “We’re gonna figure

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this out,” they said. “The next generation of election officials will be different, but I
have a belief that we’ll be fine … I’m hopeful that the next generation values things
that [will] bring us back to a more civil discussion and to help us do our jobs no
matter if we work for the police, at the board of elections, or at the factory down the
road. We are all trying to do our jobs, feed our families, live life, go home. Eventually,
people will figure that out.”

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About All Voting
All Voting is Local (All Voting) is a 501(c)(3), nonpartisan, multi-state organization
that fights against state and local voting policies that silence Americans’ voices,
particularly for Black, Brown, Native American, and other historically marginalized
communities — not just in election years, but every year. We were founded on the
principle that the problems people face when trying to vote are solvable if state and
local decision-makers are accountable to the communities they serve. All Voting is
committed to working with our partners to advance fair, inclusive rules on voter
registration, remove barriers that make it more difficult for people to vote, and ensure
every vote counts. All Voting is on the ground in eight states: Arizona, Florida, Georgia,
Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Within these states, we are
active in more than 60 counties that are home to over 21 million people of color.
During the 2022 cycle, All Voting programs expanded access for more than 635,000
voters. Learn more at www.AllVotingisLocal.org

About the Author

Dean Jackson is the principal of Public Circle, LLC and a specialist in democracy,
technology, and media. Previously, he was an investigative analyst with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol. In 2023, he
was named an inaugural Tech Policy Press reporting fellow and an affiliate fellow
with the Propaganda Research Lab at the University of Texas at Austin. He has ten
years of think tank experience at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and the research & conferences team at the National Endowment for
Democracy, an international grantmaking institution. He holds an MA in
international relations from the University of Chicago and a BA in political science
from Wright State University in Dayton, OH.

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