Mainstreaming Gender in Global

Climate Governance

This book explores the role of feminist activists in The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and highlights the
progress they have made in mainstreaming gender as a key issue in global
climate governance.
It is now commonplace for gender to be framed as a political issue in
global climate politics within academic scholarship, but there is typically
a lack of robust empirical analysis of existing advocacy approaches. Fill-
ing this lacuna, Joanna Flavell interrogates the political strategies of the
Women and Gender Constituency (WGC) in the UNFCCC. Through a con-
ceptual framework that integrates climate change with intersectional crit-
ical inquiry and political practice, Flavell analyses hundreds of historical
documents, coupled with interviews and observations from two UNFCCC
conferences. This research uncovers a so-far untold story about the history
of the UNFCCC that foregrounds gender and feminist advocacy, highlight-
ing the importance of the WGC in shaping dominant narratives of global
climate governance through a series of rhetorical and procedural strategies.
Overall, the book draws important conclusions around power in global cli-
mate governance and opens up new avenues for advancing a feminist green
politics.
This volume will be of great interest to students and scholars of environ-
mental justice, climate politics and governance, environmental activism and
gender studies more broadly.

Joanna Flavell is a fellow and ecofeminist scholar researching and teach-

ing in environmental politics, with a special interest in activism in global
climate politics. Joanna’s 2020 paper ‘The embodied politics of climate
change: analysing the gendered division of environmental labour in the UK’
was published in Environmental Politics and was shortlisted for the best
paper award 2020.
Routledge Studies in Gender and Environments
Series Editor: Professor Susan Buckingham, an independent researcher,
consultant and writer on gender and environment related issues.

With the European Union, United Nations, UN Framework Convention

on Climate Change, and national governments and businesses at least os-
tensibly paying more attention to gender, including as it relates to environ-
ments, there is more need than ever for existing and future scholars, policy
makers, and environmental professionals to understand and be able to
apply these concepts to work towards greater gender equality in and for a
sustainable world.
Comprising edited collections, monographs and textbooks, this new Rou-
tledge Studies in Gender and Environments series will incorporate sophisti-
cated critiques and theorisations, including engaging with the full range of
masculinities and femininities, intersectionality, and LBGTIQ perspectives.
The concept of ‘environment’ will also be drawn broadly to recognise how
built, social and natural environments intersect with and influence each
other. Contributions will also be sought from global regions and contexts
which are not yet well represented in gender and environments literature, in
particular Russia, the Middle East, and China, as well as other East Asian
countries such as Japan and Korea.

Gender, Intersectionality and Climate Institutions in Industrialized States

Edited by Gunnhildur Lily Magnusdottir and Annica Kronsell

Gender and the Social Dimensions of Climate Change

Rural and Resource Contexts of the Global North
Edited by Amber J. Fletcher and Maureen G. Reed

Mainstreaming Gender in Global Climate Governance

Women and Gender Constituency in the UNFCCC
Joanna Flavell

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/

Routledge-Studies-in-Gender-and-Environments/book-series/RSGE
Mainstreaming Gender in
Global Climate Governance
Women and Gender Constituency in the
UNFCCC

Joanna Flavell
First published 2023
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2023 Joanna Flavell
The right of Joanna Flavell to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-032-30751-0 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-032-30752-7 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-30647-4 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003306474
Typeset in Times New Roman
by codeMantra
For my son, Iggy
Contents

List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
Acknowledgements xiii
List of Acronyms xv

1 Introduction 1
Why ‘­G ender and Climate Change’? 4
The UNFCCC as a Site of Inquiry 6
Overview of the Book 10
Bibliography 17

2 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 21

Theorising Feminist Climate Activism 21
Enduring Debates 26
Conclusion 40
Bibliography 42

3 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis 46

Ecofeminist Intersectionality as Critical Inquiry 49
Transversal Politics as Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 60
Conclusion 64
Bibliography 64

4 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in

UNFCCC History 67
Phase 1: Zero ­G ender – ­​­­1992–​­2007 68
Phase 2: Mainstreaming Gender into the
­UNFCCC – ­​­­2007–​­2013 77
Phase 3: Gender Action ­Plan – ­​­­2014–​­2021 83
Conclusion 93
Bibliography 95
viii Contents
5 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women and Gender
Constituency 102
Rhetorical Strategies 105
Procedural Strategies 117
Conclusion 130
Bibliography 131

6 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 138

Lessons from the WGC for Intersectional Inquiry
and Praxis 140
Towards an Ecofeminist Transversal Politics 148
Conclusion 154
Bibliography 155

7 Conclusion: New Directions for Ecofeminist

Intersectional Praxis 158
Original Contributions 160
Coda 161
Bibliography 162

Appendix 1: Methodology 163

Index 177
Figures

1.1 Structure of the UNFCCC 8

4.1 Gender in the UNFCCC 1992–2007 68
4.2 Gender in the UNFCCC 2007–2013 78
4.3 Gender in the UNFCCC 2014–2021 83
4.4 Key Moments in the History of the UNFCCC 94
Tables

3.1 A Framework of Ecofeminist Intersectionality 48

3.2 A Framework of Transversal Politics 49
Acknowledgements

My thanks and appreciation must first go to the feminist women and men
that I interviewed in the process of my research. They were generous enough
to speak to me about their work in the UNFCCC and without them this
research would not have been possible.
There are many people at the University of Manchester who have sup-
ported me during this research and to whom I am eternally grateful. I owe
my biggest debt of thanks to Sherilyn MacGregor for her kind guidance and
challenging feedback and comments. I appreciate the hours spent comment-
ing on and editing my work and knowing I could always turn to her when
I felt lost. Her previous work in the area of gender and climate change in-
spired my own research project and it has been an honour to work with her.
I also owe enormous thanks to Matthew Paterson for his encouragement of
my project and committed mentorship. Not only have Sherilyn and Matt
helped shape the research project as it is, but they have also helped shape me
as a young academic and I am forever grateful.
I have been incredibly lucky to have had very supportive colleagues at
the University of Manchester. Very special thanks go to Anna Sanders and
Jennifer Hobbs. Our ‘PhD Club’ (with a slightly less appropriate name!) has
gotten me through some of the tougher moments and our friendship has
kept me laughing throughout. Thank you for lending an ear and a shoul-
der, both academically and personally, without reservation. To Anh Le, our
wedding celebrant that never was, thank you for always being there, for be-
ing the irritating little brother I never had and for fronting my dinner that
time! To Andrew Barclay, thank you for your cutting humour and never-­
ending friendship and enthusiasm.
I am grateful for the many conversations with various academics, and
the generous yet challenging feedback received has been immeasurably val-
uable. Particular thanks must go to Annica Kronsell and Carl Death who
examined this research as a PhD manuscript. Their comments and advice
have helped shape this book today. Special thanks also to Ursula Maki for
your research assistance and to Silke Trommer and Paul Tobin for all the
guidance and mentoring over the years. Thanks also to Katrina Farrugia,
Hannah Mooney, Val Lenferna and Ann Cronley for their support during
xiv Acknowledgements
these years. Thank you for never making me feel that my queries were too
silly!
This book would never have been realised without the love and support
of my family. To my Mum and Sister Heather and Tara Wilson, I thank you
for being my biggest cheerleaders. Alan Forrest, thank you for all your sup-
port. To my extended family, Leon, Helen and Will Flavell, thank you for
welcoming me into your family. Last but never least, my biggest thanks go to
my husband Jake Flavell, and our dog Elsie. For your dedication in listening
to my worries, reading over the entire book and pouring me wine when I
needed it most, I thank you! For your kindness and generosity, I love you!
Acronyms

ADP Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform

AIWC All India Women’s Conference
AWG-LCA Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action
under the Convention
AWID Association for Women’s Rights in Development
BAP Bali Action Plan
BINGO Business and Industry Non-Governmental Organisation
CAN Climate Action Network
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
CFFP Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy
CFLEDD The Coalition of Female Leaders for the Environment and
Sustainable Development
CMA Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties
to the Paris Agreement
CMP Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties
to the Kyoto Protocol
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
COP Conference of the Parties
CRC Combahee River Collective
CSO Civil Society Organisations
DFPA Danish Family Planning Association
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
ENGO Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation
EU European Union
FAWCO Federation of American Women’s Clubs Overseas
GAP Gender Action Plan
GCF Green Climate Fund
GED Gender, Environment and Development
GEF Global Environmental Facility
GGCA Global Gender and Climate Alliance
GLBTQ Gay, Lesbian, Bi-sexual, Trans, Queer
xvi Acronyms
INDC Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPO Indigenous Peoples Organisations
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
LCIPP Local Communities and Indigenous People’s Platform
LDC Least Developed Countries
LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, Trans
LGMA Local Government and Municipal Authorities
LWPG Lima Work Programme on Gender
MRF Mary Robinson Foundation
NAPA National Adaptation Programme of Action
NGO Non-Governmental Organisations
NOW National Organisation of Women
NSM New Social Movements
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
RINGO Research and Independent Non-Governmental Organisation
RUWES Rural Women Energy Security
SB Subsidiary Body
SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SIDS Small Island Developing States
SRHR Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
SWAGEN Support for Women in Agriculture and Environment
TUNGO Trade Union Non-Governmental Organisation
UN United Nations
UNCED United Nations Conference of Environment and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WDF Women’s Delegate Fund
WECF Women in Europe for a Common Future
WED Women, Environment and Development
WEDO Women’s Environment and Development Organisation
WGC Women and Gender Constituency
WINGO Women’s International Non-Governmental Organisations
WOTR Watershed Organisation Trust
YOUNGO Youth Non-Governmental Organisation.
1 Introduction

Women do not want to be mainstreamed into a polluted stream: We want

the stream to be clean, clear and healthy.
(Abzug, 1991 opening speech)

On 8 November 1991 in Miami, Bella Abzug, co-founder of the Wom-

en’s Environment & Development Organisation (WEDO) and leader of
the American feminist movement, addressed more than 1,500 women
from 83 countries at the ‘Miami Women’s Congress for a Healthy Planet’
(Dankelman, 2011) closing with the words above. The five- day conference
brought together a diverse group of women ahead of the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), colloquially
known as the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. Participants at the Miami Women’s
Congress discussed their vision for a healthy planet, which resulted in the
Women’s Action Agenda 21 (Miami Women’s Conference, 1992), its name a
play on the official Rio Earth Summit agreement ‘Agenda 21’. At its heart,
the Women’s Action Agenda 21 provided a fundamental critique, from an
ecofeminist lens, of the political- economic system:

As long as Nature and women are abused by a so- called “free market”
ideology and wrong concepts of “economic growth,” there can be no
environmental security. Rainforest dwellers, island peoples, and in-
habitants of fragile arid zones are threatened with displacement and
dispossession due to human disruption and pollution of vulnerable eco-
systems. In a world that condones such practices, there lies little hope
for long-term survival or peace among peoples.
(Miami Women’s Conference, 1992, preamble)

The document spanned a host of critical issues, including governance, the

environment, militarism, the global economy, poverty, women’s rights and
education (WEDO, 2015). The Women’s Action Agenda 21 became the
spark for activism over a series of conferences on development, including
Rio 1992.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003306474-1
2 Introduction
The Miami Women’s Congress helped to form a coalition of feminist envi-
ronmentalists who, armed with the Women’s Action Agenda 21, went on to
be hugely successful at Rio.1 Irene Dankelman, a researcher and specialist
in gender and environment who was involved with the women’s movement
at the time, wrote that ‘we left Rio with Principle 20 [of the Rio Declaration]
in our hands: “Women have a vital role in environmental management and de-
velopment. Their full participation is therefore essential to achieve sustainable
development”’ (Dankelman, 2011, existing emphasis). In the huge document
that was Agenda 21, Chapter 24 reflected ‘Global Action for Women to-
wards Sustainable Development’ in 11 commitments along with 145 other
references that mentioned the necessary steps to be taken from a gender
perspective (Dankelman, 2011; see also UNCED, 1992).
Most of the outcomes from Rio, including Agenda 21, the Rio Dec-
laration and the Conventions on Biodiversity and on Desertification and
Drought, made clear attempts to address the kinds of concerns and recom-
mendations set out in the Women’s Action Agenda. The combined advocacy
of women leaders from governments and civil society organisations at Rio
1992 had demonstrated the importance of public participation and resulted
in the creation of nine Major Groups, one each for farmers, trade unions,
indigenous peoples and their communities, women, children and youth,
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local authorities, science and
technology, and business and industry – creating a formal mechanism for
diverse constituencies of civil society to have representation in the follow-
up activities (Women’s Major Group, 2015). Another outcome, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), however,
did not see this kind of ‘gender mainstreaming’ (i.e., having gender written
into its foundations) and did not include ‘women’ as one of its constituen-
cies. Initially, only two were included: business and industry (BINGOs) and
environmental NGOs (ENGOs), with others corresponding to the Major
Groups included at later dates (UNFCCC, 2020a). Of all the outcomes of
the Rio Earth Summit, the UNFCCC was the only one not to include any
mention of gender. Dankelman (2011) reflects that those involved ‘lobbied
with the NGOs and with indigenous groups for many more innovative and
fundamental ideas to be included in these Rio results, so we came home a
bit disappointed’.
­
 Introduction 3
because, just 30 minutes over schedule, negotiators had agreed a text which
would become the UNFCCC’s first Gender Action Plan (GAP). The agree-
ment of the GAP was one of the key priorities of the Fijian Presidency at
COP23 (COP23 Fiji, 2017), with the Prime Minister of Fiji and COP23 Pres-
ident Frank Bainimarama warmly welcoming the agreement. Bainimarama
characterises the GAP as ‘a major achievement as it recognises the critical
role of women in climate action’ (Bainimarama, 2017).
The purpose of the GAP was to consolidate for implementation the grow-
ing number of decisions and mandates relating to gender that existed under
the UNFCCC. In 2017, WEDO launched a smart phone app to help those
interested in issues of gender and climate change keep track of the grow-
ing number of gender decisions that had been adopted by the UNFCCC
(WEDO, 2022). As of spring 2022, the app shows that there are 104 ‘gender
mandates’ that currently exist under the UNFCCC, ranging from issues of
adaptation and mitigation to finance and technology transfer. The mandates
cover themes of ‘gender balance’, ‘gender equality’, ‘gender mainstreaming’
and ‘women as a vulnerable group’. As a method of ‘quick analysis’, the
app states that ‘out of the current decisions that reference gender, while
many explicitly refer to gender balance and enhancing women’s partici-
pation on boards and bodies, the majority now reference or use a gender-
mainstreaming approach’ (WEDO, 2022).
The concept of gender mainstreaming has long been contentious among
feminist academics and activists. While some academics, such as Margaret
Alston (2014), consider gender mainstreaming as a potentially radical means
of avoiding the traps of treating women’s issues as women only issues, oth-
ers such as Susan Buckingham and Rakibe Kulcur (2009) consider the pro-
cess as a mere tick-box approach to inserting gender, or gender understood
as women, into existing masculinised frameworks. This debate presents a
bind for feminist activists: how can they meaningfully participate in global
governance processes while remaining true to their feminist principles that
demand radical change? This is a key motivating question underpinning the
research in this book.
Clearly, the UNFCCC has advanced greatly in terms of women’s and gen-
der considerations. The institution has gone from ‘zero-gender’ to ‘Gender
Action Plan’ in the space of 25 years. Yet, most historical accounts of the
UNFCCC do not tell this story. In fact, an infographic timeline on the
UNFCCC website celebrating ‘25 Years of International Climate Policy’
(UNFCCC, 2019a) fails to mention gender, nor the WGC and its members
who have played a huge role in the process of mainstreaming gender into
the UNFCCC. The infographic does not even mention the GAP despite its
seemingly prominent status at COP23. A small number of women’s, gender
and environment NGOs including WEDO ( WEDO, 2018a) and GenderCC
(GenderCC, 2019a) have given a systematic, feminist account of the history
of the UNFCCC. But no such account currently exists in scholarly liter-
ature. This book offers an important corrective to this gap in knowledge
4 Introduction
about processes of global climate change governance, positioning the story
of gender-mainstreaming in the UNFCCC and the feminist political work
that negotiated that change, front and centre. I begin by asking the ques-
tions ‘what is the story of gender in the UNFCCC’ and what role has the
WGC played in the evolution of a gender-blind UNFCCC to a Gender
Action Plan? What does the WGC experience tell us about the limits and
possibilities of ‘doing’ intersectionality in the UNFCCC? Doing so allows
critical reflection upon both feminist environmental theorising and feminist
practice in global climate politics, creating productive space for a dialogue
between ideas and action.

Why ‘Gender and Climate Change’?

The topic of ‘gender and climate change’, while missing from broader writing
on climate change, is a steadily increasing area of scholarly attention. The
story of how the WGC succeeded in shifting the UNFCCC from gender-
blind in 1992 to being in a gender-bind today is a prime example of ‘gender
and climate change’ in practice, yet little scholarly attention has focused
specifically on this activist work. Instead, much of the early contributions to
gender and climate change scholarship typically appeared in Gender, Envi-
ronment and Development (GED) journals such as Gender and Development
or Climate and Development. These contributions tend to focus on women
despite ostensibly looking at gender. In doing so, they position women in
one of three ways: as being more vulnerable to the effects of climate change
than men; virtuous in their ability to solve the climate crisis; or part of the
problem due to their reproductive capacities (Bretherton, 1998; Arora-
Jonsson, 2011; Resurrección, 2013; Sasser, 2018). These kinds of discursive
framings of gender in relation to climate change have dominated academic
research as well as social movement priorities and have been responsible for
most of the ‘policy-wins’ seen on gender in the global climate governance
process. For example, every mention of gender in the ‘Intended Nation-
ally Determined Contributions’ (INDCs) that were submitted by Parties to
the UNFCCC ahead of COP21 Paris in 2015 appear in sections pertaining
to adaptation, relating specifically to women located in the Global South
(WEDO, 2016a; Tobin, Schmidt and Tosun, 2018).
These kinds of narratives should be credited for their role in getting the
issue onto the policy agenda. However, a disproportionate focus on the ma-
terial impacts on and differential vulnerabilities of women compared to
men has limited the political scope of the issue and diverted attention away
from issues of structural imbalances of power, including patriarchal power
(MacGregor, 2009; 2017). This represents a tricky strategic bind for feminist
activists who engage with the UNFCCC. On the one hand, activists have
seen success in mobilising rhetorical strategies that foreground how poor
women are vulnerable to the effects of climate change. On the other hand,
these strategies may risk reinforcing existing structures of power, including
 Introduction 5
patriarchal and geopolitical power structures, and limit political ambition
on gender equality. This concern has prompted a handful of feminist schol-
ars to problematise simplistic and universalising narratives of ‘vulnerable
versus virtuous’ women in the gender and climate change field, and to high-
light the political work that such framings do. For example, Seema Arora-
Jonsson (2011) has highlighted how limited narratives of vulnerable women
risk reinforcing stereotypes of women from the Global South and could po-
tentially result in an increased workload for women. Similarly, Bernadette
Resurrección calls attention to the way that policy translations of fixed and
uniform framings of gender divert attention from wider webs of power and
reify traditional gender roles. As a way of moving the conversation onto
more fruitful ground, Sherilyn MacGregor (2009; 2017) suggests that schol-
ars need the freedom to fully explore important questions of power and
authority and begin to theorise for a positive feminist vision for a future
post- carbon world. As a means of theorising such a positive vision, Anna
Kaijser and Annica Kronsell (2014) have suggested intersectionality as a
critical tool for feminist research, drawing attention to the different ways
climate change is experienced by people at the intersections of multiple
forms of marginalisation and oppression.
In response to the challenge of diverting feminist attention towards ques-
tions of power and authority, several scholars have noted that the production
of climate change knowledge is highly masculinised and ultimately works to
frame climate change as an issue of science, requiring technological fixes
and market solutions (c.f. Alaimo, 2009; Seager, 2009; Nelson, 2012). They
argue that climate change, as a concept, is one in which masculinised ide-
als, perspectives and approaches are deeply entrenched, with effects ranging
from the ‘hyper-masculinity’ of aggressive consumption that has increased
carbon footprints (Alaimo, 2009) to the subtle masculinism of climate
change governance, in institutions such as the UNFCCC (Nagel, 2015). This
entrenchment of masculine norms and ideals has resulted in climate change
being constructed and framed as a problem of science requiring technologi-
cal and economic solutions, while individual behaviour change is hailed as a
corner-stone of neo-liberal climate change policies (Bee, Rice and Trauger,
2015). Bee, Rice and Trauger (2015) suggest that this ‘common sense’ of cli-
mate change requires both a dismissal of non-scientific, embodied or expe-
riential forms of knowledge and fails to consider the everyday spaces where
climate action takes place. Emma Foster (2017) also illustrates this using a
Foucauldian-inspired analysis of ‘governmentality’ (the shaping and pro-
duction of ‘good citizens’), showing that there has been a marked shift in the
international consensus on sustainable development between Rio 1992 and
Rio+20 2012. Foster argues that the dominant discourse has shifted from
governance and citizen decision-making to one that is almost solely fixated
on the market and technology.
In another feminist critique of global climate change politics, Joane Nagel
(2012) points out that climate change is increasingly framed as a threat to
6 Introduction
security which should be met with militarisation, reflecting the gendered
power, privilege and preoccupations of the mostly male policymakers
around the world. Framing climate change in terms of security – food se-
curity, energy security, border security – dominates the political discussion
to such an extent that these narratives are now so deeply entrenched in the
dominant discourse that resisting them is a huge challenge for feminist
climate activists (Seager, 2009; Detraz and Windsor, 2014). Focussing on
‘human security’ could be better than a focus on ‘state security’ because,
despite rhetorically playing into discourses of militarisation, the term hu-
man security shifts the narrative yet still fits into the masculinised political
sphere of climate change without much disruption (Detraz and Windsor,
2014). The hegemonic masculinity that dominates climate politics has been
borne out of the male- dominated spheres of science, innovation, econom-
ics and politics. In fact, ‘men dominate the issue at all levels, as scientific
and economic experts, entrepreneurs, policy-makers and spokespeople’
(MacGregor, 2009, p. 128). There is no space for nuance or differences of
experience in this story and so climate change is framed as a common threat
to all of humanity rendering the issue as gender neutral, meaning that social
differences and asymmetries can be ignored, perhaps explaining the initial
gender-blindness seen in the UNFCCC despite advances on women’s equal-
ity in other outcomes at Rio.
Scholarly writing that problematises the masculinised dominant fram-
ings of climate change and highlights how these framings ignore and even
exacerbate social inequalities is important intellectual work. Equally, schol-
arship that challenges how gender is framed in order to easily slot into dom-
inant framings of climate change has advanced feminist climate knowledge
in important ways. But what is missing in these accounts is attention to
the realities of feminist practice in the UNFCCC. Feminist climate activ-
ists have been advocating for women’s and gender issues in the halls of the
UNFCCC since its inception and have been largely responsible for the in-
stitution’s increasing attention to issues of gender equality. Little is known
about the institutional conditions that the WGC is operating under, efforts
by its members to advance feminist arguments in the UNFCCC or the po-
litical strategies – rhetorical and procedural – that they have mobilised in
order to make them. Greater integration between academics and activists
who work to advance a feminist agenda in global climate politics could pro-
vide more creative visions for the future of feminist organising in spaces of
climate politics.

The UNFCCC as a Site of Inquiry

Climate change is one of the biggest political challenges facing humanity
today. Countries across the world are declaring climate emergencies and
pledging to more ambitious climate action, creating a renewed sense of ur-
gency in solving the climate crisis (Climate Emergency Declaration, 2020).
 Introduction 7
The UNFCCC is the institution tasked with supporting the global response
to the threat of climate change (UNFCCC, 2020b) and is a political space
where feminist climate activists devote much of their resources under the
umbrella of the WGC. As such, the UNFCCC is a key site for the investi-
gation of the kinds of political strategies mobilised to integrate gender into
global climate governance. The UNFCCC was adopted on 9 May 1992 and
opened for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.
In March 1994, a sufficient number of countries had ratified the Convention
and it entered into force. Article 2 of the UNFCCC, which sets out the Con-
vention’s long-term objective, states that,

The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instru-
ments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabiliza-
tion of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient
to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that
food production is not threatened and to enable economic development
to proceed in a sustainable manner.
(UNFCCC,
­ 1992, ­p. 9)

There are 197 Parties that are members of the UNFCCC, including all
United Nations member states, United Nations General Assembly observer
State of Palestine, UN non-member states Niue and the Cook Islands and
the supranational union the European Union. In addition, the Holy See is
an observer state (UNFCCC, 2020c). The Parties to the Convention have
met annually (with the exception of 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic)
since 1995 at the Conference of the Parties (COP) in order to assess pro-
gress on dealing with global climate change and to negotiate necessary new
mandates.
The Convention is supported by the UNFCCC Secretariat (also known as
UN Climate Change), which is part of the United Nations. In the early years
of the UNFCCC, the Secretariat was focused largely on facilitating the in-
tergovernmental climate change negotiations, but today supports a complex
architecture of bodies that serve to advance the implementation of the Con-
vention itself and its two treaties, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agree-
ment. The Secretariat provides technical expertise and assists in the analysis
and review of climate change information reported by Parties, and in the im-
plementation of the Kyoto mechanisms, as well as the Paris Agreement. The
Secretariat is staffed by around 450 people and is headed by the Executive
Secretary, a position held today by Patricia Espinosa (UNFCCC, 2020d).
The Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement establish
the institutional arrangements for the intergovernmental negotiation pro-
cess and is comprised of several bodies and entities. The UNFCCC website
8 Introduction
Conference of the Parties (COP) / Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP)

Bureau

Permanent subsidiary bodies

Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Subsidiary Body for Implementation

Technological Advice (SBSTA) (SBI)

Convention bodies Kyoto Protocol bodies

Ad HOC Working Group on the

Paris Agreement (APA)

Adaptation Committee (AC) Compliance Committee

Standing Committee on Executive Board of the Clean

Finance (SCF) Development Mechanism
(CDM-EO)
Executive Committee of the
Warsaw International Mechanism Joint Implementation
for Loss and Damage Supervisory Committee (JISC)

Paris Committee on
Capacity Building Adaptation Fund Board (AFB)

Technology Executive
Committee (TEC)
Technology Mechanism Global Environment Facility (GEF)
Advisory Board of the Climate
Technology Centre & Network Financial mechanism
Green Climate Fund (GCF)
(CTCN)

Consultative Group of Experts on Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)

National Communication from
Parties not included in Annex I Other financial arrangements Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)
Expert Groups to the Convention (CGE)
Adaptation Fund (AF)
Least Developed Countries
Expert Group (LEG)

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat

Figure 1.1 Structure of the UNFCCC (UNFCCCC, 2022).

gives a useful overview of this structure (UNFCCC, 2020e), which was

summarised as follows (also visualised in Figure 1.1):

• A supreme governing body: the COP for the Convention, the Confer-
ence of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol (CMP) and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meet-
ing of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA);
• A process management body: the Bureau of the COP, the CMP and the
CMA;
• Subsidiary bodies: two permanent subsidiary bodies – the Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidi-
ary Body for Implementation (SBI) – as well as other ad hoc subsidiary
bodies established by the COP, the CMP or the CMA as deemed neces-
sary to address specific issues;
• Technical subsidiary bodies with limited membership (referred to in
practice as the constituted bodies) established under the Convention,
the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement;
 Introduction 9
• A secretariat; and
• Entities entrusted with the operations of the Financial Mechanism – i.e.
the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund
(GCF).
­

Collectively, these institutions participate in the process of developing pol-

icies and guidance to support Parties in the implementation of the Conven-
tion, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement (for more details about
the roles of each of the bodies and entities, see UNFCCC, 2020e).
The UNFCCC negotiating process is observed by nine constituencies
representing civil society that are based on the nine Major Groups de-
scribed above: Business and Industry NGOs (BINGO); Environmental
NGOs (ENGO); Local Government and Municipal Authorities (LGMA);
Indigenous Peoples Organizations (IPO); Research and Independent NGOs
(RINGO); Trade Union NGOs (TUNGO); Women and Gender (WGC);
Youth NGOs (YOUNGO); and Farmers (UNFCCC, 2020a). Constituencies
provide advocacy organisations legitimacy in, and access to, the negotia-
tions. The WGC was admitted as an official constituency in 2011 shortly
before COP17, several years after the UNFCCC came into force. Today, the
WGC consists of 29 women’s and gender environmental NGOs working
closely in coalition with each other to advance gender concerns, ensuring
women’s rights and gender justice in global climate governance. The Con-
stituency provides member NGOs with a platform to

exchange information between members and with the UNFCCC Sec-

retariat. [It] also ensures that meetings, workshops and conferences in-
clude the participation and representation of women’s civil society and
non-governmental organizations which otherwise would not be able to
attend.
­
(WGC, 2020)

Most of the gender-related policy discussions in the UNFCCC take place un-
der the Gender Agenda Item, which is consumed under the SBI (significant
since this denotes gender as relevant for the implementation of UNFCCC
treaties). It was under the Agenda Item that the GAP negotiations were con-
ducted. The adoption of the GAP is a pivotal moment in the history of gen-
der in the UNFCCC, because it reflects that the Convention was beginning
to take seriously the issue of gender and climate change and began the pro-
cess of meaningful implementation of existing gender decisions and man-
dates, or, as members of the WGC called on them to do the UNFCCC began
to ‘mind the GAP’ (International Alliance of Women, 2017). The GAP

sets out objectives and priority areas that aim to advance knowledge
and understanding of gender-responsive climate action and its coherent
mainstreaming in the implementation of the UNFCCC and the work of
10 Introduction
Parties, the secretariat, United Nations entities and all stakeholders at
all levels, as well as women’s full, equal and meaningful participation in
the UNFCCC process.
(UNFCCC,
­ 2020f)

The priority areas are capacity-building, knowledge management and com-

munication; gender balance, participation and women’s leadership; coher-
ence; gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation; and
monitoring and reporting.
The WGC was a powerful force during the GAP negotiations:

Political will was also built through the effective mobilization efforts of
both the Women and Gender Constituency and other civil society allies
who refused to see this COP stall progress on gender equality.
(WGC,
­ 2019)

For these reasons, the negotiation of the GAP, including documents pro-
duced as part of the negotiations, interviews with people involved as well as
my own field notes, makes up a large part of the empirical data that I have
analysed as part of this research. The adoption of the GAP represents a key
success for the WGC in its advocacy efforts to get Parties to the UNFCCC
to take gender seriously. Crucially, the GAP does not aim to introduce new
gender mandates. Rather, the purpose of the GAP is to consolidate for
implementation existing gender mandates (UNFCCC, 2017b). Because of
this, the GAP is a hugely important document for the study of both rhe-
torical and procedural strategies of the WGC in the UNFCCC, as is the
information gathered from fieldwork during its negotiation. The document
itself gives a good indication of the most dominant framings of gender in the
UNFCCC as well as pointing to previous important decisions such as the
Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG). But an analysis of WGC mem-
bers’ accounts of their advocacy efforts in the years and months leading up
to the adoption of the GAP also gives valuable insights into the procedural
strategies that govern the WGC in its advocacy.

Overview of the Book

Feminist activists in the WGC have made remarkable progress in main-
streaming gender into the UNFCCC. The central argument of this book is
that, by focusing on an insider strategy of feminist practice, this success has
come at a cost of relying on simplistic and universalising arguments, limit-
ing the political conversation to material impacts on women and differential
vulnerabilities between the sexes (with little or no attention to men). How-
ever, an analysis of this political work through a framework of ecofeminist
intersectionality as critical inquiry and political praxis can work to create
space for feminist theorising and activism to work closely in dialogue to
 Introduction 11
envision a next phase for the feminist climate project. My contribution to
this dialogue is that such a next phase would rely on a political strategy of
ecofeminist transversal politics shifting the conversation from focusing on
women as a marginalised and homogenous group to demanding a positive
feminist vision for doing climate politics differently.
As discussed above, there are a small number of feminist scholars who
have commented on the persistence of simplistic and universalising fram-
ings of ‘gender’ in political spaces of global climate governance, such as
the UNFCCC. These scholars comment on rhetorical strategies that posi-
tion women as vulnerable to the effects of climate change, virtuous in their
knowledge of climate solutions, or when understood through discourses of
overpopulation, as the problem due to women’s reproductive capacities (c.f.
Bretherton, 1998; Arora-Jonsson, 2011; Resurrección, 2013; Sasser, 2018).
While these authors do not always explicitly refer to the political, rhetori-
cal and procedural strategies mobilised by members of the WGC, the Con-
stituency is part of a broader coalition of feminist environmental activists.
The persistence of universalising and problematic framings of gender with
regards to climate change has prompted MacGregor (2017) to argue for
‘better answers’ to the gender and climate change question. The debates that
emerge from this kind of critical feminist environmental scholarship are not
unique to the topic of ‘gender and climate change’. Rather, the questions
raised speak to a set of enduring debates in many other feminist writings.
In Chapter 2, ‘Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Inquiry and Prac-
tice’, I identify and explore four debates in this literature under the head-
ings: ‘dilemmas of rhetorical strategies’, ‘radical outsiders versus pragmatic
insiders’, ‘questions of power dynamics and hierarchies’ and the ‘academic-
­activist debate’.
Integral to each of these debates has been the bind posed by intersection-
ality: how to maintain a theoretical commitment to intersectional feminism
while pursuing collective political projects in spaces of global governance
such as the UNFCCC. The concept of intersectionality emerged as a coun-
ter to the ideas of ‘identity politics’ that

assumes the same positioning and identifications for all members of the
grouping, and thus each member can, in principle, be a ‘representative’
of the grouping and an equal contributor to the collective narrative –
which, of course, is virtually never the case.
(Yuval-Davis,
­­ ​­ 2011, p.
­ 10)

In this way, intersectionality can provide a useful tool for troubling the kinds
of universalising representations of gender that are mobilised by feminist
environmental activists, including those active in the UNFCCC.2 For this
reason, intersectionality is the key concept that underpins my inquiry into
the political strategies of the UNFCCC. Intersectional frameworks remain
largely absent in feminist environmental scholarship despite the obvious
12 Introduction
crossovers between intersectionality and principles of environmental jus-
tice. Kaijser and Kronsell (2014) remain two of the only scholars to offer
such a framework of intersectionality in the context of climate change.3
Theirs is an intersectional framework that acts ‘as a tool for critical think-
ing and provides a set of questions that may serve as sensitisers for intersec-
tional analyses on climate change’ (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014, p. 417). This
is an important contribution that demonstrates the kind of knowledge that
can be uncovered through an intersectional lens and offers a useful starting
point for my own analysis in this book. However, I am less concerned with
the study of ‘gender and climate change’ per se and more interested in the
intersections of hegemonic understandings of the relation between gender
and climate change and feminist resistances to these dominant framings. As
such, in Chapter 3, Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis, I set
out a conceptual framework of intersectionality as a form of critical inquiry
that is structured around the six core ideas set out by Collins and Bilge (2020):
social inequalities, intersecting power relations, social context (or contex-
tuality), relationality, complexity and social (or ecological) justice. Kaijser
and Kronsell assert that it is important that, for research on climate issues,
‘the intersectional approach must be informed by a range of social theories
as well as theories generated in research fields that look at the relationship
between society and nature’ (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014, pp. 423– 424). In
response, I turn to theories that emerge from feminist environmental schol-
arship, such as Tuana’s (2008) commitment to foregrounding the natural
context in environmental analyses, Plumwood’s (1993) conceptualisation of
dualisms and Merchant’s (1983) thoughts on the backgrounding of women
and nature. The framework in Chapter 3 offers an important intellectual
contribution to the intersectional study of environmental issues in ways that
take seriously the role and agency of nature and its position in intersecting
lines of marginalisation, oppression and destruction.
While a framework of ecofeminist intersectionality as critical inquiry
is necessary for the academic analysis of feminist strategies of resistance
in global climate politics, more concepts are needed to theorise new direc-
tions for that resistance. Yuval-Davis’ (1997) ideas of transversal politics
are useful in conceptualising new forms of feminist ‘co-resistances’. Her
ideas on flexible solidarity, epistemic communities and ongoing dialogue
are all integral concepts for informing a conceptual framework of ecofem-
inist intersectionality as political praxis. Coupled with Bretherton’s (1998)
conceptualisations of organising in climate governance, Morrow’s (2017a)
ideas about the structure of the WGC as transversal politics and Haraway’s
(1988) ideas about solidarity politics, this framework offers a useful mode of
thinking about doing intersectionality in political spaces of global climate
governance such as the UNFCCC. These frameworks are not intended to
be understood as an ‘off-the-shelf’ solution for studying climate politics in
intersectional ways, but they do offer a potentially rich dialogue between
climate justice projects and intersectionality.
 Introduction 13
­

The importance of this timeline of the development of gender as a polit-

ical issue in the UNFCCC is that it uncovers the hard work and determi-
nation of the feminist climate activists that make up the WGC. Chapter 5
‘Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women and Gender Constituency’ in-
vestigates the WGC’s role in embedding gender in the UNFCCC. There are
four primary rhetorical strategies uncovered by this analysis. The first is em-
powering women, which focuses on women’s inclusion in domains of power
either as negotiators in national Delegations to the UNFCCC or as local
resource managers. The second strategy is universalising lived experience
which works to foreground arguments based on women’s poverty, particu-
larly of women located in the Global South, as a primary means of political
action. This strategy typically manifests in arguments about vulnerabilities
and has proven a seemingly necessary and effective step in influencing the
negotiations. The feminist climate activists who were involved in UNFCCC
14 Introduction
negotiations in the early years had been reluctant to rely on strategies that
foreground women’s vulnerability, precisely because the potentially damag-
ing political work that such strategies do. But, as the UNFCCC shifted from
a focus on mitigating the worst effects of climate change to adapting to the
already visible effects, along with the increased participation of develop-
ment NGOs, feminist climate activists were left to conclude that ‘women as
vulnerable’ worked as a strategic ‘hook’ on which to hang arguments about
the importance of gender in relation to climate change. The political deploy-
ment of strategies that universalise lived experiences, or position women as
virtuous, requires the mobilisation of a third rhetorical strategy, equating
gender with women, which was a key concern for those reluctant to pursue
arguments about women’s vulnerability. Because of this concern, the Con-
stituency typically makes arguments about ‘women and gender’ that fore-
ground women’s issues while backgrounding ‘gender’ meaning the workings
of both masculinities and femininities. This has been a move necessitated
by institutional resistance to understanding gender as including the work-
ings of masculinities and male power, because to do so would require an
entirely different climate politics. While these three strategies give empirical
weight to the kinds of critiques levelled at feminist environmental practice
highlighted in Chapter 2, they have also uncovered important reasons be-
hind these decisions. Furthermore, there is a fourth, less commented upon,
strategy that has been increasingly mobilised by members of the WGC, par-
ticularly since COP21 Paris in 2015: ‘intersectionality in baby steps’. This in-
volves making arguments based on multiple-axes of social inequalities and
promises to more effectively challenge the problematic framings of women
and gender that have resulted from the necessity of the first three strategies.
The rhetorical strategies mobilised by members of the WGC are put to
work in the UNFCCC through a carefully developed procedural modus
operandi: identifying entry points for gender aspects in the climate change
debate; raising awareness and disseminating information; building women’s
capacity and joint strategising; and developing a future research agenda.
While these strategies have been successful in influencing the negotiations,
they have typically focused on the workings of the UNFCCC as an institu-
tion, and strategies through which to engage with that institution, and less
on the inner workings of the Constituency itself. This kind of self-reflection
is necessary for a next phase of feminist organising in the UNFCCC if it is
to overcome the challenges of making intersectional arguments in a political
space that has traditionally been resistant to them. This next phase is the fo-
cus of Chapter 6 ‘Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis’ reflects on.
Placing the intellectual work of watching and engaging with the WGC and
its members into conversation with the critiques of feminist environmental
and climate change, activism underscores a key argument in this book that
doing intersectional feminist work in the UNFCCC is hard. Understanding
the complexities of this work, including the challenges and the successes, is
an important step in reflecting upon what lessons can be learned from the
 Introduction 15
political work of the WGC for intersectional praxis. There are three key les-
sons to be learned: there are no easy solutions; prevalent domains of power
have hindered intersectional praxis in the UNFCCC; and intersectional
inquiry and practice cannot be separated in the feminist political project.
Building on these lessons and reflecting on theoretical principles of critical
ecofeminist intersectionality can create new, and exciting, spaces for the next
phase of feminist organising in the UNFCCC. Based on the empirical anal-
ysis of previous phases, coupled with a conceptual framework of ecofemi-
nist intersectionality as critical praxis, I suggest that there are three possible
next phases: fold and withdraw, ‘business as usual’ or ecofeminist transver-
sal politics. It is the third option that offers the most promising next phase
of feminist praxis in the UNFCCC. Ecofeminist transversal politics offers
feminists new language of co-resistances, or epistemic communities com-
prised of like-minded individuals or groups, that can help to shift the focus
on women, as a homogenous group in need of masculine saviour, towards a
focus on multiple and intersecting lines of inequalities and arguments based
on a feminist vision for a different kind of feminist climate politics.
Making the arguments set out above makes several important contribu-
tions to the feminist climate agenda. The first contribution is an empirical
one: a systematic and in- depth story of the history of the UNFCCC that
foregrounds ‘gender’ and feminist organising. This history serves as a useful
resource for those writing about feminist climate activism in the way it com-
piles years of historical documents pertaining to gender in the UNFCCC,
coupled with elite interviews and observations from primary research at two
UNFCCC conferences. This historical account of gender developments in
the UNFCCC promises to bring academic inquiry and political practice
into closer conversation through shedding light on the, otherwise untold,
story of gender and feminist organising in the UNFCCC. The timeline
also provides an important corrective to scholarship on climate change
governance more broadly, which has traditionally been silent on issues of
gender equality, by uncovering the importance of feminist climate activ-
ism in shaping contemporary global climate governance. This history also
makes visible the feminist political work that has been integral in shaping
it. Understanding the challenges facing feminists active in spaces of global
climate governance, such as the UNFCCC, is of crucial importance to inter-
sectional academic thought because, as Collins and Bilge (2020) remind, the
role of academic work is not simply to reproduce or advance explanations of
inequality, though this is part of it. Rather, the role of academic theorising
is critical to intersectional praxis for its ability to advance the conversation
to shape the future of both the intellectual contours and political action that
intersectionality offers.
Putting concepts of intersectionality into productive conversation with
ecofeminist, or feminist environmental, ideas is a theoretical contribution
of this book. While environmental concerns, particularly climate change,
are increasingly entering feminist consciousness, intersectional frameworks
16 Introduction
rarely offer the conceptual tools to integrate the natural world into inter-
secting lines of marginalisation, oppression and destruction. The resulting
frameworks of intersectionality as inquiry and as praxis, from placing inter-
sectional concepts with feminist environmental ideas into productive con-
versation, are not intended as a framework that can simply be lifted and
placed into another context to inform analyses. Rather they should be con-
sidered as frameworks that integrate the natural world into intersectional
analyses and offer concepts that can be adapted for different intersectional
analyses of environmental issues such as climate change.
Finally, this book offers an important political contribution to the pur-
suit of a feminist climate project. Opening up productive ground for start-
ing a dialogue between theorising and activism, that considers theorising
as an important act of activism, is the fourth key contribution of this re-
search. By sitting in the intersection of feminist inquiry on climate change
and feminist practice in spaces of climate governance, this book offers a
pathway for intersectional praxis in climate change governance. Putting in-
quiry and practice into productive conversation creates space to move the
debate onto more fertile ground recognising both the complexity of making
intersectional demands in political institutions such as the UNFCCC, and
the need for strategies to enable feminists to make collective political de-
mands. By highlighting some of the key challenges of feminist organising in
the UNFCCC and reflecting on how this can inform important lessons of
intersectional inquiry, I suggest a mode of ecofeminist transversal politics
as intersectional praxis in the UNFCCC that can overcome the bind that
feminist climate activists are in.

Notes
1 While I am comfortable with the term ‘ecofeminist’ to describe my approach,
I recognise that not all feminists who write about environment and/or climate
change, or who participate in feminist climate activism, are comfortable with
the term ecofeminist to name their politics. Consequently, I use ‘feminist envi-
ronmental’ as a more inclusive term when referring to scholarship or activism on
environmental politics from a feminist perspective that does not claim the term
ecofeminism.
 Introduction 17
Schlosberg, 2007; 2013; Di Chiro, 2008; Pellow, 2018 for examples of environ-
mental justice research that, while not employing intersectional frameworks, are
closely aligned to intersectional concepts).

Bibliography
Abzug, B., (1991). World Women’s Congress for a Healthy Planet – Opening Cer-
emony. (online).
­ Available at: http://gift-economy.com/portfolio-item/wedo-
­­ ​­ ­­ ​­ ­­ ­​
­­opening-ceremony/.
​­ Last accessed: 27/07/2020.
­ ­
Alaimo, S., (2009). ‘Insurgent vulnerability and the carbon footprint of gender’,
Kvinder, Køn og Forskning (Women, Gender and Research), ­3–4, ​­ pp.­ ­22–35.
​­
Alston, M., (2014). ‘Gender mainstreaming and climate change’, Women’s Studies
­ ­287–294.
International Forum, 47, pp. ​­ ­
doi: 10.1016/j.wsif.2013.01.016.
­
­ ­ ​­ ­

Bainimarama, F., (2017). COP23 Presidency Announces First Gender Action Plan,
Highlights the Role of Women in Climate Action. (online). Available at: https://
cop23.com.fj/cop23-presidency-announces-first-gender-action-plan-highlights-
­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­role-women-climate-action/.
­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
Bee, B. A., Rice, J. and Trauger, A., (2015). ‘A feminist approach to climate change
governance: Everyday and intimate politics’, Geography Compass, 9(6), ­ pp. ­ ­1–12. ​­
doi: 10.1111/gec3.12218. ­
Bretherton, C., (1998). ‘Global environmental politics: Putting gender on the
agenda?’ Review of International Studies, 24(1), ­ pp. ­ ­85–100. ​­
Buckingham, S. and Kulcur, R., (2009). ‘Gendered geographies of environmental
injustice’, Antipode, 41(4), ­ pp. ­ ­659–683. ​­ doi: 10.1111/j.1467–8330.2009.00693. ­ ­ ​­
Butler, J., (1990). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York
and London: Routledge.
Climate emergency declaration, (2020). Climate Emergency Declaration. (online). Avail-
able at: https://climateemergencydeclaration.org/climate-emergency-declarations-
­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­
­​­­cover-15-million-citizens/.
­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
Collins, P. H. and Bilge, S., (2020). Intersectionality (2nd edn.), Cambridge: Polity Press.
COP23 Fiji, (2017). COP23 Presidency Announces First Gender Action Plan, High-
lights the Role of Women in Climate Action. (online). Available at: https://cop23.
com.fj/cop23-presidency-announces-first-gender-action-plan-highlights-role-
­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­women-climate-action//­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
Dankelman, I., (2011). Women on the Forefront at the Earth Summit ’92 in Rio. (online). ­
Available at: http://wedo.org/women-on-the-forefront-at-the-earth-summit- ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­
­​­­92-in-rio-a-personal-journey-by-irene-dankelman/.
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
Detraz, N. and Windsor, L., (2014). ‘Evaluating climate migration: Population
movement, insecurity and gender’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 16(-
1), pp. ­ ­127–146. ​­ doi: 10.1080/14616742.2013.789640.
­
Di Chiro, G., (2008). ‘Living environmentalisms: Coalition politics, social repro-
duction, and environmental justice’, Environmental Politics, 17(2), ­ pp. ­ ­276–298. ​­
doi: 10.1080/09644010801936230. ­
Foster, E. A., (2017). ‘Gender, Environmental Governmentality, and the Discourses
of Sustainable Development’, in S. MacGregor (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Gen-
der and Environment. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 216–228.
18 Introduction
GenderCC, (2019a). ­ UNFCCC Conferences. (online). Available at: https://gendercc.
net/genderunfccc/unfccc-conferences.html.
­ ­­ ​­ Last accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
Haraway, D. J., (1988). ‘Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism
and the privilege of partial perspective’, Feminist Studies, 14(3), ­ pp. ­ ­575–599. ​­ doi:
10.2307/3178066. ­
International Alliance of Women, (2017). Gender Action Plan. (online). Available at:
https://womenalliance.org/unfccc-cop-23-in-bonn-and-the-gender-plan-of-action-
­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­
gap.
​­ Last accessed: 27/07.2020. ­
Kaijser, A. and Kronsell, A., (2014). ‘Climate change through the lens of intersec-
tionality’, Environmental Politics, 23(3). doi: 10.1080/09644016.2013.835203.
MacGregor, S., (2009). ‘A stranger silence still: The need for feminist social re-
search on climate change’, Sociological Review, 57(SUPPL. ­ 2), pp. ­ ­124–140. ​­ doi:
10.1111/j.1467–954X.2010.01889.x.
­ ­ ​­
MacGregor, S., (2017). ‘Moving beyond impacts: More answers to the “gender and
climate change” question’, in S. Buckingham and V. Le Masson (eds.) Understand-
ing Climate Change through Gender Relations. New York and London: Routledge,
pp. ­ 15–30.
­ ​­
Merchant, C., (1983). The Death of Nature. New York: Harper & Row.
Miami Women’s Conference, (1992). Women’s Action Agenda 21. (online). Available
at: https://www.iisd.org/women/action21.htm.
­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 03/05/2018. ­ ­
Morrow, K., (2017a). ‘Changing the climate of participation: The gender constitu-
ency in the global climate change regime’, in S. MacGregor (ed.) Routledge Hand-
book of Gender and Environment. New York: Routledge, pp. ­ ­398–411. ​­
Nagel, J., (2012). ‘Intersecting identities and global climate change’, Identities: Global
Studies in Culture and Power, 19(4), ­ pp. ­ ­467–476. ​­ doi: 10.1080/1070289X.2012.710550.
­
Nagel, J., (2015). ‘Gender, conflict, and the militarization of climate change policy’,
Peace Review, 27(2), ­ pp. ­ ­202–208.​­ doi: 10.1080/10402659.2015.1037629.
­
Nelson, J., (2012). ‘Is Dismissing the precautionary principle the manly thing to
do? Gender and the economics of climate change’, IDEAS Working Paper Series,
12(04),
­ pp. ­ ­1–21. ​­
Pellow, D. N., (2018). What Is Critical Environmental Justice? Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Plumwood, V., (1993). Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. London: Routledge.
Resurrección, B. P., (2013). ‘Persistent women and environment linkages in climate
change and sustainable development agendas’, Women’s Studies International
Forum, 40, pp. ­ ­33–43. ​­ doi: 10.1016/j.wsif.2013.03.011.
­
Sasser, J., (2018). On infertile Ground : Population Control and Women’s Rights in the
Era of Climate Change. New York: NYU Press.
Schlosberg, D., (2007). ‘Reconceiving environmental justice: Global movements
and political theories’, Environmental Politics, (13)3, ­ ­ pp. ­ ­517–540. ​­
Schlosberg, D., (2013). ‘Theorising environmental justice: The expanding sphere of
a discourse’, Environmental Politics, 22(1), ­ pp. ­ ­37–55.
​­
Seager, J., (2009). ‘Death by degrees: Taking a feminist hard look at the 2° climate
policy’, Women, Gender and Research (Kvinder, Køn & Forskning), ­3–4, ​­ pp. ­ ­11–21.
​­
Tobin, P., Schmidt, N. and Tosun, J., (2018). ‘Mapping States’ Paris climate pledges:
Analysing targets and groups at COP’, Global Environmental Change, 48, pp. ­ ­11–21.​­
Tuana, N., (2008). ‘Viscous porosity: Witnessing Katrina’, in S. Alaimo and S.
Hekman (eds.) ­ Material feminisms. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
pp.­ ­188–212. ​­
 Introduction 19
UNCED, (1992). ­ Agenda 21. (online). Available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.
un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf.
­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (1992). ­ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
­
(online). Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Last
accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2017a). ­ Provisional list of Registered Participants, COP23. (online). ­
Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/cop23/eng/PLOP.pdf. ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Last ac-
cessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2017b). ­ Decision 3/CP.23 Establishment of a Gender Action Plan,
(online).
­ Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cp23_auv_gender.pdf. ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
Last accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2019a). ­ UNFCCC -25 Years of Effort and Achievement. (online). Availa-
ble at: https://unfccc.int/timeline/. Last accessed: 27/07/2020.
UNFCCC, (2020a). ­ ­Non-governmental ​­ Organization Constituencies. (online). ­
Available at: https://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
constituencies_and_you.pdf. Last accessed: 27/07/2020.
UNFCCC, (2020b). ­ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
(online). Available at: https://unfccc.int/. Last accessed: 27/07/2020.
UNFCCC, (2020c). ­ UNFCCC Process: Parties. (online). Available at: https://unfccc.
int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties-convention-and-observer-
­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​
­states. Last accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2020d). ­ About the Secretariat. (online). Available at: https://unfccc.int/-
about-us/what-is-the-unfccc-secretariat.
​­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2020e). ­ What Are Governing, Process Management, Subsidiary,
Constituted and Concluded Bodies? (online). Available at: https://unfccc.int/
­­process-and-meetings/bodies/the-big-picture/what-are-governing-process-
­​­­ ​­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­management-subsidiary-constituted-and-concluded-bodies. ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed:
27/07/2020.
­ ­
UNFCCC, (2020f). ­ The Gender Action Plan. (online). Available at: https://unfccc.
int/topics/gender/workstreams/the-gender-action-plan.
­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2022). ­ Structure of the UNFCCC. (online). Available at: https://unfccc.
int/files/inc/graphics/image/gif/2011_bodies_large.gif.
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 20/06/2022. ­ ­
WEDO, (2015). ­ Women’s Action Agenda for a Healthy and Peaceful Planet 2015: A
Decade of Women’s Advocacy for Sustainable Development. (online). Available at:
https://www.wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/agenda2015_eng.pdf.
­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ Last accessed:
27/07/2020.
­ ­
WEDO, (2016a). ­ Research Paper - Gender & Climate Change. (online). Available at:
https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/WEDO_GenderINDCAnalysis-
­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ​
­1.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
WEDO, (2018a). ­ WEDO’s Work following the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change. (online). Available at: https://wedo.org/process/unfccc/. Last
accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
WEDO, (2022). ­ Gender Climate Tracker. (online). Available at: https://
genderclimatetracker.org/. Last accessed: 27/07/2020.
WGC, (2019). ­ Advances for Gender Equality at COP25. (online). Available at: https://
womengenderclimate.org/advances-for-gender-equality-at-cop25/. ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed:
08.06.2022.
WGC, (2020). ­ Members. (online). Available at: http://womengenderclimate.org/
member/. Last accessed: 27/07/2020.
20 Introduction
Women’s Major Group, (2015). History of the Women’s Movement and Sustaina-
ble Development. (online).
­ Available at: http://www.womenmajorgroup.org/wp-
­ ­­ ​
­content/uploads/2018/01/History-of-the-Women%E2%80%99s-Movement-and-
­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­Sustainable-Development.pdf.
​­ Last accessed: 27/07/2020.
­ ­
­
­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ​­
­Yuval-Davis,
​­ N., (2011).
­ The Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Contestations. Lon-
don: Sage Publications Ltd.
2 Enduring Debates in Feminist
Climate Praxis

Theorising Feminist Climate Activism

Where does gender figure in the debates on climate change? Dual themes
recur throughout the existing though limited literature on gender and
climate change – women as vulnerable or women as virtuous in rela-
tion to the environment. This imagery makes two viewpoints seemingly
obvious: women in the global South will be affected more adversely by
climate change than men in those countries and that men in the global
North pollute more than their female counterparts.
(Arora-Jonsson,
­­ ​­ 2011, p.
­ 744)

In her 2011 paper ‘Virtue and Vulnerability: Discourses on women, gender

and climate change’, Arora-Jonsson argues that ‘dual themes’ feature in the
existing literature on gender and climate change: women as vulnerable or
women as virtuous. Women as vulnerable entails that women are dispro-
portionately affected by (i.e., they are vulnerable to the effects of) climate
change due to their disproportionate poverty (Hemmati and Röhr, 2007;
cited in Arora-Jonsson, 2011) or cultural and gender norms in many con-
texts resulting in higher mortality rates in natural disasters (Brody et al.,
2008; cited in Arora-Jonsson, 2011). Alternatively, women as virtuous con-
siders women as more risk averse, more prepared for behavioural change
and more likely to support drastic policies and measures on climate change
than their male counterparts (Brody et al., 2008; cited in Arora-Jonsson,
2011). Arguments about women’s vulnerability or virtuousness resonate
with Women, Environment and Development (WED) debates over whether
women are closer to nature and more environmentally conscious than men
(Arora-Jonsson, 2011). These claims have held powerful sway in develop-
ment circles since the 1980s but have been largely echoed in some of the re-
search on gender and climate change. This is despite the ‘unconvincing and
inadequate’ (Arora-Jonsson, 2011, p. 745) empirical evidence to back up the
premises that arguments focused on women’s vulnerability or virtuousness
are based on. Not only that, but framings of gender that focus on a single-
axis of identity (such as women’s class or poverty) can do political damage.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003306474-2
22 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis
­

In her paper, Arora-Jonsson draws upon research and reports written by

feminist environmentalists who are at the front lines of the struggle for a
feminist green future, perhaps an indication of the relative lack of scholarly
writing on the topic at the time.1 For example, she refers to Minu Hem-
mati and Ulrike Röhr (see Röhr, 2006; Hemmati and Röhr, 2007) both of
whom have been at the forefront of feminist advocacy in the UNFCCC since
the convention was adopted. Many feminist organisations, in recognising
the kinds of risks involved in mobilising single-axis framings of gender,
are quick to point out that women are not just victims of climate change,
but they are also powerful agents of change (c.f. Henrich Böll Stiftung and
WEDO, 2009), invoking the discourse of women as virtuous. While Arora-
Jonsson is justified in pointing out the harmful political work this kind of
framing can do, the claim that women are more environmentally conscious
than men is not a simple baseless assumption: it is an empirical reality for
some women. Ergas and York (2012) found that nations with greater fe-
male representation in h igh-level politics had lower carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions per capita. Similarly, arguments about women’s vulnerability are
based on several studies showing that women (and children) are more likely
to die in a natural disaster event than men (c.f. Denton, 2002; Neumayer and
Plümper, 2007; Terry, 2009). But, like Arora-Jonsson, it is the political work
of rhetorical strategies that rely on simplified narratives about women that
has motivated a number of feminist scholars.
It is the political work of framing women as ‘the problem’ that has moti-
vated Jade Sasser (2018) in her book On Infertile Ground: Population Con-
trol and Women’s Rights in the Era of Climate Change. Sasser argues that a
return among youth climate activists in Canada of overpopulation as a key
concern for climate policy problematically rests on simplified images of the
conditions of women’s reproductive freedoms (or lack thereof) in the Global
South. She cites Chandra Mohanty’s description of how the homogenous
Global South woman of these images

Leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read:

sexually constrained) and her being “third world” (read: ignorant, poor,
uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family orientated, victimised
etc.) […] in contrast to the (implicit) self-representation of Western
women as educated, as modern, as having control of their own bodies,
and sexualities, and the freedom to make their own decisions.
(Mohanty, 1984, p. 337; cited in Sasser, 2018)
 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 23
Sasser (2018) argues that advocacy efforts that problematise global pop-
ulation growth as an environmental and climate problem, with contra-
ception as the solution, are based on simplistic narratives about women
and work to obscure the social, political and economic drivers of envi-
ronmental problems. Not only that but a lack of understanding about
these key drivers of environmental change threatens to undermine social
and ecological justice and bodily autonomy for women in the Global
South. Sasser argues that part of the resurgence of overpopulation ar-
guments is due to the need for funding among Sexual and Reproductive
Health and Rights (SRHR) advocates following the reintroduction of
the Global Gag Rule.2 Again, this speaks to an important concern for
feminists advocating for gender concerns in policy discussions. Women’s
organisations are typically poorly resourced meaning that population
advocacy has become increasingly important in helping to ensure that
women around the world have access to contraceptives and other repro-
ductive health services (Sasser, 2018). But, as Sasser argues, it is impor-
tant that feminist scholars remain critical of these narratives and work
to offer corrective ones.
Criticisms of the rhetorical strategies employed by feminist activists
are common in literature on gender and climate change (and gender and
environment more broadly). For example, Resurrección suggests that ‘at
the heart of all the earlier criticisms of women– environment discourses
was the intellectual unease with the idea of a centred feminine subject as
the stable icon of feminist environmental advocacy’ (2013, p. 36, my em-
phasis). In her 2013 paper ‘Persistent Women and Environment Linkages
in Climate Change and Sustainable Development Agendas’, Resurrección
explores how women- environmental linkages remain ‘seductive and influ-
ential’ (2013, p. 33). For gender to enter climate politics women’s identi-
ties must be projected as ‘fixed, centred, and uniform – and tied to nature’
(Resurrección, 2013, p. 33), which presents a difficult strategic dilemma for
feminist climate advocates. Simplifications of women as atomised individ-
uals with fixed attributes found in policy translations of WED are entirely
dissociated with wider relationships of power and so can be counter-
productive for women insofar as they reify traditional gender roles. Yet
images that signify a victim status of rural women in the Global South
have proven to be a successful strategic entry point for feminist advocacy.
Pointing specifically to the gender experts who were (many of whom still
are) active in the UNFCCC, Resurrección demonstrates how the icon of
women being climate victims has drawn significant attention from the cli-
mate negotiating tables and thus remains a persistent rhetorical strategy in
feminist climate advocacy.
MacGregor levels a similar criticism at feminist climate justice activ-
ists such as the Mary Robinson Foundation (MRF) and the WGC in her
2017 chapter ‘Moving Beyond Impacts: More Answers to the “Gender and
Climate Change” Question’. MacGregor acknowledges that activists have
24 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis
worked ‘tirelessly’ ( p. 15) to make the case that the global ecological crisis is
exacerbating global gender inequality but:

While the work of activists and spokespeople such as Mary Robinson has
been invaluable in getting gender included in UNFCCC documents and in
drawing attention to the material links between climate change and the suf-
fering of women, it is important that theirs are not the only interventions.
(MacGregor,
­ 2017, ­p. 27)

MacGregor argues that while it is tempting to explain what gender has to

do with climate change in terms of impacts and vulnerabilities, ‘better an-
swers are necessary’ (MacGregor, 2017, p. 27). Those answers can be found
in feminist environmental theoretical insights about discourse, politics and
normative visions that have been developed over decades of feminist work
(MacGregor,
­ 2017, ­p. 27).
Positing three arguments that act as answers to the ‘gender and climate
change question’ MacGregor first contends that climate change discourse
is gendered. Feminist theoretical tools including deconstruction of binaries
and the concept of a ‘gender lens’ uncover the fact that climate change has
been shaped by a number of hegemonic discourses. These discourses posi-
tion climate change as a scientifically defined problem reflecting dominant
gendered power structures. Arguments that problematise the masculinised
nature of the scientific framing of climate change are common in the gender
and climate change literature. For example, Nagel (2015) writes that mascu-
linised ideals, perspectives and approaches are deeply entrenched in insti-
tutions of climate change governance, such as the UNFCCC. Meanwhile,
Julie Nelson (2012) argues that the mainstream economics that underpins
climate policy is informed by highly gendered, sexist and ageist attitudes.
MacGregor’s second argument is that gender equality and environmental
protection are linked and there is a link between gender balance and pro-
environmental policies (c.f. Buckingham, 2010; cited in MacGregor, 2017).
Therefore, ‘another good answer to the “gender and climate change ques-
tion” is that women-friendly politics and climate-friendly politics go hand
in hand’ (MacGregor, 2017, p. 21). The third ‘answer’ is that the transition to
a post- carbon world requires gender justice. If strategies for climate mitiga-
tion and adaptation are to work, they need to resonate with a significant pro-
portion of the population requiring that visions of a post- carbon world are
inclusive of diverse experiences and respond to the everyday needs of men
and women (MacGregor, 2017, p. 22). These three ‘better answers’, MacGre-
gor suggests, might help move the debate onto more positive and productive
ground, over- coming the ‘persistence’ (Resurrección, 2013) of simplistic ex-
planations connecting climate change and the suffering of women.
Critiques of feminist climate advocacy are not limited to academic theo-
rising but can also be found in the ranks of feminist climate activists who are
active in the UNFCCC. For example, in an analysis of the power dynamics
 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 25
and hierarchies present in the UNFCCC, gender and youth advocate Jessica
Olson remarks that civil society holds some of the responsibility to involve
women’s voices in the negotiations. Olson stated that

Current work by the activists at the UNFCCC perpetuate systems of

domination through consistent tokenisation of women from develop-
ing nations. For example, a commonly reported practice in both the
Women and Gender and Youth Constituencies, official civil society in-
terest groups within the UNFCCC, is for a group of people from more
privileged countries to write an intervention to be read by or on the
behalf of a person from an impacted nation.
(Olson,
­ 2014, p.
­ 186)

In the face of such criticism, it is easy to be critical of the actions and strate-
gies of the WGC. But it is important not to overlook the many challenges that
the Constituency has faced and overcome. In her 2009 essay ‘A View from the
Side? Gendering the United Nations Climate Change Negotiations’, Röhr re-
flects on those challenges and highlights the complexity of UN agencies such
as the UNFCCC since ‘the language had become abstract to such an extent
that only insiders and full-time climate experts could access the negotiations’
(Röhr, 2009, p. 54). She further reflects that most women’s organisations did
not engage with climate politics, meaning that the number of gender experts
working in the climate politics sphere was limited. Coupled with an institu-
tion that is imbued with ‘scientific bias’ (Röhr, 2009, p. 56), the difficulties
of making the case for a gender perspective are many. Röhr highlights that
there was an ‘attention boost’ in 2002 at COP9 Milan that was, in part, due
to ‘development NGOs finally acknowledging the issue’ (Röhr, 2009, p. 55).
These development NGOs were far more familiar with gender analyses,
gender assessments and the implementation of gender mainstreaming, and
tended to push those issues (Röhr, 2009), perhaps explaining the persistence
of WED discourses foregrounding women in developing countries criticised
by both Arora-Jonsson (2011) and Resurrección (2013).
Karen Morrow is one of the only academics to write specifically about the
WGC, taking a more sympathetic approach to her analysis. She notes that
while agenda setting is the ultimate goal of the WGC, it remains a relatively
disempowered group meaning that more incremental approaches tend to
dominate its strategy. In this light what the WGC has achieved is ‘little short
of miraculous’ (Morrow, 2017a, p. 404). Since COP9 Milan in 2003 and the
formation of GenderCC as a global network of women, gender activists and
experts on gender and climate justice issues representing all world regions,
the UNFCCC has seen an extraordinary rapid advancement of gender is-
sues (Morrow, 2017a). Morrow applauds the Constituency for the ‘inclusive
and participatory approach’ (2017a, p. 404) that has featured strongly in its
activities, evidenced through the Constituency’s draft Charter behind which
women could rally. The draft Charter of the WGC, Morrow explains, was
26 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis
shaped through an inclusive dialogue undertaken by a global coalition of
women’s groups and included principles of: participatory governance; re-
spect for divergent positions; and wide and inclusive membership in terms
of age, region and background (GenderCC, 2016, Article 2; cited in Mor-
row, 2017a). Morrow suggests that the Charter’s objectives echo an ecofem-
inist agenda, by prioritising making women’s voices and experiences heard,
feeding women’s views into all aspects of ongoing climate change discourse
and promoting co-operation with other constituencies and caucuses in the
search for constructive and mutually reinforcing alliances (GenderCC, 2016,
Article 3; cited in Morrow, 2017a). Thus, Morrow’s account of the advocacy
work and strategies of members of the WGC sits in contrast with some of
the more critical accounts of feminist environmental and climate activists
made by others. Given that Morrow is one of the few feminist scholars who
has empirically investigated the advocacy and strategies of members of the
WGC this suggests a tension between feminist critical inquiry and feminist
political practice that is worthy of deeper investigation.

Enduring Debates
There are several unresolved debates that emerge from the account of the
literature on feminist advocacy in climate and environmental policy circles
given above. The first is what I am calling dilemmas of rhetorical strategy
which includes debates around the theoretical commitment to making in-
tersectional, or at least multi-axis, arguments about women and gender and
the feminist political goal of advancing women’s interests in political insti-
tutions. As noted above, Resurrección questions the rhetorical strategies
employed by feminist climate activists to produce simplifications of women
as atomised individuals with fixed attributes that are more palatable or easy
to understand for policymakers. This atomisation of identity is at odds with
a theoretical commitment to intersectionality that recognises multiple and
intersecting lines of marginalisation and oppression.
The second debate is one concerning the choice that social movements, in-
cluding feminist and environmental movements, must make between work-
ing as radical outsiders versus pragmatic insiders. This questions whether it
is better to work within existing political institutions and agitate for reform,
or if it is more effective for activists to remain outside of those dominant
political systems with an aim of more fundamental structural change in how
society works. Third is questions of power dynamics and hierarchies. This
is evidenced above in Olson’s (2014) criticism of the WGC for perpetuat-
ing systems of domination and tokenisation. There are significant questions
around the internal structures of feminist and environmental movements
and the ways in which they might work to perpetuate existing webs of power
and hierarchies. The fourth unresolved debate is linked to the ‘intellectual
unease’ that Resurrección (2013) speaks of in relation to the idea of a cen-
tred feminine subject which is connected to a long-standing tradition of
 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 27
separating ideas and actions. The academic– activist divide refers to the
artificial distinction between ‘ideal theory’ and ‘pragmatic policy’. These
debates are certainly not unique to feminist organising in climate change
politics. Rather they speak to a series of enduring debates that are found in
feminist inquiry and practice more broadly.

Dilemmas of Rhetorical Strategy

Questions of the use of problematic rhetorical strategies are linked to a
long-standing debate over ‘strategic essentialism’. Several scholars writing
about political strategies of environmental and climate activists have com-
mented on the use of strategic essentialism including MacGregor (2006),
Sasser (2018) and Resurrección (2013). The issue of gender essentialism –
the idea that there is a fixed essence to women – has haunted ecofeminism
(and indeed many other feminisms) for over 20 years (Gaard, 2017). Stra-
tegic essentialism is a concept that was introduced by Gayatri Spivak and
is a strategy of representation that involves rhetorically taking the risk
of adopting an essentialist position to identify categories, or what Spivak
called ‘masterwords’ (such as women, worker, nation or the subaltern), in
order to mobilise a collective consciousness for achieving particular polit-
ical ends (Spivak, 1993, p. 3). Strategic essentialism is the use of common
identities for the strategic or political purposes of oppositional movements.
As a strategy, strategic essentialism pragmatically accepts the necessity
of using identity categories to advance political claims despite the percep-
tion of homogeneity (Resurrección, 2013). In the case of gender and cli-
mate change that centred identity, as explained above, tends to manifest
itself as a ‘rural producer vulnerable to environmental change and crisis’
(Resurrección, 2013, p. 36). Butler (1994) refers to this as materialising a
particular understanding of gender as fact, and repetitively harnessing a
central identity of ‘woman’. This form of essentialism, Spivak (1987) argues,
is strategic precisely because it is a self- conscious act that is always attuned
to its ‘constructive paradox’ that evokes that the common identity is not
always reducible to a singular essence. But MacGregor, who is much more
critical of the concept of strategic essentialism, questions if it can ever be
strategic, suggesting that the strategy simply allows ‘feminists to simultane-
ously acknowledge the way rhetoric plays into universalising ideas and use
it anyway’ (MacGregor, 2006, p. 50).
In ecofeminist literature, the topic of strategic essentialism is taken up
most directly by Noël Sturgeon in her 1997 book Ecofeminist Natures in
which she argues that ‘ecofeminism seems to be situated in a history of
feminism in such a way that it is required to solve the mystery of how to
create an anti- essentialist coalition politics, while deploying a strategic pol-
itics of identity’ (Sturgeon, 1997, p. 5). For many years feminist theorists
have been concerned with the problem of trying to conceptualise ‘women’s
differences from men (differences, from a feminist point of view, imbued
28 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis
with the consequences of women’s domination by men) and at the same time
acknowledge differences among women (also imbued with unequal power
relations)’ (Sturgeon, 1997, p. 16). Sturgeon calls the common identities that
are often deployed by ecofeminists (e.g. ‘third world woman’ or ‘indigenous
woman’) ‘essentialist constructs’ or ‘ecofeminist natures’ (Sturgeon, 1997,
p. 5) and asserts that the use of such ecofeminist natures is acceptable if it
contributes to an oppositional consciousness and political collectives.
In feminist climate movements this kind of strategy is deployed all the
time. As shown above, Resurrección demonstrates that essentialism played
a significant role in the 1980s, helping feminists bring women’s issues to the
table. Similarly, Braidotti et al. (1994) note that ways in which femininity
was essentialised to fulfil the strategic aims of the women’s lobby which
was ultimately reproduced in the outcomes of the 1992 Rio Declaration.
MacGregor (2006) also notes that organisations such as WEDO use con-
structions of ‘traditional knowledge’ as a means of getting more women at
the table. Indeed, WEDO have been successful in their endeavours to place
women both in h igh-level environmental policy meetings, as well as to place
women (if not gender) on the political agenda. Sasser (2018) suggests that the
success of essentialising strategies is perhaps because ‘presenting women’s
relationships to nature in the Global South in homogenous ways provides
policymakers with a shorthand for understanding the basics of gendered
environmental roles and differentiated impacts’ (Sasser, 2018, p. 106). Crit-
ics of strategic essentialism (such as MacGregor, 2006; Moore, 2008; Gaard,
2017; Sasser, 2018) assert that essentialised narratives

fix women in a static model: that of an essentialised, universal relation-

ship between women and nature. As a result, the initial policy attention
to women’s environmental experiences left little room for articulating
dynamic, diverse experiences in ways that resist the victim-agent role.
(Sasser,
­ 2018, p.
­ 106)

This debate has led to feminist environmental theorists to work towards

providing corrective challenges to gender essentialism, strategic or other-
wise (Gaard, 2017). For example, MacGregor (2006) disagrees with Stur-
geon’s assertion that ‘the invocation of “essentialist natures” is valuable for
ecofeminism in spite of the particular dangers it presents’ (MacGregor, 2006,
p. 52, existing emphasis). Not only do such homogenising categorisations
and romantic portrayals of women ‘in the South’ do more harm than good
(Mohanty, 1991), but discourses of femininity do not challenge or disrupt
prevailing gender norms.
MacGregor asks:

what are the longer-term effects of this strategy? How do policy-makers,

the majority of whom do not make gender part of their political plat-
form, regard women’s concerns? Does this strategy foster critical
 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 29
discussions of gender relations and the impact of environmental change
on women’s lives? Or are gender roles taken as given?
(MacGregor,
­ 2006, ­p. 51)

She further states that no one seems to have asked these questions and that
an effort to address them will lead to the conclusion that essentialist ar-
guments are not a good strategy for a green feminist politics that seeks to
destabilise existing gender codes.
More recently this debate has shifted from a focus on harnessing a par-
ticular ‘essence’ of womanhood, as seen in strategic essentialism, towards
a focus on the use of single-axis framings of identity in order to make col-
lective political demands. Alaimo (2009) argues that a ‘feminist and an
LGBT-affirmative politics must avoid reinstalling rigid gender differences
and heteronormativity’ (2009, p. 31). To ignore intersectional concerns, or to
position identity politics under the catchment of gender, and to reduce gen-
der to a male/female binary is to lose out on incredibly rich and important
knowledge and embodied experiences.
Explicitly intersectional studies are still largely absent from the gender
and climate change literature with only a few scholars addressing multiple
intersecting lines of marginalisation and oppression in the context of cli-
mate change (for an example of an intersectional framework to the study of
climate change see Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014). The concept of intersection-
ality posits that inequality, oppression and marginalisation do not happen
in a gendered vacuum, but are made up of multiple, and intersecting, power
relations that shape identity politics such as race, class, gender, ability, eth-
nicity and sexuality, to name a few (Crenshaw, 1991).
Intersectionality’s history is often told as quite a straightforward history,
with most citing Crenshaw as having ‘coined’ the term in her 1991 article
‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Colour’. But intersectional praxis is arguably much
older, with movements in the late 1960s to early 1980s catalysing many of the
main ideas of intersectionality (Collins and Bilge, 2020). Crenshaw’s work is
vital but Black feminists in the US were creating their own political organ-
isations using the epithet ‘Black Feminism’, drawing attention to inherent
sexism in the Black Power movement, and an autonomous Chicana femi-
nist movement separate to the Chicano liberation movement in the 1960s
and 1970s. These movements set much of the groundwork for intersectional
ideas (Collins and Bilge, 2020; see also Garcia, 1997a, 1997b; Arredondo
et al., 2003). Women in these movements expressed many of their ideas in
political pamphlets, poetry, essays, edited volumes, art and other creative
venues and the core ideas of intersectionality appear in several key texts
of Black Feminism. Collins and Bilge (2020) highlight Black feminist au-
thor and essayist Toni Cade Bambara, editor of The Black Feminist in 1970
which, through a collection of essays, pointed out how Black women would
never gain their freedom without attending to oppressions of race, class and
30 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis
gender. Similarly, the work of Gloria Anzaldúa has been central to intersec-
tional modes of Latina feminism. Her semi-autobiographical book Border-
­ Frontera (1987) examines the condition of women in Chicano and
lands/La
Latino culture discussing several critical issues related to their experiences
including heteronormativity, colonialism and male dominance.
Despite the obvious influence these forms of knowledge have had on
intersectional thought, they remain neglected in most narratives of inter-
sectionality’s history (Collins and Bilge, 2020). Instead, writings on inter-
sectionality that do acknowledge the huge influence of social movements on
intersectional thought tend to cite the Combahee River Collective’s (CRC)
‘A Black Feminist Statement’ originally published in 1977. Collins and Bilge
(2020) put the popularity of the CRC down to the resources available to its
members to make their voices heard. The CRC was a collective made up of
a community of Black feminists and developed its intersectional analysis
in the context of social movements for decolonisation, desegregation and
feminism, making it an integral part of intersectionality’s history. Yet, it
was not until the 1980s and 1990s when social movements went into abey-
ance and political protest took on different forms (Collins and Bilge, 2020)
that intersectionality became a popular phrase. As stated above, prevail-
ing stories about the emergence of intersectionality repeat verbatim that it
was ‘coined’ by Crenshaw in 1991. ‘Mapping the Margins’ is an important
article in marking the ‘translation of understandings of intersectionality
emanating from Black and Chicana feminism and similar social justice pro-
jects, and understandings of intersectionality within academia’ (Collins and
Bilge, 2020, p. 91) and represents a pivotal moment for intersectionality. But
intersectionality has a far longer history in social movements than the early
1990s.
Despite its popularity, or even because of it, intersectionality is not with-
out criticism, particularly surrounding its methodological application and
use in policy circles. Even Crenshaw remarked in 2009 that she is ‘amazed
at how [intersectionality] gets over- and under-used; sometimes I can’t even
recognise it in the literature anymore’ (Crenshaw, 2009; cited in Berger and
Guidroz, 2009). The term intersectionality is used throughout contempo-
rary public international discourse, including in the United Nations (UN),
particularly included in human rights discourses. Yet, as Yuval-Davis
(2006) has pointed out, not only do these attempts to bring in intersectional
arguments in policy processes raise important ontological questions of how
many social divisions there are, but also raises important methodological
issues surrounding conflation between vectors of discrimination and dif-
ference, and identity groupings. Simply identifying a series of ‘vectors of
difference’ is problematic, both theoretically and politically, as it constructs
difference as automatic grounds for both discrimination and entitlement for
defence from discrimination. It does not attend to differential positionings
of power in which identity groups can be located or the dynamics of power
relations within these groups. Nor does it give recognition to the ‘potentially
 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 31
contested nature of the boundaries of these groupings and the possibly con-
tested political claims for representation of people located in the same social
positionings’ (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 204). In other words, any attempt to
categorise difference for the methodological application of intersectionality
raises difficult and complex empirical and analytical questions. As Kaijser
and Kronsell state the

the aim of intersectionality is not simply to include as many analyti-

cal categories as possible, or list an
­ – obviously
​­ not ­all-encompassing
­​­­ –​
number of factors that may determine responsibility and vulnerability
in relation to climate change, but to widen the perspective and reflect
upon what factors may be relevant in a particular setting.
(Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014, p. 422)

Kathryn Russell (2007) suggests ‘current scholarship seems to be caught in a

bind between collapsing social categories together and separating them out
in a list’ ( p. 35; my emphasis). This bind is not only a challenge for feminist
academics studying gender and climate change, but, based on the scholar-
ship concerned with feminist political strategies discussed above, is also a
major challenge for feminist climate activists in the UNFCCC when making
collective political demands.

Radical Outsiders versus Pragmatic Insiders

A second enduring debate that emerges in the literature on feminist climate
and environmental activism and strategy is the choice between acting as
radical outsiders or pragmatic insiders. This debate stems from writing
on New Social Movements (NSM) (c.f. Diani, 1992; Doherty, 1992; 2006;
Ciplet, 2014). Perhaps one of the most famous contemporary examples
of this debate is the internal struggle of the German Greens in the 1980s
(Doherty, 1992). In short, the fundamentalist ‘Fundis’ advocated remaining
a party of protest while the realist ‘Realos’ advocated for compromises. The
Realos ultimately won the argument, and the German Greens went on to
share power with the Social Democrats in Gerhard Schröder’s red-green
coalition – perhaps the ultimate version of working inside the system. The
fundamentalists in green parties can be defined as those who are critical
of coalitions with other parties and are sceptical about achieving radical
change by parliamentary means (radical outsiders), while the realists argue
that radical change must involve an instrumental parliamentary strategy as
well as extra-parliamentary action ( pragmatic insiders).
A small body of feminist literature examines the political strategy of both
gender and environment networks as well as the gender and climate change
network, including the WGC. This work is mostly written by academics and
a few activists who have themselves been active in these networks (c.f. Breth-
erton, 1998; 2003; Alber, 2009; Röhr, 2009). As with other social movements,
32 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis
the feminist efforts in global climate change politics have been similarly be-
devilled by debates over the best approaches for advocating feminist posi-
tions in global climate politics. The choice between feminists working inside
or outside conventional political institutions is one that is always at the
forefront of feminist organising. Bretherton is one feminist environmental
scholar who has theorised this dilemma, stating that the ‘principal division,
in terms of women’s organising, lies in the choice between insider and out-
sider strategies’ (Bretherton, 2003, p. 108). Meyer and Prügl sum this up
neatly in reference to women’s international NGOs:

Some women’s international NGOs ( WINGOs), particularly the older

ones, are more formally organised and seek to influence more directly
the agendas of multilateral institutions. Other WINGOs, particularly
those founded since the 1970s eschew this formality and its related hi-
erarchy and bureaucracy, preferring instead to mobilise and organise
women at the grassroots and national levels around global feminist
issues like development, population, women’s human rights, violence
against women, environment and so on.
(Meyer and Prügl, 1999, p. 8)

The WGC, as part of the Women’s Major Group, exhibits predominantly

‘insider’ characteristics, employing ‘an innovative lobbying strategy that
has vastly increased the participation of non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) at recent UN conferences’ (Higer, 1999, p. 130). But these strat-
egies are supplemented by mobilising women outside of official processes
by, for example, disseminating insider information to women’s networks at
local levels to inform their political activism. This kind of dual process has
set the precedent for women’s participation in UN conferences: the insider
approach has allowed the women’s movement to become a highly visible
player at the policy table, while outsider approaches have allowed them to
articulate an alternative policy framework to existing international institu-
tions (Higer, 1999). Yet, Bretherton (2003) argues that while women’s move-
ments have the potential for much power, their strategy of engagement has
resulted in rather limited success. The dilemma is that networked women
must learn to work within existing processes of global governance, which,
Bretherton argues, inhibits actions intended to undermine dominant norms
and practices.
The benefits of working inside dominant political structures and insti-
tutions, like the UNFCCC, however, are many. A strategy of engagement,
developing centralised, hierarchical organisational structures and levels of
expertise enables feminists to contribute to, and disseminate, information in
order to challenge the dominant narratives of climate change (Bretherton,
1998). And as Hemmati and Röhr point out ‘if women’s organisations are
not actively involved, gender and women’s aspects will not be addressed’
(2007, p. 6). In other words, getting the word on the page requires a seat at
 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 33
the table. But, as demonstrated above, that seat at the table often requires
the mobilisation of single-axis framings of identity to get the word into the
document.
The challenges of making intersectional arguments within political insti-
tutions are taken up by Kaijer and Kronsell (2014):

Intersectional analyses of institutions may reveal how power structures

are reflected materially but also normatively as norms are reproduced
in practices of political, economic, and social institutions. For climate
issues, political and societal institutions that regulate and create de-
mands for transport, energy, and consumption are particularly rele-
vant. Such institutions both build on and take part in the construction
and reinforcement of injustices and intersectional categorisations.
(Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014, p. 426)

The key to intersectional analyses of institutions, Kaijser and Kronsell ar-

gue, is to look not only at policies and actions but also at the normative as-
sumptions that they reflect. For example, transport policies reflect the travel
needs, priorities and preferences of the white, middle- class male car owner
helping to explain the reluctance to curb car use (Polk, 2009; cited in Kaijser
and Kronsell, 2014). Specific to research on climate change, it is important
not only to look at the adverse impacts of climate change on vulnerable
groups but also to problematise the norms and underlying assumptions that
are naturalised and regarded as common sense (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014).
Writing from a Feminist Institutionalist perspective, Krizsan, Skjeie
and Squires (2012) suggest that before the turn of the century there were
three main approaches to equality in institutional structures: those fo-
cused on only one inequality, mostly gender (a single approach); those that
addressed more than one inequality but treated them as separate and as
specific (a multiple approach); and those that address multiple inequali-
ties in integrated ways (an integrated approach). The authors argue that
due to policy changes in the 2000s, as a state response to pressure from
civil society groups, greater attention was given to an anti- discrimination
approach that tended to judicialise inequality rather than the previously
predominant approach that focused on group-based differences. While
some see this gradual shift towards more intersectional practices in insti-
tutions as positive, others express reservations that the emerging focus on
multiple inequalities could result in downsizing already established gender
equality policies and institutions (c.f. Squires, 2008; Kantola and Nous-
sainen, 2009; Lombardo and Verloo, 2009; Strid, Walby and Armstrong,
2011). This reservation, however, rests on an understanding of intersection-
ality as a theory of identity. While intersectionality places value on the
richness of multiple identities that make every person unique, a primary
understanding of intersectionality as a theory of individual identity over-
emphasises some dimensions of intersectionality while underemphasising
34 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis
others, specifically the intersecting nature of identity and the ways in which
those intersections of identity manifest in structures of marginalisation
and oppression (Collins and Bilge, 2020; see also Chapter 3 for a critical
intersectional framework).
These kinds of debates, Bretherton (2003) suggests, are a matter of per-
spective. She argues that women who adopt an equity perspective, which
tends to prioritise issues associated with women’s political, economic and
social inequality over the interests of the natural environment, are rel-
atively comfortable with insider strategies such as working closely with
governments and international organisations. On the other hand, ecofem-
inists and more radical elements within the broad women’s environmental
movement are deeply suspicious of insider strategies, and the accompa-
nying danger of c o- option (Bretherton, 2003). The issue of c o- option
is an important concern for those who advocate more radical outsider
techniques.
Participation by societal actors is implicit in the concept of global gov-
ernance. Social movements, including the women’s movement, are en-
couraged to participate in global governance, hence the inclusion of civil
society in the UN system, including the UNFCCC (Bäckstrand et al., 2017).
Today, most organisations proclaim their eagerness to listen to women’s
caucuses (or constituencies in the case of climate change). In return there
is an expectation of access and influence. Some argue that this is a case
of states and governments co-opting NGOs for their own purposes since
engagement with NGOs gives states legitimacy (Stienstra, 1999). Through
the UN, NGOs have more access than ever, and for many NGOs this level
of participation has been equated with more power – they are necessary
partners who provide significant contributions to the text. But these NGOs
may have overestimated their influence since they also operate in a global
system of push and pull from transnational corporations and global fi-
nance (Stienstra, 1999). Understanding this dilemma is important because
‘divisions are not trivial; choice of strategy and related ideological posi-
tion are important determinants of cohesiveness in women’s movements’
(Bretherton,
­ 2003, ­p. 109).
Another area that the insider/outsider debate has been explored is in de-
bates on ‘gender mainstreaming’ a concept that has emerged as an attempt to
move away from the discursive essentialisation of women and their concerns.
Gender mainstreaming was developed by international NGOs (INGOs) and
women’s lobby groups operating from a radical feminist framework (Alston,
2014). It was developed as a policy tool aiming to ensure the widespread and
systematic insertion of gendered priorities into the policymaking process.
Alston (2014) reflects that gender mainstreaming emerged as an attempt
to move away from essentialising women’s issues as women’s only issues,
through ensuring that they are instead included throughout all policy areas,
not just those specifically focused on women, and at all stages of the policy-
making process. She states that
 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 35
essentially gender mainstreaming is designed to bring about gender
equality, by exposing gender as a socially constructed phenomenon and
making transparent new possibilities for reshaped, and more equitable
gender arrangements.
(Alston,
­ 2014, p.
­ 289)

But, as a political strategy gender mainstreaming has been criticised for re-
ducing the gender issues to a tick-box exercise and being limited in scope
(c.f. Buckingham and Kulcur, 2009; Wonders and Danner, 2015; Rochette,
2016). Gaard (2015) highlights the bind of these strategic decisions in cli-
mate change negotiations in relation to inserting queer feminist arguments:

Given the gender-blind

­ ​­ ­techno-science
​­ perspective dominating cli-
mate change discussions, queer feminist entry to these discussions has
been stalled, trapped between Scylla and Charybdis: over the past two
decades, discussions have alternated between the liberal strategy of
mainstreaming women into discussions of risk, vulnerability, and adap-
tation, as WEDO has done; or, adopting the cultural feminist strategy
of calling on women’s “unique” capacities of caring for family and for
environment, women’s “special knowledge” and agency based on their
location within gender-role restricted occupations, and lauding wom-
en’s grassroots leadership. In either strategy, “gender” is restricted to
the study of women, and feminist analyses of structural gender inequal-
ities that compare the status of men, women, and GLBTQ others are
completely omitted.
(Gaard,
­ 2015, p.
­ 24)

More scathingly, Susan Hawthorne suggests that ‘gender mainstreaming

asks feminists not to rock the boat, not to go too far, not to demand any-
thing other than equality of treatment in a badly skewed system, rather than
equality of outcomes’ (2004, p. 120). Critics of gender mainstreaming assert
that much of the approach is concerned with simply getting the word on the
page, or counting women into the political process, rather than addressing
the root causes of inequality ( Wonders and Danner, 2015). According to
Hawthorne gender mainstreaming simply ‘encourages feminist projects to
have the same aims as projects that benefit men’.
Alston (2014), as one scholar who sees benefits in strategies of gender
mainstreaming, does not refute criticisms of the strategy but suggests that
there may be a lack of understanding about the goals of the policy tool. She
suggests that while the origin of gender mainstreaming was transformative
it can be interpreted and operationalised in divisive ways. Gender main-
streaming may be understood as: a means of achieving sameness (fostering
women to enter male domains where masculinised norms prevail); dif-
ference (working to ensure that the differing contributions of men and
women are valued in gendered societies); or transformative actions (where
36 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis
transformation of inequitable gender relations is undertaken) (Alston, 2014,
p. 290). It is typically the first operationalisation, and to a lesser extent the
second, that has occurred in political institutions such as the UNFCCC.
Morrow (2017a) concurs that gender mainstreaming needs to be fully in-
tegrated into all aspects of policymaking in more meaningful ways than
has previously been permitted. She suggests that a reconfiguring of gender
mainstreaming could be entirely consistent with ecofeminist values since
it would demand institutional change and work to foster a more profound
enculturation of gender at an institutional and societal level. But for gender
mainstreaming to be successful it requires both attitudes and practices to
change.
The debate over the merits, or lack thereof, of gender mainstreaming can be
read as a proxy for the insider/outsider debate. Those who champion insider
strategies are typically preoccupied with the insertion of words or phrases in
international agreements, which has become the principal measure of their
success, and they fail to demonstrate similar force in relation to monitoring
and compliance (Morrow, 2017a). In many ways women’s movements have
been successful in getting gender on the agenda. But gender mainstreaming
strategies have resulted only in ensuring that women/environment links have
featured on global agendas which neglect to address gender/environment
­
links (Bretherton, 1998). It does not ‘encourage curiosity as to how, why
and in whose interests’ women and gender are perceived as synonymous’
(Bretherton, 1998, p. 95), a flaw that lies in its failure to conceptualise the
more subtle operations of power that intersectionality demands.
Bretherton writes:

Inclusion of women/environment links on global agendas can now be

re-interpreted: it is eminently sensible given the need for women’s coop-
eration in policy implementation. More-over, it enhances the legitimacy
of international decision making, giving the appearance of increased
openness and democratisation. But the added-on nature of women as a
special, separate category – subsequently joined in Agenda21 by youth
and indigenous p eoples – presents no major challenge to existing value
systems or power structures. Attempting to incorporate gender would
involve fundamentally challenging both.
(Bretherton,
­ 1998, ­p. 96)

Spivak is particularly critical of forms of insider organising that fail to

conceptualise power. In her critique of feminist organising at the 1995 UN
Beijing Conference on Women, Spivak fears a ‘proliferation of feminist ap-
paratchicks who identify conference organising with activism, who cannot
successfully imagine the lineaments of the space of existence of the South-
ern grassroots’ (Spivak, 1996, p. 4). She calls out feminists who fail to resist
the ways in which women are being ‘framed’ in the neoliberal agenda that
gender mainstreaming supports and encourages.
 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 37
This point is further reinforced in a study between gender representa-
tion and climate policymaking in Scandinavia in which Magnusdottir and
Kronsell (2015) found that a critical mass of women does not automatically
result in gender-sensitive climate policymaking, recognising established
gender differences in material conditions and attitudes towards climate is-
sues. This study draws upon Ergas and York (2012) whose cross-national
research finds that carbon dioxide emissions were, per capita, lower in coun-
tries where women have higher political status (controlled for factors such
as world system position or industrialisation). Magnusdottir and Kronsell
assert that it would be reasonable to assume these countries would also show
signs of gender sensitivity. The authors argue, however, that a single-minded
focus on women is problematic and instead the focus should be on winning
‘critical acts’ not a ‘critical mass’ (Magnusdottir and Kronsell, 2015). Simply
introducing more women into the policymaking process, without feminist
scrutiny of gendered practices and norms, will not necessarily affect change.
The debate over gender mainstreaming is by no means resolved and the
strategy continues to prevail in political institutions of global governance
such as the UNFCCC. This raises an important question around the kinds of
procedural political strategies that are available to feminists making the case
for gender considerations to be embedded in climate responsive policies: how
can feminists ensure gender is embedded throughout global climate change
policy without resorting to a tick-box approach to including gender concerns?

Questions of Power Dynamics and Hierarchies

In keeping with insider strategies, Tripp (2006) argues that the UN allows femi-
nist movements to create a truly transnational network, rather than simply gain-
ing national influence. Keck and Sikkink (1998) refer to this as a ‘boomerang
effect’ that allows the UN to provide the space for NGOs to bypass their own
states and seek out transnational advocacy networks, whether it be women’s,
environmental, human rights, or indigenous rights in order to pressure their
state from outside (though inside the UN). She argues that one key aspect of
the creation of such a transnational feminist movement was that it gave local
activists of the Global South the opportunity to challenge and change the per-
spectives and priorities of the North. However, scholars such as Higer (1999)
and Kingdon (1984) argue that despite a rhetoric of inclusiveness, transparency
and solidarity, power structures inevitably emerge within feminist networks
that work to silence both disagreement and geographically different positions.
Feminist networks are not removed from internal power relations and
the rhetoric of feminist cohesion can mask considerable dispute. For ex-
ample, Spalter-Roth (1995) describes one instance where disagreement
boiled over into discontent within the feminist movement exposing in-
ternal divisions in strategic goals and direction. Spalter-Roth recalls
that the ‘Washington pro- choice coalition of women’s organisations was
nearly torn apart’ (1995, p. 114) when one organisation – The National
38 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis
Organisation of Women ( NOW) – announced its desire to use methods
of civil disobedience during the 1992 pro- choice demonstration. Eventu-
ally NOW yielded to the vehement objections of its coalition partners who
‘argued that such tactics would be counter-productive in an election year’
(Spalter-Roth, 1995, p. 114). Instead, the coalition relied on more conven-
tional tactics consistent with an insider strategies such as lobbying, pro-
viding policymakers with information, developing media campaigns, and
even writing legislation.
Networks comprising geographically diverse women’s organisations are
entirely heterogenous, made up of a mosaic of individuals, informal groups,
research institutes and more formal organisations concerned with improv-
ing women’s status and pursuing issues perceived to reflect the interests
of women (Bretherton, 2003). Issues of difference are always present, but
reflections from those involved in the feminist environmental movement
suggest that these are not always articulated. For example, Gaard (2017)
recalls feeling uncomfortable in the audience of the Women’s Conference
in Miami ahead of Rio 1992 while one elite speaker after another addressed
the audience. Sitting with queer friends Gaard remembers her feelings of
disengagement; the speakers were not addressing them. Indeed, ‘a social
movement has to be understood as an ongoing social process in which sol-
idarity is continually subject to dissent and negotiation’ (Eschle and Mai-
guashca, 2007, p. 293). So, when a movement claims to speak for all women
but neglects to put issues of importance to women of colour, lesbian/queer
women and working- class women in the policy agenda, serious tensions
can arise.
Heterogeneity or difference within social movements is not simply a question
of varying identities but is also reflective of the inequalities generated by power
relations from which social movements are not immune (Eschle, 2004). For
example, Stienstra (1999) refers to another ‘significant dispute’ (p. 264) which
broke out at the Beijing women’s conference between WEDO and the organis-
ers of the conference. Both groups felt that they should manage the presence of
women’s NGOs during the conference due to their leadership in the women’s
movement. It reflected a tension between WEDO, who had significant lobby-
ing experience in the UN, and the organisers of the conference, who claimed
to be more regionally based and representative. Thus, ‘existing power relations
often determine leadership within social movements’ (Stienstra, 1999, p. 264).
Existing divisions of power are reflected in women’s movements whose
leaders tend to be white m iddle- class women from the Global North, much
like the criticism levelled at the WGC by Olson for putting forward a woman
from a Global South country affected by climate change to read an inter-
vention written by women from the Global North (Olson, 2014). A robust
analysis of the WGC that questions how it can ensure the just inclusion of
diverse voices in ways that do not romanticise marginalised women or make
tokenistic gestures could provide more fruitful modes of participation by a
diverse range of Constituency members.
 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 39
The Activist-Academic
­ ​­ Divide
It is clear from literature both criticising and defending the feminist envi-
ronmental and climate movement, including the WGC as part of the cli-
mate movement, that there is a discrepancy between academic critique of
problematic and simplistic narratives about women and their lives and the
pragmatic approach by practitioners at the forefront of global climate poli-
cymaking. Referring to the environmental justice movement, David Schlos-
berg and Lisette Collins (2014) characterise this distinction as ‘ideal theory’
and ‘pragmatic policy’. The authors draw a clear distinction between three
articulations of climate justice: ideal theory of academic discourse; prag-
matic policy concerns of elite NGOs; and social movement concerns of
grassroots movements. Noting that there is a disconnect between the differ-
ent articulations of climate justice, the authors suggest that this is, at least
in part, due to a lack of conversation between them: ‘as much as their in-
terests and ideas may overlap, these theorists rarely cite movements, and
movements do not commonly refer to academic journal articles to clarify
their positions’ (Schlosberg and Collins, 2014, p. 365). It is this separation
between ‘ideal theory’ and ‘pragmatic policy’ (or separation between ideas
and action) that works to separate academia and activism in troubling ways,
as found in feminist climate politics.
Eschle and Maiguashca (2007) comment on the ‘widespread belief that
academia and activism are separate worlds, driven by contrasting aims and
imperatives and governed by different rules’ ( p. 119). They suggest that the
view that academia and activism are entirely separate worlds is based on a
series of taken for granted and highly problematic ontological dichotomies:
mind/body,
­ theory/practice,
­ reason/emotion,
­ abstract/concrete
­ and ‘ivory
­
tower’/‘real world’. This kind of dualistic construction sets up thinking and
reflecting in opposition to doing and acting. Eschle and Maiguashca (2007)
argue that most feminist writers in global politics see this divide between
academia and activism as problematic and should be challenged. Yet, it is a
tension that still exists in writing on feminist environmentalism and climate
activism. For example, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, Resur-
rección (2013) describes the ‘intellectual unease’ with the idea of a centred
feminine subject in feminist environmental advocacy. When reading this
separation through Schlosberg and Collins’ (2014) framework of ‘ideal the-
ory’ and ‘pragmatic policy’ academic theorising is positioned as superior to
activism and organising.
The separation of ideas and actions is abundantly clear in the narrative
of intersectionality’s complex history offered above. Most contemporary
scholars either ignore or are unaware of intersectionality’s deep connec-
tion to social movements, instead assuming that intersectionality did not
exist until it was ‘named’ in the academy in 1991 (Collins and Bilge, 2020).
Because many of the germinal ideas of intersectionality were generated in
social movements pre- dating ‘Mapping the Margins’ by 10–15 years, they
40 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis
are not commonly included in histories of intersectionality. Not only does
neglecting the writings and activities of the many people who came before
Crenshaw invisibilise an important part of intersectionality’s history, it also
does not do justice to Crenshaw’s arguments. Crenshaw advances intersec-
tionality as a form of critical inquiry and praxis (Collins and Bilge, 2020)
and builds on the ideas of the CRC. The purpose of ‘Mapping the Margins’
is certainly to name intersectionality as a concept but also to draw links
between individual identity and collective identity and to remind readers
that the political importance of intersectional scholarship lies in its contri-
butions to social justice initiatives. It is not to simply advocate for a theory
that is disconnected to social justice concerns. As intersectionality has been
integrated into the neoliberal academy, it has been invited to ‘settle down’
within, rather than unsettling, established frameworks of knowledge pro-
duction (Bilge, 2014). This has led some to question whether intersection-
ality remains critical enough (Bilge, 2013; 2014). But it is intersectionality’s
connection to both academic inquiry and political praxis that provides its
critical potential.
MacGregor takes a slightly different view on what she sees as a ‘strange
and troubling relationship between academic researchers and the activists
or grassroots, non-academic women about whom they write’ (MacGregor,
2006, p. 131). She suggests that there is a tendency by some ecofeminists to
trivialise research and theorising done by feminist academics. She points to
examples of ecofeminists such as Ariel Saleh (1997) and Mary Mellor (1997)
who position the practices of ‘grassroots women’ as superior to the abstract
theorising of ‘postmodern’ feminism. Agreeing with Gaard (1998), MacGre-
gor suggests that ‘it is important to be vigilant against using examples of
activism uncritically to support one’s own ecofeminist positions’ (2006,
p. 133). Clearly then, there are questions, or even tensions, around the rela-
tionship between academics and activists and the different kinds of knowl-
edges created. MacGregor (2006) calls on feminist researchers to imagine a
more cooperative relationship based on dialogue and to acknowledge that
feminist theorising itself has always been connected to the movements and
is its own form of activism. The relationship between theory and practice
is at the heart of this research and as such, this book aims to address the
separation between ideas and actions in relation to feminist interventions in
global climate governance.

Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted some of the dilemmas and difficult strategic
decisions facing feminists pursuing collective political projects. These di-
lemmas raise many questions: how can feminists make collective political
demands without invoking a homogenised framing of gender? How can fem-
inists navigate a theoretical and ideological commitment to intersectionality
 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 41
while still providing firm policy recommendations? How can feminists raise
marginalised voices without romanticising or tokenising women of colour,
indigenous women and Global South women? How can feminist academics
and activists mutually reinforce each other to advance the feminist climate
agenda?
These kinds of questions have motivated many of the scholars showcased
in this chapter, but they have not been asked of the WGC in any sustained
or curious way. Scholars who have levelled some criticism at the WGC, or
feminist environmental activists more broadly, have tended to comment
on the problematic results of decisions made in the face of dilemmas and
difficulties. This criticism is necessary, important and valid. But there is
a need for empirically rooted research that takes these kinds of criticisms
and examines the processes and strategies that have succeeded in inserting
a gender perspective into institutions of global climate governance. There is
a need for empathetic research that recognises that feminist organising in
political spaces such as the UNFCCC is hard, and offers suggestions based
on an understanding of the history.
It is clear from the introductory section of this chapter that feminist en-
vironmental scholars have begun to provide answers to an important set of
questions around the possible ways in which the WGC (or feminist environ-
mental practitioners more generally) could provide better feminist interven-
tions in global climate governance. But this should be preceded by other,
important, questions: what kinds of political and rhetorical strategies does
the WGC rely on? How have the institutional conditions of the UNFCCC
shaped these kinds of strategies? In what ways, if any, has the WGC improved
or adapted its strategies? Robust empirical evidence that answers these kinds
of questions is a necessary pre-requisite to be able to answers questions about
future directions for feminist climate organising. Those answers are neces-
sary because understanding the WGC’s position, and appreciating efforts
made by its members to improve, will encourage a sense of empathy of the
kind of strategic, institutional or political binds that they are in.

Notes

­
42 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis
Bibliography
Alaimo, S., (2009). ‘Insurgent vulnerability and the carbon footprint of gender’,
Kvinder, Køn og Forskning (Women, Gender and Research), ­3–4, ​­ pp.­ ­22–35.
​­
Alber, G., (2009). ‘The women and gender constituency in the climate negotiations’,
Talking Points. (online). Available at: http://www.isiswomen.org/phocadownload/
print/isispub/wia/wia2009-2/2wia09_15talkpoints_gotelind.pdf.
­ ­ ­­ ​­ ­ Last accessed:
29/07/2020.
­ ­
Alston, M., (2014). ‘Gender mainstreaming and climate change’, Women’s Studies
International Forum, 47, pp.
­ ­287–294.
​­ doi: 10.1016/j.wsif.2013.01.016.
­
Anzaldúa, G., (1987). Borderlands/La­ Frontera. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Founda-
tion Books.
­
­ ­ ​­ ­

Arredondo, G., Hurtado, A., Klahn, N., Nájera-Ramírez, O., and Zavella, P. (eds.).,
(2003).
­ Chicana Feminisms: A Critical Reader. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press.
Bäckstrand, K. and Kuyper, J. W., (2017). ‘The democratic legitimacy of orches-
tration: The UNFCCC, non-state actors, and transnational climate governance’,
Environmental Politics, 26(4), ­ pp. ­ ­764–788.
​­ doi: 10.1080/09644016.2017.1323579.
­
Bambara, T. C., (ed.), (1970). The Black Woman: An Anthology. New York: Signet.
Berger, M. T. and Guidroz, K., (2009). The Intersectional Approach: Transforming
the Academy through Race, Class, and Gender. North Carolina: University of
North Carolina Press.
Bilge, S., (2013). ‘Intersectionality undone: Saving intersectionality from feminist
intersectionality studies’, Du Bois Review, 10, pp. ­ 405–425.
­ ​­
Bilge, S., (2014). ‘Whitening intersectionality: Evanescence of race in intersectional-
ity scholarship’, in W-D. Hund and A. Lentin (eds.), Racism and Sociology. Berlin:
Lit Verlag/Routledge,
­ pp.­ ­175–205.
​­
Braidotti, R. et al., (1994). Women, the Environment and Sustainable Development.
London: Zed Books.
Bretherton, C., (1998). ‘Global environmental politics: Putting gender on the
agenda?’ Review of International Studies, 24(1), ­ pp.­ 85–100.
­ ​­
Bretherton, C., (2003). ‘Movements, networks, hierarchies: A gender perspective on
global environmental governance’, Global Environmental Politics, 3(2), ­ pp.
­ ­103–​
­119. doi: 10.1162/152638003322068245.
­
Brody, A., Demetriades, J. and Esplen, E., (2008). Gender and Climate Change:
Mapping the Linkages. Brighton: BRIDGE, Institute of Development Studies
(IDS), University of Sussex.
Buckingham, S. and Kulcur, R., (2009). ‘Gendered geographies of environmental
injustice’, Antipode, 41(4), ­ pp.­ ­659–683.​­ doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2009.00693.
­ ­ ​­
Buckingham, S., (2010). ‘Call in the women’, Nature, 468(7323), p. 502. doi:
10.1038/468502a.
­
Butler, J., (1994). ‘Feminism by any other name’, Differences: A Journal of Feminist
Cultural Studies, 6(2–3),
­­ ​­ pp. ­ ­27–62. ​­
Ciplet, D., (2014). ‘Contesting climate injustice: Transnational advocacy network
struggles for rights in UN climate politics’, Global Environmental Politics, 14(4), ­
pp.­ ­75–96.
​­ doi: 10.1162/GLEP_a_00258.
­
 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 43
Collins, P. H. and Bilge, S., (2020). Intersectionality (2nd edn.), Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Combahee River Collective, (1977). The Combahee River Collective Statement.
(online).
­ ­ ­­ ​­
Available at: https://mronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Keyword ­ ­ ­ ­
20Coalition_Readings.pdf. Last accessed: 29/07/2020.
Crenshaw, K. (1991). ‘Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity poli-
tics, and violence against women of color’, Stanford Law Review, 43(1241), ­
pp. ­ ­1241–1299.
​­
Denton, F., (2002). ‘Climate change vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation:
Why does gender matter?’, Gender and Development, 10(2), ­ pp.­ ­10–20. ​­ doi:
10.1080/13552070215903.
­
Diani, M., (1992). ‘The concept of social movement’, Sociological Review, 40(1), ­
pp. ­ 1–25.
­ ​­
Doherty, B., (1992). ‘The fundi-realo controversy: An analysis of four European
green parties’, Environmental Politics, 1(1), ­ pp. ­ 95–120.
­ ​­
Doherty, B., (2006). ‘Friends of the earth international: Negotiating a transnational
identity’, Environmental Politics, Special Issue guest edited by B. Doherty and T.
Doyle, 15 (4), ­ pp. ­ 860–880.
­ ​­
Ergas, C. and York, R., (2012). ‘Women’s status and carbon dioxide emissions: A
quantitative cross-national ­ ​­ analysis’, Social Science Research, 41(4), ­ pp. ­ ­965–976. ​­
doi: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.03.008.
­
Eschle, C. and Maiguashca, B., (2007). ‘Rethinking globalised resistance:
Feminist activism and critical theorising in international relations’, British
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 9(2), ­ pp. ­ ­284–301. ​­ doi: 10.1111/j.1467- ­ ­ ​­
856X.2007.00284.
Eschle, C., (2004). ‘Constructing “the Anti- Globalisation Movement”’, in C. Eschle
and B. Maiguashca (eds.) Critical Theories, IR and the Anti- Globalisation Move-
ment: The Politics of Global Resistance. New York: Routledge, pp. ­ ­17–35.​­
Gaard, G., (1998). Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference. New
York: Routledge.
Gaard, G., (2015). ‘Ecofeminism and climate change’, Women’s Studies International
Forum, 49(March/April), ­ ­ pp.
­ ­20–33.
​­
Gaard, G., (2017). Critical Ecofeminism. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Garcia, A., (1997a). ‘The development of Chicana feminist discourse’, in L. A. West
(ed.)
­ Feminist Nationalism. New York: Routledge, pp. ­ ­257–268.​­
Garcia, A., (1997b). ‘Introduction’, in A. M. Garcia (ed.) Chicana Feminist Thought:
The Basic Historical Writings, Vols. 1–16. ­ ​­ New York: Routledge, pp. ­ ­1–20. ​­
GenderCC, (2016). ­ Charter of the Women’s and Gender Constituency. (online). Avail-
able: http://womengenderclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WGC_Char-
­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­
ter_2016.pdf. Last accessed: 29/07/2020.
Hawthorne, S, (2004). ‘The political uses of obscurantism: Gender mainstreaming
and intersectionality’, Development Bulletin, 64, pp. ­ 87–91.­ ​­
Hemmati, M. and Röhr, U., (2007). ‘A huge challenge and a narrow discourse: Ain’t
no space for gender in climate change policy?’, Women and Environment Interna-
tional, ­74–75, ​­ pp. ­ ­5–10. ​­
Henrich Böll Stiftung and WEDO, (2009). Gender and Climate Finance: A
Case study from the Philippines. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp- ­ ­­ ​
­content/uploads/2009/01/genderandclimatechangefinance-1.pdf.
­ ­ ­ ­­ ​­ Last accessed:
29/07/2020.
­ ­
44 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis
Higer, A., (1999). ‘International women’s activism and the 1994 Cairo population
conference’, in M. Meyer and E. Prügl (eds.) Gender Politics in Global Governance.
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, pp. 111–126.
Kaijser, A. and Kronsell, A., (2014). ‘Climate change through the lens of intersec-
tionality’, Environmental Politics, 23(3). doi: 10.1080/09644016.2013.835203.
Kantola, J. and Nousiainen, K., (2009). Institutionalizing intersectionality in
Europe: Introducing the theme. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 11(4), ­
pp.­ ­459–477. ​­
Keck, M. and Sikkink, K., (1998), Avtivists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kingdon, J., (1984). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston, MA: Little
Brown.
Krizsan, A. Skjeie, H. and Squires, J., (2012), ‘Institutionalising intersectionality: A
theoretical framework’, in A. Krizsan, H. Skjeie and J. Squires (eds.) Institutional-
izing Intersectionality: The Changing Nature of European Equality Regimes. New
York: Springer, pp. ­ 1–32.
­ ​­
Lombardo, E. and Verloo, M., (2009). Institutionalizing intersectionality in the
European Union? Policy developments and contestations. International Feminist
Journal of Politics, 11(4), ­ pp. ­ ­478–495.
​­
MacGregor, S., (2006). Beyond Mothering Earth: Ecological Citizenship and the Pol-
itics of Care. Vancouver: UBC Press.
MacGregor, S., (2017). ‘Moving beyond impacts: More answers to the “gender and
climate change” question’, in S. Buckingham and V. Le Masson (eds.) Understand-
ing Climate Change through Gender Relations. New York and London: Routledge.
Magnusdottir, G. L. and Kronsell, A., (2015). ‘The (In)visibility of gender in Scan-
dinavian climate ­policy-making’, ​­ International Feminist Journal of Politics, 17(2), ­
pp.­ 308–326.
­ ​­ doi: 10.1080/14616742.2014.896661.
­
Mellor, M., (1997). Feminism & Ecology. New York: New York University Press.
Meyer, M. and Prügl, E., (1999). Gender Politics in Global Governance. Oxford: Row-
man & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Mohanty, C. T., (1984). ‘Under western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial dis-
courses’, Boundary, 2, pp. ­ 333–358.
­ ​­
Moore, N., (2008). ‘Eco/feminism, non-violence and the future of femi-
nism’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 10(3), ­ pp. ­ ­282–298.
​­ doi:
10.1080/14616740802185486.
­
Morrow, K., (2017a). ‘Changing the climate of participation: The gender constitu-
ency in the global climate change regime’, in S. MacGregor (ed.) Routledge Hand-
book of Gender and Environment. London: Routledge, pp. ­ 398–411.
­ ​­
Nagel, J., (2015). ‘Gender, conflict, and the militarization of climate change policy’,
Peace Review, 27(2), ­ pp.
­ ­202–208. ​­ doi: 10.1080/10402659.2015.1037629.
­
Nelson, J., (2012). ‘Is dismissing the precautionary principle the manly thing to do?
Gender and the economics of climate change’, IDEAS Working Paper Series,
­
12(04), pp. ­ ­1–21.
​­
Neumayer, E. and Plümper, T., (2007). ‘The gendered nature of natural disasters:
The impact of catastrophic events on the gender gap in life expectancy, 1981–
­2002’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 97(3), ­ pp. ­ ­551–566. ​­
Olson, J., (2014). ‘Whose voices matter? Gender inequality in the united nations
framework convention on climate change’, Agenda, 28(3), ­ pp.
­ ­184–187.​­ doi:
10.1080/10130950.2014.951215.
­
 Enduring Debates in Feminist Climate Praxis 45
Polk, M., (2009). ‘Gendering climate change through the transport sector’, Women,
Gender and Research, 18(3–4),­­ ​­ pp.
­ 73–82.
­ ​­
Resurrección, B. P., (2013). ‘Persistent women and environment linkages in climate
change and sustainable development agendas’, Women’s Studies International
Forum, 40, pp. ­ ­33–43.
​­ doi: 10.1016/j.wsif.2013.03.011.
­
Rochette, A., (2016). ‘Climate change is a social justice issue: The need for a gender-
based analysis of mitigation and adaptation policies in Canada and Québec’,
Journal of Environmental Law and Practice, 29, pp. ­ ­383–410.
​­
Röhr, U., (2006). ‘Gender and climate change’, Tiempo: A Bulletin on Climate and
Development, (online). Available at: http://www.tiempocyberclimate.org. Last ac-
cessed: 29/07/2020.
­ ­
Röhr, U., (2009). ‘A view from the side? Gendering the united nations climate change
negotiations’, Kvinder, Køn & Forskning Nr (Women, Gender and Research), 3,
pp.
­ ­52–61.
​­
Russell, K., (2007). ‘Feminist dialectics and Marxist theory’, Radical Philosophy
Review, 10(1),­ pp.­ 33–54.
­ ​­ doi: 10.5840/radphilrev200710115.
­
Salleh, A., (1997). Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and the Postmodern. Lon-
don: Zed.
Sasser, J., (2018). On Infertile Ground: Population Control and Women’s Rights in the
Era of Climate Change. New York: NYU Press.
Schlosberg, D. and Collins, L. B., (2014). ‘From environmental to climate justice:
Climate change and the discourse of environmental justice’, Wiley Interdiscipli-
nary Reviews: Climate Change, 5(3), ­ pp. ­ ­359–374.
​­
­

Spivak, G. C., (1987). In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. London: Methuen.
Spivak, G. C., (1993). Outside in the Teaching Machine. New York and London:
Routledge.
Spivak, G. C., (1996). ‘Woman as theatre: United Nations Conference on Women,
Beijing 1995’, Radical Philosophy, 75(Jan/Feb),
­ ­ pp.
­ ­2–4.​­
Squires, P. ed., (2008). ASBO Nation: The Criminalisation of Nuisance. Bristol: Pol-
icy Press.
Stienstra, D., (1999). ‘Of roots, leaves, and trees: Gender, social movements and
global governance’, in Meyer, M. and Prügl, E. (eds.) Gender Politics in Global
Governance. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, pp. 222–231.
Strid, S., Walby, S. and Armstrong, J., (2013). ‘Intersectionality and multiple ine-
qualities: Visibility in British policy on violence against women’, Social Politics:
International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 20(4), ­ pp. ­ ­558–581.
​­
Sturgeon, N., (1997). Ecofeminist Natures: Race, Gender, Feminist Theory, and Polit-
ical Action. New York and London: Routledge.
Terry, G., (2009). ‘No climate justice without gender justice: An overview of the
issues’, Gender & Development, 17(1),­ pp. ­ 5–18.
­ ​­ doi: 10.1080/13552070802696839.
­
Wonders, N. A. and Danner, M. J. E., (2015). ‘Gendering climate change: A feminist
criminological perspective’, Critical Criminology, 23, pp. ­ 401–416.
­ ​­
­
­ ­ ­ ​­ ­
3 Ecofeminist Intersectionality
Inquiry and Praxis

Feminists advocating in spaces of global climate governance come up

against many dilemmas in their political strategy. The questions that are
most interesting from an integrated academic/activist perspective are: how
to make collective political demands without relying on homogenising
single-axis framings of gender? Does working ‘inside’ the system allow femi-
nists more influence than working ‘outside’ the system or does it result in the
co-option of feminist ideas for non-feminist purposes? How can feminists
ensure that marginalised voices are amplified without resulting in little more
than a mere tokenistic gesture? How can feminists translate abstract femi-
nist theorising into tangible policy recommendations in ways that retain the
critical potential of intersectional feminism?
The on-the-ground, practical responses by feminist activists to these com-
plex binds come with the best of intentions aiming to improve the quality
of women’s lives but, as discussed in Chapter 2, have often resulted in per-
petuating images about women’s vulnerabilities, their under-representation
in climate politics and/or their (lack of) sexual freedoms and liberties. As
a means of troubling limited understandings of gender, intersectionality is
an increasingly popular framework that allows the feminist investigator to
explore multiple axes of difference. Kaijser and Kronsell (2014) suggest that
the concept can be an important analytical framework for understanding
the complex dimensions of climate change. Using ‘intersectionality as an
analytical tool fosters more expansive understandings of collective identities
and political action’ (Collins and Bilge, 2020, p. 166), making it an impor-
tant tool for a critical analysis of the kinds of rhetorical and procedural
strategies mobilised by members of the WGC. And, given intersectionality’s
deep connection and rooting in social movements, an intersectional frame-
work can help to put intellectual inquiry and political practice into produc-
tive conversation.
As an analytical tool, intersectionality sheds light on ‘the interaction be-
tween gender, race and other categories of difference in individual lives,
social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the
outcomes of these interactions in terms of power’ (Davis, 2008, p. 68). Kings
(2017) suggests that ecofeminists have been ‘doing’ this kind of intersectional

DOI: 10.4324/9781003306474-3
 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis 47
work for decades by grappling with questions of the interconnected rela-
tionship between the domination of women and the domination of nature
(see also MacGregor, 2017). Ecofeminist projects encompass the oppression
of humans and nonhumans, as well as focusing attention towards the rights
of animals and the natural world, offering a potentially rich dialogue with
intersectionality. But this work rarely informs intersectional frameworks
within (non- ecofeminist) feminist scholarship. Given the lack of attention
to intersectional concepts in most environmental scholarship, coupled with
the lack of concern for ecological issues in feminist frameworks, most in-
tersectional analyses remain highly anthropocentric in nature. This means
that most intersectional frameworks lack the critical tools needed to inter-
rogate the way in which the natural world intersects with multiple lines of
marginalisation and oppression.
It is my aim here to offer such a dialogue between intersectional feminist
and ecofeminist, or feminist environmental, thought as intellectual inquiry
and as political praxis. I take my conceptual lead from Collins and Bilge
(2020) and the ideas laid out in their book Intersectionality. I find this a par-
ticularly useful starting point due to their conceptualisation of intersection-
ality as both a form of critical inquiry and praxis. As a form of inquiry,
intersectionality is inherently critical because it has traditionally ‘challenged
existing bodies of knowledge, theories and epistemologies, methodologies,
and pedagogies, especially in relation to social inequality’ (Collins and
Bilge, 2020, p. 38). When used as a form of praxis, ‘intersectionality refers to
the ways in which people, either as individuals or as part of groups, produce,
draw upon, or apply intersectional frameworks’ (Collins and Bilge, 2020,
p. 39). This praxis is important, though often underemphasised, because
practices make intersectional knowledge possible, ‘especially those that in-
volve criticising, rejecting and/or trying to fix the social problems that com-
plex social inequalities engender’ (Collins and Bilge, 2020, p. 39).
There are two frameworks that underpin the analysis in this book.
Table 3.1 sets out my conceptual framework for ecofeminist intersectional-
ity as critical inquiry. It is structured around Collins and Bilge’s (2020) six
core ideas of intersectionality: social inequality (or inequalities); intersecting
power relations; social context (or contextualisation); relationality; complex-
ity; and social justice (or ecological justice). Following Kaijser and Kronsell’s
direction that ‘for research on climate issues, the intersectional approach
must be informed by a range of social theories as well as theories generated
in research fields that look at the relationship between society and nature’
(Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014, p. 424), intersectional concepts are put into pro-
ductive conversation with feminist environmental concepts. For example,
Tuana’s (2008) commitment to foregrounding the natural context in environ-
mental analysis, Plumwood’s (1993) conceptualisation of dualisms and Mer-
chant’s (1983) thoughts on the backgrounding of women and nature. Naming
this framework as ‘ecofeminist intersectionality’ highlights the hybrid nature
of putting intersectional thought into conversation with ecofeminist ideas.
48 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis
­Table 3.1 A Framework of Ecofeminist Intersectionality

Ecofeminist intersectionality offers the conceptual tools to identify and trouble the
rhetorical strategies of feminist organising in the UNFCCC.

Social Inequality Intersecting Power Relations

• Troubles single-axis
­ ​­ framings of • Reveals how dominant ideologies mask
inequality and the strategic process significant power differences.
of simplification. • Troubles the types of knowledge that
• Interrogates which identities are are privileged by recognising that
promoted and serve as grounds for knowledge is situated.
political action. • Asks how types of legitimate
• Asks which identities, if any, knowledge are related to intersecting
become invisible in these processes. power relations.
• Asks how the natural world is • Asks how multiple power structures
considered in relation to framings of interact in order to objectify and
inequality? instrumentalise nature.
• Requires the symmetrical treatment of
masculinities and femininities.
Contextuality Relationality
• Draws attention to the specific • Embraces a both/and analytical
concerns of groups in specific framework, not an and/or framework.
social contexts. • Shifts focus from seeing categories
• Troubles the relation between the as oppositional to examining their
‘social’ and the ‘natural’ in these interconnections.
contexts. • Interrogates the dualistic construction
• Asks how social contexts are of rhetorical strategies to make feminist
considered in making collective demands.
political demands.
Complexity Ecological Justice
• Acknowledges that doing • Challenges notions of meritocracy and
intersectional work is hard. assumptions of fairness and equality.
• Asks how political projects for • Challenges the ways that dominant
climate change mitigation and ideologies work to obscure inequality.
adaptation can be designed that • Shifts focus from impacts and
achieve emancipation without vulnerabilities towards socially just
essentialising categories or climate solutions.
promoting certain identities while
others remain invisible?

Ideas stemming from feminist environmentalists denoted in italics in order to highlight a

hybrid approach to intersectional investigation.

­
 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis 49
­Table 3.2 A Framework of Transversal Politics

Transversal Politics offers the conceptual tools to consider how intersectionality might
be ‘ done’ in practice.

Solidarity
• Encourages coalition building that takes into account the specific positions of
political actors and is based on principals of solidarity.
• Troubles collective political demands based on strategies that highlight single-
axis identities and homogeneity.
• Accepts that knowledge is partial but that collective entities working together
can better understand the world in which they live.
Epistemic Communities
• Those with similar and compatible values can assume an ‘epistemic
community’ that shares common value systems and can exist across difference.
• Provides an effective strategy for groups to link together in a relation of mutual
equivalence, not of domination and subordination.
Flexible Dialogue
• Advocates for a political dialogue between participants who each bring with
them reflexive knowledge of their own positioning and identity.
• Each participant brings to the dialogue the rooting in their own membership
and identity, but at the same time tries to shift in order to put themselves in a
situation of exchange with women who have different membership and identity.
• Demands that dialogue is ongoing.

movements and translated into intersectional political action. This frame-

work is structured around Yuval-Davis’ key ideas of transversal politics –
flexible solidarity, epistemic communities and ongoing dialogue – and I
have put these into conversation with ideas about feminist environmental
organising, namely Haraway’s (1988) ideas about solidarity politics, Breth-
erton’s (1998) conceptualisations of organising in climate governance and
Morrow’s (2017a) ideas about transversal politics in the WGC.
These two frameworks are not intended to act as a novel common in-
tersectional methodology that can be taken verbatim and applied to dif-
ferent contexts. Rather they should be considered an important dialogue
between intersectional concepts and feminist environmental thought that
can provide a solid base for ecofeminist intersectionality as a mode of crit-
ical inquiry and praxis that can make sense of feminist resistance in the
UNFCCC. In what follows I provide an extended discussion of these two
frameworks.

Ecofeminist Intersectionality as Critical Inquiry

Despite debates surrounding intersectionality, particularly around its meth-
odological application and use in policy circles and political institutions, a
critical framework can harness intersectionality’s potential to highlight and
50 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis
trouble the issues associated with homogenisation based on single-axis iden-
tity markers such as ‘women’. Coupled with ideas articulated by important
ecofeminists and feminist environmentalists, what follows is an important
theoretical contribution for the critical analysis of feminist climate organis-
ing and political institutions such as the UNFCCC.

Social Inequalities
The first of the core ideas outlined by Collins and Bilge (2020) is the need for
intersectional research to pay attention to social inequalities of gender, race,
nation and class that characterise institutional practices. Social inequalities
are the ‘fundamental object of investigation for intersectionality’ (Collins
and Bilge, 2020, p. 224). The use of the plural in inequalities is important
here in drawing attention to multiple axes of inequalities experienced by
any one person. By troubling inequality seen through single-axis lenses – i.e.
­race-​­ or gender-only
­ ­​­­ – ​­and conceptualising social inequality through inter-
actions among various power structures, intersectionality ‘constitutes a way
of understanding and explaining complex social inequalities of the world,
in people and in human experience’ (Collins and Bilge, 2020, p. 224). In this
way, intersectionality can inform different explanations for inequality than
those based on a single-axis framing of identity. An intersectional lens used
to analyse the political strategies employed by members of the WGC can
help to understand how social movements constitute important political re-
sponses to patterns of social inequality, such as the intersections of racism,
sexism, class exploitation and national identity.
One approach to attuning oneself to the multiple axes of social inequality
is as straightforward as Matsuda’s framework of ‘asking the other question’:

When I see something that looks racist, I ask, ‘Where is the patriarchy
in this?’ When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, ‘Where is the
hetero-sexism in this?’ When I see something that looks homophobic, I
ask, ‘Where are the class interests in this?’.
(Matsuda 1991, p. 1189; cited in Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014)

More specifically, an investigation into strategies, particularly rhetorical

strategies, of members of the WGC might ask: Which identities are pro-
moted and serve as grounds for political action? And which identities be-
come invisible in such projects? (Kaijser and Kronsell, p. 422).
The way in which certain (or multiple) identities become invisible or
‘backgrounded’ in collective political projects has been the scholarly focus
of several feminist thinkers, including key ecofeminist thinker Carolyn Mer-
chant. Merchant (1983) used the term ‘backgrounding’ to describe the denial
of women and nature through their connection and their mutual inferiorisa-
tion, providing an important tool for extending the term ‘social inequalities’
to encompass nature in the intersections of marginalisation, oppression and
 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis 51
destruction. Backgrounding is the way that women and nature ‘provide the
background to a dominant foreground sphere of recognised achievement of
causation’ (Merchant, 1983, p. 21). Alaimo reflects on the way background-
ing manifests in ecofeminist projects such as the Chipko movement where
nature became ‘a mere background for the gendered human drama that
unfolds’ (Alaimo, 2008, p. 23). This same process can be seen in popular
depictions of ‘gender and climate change’. A simple Google Image search
typically returns pages of images depicting vulnerable women located in the
Global South, set to a background of a barren landscape to foreground her
plight. Backgrounding certain intersections of social inequality, including
nature and earth others (Plumwood, 2002), is important in analysing rhetori-
cal strategies and discursive framings because, as ecofeminists have demon-
strated, paradigms that omit, or background, ‘race, class, gender, sexuality,
and species effectively ensure that these paradigms will be marked by the
“unmarked”
­ dominant ­group – ​­typically white, male, ­middle-class,
​­ het-
erosexual, and human animals’ (Gaard, 2017, p. 9). Therefore, advocates
looking to challenge such dominant paradigms need to recast the issues in
dialogue with an ecofeminist intersectional framework that highlights mul-
tiple and intersecting social inequalities.

Intersecting Power Relations

Collins and Bilge (2020) stress that important to intersectional analyses is
the recognition that social inequality is not natural, normal or inevitable.
In this way, intersectionality provides an important tool for understand-
ing intersecting power relations and how they produce social inequalities, as
well as political responses to them. Intersecting power relations should be
analysed (or resisted) across specific intersections of power such as racism,
sexism, capitalism or hetero-sexism but also across intersecting domains of
power, namely structural, disciplinary, cultural and interpersonal.
Collins and Bilge suggest that the framework of power domains offers an
important heuristic, or thinking tool, for examining power relations. The
structural domain of power refers to the fundamental structures of institu-
tions, such as the UNFCCC, and their rooting in power relations of mascu-
linity, patriarchy, racism or capitalism (and I would add anthropocentrism).
The cultural domain of power refers to the increasing significance of ideas
and culture in ways that help to manufacture and disseminate dominant
narratives. For the purposes of my analysis, the cultural domain of power
helps to position climate change as a scientific and technocratic issue, back-
grounding issues of social inequality. The disciplinary domain of power
refers to the rules and regulations that are fairly or unfairly applied to dif-
ferent people or groups. Collins and Bilge (2020) explain this in the context
of the FIFA World Cup which shows how intersecting power relations are
organised and operate in a social institution where the ideology of ‘fair play’
masks significant power differences such as who gets to play and how, and
52 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis
where? Finally, the interpersonal domain of power refers to the way that
individuals experience the convergence of the structural, disciplinary and
cultural domains of power in ways that perpetuate intersecting lines of mar-
ginalisation and oppression or social inequalities.
There are two feminist conceptual tools that are crucial to this line of
inquiry into domains of power and the way in which they produce social
inequalities: situated knowledges and the symmetrical treatment of mas-
culinities and femininities. Situated knowledges, a concept used widely in
feminist research, particularly in Feminist Geography and International
Relations, acknowledges that all knowledge is partial precisely because
knowledge is situated. That is, rooted not simply in one’s own positionality,
but also in the situatedness of that positionality in political time and space
(c.f. Haraway, 1988; Rose, 1997). Proponents of situated knowledges argue
that all knowledge is produced in specific circumstances and that those cir-
cumstances shape it in some way. Kaijser and Kronsell (2014) suggest that
theories of situated knowledges are useful in intersectional analyses of in-
stitutions and encourage feminist analysts not only to look at policies and
actions but also at the normative assumptions that they reflect. For example,
the dominant ideology of climate change as a scientific and technological
issue masks significant and multi-axis differences in power, both in terms of
setting the agenda and in terms of how the agenda is experienced (speaking
to both cultural and interpersonal domains of power).
The concept of situated knowledges provides the theoretical tools to chal-
lenge the legitimacy of dominant framings in climate politics, by offering
different stories based on different situated knowledges. Kaijser and Kro-
nsell explain this in specific reference to connecting climate change to gen-
der concerns:

To speak in terms of situated knowledge rather means a questioning of

universal claims of knowledge production; not all women give birth,
and if they do, it is often only a fraction of their life experience. The con-
ditions of life vary so significantly between, for instance, a female sub-
sistence farmer in a low-income country and a Western female academic
that the knowledge emerging from those positions varies considerably,
which means that one should be careful to talk about a particular fe-
male experience or perspective. Different knowledges are generated by
differences in economic resources, division of labour, and place.
(Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014, p. 423)

This quote highlights two important ways that the concept of situated knowl-
edges can aid intersectional analyses of domains of power. First, Kaijser and
Kronsell trouble the use of rhetorical strategies that rely on universalising
claims about women and their lives by addressing the complexity and varia-
tion of women’s experiences. But this quote also speaks to the importance of
recognising that academic knowledge can be very different to other forms of
 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis 53
knowledge. Both forms of knowledge production are important in making
political claims about women and women’s experiences. Therefore, Kaijser
and Kronsell suggest that an intersectional analysis should ask: what type
of knowledge is privileged in dealing with climate change? How is the un-
derstanding of what is legitimate knowledge related to social categories and
power relations? And how do multiple power structures interact in order to
objectify and instrumentalise nature? These are important questions in an
analysis of domains of power and their role in shaping social inequalities.
The symmetrical treatment of masculinities and femininities in feminist
research addresses the criticism that attempts to bring in intersectional lines
of critique to environmental policy circles have often failed to account for
the plurality of gender itself and its place in webs of power. Bretherton (1998)
has noted, for example, that attempts to put ‘gender’ on the agenda have
resulted, not in the incorporation of gender per se, but rather the addition
of women to existing frameworks and policy positions allowing dominant
(masculinised) ideologies to prevail. Bretherton asserts that ‘gender –
understood as a relational term which would focus critical attention upon
men and the operation of male power – has not reached the global envi-
ronmental agenda’ (Bretherton, 1998, p. 92). While Bretherton made these
observations over 20 years ago, little has changed in the intervening years.
Gender has remained synonymous with women (as a single-axis category)
and women remain, problematically, the focus of policy attention. Breth-
erton draws upon influential feminist writing on gendered organisations,
specifically the work of Joan Acker (1990) who argues that organisations,
despite being assumed to be gender neutral, are in fact organised by gen-
dered power structures. Acker engages with Kathy Ferguson’s 1984 book
The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy, which conceptualises bureaucracy
as an organisation of male power constructed through abstract discourses
on rationality, rules and procedures (much like the UNFCCC). In response
to this overwhelming organisation of power bureaucrats, workers and cli-
ents are all feminised in their powerlessness. Acker (1990) however points
out that such a metaphor for feminisation not only uses a stereotype of fem-
ininity as oppressed, weak and passive but also, by equating the experience
of male and female clients, women workers and male bureaucrats, obscures
the specificity of women’s experiences and the connections between mascu-
linity and power. She asserts that the origins of Ferguson’s analysis in Fou-
cauldian theory can account for the problem since Foucault himself fails to
place gender in his own analysis of power.
The work of Bretherton and Acker is critical of the asymmetrical treat-
ment of masculinity and femininity and highlights the importance of pay-
ing attention to the workings of masculinity and male power in feminist
analyses. Such asymmetrical treatment results in analyses that focus on
women, femininities and feminisation, but does not hold the analytical ca-
pacity to consider the role of masculinity and male power. Kronsell’s 2005
study which applies Connell’s (1995) theorising of ‘hegemonic masculinity’
54 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis
to military and defence institutions is particularly useful in highlighting
how paying attention to the workings of masculinity and male power aids in
analysis across domains of power. Kronsell suggests that the silence on he-
gemonic masculinity is possible because ‘once a particular set of behaviours
has been established as the norm for appropriate conduct within any insti-
tution, it becomes difficult to critique, in part because normativity makes
certain practices appear “natural”, beyond discussion’ (Kronsell, 2005,
p. 288). Read through the framework of domains of power, a particular set
of behaviours are established as the norms (structural), they become diffi-
cult to criticise (disciplinary) and they appear natural and beyond discus-
sion (cultural). These power relations are then experienced by individuals
across multiple and intersecting lines of oppression and marginalisation in
different ways (interpersonal). To aid such a critique, Kronsell advocates
a feminist critical analysis that questions what appears normal in institu-
tional practice by listening to the voices of women who challenge the norm
of hegemonic masculinity. She takes Cynthia Enloe’s germinal approach
of ‘feminist curiosity’ when questioning the previously taken for granted
in order to ‘bring in more narratives about the international than are usu-
ally voiced’ (Kronsell, 2005, p. 288). However, Kronsell criticises Enloe for
her focus on women whose lives remain ‘outside’ of hegemonic institutions
and for underestimating the significance of the transformative work of those
who work on the ‘inside’. Thus, Kronsell encourages scholars to ask:

what happens when women engage in institutions of hegemonic mascu-

linity? What types of insight do they gain? How can that knowledge be
related to a feminist project?
(Kronsell,
­ 2005, p.
­ 288)

Treating gender as an analytical category rather than simply an empirical

one (i.e., understanding gender as encompassing both femininities and mas-
culinities rather than the sexed differences between men and women) re-
quires the symmetrical analysis of both the workings of masculinities and
femininities and has a long history in feminist scholarship (c.f. Harding,
1986; Connell, 1987; 1995; Peterson, 2005). The aim is to find new avenues
into the dense and complicated problems of explaining the extraordinary
persistence through history and across societies of the subordination of the
feminine, making it an important tool for analyses across domains of power.

Contextuality
The third core idea as named by Collins and Bilge (2020) is social context.
This encourages intersectional analysis to recognise the specific concerns of
groups in specific social contexts. As Collins and Bilge (2020) point out the
term ‘contextualise’ comes from the impetus to think about social inequal-
ity, relationality and power relations in a social context. Tuana provides an
 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis 55
illustrative example of this in her research on how the impacts of climate
change are shaped by power relations. In her 2008 study of Hurricane Kat-
rina, ‘Viscous Porosity: Witnessing Katrina’ Tuana places the devastation
of New Orleans in relation to various intersecting forms of marginalisation.
She demonstrates that those most marginalised in New Orleans were less
likely, or even unable, to evacuate prior to the hurricane, the result of which
made uncomfortably visible how climate change interacts with existing so-
cial structures. The specific context of Hurricane Katrina demands that in-
tersectional stories are told about lived experiences of climate events. Thus,
universalising claims about women’s vulnerability to the effects of climate
change fail to draw adequate attention to social context. Not all women (or
men) everywhere will be affected in the same ways. Furthermore, in Wit-
nessing Katrina, Tuana writes ‘the urgency of embracing an ontology that
rematerializes the social and takes seriously the agency of the natural is
rendered apparent’ (Tuana, 2008, p. 188).
Important to the study of feminist political strategies in the UNFCCC,
but missing in most intersectional frameworks, is the separation of the
‘social’ and the ‘natural’. The way in which knowledge practices in both the
natural sciences and the social sciences have been divorced from each other
does not provide an adequate contextual view of lived experiences of climate
change (Tuana, 2008). Tuana stresses that the world cannot be divided into
two neat and tidy piles and that ‘witnessing the world through the eyes of
Katrina reveals that the social and the natural, nature and culture, the real
and the constructed, are not dualisms we can reasonably separate’ (Tuana,
2008, p. 209). It is the interaction between them that is important. Tuana
calls upon feminist theory and practice to abandon ontological divides be-
tween nature and culture in an effort to better understand the world, as
well as our place in it. She suggests interactionism as a means of compelling
researchers to speak of the social context without importing the mistaken
notion that this social context somehow exists independently of, or prior
to, cultures and environments: ‘it serves as witness to the materiality of the
social and the agency of the natural’ (Tuana, 2008, p. 210). That is not to
say that nature should be treated as an empirical category of analysis, sim-
ply added onto an ever-growing list. Rather, as Kaijser and Kronsell (2014)
point out, the aim of intersectionality is to widen our perspective to reflect
on the factors that may be relevant in a particular context. Attention to the
social context, including the natural context, provides the conceptual tools
to do so.
The historical context is equally integral in the process of contextual-
isation in ecofeminist intersectional analyses. The historical context is of
particular importance in the study of climate justice movements precisely
because of the rapid shift seen in attention given to climate change as a po-
litical issue. Those scholars who have criticised feminist environmentalists,
including feminist climate activists (such as those discussed in Chapter 2)
were not writing in an age of a ‘climate emergency’ giving weight to the
56 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis
urgency of climate action. MacGregor has written about the effects of ur-
gency in post-political discourse that gives the impression that ‘we are all in
the same leaking boat careening towards the apocalypse’ (MacGregor, 2014,
p. 620) and obscure differences in lived experiences of climate change. Sim-
ilarly, early activism in the UNFCCC was not taking place in a time where
the concept of intersectionality enjoyed the popularity that it does today.
In this way, attention in intersectional frameworks to the historical context
encourages a sense of empathy for what is, or is not, possible. But it also
draws attention to how different historical contexts might open up spaces
for intersectional praxis. For these reasons, the term ‘contextualisation’ is
perhaps more fruitful for an ecofeminist intersectional framework than so-
cial context. Contextualising the social, natural and historical contexts in
intersectional inquiry enables a more complex and nuanced narrative.

Relationality
The fourth core idea, relationality, informs all aspects of intersectionality
by embracing a both/and ­ analytical framework rather than either/or­ frame-
work. At its most basic, this logic provides a simple heuristic in challeng-
ing the ‘seemingly simple idea that entities that are treated separate may
actually be interconnected’ (Collins and Bilge, 2020, p. 232). Embracing a
both/and analytical framework shifts the focus from seeing categories as op-
positional to examining their interconnections. This helps to highlight the
idea that identity is not an a-political, individualistic category but is always
constructed in relation to and within social, natural and historical contexts
shaped by intersecting power relations. The insight that ‘entities that have
historically been conceptualised as separate and oppositional are intercon-
nected and interrelated constitutes a major contribution of intersectionality
to a variety of intellectual and political projects’ (Collins and Bilge, 2020,
p. 233). A both/and framework helps to trouble the political necessity of sim-
plification, or atomisation – i.e. reducing ‘gender’ to narrow man-woman
binaries – r isks reinforcing categorisations and invisibilises how differences
are socially constructed and context-specific (Kaijser and Krsonell, 2014).
A both/and framework rejects the idea that humans are ‘atomistic, autono-
mous individuals in need only of basic legal rights to protect our freedom of
choice’ (Chambers, 2013, p. 6).
The atomisation of individuals with fixed attributes (e.g. womanhood) al-
lows them to be dissociated from wider webs of power (Resurrección, 2013)
and from each other. For example, Mies (1982) describes how lace-makers
of Narsapur, India, are viewed as ‘non-working housewives’, their work
a ‘leisure-time activity’ keeping them entirely atomised and disorganised
as workers, and ensuring that their work remains outside of the realms of
productive work resulting in its devaluation. Merchant (1992) comments on
how the atomisation of humans and nature has resulted in the illusion that
humans can ‘master’ climate change (see also Seager, 2009). Mechanical
 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis 57
conceptualisations of Earth as separated from humans are so totalising that
Merchant describes it as the Death of Nature:

As the unifying model for science and society, the machine has perme-
ated and reconstructed human consciousness so totally that today we
scarcely question its validity. Nature, society, and the human body are
composed of interchangeable atomised parts that can be repaired or
replaced from outside.
(Merchant,
­ 1992, ­p. 48)

Mohanty asserts that in an atomising and totalising framework ‘questions of

history, collective memory, and social and structural inequality’ (Mohanty,
2003, p. 209) are inadmissible since they are fundamentally at odds with
institutional fabrics. In resisting these institutional fabrics relationality of-
fers new political relationships between historically disenfranchised groups
(Collins and Bilge, 2020). Relational terminology such as ‘solidarity’ and
‘coalition’ can help intersectionality to emerge from within coalition build-
ing for environmental justice movements (I return to this point below).
Rhetorical strategies of simplification and atomisation that invisiblise
the relationship between identities should be troubled because ‘fixing differ-
ence and turning it into categories […] excludes those who do not fit in these
static categories and denies social struggle, contestation, and the complexity
and fluidity of identities’ (Alaimo, 2009; cited in Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014,
p. 421). This can result in the homogenisation of groups whereby differences
among them are disregarded for strategic purposes. Plumwood (1993) sug-
gests that homogenisation in gender stereotyping is well known ‘involving the
appeal to homogenous and eternal male and female “natures”’ (Plumwood,
1993, p. 54). But homogenisation can occur in any heterogenous group, not
just the groupings of ‘women’ and ‘men’. For example, homogenisation is a
feature of the colonial relationship where all colonised people are alike and
not considered on personal terms or as individuals (Plumwood, 1993). Even
the natural world is homogenised and ‘defined negatively and in relation to
humans as “the environment”’ (Plumwood, 1993, p. 70). The kind of insen-
sitivity shown to the natural world under the category of ‘the environment’
treats beings in nature as if they are all alike in their defectiveness, ‘their
lack of human qualities’ (Plumwood, 1993, p. 70 existing emphasis). Posi-
tioning nature, including the natural world and all earth others in relation to
humans, results in a dualistic construction that subordinates nature under
humans resulting in what Plumwood terms as ‘radical exclusion’ or hyper-
separation, negating the relationality between them.
The feminist tool of critical deconstruction of binaries can help draw at-
tention to how issues are framed in oppositional terms, for example wom-
en’s marked vulnerability versus men’s assumed invulnerability. Feminist
environmental scholars are attuned to seeing how things are discursively
framed in particular dualisms that work to position contrasting concepts
58 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis
(for example, masculine and feminine gender identities, or human and na-
ture) through a lens of domination and subordination, constructed as op-
positional and exclusive (Plumwood, 1993). The critical deconstruction of
dualisms highlights the ways in which that which is regarded as feminine
is constructed in opposition to that which is regarded as masculine. Such
opposition not only dichotomises masculinity and femininity but also, de
facto, ranks men above women and culture above nature (Mathews, 2017).
It is this entrenchment of hierarchical dualisms in Western thought (e.g.
­
man/woman, ­
culture/nature, ­
mind/body, ­
reason/emotion, ­
ideas/actions)
that places the traits associated with maleness over those associated with
femininity that is central to feminist scholarship.
The concept of dualisms is an illuminating means of understanding and
deconstructing rhetorical strategies in climate politics. Plumwood suggests
that ‘what is at stake here is not the distinctions between men/women, and
human/nature, but rather their dualistic construction’ (Plumwood, 1993,
p. 33). That dualistic construction, Plumwood argues, is not merely that
the terms in each binary are dichotomised and ranked as relative (either/or
logics), but that the subordinate terms are instrumentalised to, or made
to appear as it is created for the purposes of serving, the dominant term.
Mathews (2017) illustrates this relationship by pointing out that the body
(in Western worldviews) is seen as merely a vessel for the mind, rather than
having significance in its own right. Furthermore, the ‘inferior’ term in the
binary is backgrounded with respect to the superior (e.g. the private sphere
figures only in the background to the public sphere). Seen through this anal-
ysis, it is clear how dualisms legitimise not only male domination, but also
domination in general, thus crucial to an intersectional analysis because
dualistic constructions can only be properly understood if seen relationally.
Dualisms are constantly ­re-imagined
​­ and ­re-applied
­​­­ – ​­coloniser/colonised,
­
public/private, productive/reproductive and so forth. The superior cate-
gory, or the master category, does not always distinguish men from women
but rather maleness from femaleness. For example, in colonial contexts, a
white woman might assume the master identity in relation to indigenous
or colonised peoples, though their position would be merely honorary. As
Mathews explains, ‘the white women in the colonial context might assume
a masculine-tinged identity in relation to the native people, who will be
glossed over as feminine’ (Mathews, 2017, p. 59). In other words, she is both
a woman and white. This is the importance of a logic that allows for both/and­
reasoning.

Complexity
The fifth core idea, complexity, acknowledges that doing critical intersec-
tional work, inquiry and praxis, is hard! Both because intersectionality it-
self is multifaceted, as demonstrated by this framework, but also because
 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis 59
intersectionality aims to analyse the complexity of the world and it requires
intricate strategies to do so. Collins and Bilge (2020) point out that this can
be a ‘source of frustration for scholars, practitioners, and activists alike’
(p. 34). As Kaijser and Kronsell (2014) put it ‘when relying on categorisations
of people, there is a risk of falling into determinism and neglecting the com-
plexity and constant renegotiation of power relations’ (p. 423). Recognising
and understanding that frustration is an important part of this research.
Complexity is not something that can be achieved by deploying an inter-
sectional framework, rather it is something that deepens intersectional anal-
ysis. Complexity allows researchers to acknowledge that single-axis framing
of identity can be mobilised under certain circumstances but ‘the fluidity
and constructedness of categories should always be kept in mind’ (Kaijser
and Kronsell, 2014, p. 423). Complexity is key to understanding the political
landscape facing feminist climate activists, as demonstrated in the questions
posed by Kaijser and Kronsell: how can political projects for climate change
mitigation and adaptation be designed that achieve emancipation without
essentialising categories or promoting certain identities while others remain
invisible? In other words, how do feminists do intersectionality? I return to
this question below and offer some tentative answers through a framework
of transversal politics as intersectional praxis.

Ecological Justice
The sixth core idea, social justice, has historically informed much of inter-
sectionality’s critical inquiry and political praxis. Indeed, the connection
to social justice is what makes intersectionality critical (Collins and Bilge,
2020). The commitment to articulating a goal of social justice is important
in challenging notions of meritocracy and beliefs that economic inequal-
ity, for example, is the outcome of fair competition and fully functioning
democratic institutions (Collins and Bilge, 2020). In this framing, social in-
equalities can exist without it being socially unjust. But an intersectional
commitment to social justice challenges this view by highlighting the ways
in which social inequality is reproduced in ways that are neither fair nor
just. It challenges the researcher to trouble norms and rules in the name of
fairness, or even equality, that, while applied equally to everyone, produce
unequal and unfair outcomes.
The notion of justice also has important significance in the climate move-
ment. Discussions of ‘climate justice’ have gained traction in global climate
policy with notable impacts (Okereke, 2010). In the climate justice move-
ment, the term ‘justice’ rhetorically plays two important roles. First, it high-
lights the ‘injustice’ of climate change, acknowledging differential impacts
and vulnerabilities that cut across multiple and intersecting lines of social
inequality. Second, it suggests a human r ights-based approach to climate
solutions (c.f. Climate Just, 2017; Friends of the Earth, n.d.; United Nations,
60 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis
n.d.; Mary Robinson Foundation, n.d.). That is, the focus on justice acts as
a signal to move on from making arguments based on material impacts and
vulnerabilities towards making the case for just climate solutions. It is a
positive force for change. For these reasons, I find the term ecological justice
more apt in an ecofeminist intersectional analysis.
This framework of ecofeminist intersectionality for critical inquiry in-
forms my analysis in this book by helping to identify and analyse the rhe-
torical strategies mobilised by members of the WGC and to assess how
they challenge or fit into dominant framings of gender in the UNFCCC.
But, as Collins asserts, intersectionality on its own is unlikely to yield
more effective political solutions because ‘analysis is important, yet ac-
tion also matters’ (Collins, 2017, p. 1467). ‘Thinking’ one’s way out of
domination is unrealistic so ‘how might more sophisticated analyses of
power that take into account the ties linking violence, intersecting op-
pressions and domination facilitate more robust analyses of political re-
sistance?’ (Collins, 2017, p. 1467). This is a question that has motivated a
number of scholars to turn to ‘transversal politics’ as a means of ‘doing’
intersectionality.

Transversal Politics as Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis

In the face of the political, social, economic, and ecological urgencies
of our times, the viability of social movements that may build an alter-
native future depends on how well we can practice radical relationality
and deep reciprocity with each other and with nonhuman animate and
inanimate beings, and work together in co-resistance.
(Collins and Bilge, 2020, p. 235)

The idea of relationality is of particular importance to intersectional praxis,

found in terms such as ‘dialogue’, ‘conversation’, ‘interaction’, ‘community’,
‘solidarity’ and ‘coalition’. Writing about the work of the WGC, Morrow
(2017a) shows that the task of coalition building across highly heterogeneous
yet administratively convenient constituencies is a difficult challenge. She
suggests that Yuval-Davis’ (1997) concept of transversal politics has been a
key tool to overcome this as a means of developing collective identity and
action:

Transversal politics appears to offer an excellent opportunity to build

upon the recognition of intersectionality that is a key response to the
ecofeminist conception of compound disadvantage, as it can, among
other things, potentially capitalize on the politics of multiple overlap-
ping identities, identifying important elements of commonality that can
promote coalition building.
(Morrow,
­ 2017a, p.
­ 403)
 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis 61
Transversal politics – a concept stemming from autonomous Left and fem-
inist politics in Bologna – offers a solution to the bind of the ‘universalistic’
politics of the Left on one hand and identity politics on the other (Yuval-
Davis, 1997). It avoids the traps of ethnocentrism and exclusionary practices
while challenging the essentialism associated with reifying boundaries be-
tween groups. Transversal politics also challenges the principals of ‘identity
politics’ which conflate individual and collective identities that assume any
member of any social category or identity can speak for all other members
of that identity (Yuval-Davis, 2006). The transition from identity politics to
transversal politics has made clearer the separation between the individual
and collective voice, thereby offering ‘an exciting means to progress beyond
the deadlock that inevitably ensues from a need for total agreement in forg-
ing subject-specific alliances, requiring instead an openness to dialogue as a
means to arriving at a common perspective’ (Morrow, 2017a, p. 404).
Transversal politics offers a potential solution to some of the dilemmas
of feminist organising in climate governance that I discussed in Chapter 2.
There are three core principles that inform this framework of transversal
politics based on Yuval-Davis’ (1997) conceptualisation of intersectional
praxis: solidarity politics; epistemic communities; and flexible dialogue, all
building upon the relational language of intersectionality.

Solidarity Politics
Transversal politics emphasises coalition building that takes into account
the specific positions of political actors (Collins, 1998). The notion of co-
alition building is a concept that has inspired several feminist thinkers.
For example, Mohanty describes the ‘urgent political necessity of forming
strategic coalitions across race, class and national boundaries’ (Mohanty,
2003, p. 18). Such strategic coalitions, as Arruzza, Bhattacharya and Fraser
(2019) argue, should be based upon the principles of solidarity not same-
ness. Sameness is precluded by the ideas of intersecting power relations and
complexity, yet it is at the root of many of the criticisms of feminist envi-
ronmental activism in that universalising claims presuppose a sameness of
the category of ‘woman’ that intersectionality challenges. Solidarity, on the
other hand, presents a radical challenge to the status quo by demanding a
redistribution of power. Mohanty defines this solidarity

in terms of mutuality, accountability, and the recognition of common in-

terests as the basis of relationships among diverse communities. Rather
than assuming an enforced commonality of oppression, the practice of
solidarity foregrounds communities of people who have chosen to work
and fight together. Diversity and difference are central values here – to
be acknowledge and respected, not eased in the building of alliances.
(Mohanty,
­ 2003, p.
­ 7)
62 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis
This kind of solidaristic politics is influenced by a long history of feminist
theorising about feminist political resistance. For example, Haraway (1988)
theorises a coalition politics that is about diverse social actors engaging in
strategies that embrace multiple ‘situated knowledges’ about the world and
creating new collective eco-political entities in the hopes of surviving to-
gether (see also Di Chiro, 2008, p. 280). Coalition politics, like intersection-
ality, accepts that knowledge is partial (c.f. Haraway, 1988; Rose, 1997) but
that collective entities working together in solidarity can better understand
the world in which they live.

Epistemic Communities
Transversal politics does not assume that solidarity among different groups
is without boundaries or that each and every conflict is reconcilable. But
similar and compatible values can cut across differences in positioning and
identity and assume what Alison Assiter (1996) calls ‘epistemological com-
munities’ (see also Yuval-Davis, 1997). These epistemological (or epistemic)
communities share common value systems and can exist across differ-
ence.1 This speaks closely to the ideas of mutual equivalence in Laclau and
Mouffe’s pivotal book ‘Hegemony and Social Strategy: Towards a Radical
Democratic Politics’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). The purpose of this book is
to highlight, against a certain type of Marxist economic reductionism, that
the working class has no necessary or preordained ‘leading role’. Instead,
the authors argue that an effective strategy for the Left must be to link to-
gether a number of autonomous movements in a relation of mutual equiv-
alence, not of domination and subordination. For Laclau and Mouffe, the
term hegemony designates precisely the linking together, or ‘articulation’,
of heterogenous struggles and demands into a bloc which must oppose the
political ‘right’.
­
The work of articulation is not merely ideological or cultural, although
it is these things too. It also takes place across material institutions and
practices and is political work in the fullest sense. Political work can help to
keep a sense of the ‘centrality of radical democratic politics to our tradition’
(MacGregor, 2014, p. 629) and challenge the very concept of a ‘global we’,
highlighting multiple and intersecting lines of oppression and marginali-
sation meaning that ‘we’ do not all experience climate change in the same
ways. By ‘articulating’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; see also Mouffe, 2005) the
‘them vs us’ (Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser, 2019), feminist environ-
mental co-resistances (that is linked resistances of heterogenous struggles
and demands) can create a political and collective identity that can unite
different social movements in common resistance, not common identity, re-
sisting the political necessity of homogenisation.
­
 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis 63
struggle against her imprisonment in the 1970s had been limited to only
those who shared her politics, the campaign would never have been suc-
cessful (Yuval-Davis, 1999). As shown in Chapter 2, however, even within
feminist environmental movements, there are many strands of self-identified
feminists who may have very different opinions, goals or even preferences in
political strategy. Yuval-Davis suggests that ‘transversal politics stop where
the proposed aims of the struggle are aimed at conserving or promoting un-
equal relations of power, and where essentialised notions of identity and dif-
ference naturalise forms of social, political and economic exclusion’ (1999,
p. 97). This may be clear cut in some cases, but far more complicated in
others. For example, campaigns about women’s control of their own bodies
might simultaneously prioritise struggles for the legislation of abortion in
one location and they might prioritise against forced sterilisation in another
(Yuval-Davis, 1999). But, if there are limited human and financial resources
available and the movement must choose only one of those struggles at any
one time, then transversal political offers no built-in way of deciding which
one to choose (Yuval-Davis, 1999). That is not the point of transversal pol-
itics. Yuval-Davis points out that there is no ‘end of history’ or ‘end goal’
for political struggles, precisely because of the complexity of intersectional
work (1997, p. 135). Instead, transversal politics might offer a means of mu-
tual support and greater effectiveness in the continuous struggle, through
flexible and ongoing dialogue.

Flexible Dialogue
Transversal politics advocates for a political dialogue between participants
who each bring with them reflexive knowledge of their own positioning and
identity (Yuval-Davis, 1999), embodying intersectional frameworks. The
importance of dialogue stems from Collins’ argument in Black Political
Thought (1990) that

each group speaks from its own standpoint and shares its own partial
knowledge, situated knowledge. But because each group perceives its
own truth as partial its knowledge is unfinished.
(Collins,
­ 1990, ­p. 236; cited in Yuval-Davis,
­ ​­
1997 p. 125, existing emphasis)

Partiality, not universality, is the condition of being heard and so dialogue is

critical to the success of this approach. In this way, it is clear how transver-
sal politics offers an exciting method of intersectional political work in the
WGC. The Italian activists that influenced Yuval-Davis referred to this pro-
cess of dialogue as ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Each partic-
ipant brings with them to the dialogue the rooting in their own membership
and identity, but at the same time tries to shift in order to put themselves
in a situation of exchange with women who have different membership and
64 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis
identity. It is important that the process of shifting should not involve self-
decentring nor should it homogenise the ‘other’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997). The
process of rooting and shifting should not be considered a straightforward
or fixed process (Yuval-Davis, 2006) speaking to the complexity of intersec-
tional inquiry and practice. Rather, ‘the point of transversal politics is to
transcend the binary divisions of those who are in different positionings in
the dialogue’ (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 284). The process of rooting should not
be considered as simply relational but instead a process of deep engagement.
The aim of the rooting process is not to simply imagine oneself in relation to
the social category of the Other, but also to consider the different kinds of
relationships that can be developed through transversal politics. Similarly,
it is not possible in the process of shifting to simply imagine oneself in the
narrative of the Other but those narratives may be envisioned in very differ-
ent ways than the narrator intended (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Not only does this
point speak to the complexity of intersectional praxis but it highlights the
importance of ongoing dialogue in any transversal politics.

Conclusion
In sum, my analysis applies the conceptual frameworks of ecofeminist in-
tersectionality as critical inquiry and praxis to my investigation of feminist
resistance in the UNFCCC. My critical intersectional framework is a hy-
brid of feminist and ecofeminist and/or feminist environmental ideas and
offers the conceptual tools to identify and trouble the rhetorical strategies
employed by feminists organising in the UNFCCC and to comment on the
procedural strategies through which the WGC engages in the UNFCCC.
This chapter has offered two interrelated frameworks: ecofeminist inter-
sectionality as critical inquiry and as critical praxis. I mobilise these frame-
works in the second half of this book to analyse the empirical material
during fieldwork.

Note

Bibliography
Acker, J., (1990). ‘Hierarchies, jobs, bodies: A theory of gendered organizations’,
Gender & Society, 4(2),
­ pp.
­ ­139–158.
​­
Alaimo, S., (2008). ‘Ecofeminism without nature? Questioning the relation between
feminism and environmentalism’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 10(3),
­
pp.
­ ­299–304.
​­
 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis 65
Alaimo, S., (2009). ‘Insurgent vulnerability and the carbon footprint of gender’,
Kvinder, Køn og Forskning (Women, Gender and Research), ­3–4, ​­ pp. ­ ­22–35. ​­
Arruzza, C., Bhattacharya, T. and Fraser, N., (2019). Feminism for the 99%. Lon-
don: Verso.
Assiter, A., (1996). Enlightened Women, Modernist Feminism in a Postmodern Age.
London: Routledge.
Bretherton, C., (1998). ‘Global environmental politics: Putting gender on the
agenda?’ Review of International Studies, 24(1), ­ pp. ­ 85–100.
­ ​­
Chambers, C., (2013). ‘Feminism’, in M. Freeden and M. Stears (eds.) The Oxford
Handbook of Political Ideologies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 562–582.
Climate Just, (2017). Why Does Climate Justice Matter? (online). Available at:
­ ­ ­­ ­​­­
https://www.climatejust.org.uk/messages/why-does-climate-justice-matter. ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last
accessed: 29/07/2020.
­ ­
Collins, P. H., (1990). Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the
Politics of Empowerment. New York: Routledge.
Collins, P. H., (1998). Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice. Min-
nesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Collins, P. H., (2017). ‘On violence, intersectionality and transversal politics.’ Ethnic
and Racial Studies, 40(9),­ pp.
­ ­1460–1473. ​­
Collins, P. H. and Bilge, S., (2020). Intersectionality (2nd edn.), Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Connell, R., (1987). Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Connell, R. W., (1995). Masculinities. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Davis, K., (2008). ‘Intersectionality as buzzword: A sociology of science perspective
on what makes a feminist theory useful’, Feminist Theory, 9(1), ­ pp. ­ ­67–85. ​­
Di Chiro, G., (2008). ‘Living environmentalisms: Coalition politics, social repro-
duction, and environmental justice’, Environmental Politics, 17(2), ­ pp. ­ ­276–298. ​­
doi: 10.1080/09644010801936230.
­
Ferguson, K., (1984). The Feminist Case against Bureaucracy. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
Friends of the Earth Europe, (n.d.). Climate Justice in Depth. (online). Available at:
www.foeeurope.org/climate-justice-in-depth.
­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 29/07/2020. ­ ­
Gaard, G., (2017). Critical Ecofeminism. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Haraway, D. J., (1988). ‘Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism
and the privilege of partial perspective’, Feminist Studies, 14(3), ­ pp. ­ ­575–599. ​­ doi:
10.2307/3178066.
­
Harding, S. G., (1986). The Science Question in Feminism. New York: Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
Kaijser, A. and Kronsell, A., (2014). ‘Climate change through the lens of intersec-
tionality’, Environmental Politics, 23(3). doi: 10.1080/09644016.2013.835203.
Kings, A. E., (2017). ‘Intersectionality and the changing face of ecofeminism’, Ethics
and the Environment, 22(1), ­ pp. ­ ­63–87.
​­
Kronsell, A., (2005). ‘Gendered practices in institutions of hegemonic mas-
culinity’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7(2), ­ pp.
­ ­280–298. ​­ doi:
10.1080/14616740500065170.
­
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C., (1985). Hegemony and Social Startegy: Towards a Radical
Democratic Politics. London: Verso.
MacGregor, S., (2014). ‘Only resist: Feminist ecological citizenship and the post-
politics of climate change’, Hypatia, 29(3), ­ pp.­ 617–633.
­ ​­ doi: 10.1111/hypa.12065.
­
66 Ecofeminist Intersectionality: Inquiry and Praxis
MacGregor, S., (2017). ‘Moving beyond impacts: More answers to the “gender and
climate change” question’, in S. Buckingham and V. Le Masson (eds.) Understand-
ing Climate Change through Gender Relations. New York and London: Routledge,
pp.
­ ­15–30.
​­
Mary Robinson Foundation, (n.d.). ‘Principles of Climate Justice’, (online). Avail-
­ ­­
able at: https://www.mrfcj.org/principles-of-climate-justice/ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­
(Last accessed:
12/06/2020).
­ ­
Mathews, F., (2017). ‘The Dilemma of dualism’, in S. MacGregor (ed.) Routledge
Handbook on Gender and Environment. London: Routledge, pp. ­ ­54–70. ​­
Matsuda, M. J., (1991). ‘Beside my sister, facing the enemy: Legal theory out of coa-
lition’, Stanford Law Review, 43(6), ­ pp. ­ ­1183–1192. ​­
Merchant, C., (1983). The Death of Nature. New York: Harper & Row.
Mies, M., (1982). The Lace Makers of Narsapur: Indian Housewives Produce for the
World Market. London: Zed Books.
Mohanty, C. T., (2003). Feminist without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing
Solidarity. Durham, NC & London: Duke University Press.
Morrow, K., (2017a). ‘Changing the climate of participation: The gender constitu-
ency in the global climate change regime’, in S. MacGregor (ed.) Routledge Hand-
book of Gender and Environment. New York: Routledge, pp. ­ ­398–411.
​­
Mouffe, C., (2005). On the political: Thinking in Action. London and New York:
Routledge.
Okereke, C., (2010). ‘Climate justice and the international regime’, Wiley Interdisci-
plinary Reviews: Climate Change, 1(3), ­ pp. ­ ­462–474. ​­
Peterson, S. V., (2005). ‘How (the meaning of) gender matters in political economy’,
New Political Economy, 10(4), ­ pp. ­ ­499–521. ​­ doi: 10.1080/13563460500344468.
­
Plumwood, V., (1993). Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. London: Routledge.
Plumwood, V., (2002). Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason. Lon-
don and New York: Routledge.
Resurrección, B. P., (2013). ‘Persistent women and environment linkages in climate
change and sustainable development agendas’, Women’s Studies International
Forum, 40, pp. ­ ­33–43.
​­ doi: 10.1016/j.wsif.2013.03.011.
­
Rose, G., (1997). ‘Situating knowledges: Positionality, reflexivities and other tactics’,
Progress in Human Geography, 21(3), ­ pp. ­ ­305–320.
​­ doi: 10.1191/030913297673302122.
­
Seager, J., (2009). ‘Death by degrees: Taking a feminist hard look at the 2° climate
policy’, Women, Gender and Research (Kvinder, Køn & Forskning), ­3–4, ​­ pp.­ ­11–21.
​­
Tuana, N., (2008). ‘Viscous porosity: Witnessing Katrina’, in S. Alaimo and S. Hek-
man (eds.)
­ Material Feminisms. Indiana: Indiana University Press, pp. 188–212.
United Nations, (n.d). Climate Justice. (online). Available at: https://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/climate-justice/
­ ­ ­ ­­ ​­ (Last
­ accessed: 12/06/2020).
­ ­
­
­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ​­
­ ­
­ ­ ​­
­
­ ­ ­ ​­ ­
4 From Zero Gender to GAP
Foregrounding Gender in
UNFCCC History

A key motivation for this book was wanting to understand the adoption of
the Gender Action Plan (GAP) in 2017 and its subsequent renewal in 2019.
The GAP represents a pivotal moment in the history of feminist organising
in the UNFCCC, which has gone from being entirely gender-blind at its
formation in 1992 to having so many mentions of gender in 2017 that a GAP
was required to streamline the policies for implementation. The advocacy/
lobbing efforts of the WGC appears to have been integral to this shift. Yet,
as discussed in Chapter 2, most histories of the UNFCCC fail to acknowl-
edge this important political work. The lack of knowledge surrounding
feminist advocacy and activism in the UNFCCC has meant that academic
critiques of feminist environmental practice (such as Arora-Jonsson, 2011;
MacGregor, 2017) have included the WGC under this umbrella without the
necessary contextualisation of feminist climate activism. This results in a
lack of understanding about the specific successes of and challenges facing
the WGC in lobbying the UNFCCC ensuring its transition from zero gender
to GAP.
This chapter fills an important gap in existing literature on gender and
climate change by offering an empirically grounded history of feminist or-
ganising in the UNFCCC. This history is based on data from participant
observation, interviews, and archival documents.1 Through analysis of the
empirical data I have organised this history into three key phases of fem-
inist organising in the UNFCCC, though given the nature of an historical
account there are some overlaps between them. The first phase, 1992–2007,
represents an early, zero-gender phase of strong feminist voices in the COP
but a lack of attention from Parties. The second phase 2007–2014 repre-
sents a period of relative success whereby, due to more formal organising
within the feminist community, gender became increasingly mainstreamed
throughout the UNFCCC. The final phase, 2014–2021, represents another
period of transition towards implementation through the negotiation, and
subsequent renewal, of the Gender Action Plan (GAP).

DOI: 10.4324/9781003306474-4
68 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
Phase 1: Zero ­Gender – ­​­­1992–2007
​­
The UNFCCC as a ‘Rio Convention’ opened for signature at the Rio Earth
Summit in 1992 and by 21 March 1994 it had gained enough signatures to be
ratified and entered into force (UNFCCC, 2020i). The Convention’s adop-
tion was remarkable for its time since there was far less scientific evidence
surrounding climate change than there is today. Borrowing a line from the
very successful Montreal Protocol, the UNFCCC ‘bound member states to
act in the interests of human safety even in the face of scientific uncertainty’
(UNFCCC, 2020i). The first UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP1)
was held in Berlin in March 1995. At this time, despite a handful of feminist
activists lobbying for a gender perspective to be included in the negotiations,
the UNFCCC remained largely gender-blind. It was not until 2001 that the
first gender decision was agreed by the COP, Decision 36/CP.7 ‘Improving
­
the Participation of women in the representation of Parties established under
the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol’ (UNFCCC, 2001a). This remained the
only gender decision for some time and the period between 1992 and 2007
can mostly be characterised as ‘zero gender’, except for Decision 28/CP.7
‘Guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action
(NAPAs)’
­ (UNFCCC, 2001b).2 Decision 28/CP.7 called on Parties to the COP
to design and submit National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)
to be a complementary approach to existing plans and programmes, includ-
ing attention to ‘gender equality’, ‘simplicity’ and ‘cost- effectiveness’ among
others. On my analysis, this phase has three distinct periods: Early Days:
1992–2002;
­ ​­ Getting Organised: 2003–2005
­ ​­ and Gaining Momentum: 2006– ­ ​
2007. Figure 4.1 shows the primary, or most important, events of this phase
of zero gender.

A much more organised

Gender Network

2005 Significant
UNFCCC
First COP Gender Decision discursive shift
‘Decision 26/CP.7’ on towards
Participation of Women adaptation

2001 2006 Formal

alliances:
The UNFCCC was adopted at GenderCC
the Rio Earth Summit (LIFE,
Beginnings
COP1 and ‘Solidarity in the of a Gender ENERGIA,
1992 Greenhouse’ Coalition WECF); GGCA
Kyoto (WEDO,
1995 2003 IUCN, UNDP)
Protocol

1997 2007

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

­Figure 4.1 Gender in the UNFCCC 1992–2007 (light grey flags denote UNFCCC-
wide developments, dark grey flags denote gender-specific developments).
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 69
Early Days: ­1992–2002
​­
Following an initial gender-blind UNFCCC it took several years after the
Rio Earth Summit in 1992 before gender appeared in a COP decision under
the UNFCCC. But, as Morrow asserts, ‘if the institutional machinery of the
UNFCCC was slow to grasp the significance of gender to climate change, the
same was not true for women themselves’ (2017b, p. 35). Feminist activists
have engaged in the UNFCCC process since before COP1 (see Chapter 1)
and have ‘provided constant enthusiasm, expertise and support and advo-
cacy’ (Participant B, 2018, interview). At COP1 a local organisation called
‘Women for Peace and Ecology’ hosted an international women’s forum with
the title ‘Solidarity in the Greenhouse’ (Women for Peace and Ecology, 1995).
According to a newsletter account of the event, the forum was held in parallel
to the official negotiations and was attended by more than 200 women from
25 countries who came together to discuss and exchange views on climate
protection from a gender lens (Women for Peace and Ecology, 1995). Despite
great appetite for lengthy in-depth conversations by the attendees, the organ-
isers ‘only had limited space as a result of lacking financial means, [meaning
that they] had to reduce the four forums to half a day each’ (Women for Peace
and Ecology, 1995, p. 7). Refusing to be deterred, the newsletter reports that
attendees continued their conversations past the designated time and into the
corridors, coffee rooms and even official COP1 evening receptions.
‘Solidarity in the Greenhouse’ helped build momentum within the net-
work of feminist activists organising in the UNFCCC process to advocate
for the connection between environmental degradation and issues of wom-
en’s equality:

The context between environment and development on the one hand

and issues of violence and women’s issues on the other was pointed out,
together with the fact that feminist contributions have to be inserted
into the environment-political agenda as an integral part.
(Women for Peace and Ecology, 1995, p. 7)

In these early days of feminist organising within the UNFCCC the term
‘feminist’ was used liberally by activists. For example, in a newsletter cir-
culated after ‘Solidarity in the Greenhouse’ one of the conference organis-
ers, Eva Quinstorp set out her vision for a ‘climate politics from a feminist
view-point’. Quinstorp suggested that a feminist climate politics was needed
because: (a) the majority of the extremely poor are women and children, (b)
modern natural science and technological development, which pretends to
be ­gender-,​­ ­interest-,​­ and ­class-neutral,
​­ complies with economic growth and
mobility-mania and (c) alliances of feminists and environmental activists
and experts were organising themselves simultaneously for the UN Social
Summit in Copenhagen, the Climate Conference in Berlin and the UN
70 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
Women’s Conference in Beijing (Quinstorp, 1995, p. 10). Feminist discus-
sions were taking place in other international forums, and it was time that
the UNFCCC took note.
This kind of linking to other international forums is a common tactic in
the feminist environmental community, who at this time were likely bold-
ened by events at the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing
1995. In a personal account of the conference Jo Freeman, an American
feminist and political scientist recalls that although most issues had been
discussed at previous conferences, the environment was added to the agree-
ment at this time (Freeman, 1996). I would describe this period as a kind
of Golden Age of feminist organising on climate change with the Beijing
Platform for Action on Women not only providing a document that they
could point to, or draw upon, but also providing healthy fertilising ground
for feminist movement building. WEDO had been in attendance with over
4,000 representatives of over 20,000 NGOs (United Nations, 1995), provid-
ing plenty of opportunity and cross-fertilisation as well as potentially pro-
viding an explanation for the strong level of feminist organising in these
early days of the UNFCCC.
The main organisers of ‘Solidarity in the Greenhouse’, Eva Quinstorp
and Alexandra Wandel, sent an open letter to Angela Merkel, President of
the COP and then German Minister of Environment, as well as the former
Minister for Women and Youth. An excerpt of the open letter states:

How do you respond to our demand that NGO representatives from

women’s and environmental organisations have as much influence at
the UN Conference as business lobbies from the coal and oil-producing
countries who are preventing an energy tax not only by the Clinton-
Gore administration, but also in the EU and in Germany? If the con-
ference bows to the pressure from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in setting
up its rules of procedure and adopts a consensus rule, every step toward
CO2 reductions will be nullified.
(Quinstorp and Wandel, 1995)

Two primary concerns can be read from this excerpt, both of which are
linked to the structure of the UNFCCC. The first relates to civil society par-
ticipation in the UNFCCC. Initially, there were two formal constituencies –
the business and industry non-governmental organisations (BINGOs) and
the environmental non-governmental
­ ​­ organisations (ENGOs)
­ (UNFCCC,
­
2020a), speaking to the technocratic nature of these early days of the
UNFCCC. Women and Gender was not yet a recognised constituency and
the excerpt above speaks to the power dynamics that are at play in this set
up. Quinstorp and Wandel suggest that BINGOs were in fact hindering the
process through the power that they held. The second concern is with the
decision-making process itself, warning against the system of consensus (and
de facto veto), that is in place today. This kind of ‘system- change’ approach
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 71
is emblematic of the network of feminist climate activists at the time with
general anti- capitalist sentiments running through documents from 1995
(International Women’s Forum, 1995; Quinstorp, 1995). The small network
of feminists took every opportunity to point out the inadequacies of the ‘free
market’ and ‘economic growth’ in any attempt to tackle climate change. The
evidence shows that in these early days feminist climate activists were advo-
cating a distinctly feminist (if not explicitly intersectional) climate politics.

Getting Organised: ­2003–2005

​­
After 1995 it took several years to regain this level of momentum. However,
Röhr (2017, interview) noted in our interview that records suggest that there
were some women’s activities and position papers distributed at COP3 Kyoto
in 1997, although these are no longer available. However, there was an e-mail
sent out by an Australian delegate asking why women’s organisations were
not more strongly present at COP3 and why they did not take more notice
of the conference. Partly in answering her own question the delegate sug-
gested: ‘The arguments used here are almost entirely economic. Decisions
are made mostly with little consideration being given to survival. Perhaps
women felt that they could not penetrate this masculine perspective – and
stayed home’ (Sargent, 1997; cited in Hemmati and Röhr, 2009). Despite
the presence of feminist climate activists who were advocating a feminist
approach to climate politics, the professional make-up of Party delegates in
the early days of the COPs included people who hailed predominately from
economics, science and law (Participant B, 2018, interview), meaning that
activists found it difficult to make arguments about intersecting social ine-
qualities. The lack of presence of women may have been more of a structural
issue than simply an issue of wilful dismissal of gender issues since women
(and gender) was not yet an official constituency. Not holding constituency
status meant that women’s NGOs did not enjoy benefits of access to the
Plenary floor, invitations to limited-access workshops and meetings and so
on (see UNFCCC, 2020a for constituency benefits). Competition for access
to the negotiations was particularly fierce in 1997, with 9,850 registered par-
ticipants compared to 3,969 at COP1 in 1995 and just 1,584 at COP2 in 1996
(UNFCCC, 2020g). The reason for this was that COP3 Kyoto was the COP
that agreed the Kyoto Protocol, the first UNFCCC treaty to reduce global
emissions (UNFCCC, 1997). I discuss in the concluding section of this chap-
ter how key moments tend to coincide with a drowning out of gendered con-
cerns (see Figure 4.4), so when all is considered I do not see much reason to
be surprised at the lack of evidence of feminist activity at this time.
As a result, despite a handful of gender based side events (see GenderCC,
2000) the COP remained mostly gender-blind. But in the years immediately
following the Kyoto Protocol, one prominent issue did begin to emerge:
the low participation of women in the negotiations. A number of articles
and statements were published by the daily newsletters that are circulated
72 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
during the COP and related meetings of the Parties (such as The Earth
Times, ECO, and Equity Watch) criticising the low participation of women
(see for example Climate Action Network, 2001). This led to the adoption
of the first ever gender decision under the UNFCCC resulting in Decision
36/CP.7
­ ‘Improving the participation of women in the representation of Par-
ties in bodies established under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change or the Kyoto Protocol’ (UNFCCC, 2001a) at COP7 Mar-
rakech in 2001. Civil society organisations (CSOs) pointed out that neither
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) executive board, COP7 Work-
ing Group chairs nor the Bureau of the COP featured even one woman on
their boards (Climate Action Network, 2001, p. 2). The decision itself was
proposed by Samoa and supported by Russia and the European Union (EU)
and called for more nominations of women to bodies under the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol. It also tasked the Climate Secretariat (or UN Cli-
mate Change) with monitoring the gender composition of these bodies and
with bringing the results to the attention of the Parties, a practice that still
stands today.
Hemmati describes the feminist organising at this time as ‘rather sketchy
and uncoordinated’ (Hemmati, 2005, p. 2), somewhat ad hoc and reliant on
a handful of individuals. But COP9 Milan in 2003 provided an opportu-
nity for those working on gender and climate change issues to re-group and
come together with a view of organising more coherently, establishing their
goals and priorities within the negotiations. Women’s and gender NGO
LIFE – Education, Environment, Equality, in co-operation with similar or-
ganisations ENERGIA – International Network on Gender and Sustaina-
ble Energy, and Women in Europe for a Common Future ( WECF), hosted
an informal meeting to address the question ‘Is gender an issue in climate
change negotiations?’ (LIFE, ENERGIA, and WECF, 2003). According to
minutes from the meeting, the 30 or so people that attended the meeting on
5 December 2003 were all in agreement that that gender had been a miss-
ing component of the climate change negotiations and that more action
was needed to make gender more visible in the process (LIFE et al., 2003).
I discussed this event with Röhr, who was one of the event organisers. She
noted her surprise at such levels of interest in the issue of gender and climate
change, something she had felt, despite the small steps of progress made,
was a hugely marginalised issue (Röhr, 2017, interview). The purpose of the
meeting was to discuss strategy and resulted in the conclusion that a more
formalised network for gender advocacy was required if feminists were to
make more headway in influencing the negotiations.
It took two years of strategising, but this new and more formal network
was implemented at COP11 Montreal in 2005 (GenderCC, 2005). In prepa-
ration, Hemmati drafted a strategy paper (Hemmati, 2005) which identified
possible entry points for gender aspects in the climate change debate, with a
particular focus on the Global North. This was in contrast with the majority
of scholarship on gender and climate change and gender and environment
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 73
social movement priorities at this time which tended to focus on women
located in the Global South and highlighted their disproportionate vul-
nerability to the effects of climate change (see for example Cannon, 2002;
Masika, 2002). Hemmati’s (2005) paper called for women’s organisations,
researchers and others working on climate change to develop a strategy to-
wards a more effective effort to have the gender aspects of climate change
included in a future regime. She pointed to a series of specific entry points
to be addressed when looking at the gender aspects of climate change in
the Global North specifically, which included: health issues (e.g. mortality
and caring work), economic issues (e.g. energy prices, health costs and food
security/nutrition), social issues (e.g. natural resource conflicts and eco-
nomic and environmental migration) and gender roles and gender-specific
attitudes (e.g. power and decision-making and risk perception) (Hemmati,
2005, pp.
­ 4–5).
­ ​­
Reports from the time show that the feminist network additionally or-
ganised a series of events including: raising awareness and disseminating in-
formation via an exhibition booth called ‘gender-justice-climate’;
­­ ­​­­ ​­ a written
statement which was handed out to delegates ( Women at COP11 and MOP1,
2005a); the first ever intervention (or statement) to the COP Plenary on gen-
der (Women at COP11 and MOP1, 2005b); and the creation of a mailing list
that is still in use today (GenderCC, 2005). This level of organisation marks
a shift in feminist strategy:

individuals and organisations working on women & environment issues

are a bit stuck – maybe not in a cul- de-sac, but at least at a cross-roads.
Over the last few decades, we have moved from activism “outside”
the political processes (literally outside the buildings and conference
rooms) to advocacy on the “inside”. Much of the early activism was to
ensure access to the policy-making processes, highlighting the need for
women’s participation to ensure quality of discussion and legitimacy
of outcomes. Nowadays, women’s organisations are being consulted in
many national processes, their representatives are being invited to ad-
vise governmental delegations, and women are recognized as a “Major
Group” in many UN processes, participating actively as NGOs, civil
society representatives, and stakeholder dialogue participants. In many
fora, we have opportunities to speak at negotiating sessions and/or lobby
delegates at meetings, distribute materials, etc. We are nowadays being
asked for inputs, comments, ideas, strategies, paragraphs (including the
rather exploitative mechanisms that often come with that). Much of
the work is professionalized; there are highly educated women doing the
work – the research, the advocacy, and implementation in governments
and elsewhere. These mechanisms have been used by women’s organ-
isations in many processes, and have resulted, at least in many cases,
in more gender-sensitive decisions and policies. However, women are
still far from equal representation in decision-making. And many areas
74 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
remain where we have not moved from general statements concerning
gender issues to the necessary concrete and substantive recognition of
gender specific aspects of particular issues.
(Hemmati,
­ 2005, p.
­ 24)

This quote demonstrates a that clear strategic decision was taken to work
inside the official UNFCCC structures with a view to gaining access inside
the institution, a successful decision that resulted in feminists gaining much
more power to influence the agenda. But the quote also demonstrates a con-
cern that the greater opportunities afforded to the feminist network were
rooted in exploitative mechanisms. Despite the dangers of working inside
the UNFCCC, GenderCC hints at the excitement felt by feminist climate
activists stating that ‘after almost ten years of on-off and largely uncoordi-
nated participation by women’s organisations, the direction from COP1 had
been found again’ (GenderCC, 2005). Those involved approached the nego-
tiations with more purpose, focus and strategic thinking than ever before.

Gaining Momentum: ­2006–2007

​­
The momentum established from feminist efforts at COP11 in 2005 helped
to propel organising efforts into COP12 Nairobi in 2006, the first climate
change conference to focus on sub-Saharan Africa. This COP marks a sig-
nificant shift in discourse from mitigation to adaptation and so provided a
strategically convenient entry point for women’s equality advocates, who
had recently begun to formalise their activities. They used this opportu-
nity to make visible the point that while women are particularly affected by
global environmental changes, they also play a key role for the development
and implementation of adaptation measures ( Waititu, 2006). In other words,
women are not just vulnerable victims to the effects of climate change, but
they are also powerful agents of change. This point was relayed to Parties in
an eloquent intervention made by Annabell Waititu from Kenya. In closing
she made the sassy remark: ‘therefore, we call for a creative and integrated
approach to climate change policy. If you are lacking in ideas, women are
prepared to contribute!’ (Waititu, 2006).
COP12 Nairobi was presided over by the first ever sub-Saharan Afri-
can country and because of this Röhr points out that the issue of wom-
en’s vulnerability to the worst effects of climate change slotted well into the
discourse that was shifting towards adaptation, and was something that
continued into COP13 Bali:

So, this was for me, it really was the starting point and just because
we got attention only by evidencing women as the most vulnerable. So,
what we have to do, my experience was, to get to end with gender into
these processes, or women into the process, we had to take this approach
as an entry point on women are the most vulnerable. And so, for that
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 75
reason, and I remember it very well in Bali, you’ll have to look for the
dates or COP numbers, but in Bali that was for me the first conference
where much more focus was put on adaptation. Beforehand it was much
more on mitigation, so it was a shift in issues because of pressure from
development corporations, or organisations, working in these areas.
(Röhr, 2017, interview)

This entry point played well in a strategy intended to advocate on the ‘inside’
and represents a distinct shift in feminist organising in the UNFCCC that
would come to shape the future of the Constituency. But it is important to
point out that this shift was not one that was welcomed by all feminist cli-
mate activists. Rather, for many who had been engaging with the UNFCCC
for many years, such as Röhr, it was a necessary strategic manoeuvre to
integrate other stories about women and their lives.
In keeping with a more insider approach, COP13 Bali in 2007 saw what
had been a loose collective of feminist climate activists became more for-
malised with the emergence of two broad coalitions: GenderCC – Women
for Climate Justice was created out of the small group of NGOs present
within the negotiations including LIFE, ENERGIA and WECF; and The
Global Gender and Climate Alliance (GGCA) formed between WEDO, the
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). While GenderCC was a coa-
lition of small gender focused NGOs, GGCA was more institutionally fo-
cused. This was, at least in part, because WEDO had much more experience
in bringing gender into the negotiations, having been a strong force at the
Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and so favoured a more formal means of working
directly with UN organisations (Meyer and Prügl, 1999). Though the two
alliances disagreed on certain issues such as finance and carbon markets
(see GenderCC, 2007a; 2007b), both alliances worked very closely together
creating the Women’s Caucus which met (and still does) every morning from
9am to 10am during the negotiations. This marked a move towards a more
formal role in the UNFCCC infrastructure and the beginning of a two-
year process towards the caucus being recognised as an official UNFCCC
constituency.
Constituency status, while not a compulsory or binding requirement for
observer NGOs, comes with several benefits including: access to the Plenary
floor in the form of an intervention; allocation of secondary badges when
‘site access limiting’ is planned by the Secretariat; receipt of informal ad-
vance information from the Secretariat; timely information through daily
meetings; occasional and very limited invitation to Ministerial receptions
by host Governments; access to bilateral meetings with officials, invitation
by the Secretariat to limited-access workshops between sessional periods,
etc. (UNFCCC, 2020a). To become an official constituency, the group must
apply and serve a two-year term similar to a kind of probation. The purpose
of this two-year process is to allow NGOs to demonstrate that they can work
76 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
together as a constituency, but a more cynical view might suggest that it also
has the added benefit of ensuring those on ‘probation’ play by the rules, and
an exercise of disciplinary power if read through an intersectional frame-
work. The Women’s Caucus (caucus being the name given to those waiting
for full constituency status) had applied as the Women and Gender Constit-
uency, a point of departure from the UN wide Women’s Major Group on
which it was based. The inclusion of ‘gender’ in ‘women and gender’ was
intended to communicate the intention to take a more inclusive feminist
approach to climate action (see Morrow, 2017a).
Despite the increasing formalisation of the Women’s Caucus in the
UNFCCC, the institution remained largely gender-blind. As of 2006
only one decision relating specifically to gender existed, Decision 36/CP.7
(UNFCCC, 2001a) intended to increase the participation of women, and
one other decision mentioning gender equality Decision 28/CP.7 (UNFCCC,
2001b), suggesting a persistent resistance from decision makers in the
UNFCCC process. As noted above, feminists and gender advocates were
being increasingly called upon to feed into gender-responsive climate policy
ideas but these efforts rarely translated into official policy. Instead, policy-
makers stalled, calling for more specific data, as opposed to the anecdotal
evidence seen to be provided by the Women’s Caucus. A report of a high-
level roundtable on ‘How Changing Climates Impact Women’ at COP13 in
2007, George Pataki, former Governor of New York and US Representative
on Climate Change to the UN General Assembly remarked ‘we have heard
powerful anecdotes. What we need now is gender-specific data on climate
change’ (Pataki, 2007 in Council of Women World Leaders, WEDO and
Henrich Böll Stiftung, 2007). He further goes on to state that ‘there is a need
for research, gathering data and documentation of gender specific conse-
quences of climate change’ (Pataki, 2007 in Council of Women World Lead-
ers, WEDO and Henrich Böll Stiftung, 2007), despite years of research,
policy recommendations and position papers (see for example Kronsell,
2005; United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2005; Davion, 2009).
Lorena Aguilar, Senior Gender Advisor at IUCN, at the same event noted
that

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) notes that

“the impacts of climate change will fall disproportionately upon devel-
oping countries and the poor persons within all countries, and thereby
exacerbate inequities in health status and access to adequate food, clean
water, and other resources.” We also know that 70-80% of overall deaths
were women in the 2004 Asian Tsunami. In Bangladesh, women suf-
fered the most following the cyclone and flood of 1991. Among women
aged 20- 44, the death rate was 71 per 1000, compared to 15 per 1000
men. Warning information was transmitted by men to men in public
spaces, but rarely communicated to the rest of the family. Without se-
cure access to and control over natural resources (land, water, livestock,
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 77
trees) women are less likely to be able to cope with permanent climatic
change or willing to make investments in disaster mitigation measures.
(­Aguilar, 2007 in Council of Women World Leaders,
WEDO, and Henrich Böll Stiftung, 2007, ­p. 5)

Thus, the calls for more specific data, despite clear evidence that the knowl-
edge exists in other forums, raises important questions around what kind of
research, data and evidence would be sufficiently scientific to support action
on gender and climate change. An intersectional reading of the exchange
above might suggest that structural and cultural power is at play in gate-
keeping the kinds of knowledge that is deemed legitimate in global climate
politics.
The period from 1992 to 2007 is characterised by a loose network of fem-
inist climate activists who were increasingly organising their efforts inside
the UNFCCC. By 2007 this network was becoming more formalised itself
and was gaining important recognition in the UNFCCC infrastructure.
This work seemingly had paid off given that ‘­gender’ was now included in
UNFCCC decisions and mandates, including a decision specifically relating
to the need to include more women in negotiating processes. Yet, despite
years of research and feminist knowledge about the gendered impacts of
climate change, much of the political energies of the network of feminists
were still focused largely on making the case for gender as a relevant polit-
ical issue for climate change. The UNFCCC broader system remained un-
convinced of the importance of mainstreaming gender into its structures.

Phase 2: Mainstreaming Gender into the

­U NFCCC – ­​­­2007–​­2013
By 2007 feminist climate activists were actively and strategically working
inside’ the UNFCCC institutional boundaries, building alliances with
‘­
one another as well as seeking formal recognition in the UNFCCC as a
constituency. Because of their insider advocacy work, negotiators and the
UNFCCC Secretariat were taking increasing notice of these efforts. My
analysis suggests that ­2007–​­2013 was a phase of mainstreaming gender into
the UNFCCC. The phase can be divided into two distinct periods: Getting
Noticed: ­2007–​­2009; and Feminist Leadership: ­2010–​­2013. Again, the key
moments are visualised in ­Figure 4.2 for reference.

Getting Noticed: ­2007–​­2009

The focus of COP13 Bali in 2007 was the Bali Action Plan (­BAP), a ­two-​
­year process whereby every major component of climate change was to
be addressed: a shared vision for ­long-​­term cooperative action as well as
enhanced action on mitigation, adaptation, technology development and
transfer, capacity building and finance (­UNFCCC, 2007). The BAP process
78 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
COP15
Copenhagen
Figueres becomes first
2009 female UNFCCC Secretary
Institutional commitments General
to gendered issues
2010 Constituency granted
2007 full status

2011 Gender granted a

‘Standing Agenda Item’

2012

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

­Figure 4.2 Gender in the UNFCCC 2007–2013 (light grey flags denote UNFCCC-
wide developments, dark grey flags denote gender-specific developments).

offered an opportunity for the global community to shift its focus from the
scientific and highly technological conversations towards a climate politics
that was more aware of the pressing social issues, including sustainable de-
velopment and poverty eradication (WEDO, 2009). The BAP offered a more
holistic approach to the climate negotiations and gender was a part of that
discussion. A post-analysis report of the COP13 stated that

it was not only NGOs, but also United Nations Organisations like
IUCN who expressed their commitment to gender mainstreaming in
climate change policies. Thus, it seems that ‘gender equality’ is finally
beginning to be accepted as one of the core principles for mitigating
climate change and adapting to its impacts.
(Röhr and Hemmati, 2007, p. 2)

The authors went on to state that ‘some countries, and not least the
UNFCCC Secretariat, are also appearing more open-minded towards gen-
der equality’ (Röhr and Hemmati, 2007, p. 2). Indeed, six months before the
COP the Indonesian COP President, Minister for the Environment Rach-
mat Witoelar expressed the Presidency’s commitment to support women’s
involvement in the conference (GenderCC, 2007c). Later the Presidency also
expressed a desire to integrate a commitment to gender equality in the de-
liberations during a meeting with Indonesian CSOs (Hemmati and Röhr,
2009). While he failed in doing so – the BAP, while recognising the need for
economic and social development and poverty eradication as global priori-
ties, did not mention women or gender (see UNFCCC, 2007) – h is statement
was a strong message at the institutional level.
Two years later, COP15 Copenhagen took place, a COP widely regarded
as a failure on many fronts (see Vidal, Stratton, and Goldenberg, 2009 for
example). A series of meetings paved the way for COP15 that feminist cli-
mate activists followed closely in the hopes of lobbying for strong gender
language to be included in the agreement. The priority for Copenhagen was
to adopt a comprehensive agreement for tackling global climate change, in
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 79
which the women’s coalitions had hoped gender would feature prominently.
In the words of UNFCCC Executive Secretary at the time, Yvo de Boer,
the Copenhagen summit was a ‘rollercoaster ride’ (de Boer, 2009). In draft
documents that were prepared before the COP there were 137 references to
gender (Röhr, 2017, interview), but most did not make the final document,
a document that was not based on any previous draft but an entirely new
one written by the Danish Presidency-- although the Presidency previously
denied any such document existed (Climate Action Network, 2009).
Far from the comprehensive, binding agreement that had been hoped for,
the resulting Copenhagen Accord was a sparse 12-paragraph document with
few details. The Accord was produced by just 26 Parties and introduced on
the 18 December 2009, the last day of the negotiations (UNFCCC, 2009). The
Copenhagen Accord was controversial; it made promises but lacked legally
binding commitments and, as the final text was not negotiated or debated
by all of the 194 Parties to the UNFCCC, many Parties and Observers ques-
tioned its viability (WEDO, 2009). During the process, however, support for
the principles of gender equality was found in a variety of Parties includ-
ing allies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Small Island Developing States
(SIDS), the Arab League and industrialised countries, most prominently the
Nordic States ( WEDO, 2009). The text of the Copenhagen Accord makes
note of the scale of the challenge of climate change and agrees, in principle,
that ‘deep cuts’ are needed (UNFCCC, 2009, paragraph 2). While the text
recognises enhanced vulnerability of least developed countries the Accord
does little to attend to the social issues, such as gender, that had been in wide
discussion since Bali in 2007.
The Copenhagen Accord represents a theme that would become common
in the history of gender in the UNFCCC: issues of gender equality tend to
fall to the background in years of heightened political tensions and in years
where focus is placed on agreeing official UNFCCC treaties, while tech-
nocratic and economic concerns, such as technology transfer and carbon
markets, are foregrounded in the political discussion.

Feminist Leadership: ­2010–2013

​­
After the disappointing outcome at COP15, de Boer stepped down and
was replaced by Christiana Figueres from Costa Rica as the first woman
UNFCCC Executive Secretary in 2010 (UNFCCC, 2020d). In collaboration
with the Mexican COP16 President Patricia Espinosa there was a radical de-
parture in focus from the previous conference in Copenhagen, ultimately de-
livering a comprehensive package to assist developing nations in mitigating
climate change and adapting to its effects through the GCF, the UNFCCC
Technology Mechanism and the Cancun Adaptation Framework. But it was
the Cancun Agreements established under the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) that was
the main outcome of COP16.
80 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
The Agreements were essentially a series of annexes in which gender
was mentioned six times on issues ranging from women’s participation,
gender-sensitive adaptation plans and recognising women’s vulnerability
(UNFCCC, 2010). As part of this shift COP16 Cancun is regarded as the
COP that ‘really opened up to cross- cutting issues like gender’ (Coates, 2018,
interview) representing a shift towards a deliberate gender-mainstreaming
effort. One interview participant attributes this shift as due to the Wom-
en’s Caucus providing a lot of technical assistance and support to Parties
alongside a huge amount of advocacy pre- Cancun (Participant B, 2018, in-
terview). Reports from the time show that the Women’s Caucus was ulti-
mately happy with the outcome in Cancun ( WEDO, 2010). Not only had
the total number of references to women in the final text of the AWG-LCA
increased, there were also qualitative improvements compared to previous
texts (GenderCC, 2010). For example, the issue of ‘women and gender’ was
beginning to be mainstreamed throughout the UNFCCC bodies including
appearing in climate finance, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation (REDD) and adaptation. In particular, discussions around
the GCF acknowledged that climate finance was not a gender-neutral is-
sue (Climate Action Network, 2010). As a result, gender was written into
the founding documents of the GCF, with particular focus on the need for
‘gender balance’ (Schalek, 2017, interview), although Schalek also notes that
this has never actually happened.
­

­­ ​

Every year the world’s nations have been meeting to come up with a
global climate change agreement. However, the voice of grassroots com-
munities, particularly women, has effectively not been heard. These are
people who depend on the weather for their survival yet their voice has
been overshadowed by the corporations with their strong lobby and as a
result their environmental, economic, social and cultural rights receive
very little or no attention on the UNFCCC agenda.
(Tjale,
­ 2011)

This quote suggests that despite the leaps forward in terms of references to
gender in the decision texts, the very structure of the UNFCCC, that same
structure that feminist environmentalists had critiqued at COP1 in 1995,
was very much still in place. Corporations and their ‘strong lobby’ still held
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 81
the locus of power in civil society at the expense of ‘grassroots communi-
ties’. This raises important questions around the process of advocating for
women and gender concerns in neo-liberal political institutions laced with
multiple and intersecting webs of power (c.f. Spivak, 1996).
Notwithstanding the challenges facing the WGC, the issue of ‘gender and
climate change’ had captured institutional attention. At a high-level event
co-hosted by the Government of Mexico and the Mary Robinson Founda-
tion (MRF) ministers decided to form a ‘Troika’ that originally consisted
of the COP15/CMP5 President and Minister for Climate and Energy, Den-
mark, Connie Hedegaard, COP16/CMP6 President and Minister for For-
eign Affairs, Mexico, Patricia Espinosa and COP17/CMP7 President and
Minister of International Relations and Co-operation, South Africa, Maite
Nkoana-Mashabane (Mary Robinson Foundation, 2020). The Troika,
which quickly became a ‘Troika+’, consists of women leaders on gender and
climate change and now boasts more than 55 high-profile women leaders
(Mary Robinson Foundation, 2020). The MRF has served as a Secretariat
for the Troika+ since its inception, providing briefing papers and convening
meetings (Mary Robinson Foundation, 2020). The Troika+ played a signifi-
cant role in realising the ‘Doha Miracle’ (Mary Robinson Foundation, 2020)
that was Decision 23/CP.18 ‘Promoting gender balance and improving the
representation of women in the UNFCCC negotiations and in the representa-
tion of Parties in bodies established under the Convention or the Kyoto Pro-
tocol’ (UNFCCC, 2012). The MRF claims that ‘through collective action
and leadership the Troika+ succeeded in overcoming significant procedural
obstacles with a decision being introduced and adopted at the same COP’
(Mary Robinson Foundation, 2020). ECO (Climate Action Network, 2012),
a daily newsletter distributed at the COP produced the Climate Action Net-
work (CAN), rightly pointed out that the decision was remarkably similar
to the very first gender decision from COP7 (36/CP.7) which was aimed at
the ‘improvement’ of the participation of women and encouraged UNFCCC
Parties ‘to give active consideration to the nomination of women for elective
posts in anybody established under the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol’
(UNFCCC, 2001a paragraph 1). The new decision, however, was widely sup-
ported and had gained input from various organisations.
Despite this win, the WGC, which has engaged very little with the MRF
or the Troika+ on a formal basis, remained less convinced of the outcome
of the Doha Miracle than the MRF. The WGC was quick to state its ‘deep
disappointment’ at the watering down of the wording, which had shifted
from language on ‘gender equality’ to the less contentious phrase ‘gender
balance’. Alber, then Focal Point for the WGC, pointed out in a press state-
ment that while gender balance is important from an equity and human
rights perspective it falls far short of the substantive gender equality needed
to accomplish fundamental changes in human societies (Alber, 2012). The
WGC was clear that language specifically on gender equality would help to
move beyond the numbers and to deal with substantive issues of equality.
82 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
Decision 23/CP.18 is significant in two ways. First, rather than simply
urging Parties to improve the participation of women, it ‘invites Parties to
commit’ to the goal of gender balance (UNFCCC, 2012 paragraph 5). Sec-
ond, and more significantly, it established ‘Gender and Climate Change’ as
a standing agenda item. Previously gender issues were discussed under the
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) Agenda 21 – Any other Items.
Being under the ‘any other items’ section of the negotiations, ECO sug-
gested, meant that

the needs and concerns of half the world’s population were not given a
place of their own in the central agenda of the COP. Adopting this deci-
sion would place gender and climate change issues on the official COP
agenda so that the interests of women would no longer be considered
auxiliary to UNFCCC goals.
(Climate Action Network, 2012, p. 2)

Furthermore, one interview participant remarked that by giving the issue of

‘gender and climate change’ formal space within the Convention signified that
Parties accepted gender and climate change as an important cross- cutting
issue that needed to be resourced (Participant B, 2018). As such, the new
‘Gender and Climate Change’ Agenda Item was to be supported by a Gender
Advisor who had begun working in the Climate Secretariat from Spring 2012
with the aim of strengthening the gender perspective in the various strains
of the negotiations. The advisor appointed was Fleur Newman who quickly
became highly respected amongst negotiators, the WGC and the Secretariat
itself. But, while this position, and the work that went with it, needed funding,
Parties had failed to provide that funding (Participant B, 2018, interview).
From an intersectional feminist lens COP18 in 2013 was a particularly
interesting year within the WGC. For one reason, in May 2013 at a pre- COP
meeting, Röhr gave an intervention on the need to discuss ‘justice’ in dis-
cussions about equality since justice opened up pathways to discuss power
relations, social divisions and inequality within borders as well as across
borders (Röhr, 2013a). Röhr also brought up the ‘dominance of male values
and standards’ or ‘androcentrism’ (Röhr, 2013a) which, she later informed
me in an interview, had received a frosty reception from both Parties and
CSOs (Röhr, 2017, interview). At the same time, Bridget Burns and Emelia
Reyes gave a capacity building workshop presentation that warned against
problematic gender rhetoric: using women as a synonym for gender; gender/
women implying vulnerable, victim, poor or altruistic stewards of the envi-
ronment; and (strategic) essentialism (Reyes and Burns, 2013).
This pre-COP event represents an important moment of reflection for
the Constituency, in collaboration with a handful of academics includ-
ing Magnusdottir who presented her co-authored research with Kronsell
(Magnusdottir and Kronsell, 2015). Reflections on the event suggest that the
WGC and its members were aware of the challenges of making intersectional
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 83
demands in the UNFCCC and were committed to beginning a dialogue
with actors outside of the Constituency, including academic theorists, in an
effort to advance women and gender arguments and to enact intersectional
praxis.

Phase 3: Gender Action ­Plan – 2014–2021

­​­­ ​­
By 2014 ‘gender’ was an issue that was increasingly mainstreamed through-
out the negotiations with so many decisions, many of which aiming at the
same thing, that a mechanism was required to streamline these decisions
for implementation. This was the purpose of the GAP. This section gives
a history in three key parts: Towards Implementation: 2014–2015; Extend-
ing the Lima Work Programme on Gender: 2016; The Gender Action Plan:
2017–2021. Figure 4.3 depicts the main events from 2014 to 2021.

Towards Implementation: ­2014–2015

​­
COP20 in Lima in 2014 was a landmark year in the history of gender and the
UNFCCC. COP President and Minister of Environment of Peru, Manuel
Plugar-Vidal noted that a key priority for COP20 was ‘to build on progress
in advancing gender-responsive
­ ​­ ­climate-policy’
​­ (Plugar-Vidal,
­­ ​­ 2014). To this
end negotiators were debating a new framework for harmonising gender-
related mandates located within existing decisions that would provide a
platform to define actions, guidance and instruments as well as setting the
benchmarks for implementing those decisions (Climate Action Network,
2014). As a result, parties to the convention at COP20 Lima adopted a new
and significant decision on gender equality: Decision 18/CP.20 The Lima
Work Programme on Gender (LWPG). In the LWPG, Parties requested the
Secretariat to prepare an action plan for the development of a two-year
work programme on gender, including mapping all of the relevant decisions
on gender and climate change (UNFCCC, 2014) in order to take stock of the
existing decisions relating to gender to advance them for implementation.

Lima Work Programme on

Gender adopted
2014
Patricia Espinosa becomes
UNFCCC executive Secretary
COP2G Glasgow
2016
Lima Work Programme on Gender 2021
Paris extended for three years Paris Rulebook Adopted
Agreement 2016 Gender Action 2018
adopted Plan adopted Gender Action Plan Renewed
2015 2017 2019

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

­Figure 4.3 Gender in the UNFCCC 2014–2021 (light grey flags denote UNFCCC-
wide developments, dark grey flags denote gender-specific developments).
84 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
While pleased with the outcome of Lima, the WGC was again disap-
pointed by the watering down of language from gender equality to gender
balance (WGC, 2014a). Canadian negotiator Laura Coates noted in our in-
terview that the Gender Agenda Item was being used as a bargaining chip
in the tense negotiations resulting in this weaker language (Coates, 2018,
interview). In a press statement Burns, the recently elected WGC co-Focal
Point for the Global North (Kalyani Raj had been elected Global South co-
Focal Point) made the point that

Without gender equality, women’s rights, indigenous peoples rights and

climate justice, including financing for loss and damage, a rapid transi-
tion to safe and renewable energies, massive commitment and emissions
reductions by the developed world, and full participation of those most
impacted, the programme of work to be done will be incubated and
launched within an empty shell and will do little to support the lives of
millions nor protect the precious ecosystems upon which we depend for
our survival.
(WGC,
­ 2014b)

In this vein the Constituency had already turned its attention to COP21
Paris in 2015.
In a plenary intervention Mrinalini Rai, speaking on behalf of the WGC,
warned the chairs of the Paris Agreement that it was ‘crucial that gender
equality is included as a guiding principle in the operative language of the
new climate agreement, a cross- cutting issue in all elements of climate pol-
icy’ (WGC, 2014c). This was because COP21 Paris was set to adopt the ‘Paris
Agreement’ to provide a comprehensive framework for tackling global cli-
mate change (see UNFCCC, 2015). COP21 was held between 30 Novem-
ber and 11 December 2015 and, after two weeks of intense negotiations, the
Paris Agreement was adopted to cheers, tears and hugs from exhausted ne-
gotiators, facilitators and observers (for an interesting visual overview of the
two weeks of COP21 Paris see UN Climate Conference, 2015).
The expectation for the Paris Agreement within the WGC was that gen-
der would be meaningfully included in the agreement in all areas including
adaptation, mitigation, capacity building, finance, and technology (Burns,
2017). An Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP) meeting
(ADP2.8) in Geneva in February 2015 showed that ‘a significant number of
groups and countries; including Mexico, Uganda, Chile, the EU, Bolivia,
and Tuvalu, supported the inclusion of strong language of human rights,
the rights of indigenous peoples, and gender equality’ (Climate Action Net-
work, 2015a, p. 1). Most significantly Burns (2017) recalls that this was to be
included in ‘Section C’ of the decision text which would ensure that these
principles applied to all aspects of the agreement.
CSOs, including the WGC, were well prepared with many demon-
strations and lobbying efforts planned for the t wo-week conference.
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 85
Reports from Paris show that the WGC loudly protested and lobbied on
everything from the need for a ‘fair and ambitious Paris Agreement’ to
climate finance (see GenderCC, 2015). Perhaps the biggest action seen
at COP21, organised collaboratively between climate justice orientated
NGOs was the civil society sit-in for climate justice. The sit-in included
huge cut- outs of animals that face extinction and chants claiming that
they were ‘unstoppable; another world is possible!’ Actions such as this
were particularly notable at COP21 Paris since civil society action was
heavily policed during the conference. The city was still in an emergency
state of law following terror attacks in the French capital, meaning that
the usual climate marches had been banned from taking place ( Fishwick,
2015). Naomi Klein, a well-known author and climate activist, claimed
that the ‘French government had taken advantage of people’s fear and
grief’ (Klein, 2015). She further pointed out that it seemed curious that
football matches and Christmas markets had been allowed to continue,
but mass protests had not.3
Despite more than 40 countries calling for language on human rights,
including gender equality, to be included in the Paris Agreement a draft text
released in October, just one month before the summit, left many Parties
and observers wondering why the issue of human rights had been left out of
the text in all areas apart from the non-legally binding preamble (Climate
Action Network, 2015b). The Paris Agreement was a huge disappointment
for members of the WGC. In a statement they claimed that ‘the responsi-
bility to protect people’s rights and ecosystems, [had] either been surgically
removed or lack[ed] specificity’ ( WGC, 2015a). Rather than gender being
fully mainstreamed across all themes of the Agreement the most significant
inclusion was a line in the preamble which stated

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of human-

kind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change,
respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human
rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local com-
munities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in
vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender
equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.
(UNFCCC, 2015, premable)

The terms ‘women’ and ‘gender’ were further included in the areas of ad-
aptation and capacity building (UNFCCC, 2015, pp. 25, 28 respectively),
which includes reference to ‘gender-responsive’ approaches to adaptation
and capacity building and concern for achieving the goal of ‘gender-balance’
on boards and committees in the implementation of the Agreement. In a
webinar in 2017 Burns described how the WGC had been assured that the
principle of gender equality would underpin all climate policy, but the Paris
Agreement did exactly the opposite. The WGC said that
86 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
The Paris Agreement served to undermine the concept of international
solidarity – a founding principle of the UN that requires differentiation
amongst states in a way that should lead to redistribution and shared
prosperity.
(WGC,
­ 2015b)

In addition to a somewhat disappointing Paris Agreement several analyses

of their INDCs showed that while 64 countries included reference to gender
in their INDCs, none of these countries were Annex 1 nations (or the most
developed nations) (WEDO, 2016a; Tobin, Schmidt and Tosun, 2018). All
references to gender in the INDCs related to issues of adaptation in the
Global South. Perhaps, Burns suggests, this is because nations of the Global
North do not ‘understand gender as a lens in their own countries’ (Burns,
2017), yet Party delegates from the EU, Canada and the United States are
prominent figures in the gender negotiations.
The Paris Agreement represents little quantitative progress from COP1
with focus placed on adaptation, and thus women’s vulnerability, and gen-
der balance, which does not constitute a means of improving gender equal-
ity in itself but merely serves ‘better’ policy. What was different from the
COP1 context, however, was the prominence that the issue was afforded
along with the widespread support and understanding from individuals
across the UNFCCC institutional infrastructure. The UNFCCC was no
longer a technical and economic political space, but rather social concerns
including gender equality were given much more prominence in the negoti-
ations. Furthermore, the WGC were increasingly turning to intersectional
language and engaging in coalition politics consistent with principles of
transversal politics.

Extending the Lima Work Programme on Gender: 2016

Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, focus turned towards its im-
plementation at COP22 Marrakech, dubbed the ‘Action COP’ (GenderCC
and LIFE, 2016). After a successful outcome at COP21 Figueres stood
down and her successor was announced shortly before COP22 as Patricia
Espinosa, former foreign minister of Mexico and previous gender advocate
alongside Figueres in 2011 during her Presidency of COP16 (Climate Action
Network, 2016). Part of the negotiations concerned the continuation of the
LWPG, which had been adopted in 2014 with a planned duration of two
years (see UNFCCC, 2014). Ahead of the COP a two- day workshop was
held in Bonn, Germany on the topics of adaptation and capacity building
(UNFCCC, 2016a), the two areas where gender is formally mentioned under
the Paris Agreement. The second day of this workshop involved splitting
both Party delegates and observers into separate working groups focusing
on four different groups of actors that make up the UNFCCC: Parties to
the UNFCCC; Finance and Financial Institutions; UNFCCC Secretariat
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 87
and United Nations Systems; and Implementing Agencies and Civil Society
(UNFCCC, 2016a). The working groups were tasked with identifying chal-
lenges and elaborating on recommendations that could be applied to each
group of actors.
The working groups recommended that the LWPG should be extended,
and that there was a need for continued dialogue/exchange and skill sharing
between policymakers and NGOs and grassroots community leaders (SBI,
2016). They also recommended action focused on specific issues of climate
justice and stayed away from the more technical language commonly seen
in UNFCCC negotiations. For example, Working Group 4 – Implementing
agencies and civil society at national/subnational level, recognised the need
for ‘analysis of structural power imbalances (ex. patriarchal or matriarchal
society), which can be done by applying tool kits (ex. “floating coconut tool
kits” for demonstrating productive labour of women) and can be improved
by having male champions’ (UNFCCC, 2016a).4
Following these workshops COP22 took the decision to extend the LWPG
for a further three years and to further enhance the activities under the pro-
gramme (UNFCCC, 2016b). This included women’s full and equal participa-
tion in the UNFCCC process and strengthening gender-responsive policies
in all activities concerning adaptation and mitigation as well as finance,
technology development and transfer and capacity building. Significantly,
in the decision text Parties mandated COP23 Fiji (to be hosted in Bonn)
in 2017 to develop a two-year Gender Action Plan (GAP) and tasked the
Secretariat with continuing to conduct annual in-session workshops and to
offer training specifically for women delegates (UNFCCC, 2016b). In short,
rather than introduce new themes, issues or concerns, the extended LWPG
made a concerted effort to streamline for implementation the growing num-
ber of decisions that already existed under the Convention.
While Decision 21/CP.22 was warmly welcomed by gender advocates, in-
cluding members of the WGC, and was accepted to have gone further than
the somewhat disappointing Paris Agreement, they also felt that it has a
number of faults (GenderCC and LIFE, 2016). The WGC expressed concern
of the lack of consideration of what they felt was the most important issue:
the question of finance (GenderCC and LIFE, 2016). The main point of con-
cern was that the text of the decision stated that actions were to be taken
‘subject to the availability of financial resources’ (UNFCCC, 2016b, para-
graph 32). This lack of specificity of financial resources, the WGC argued,
undermined the effectiveness of the extended LWPG while also representing
a trend of Parties paying (easy) lip-service to issues of gender without put-
ting meaningful finances behind the actions (Participant B, 2018, interview).
The extended LWPG also invited all countries to appoint National Gen-
der Focal Points who were intended to lead for national delegations on
gender issues throughout the negotiations. There are several issues, or in-
consistencies with the introduction of the National Gender Focal Point po-
sitions that became apparent in interviews with several such Focal Points.
88 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
First, Parties were only ‘invited’ to nominate a Gender Focal Point, some-
thing which many Parties have been slow to do. Indeed, as of May 2018, the
time that I was conducting these interviews, only 32 Parties out of 197 had
nominated a Focal Point (UNFCCC, 2018a). This had increased to a more
impressive 59 by January 2020 (UNFCCC, 2020h). Second, the National
Gender Focal Point was an unpaid position which was an ‘add-on’ to del-
egates ( predominantly women) with already exceptionally busy day jobs
(Participant C, 2018, interview). This speaks to a question of interpersonal
power whereby women are expected to take on the heavy-lifting work of en-
suring gender equality, while the institution continues to be viewed in a pos-
itive light since it is, seemingly, taking meaningful action on gender equality.
There was no clear definition of what the National Gender Focal Points
were, thus leaving the interpretation very much in the hands of individuals
(Mertz, 2018, interview). Some see it as a role that requires them to do a huge
amount of research and actively pursue the introduction of gender-sensitive
climate policies in their home countries (Mertz, 2018, interview; Terpstra,
2018, interview), while others see it more (or additionally) about acting as
an information hub in the negotiations themselves (Nummelin, 2018, inter-
view). There were also differing views on where the National Gender Focal
Point should be located within national Governments and how a person
would be selected. For example, Finland held a lengthy discussion on this,
first considering the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health where gender is-
sues are mainly based, or in the Foreign Ministry where the Department for
Development is located. Finally, Finland decided that gender was far more
overarching than one of these two issues and so decided that the Focal Point
should be someone located in the Department for Environment (Nummelin,
2018, interview). Other countries however, such as Belgium and the Nether-
lands, simply had one interested individual who nominated themselves for
the position (Mertz, 2018, interview; Terpstra, 2018, interview). Thus, while
the introduction of National Gender Focal Points, on the face of it, was a
positive and logical step towards streamlining, it has become itself a very
uneven process; it could be construed as a mere box-ticking exercise.
The WGC, while ostensibly still heavily involved in negotiations of the
extended LWPG, returned to a more ‘outside’ position and were more crit-
ical of the UNFCCC as an institution following COP21 Paris. For exam-
ple, WEDO joined feminist allies in civil society in a collective effort to
draw global attention to the climate crisis and its urgency at a protest called
‘Reclaim Power’ (WEDO, 2016b). Reclaim Power had many demands in-
cluding: stop new dirty energy projects; end public handouts to dirty energy;
and advance energy democracy that promotes solutions to the climate crisis
and to energy poverty (WEDO, 2016b). Similarly, a report of the Associa-
tion for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) Forum in Brazil in 2016,
at which several members of the WGC were present, stated that the Paris
Agreement represented that a ‘dominant patriarchal elite and capitalist elite
and their corporations took decisions that affect us all without consent of
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 89
peoples and communities, and certainly without the consent of the earth
and its other inhabitants’ (Acha, 2016, p. 4), reflecting a distinctly intersec-
tional feminist position that also included concerns for the natural world.
In these actions the WGC is, seemingly, positioning itself as outside of,
and separate from, the institutional fabric of the UNFCCC. After years of
working ‘inside’ the system the Paris agreement was a huge disappointment
for the WGC. After this the Constituency started to position themselves as
a ‘protest Constituency’ and began to loudly challenge masculinised climate
action including the patriarchal and capitalist power structures that they
were based upon. In this way the WGC were becoming more reminiscent of
the early years of feminist organising in the UNFCCC.

The Gender Action Plan: 2017–2021

The WGC’s distancing from the UNFCCC mainstream continued into
COP23 2017 Fiji (held in Bonn). In an interview conducted by WEDO, Azeb
Girmai, a climate change advocacy and campaign advisor, said

Honestly, it’s time we revise our strategies. We have become numb in a

way; we keep thinking a solution is going to pop up and it isn’t. We must
engage and strategize on a grassroots level. Clear action plans from con-
ventions have attempted to address these issues for so many years but
that narrative hasn’t connected or sunk in for the majority of the inter-
national community.
(Girmai,
­ 2017, p.
­ 1)

But at the same time, 2017 was the year that the GAP was to be adopted.
In the months before COP23 Fiji in December 2017 several workshops were
held with the intent of considering possible elements for a Gender Action
Plan. A two- day workshop brought together both Parties, observers and
other stakeholders in an informal setting to co- develop elements that would
be formally negotiated, and ultimately adopted, at the COP (UNFCCC,
2017d). The elements that were proposed included: capacity building,
knowledge sharing and communication; gender balance, participation and
women’s leadership; coherence within the UNFCCC and other UN agen-
cies; gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation; and
monitoring and reporting. Timing was important and Parties (and their ne-
gotiators) were acutely aware that if the GAP was to draw any attention at
all it must be adopted at COP23 (O’Hehir, 2018, interview). The reason was
that COP24 Katowice in 2018 was likely to be the biggest COP since Paris
(Wyns, 2018) due to the upcoming deadline to agree upon a ‘Rulebook’ for
implementation of the Paris Agreement. The ‘Rulebook’ would set out the
rules and operating procedures which were essential to drive a fair and ef-
fective process that will support all countries to achieve zero- carbon, cli-
mate resilient transformation (Dagnet and Cogswell, 2018). Colin O’Hehir,
90 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
head of Irish Delegation and chair of the GAP negotiations, pointed out in
an interview that if the GAP rolled into COP24 the headlines would read
‘mitigation, litigation, compliance, adaptation, oh and p.s. GAP’ (O’Hehir,
2018, interview). In this spirit additional workshops were organised by the
Netherlands in The Hague and by Canada in Ottawa, both leaders in the
GAP negotiations (Terspta, 2018, interview).
By the time negotiations reached COP23, one of the main challenges was
that it was supposed to consolidate over 60 actions that had come out of
the workshops which O’Hehir, along with other Parties including the EU,
Canada and the USA, felt was too many. He noted: ‘how do you meas-
ure that? What if you only achieve 30? They might be the good 30, or they
might be the easy 30’ (O’Hehir, 2018, interview). Additionally, because of
the nature of the workshops not all Parties had been present at each one.
For instance, China raised an objection early in the negotiations of COP23
that they had not been invited to the workshop in The Hague. However,
Terpstra, who had organised that particular workshop, rebutted that China
had been invited, but as the workshop was not ‘in-session’ (i.e. organised
internally by the UNFCCC Secretariat) there was no funding to offer for
travel as is custom for non-Annex 1 Parties. Terpstra, further noted however
that video conference was offered as an option (Terpstra, 2018, interview).
Nonetheless, by COP23 all Parties were coming at the negotiations from a
different starting point and O’Hehir was aware that they rapidly needed to
get to a point where all Parties felt a sense of ‘ownership’ over the document
(O’Hehir, 2018, interview).
As a result, O’Hehir took the decision to close the GAP negotiations to
observers, including members of the WGC, (meaning that only those with
Party or Secretariat badges were allowed to enter). This decision was taken
in order to give Parties an opportunity to debate the finer details and cre-
ate a common starting point without the pressure of NGOs watching their
every move, every decision and, importantly, every disagreement and con-
cession made (O’Hehir, 2018, interview). Observers took this as another stab
at the principle of transparency within the negotiations that CSOs had felt
was increasing since COP15 Copenhagen. Members of the WGC felt that
initiatives such as the Talanoa Dialogue (an informal dialogue between
negotiators and civil society that was introduced at COP23) were ‘good in
principle’ (Lauron, 2017, interview) but served to distract from the very real
issue that civil society had been redefined over the years to include busi-
nesses promoting renewable energies but did not account for the fact that
renewable energies displace people. Lauron also expressed frustration at the
fact that researchers who are interested in watching the negotiations but do
very little advocacy were included in civil society (Lauron, 2017, interview),
speaking to a clear separation of ideas and action by both academics and
the WGC. There was a clear sense of frustration amongst the WGC since
many of its members had been involved in the process long before discus-
sions of a GAP had started. They felt that they were the experts on the issue
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 91
and raised concern that they did not even recognise the negotiators, since
they were new at every meeting (Goldner, 2018, interview). This was com-
pounded even further with gender considered a ‘soft’ issue (Marchington
and Coates, 2018, interview) with very few meaningful implications.
The GAP was exactly a case of a soft issue with minor implications within
the wider negotiations. Indeed, its very design was to consolidate for im-
plementation existing decisions under the Convention. It was not a space
to introduce new issues, predominately loss and damage and human rights.
This was a second sticking point in what had been regarded a very easy
negotiating process (Verla, 2018, interview). However, there were some Par-
ties, namely Mexico, who were pushing until the very last minutes for loss
and damage to be included in the preamble text to the GAP. Again, because
this process was unfolding away from the eyes of observers, the rumour
mill went into overdrive in the last minutes of negotiations. On Saturday 11
November at 6.30pm (half an hour over schedule) I waited for news while
negotiators were popping in and out of the room to give updates to their
allied observers. The rumour was that ‘Mexico is holding it up, Mexico is
stopping the GAP being adopted’. Mexican negotiator Emilia Reyes (2017,
interview) later confirmed in an negotiating debrief that this was not the
case; in fact Mexico were the only ones in the room pushing until the very
last minute for the inclusion of stronger language on gender, particularly
language that recognised the intersectional nature of women’s identities.
Reyes told me that this was a common negotiating tactic. She would insist
on the most progressive gender language possible in the hope that the chairs
would extend the time allocated for negotiations. It was essentially a game
of ‘chicken’ to see who gave in first. In the end, opposition was too strong,
and Mexico conceded, meaning a text could be agreed.
Another issue concerning language in the GAP negotiations, according
to Reyes, was around the issue of human rights. An unnamed Party refused
for ‘human rights’ and ‘just transition’ to be in the same paragraph as this
would require that Parties to extend basic human rights to workers. ‘It’s
disgusting’ Reyes concluded, clearly exhausted after two intense weeks of
negotiations and disappointed with the outcome.
Not everyone was enthusiastic about the idea of a GAP because it exists
purely under the Gender Agenda Item, so that gender issues may become
‘further side-lined, meaning that gender will not be discussed in the “real”
negotiations’ (Röhr, 2018, interview). For members of the gender and cli-
mate change advocacy community, although the GAP may be ‘better than
nothing’, it also opens the possibility that the COP can finally get on with
discussing the issues that matter, such as mitigation or climate technology,
which then makes little to no effort to include gender. While more radical
language of human rights and just transition is beginning to be articulated
in the GAP, it is not yet seen in other areas of the Convention, which are still
dominated by highly technical discussions about technology transfer and
finance mechanisms, which could be criticised as market-fixes.
92 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
Röhr’s comments about the potential silo-ing of gender issues under the
Gender Agenda Item acts as a caution: the GAP certainly is a huge win
for the WGC, but it is important to remain vigilant in ensuring that the
UNFCCC has embraced a gender perspective throughout the climate nego-
tiations and not simply meant that women have been mainstreamed into the
polluted stream that Bella Abzug warned of in 1992.
In the years following the adoption of the GAP a series of workshops
and gender-related events were held, including the Gender Workshop re-
quested by the GAP as well as a Gender Dialogue that invited the chairs of
the UNFCCC constituted bodies to discuss their efforts to achieve gender
balance and to integrate gender aspects into their work (Gender CC, 2018).
But attention was already turning towards COP24 Katowice with growing
concern about a bill adopted by the Polish government which would give the
Polish authorities access to extensive private data of all COP24 participants.
The WGC opposed this bill strongly on the basis that it would effectively
prohibit ‘the freedom of assembly, among other rights, [and it] cultivates an
atmosphere of intimidation and fear and reinforces the highly worrisome
tendencies of shrinking spaces for civil society worldwide’ (Bohland, 2018
cited in WGC, 2018b). The WGC attributed this move to a worrying trend in
global environmental politics more broadly where it was increasingly diffi-
cult to ‘speak truth to power’. In a press statement, the Constituency stated

These actions effectively impose a ‘gag rule’ on pointing fingers at those

who are most responsible for climate and social injustice. And this is not
limited to actions from civil society but also to dialogues among Parties
where, as we saw in the Talanoa Dialogue, Parties were asked to refrain
from ‘naming and shaming’. Is this not the point of international policy,
particularly in the context of a ‘ bottom- up’ and nationally determined
climate agreement with only a facilitatory compliance mechanism? If
the people of the world cannot hold countries accountable, what and
who will?
Certainly, the WGC will not be silent about where
we are (WGC, 2018b, online)

Throughout 2018 there was little progress on gender issues but 2019 saw the
GAP renewed for a full five years which, the WGC claimed, ‘highlighted
the critical importance of gender equality in climate action’ (WGC, 2019a,
cited in GenderCC, 2019b). This was a huge achievement at a COP that,
according to the WGC, ‘saw unprecedented resistance of Parties against
acknowledging the interconnections of human rights with every aspect of
the negotiations’ (WGC, 2019a, cited in GenderCC, 2019b). Tensions were
heightened during the Conference when more than 100 civil society dele-
gates were physically locked out of the conference centre following a peace-
ful protest calling for more climate ambition, many left without coats and
other possessions in the cold Madrid winter ( WGC, 2019a).
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 93
COP26 Glasgow was, perhaps, the most anticipated COP since COP21
Paris in 2015 because states were expected to pledge further cuts to their
emissions. The was part of the design of the Paris Agreement which ex-
pected a ‘ratcheting up’ of carbon emission cuts pledges every five years
(Yeo, 2015). COP26 was held against the backdrop of the Covid-19 pandemic
which caused huge logistical problems for CSOs, particularly those located
in the Global South, to attend. The WGC repeatedly raised concerns that
COP26 was far from inclusive (Gender CC, 2021). During online WGC cau-
cuses which I attended remotely, those present in Glasgow reported, with
alarming frequency, enormous queues and a lack of space for civil society
delegates to actually enter the building, instead being asked to log in via
remote link in the hotel rooms.
In keeping with an emerging theme from this history, women’s and gender
issues somewhat fell off of the agenda in the face of the ‘real’ politics of the
renewed NDCs and any discursive progress made, from an intersectional
feminist viewpoint, at COP24 Madrid was swiftly abandoned. Indeed, the
Glasgow Summit was billed to be the ‘whitest and most privileged ever’
(Taylor, 2021) due to a combination of ‘visa and accreditation problems,
lack of access to Covid vaccines and changing travel rules – as well as
“scarce and expensive” accommodation’ (Taylor, 2021) meaning many civil
society observers had given up trying to attend, making it one of the most
exclusionary COPs yet.

Conclusion
In tracing the history of gender in the UNFCCC I have shown a clear shift
from ‘outsider’ political strategies to far more ‘insider’ strategies employed
by members of the WGC, though there are signs that the Constituency is re-
turning to its outsider roots. I have identified three clear phases of feminist
­ ​­
organising: 1992–2007 ­
‘Zero ­ ​­
Gender’; 2007–2013 ­­ ​­
‘Gender-Mainstreaming’;
and 2014–2021 ‘Gender Action Plan’. The early period between 1992, i.e.
the agreement of the UNFCCC, and 2007 was characterised by a mostly
gender-blind UNFCCC. While the informal coalition of feminist climate
activists were very active in their advocacy efforts during this period there
was little institutional response bar one main gender decision 23/CP.7
adopted to improve the participation of women and address the unequal
gender balance on UNFCCC boards and bodies. The period between
2007 and 2013, however, was characterised by far more active institutional
gender-mainstreaming. This institutional shift, however, did not happen by
chance, nor can it be attributed to the mere passage of time. Rather, it coin-
cided with a feminist coalition that was becoming increasingly organised,
formalised and, indeed, bureaucratic. Several alliances at different levels
were formed at this time, including GenderCC, GGCA and the MRF and
these alliances moved towards becoming a full Constituency within the
UNFCCC. At the same time a wider discursive shift in the institution from
94 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
issues around mitigation towards those of adaptation provided a hook for
gendered concerned to be included in global climate policy, primarily in
the form of a concern for women’s vulnerability to the effects of climate
change. Ultimately, this period was characterised by both a sharp increase
in decisions mentioned or related to gender as well as an increase in in-
stitutional concern for gendered issues in global climate politics. The final
period 2014–2021 was characterised by the ongoing negotiations towards
adopting and implementing a Gender Action Plan, a decision that was fi-
nally adopted in 2017. During this period, members of the WGC were si-
multaneously heavily involved in influencing the negotiations with the aim
of securing the most progressive gendered language in the GAP, as well as a
kind of self- distancing from the UNFCCC as an institution in the wake of
the disappointing Paris Agreement.
This chapter has put into stark contrast the more well-known history of
the UNFCCC and a lesser known history in which gender is foregrounded.
As Colin O’Hehir head of Irish Delegation and chair of the GAP negotia-
tions pointed out in an interview, if the GAP rolled into COP24 the head-
lines would read ‘mitigation, litigation, compliance, adaptation, oh and p.s.
GAP’ (O’Hehir, 2018, interview). I understood O’Hehir to be saying that it
was important that the GAP was agreed in 2017, specifically, because had
it fallen to 2018 the UNFCCC, as an institution, would be more concerned
with agreeing the Paris rulebook, the guidelines which would underpin the
implementation of the Paris Agreement in 2020. Significantly, O’Hehir was
suggesting that in that case nobody would have paid attention to the GAP.
Indeed, this is a trend that has become apparent throughout the UNFCCC’s
history (see
­ Figure
­ 4.4).
‘Gender’ as a political issue only seemed to become one of real impor-
tance in a year when little else of note was taking place. More concretely,
as visualised in Figure 4.4, plotting the most high-profile moments of the
UNFCCC’s history (1995, Kyoto Protocol, 2009 Copenhagen Accord and
2015 Paris Agreement) against the most important moments in the gender
timeline (2001 first gender decision, 2014 LWPG and 2017 GAP), it is clear
that the two almost run in opposition to one another.

Lima Work Programme on Gender adopted

2014
First Conference of the Parties (COP) Gender Action Plan adopted
1995 2017 Gender Action Plan
Kyoto Protocol adopted Paris Renewed
1997 Copenhagen Accord Agreement 2019 COP2G
First Gender Decision adopted adopted adopted Glasgow
2001 2009 2015 2021

1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019

­Figure 4.4 Key Moments in the History of the UNFCCC (light grey flags denote
­UNFCCC-wide
​­ developments, dark grey flags denote ­gender-specific
​­
developments).
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 95
Notes

Bibliography
Acha, M. A. R., (2016). Climate and Environmental Justice Summary of Umbrella
Issue eDiscussion 2016. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp-content/ ­ ­­ ​­
­uploads/2016/08/CEJ-Discussion-2016-Final.pdf.
­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Aguilar, L., (2007). Speech Given at High-level Roundtable How a Changing
Climate Impacts Women. ‘In Council of Women World Leaders, WEDO and Hen-
rich Böll Foundation (2007)’ Report of High-level Roundtable How a Changing
Climate Impacts Women. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/ ­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­
2007/12/roundtable-final-report-6-nov.pdf.
­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Alber, G., (2012). Ironically Gender in the Fossil Patriarchy. (online). Available at:
https://globalforestcoalition.org/ironically-gender-in-the-fossil-patriarchy/.
­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last
accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
­
­ ­ ​­ ­
­ ­­ ­​
­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­ ­
Bohland, P., (2018). ‘Controversial Polish Bill creates an atmosphere of intimidation
amongst civil society’, in WGC, (ed.). (online). Women and Gender Constituency
joint statement on SB 48. Available at: https://womengenderclimate.org/women- ­ ­­ ­​
­­and-gender-constituency-joint-statement-on-sb-48/.
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 18/05/2022. ­ ­
Burns, B., (2017). Webinar: The Gender Action Plan (GAP) From a Reproductive Health
Perspective. (online). ­ Available at: https://www.prb.org/recent-developments-in- ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­gender-and-climate-the-gender-action-plan-gap-from-a-reproductive-health-
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​
­perspective/. Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Cannon, T., (2002). ‘Gender and climate hazards in Bangladesh’, Gender & Develop-
ment, 10(2), ­ pp. ­ ­45–50. ​­ doi: 10.1080/13552070215906. ­
Climate Action Network, (2001). ‘7 November royal issue’, ECO, 8(CVII), ­ pp. ­ ­1–4. ​­
Climate Action Network, (2009). ­ ‘Non-existent
­­ ​­ issue’, ECO, 3(CXXII), ­ pp.
­ ­1–4. ​­
Climate Action Network, (2010). ‘2 December nichupye issue’, ECO, 4(CXXVII), ­
pp.
­ ­1–4. ​­
96 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
Climate Action Network, (2012). ‘1 December donating issue’, ECO, 6(CXXXIII), ­
pp. ­ ­1–4. ​­
Climate Action Network, (2014). ‘5 December IPCC issue’, ECO, 9(CXXXIII) ­
pp, 1–4. ­ ​­
Climate Action Network, (2015a). ‘12 Febraury outside issue’, ADP2.8, ECO,
pp. ­ ­1–2. ​­
Climate Action Network, (2015b). ‘22 October brussels issue’, ADP2.11, ECO, pp. ­ 1–2. ­ ​­
Climate Action Network, (2016). ‘A busy agenda for the new “climate queen”’, ECO
­
(online). Available at: https://climatenetwork.org/2016/05/23/a-busy-agenda-for- ­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­the-new-climate-queen/.
­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 4.11.2022.
Council of Women World Leaders, WEDO and Henrich Böll Foundation, (2007).
Report of High-level Roundtable How a Changing Climate Impacts Women.
(online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/12/roundtable-­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​
­­final-report-6-nov.pdf. ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Dagnet, Y. and Cogswell, N., (2018). Bangkok Climate Talks: Time to Deliver Real
Progess on the Paris Agreement Rulebook. (online). Available at: https://www.
wri.org/blog/2018/08/bangkok-climate-talks-time-deliver-real-progess-paris-
­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­agreement-rulebook. ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Davion, V., (2009). ‘Feminist perspectives on global warming, genocide, and card’s
theory of evil’, Hypatia, 24(1), ­ pp. ­ ­160–177. ​­ doi: 10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.00012.x.
­ ­ ​­
de Boer, Y., (2009). UNFCCC’s de Boer Discussed U.S. Action on Climate Change,
Copenhagen Meeting. (online). ­ Available at: https://www.eenews.net/tv/videos/ ­ ­ ­ ­
1032/transcript. ­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Figueres, C. and ­Rivett-Carnac., ​­ (2020).­ The Future we Choose: Surviving the Cli-
mate Crisis. London: Manilla Press.
Fishwick, C., (2015). ‘Paris climate march banned: What do you want to say to UN
climate talks?’, The Guardian, 25 November. (online). Available at: https://www.
theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/25/paris-climate-talks-march-banned- ­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­what-do-you-want-to-say%0D. ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/20. ­ ­
Freeman, J., (1996). Beijing Report: The Fourth World Conference on Women.
(online).
­ Available at: https://www.jofreeman.com/womenyear/beijingreport. ­ ­ ­
htm. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
GenderCC, (2000). ­ COP6 The Hague 2000: Role If Women in the Negotiations, Gender
and Climate Change Activities from COP3 in Kyoto to COP8 in New Delhi. (online). ­
Available at: https://gendercc.net/genderunfccc/unfccc-conferences/kyoto-1997- ­ ­ ­­ ​­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­to-new-delhi-2002.html.
­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
GenderCC, (2005). ­ Gender and Climate Change Activities @ COP11 - Mon-
treal 2005. (online). ­ Available at: https://gendercc.net/genderunfccc/unfccc-
­ ­ ­­ ​
­conferences/montreal-2005.html. ­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
GenderCC, (2007a). ­ Gender: Missing Links In Financing Climate Change Adapta-
tion And Mitigation. (online). ­ Available at: https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/ ­ ­ ­ ­
dokumente/6_UNFCCC/gender_cc_financing_positionpaper_bali_final.pdf. ­ ­
Available at: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
GenderCC, (2007b). ­ Gender And Climate Change Network – Women For Climate Jus-
tice Position Paper. (online). ­ Available at: https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/­ ­ ­ ­
dokumente/6_UNFCCC/gender_cc_positionpaper_future_climate_regime.pdf.­ ­
Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 97
GenderCC, (2007c). ­ Women’s Milestones for the Bali Roadmap. (online). Available
at: https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_UNFCCC/press_release.
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
GenderCC, (2010). ­ Gender and Climate Change Activities @ COP16 - Can-
cun 2010. (online). ­ Available at: https://gendercc.net/genderunfccc/unfccc- ­ ­ ­­ ​
­conferences/cancun-2010.html. ­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
GenderCC, (2015). ­ Actions at COP21. (online). Available at: https://gendercc.net/
genderunfccc/unfccc-conferences/paris-2015.html. ­­ ​­ ­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
GenderCC, (2019b). ­ Gender and Climate Change Activities @ COP25 – Madrid
2019. (online).­ Available at: https://www.gendercc.net/genderunfccc/unfccc- ­ ­ ­­ ​
­conferences/madrid-2019.html. ­­ ​­ Last accessed: 18/05/2022. ­ ­
GenderCC, (2021). ­ COP26 as a Meet and Greet of the Global North – Male, Pale and
Stale*. (online). ­ Available at: https://www.gendercc.net/genderunfccc/glasgow- ­ ­ ­­ ​
2021.html.
­ Last accessed: 18/05/2022. ­ ­
GenderCC and LIFE, (2016). COP of (in)action with Some Promising Develop-
ments on Gender. (online). ­ Available at: https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/ ­ ­ ­ ­
dokumente/6_UNFCCC/COPs/GenderCC_LIFE_statement.pdf.
­ ­ ­ Last accessed:
15/07/2020.­ ­
Girmai, A., (2017). #Oursolutions: Interview with Azeb Girmai of Environmen-
tal Development Action (ENDA). (online). Available at: https://wedo.org/
­­oursolutions-interview-azeb-girmai-environmental-development-action-enda/.
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­
Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Hemmati, M. and Röhr, U., (2009). ‘Engendering the climate- change negotiations:
Experiences, challenges, and steps forward’, Gender & Development, 17(1), ­ pp. ­ ­19–​
­32. doi: 10.1080/13552070802696870. ­
Hemmati, M., (2005). Gender & climate change in the North: Issues, entry points
and strategies for the post-2012 process and beyond. (online). Available at: https://
gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_UNFCCC/Gender_Post-Kyoto.
­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ​­
pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
International Women’s Forum, (1995). Statement to the Delegates and NGO’s at the
First Conference of the Parties (COP) From the International Women’s Forum.
(online).
­ Available at: https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
UNFCCC/COP1_Statement_to_delegates.pdf.
­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Klein, N., (2015). France Took Advantage of Paris Terror Attacks during
COP21. (online). ­ Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate- ­ ­ ­­ ​
­environment/news/naomi-klein-france-took-advantage-of-paris-terror-attacks-
­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
during-cop21/.
­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Kronsell, A., (2005). ‘Gendered practices in institutions of hegemonic masculinity’,
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7(2), ­ pp. ­ 280–298.
­ ​­ doi: 10.1080/1461674 ­
0500065170.
LIFE, ENERGIA and WECF, (2003). Minutes on Gender and Climate Change.
(online).
­ Available at: https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­
UNFCCC/Minutes_first_meeting_Cop9.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
MacGregor, S., (2017). ‘Moving beyond impacts: More answers to the “gender and
climate change” question’, in S. Buckingham and V. Le Masson (eds.) Understand-
ing Climate Change through Gender Relations. New York and London: Routledge,
pp.­ ­15–30.
​­
98 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
Magnusdottir, G. L. and Kronsell, A., (2015). ‘The (In)visibility of gender in Scan-
dinavian climate ­policy-making’, ​­ International Feminist Journal of Politics, 17(2), ­
pp. ­ 308–326.
­ ​­ doi: 10.1080/14616742.2014.896661.
­
Mary Robinson Foundation, (n.d.). Principles of Climate Justice. (online). Available
at: https://www.mrfcj.org/principles-of-climate-justice/
­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ (accessed:
­ 12/06/2020).
­ ­
Masika, R., (ed.), (2002). Gender, Development, and Climate Change. Oxford:
Oxfam.
Meyer, M. and Prügl, E., (1999). Gender Politics in Global Governance. Oxford: Row-
man & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Morrow, K., (2017a). ‘Changing the climate of participation: The gender constitu-
ency in the global climate change regime’, in S. MacGregor (ed.) Routledge Hand-
book of Gender and Environment. New York: Routledge.
Morrow, K., (2017b). ‘Gender in the global climate change regime’, in S. Bucking-
ham and V. Le Masson (eds.) Understanding Climate Change through Gender Rela-
tions. London and New York: Routledge.
Pataki, G., (2007). ‘Speech given at high-level roundtable how a changing climate im-
pacts women’, in Council of Women World Leaders, WEDO and Henrich Böll Foun-
dation, Report of High-level Roundtable How a Changing Climate Impacts Women.
­
(online). ­
Available at: https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/12/roundtable- ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​
­­final-report-6-nov.pdf.
­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
­Plugar-Vidal, ​­ M., (2014). ­ Opening Remarks From Cop President, Manuel Pulgar-
Vidal, Minister of Environment of Peru. (online). Available at: https://unfccc.
int/files/meetings/lima_dec_2014/statements/application/pdf/cop20-mpv-1dic-
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​
­english.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Quinstorp, E., (1995). Who’s Talking about the Weather? Climate Politics from a Femi-
nist Viewpoint. (online). ­ Available at: https://www.gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/
­ ­ ­ ­
dokumente/6_UNFCCC/COP1_Introduction.pdf.
­ ­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Quinstorp, E. and Wandel, A., (1995). Open Letter from the International Women’s
Forum to the Minister of the Environment Angela Merkel. (online). Available at:
https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_UNFCCC/COP1_Letter_
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
merkel.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
Reyes, E. and Burns, B., (2013). Gender Stereotypes in (International) Climate
Change Policies. How the Prevalent Use of ‘Gender’ Might Perpetuate and Reinforce
Traditional Gender Roles. (online). ­ Available at: http://genanet.de/fileadmin/user_ ­ ­ ­
upload/dokumente/Gender-Klima-Energie/WEDO_GenderInnovations_Pres-
­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­
entation.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
Röhr, U., (2013a). ADP 2, Bonn Germany May 2. (online). Available at: https://
gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_UNFCCC/Women_gender_
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
part_1_ADP_special_event.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
Röhr, U. and Hemmati, M., (2007). A ­Gender-Sensitive ​­ Climate Regime? (online). ­
Available at: https://gendercc.net/genderunfccc/unfccc-conferences/bali-2007.
­ ­ ­­ ​­ ­­ ​­
html. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
Sargent, M., (1997). How the Women Stayed at Home. Published by email.
SBI, (2016).­ Gender and Climate Change Draft Conclusions Proposed by the Chair.
(online).
­ Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2016/sbi/
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
eng/l16.pdf. ­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Spivak, G. C., (1996). ‘Woman as theatre: United Nations Conference on Women,
Beijing 1995’, Radical Philosophy, 75(Jan/Feb), ­ ­ pp. ­ ­2–4. ​­
Taylor, M., (2021). ‘Cop26 will be whitest and most privileged ever, warn cam-
paigners’, The Guardian. (online). Available at: https://www.theguardian.
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 99
com/environment/2021/oct/30/cop26-will-be-whitest-and-most-privileged-ever-
­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­ warn-campaigners. ​­ Last accessed: 18/05/2022. ­ ­
Tjale, E., (2011). Intervention in the High Level Segment. (online). Available at:
­
https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_UNFCCC/KP_Interven- ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
tion_3.12.2011.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
Tobin, P., Schmidt, N. and Tosun, J., (2018). ‘Mapping States’ Paris climate pledges:
Analysing targets and groups at COP’, Global Environmental Change, 48, pp. ­ ­11–21. ​­
UN Climate Conference, (2015). ‘Two weeks of COP21 in 10 minutes’, YouTube.
­
(online). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gOgTxo_4Tgo%0D. ­ ­
Available at: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (1997). ­ Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. (online). ­ Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
kpeng.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
UNFCCC, (2001a). ­ Decision 36/CP.7 Improving the participation of women in the
representation of Parties in bodies established under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change or the Kyoto Protocol. (online). Available at: https://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a04.pdf#page=26. ­ ­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2001b). ­ Decision 28/CP.7 Guidelines for the preparation of national ad-
aptation programmes of action. (online). Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/cop7/13a04.pdf.
­ ­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2007). ­ Bali Action Plan. (online). Available at: https://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf.
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2009). ­ Decision 2/CP.15 The Copenhagen Accord. (online). Available at:
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Last
accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2010). ­ Decision 1/CP.16 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Conven-
tion. (online). ­ Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
UNFCCC, (2011a). ­ Decision 2/CP.17 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. (online). Availa-
ble at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf. ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Last accessed:
28/07/2020.
­ ­
UNFCCC, (2011b). ­ Decision 13/CP.17 Capacity- building under the Convention.
(online).
­ Available at: http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/repository/entri/docs/ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
cop/FCCC_COP17_dec13.pdf.
­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2012). ­ Decision 23/CP.18 Promoting gender balance and improving
the participation of women in UNFCCC negotiations and in the representation of
Parties in bodies established pursuant to the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol.
(online).
­ Available at: http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/repository/entri/docs/ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
cop/FCCC_COP18_dec23.pdf.
­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2014). ­ Decision 18/CP.20 Lima Work Programme on Gender. (online). Avail-
able at: https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/lima_dec_2014/decisions/application/pdf/
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­auv_cop20_gender.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2015). ­ Adoption of the Paris Agreement. (online). Available at: http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf. ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2016a). ­ ­In-session ​­ Workshop on Gender-responsive ­ ​­ Climate Policy with
a Focus on Adaptation, Capacity- building and Training for Delegates on Gender
Issues. (online). ­ Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
2016/sbi/eng/10.pdf%0D.
­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
100 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History
UNFCCC, (2016b). ­ Decision 21/CP.22 Gender and Climate Change. (online). Avail-
able at: https://unfccc.int/files/gender_and_climate_change/application/pdf/auv_­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
cop22_i15_gender_and_climate_change_rev.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
UNFCCC, (2017d). ­ Informal Summary Report on the Subsidiary Body for Implemen-
tation In-session Workshop to Develop Possible Elements of the Gender Action Plan
under the UNFCCC. (online). ­ Available at: http://unfccc.int/files/gender_and_cli- ­ ­ ­
mate_change/application/pdf/170517_sbi_informal_workshop_summary_web. ­ ­ ­
pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
UNFCCC, (2020a). ­ ­Non-governmental ​­ Organization Constituencies. (online). ­
Available at: https://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
constituencies_and_you.pdf. Last accessed: 27/07/2020.
UNFCCC, (2020d). ­ About the Secretariat. (online). Available at: https://unfccc.int/-
about-us/what-is-the-unfccc-secretariat.
​­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2020g). ­ Statistics on Participation and In-session Engagement. (online). ­
Available at: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stake ­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­
holders/non-party-stakeholders/statistics-on-non-party-stakeholders/statistics-
­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­­ ­​
­­on-participation-and-in-session-engagement.
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2020h). ­ National Gender and Climate Change Focal Points. (online). ­
Available at: https://unfccc.int/topics/gender/resources/list-of-gender-focal-points- ­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­
­​­­under-the-unfccc. ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2020i). ­ What is the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change? (online). ­ Available at: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­
­­the-convention/what-is-the-united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-
​­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​
­change. Last accessed: 30/08/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (n.d.). ­ Floating Coconut Story. (online). Available at: https://unfccc.int/
sites/default/files/2v0160525_vanuatu_2.pdf.
­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 29/07/2020. ­ ­
United Nations Economic and Social Council, (2005). Discussion Papers Submitted
by Major Groups: Engendering the Energy and Climate Change Agenda. (online). ­
Available at: https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/01/csd14_wmg_discus- ­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­
sionpaper.pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
United Nations, (1995). Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women. (online). ­
Available at: https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1. ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Last ac-
cessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Vidal, J., Stratton, A. and Goldenberg, S. (2009). ‘Low targets, goals dropped:
Copenhagen ends in failure’, The Guardian, 19 December. (online). Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal.
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ​­ Last
accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Waititu, A., (2006). Women’s Statement at COP12/COP-MOP2. ­­ ​­ (online). Availa-
ble at: https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_UNFCCC/Women_ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
statement_cop12_17Nov.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
WEDO, (2009). ­ Gender and Climate Change at Copenhagen COP-15: WEDO’s
Perspective on a History- making Year. (online). Available at: https://www.wedo.
­­ ​­
org/wp-content/uploads/COP15-Gender-Perspective_WEDO_Feb2010.pdf. ­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last
accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
WEDO, (2010). ­ WEDO at COP16 – Progress Report: Ensuring Gender Equality and
Strengthing Women’s Leadership. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wedo- ­ ­­ ­​
­­at-cop16-progress-report-ensuring-gender-equality-and-strengthing-womens-
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​
­leadership/. Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
 From Zero Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History 101
WEDO, (2016a). ­ Research Paper - Gender & Climate Change. (online). Available at:
https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/WEDO_GenderINDCAnalysis-
­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ​
­1.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020, ­ ­
WEDO, (2016b). ­ Call to Action on 2016 Reclaim Power. (online). Available at: https://
wedo.org/call-action-2016-reclaim-power/. ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
WGC, (2014a). ­ SBI Closing Plenary, Mirna Inés Fernández, COP20. (online). ­
Available at: http://womengenderclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/SBI- ­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​
­­Closingstatement_delivered-1.pdf. ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
WGC, (2014b). ­ RELEASE: Women at COP20 Blast Failure for Real Action in Lima.
(online). ­ Available at: http://womengenderclimate.org/release-women-at-cop-20- ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­blast-failure-for-real-action-in-lima/.
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
WGC, (2014c). ­ ADP Opening Plenary, Mrinalini Rai, COP20. (online). Available at:
http://womengenderclimate.org/gender-equality-must-be-central-to-new-paris-
­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​
agreement/.
­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
WGC, (2015a). ­ A Reality Check on the Paris Agreement: Women Demand Climate
Justice. (online). ­ Available at: http://womengenderclimate.org/a-reality-check-on- ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­the-paris-agreement-women-demand-climate-justice/.
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
WGC, (2015b). ­ Gender Just Solutions Awards. (online). Available at: https://wedo.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/WECF-WGCCOP21.07.121.pdf.
­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ​­ Last accessed:
28/07/2020.
­ ­
WGC, (2018). ­ Women and Gender Constituency Joint Statement on SB 48. (online). ­
Available at: https://womengenderclimate.org/women-and-gender-constituency- ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
joint-statement-on-sb-48/.
­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 4/11/2022. ­ ­
WGC, (2019a). ­ Advances for Gender Equality at COP25. (online). Available at: http://
womengenderclimate.org/advances-for-gender-equality-at-cop25/. ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed:
27/07/2020.
­ ­
Women at COP11 and MOP1, (2005a). Global Warning: Women Matter. (online). ­
Available at: https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/01/gender_cc_cop11_ ­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­
statement_short_7dec.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
Women at COP11 and MOP1, (2005b). Statement by Women at COP11 & COP/MOP1.
(online).
­ Available at: https://www.gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
UNFCCC/Gender_CC_COP11_plenarystatement_9Dec.pdf. Last accessed:
15/07/2020.
­ ­
Women for Peace and Ecology, (1995). International Women’s Forum ‘Solidarity
in the Greenhouse’. (online). ­ Available at: https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/ ­ ­ ­ ­
dokumente/6_UNFCCC/COP1_Introduction.pdf. ­ ­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Wyns, A., (2018). ‘Katowice is not large enough to host COP24 – this is how the
Polish presidency plans to solve it’, Climate Tracker. (online). Available at: cli-
matetracker.org/katowice-is-not-large-enough-to-host-cop24-this-is-how-the- ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­polish-presidency-plans-to-solve-it/%0D.
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Yeo, S., (2015). ‘Explainer: The “ratchet mechanism” within the Paris climate deal’,
Carbon Brief. (online). ­ Available at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-the- ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­ratchet-mechanism-within-the-paris-climate-deal/. ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 18/05/2022. ­ ­
5 Political Strategies Mobilised
by the Women and Gender
Constituency

The goal of the Women and Gender Constituency is to formalise the voice
of the women’s and gender civil society organisations present and regularly
active in UNFCCC processes, and to debate, streamline and strengthen
the positions which these organisations put forth. The Constituency draws
upon global commitments to gender equality and women’s rights, especially
as they relate to climate change, and toward the achievement of the Mil-
lennium Development Goals and related commitments and Conventions.
The Constituency works to ensure human rights and a gender perspective is
incorporated into UNFCCC negotiations, plans and actions.
(WGC,
­ 2009, ­p. 1)

The WGC is comprised of 29 NGOs out of around 2000 organisations that

now observe the annual UN climate conferences as ‘civil society’ (UNFCCC,
2016c). The UNFCCC Charter (1992) establishes in Article 7.6 the mandate
for the admission of observers as follows:

Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental

or nongovernmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Con-
vention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be repre-
sented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may
be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object.
The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the
rules of procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties.
(United Nations, 1992 Article 7.2)

Under these rules of procedure (or the disciplinary domain of power in an

intersectional framework – see Chapter 3), there are a number of activities
that observer organisations can undertake at the COPs including: observ-
ing the official negotiations (where permitted, though some sessions have
restricted access), organising and participating in side events and paral-
lel events (events outside of official UN remit), hosting exhibits, as well as
­business-to-business
­​­­ ​­ meetings and informal discussions at numerous social

DOI: 10.4324/9781003306474-5
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 103
events (UNFCCC, 2020a). Therefore, as a Constituency the WGC is the pri-
mary platform for observer organisations working to ensure women’s rights
and gender justice within the UNFCCC framework and has been an inte-
gral force in the transition from gender-blind to GAP in the UNFCCC. The
Constituency works on behalf of its members to enhance access to meetings,
workshops and conferences and to ensure that such events include the par-
ticipation and representation of women’s and gender NGOs who otherwise
would not be able to attend. Being affiliated with a Constituency means
that NGOs gain more institutional respect through being called upon by the
Secretariat as experts for consultations with chairs of committees and the
COP Presidencies.
GenderCC founder and board member Gotelind Alber served as the first
Focal Point from 2008 until 2014 (GenderCC, n.d.). The Focal Point is not
considered to be the ‘leader’ of the Constituency, but they do act as the li-
aison between Constituency members and the UNFCCC Secretariat. Alber
is currently GenderCC treasurer and takes part in the decision-making
processes of the steering group. Based in Berlin she works as an independ-
ent researcher and consultant and has been following the UNFCCC since
the beginning gaining recognition for her work around gender and cli-
mate change. Alber stepped down in 2014 giving way to Bridget Burns as
the Global North representative (2014–present) and Kalyani Raj as Global
South representative (2014–2018). This was a move taken in attempt to en-
sure that the WGC remained representative of all its members and could
amplify traditionally marginalised Global South members’ voices. Burns is
‘a feminist, environmental activist and Director of WEDO’ (WEDO, n.d.),
who specialises in policy advocacy, research and movement building on the
issue of gender equality. Raj is honorary Secretary of All India Women’s
Conference (AIWC), has extensive experience working on gender and cli-
mate change and has advocated for disaster preparedness, adaptation and
mitigation as well as alternate energy, as is her focus in AIWC ( WEDO, n.d).
Raj has been firmly committed to the participation of grassroots women
during her involvement in the UNFCCC.
Raj announced at SB48 in 2018 that she would be stepping down, i.e.
not seeking re- election, as co-Focal Point due to her large workload in her
own organisation. While a feature of all constituencies, not exclusive to the
WGC, Raj stepping down to reduce her workload raises an important issue
regarding the voluntary nature of the co-Focal Point position, much like the
National Gender Focal Points as discussed in Chapter 4. The co-Focal Point
takes on a huge workload in the organising and facilitating of Constituency
efforts, not just at the COP but throughout the year. The Focal Point’s work
is carried out on top of often h igh-ranking positions in their home organi-
sations. Thus, taking on the position requires time and resources to be allo-
cated by the home organisation, effectively preventing many from taking on
the role, particularly those from under-resourced organisations often from
the Global South. Raj was replaced by Ndivile Mokoena from GenderCC
104 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
Southern Africa and is based in South Africa. The focus of Mokoena’s work
is on gender and climate change, including policy interventions, capacity
building, advocacy, lobbying and training (Women2030, 2017).
The WGC is a complex coalition that currently comprises of 29 NGOs,
all but five of whom place the WGC as their primary Constituency, meaning
that their primary climate change focus is related to issues of women and
gender.1 Member organisations of the WGC vary widely. While some favour
advocacy of particular issues, others prefer the facilitation role that global
or regional networks play. While some specifically work on issues of gen-
der others cover issues of environmental justice more broadly. The NGOs
themselves can be broadly grouped: advocacy NGO and networks (global,
regional or independent); national NGO; grassroots organisation; or con-
sultancy NGO. Advocacy NGOs work to defend or promote specific issues
or causes. Rather than operational project management, advocacy NGOs
raise awareness, acceptance, and knowledge of particular issues through
processes of lobbying, press work and/or activist work. For example, the
focus of AIWC is primarily on climate change mitigation processes through
the propagation of alternative energy (AIWC, 2018a). In its advocacy ef-
forts, AIWC runs training and awareness programmes on energy con-
servation and energy efficiency as well as poverty alleviation through the
self-assembly and repair of solar equipment as an income generation activity
(AIWC, 2018a). Similarly, the Centre for 21st Century Issues (C21C) works
to build capacity for sustainable development with youth groups, promoting
environmental, social and economic justice and peace building (C21C, n.d.).
They do so through gender and climate change workshops which have been
held in Nigeria and at the COPs in Copenhagen and Cancun.
Advocacy networks are essentially alliances whether they be global, re-
gional or even independent networks and are typically small groupings of
NGOs working on similar issues with a central organisation. Women in
Europe for a Common Future (WECF) is one example of a regional net-
work of women’s, environmental and health organisations advocating glob-
ally for a healthy, sustainable and equitable future (WECF, 2018a). The 150
organisations in WECF work together to promote greater and more equita-
ble participation at local and global levels in policy processes for sustaina-
ble development. WECF, like most networks, has a Board of Trustees who
bear final responsibility for the strategic and financial management who
are based in three offices in the Netherlands, Germany and France, though
member organisations hail from Turkey, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and many,
many more.
National NGOs such as Rural Women Energy Security (RUWES) Initi-
ative work at the national level to advocate national interests. RUWES, for
example, have a geographical focus in Nigeria and target women with the
aim of making access to energy easier (RUWES Nigeria, 2018). Similarly,
but more localised, grassroots organisations such as Support for Women
in Agriculture and Environment (SWAGEN) create strong grassroots
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 105
community groups capable of actively participating in, meaningfully con-
tributing to, and efficiently tapping into the benefits of mainstream national
and international development. Finally, consultancy NGOs, such as the
Watershed Organisation Trust ( WOTR) provide consultancy services, in
this case through training villagers to regenerate their watersheds by trap-
ping and making full use of their scarce rainfall which not only vastly in-
creases agricultural yield but enriches economies with greater opportunities
and standards of living (Watershed Organisation Trust, 2018). The NGOs
that make up the WGC are also varied in both geographical base and focus.
Indeed, 20 of the 28 state a geographical focus of the Global South, most of
which being focused on sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (WGC, n.d.). Of the
remaining eight, five state a focus on the Global North, though only LIFE
and the Italian Climate Network state a sole focus on the Global North, spe-
cifically Europe. The other NGOs, the Danish Family Planning Association
(DFPA), The Federation of American Women’s Clubs Overseas (FAWCO)
Foundation and WECF state their geographical focus as ‘Denmark, Europe
and International’, ‘International, United States’ and ‘Europe, Global South
and International’ respectively. This broad coalition of women’s and gender
NGO’s has been crucial in its advocacy efforts in the UNFCCC, as demon-
strated in Chapter 4.
The Constituency works closely with the UNFCCC Secretariat gender
advisor, Fleur Newman, and has been, in large part, responsible for the in-
creasing inclusion of gender concerns in the UNFCCC. The purpose of this
chapter is to examine the political (rhetorical and procedural) strategies that
are mobilised by the WGC. On my analysis, the WGC follows a carefully
developed political strategy that falls into two categories: rhetorical strate-
gies and procedural strategies. Rhetorical strategies refer to the ways that
gender is framed as a political issue in order to influence the negotiations.
Based on my analysis I categorise the rhetorical strategies mobilised by the
WGC in four main themes: gender equality and empowering women; uni-
versalising lived experience; equating gender with women; and intersection-
ality in baby steps. Procedural strategies are concerned with the specific
actions taken in order to implement the rhetorical strategies. In the case of
the WGC, I categorise these as: identifying entry points for gender aspects
into the climate change debate; raising awareness and disseminating infor-
mation; building women’s capacity and joint strategising; and developing a
future research agenda.

Rhetorical Strategies
Consistent with arguments made by scholars who have criticised feminist
environmental activists for their persistent use of universalising and simplis-
tic representations of gender, Chapter 4 demonstrates that members of the
WGC have drawn on rhetorical strategies that universalise lived experiences
and equate women with gender. But while these stories have gained the most
106 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
traction in policy influence, they are by no means the only stories told about
women and their lives by the WGC. My analysis of data collected from his-
torical documents, interviews and my own observations suggests that there
are four main rhetorical strategies that have been mobilised by the WGC
which have seen varying levels of success: gender equality and empowering
women; universalising lived experience; equating women with gender; and
intersectionality in ‘baby steps’.

Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women

The commitment to gender equality through the empowerment of women
is a principle enshrined in the United Nations institutional fabrics, mostly
thanks to the hard work of feminists and gender advocates at the Beijing
Declaration of the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women (United
Nations, 1995). Because Parties to the UNFCCC are committed to wider
UN principles it has been a common tactic of the WGC to pin arguments
about gender equality on the principles of gender equality and women’s em-
powerment that are enshrined in other UN documents. There has been a
good level of success in mobilising rhetoric around empowering women in
the name of gender equality in the UNFCCC. Decision 36/CP.7, or the very
first gender mandate under the UNFCCC that aimed to improve the partic-
ipation of women in the institution recalled the Beijing Platform for Women
as a key reason for the adoption of the decision:

Recalling the Beijing Declaration of the 1995 Fourth World Conference

on Women which recognizes that women’s empowerment and their full
participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, includ-
ing participation in decision-making processes and access to power, are
fundamental for the achievement of equality, development and peace.
(UNFCCC,
­ 2001a, p.
­ 1)

However, despite the obligation of Parties to the UNFCCC to respect the

principles of gender equality and the empowerment of women, the WGC has
experienced regular resistance to the phrase ‘gender equality’. In 2012 Deci-
sion 23/CP.18 ‘Promoting gender equality and improving the participation of
women in UNFCCC negotiations and in the representation of Parties in bod-
ies established pursuant to the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol’ was adopted
(UNFCCC, 2012). While the phrase ‘gender equality’ appeared in the title, the
wording of the main body of the text had been watered down to ‘gender bal-
ance’. The WGC and its members were extremely disappointed by this change:

However welcome this decision, GenderCC must express its deep dis-
appointment at the watering down of the wording, from the initial in-
sistence on gender equality to its present position on gender balance.
Gender balance, though important from an equity and human rights
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 107
perspective, falls far short of the substantial gender equality needed to
accomplish fundamental changes in human behaviour. Gender equality
moves us beyond the numbers to deal with issues of substantive equal-
ity. Substantive equality would require us to begin to rephrase both cli-
mate science and climate politics from a gendered perspective, making
true empowerment of women an issue, according to Gotelind Alber,
co-founder and board member of GenderCC. “The decision on gender
balance, though only a very first step, offers opportunities to strengthen
the gender agenda in the UNFCCC process”.
(GenderCC,
­ 2012, p.
­ 1)

Related to the kind of re-imagining of climate politics that the phrase

‘gender equality’ implies is the phrasing of gender equality and empower-
ment of women, instead of gender equality through the empowerment of
women. The latter suggests gender equality through women’s equality with
men, while the former suggests both gender equality and women’s empow-
erment as crucial, but separate processes. As such, members of the WGC
have consistently lobbied for a change in phrasing so that UNFCCC docu-
ments recognise both women’s empowerment and gender equality. The GAP
offered a huge win for the WGC in this respect: ‘the GAP aims to ensure the
respect, promotion and consideration of gender equality and the empow-
erment of women in the implementation of the Convention and the Paris
Agreement’ (UNFCCC, 2017b, p. 4, emphasis added). Including the phrase
‘gender
­ equality and women’s empowerment’, the WGC argues, signals the
important distinction that gender equality does not necessarily mean equal-
ity with men under male terms. Rather, the phrase gender equality signifies
a far greater shift in priorities.
The issue of the empowerment of women is commonly understood as
necessitating greater participation by women in the UNFCCC negotiating
processes. As one practical means of ensuring the increased participation of
women, particularly women from developing countries, the Global Gender
and Climate Alliance (GGCA), formed of WEDO, UNDP, IUCN in 2009,
partnered with the Government of Finland and launched the Women’s Dele-
gate Fund (WDF). Over the years this WDF has drawn support from several
other donors including the governments of Australia, Canada, France, Ice-
land, the Netherlands, Scotland, Sweden, and Switzerland (WEDO, 2018b).
Administered by WEDO, the fund provides travel support for women from
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to attend the COP as well as a night
school intended to build leadership skills, regional trainings and provides
advocacy by facilitating organisations and the delegates themselves to high-
light the importance of women’s full participation and networking oppor-
tunities. Since 2009 the WDF has supported ‘trips for 175 women across
69 countries to attend 35 sessions of the UNFCCC’ (WEDO, 2021).
It is not only within the halls of the UNFCCC that members of the WGC
advocate for gender equality and women’s empowerment, but strategies
108 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
that pin arguments on these principles are mobilised by the WGC in ef-
forts to influence negotiations on adaptation and mitigation, particularly
in the Global South. Typically, these kinds of strategies will work to pro-
mote women’s participation in green climate solutions such as technology
transfer. A factsheet published by ENERGIA and WEDO in 2010 called
‘Recommendations for Climate Negotiators on Energy Technologies and
Gender Equity’ is a good example of this. The factsheet stated that:

The technology transfer, capacity building and financing provisions of

climate agreements and response plans should be inclusive and equita-
ble so that both women and men can have access to, and benefit from,
the development and transfer of new energy technologies, and should
specifically:
• Require gender balance on management boards, expert panels and
advisory groups for international, national and local climate re-
sponse planning, energy technology transfer and dissemination, and
carbon financing;
• Support training of women on the use, development, production and
marketing of low- carbon energy technologies, and opportunities to
share that knowledge with other women;
• Set targets for women’s participation in projects and programmes
designed to expand energy access, including as designers, managers
and entrepreneurs;
• Establish programmes and centres focused on capacity building for
women on clean energy business initiatives and opportunities;
• Create financing mechanisms for making access to carbon finance
easier for smaller projects;
• Engage gender and energy experts to apply a gender analysis in the
development of climate and energy policies and projects (ENERGIA
and WEDO, 2010, p. 1).
Underpinning such arguments is the idea that women should be able to take
advantage of a Green Economy type approach to climate action in access-
ing equal business opportunities to improve women’s opportunities for eco-
nomic empowerment. In this way,

The role of women as energy providers can be transformed into suitable

micro- enterprises if they can manage fuel wood or oil seed plantations,
dispense kerosene or liquified petroleum gas (LPG), assemble solar pan-
els, build cook stoves and brick kilns, and even manage electricity dis-
tribution and bill collection.
(ENERGIA and WEDO, 2010, p. 1)

These strategies have been, on paper at least, successful in influencing pol-

icy. There are several mandates under the UNFCCC that include the term
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 109
‘women’s empowerment’ including Decision 23/CP.18 that aimed at promot-
ing gender balance and improving participation of women in the UNFCCC.
The decision draws attention to the importance of

ensuring coherence between the participation of women in the

UNFCCC process and the principles and objectives of international in-
struments and relevant multilateral processes, such as the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and
the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which recognize the
importance of women’s empowerment and their full participation on
equal terms with men in all spheres of society, including participation
in decision-making processes and access to power.
(UNFCCC,
­ 2012, p.
­ 1)

But as Anniete Cohn-Lois, WDF Delegate from the Dominican Republic,

warned, ‘at the national level we speak a lot about the importance of women
empowerment, but it’s not the same thing as actually implementing policies
to achieve progress on this’ (Cohn-Lois, 2014, in Burns and Andre, 2014,
p. 6). This suggests that the term ‘women’s empowerment’ is an example of
gender-mainstreaming as a tick-box exercise that is rarely followed up by
meaningful political action (see Buckingham and Kulcur, 2009).

Universalising Lived Experience

So, this was for me, it really was the starting point and just because
we got attention only by evidencing women as the most vulnerable. So,
what we have to do, my experience was, to get to end with gender in these
processes, or women into the process, we had to take this approach as
an entry point on women are the most vulnerable. And so, for that rea-
son, and I remember it very well in Bali, you’ll have to look for the dates
or COP numbers, but in Bali that was for me the first conference where
much more focus was put on adaptation. Beforehand it was much more
on mitigation, so it was a shift in issues because of pressure from devel-
opment corporations, or organisations, working in these areas.
(Röhr, 2017, interview)

As discussed in Chapter 4, COP13 Bali in 2007 represents a pivotal moment in

feminist organising in the UNFCCC. Members of the Constituency made the
decision to speak to the wider shift in UNFCCC discourse from mitigation
towards adaptation, which resulted in the pursuit of a rhetorical strategy that
centred framings of gender – meaning women – as vulnerable victims of climate
change. Prior to COP13 Bali, the network of feminists active in the UNFCCC
had avoided discussing the specificity of women located in the Global South,
instead favouring a more holistic feminist approach to global climate politics.
110 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
For example, at an informal meeting of feminist climate activists at COP9
Milan in 2003 the attendees noted that ‘the process tends to be driven by a
masculine view of the problem and its solutions’ (LIFE et al., 2003, p. 1). Simi-
larly, in 2005 Genanet, the organisation that preceded GenderCC, published a
working paper entitled ‘Gender & Climate Change in the North: Issues, Entry
Points and Strategies for the Post-2012 Process and Beyond’ (Hemmati, 2005).
The paper was aimed at researchers and other gender advocates calling upon
them to focus on ‘ensuring a (more) comprehensive and effective recognition
of gender aspects of climate change in a future regime’ (Hemmati, 2005, p. 1).
But the WGC shifted in 2007 from what can be described as a relatively ho-
listic vision of a feminist climate politics to one that foregrounds women’s vul-
nerability in the Global South, mirroring the wider shift in the UNFCCC. The
political conversation shifted from being concerned with how to halt climate
change (mitigation) towards one more concerned with how to deal with the
most harmful effects of climate change (adaptation). The result was a growing
focus on the Global South as a primary location for climate action, which, as
one interview participant remarked, meant that ‘the constituted bodies are
obviously all dealing with non-Annex 1 [developing countries] country issues’
(Participant B, 2018, interview).2 The WGC responded, shifting to a strategy
of foregrounding the lived experiences of vulnerable women in the Global
South, and presenting these as a universal experience. For example, several
high-level statements and plenary interventions from the time began to high-
light women’s vulnerability to the most severe effects of climate change (see
for example, Aguilar, 2007; Brundtland, 2007; Zeitlin, 2007). They saw this as
a means of influencing policy and had some great successes in doing so. The
2010 Cancun Agreements, for example, make special reference to ‘those seg-
ments of the population that are already vulnerable owing to geography, gen-
der, age, indigenous or minority status, or disability’ (UNFCCC, 2010, p. 2).
A technical guide to existing mandates for gender equality from 2014
written on behalf of the GGCA by Burns and Patouris, both from WEDO,
highlights that the most mentions of gender appear in the UNFCCC topic
area of adaptation. The authors put this down to three primary reasons.
First, the decision from COP7 in 2001 which integrated a gender-sensitive
approach mandated that National Adaptation Programmes of Action
(NAPAs) should be guided by gender equality (UNFCCC, 2001b). Second,
from the outset of the current UNFCCC adaptation framework it was man-
dated that adaptation should follow a gender-sensitive approach. And third,

early research and awareness-raising highlighting the linkages between

gender and climate change framed women predominantly in terms of
their vulnerability to climate impacts, making the link to adaptation
more relevant to policy-makers than in other areas such as mitigation
and technology.
(Burns and Patouris, 2014, p. 6)
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 111
Out of all of the main negotiating areas (adaptation, mitigation, finance,
technology, and capacity building) mitigation has the lowest number of de-
cisions that reference gender, with no guiding mandate for gender-sensitive
mitigation actions (Burns and Patouris, 2014).
Despite the seemingly limiting effects of arguments that are based
on women’s vulnerability there have been some practical benefits for the
WGC working under such a framework. The move from a holistic feminist
approach attending to issues of masculinities and Global North consid-
erations, to foregrounding women’s vulnerability and presenting it as a uni-
versal lived experience allowed the network to increase its legitimacy as a
group working inside the UNFCCC. It also provided the tools to help make
the links between gender and climate change clear, or perhaps more palata-
ble to, Party negotiators:

Initial attempts to link gender and climate change may seem rather ­far-​
­fetched especially for the sceptic. However, analysing the issues from
a poverty, vulnerability, environmental resource management, equity
and sustainability angle the links become inherently obvious.
(ENDA Tiers Monde, 2002, p. 7 my emphasis)

The WGC makes these links in a variety of ways. For example, in a pres-
entation given in 2007 Lorena Aguilar, in the words of Doña Vera Sanchez,
a survivor of Hurricane Mitch, gave an account of ‘how a changing climate
impacts women’:

I lived on the Atlantic coast in Honduras. At that time, I was a single

mother of three kids, my husband had left us some time ago. I built a
very “rustic house” close to an estuary. With my older son I collected
molluscs, did some fishing from the coast and processed (dried and
salted) some of the smaller fish that the fishermen gave up.
One morning some of my neighbours said that they had heard in the
radio that a big storm was coming and that it had winds of about 290
Km per hour. I remember thinking, what is a 290Km wind?
Most of us on the coast were women with our sons. What should we
do? We had no idea. Some women commented that they had heard from
their husbands that we had to take some precautions. Unfortunately,
none of us had ever been invited or went to meetings dealing with this
type of situation.
Then it happened. The winds, the waves, the flood. I took my three
kids and started walking inland. Very soon the current was so strong, I
could not hold all of them, my oldest son was holding my daughter. My
hands were holding my youngest baby. The water snatched them, I saw
my son trying to swim … I lost sight of them.
(Aguilar,
­ 2007, p.
­ 1)
112 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
Aguilar goes on to note that ‘in the 2004 Asian Tsunami, 70– 80% of overall
deaths were women’ (Aguilar, 2007, p. 2).3
Other examples are found in a series of ‘case studies’ published between
2008 and 2009 that highlight individual country issues, all of which are fo-
cused on the Global South including the Philippines, Bangladesh, Senegal
and Ghana (Alam, Fatema, and Ahmed, 2008; Gueye, 2008; Mensah-Kutin,
2008; Henrich Böll Stiftung and WEDO, 2009). For example, Yacine Diagne
Gueye of Environmental Development Action in the Third World (EBDA)
in Senegal gives an overview of the climate change situation in Senegal
drawing attention to the implications for women’s livelihoods, security and
gender equality. She writes that women in Senegal face several issues includ-
ing access to water due to a 35% decrease in rainfall, issues of energy due to
the reliance on biomass as the main source of energy and fishing since more
than 90% of women are involved in the fishing process while coasts are par-
ticularly sensitive areas (Gueye, 2008).
The purpose of these case study examples is to highlight the main issues
faced by women across the (developing) world and to provide entry points
for feminist advocacy in the UNFCCC. A final example of linking climate
change to women’s vulnerability from 2008 is a fact sheet on ‘climate change
and women’ published by WEDO in collaboration with Oxfam (Oxfam
America and WEDO, 2008). The fact sheet, which was distributed during
the COP, included a map of the impacts of climate change on women. It
shows that because of their ‘dual roles as providers and caretakers, women
experience a long list of consequences when the climate changes. They
sometimes feel the effects all at once’ (Oxfam America and WEDO, 2008,
p. 2). The examples given are almost all from the Global South including
‘clean water shortage in Senegal’ and ‘civil war/conflict in Sudan’. There is
one notable exception, which is ‘displacement in the US’ which focused on
displaced people (mainly women and children) in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina. In order to foreground women’s vulnerability to the effects of cli-
mate change it is necessary to point to examples such as women’s role in
caring for family members, resulting in their added burden when fleeing a
climate disaster (see Aguilar, 2008). Or to connect traditional gender roles
with intensified domestic labour, for example water collection in an envi-
ronment of increasing water scarcity (see WGC, 2015b). While these roles
represent an empirical reality for many of the world’s women, they are not a
universal female experience.
Members of the WGC are aware of the potentially harmful effects that
strategies that rhetorically universalise the lived experience do:

We [US communities of colour] know that solutions look different for

our communities and there is no one-size fits all, (and) recognise that we
must resist in the different ways that we can.
(Managaliman, 2016; cited in Acha, 2016, p. 13)
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 113
But, as Ghani (2017, interview) frankly put it: ‘you could be a raging feminist,
but you never bring that into your conversations or the work that you are do-
ing. There’s no space. It’s just not possible’. This is just one example of the di-
lemmas facing the WGC and its members as feminist activists working ‘inside’
the system: arguments for the inclusion of gender equality are most successful
when they fit into dominant frameworks, in this case frameworks that posi-
tion climate change as an issue of science, requiring technological change and
individual behaviour change (c.f. Alaimo, 2009; Seager, 2009; Nelson, 2012).

Equating Gender with Women

Underpinning both rhetorical strategies described above is the need to
centre women and their experiences rather than making arguments that
understand gender as a relational concept, including attention to both mas-
culinities and male power. This reinforces Bretherton’s (1998) claim dis-
cussed in Chapter 3 that gender, understood as a relational term requiring
critical attention to men and male power, has not yet reached the global
environmental agenda. Though making this claim in 1998, there is little evi-
dence from this research that much has changed. The use of rhetorical strat-
egies that frame ‘gender’ to be synonymous with ‘women’ has, again, been a
matter of strategic necessity due to the institutional resistance to accepting
masculinity as relevant to issues of global climate politics. For example,
Röhr recalls the push-back she faced after mentioning masculinity during
an intervention on behalf of the WGC:

[The intervention] was about Article 6 of the Convention, so about

education and capacity building and I said ok capacity building for
women is important, but we need much more capacity building for men
to change their masculinised approaches to reducing emissions, and so
on. And this is, you know, nobody is listening to interventions and that
moment when I used the term masculinity, then you could see every-
body oh…. [mimes sticking head up]. Haha and it was directly part of
the intervention but in the Women and Gender Constituency there were
people who said I hate it, don’t do it again everybody is asking me about
masculinity now and I don’t we don’t want to fight against men. I also
don’t want to fight against men but it’s a different approach.
(Röhr, 2017, interview)

Later in the conversation, when I asked her who had been against the use of
the term masculinity, Röhr replied ‘everyone really, both Parties and civil
society’ (Röhr, 2017, interview).
There are several explanations as to why some might be against bring-
ing men, masculinity and masculine power into the gender and climate
change debate. Röhr suggests it is an issue of lack of understanding which
114 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
has forced the Constituency to rely on strategies that conflate women and
gender. She claims that

These terms gender and women were used as if they were the same, so
gender is equal to women and women is equal to gender. And one of
the problems that we’re facing here, and I wouldn’t make a difference
between erm civil society organisations, environmental civil society
organisations, negotiators, sometimes also UN organisations, though
they might be a little bit yes, further in their debates. They work with
gender concepts but also their gender concepts are women concepts,
as empowering women etc. And that’s one of the difficulties, we tried
several times to explain the difference between gender and women and
what it means, but it’s too much. They don’t follow.
(Röhr, 2017, interview)

Another interview participant told me that

Lack of understanding is definitely a part of it, it’s also about power. It

is also because even if you do educate people, they are not necessarily
going to take it on board, or agree, and there are lots of other political
shifts going on.
(Participant B, 2018, interview)

It would seem that the UNFCCC pursues the kind of gender-mainstreaming

approach that has been criticised by several scholars for lacking a critical
potential to challenge existing political frameworks (c.f. Buckingham and
Kulcur, 2009; Rochette, 2016; Wonders and Danner, 2015). This approach
is becoming increasingly prominent as countries in the Global North try to
understand gender as an issue for all countries, not just the Global South.
One interview participant recalled that a Party delegate approaching her
very excitedly a couple of days after asking for an example of how they
might be able to incorporate a gendered perspective in their domestic Euro-
pean policy. The Party delegate eagerly told her that they had ‘found one’;
women need less water in a heatwave than men and this fact could be writ-
ten into domestic policy on responding to a heatwave (Participant B, 2018,
interview). The delegate had told me the exact same titbit in my interview
with them one day prior (Participant E, 2018, interview). Participant B went
on to gently criticise this kind of approach:

But that was a lightbulb moment ‘I know and understand this is con-
crete’. And I had a contact with a guy at a stakeholder meeting with the
EU, it was a project they were doing on energy and he was transmission
specialist, and he said well I don’t see the gender in transmission and I
said that’s because you’re not looking and because you’re looking at the
wrong thing. You’re looking at the transmission lines once the decision
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 115
has been made to put those lines up. But where was the discussion be-
fore the transmission lines were put up about whether or not having a
massive power station with massive lines was the appropriate way to go
given that there will be however many people, many of them women,
who won’t be able to access that electricity from the grid. Where is the
discussion about distributed energy?
(Participant B, 2018, interview)

This approach to writing gender into policy does not challenge the existing
agenda, rather it involves adding women into it. This is similar to what Breth-
erton (1998) suggests results in a resistance to a broader conversation about
gender, since this would fundamentally challenge existing value systems and
power structures. An implication of this approach is that attempts to steer the
conversation away from a focus on women’s vulnerability results in the Con-
stituency relying on strategies that simply insert women into existing frame-
works and making arguments that demonstrate how the inclusion of women
can be of benefit to dominant systems of neoliberal capitalism. For example,
members of the WGC published a document in 2009 stating that, although
women are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than men,

At the same time, women’s vulnerability can obscure the fact that they
are an untapped resource in efforts to cope with climate change and re-
duce the emissions that cause it. As innovators, organisers, leaders, ed-
ucators and caregivers, women are uniquely positioned to help curb the
harmful consequences of a changing climate.
(Blomstrom, Cunningham, Johnson, and Owren,
2009, p. 3, emphasis added)

In a context where technocratic and economic interests are given priority

over all others (c.f. Alaimo, 2009; Seager, 2009; Nelson, 2012; Bee, Rice and
Trauger, 2015) it makes sense that the WGC would have to adapt its strat-
egies in its attempts to influence the negotiations. Dutch negotiator Pieter
Tepstra candidly noted in an interview that ‘the economic arguments carry
more weight with negotiators than the moral ones. If you want Parties to
act then you have to show that by not including women, they are losing out
on half the workforce’ (Tepstra, 2018, interview). However, as I have shown
elsewhere (Wilson and Chu, 2019) a gender intervention in a Green Econ-
omy approach to dealing with climate change that over- emphasises partic-
ipation of women can only ever result in a simplified tick-box inclusion of
women, another challenge facing feminists working inside the system.

Intersectionality in Baby Steps

It’s this being able to see that diversity brings different ideas and again
it’s not just about gender diversity but more generally. But that’s one
116 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
of the things that comes with gender equality and I often talk about
this, there’s women’s equality and there’s women’s empowerment. We
need women’s empowerment to get gender equality but gender equality
means women and men and boys and girls and that’s critically impor-
tant because there are many things where men are more vulnerable than
women. [...]. So there’s this whole issue about caste, and around ethnicity
and race and other things, but in all of the gender equality stuff that’s
what it also means. That’s part of the feminist perspective, if you are a
feminist then you are for everybody’s rights.
(­Participant B, 2018, interview)

It is clear from the documentary data I have analysed as well as from my

interviews and observations that the WGC, and its members, are commit-
ted to principles of intersectional feminism. Intersectionality is particularly
explicit in internal training events (­c.f. Burns, 2013; Reyes and Burns, 2013;
Röhr, 2013b). It can be easy to overlook these commitments because they
rarely make it into official policy documents. Nonetheless, a commitment
to the principles of intersectionality is at the heart of the WGC’s political
practice. As discussed in C ­ hapter 4, there was a moment of reflection within
the Constituency in 2013 about the use of problematic rhetorical strategies
(­including the ones described above) to get women’s issues on the negoti-
ating ­table – ​­e.g. gender as synonymous for women; gender/­women imply-
ing vulnerable, victim, poor or altruistic stewards of the environment. The
presenters called for a more embedded intersectional approach to gender
advocacy (­c.f. Reyes and Burns, 2013). A series of internal capacity building
events stressed that intersectionality was not only relevant for research but
for policymaking too. They also encouraged members of the WGC to be
aware of the politics of knowledge production, to be more specific when
talking about ‘­women’ and ‘­gender’ and to make clear the different situa-
tions of ‘­women’ in different contexts (­A lber et al., 2013). As a result, the
Constituency agreed that its members should share expertise with an aim
of coming up with a common understanding of gender issues (­Burns, 2013,
in Alber et al., 2013) and that they should pursue a t­wo-​­track strategy of
continuing to lobby for the inclusion of gender language in UNFCCC texts
while also continuing the internal discussion about n ­ on-​­essentialist and
intersectional approaches and building capacity within the Constituency
(­Röhr, 2013b in Alber et al., 2013).
Since then, there has been an increase in explicit articulations of in-
tersectional principles with the term being used more commonly in the
Constituency’s demands. For example, in an eDiscussion on Climate and
Environmental Justice held in 2016, Maria Alejandra Rodriguea Acha, ­Co-​
E
­ xecutive Director at ­FRIDA – ​­The Young Feminist Fund, the ­co-​­founder
and former c­ o-​­coordinator of TierrActiva Perú, claimed that ‘­g roups are
increasingly rejecting ­single-​­issue campaigns and demands and recognising
the intersectionality of diverse movements and struggles’ (­Acha, 2016, ­p. 13).
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 117
Aguilar, Granat and Owren (2015) even assert that as part of the significant
progress that has been made in addressing the complexity and intersection-
ality of global environmental and development challenges, the UNFCCC
has progressed to understanding the need to tackle climate change impacts
as an issue of human rights. To this end the term intersectionality was ex-
plicitly mentioned in the GAP negotiations and was incorporated into an
informal summary of a workshop intended to develop the main elements for
the plan to stress that implementation of climate solutions must ‘highlight
intersectionality and broader social contexts as part of gender-assessments’
(UNFCCC,
­ 2017b, ­p. 5).
This new focus on the need to consider ‘broader social contexts’ is signif-
icant from an ecofeminist intersectional lens because it draws attention to
the importance of contextuality of experience. Despite these small wins, the
Constituency is aware that it faces a huge challenge in gender rhetoric at the
official agreement and policy level because

while gender issues have now a higher profile in the UNFCCC, a nor-
mative understanding of the link between gender equality and climate
action, and the role of the gender mainstreaming strategy is still very
limited, as are links to a human-rights based approach to development.
(Burns and Lee, 2015, p. 18)

Burns and Lee go on to suggest that within the UNFCCC challenges in the
process of gender-mainstreaming are in part due to limited capacity and re-
sources. But critically there is gap in knowledge among the majority of those
engaging in climate policy from a scientific, technical, and financial back-
ground regarding to the social dimensions of climate change issues. As such,
the WGC pursues intersectionality in ‘baby steps’ or, as Morrow (2017a)
suggests, they favour incremental progress towards an inclusive gender-just
climate framework.

Procedural Strategies
Rhetorical strategies can only be effective if they are coupled with proce-
dural strategies to implement them. This is linked to the decision facing
social movements between acting as pragmatic insiders or radical outsiders
(see Chapter 2). The WGC actually employs both of these approaches as
a Constituency, as do individual member NGOs. Alongside their insider
strategy of influencing global climate change negotiations in the UNFCCC,
member NGOs also conduct a lot of advocacy and grassroots work. For
example, AIWC conducts a series of awareness programmes in various
Indian regions around issues of climate change as well as providing train-
ing on the consumption of conservation of energy (AIWC, 2018b). Simi-
larly, as part of their ‘Great Green Wall’ project, Women’s Environment
Programme ( WEP) is
118 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
building capacities of women on efficient use of energy to reduce health
hazards associated with the burning of biomass and save the vegetation
from degradation by teaching women to construct energy efficient cook
stoves from local materials. WEP is also training women on alternative
sources of income, to empower them economically and reduce over-
dependence on farming.
(WEP, 2017 n.p.)

Because my fieldwork was focused on the COPs, I will not discuss these out-
sider strategies in detail. Rather, I focus here on the insider strategies of the
WGC vis-à-vis the UNFCCC. The Constituency has developed a particular
modus operandi over the years in order to ‘speak truth to power’ (Röhr,
Hemmati and Lambrou, 2009, p. 297). As I see it, this modus operandi is
organised around four complementary activities: identifying entry points
for gender aspects into the climate change debate; raising awareness and
disseminating information; building women’s capacity and joint strategis-
ing; developing a future research agenda.

Identifying Entry Points for Gender Aspects into the Climate

Change Debate
As a first point of reference for lobbying for gender issues to be integrated
into global climate change policies, the WGC draws upon the links between
gender equality, women’s rights and climate change that exist outwith the
confines of the UNFCCC itself. As discussed above, UN declarations such
as the Beijing Platform for Action for gender-mainstreaming (1995) are par-
ticularly significant because Parties to the UN have already committed to
this mandate. Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has direct implications for cli-
mate change policy because it obligates Parties to the UN to take

all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in

rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women,
that they participate in and benefit from rural development.
(United Nations, 1979, p. 5)

CEDAW further addresses issues of resources, credit, family planning, ed-

ucation and the right to work, to participate in forming and implement-
ing government policies and to represent the country at an international
level – all of which, the WGC asserts, impact a woman’s capacity to adapt
to impacts of climate change and to participate in the planning and imple-
mentation to address climate change (UNEP, 2004). More recently femi-
nists have pointed to the Paris Agreement, Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) and Agenda 2030. For example, during COP23 at an open negoti-
ation for the Gender Action Plan (GAP) where observers were admitted to
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 119
the negotiating room to observe proceedings, the Mexican negotiator called
for the GAP to make clear links to both Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, result-
ing in the preamble including the line ‘reaffirming the General Assembly
resolution on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (UNFCCC,
2017b).
These links inform the WGC’s members when lobbying for the inclusion
of specific language, such as ‘loss and damage’, ‘human rights’ and ‘gender
equality’. It gives the Constituency something concrete (in that they have al-
ready been agreed and mandated by Parties) to pin arguments on while lob-
bying. Emilia Reyes, negotiator for Mexico and human rights activist, sums
this up as ‘the biggest achievement of the GAP was including language on
human rights for the first time under the gender agenda item’ (Reyes, 2017
interview). She went on to say ‘gender equality [in the Paris Agreement] was
the same fight. We don’t care about where it is, we just want the precedent.
In the preamble is ok’ (Reyes, 2017, interview). Therefore, it seems that the
logic of much of the work around identifying entry points for gender aspects
in the climate change debates is about getting specific words and phrases in
the document, because once it is there it can act as a precedent to be drawn
upon in future negotiations. A phrase that came up in multiple interviews
with both negotiators and with WGC members was that gender advocacy
was best done in ‘baby steps’ (Lauron, 2017, interview; Reyes, 2017, inter-
view; Coates, 2018, interview; Marchington, 2018, interview; O’Hehir, 2018,
interview).
Language is important, not just in the gender negotiations, but also in the
UNFCCC negotiations as a whole. Language provides a reinforcing frame-
work for the UNFCCC which is, at its heart, an institution that is concerned
with negotiating treaty text. As such, ‘language in the UNFCCC is often a
huge point of contention and there’s so much attention paid to words and
how they go together’ (Marchington, 2018 interview). Contention and disa-
greement on language at COP24 Katowice in 2018 was what made national
news in the UK when Parties failed to reach an agreement on the IPCC Spe-
cial Report where oil producers Saudi Arabia, Russia and the US refused to
‘welcome’ the report in favour of merely ‘noting’ it (Doherty, 2018). Such a
distinction is seen as important because it ultimately sets the tone for global
climate ambition.
But language on gender in the UNFCCC does not seem to have as much
of a strict code of conduct with phrases often being introduced includ-
ing: ‘gender
­ equality’, ‘gender
­ balance’, ‘gender-mainstreaming’,
­­ ​­ ‘gender-
­­ ​
responsive’ and ‘gender-sensitive’, among others. As Canadian negotiator
Erin Marchington recalled: ‘I know when I started looking at the gender
decisions I was trying to differentiate, ok what is the difference between
gender-responsive and gender-sensitive? And I’m not sure there’s really a
good answer’ (Marchington, 2018 interview). She suggested that there is a
variety of reasons why such vagueness exists around language on gender
issues, but perhaps the most pragmatic of those is that for most negotiators
120 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
English (the primary negotiating language) is not their first language.
Therefore ‘you have people trying to craft a document together who it is
not their first language and in the case of the GAP it is not always logical’
(Marchington, 2018, interview). But ‘when you have a soft issue that’s not
an obligation for Parties [like gender] I think people become a bit laxer and
the concept of those terms are not always well understood’ (Marchington,
2018, interview).
Vagueness in gender language can reveal politically vested agendas.
Choosing less threatening words becomes a political strategy. For example,
the phrase ‘gender equality’ is more threatening, more prescriptive, than
simply ‘gender balance’ (as described above), ‘gender’ or ‘gender equality in
line with national circumstances’. Resistance to the phrase gender equality
was a contentious feature of COP19 Warsaw in 2013 where ‘gender equity’
was introduced as an alternative to ‘gender equality’ because Saudi Arabia,
backed by the EU (who were looking for Saudi support in other aspects of
the negotiations), were strongly opposed to the phrase gender equality. Saudi
Arabia have always been opposed to the phrase gender equality, because it
would require a huge upheaval in national social policy and so, while they
do not actively block gender decisions, it is often the case that language on
gender is watered down, or highly caveated rendering it non-binding.
The focus on language, or on getting the word on the page, advances the
WGC’s general demands for gender-mainstreaming, a strategy that focuses
on anchoring women’s concerns and gender aspects in the negotiating texts.
But, in an analysis of the strategies used by members of the WGC, Röhr
suggests that there is more than one way to influence negotiations (Röhr,
2009) and that their submissions and interventions aim at a more fundamen-
tal change in structures and practices than WGC efforts to lobby for policy
recommendations. She gives three examples of this more radical ambition,
the first being WEDO which refers explicitly to the existing negotiating text
and suggests that

financial support be directed at adaptation initiatives and national pol-

icies and programs that prioritize women and other vulnerable popula-
tions. […] Regarding the effectiveness of vulnerability and adaptation
assessments to support adaptation planning and implementation: gen-
der analysis and sex- disaggregated data.
(submission by WEDO 2008 on behalf of GGCA; cited in Röhr 2009)

In another example, WECF refers to the instruments of the Kyoto Protocol

urging that they be applicable at the local level benefiting women:

we propose to create a simplified CDM mechanism for sustainable

energy projects in rural areas at the household and community level,
including improved funding conditions for smaller scale and cutting-
edge-technology projects. Such projects should be developed in
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 121
consultation with the local communities, including women, and should
be accessible to them.
(submission by WECF 2009; cited in Röhr 2009)

GenderCC provides one even more explicit example of demanding that the
negotiations themselves should aim at fundamental change:

Gender mainstreaming is an important part of involving women and

gender aspects actively in climate politics. However, achieving true jus-
tice between women and men – including in relation to climate change –
will involve more fundamental changes of cultures, structures and
institutions, individual capacities and relationships between sectors in
society. […] Recognize the ways in which the economic crisis and the
climate crisis are based on the same failures: we consume more than we
have at our disposal, we are living in an unsustainable way that ignores
economic, ecological and social limits to growth whilst relegating those
elements we need to live a good life to the status of mere “resources”.
Therefore, economic activity has to be transformed and renewed from a
“careless” process into a “caring” one. The vantage point for this trans-
formation should be the provision of care and caring, paid or unpaid
work that has, up to now, mostly been done by women. The economy,
its actors, structures and processes need to adapt to the environment,
to the needs of women, indigenous peoples, the socially disadvantaged,
not vice versa. This transformation needs additional financing mecha-
nisms, beyond market-based mechanisms. Investigation in creating and
supporting funding mechanisms that provide an alternative to market-
based solutions is essential.
(submission by GenderCC LIFE 2009; cited in Röhr 2009)

Since such submissions and interventions lack the binding power of lan-
guage in official policy documents, the rhetoric can be much more radical
in its aim for fundamental structural change. Submissions and interventions
also serve a different purpose. They are designed to be strongly worded and
demanding. As such, I interpret the strategic decisions about when and
where to use specific language and words to be WGC’s way of navigating
the complex political landscape of global climate politics.
Several factors have influenced Parties in the decision to shift from nom-
inally ‘gender-blind’
­­ ​­ to ‘gender-responsive’
­­ ​­ (Barre
­ et al., 2018). For one, this
shift has required similar shifts in climate policy discussions and literature
that allowed for a more socially focused, society-wide debate on climate ac-
tion that happened around the launch of the Bali Action Plan. Secondly,
this shift from gender-blind to gender-responsive, even in the face of oppo-
sition from a handful of Parties that challenged the relevance of gender to
climate change policy, was possible because there remained strong polit-
ical will from heads of states, ministers, key government negotiators and
122 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
political leaders in the UN, particularly champions within the UNFCCC
(Barre et al., 2018). But the achievement of any feminist successes in global
climate change policy has relied on the strategic savviness of the WGC and
its members. It has relied on the WGC’s members painstakingly lobbying
for very specific wording while simultaneously introducing radical ideas in
less politically charged spaces. Therefore, my understanding is that gaining
formal recognition is a worthwhile and successful endeavour. Better to gain
support than to be shut out of the negotiations altogether.

Raising Awareness and Disseminating Information

Efforts to get language on gender included in official policy are informed
by a dedicated team within the WGC of primarily younger feminists who
design creative ways to raise awareness of gender and climate change issues
at the COP. This includes the increasing use of social media and ‘actions’, by
which they mean strategies of disruption, as well as more traditional infor-
mational side events and exhibits. ‘Actions’ are relatively common features
of the COP, performed by most sectors of civil society, not only the WGC.
One feature any COP attendee will quickly become familiar with is the Fos-
sil of the Day, hosted by ENGOs, specifically the Climate Action Network
(CAN). To the theme of Jurassic Park presenters award the country who
has been most abysmal during the day’s negotiations the Fossil of the Day.
Although only a light-hearted competition, no country really wants to be
known as the Fossil of the Day. Typically, actions are designed to draw at-
tention to recent or upcoming events, both at the COP and sometimes more
broadly. One such example entitled #MindTheGAP, performed at COP23
amidst the GAP negotiations in 2017, was designed to highlight the impor-
tance of the GAP and to reinforce demands for the negotiators. In a press re-
lease Hanna Gunnarsson, policy and communications officer for the WGC,
wrote

The Women and Gender Constituency views a comprehensive, targeted

and resourced two-year gender action plan (GAP) as a critical outcome
for COP23, in order to urgently advance gender-responsive and human-
rights based climate policy and action.
(Gunnarsson,
­ 2017)

The action itself was based around an aerobics class which included all
the main priorities that the WGC argued are essential for a comprehensive
GAP. In this spirit participants (myself included) and observers were urged
to ‘reach for the money’, ‘lift the [gender- disaggregated] data’ and to ‘fight
for gender equality’ (WECF, 2017a).
Another example of an action from COP23 was held the last available
day for GAP negotiations where it looked as though the negotiations would
fall through entirely and no GAP would be adopted. Early in the morning
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 123
members of the WGC congregated outside of the negotiating room with the
intention of greeting the negotiators as they entered to ‘wish them luck and
good will’. Lisa Goldner, a member of the WGC at the time explained that
despite the friendly approach, the action was really a way of saying ‘we are
here, we are gender experts and you can call on us if you need us.’ One final
example occurred one year later at COP24 Katowice in 2018. The action
was designed to draw attention to the emergence of ‘macho-fascism’ not
only, the Constituency asserted, in the corridors of the UNFCCC, but also
around the world ( WEDO, 2018c). The action was essentially a response to
the worrying rise of figures such as US President Donald Trump and Bra-
zilian President- elect Jair Bolsonaro. The participants enacted a feminist
standing up and ‘saying no’ to aggressive, violent figures acted out by some
members of the WGC wearing big black paper moustaches.
The purpose of such actions is to increase visibility and to change both
public and negotiator opinions, as well as to gain global, national and social
media attention. The reasoning is that media attention can raise awareness
both within and outwith the COP corridors. But it is not clear just how much
impact such actions have. According to the WGC such actions do have some
impact. At a WGC Caucus that I attended, Gunnarsson informed the Con-
stituency that during the two-week conference the twitter hashtags had
made 22 million impressions. While impressive, I am not convinced that this
strategy necessarily corresponds with how the Constituency is perceived at
the COP itself. To use the example above, Trump and Bolsonaro were not in
attendance so using the COP is a space for calling out their ‘macho-fascism’
comes with risks of with being dismissed as hysterical women by the people
in the room (so to speak), rather than praised by allies on social media. Lau-
ron suggested that ‘there is a notion that CSOs are there to create problems
or make lots of noise, and that’s keeping governments defensive’ (Lauron,
2017, interview). This is similar to what Harriet Thew (2018) found in a study
on Youth NGO strategies at the COPs. Many youth participants felt that
they would rather talk to people more directly than performative actions
allow and they felt that they were either perceived negatively by negotiators
or ignored by them completely. On the other hand, the action aimed at wish-
ing negotiators luck in the final hours of GAP negotiations was mentioned
explicitly by lead GAP negotiator Colin O’Hehir in the final moments of the
tense negotiations. According to one interview participant who was in the
room, O’Hehir reportedly told fellow negotiators ‘we have to come to an
agreed text; those women [the WGC] out there are counting on us, we can’t
let them down’ (Participant A, 2017, interview). This suggests that there is
a kind of trade-off to be made in these actions, or a fine line between a
successful action that catches the eyes and ears of negotiators and being
dismissed as frivolous.
Actions do not happen in a vacuum; they are just one part of a package
of activities designed to raise awareness and disseminate information. The
WGC also uses side events as a means of introducing potential agenda items
124 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
for the negotiations, networking and connecting with people as well as pro-
moting reports and research. Side events were originally held in the break
between negotiating sessions, but as the COP has grown along with observer
participation, they currently run throughout the day with space being highly
competitive (UNFCCC, 2016c). Typically, events are in the form of panels
with speakers on particular issues. For example, at COP23 in 2017 the WGC
held side events on issues ranging from: ‘Secure Women’s Land Rights as a
Climate Strategy’; ‘Climate Finance and Sustainable Land Use: The Gap
between Theory and Reality’; and ‘Fair Shares and Ambition in the Post-
Paris Regime’ (WGC, 2017a). Previous research by Schroeder and Lovell
(2009) has shown that around one quarter of attendees of side events are
negotiators or government representatives. So, side events are not a parallel
world with little interaction between them and the formal sessions, but the
information being presented at side events can have a potential knock-on ef-
fect in the negotiations. They are an integral part of the UNFCCC process.
However, at COP23 formal sessions and side events were separated by
a 1.3km path known as the Bonn Zone (for NGOs) and the Bula Zone (for
negotiations). This meant that busy negotiators were much less likely to at-
tend side events due to the time it took to travel between zones, which also
included a security check each time they entered a different zone. Members
of the WGC, and CSOs more broadly, suggested that this physical separa-
tion represents an increasing trend of restricting the access of civil society
organisations to COP events (Lauron, 2017, interview). Since 2017 this trend
has seemingly increased with hundreds of observers being physically shut
out of the building without bags or coats (in December) in Madrid at COP25
Chile in 2019 (Magulio, 2019). Furthermore, the institutional set-up requires
individual negotiators to actively seek out this information, meaning few
negotiators may be aware of gender issues at all. For example, Fanny Mertz,
the Belgian Gender Focal Point in the UNFCCC, remarked that she had
given a presentation to her colleagues that was ‘well received because many
of [her] colleagues said that this is something quite new, they didn’t know
about it’ (Mertz, 2018, interview). As such, it is not clear how much influence
side events or constituency stalls have.

Building Women’s Capacity and Joint Strategising

Creating an influential movement requires coordination, and one of the
key strategies in representing the interests of women is to form networks
or coalitions with like-minded COP participants. In many ways, the Con-
stituency itself is an example of this coalition-building, or ‘epistemic com-
munity’ building (Yuval-Davis, 1997). The WGC organises throughout the
year, hosting regular webinars and caucuses in order to build women’s ca-
pacity and to facilitate joint strategising among feminists. Morrow (2017a)
sees this as indicative of the Constituency’s strategy of transversal politics.
It is beneficial for NGOs to be a member of an advocacy network such as the
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 125
WGC partly because it allows for coordinated national and international
advocacy. While there are some in the WGC who prefer to work with their
national governments and are only nominally involved with the Constitu-
ency, other WGC members rely heavily on advocacy at the UNFCCC in
addition to pressing their government officials.
One means of joint strategising in the WGC is to invite representatives of
other constituencies to the Women and Gender Caucus. It is a tradition dur-
ing the COP events for the WGC to host ‘theme’ days during which women
and feminists from other constituencies are invited to the WGC’s Caucus.
During COP23 the WGC held several themed days including Young Femi-
nist Day and Indigenous Women’s Day, as discussed above. Both days were
very poignant, with the Young Feminists opting to use their time to high-
light issues faced by young women in a series of moving poems. For example:

Dear society, you told me to be cute and adorable, to be quiet and

pliable. I told you I will be loud and speak my mind. I was your joke.
The only wrong- doing I did was take the space of boys.
Dear society. Dirty. Fat. Fag. Undesirable. These are all words on my
body that you prescribe, like the crashing of waves on coastlines that
were never supposed to know how high sea level can rise.
Dear society. I do not shave the hairs off my body like you shave the
trees off this Earth (Read by Deleon & Gunnarsson).
I’m Laura, I’m from the US. Millions of youth are rising up. We are
tired of the current system that is based on the destruction of the
Earth, on greed, on war and violence. Young people all over the
world have been raising their consciousness to include feminists,
queer, trans, anti- capitalist, environmental, racial, intersectionality
and indigenous analysis. We are not only in social movements but are
leading them. From Black Lives Matter, to Palestine, to Ende Gelende
and to UN spaces to the fight to control our bodies we have a world to
­
win! (Read ­ ​­
by Cooper-Hall).

On Indigenous Women’s Day women from indigenous communities from

around the world began with an invocation led by Tarcila Rivera Zea from
Peru calling for an intersectional gender just sustainable future. This was a
moving event that involved lighting candles and forming a circle sealed by
holding hands for quiet reflection.
Despite the divisions of the constituencies, building alliances between
NGOs is imperative, not least in linking issues and allowing like-minded
groups to push for issues of human rights together. As such, submissions by
various UNFCCC constituencies, particularly ENGOs, WGC, YOUNGOs
and IPOs often mention women’s rights, indigenous people’s rights and
youth rights as well as issues of climate justice more generally, in a bloc (see
for example WGC, 2016a; 2017b). But some members of the Constituency
126 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
are wary about the kinds of alliances that are built and the coalitions that
are formed. One interviewee, for example, said:

This morning I read in the advocacy list [an email list that is used for
strategizing among the Constituency both during and beyond the COP]
an advertisement for a side event that was weird. It was transformation
of … of principles of Pope Francis, a book or pamphlet or something.
Have you read it? It’s against gender, well it’s against reproductive rights
of women, and we from the WGC promote it! I asked and they said, well
yes but it’s [another member of the Constituency] who is on the podium.
I said, well we should ask why they are on the podium!
(Participant C, 2017, interview)

This speaks to what Yuval-Davis warned about the creation of epistemic

communities, whereby the divisions of who should be included, or where
the boundaries of a community should be, are not always clear. Joint strat-
egising with other activists who are committed to the principles of climate
justice, or principles which could be articulated together in a ‘chain of
equivalence’ (see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 2005), facilitates efforts
not only for lobbying Party delegates in the creation of a cohesive message,
but also for capacity building activities which are of huge importance to the
Constituency and for Party delegates. Internal capacity building workshops
began at COP14 Bali in 2007. The idea was that workshops were a small step
towards hosting global strategy meetings every two years with ‘the aim of
discussing latest research and recent developments from a gender perspec-
tive and strategising about the integration of gender perspectives in climate
change negotiations, programmes and measures at all levels’ (Röhr, Hem-
mati and Lambrou, 2009, p. 301).
The aim of formalising a process of joint strategising through regular
strategy meetings is built upon previous informal strategy meetings. For
example, shortly before the COP13 in 2006 an Indigenous Peoples’ Capac-
ity Building Workshop was held between 25 and 28 November. During this
workshop a member from GenderCC facilitated sessions and participated
in strengthening the gender issues relevant to forest conservation, displace-
ment, mining and water source loss and contamination issues (Röhr, 2008,
p. 3). The main aims of the capacity building workshops were both to de-
velop positions on these issues and to develop strategies to lobby for gender
perspectives to be included in these areas. A second capacity building work-
shop was held during COP14 on the 4 December 2007~ which, on one hand,
focused on the main elements and principles of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol and how the process is organised and, on the other hand, on gender
issues related to the process and content (Röhr, 2008). This workshop was
attended by 25 women and proved to be so popular that the group met twice
more during the COP. Again, the idea was both to strengthen the network’s
position in lobbying for gender considerations as well as enhancing women’s
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 127
knowledge on the make-up and inner workings of the UNFCCC itself, a
practice that is still in place today in the first few days of the COP.
The focus of capacity building events is to teach women the skills, knowl-
edge and resources needed to engage in the UNFCCC negotiations. These
events, in my observations, are not about building men’s capacity on what a
feminist climate politics might look like. This issue was brought to light at
a Gender Dialogue event at SB48 in May 2018. The event, mandated by the
GAP, was intended as a dialogue between the chairs of the UNFCCC con-
stituted bodies to discuss the outcomes and recommendations in a technical
paper identifying possible actions within each of the constituted bodies on
gender. At this event one of the male participants remarked

I will excuse myself in advance if I say something offensive because I

was not educated enough. I am very happy to have this event but I am a
bit puzzled as to why the audience does not have any men.
(Participant A, 2018)

The participant went on to share his concern for the lack of men’s partici-
pation and encouraged the WGC, or women more broadly, to ensure in the
future greater participation of men in the process of capacity building on
gender. This comment sparked some disagreement between members of the
WGC on the role and inclusion of men. One senior member argued that it
was necessary to come up with a standard push-back on this type of crit-
icism, while another more junior member took the position that ‘we don’t
need men in this process, women are more than capable’. Meanwhile, others
felt that the male participant’s comment was fair and that it was important
to encourage men to participate in the process if any progress was to be
made. The main point of contention was the assertion that it was women’s
duty to educate men on gender issues. That ‘gender’ is a stand in for women,
while men remain ungendered (or unmarked by gender).
Alongside these capacity building workshops members of the WGC also
meet regularly during the COP for informal workshops. One such workshop
occurred at SB48 Bonn in May 2018. At the end of a long and disappointing
day, the WGC gathered outside in the sun for a last-minute workshop led
by Reyes, who was serving as a negotiator for Mexico. Reyes encouraged
members of the WGC to wear their brightest clothes and biggest smile and
always carry fresh fruit with them when lobbying negotiators. Her idea was
that during the UNFCCC conferences negotiator are exhausted and lacking
good nourishment. Their bright clothes, big smiles and fresh fruits will be
happily accepted by negotiators and provide a means of getting an ‘in’. Or,
as Reyes put it, ‘put them in a good mood before stating your demands!’
While historically feminist writers have been critical of smiling as a gen-
dered practice, used to manage how gender advocates, and so gender itself,
are perceived (see Friedan, 1963; Ahmed, 2017), I read this situation slightly
differently.4 The next morning the WGC Caucus was filled with laughing
128 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
feminist environmentalists armed with a new strategy to take on the nego-
tiators, who at that time were failing to reach any meaningful agreement on
the Paris Rulebook. There was a sense of camaraderie among the Constit-
uency itself and the over-worked, over-tired and thoroughly disappointed
women had a new renewed sense of purpose. And, if nothing else, speak-
ing as one of those over-worked, over-tired and thoroughly disappointed
women present, it was a bit of fun!

Developing a Future Research Agenda

Underpinning all of these efforts is a broad research agenda. Having access
to specific material resources allows the Constituency to establish themselves
as experts on the issue of gender and climate change and helps gain influence
in UNFCCC meetings. Via an email list-serve the Constituency has a system
of information access exchange among its members, but they also share this
between the other constituencies and Party delegates, which is how I, as a
researcher, was added to this list. Recently, there has been a tendency to
keep research within the WGC, preferring material written by practitioners
rather than academic researchers. During my fieldwork there was some ten-
sion between academics and members of the WGC, with one member in an
interview even remarking that academics should not necessarily be labelled
as civil society as they take up space from those who are more actively trying
to influence the negotiations (Lauron, 2017, interview). Her position speaks
to the separation of ideas and action that has been emblematic of the rela-
tionship between academics and activists in the feminist climate project.
Academics who do research on processes of global climate governance
have not typically been involved with the WGC in ways that contribute to
the activist priorities. I learned that WGC members do not tend to regard
academic theorising is an important part of feminist praxis. Röhr suggests
that part of that tension is the result of the fact that most academics writing
about the WGC having never actually attended a COP:

I have had a lot of discussions with German researchers who have never
been at a conference here and they look at the text and say “Oh, what’s
that”? Women here are so traditionally working on words so I have one
of them here and we are always trying to explain […] I say come and
speak about this problem and see how people react and come to the
caucus and see a little bit how the situation is, that is also women’s or-
ganisations have to react to the situation they are facing. And then they
usually come up with the ‘right’ research questions but sorry, we are
already two steps ahead why don’t you ask us?
(Röhr, 2017 interview)

However, Röhr also went on to suggest that there is also some resistance
from the WGC towards academic research, and that it is an exciting time for
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 129
gender and climate change research because so many early career, usually
women, researchers are interested in the area:

And this might really be an opportunity to bring these some steps fur-
ther and to provide debates and new ideas, fresh impetus to our dis-
cussions. And I think this is done in a connection between researchers
and activists, it’s really always one of the demands or recommendations
that we have to. But, no we don’t want this academic research, we need
research from the ground, from the grassroots organisations and I say
yeah, but so I am part, mine is also researcher and more academic and
I’m thinking yeah it’s important to have knowledge and to bring this
knowledge to other parts of the world let’s say. But it’s not enough, we
need to connect.
(Röhr, 2017, interview)

Rather than engaging with the academic writing on either strategies of resist-
ance or connecting gender and climate change more broadly, the Constitu-
ency tends to favour ‘in-house’, or NGO-produced research and reports. As
discussed above, the WGC published a series of case studies in 2007 and 2008
by local NGOs aiming to give an overview of the local situation in countries
such as Senegal, the Philippines and Ghana, and to draw out the contex-
tualised implications for women’s lives and for gender equality (c.f. Alam,
Fatema and Ahmed, 2008; Gueye, 2008; Mensah-Kutin, 2008; Henrich Böll
Stiftung and WEDO, 2009). Similarly, position papers have been developed
by various member NGOs of the WGC aiming to think strategically about
the ways forward, such as a report by Agnes Otzelberger, from the BRIDGE
Institute of Development Studies, entitled Gender-responsive strategies on
climate change: recent progress and ways forward for donors (Otzelberger,
2011). The GGCA have also published a variety of reports such as ‘Gender
and Climate Change: A Closer Look at Existing Evidence’ (GGCA, 2016a)
and ‘Gender and Climate Change in Africa, Asia, Latin America, America
and Europe’ (GGCA, 2016b). What these kinds of reports and research pa-
pers have in common is tangible policy recommendations and strategies for
feminist organising in the UNFCCC.
While relying on NGO-produced research and reports may be explained
by the separation between ideas and actions seen in both social movements
and in academia, I also see this it in this case as being about strategic ne-
cessity. The need for more research and knowledge was a common theme in
interviews with negotiators, particularly among those based in the Global
North. For example, Mertz, the Belgian Gender Focal Point, proclaimed
that there were no examples to draw upon in making the case for a gender
perspective in the Global North. She also commented that ‘it takes time to
go through and read one report’ (2017, interview). Given that the National
Gender Focal Points typically take on the role as an add-on to their al-
ready busy day-jobs, it is clear that they are looking for easy to find and
130 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
­

Conclusion
The account of feminist modes of organising in the UNFCCC offered in
this chapter demonstrates the sheer complexity of bringing a gender per-
spective to the global climate negotiations. Difficult decisions have had to
be made in order to gain increased access and legitimacy in the halls of the
UNFCCC, and lines have had to be drawn between a commitment to the
principles of intersectional theory and practice. There have been two de-
fining moments in the history of feminist organising in the UNFCCC. The
first occurred in 2007 where the, then small, network of feminist climate ac-
tivists, were caught in a bind between an outsider approach based on mak-
ing feminist demands based on the masculinity of global climate politics or
an insider approach that required more strategic means of influencing the
negotiations. Ultimately, the feminist environmental network decided on a
(mostly) insider approach and effectively dropped the more radical demands
of a feminist lens. This has resulted in a strategy that fails to challenge the
masculinity imbued in the negotiations for insider tactics which focused on
influencing the negotiations. This required a shift towards arguments based
on women’s vulnerability in the face of a changing climate in line with the
wider discursive shift seen in the UNFCCC at that time from adaptation to
mitigation. The WGC has seen some great success through this approach,
but it has also come with its own set of challenges in that it has required
arguments that equated gender with women resulting in a universalised and
simplistic framing of women’s lives and gender as a social category to dom-
inate the negotiations.
The second defining moment came as a direct result of the choices made in
2007 where the WGC was caught in a new kind of bind about how to use its
power and legitimacy gained from working inside the system to better ends.
In 2013 the Constituency began a dialogue among like-minded feminist ac-
tivists and researchers about the importance of the framing in gender in
more nuanced and complex ways. Attendees of the internal capacity build-
ing workshops stressed the need to move away from essentialised framings of
gender (strategic or otherwise), to address the plurality of gender and to add
new stories to complement the dominant framings of women as vulnerable,
the empowerment of women as local managers and the active role of women
and the inclusion of women in the neoliberal market economy. Those new
stories should ensure that gender was ‘understood as a category of analysis
that cuts across other categories of social inequality (intersectionality) and
that lies at the basis of the structure of society’ (LIFE, GGCA, WEDO, 2013
in Bathge, 2013, p. 2). However, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, these efforts
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 131
were somewhat thwarted by the negotiations for the Paris Agreement in the
run up to 2015. The Constituency was so focused on ensuring that gender
language was included in meaningful ways in the Paris Agreement that the
kinds of dialogue about the meaning of gender and gender equality never
happened.
What is clear from this story is there is a vast difference between the
kind of strategic bind facing the WGC in 2007 and the one it faces today.
Indeed, the decisions made in 2007, and the subsequent hard work and de-
termination of WGC members, has changed the conditions under which the
Constituency operates. While this has not yet resulted in more meaningful
inclusion of intersectional language in UNFCCC policy, the power and ac-
cess now held by the WGC opens up exciting new possibilities for a next
phase of feminist organising in the UNFCCC. In order to start a dialogue
as to what that next phase of feminist organising in the UNFCCC should
look like, it is important to first consider what the WGC has offered in-
tersectional praxis and to recognise and accept the challenges still facing
intersectional political projects in spaces of global climate governance. This
reflection is the focus of ­Chapter 6.

Notes
1 Those who do not list the WGC as their primary constituency include: Global
Forest Coalition (­ENGO constituency); Italian Climate Network (­YOUNGO
constituency); Landesa (­ ENGO constituency); Watershed Organisation
Trust (­ENGO constituency); and Youth Action for Development (­YOUNGO
constituency).
2 The constituted bodies are committees that support the COP such as the Adap-
tation Committee and the Green Climate Fund. For more details see ­Chapter 1.
3 Although subsequent reports of Hurricane Mitch suggest that more men died
than women in this particular event (­see Resurrección, 2017).
4 Ahmed (­2017) discusses ‘­smiling’ as a gendered act performed by women in
‘­diversity’ roles in academic institutions. She describes the act of smiling as a
means of women appearing less threatening to those who may be resistant to
her work. It is a performative act that makes her d ­ ay-­​­­to-​­day life more tolerable.
Freidan (­1963) has also discussed the role of smiling in the context of ‘­the house-
wife’ who smiles while washing the dishes, or performs her h ­ ouse-​­wifely duties,
depicting her happiness at doing this work, masking the ‘­rotten underside’ un-
derneath her smile.

Bibliography
Acha, M. A. R., (­2016). Climate and Environmental Justice Summary of Umbrella Issue e
Discussion 2016. (­online). Available at: https://­wedo.org/­­wp-​­content/­uploads/­2016/­
08/­­CEJ-­​­­Discussion-­​­­2016-​­Final.pdf. Last accessed: 15/­07/­2020.
Aguilar, L., (­ 2007). Speech Given at H level Roundtable How a Chang-
­ igh-​­
ing Climate Impacts Women. ‘­ In Council of Women World Leaders, WEDO
and Henrich Böll Foundation (­ 2 007)’ Report of ­ High-​­level Roundtable How
a Changing Climate Impacts Women. (­ online). Available at: https://­ wedo.
132 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
org/wp-content/uploads/2007/12/roundtable-final-report-6-nov.pdf.
­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed:
15/07/2020.
­ ­
Aguilar, L., (2008). Acknowledging the Linkages: Gender and Climate Change.
­
(online). ­
Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.5 ­ ­
68.5665&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
Ahmed, S., (2017). Living a Feminist Life. London: Duke University Press.
AIWC, (2018a). ­ Regional Activities. (online). Available at: http://aiwc.org.in/regional.
html. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
AIWC, (2018b). ­ Vision and Mission. (online). Available at: http://aiwc.org.in/about_
us.html. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
Alaimo, S., (2009). ‘Insurgent Vulnerability and the Carbon Footprint of Gender’,
Kvinder, Køn og Forskning (Women, Gender and Research), ­3–4, ​­ pp. ­ ­22–35.​­
Alam, K., Fatema, N., and Ahmed, W. B., (2008). Case Study: Gender Human
Security and Climate Change in Bangladesh. (online). Available at: https://wedo.
org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/bangladesh-case-study-1.pdf.
­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed:
28/07/2020.
­ ­
Barre, A. et al., (2018). ‘From Marrakesh to Marrakesh: The rise of gender equality
in the global climate governance and climate action’, in S. Duyck, A. Jodoin, and
A. Johl, (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and Climate Governance.
Oxon: Routledge, pp. ­ ­239–250. ​­
Bäthge, S., (2013). Gender Innovations: Strategies to Address “Gender” in Climate
Change Policy Draft Report. (online). Available at: http://genanet.de/fileadmin/
user_upload/dokumente/Gender-Klima-Energie/Minutes_Gender_Innova-
­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­
tions_11062013.pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
Bee, B. A., Rice, J. and Trauger, A., (2015). ‘A feminist approach to climate change
governance: Everyday and intimate politics’, Geography Compass, 9(6), ­ pp. ­ ­1–12.
​­
doi: 10.1111/gec3.12218. ­
Blomstrom, E., Cunningham, S., Johnson, N., and Owren, K., (2009). Climate
Change Connections. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/ ­ ­­ ​­ ­
­2009/10/ClimateConnectionsBookletEnglish.pdf%0D.
­ ­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
Bretherton, C., (1998). ‘Global environmental politics: Putting gender on the
agenda?’ Review of International Studies, 24(1), ­ pp. ­ 85–100. ­ ​­
Brundtland, G. H., (2007). Keynote Address: Levers of Global Security: Examining
How a Changing Climate Impacts Women. (online). Available at: http://www.wedo.
org/wp-content/uploads/brundtland-climate-change-speech.pdf.
­­ ​­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed:
02/09/2020.
­ ­
Buckingham, S. and Kulcur, R., (2009). ‘Gendered geographies of environmental
injustice’, Antipode, 41(4), ­ pp. ­ 659–683.
­ ​­ doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2009.00693. ­ ­ ​­
Burns, B., (2013). Contributions to Discussion. (online). Available at: http://genanet.
de/fileadmin/user_upload/dokumente/Gender-Klima-Energie/Minutes_Gender_
­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­
Innovations_11062013.pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
Burns, B. and Andre, C., (2014). Ensuring Women’s Access and Influence on Cli-
mate Change Policy Including Updated Data on Women’s Participation in The
United Nations Climate Negotiations. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp- ­ ­­ ​
­content/uploads/2014/12/Cop20-Publication-FINAL-WEB.pdf.
­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed:
28/07/2020.
­ ­
Burns, B. and Lee, A., (2015). Gender Mainstreaming Practices in the Context
of Climate Responses. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp-content/ ­ ­­ ​­
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 133
­uploads/2016/08/Gender-mainstreaming-practices-in-the-context-of-climate-
­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​
­responses.pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
Burns, B. and Patoutis, J., (2014). United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC) Decisions and Conclusions: Existing Mandates and
Entry Points for Gender Equality. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp- ­ ­­ ​
­content/uploads/2014/10/GE-Publication-ENG-Interactive-1.pdf.
­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed:
28/07/2020.
­ ­
C21C, (n.d.). ­ About. (online). Available at: https://c21stnigeria.wordpress.com/
about/. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
­Cohn-Lois, ​­ A., (2014). ­ Making Change. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp- ­ ­­ ​
content/uploads/2014/12/Cop20-Publication-FINAL-WEB.pdf.
­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed:
28/07/2020.
­ ­
Doherty, B., (2018). ‘US accused of obstructing talks at UN climate change summit’,
The Guardian, 11 December. (online). Available at: https://www.theguardian.
com/environment/2018/dec/11/us-accused-of-obstructing-talks-at-un-climate-
­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­change-summit. ​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
ENDA Tiers Monde, (2002). Is the Gender Dimension of The Climate Debate Forgot-
ten? Engendering the Climate Debate: Mechanisms 11 Am To 1 Pm, India Habitat
Centre, New Delhi Gender and Climate Change Event At Cop8. (online). Avail-
able at: https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_UNFCCC/COP8__ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
exec_summ.pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
ENERGIA and WEDO, (2010). Recommendations for Climate Negotiators on
Energy Technologies and Gender Equity. (online). Available at: https://wedo.org/
­wp-content/uploads/2010/11/ENERGIA-WEDO-gender-technology-climate-
​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­pdf-Cancun.pdf. ​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
Freidan, B., (1963). The Feminine Mystique. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
GenderCC, (2012). ­ Ironically Gender in the Fossil Patriarchy. In Global Forest Coali-
tion. (online). ­ Available at: https://globalforestcoalition.org/ironically-gender-in- ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­the-fossil-patriarchy/.
­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
GenderCC, (n.d.). ­ Board of Directors, Governance. (online). Available at: https://
gendercc.net/who-are-we/governance/board-of-directors.html. ­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed:
28/07/2020.
­ ­
GenderCC and LIFE, (2009). Gender ­Mainstream-ing ​­ and ­Beyond – ​­5 Steps towards
­Gender-sensi-tive ­​­­ ​­ ­Long-term ​­ Cooperation. (online). Available at: https://unfccc.
int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/ngo/140.pdf.
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 09/06/2022. ­ ­
GGCA, (2016a). ­ Gender and Climate Change: A Closer Look at Existing Evidence.
(online).
­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/GGCA-RP- ­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ​
­FINAL.pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
GGCA, (2016b). ­ Gender and Climate Change in Africa, Asia, Latin America,
America and Europe. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/ ­ ­­ ​­ ­
­2016/11/GGCA-RP-Factsheets-FINAL.pdf.
­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 28.07.2020.
Gueye, Y. D., (2008). Case Study: Gender, Human Security and Climate Change in Sen-
egal. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/senegal- ­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​
­­case-study.pdf. ​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
Hemmati, M., (2005). ‘Gender & Climate Change in the North: Issues, Entry Points
and Strategies for the Post-2012 Process and Beyond’, (online). Available at:
https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_UNFCCC/Gender_Post-
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ​
­Kyoto.pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
134 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
Henrich Böll Stiftung and WEDO, (­ 2009). Gender and Climate Finance: A
Case study from the Philippines. (­online). Available at: https://­wedo.org/­­w p-​
­content/­uploads/­2009/­01/­­genderandclimatechangefinance-​­1.pdf. Last accessed:
29/­07/­2020.
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C., (­1985). Hegemony and Social Startegy: Towards a radical
democratic politics. London: Verso.
LIFE, ENERGIA and WECF, (­ 2003). Minutes on Gender and Climate Change.
(­online). Available at: https://­g endercc.net/­fi leadmin/­i nhalte/­dokumente/­6 _
UNFCCC/Minutes_first_meeting_Cop9.pdf. Last accessed: 15/­07/­2020.
LIFE, GGCA, and WEDO, (­ 2013). Gender Innovations: Strategies to Address
“­ G ender” in Climate Change Policy. (­ online). Available at: http://­ genanet.de/­
fileadmin/­u ser_upload/­dokumente/­­G ender-­​­­K lima-​­Energie/­M inutes_Gender_
Innovations_11062013.pdf. Last accessed: 28/­07/­2020.
Magulio, C., (­2019). Protestors Kicked Out of COP25, Stripped of Badges. (­online).
Available at: https://­350.org/­­civil-­​­­society-­​­­k icked-­​­­out-­​­­of-​­cop25/. Last accessed:
28/­07/­2020.
Managaliman, J., (­2016). Groups are Increasingly Rejecting ­Single-​­Issue Campaigns
and Demands, and Recognizing the Intersectionality of Diverse Movements and
Struggles. (­online). Available at: https://­wedo.org/­­w p- ​­c ontent/­uploads/­2 016/­
08/­­CEJ-­​­­Discussion-­​­­2016-​­Final.pdf. Last accessed: 15/­07/­2020.
­Mensah-​­Kutin, R., (­2008). Case Study: Gender Human Security and Climate Change in
Ghana. (­online). Available at: https://­w ww.wedo.org/­­w p-​­content/­uploads/­­g hana-­​
­­case-​­study.pdf. Last accessed: 28/­07/­2020.
Morrow, K., (­2017a). ‘­Changing the climate of participation: The gender constitu-
ency in the global climate change regime’, in S. MacGregor (­ed.) Routledge Hand-
book of Gender and Environment. New York: Routledge, p­p. ­398–​­411.
Mouffe, C., (­2005). On the political: Thinking in Action. London and New York:
Routledge.
Nelson, J., (­2012). ‘­Is dismissing the precautionary principle the manly thing to do?
Gender and the economics of climate change’, IDEAS Working Paper Series,
12(04), p­p. ­1–​­21.
Otzelberger, A., (­2011). ­G ender-​­responsive Strategies on Climate Change: Recent Pro-
gress and Ways Forward for Donors. (­online). Available at: https://­resourcecentre.
savethechildren.net/­pdf/­5798.pdf/. Last accessed: 09/­06/­2022.
Oxfam America and WEDO, (­2008). Fact Sheet Climate Change & Women. (­online).
Available at: https://­wedo.org/­­w p- ​­content/­uploads/­2009/­01/­­c cwomenfactsheet-­​
­­fi nal-​­1.pdf. Last accessed: 28/­07/­2020.
Resurrección, B. P., (­2017). ‘­Gender and environment in the Global South: From
“­women, environment, and development” to feminist political ecology’, in S.
MacGregor (­ed.) Routledge Handbook of Gender and Environment. New York and
London: Routledge, p­p. ­71–​­85.
Reyes, E. and Burns, B., (­ 2013). Gender Stereotypes in (­ International) Climate
Change Policies. How the Prevalent Use of ‘­G ender’ Might Perpetuate and Reinforce
Traditional Gender Roles. (­online). Available at: http://­genanet.de/­fi leadmin/­user_
upload/­dokumente/­­G ender-­​­­K lima-​­Energie/­W EDO_GenderInnovations_Pres-
entation.pdf. Last accessed: 15/­07/­2020.
Rochette, A., (­2016). ‘­Climate change is a social justice issue: The need for a g­ ender-​
­based analysis of mitigation and adaptation policies in Canada and Québec’,
Journal of Environmental Law and Practice, 29, p­p. ­383–​­410.
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 135
Röhr, U., (2008). Gender and Climate Change: Networking for Gender Equality in
International Climate Change Negotiations – UNFCCC COP13/CMP3. (online). ­
Available at: https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_UNFCCC/
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
ReportCOP13_web.pdf. : Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
Röhr, U., (2009). ‘A view from the side ? Gendering the United Nations cli-
mate change negotiations’, Kvinder, Køn & Forskning Nr (Women, Gender and
Research), 3, pp. ­ ­52–61. ​­
Röhr, U., (2013b). Contributions to Discussion. (online). Available at: http://genanet.
­ ­
de/fileadmin/user_upload/dokumente/Gender-Klima-Energie/Minutes_Gender_ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­
Innovations_11062013.pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
Röhr, U., Hemmati, M. and Lambrou, Y., (2009). ‘Towards gender equality in climate
change policy’, in E. Enarson and D. P. G. Chakrabarti (eds.) Women, Gender and
Disaster: Global Issues and Initiatives. London: Sage Publications Inc, pp. 298–303.
RUWES Nigeria, (2018). Our Objectives. (online). Available at: http://ruwes.org.ng/-
our-objective/.
​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
Schroeder, H. and Lovell, H., (2009). The role of side events in the UNFCCC Climate
Negotiations. Paper presented at the 2009 Amsterdam Conference on the Human
Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, Amsterdam, 2 – 4 December 2009,
conference stream on the Problem of Agency in Earth System Governance.
Seager, J., (2009). ‘Death by degrees: Taking a feminist hard look at the 2° climate
policy’, Women, Gender and Research (Kvinder, Køn & Forskning), ­3–4, ​­ pp. ­ ­11–21. ​­
UNEP, (2004). ­ Women and the Environment, Policy Series. (online). Available at:
https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2004/05/womenandtheenvironment.pdf.
­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­
Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2001a). ­ Decision 36/CP.7 Improving the Participation of Women in the
Representation of Parties in Bodies Established under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change or the Kyoto Protocol, (online). Available at: https://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a04.pdf#page=26.
­ ­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2001b). ­ Decision 28/CP.7 Guidelines for the Preparation of National
Adaptation Programmes of Action, (online). Available at: https://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/cop7/13a04.pdf.
­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2010). ­ Decision 1/CP.16 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Conven-
tion. (online). ­ ­
Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01. ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
pdf. Last accessed: 15/07/2020.
UNFCCC, (2012). ­ Decision 23/CP.18 Promoting Gender Balance and Improving the
Participation of Women in UNFCCC Negotiations and in the Representation of
Parties in Bodies Established Pursuant to the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol,
(online).
­ Available at: http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/repository/entri/docs/
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
cop/FCCC_COP18_dec23.pdf.
­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2016c). ­ Observer Organisations in the UNFCCC: Overview. (online). Avail-
able at: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/
­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­
­­ ­​­­
non-party-stakeholders/overview. ​­ ­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2017b). ­ Decision 3/CP.23 Establishment of a Gender Action Plan,
(online).
­ Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cp23_auv_gender.pdf.
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
Last accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2020a). ­ ­Non-governmental
​­ Organization Constituencies. (online). ­
Available at: https://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
constituencies_and_you.pdf. Last accessed: 27/07/2020.
136 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women
United Nations, (1979). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women. (online). Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/documents/
professionalinterest/cedaw.pdf. ­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
United Nations, (1992). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. (online). ­ Available at: https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/ ­ ­ ­ ­
background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf. ­ ­ ­ Last accessed:
28/07/2020.
­ ­
United Nations, (1995). Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women. (online) ­
Available at: https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1. ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Last ac-
cessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Watershed Organisation Trust, (2018). About. (online). Available at: https://wotr.org/
about. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
WECF, (2009). ­ Views on Possible Improvements to Emissions Trading and the Project-
­based Mechanism. (online). ­ Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
smsn/ngo/091.pdf. ­ ­ Last accessed: 09/06/2022. ­ ­
WECF, (2017a). ­ #MindTheGAP, (online). Available at: https://www.facebook.
com/WECF.INTERNATIONAL/videos/action-
­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ on-the-gender-action-plan-
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­during-the-climate-negotiations-happening-right/10155656840260977/.
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­ Last ac-
cessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
WECF, (2018a). ­ Vision & Strategy. (online). ­ Available at: http://www.wecf.eu/english/ ­ ­ -
about-wecf/. ​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
WEDO, (2008). ­ Gender and Social Submissionsto the Ad Hoc Working Groups on
­Long-term ​­ Cooperative Action. (online). ­ Available at: https://www.wedo.org/wp- ­ ­­ ​
­content/uploads/ggca-position-paper-4-23.pdf. ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 09/06/2022. ­ ­
WEDO, (2015). ­ Women’s Action Agenda for a Healthy and Peaceful Planet 2015: A
Decade of Women’s Advocacy for Sustainable Development. (online). Available at:
https://www.wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/agenda2015_eng.pdf.
­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ Last accessed:
27/07/2020. ­ ­
WEDO, (2018a). ­ WEDO’s Work following the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change. (online). Available at: https://wedo.org/process/unfccc/. Last
accessed: 27/07/2020. ­ ­
WEDO, (2018c). ­ COP24: Feminists Say NO to the Global Rise of Macho-fascism!,
(online).
­ Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JylaviI7VAg&feature= ­ ­
share. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
WEDO, (2021). ­ Women’s Leadership: The Women Delegates Fund. (online). Avail-
able at: https://wedo.org/what-we-do/our-programs/women-delegates-fund/. ­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­­ ​­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last
accessed: 24.05.2022.
WEDO, (n.d.). ­ Our Team. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/about-us-2/our- ­ ­­ ­​­­ ​­ ­­ ­​
people-2/#tab-1.
­­ ​­ ­ ​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
WEP, (2017). ­ Implementation of the Gender Components of Great Green Wall Project in
Nigeria. (online). ­ Available at: https://wepnigeria.net/index.php/event/launching- ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​
­­of-the-great-green-wall-project-in-the-country-in-arewa-lga-of-kebbi-state/.
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last
accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
WGC, (2009). ­ Charter of the Women and Gender Constituency. (online). Available
at: https://womengenderclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/WGC_Char- ­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­
ter_2022.pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
WGC, (2015b). ­ Gender Just Solutions Awards. (online). Available at: https://wedo.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/WECF-WGCCOP21.07.121.pdf.
­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ​­ Last accessed:
28/07/2020. ­ ­
 Political Strategies Mobilised by the Women 137
WGC, (2016a). ­ SBI 44 Closing, Shaila Shadid, May 2016. (online). Available at: http://
womengenderclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/BonnSBIClosing_2016.
­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­
pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
WGC, (2017a). ­ Key Gender Events: COP23, Bonn, Germany. (online). Available at:
http://womengenderclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Bonn_KeyEvents-
­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ​
­1.pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
WGC, (2017b). ­ Intervention for Presidency’s Open Dialogue with NGO Constituen-
cies and Parties, Lisa Göldner. (online). Available at: http://womengenderclimate.
org/wp- ­­ ​­ content/uploads/2017/11/Presidency’s-
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­​­­ Open-Dialogue-with-NGO-
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­Constituencies-and-Parties_COP23.pdf. ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
WGC, (n.d.). ­ Members. (online). Available at: http://womengenderclimate.org/
member/. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
Wilson, J. and Chu, E., (2019). ‘The embodied politics of climate change: Analysing
the gendered division of environmental labour in the UK’, Environmental Politics.
doi: 10.1080/09644016.2019.1629170.
­
Women2030, (2017). ­ Ndivile Mokoena. (online). Available at: https://www.
women2030.org/ndivile-mokoena/. ­­ ​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
­ ­
Wonders, N. A. and Danner, M. J. E., (2015). ‘Gendering climate change: A feminist
criminological perspective’, Critical Criminology, 23, pp. ­ 401–416.
­ ​­
­
­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ​­
Zeitlin, J., (2007). Statement by June Zeitlin, Women’s Environment and Development
Organization. (online). ­ Available at: https://www.wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/june-
­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­­ ­​
­­ga-statement-climate-change-7-31-07.pdf.
­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 02/09/2020. ­ ­
6 Lessons for Ecofeminist
Intersectional Praxis

We have a situation of inequality between women and men, and we have to

respond to it. I want to change the situation, not to make the inequality less
unequal, but to change the reasons for the inequality. That’s what we try to
work on. It’s hard. It’s hard.
(Röhr, 2017, interview)

One thing that is abundantly clear from watching and listening to activists
who have worked tiringly to embed a gender perspective into global climate
governance is that it is hard. While the concerns about the political strate-
gies of feminist environmental and climate activists outlined in Chapter 2
are valid and, in many ways, true for the WGC, spending time and engag-
ing with the Constituency has shed light on the ‘real-life’ challenges in the
negotiating process and the difficult strategic decisions that must be made.
Simplistic and universalising claims about women and their lives sit as un-
comfortably with feminist activists in the UNFCCC as they do with femi-
nist academics writing about them. In an interview Röhr commented that
‘from the very beginning I said I don’t want to use this argument – the most
vulnerable – I want to go more about transformation, and the masculinities
and so on. But nobody was interested’ (Röhr, 2017, interview).
For the WGC, making arguments that universalise lived experience and
equate gender with women were important strategic manoeuvres that were
necessary in order to get gender concerns onto the negotiating table. In par-
ticular, women’s vulnerability in the face of climate change fit well with a
wider discursive shift in the UNFCCC towards issues of adaptation as op-
posed to mitigation and with the kind of ‘special interest thinking’ that un-
derpins the UNFCCC. While a focus on women’s vulnerability has proven
to be the most effective rhetorical strategy for influencing climate change
negotiations, it is certainly not the only story told about women and their
lives by the WGC. Indeed, the WGC has evolved in line with both academic
and activist trends out with the confines of the UNFCCC in their response
to the call for better answers to the gender and climate change question (c.f.
MacGregor, 2017).

DOI: 10.4324/9781003306474-6
 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 139
There is plenty of evidence, as discussed in Chapter 5, that the WGC is
committed to principles of intersectionality and its members share a desire
to expand the political conversation to encompass more intersectional con-
ceptualisations of identity. Attempts to widen the scope of ‘gender’ to focus
less on issues of vulnerability has resulted in a Gender Action Plan (GAP)
that calls attention to the areas of the UNFCCC that needed more consid-
eration of gender issues including areas of mitigation, implementation and
decision making. This has seen even further improvement since the COP
renewed the GAP for a further five years in 2019 (see UNFCCC, 2019b). The
extended LWPG and GAP ‘takes into account human rights, ensuring a just
transition, and the challenges Indigenous Peoples face while fighting for cli-
mate justice and protecting their communities’ (Mokoena, 2019), arguably
far more consistent with intersectional demands. Though lacking in clearly
defined indicators and targets, the new and enhanced GAP ‘acknowledges
intersectional identities that women hold, including indigenous women and
women with disabilities’ (Birk, 2019).
While academic criticism is to be welcomed, it is often too abstracted from
the concrete realities of feminist resistance within the UNFCCC and a meth-
odological claim of this book is that a more integrated approach is crucial
to understanding this process. In discussing criticisms levelled at the WGC
for not making enough progress on gender in the UNFCCC by researchers
who are removed from the COP process, Röhr commented that ‘I think if you
are writing about these processes then you don’t have to be here three years
every time, but to get a feeling how it works is quite important’ (Röhr, 2017,
interview). This process of seeing how it is, watching, talking and listening to
feminists trying to make collective political demands has been integral to my
research. Doing so has fostered an appreciation of the challenges facing femi-
nist climate activists and, in this light, I find the successes of the Constituency
to be remarkable. Morrow (2017a) has also come to this conclusion after sus-
tained engagement with the WGC. Gender equality is now reflected in a num-
ber of key UNFCCC decisions and mandates, including the Standing Agenda
Item of ‘Gender and Climate Change’ giving the issue both weight and prom-
inence within the negotiations. More concretely, the actions of the Constitu-
ency have improved the lived experiences of many women, an achievement
that should be celebrated by feminist environmental activists and academics
alike. For example, through both the mentoring and financial support of the
Constituency, Dorothee Lisenga from The Coalition of Female Leaders for the
Environment and Sustainable Development (CFLEDD) has helped women in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) gain access to land and for-
est titles. Through dialogues on women’s inheritance rights between custom-
ary chiefs, local and indigenous women this work has led to huge success in
women’s access in the provinces of Ecuador and Maindombe of the DRC (see
WECF, 2017b). Similarly, at least in part due to lobbying by members of the
WGC there has been an increased percentage of women in delegation parties
from slightly over 20% in 1996 to almost 40% in 2017 (see UNFCCC, 2018b).
140 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis
It is clear from the success of the WGC that through engagement inside
the UNFCCC the conditions under which the Constituency operates today
are very different from those that shaped its political strategy in the late
1990s and early 2000s. Early organising was concerned with gaining trac-
tion for social arguments in a political space that was only concerned about
scientific, technological and economic arguments. But social concerns, such
as gender equality, are firmly on the agenda now. The Constituency has
done much to contribute to shifting the agenda of the UNFCCC to a more
socially just framework, yet still struggle to get multi-axis arguments about
identities into important UNFCCC mandates. Understanding both the suc-
cesses and challenges of the WGC’s intersectional practice is an important
step towards conceptualising what a next phase for feminist organising in
the UNFCCC might look like.

Lessons from the WGC for Intersectional Inquiry and Praxis

While it is true that a deeper intersectional perspective has not reached
mainstream discourses of climate governance, the WGC has contributed
in many important ways to intersectional praxis and critical lessons can
be learned to inform both future ecofeminist intersectional frameworks as
well as future feminist organising in the UNFCCC. At the very heart of the
WGC is a commitment to actively protest social inequality. According to its
Charter, the WGC

works to ensure that human rights and gender equality are firmly an-
chored in all climate actions under the UNFCCC and to challenge the
extractive, exploitative and patriarchal economic model which has re-
sulted in the climate crisis.
(WGC,
­ 2016b, p.
­ 1)

In this way the WGC is ultimately doing intersectional political work, not least
in its efforts to connect social inequalities, particularly gender inequality, to
processes of ecological degradation. Based on my research findings, I think
the following important lessons should be drawn from this political work.

Lesson One: There Are No Easy Solutions

This first lesson should be obvious by now, but it is worth reiterating. Doing
intersectional work, both political and intellectual, is hard work. This has
been a key theme throughout this book and is significant because it means
that there are no easy answers to the kinds of questions feminist academics
like to pose. Answers are difficult because intersectional work is complex:

because these ideas interact with one another, collectively they contrib-
ute to intersectionality’s complexity. Thinking about social inequalities
 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 141
and power relations with an ethos of social justice, and doing so not in
abstract generalisations but in their specific contexts, brings complexity
to intersectional inquiry and praxis.
(Collins and Bilge, 2020, p. 235)

Accepting complexity is important for intellectual work because it means

that attempts to theorise solutions should always be closely linked to the
material realities of feminist climate activism. It is also a useful reminder
that just because something is difficult does not mean that it is not worth
doing. The tensions between intersectional critical inquiry and practice in
global climate governance does not mean that feminists are resigned to re-
lying on a weakened, or less critical, version of intersectionality that ulti-
mately works to sustain existing and intersecting lines of marginalisation
and oppression. Rather, it is imperative that academics and activists work
together in open dialogue to think through the conditions under which in-
tersectional arguments can prevail in spaces of global climate politics.

Lesson Two: Prevalent Domains of Power have Hindered

Intersectional Praxis in the UNFCCC
COP24 in 2018 saw an ‘action’ designed to stand up to the macho-fascism
of political leaders such as Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro, as discussed
in Chapter 5. Distinctly, even surprisingly, ecological in its intersectional
advocacy, the Constituency claimed that

Political leaders that are rooted in the patriarchal system and claim
supremacy, endanger human rights, including women’s, LGBTQI+’s
and indigenous peoples’ rights with their toxic masculinity. These po-
litical forces are denying climate change, while pushing their neolib-
eral agenda, choking the Paris ambition on serious climate action at
the national and global level. They are inhibiting a just transition by
holding on to dirty energy, endangering biodiversity and lives of indige-
nous peoples, local communities, women and other groups. Time is up!
To fight against this oppressive system, we at the Women and Gender
Constituency (WGC) and our feminist allies are organising an action at
COP24 and inviting any feminists and people that stand in solidarity to
say NO to the global rise of macho-fascism.
­
(WECF, 2018b)

Here the WGC is calling out the structural power that macho-fascism (and,
of course, the direct, behavioural, coercive power held by individuals such
as Trump and Bolsonaro) has in shaping climate ambition and that results
in weakened, or even stalled, action on climate change.1 In similar ways
the Constituency has repeatedly challenged the sexism prevalent in the
UNFCCC that keeps women, particularly indigenous women, away from
142 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis
the negotiating table. But the WGC has seen less success in challenging cul-
tural domains of power, or the significance of ideas and culture in the or-
ganisation of power. The ‘time is up’ campaign frames the neoliberal agenda
not just as an oppressive system but also one that is increasingly being mo-
bilised by far-right populists whose messages play on toxic masculinity such
as Trump and Bolsonaro. In effect this what shifts attention away from the
ways in which the UNFCCC is itself caught up in those same webs of power.
The UNFCCC is not exempt from the structural power that masculinity,
capitalism, hetero-normativity and nationalism hold in shaping its politics.
The inability of the WGC to challenge effectively the cultural domain of
power lies in the challenges facing feminist climate activists in the UNFCCC
in resisting dominant modes of knowledge production. This finding is sup-
ported by my interviews with National Gender Focal Points, particularly those
from the EU. Several Focal Points commented on the lack of resources and
knowledge that they need to be able to the shape their domestic and interna-
tional policies, despite an increasingly expanding body of scholarly literature
on ‘gender and climate change’. Gender Focal Points tend to seek specific re-
porting on policy issues for specific countries, particularly those in the Global
North. While this is, in many ways, in keeping with a gender mainstreaming
approach that either siloes gender issues or attempts to add women into ex-
isting frameworks (see Chapter 2), it is less compatible with the principles of
intersectional feminism. Simply looking for specific examples of where gender
can be easily inserted into policy does little to challenge existing knowledge
frameworks (c.f. Alston, 2014). As discussed in Chapter 5, the favouring of
specific policy recommendation reports by negotiators has resulted in a po-
litical strategy whereby some members of the WGC tend to favour research
and reports from social movements rather than by feminist climate scholars,
resulting in an awkward separation of ideas, criticisms and actions.
The framing of the natural world in arguments made by the WGC is an-
other example that uncovers the challenges in resisting existing and domi-
nant frameworks. There have been plenty of examples in this book of the
WGC including nature in the intersections of oppression, marginalisation
and destruction. One telling example is found in the Young Feminist Day
held in 2017 where Gunnarsson read a poem with the lines: ‘Dear society. I
do not shave the hairs off my body like you shave the trees off this Earth’.
Laura Cooper-Hall’s poem echoed these sentiments in the lines:

We are tired of the current system that is based on the destruction of the
Earth, on greed, on war and violence. Young people all over the world
have been raising their consciousness to include feminists, queer, trans,
anti- capitalist, environmental, racial, intersectionality and indigenous
analysis.

But these kinds of arguments connecting women’s oppression, racial dis-

crimination and homophobia with the destruction of the natural world
 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 143
rarely make it into the arguments for policy interventions because to do
so would require a real challenge to prevailing masculinist norms. Instead,
nature and the natural world tend to feature little in arguments aimed at
influencing policy. As a result, nature implicitly serves as a background to
the unfolding human drama in face of a climate breakdown, similar to the
observations of Plumwood (1993) and Alaimo (2008). For example, the com-
pelling story of Doña Vera Sanchez told by Aguilar in 2007 demonstrates
the backgrounded role that nature plays:

Then it happened. The winds, the waves, the flood. I took my three kids
and started walking inland. Very soon the current was so strong, I could
not hold all of them, my oldest son was holding my daughter. My hands
were holding my youngest baby. The water snatched them, I saw my son
trying to swim… I lost sight of them.
I climbed a tree, it was very cold, I could not sleep. Other animals,
especially the snakes, were trying to save themselves as well. I was in
the tree for almost three days, I was lucky I could breast feed my baby.
(Aguilar,
­ 2007, p.
­ 1)

While the natural world is integral to this story, it features as a background

for the horror that Sanchez experienced. This is perhaps hardly surprising
since the WGC are making arguments in a political space that understands
nature and the natural world – the planet’s climate system to be precise – as
something that can be ‘fixed’ by masculine intervention (see Merchant, 1983;
see also Fleming 2017; MacGregor and Paterson 2020). In this framework,
arguments based on the need to ‘save’ women from climate change, rather
than the need to protect nature itself carry more political weight.
Analysis of the disciplinary domain of power, or the rules and regulations
that are applied to different people or groups, in the UNFCCC lays bare
fundamental issues with the very structure of civil society involvement in the
UNFCCC. Through membership to particular constituencies the constitu-
ency structure in effect separates civil society, and their concerns, from the
dominant aspects of climate governance and from each other in atomised
ways. This prevents a both/and
­ understanding of identity and prevents rela-
tional arguments about women’s identities as they intersect with other lines
of marginalisation and oppression. In 2011 at COP17 Durban, the WGC
was granted full constituency status and today observes the negotiations
along with eight other constituencies (see UNFCCC, n.d.). In this UNFCCC
constituency structure, issues relating to women and gender are positioned
outwith the purview of the ENGO Constituency. This sets up an odd (and
false) separation where the issue of women and gender is kept separate from
wider environmental politics; it remains an add-on. Each constituency that
has been set up to represent a specific group (e.g. YOUNGOs, IPOs and the
WGC), must create a common sense of identity and make collective political
demands on their behalf. In other words, these identity-based constituencies
144 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis
have to ‘utilise the power of the collective voice’ (Olson, 2014, p. 186), which
seems inevitably to result in the kinds of universalising arguments discussed
in ­Chapter 5.
Analysis of the disciplinary domain of power demonstrates how the
essential borders of the constituencies that are based on specific identity
markers helps to sustain conceptual entities such as ‘woman’ that are consti-
tuted through acts of exclusion or ‘othering’ (Moore, 2008; see also Ahmed,
1998), and prevents any form of epistemic community building between civil
society constituencies. Although the inclusion of civil society through con-
stituencies is an attempt to level the playing field and ensure marginalised
voices (such as women, indigenous peoples, young people and even the envi-
ronment through ENGOs) are included in the process, a feminist analysis of
both masculinities and femininities reveals how this is anything but equal.
In effect women, and the female body, are set up as a variant to the ‘normal’
male (see also Buckingham and Kulcur, 2009). Men, after all, do not need to
be represented through a special interest constituency; they are governed by
different rules. Much has been written about the role and legitimacy of civil
society (see for example Biermann et al., 2012; Bäckstrand and Kuyper, 2017;
Bäckstrand et al., 2017), but rarely is the basic concept of constituencies,
envisioned in their current form, scrutinised or criticised. Indeed, the inclu-
sion of civil society, an important outcome for United Nations Conference
on Environmental and Development (UNCED) (or Rio 1992), is generally
hailed as a positive step in widening the scope of the UN and expanding the
political sphere beyond a space that is reserved for ‘statesmen’ and lawmak-
ers. But from a critical intersectional perspective it is clear that the structure
of constituencies that ultimately govern civil society’s involvement in pro-
cesses of global climate governance is actually a hindrance to the full and
successful participation of civil society that represents those experiencing
multiple and intersecting lines of social inequalities.
Keeping the WGC in its own pigeonhole (while backgrounding gender
and foregrounding women) forces its members to make political demands
based on single-axis framings of identity. This means that attention to the
relational nature of identity becomes impossible through the disciplinary
domain of power that treats men and women (or masculinity and femininity)
asymmetrically. ‘Pigeonholing’ civil society also serves to keep multi-axis
identities atomised and separate from each other. Gender (meaning women)
typically appears in a (short) list of social inequalities. Gender equality and
empowerment of women (an important rhetorical strategy for the WGC) is
included in the preamble of the Paris Agreement in this way:

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of human-

kind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change,
respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human
rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local com-
munities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in
 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 145
vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender
equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.
(UNFCCC,
­ 2015, p.
­ 2)

In this example, there is an implicit atomisation of experience in relation to

the impacts of climate change. Experience (as an indigenous person, as a mi-
grant, as a child etc.) is defined as fundamentally individual and atomistic,
subject to behavioural and attitudinal change to ensure their equality with
men (on masculinist terms). Making collective and intersectional political
demands in the UNFCCC fundamentally challenges the very disciplinary
fabric of the institution, which explains many of the challenges faced by the
WGC. This is an important lesson for intersectional praxis because any next
phase of feminist organising in the UNFCCC needs new kinds of strategies
to overcome the challenges posed by intersecting domains of power that are
features of the UNFCCC itself.
Finally, it seems to me that the interpersonal domain of power is an area
that has seen the greatest success. As discussed previously, women now
make up much higher percentages of national delegations and their voices
are taken seriously in the UNFCCC. The Gender Advisor in the UNFCCC
Secretariat, Fleur Newman, is considered so powerful that some dele-
gates avoid asking her advice. One interview participant told me that they
‘suggested to some people in the secretariat working on finance, well go talk
to Fleur, she’s the Focal Point and they say oh no no, if we go talk to Fleur
then everything is going to be about gender’ (Participant E, 2018, interview).
But a critical intersectional analysis of the ways in which the structural,
cultural and disciplinary domains of power converge to affect women’s lives
paints a slightly different picture. Women might be included in national del-
egations and make up a significant proportion of civil society, but several
interview participants commented on their different treatment depending
on their positioning in multiple and intersectional lines of social inequali-
ties. For example, Ghani reflected on her experiences as a delegate for both
Parties and as part of civil society recalling that

And so, for me it was, I kind of experienced discrimination and also

outward harassment from all angles, so within the NGOs, it depends on
how you are being treated but it can be subtle and unsubtle. It depends
on what your position is, so lots of my colleagues were harassed by their
colleagues, people they are working with and people they often meet
just within this setting. Because you know everyone is coming together
for the COPs and they are there for the COPs and it’s intense, three
weeks you are working really long hours, you’re you know in the middle
of nowhere sometimes. And so, and then also being harassed by dele-
gates because delegates have power of information. And, often that is
just held over you if you want to get information then you’d go out for
drinks, or they’d talk about it over a drink – oh come join us for dinner
146 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis
or oh we can talk at the CAN party. You know things like, and there’s
no talking happening at the CAN parties!
(Ghani, 2017, interview)

However, Röhr reflected that as an older woman she did not experience har-
assment in the same ways:

I think young women might perceive it quite different. So, I don’t know
if you have seen those, this is a little bit I think a different issue, but
if you have seen these erm, #MeToo discussions from which was here
started as far as I got it, started by Farhana Yamin. And she also said
that it was much more in the years when she was younger so, and to
have a particular age. Yeah you are not harassed in any way anymore,
because nobody is interested in grandmothers. Let’s say it in that way.
(Röhr, 2017, interview)

There is also an issue about the workload of women advocating for gender
concerns, best evidenced through the introduction of National Gender Focal
Points that I discussed in earlier chapters. These roles are predominately un-
dertaken by women and are entirely voluntary. While the UNFCCC looks
good on paper, appearing to be taking issues of gender equality seriously,
the interpersonal domain of power ensures that the burden for this work
remains women’s burden.
In these ways, it is clear that the UNFCCC is shaped by dominant power
structures in ways that limit possibilities for successful gender advocacy.
This is not a new lesson for feminist environmental academics who make
the case for intersectional arguments in global climate governance. Indeed,
MacGregor (2009; 2017) has been one scholar who has been at the forefront
of the call for ‘better answers’ to the gender and climate change question.
These better answers would necessarily challenge the structural, cultural,
disciplinary and interpersonal domains of power. It is not the case that such
better answers do not exist and members of the WGC hold many of those an-
swers themselves. Importantly, however, what are missing are the strategies
needed to embed those answers into political spaces of global climate gov-
ernance. This finding, this lesson from the WGC, should be a key area for fu-
ture research on feminist intersectional praxis in global climate governance.

Lesson Three: Intersectional Inquiry and Practice Cannot Be

Separated
The idea that intersectionality requires a creative tension between inquiry
and praxis is not a new one. In fact, this idea is central to the arguments
made in Collins and Bilge’s (2020) book Intersectionality:

In the case of intersectionality, the synergy between inquiry and praxis

can produce important new knowledge and/or practices. Inquiry and
 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 147
praxis can be effective without explicitly taking the other into account.
Yet bringing them together can generate benefits that are greater than
each alone.
(Collins and Bilge, 2020, p. 39)

But in the case of the feminist intellectual and political work in the area
of global climate governance I find the distinction between ‘inquiry and
praxis’ unhelpful for two primary reasons.
First, I am not convinced that the work of the WGC necessarily consti-
tutes praxis, based on the definition offered by Collins and Bilge:

Praxis understands thinking and doing, or theory and action, as inti-

mately linked and mutually informing each other. It rejects a binary
conception that sees scholarship as providing other theories and frame-
works and relegates practice to people who apply those ideas in real
life settings or to real-life
­ ​­ problems. ­Praxis-orientated
​­ ­knowledge – for
​­
example professional practice of trained medical personnel or skills in
social organising – sees theory and practice and interconnected.
(Collins and Bilge, 2020, p. 5)

Given the resistance to academic knowledge from the WGC, discussed in

Chapter 5, the term ‘practice’ more aptly describes the work of the WGC
today. While the Constituency has engaged in its own knowledge pro-
duction as part of its political activity (certainly entailed in the notion of
praxis) it has remained sceptical about the role of academic knowledge
production. In this way there remains a disconnect between theory and
practice, both of which are integral to critical intersectional knowledge
production.
The second, and more important, reason that the distinction between in-
quiry and praxis is unhelpful in this case is that it keeps academic theorising
outside of ‘praxis’. A key lesson from this research is that, in the case of global
climate politics, the intersectional inquiry of scholars and the intersectional
practice of the WGC have been separated in ways that do not constitute in-
tersectional praxis. Theorising often takes the form of ‘armchair theorising’
about feminist climate activism without first-hand participation and without
engaging in any meaningful dialogue with the women about whom theorists
write. For example, MacGregor (2006; 2017) criticises the Mary Robinson
Foundation and WEDO calling for better answers but has not (by her own
admission) ever engaged in UN-level lobbying or feminist activism in in-
stitutions of global climate governance. Meanwhile, intersectional practice
has moved progressively further away from academic theorising. As Röhr
comments

That’s always one of the recommendations or demands is always that we

have to, so all these no we don’t have to have this academic research we
need this research from the ground from the grassroots organisations
148 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis
and I say yeah, but so I am part of mine is also researcher and more
academic and I’m thinking yeah it’s important to have your knowledge
and to bring this knowledge to the other parts of the world let’s say. But
it’s not enough, we need both and we need to connect.
(Röhr, 2017, interview)

Future intersectional inquiry and practice need to evolve in ways that are
more interconnected and should always remain in dialogue with one an-
other. Ecological justice provides a solid starting point for this dialogue:

As a form of inquiry that grapples with complex social inequalities, in-

tersectionality’s raison d’ être is not simply to provide more complex
and comprehensive explanations of how and why social inequalities
persist, or to bemoan social injustices in the world, leaving someone
else to fix them.
(Collins and Bilge, 2020, p. 237)

This is, arguably, the WGC’s biggest contribution to intersectionality. Plac-

ing climate change within a discourse of justice made it possible to concep-
tualise it as a social issue that affects the marginalised and oppressed the
most as well as showing that it is the result of the same power structures that
other social movements seek to resist, including Black Lives Matter, anti-
capitalism, etc. This work has been done in a joined-up way with other con-
stituencies coming together and fighting for a common cause, an important
strategy for the future of feminist organising in the UNFCCC.

Towards an Ecofeminist Transversal Politics

In the spirit of intersectional praxis that encourages open and ongoing di-
alogue, I offer possible options for a next phase of feminist climate activ-
ism within (or outwith) the UNFCCC in light of the reflections and lessons
learned above. This is a critical moment for feminist climate activism for
two main reasons. First, the UNFCCC is itself in a moment of transition.
Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 and the agreement
of its rulebook in 2019, the UNFCCC is shifting from making global climate
change policy towards implementing it. This not only changes the focus of
the WGC but also offers new opportunities for feminist organising in the
sphere of climate governance.
The second reason is that more broadly, millions of people, many of
them young, around the world are becoming more concerned about climate
change and, importantly, are using their collective voices to demand change
(c.f. Fridays for Future, 2020). This growing youth climate movement offers
members of the WGC new language and new arguments for making intersec-
tional demands and new avenues for co-resistances. The need for inward re-
flection is pressing for the WGC. There was an attempt at this in 2013, but as
 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 149
I have discussed, the Paris Agreement negotiations took attention away from
this internal reflection. Chapter 5 shows that the procedural strategies of the
WGC tend to focus on lobbying and engaging with the UNFCCC structures.
There is little reflection on the mode of organising within the Constituency
itself. As such, I suggest three possible options for the next phase of feminist
climate activism: fold and withdraw, ‘business as usual’, or ecofeminist trans-
versal politics. These suggestions should not be read as a blueprint for the
future activism in the UNFCCC, but rather they are my contribution to the
beginning of a dialogue that embodies intersectional praxis.

Option One: Fold and Withdraw

One option for the WGC is to fold and withdraw from the negotiations. To
cease engaging with the UNFCCC on the basis that, as an advocacy group,
the Constituency has achieved its primary aims: gender is mainstreamed
throughout the UNFCCC and the GAP represents an important moment for
the implementation of this. Arguably this should be the aim of any feminist
organising: to achieve their goals and put themselves out of a job. In effect,
the WGC has achieved most of their original aims. For example, one of the
demands of the small network of women who first attended COP1 in 1995 was
that the principles of Agenda 21, and especially Chapter 24, the Global Action
Plan for the Enhancement of Women in Sustainable Development, have to
become part of climate protection policy (International Women’s Forum,
1995, p. 2). While these particular mandates are not specifically named in
climate policy, there are many references to similar initiatives such as the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and CEDAW. In short, the prin-
ciples of both Agenda 21 and the Global Action Plan for the Enhancement of
Women in Sustainable Development are firmly rooted in global climate pol-
itics. A second demand was that women’s participation had to be increased.
This has been the basis of several gender decisions under the Convention (see
UNFCCC, 2001a, 2014, 2015). The final demand was that women wanted to
exchange ideas and organise themselves, which they have achieved through
the creation of a Women and Gender Constituency. Of course, the WGC’s
demands have changed and evolved over time, but it is easy to see that these
goals, if not achieved in their entirety, have had the motions put in place to
achieve them.
One could argue that this is as much progress that feminists can expect
from the UNFCCC, and efforts are best placed in outsider activist tactics
aimed at ensuring that local implementation of the Paris Agreement is done
in gender-just ways. There is a sense among members of the WGC that in-
fluencing the negotiations is not the reason that feminists are active in the
UNFCCC in the first place. One interview participant said:

I think we have to be pragmatic, although I don’t believe in pragma-

tism, we have to be idealist to set the bar high, but I think we also have
150 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis
to contend with the truth that the UN will never deliver on climate jus-
tice it will never deliver on system change – because it is the system. We
have to be clear in ourselves why we bother to be in this space.
(Lauron, 2017, interview)

The notion that the WGC will never effect system change because the
UNFCCC is the system was a common theme in interviews, which raises
questions about the effectiveness of insider strategies in the UNFCCC.
That said, given the success of the Constituency through insider tactics,
the suggestion that feminists should not have a presence within the institu-
tion makes equally little sense. Given the achievements of the WGC thus far,
many of which are remarkable given the structural constraints and weight
stacked against them, there is little reason not to believe that there is more
to come. If there were no feminist presence (or pressure) within the negoti-
ations, it would be all too easy for Parties to renege on previous commit-
ments, let alone fail to include gendered considerations in future decisions.

Option Two: ‘Business as Usual’

A second option is for the WGC to continue ‘business as usual’. Morrow
(2017a) characterises the WGC advocacy as consistent with the principles of
transversal politics, a claim that is supported by my research. Members of
the WGC have forged excellent ties, or networks, with the UNFCCC Sec-
retariat and with Parties, but also with other constituencies, particularly
the Youth Constituency (YOUNGOs), Indigenous Peoples Organisations
(IPOs) and ENGOs. As Morrow (2017a) suggests, even the very structure
of the WGC itself is consistent with transversal politics in that it emerged
as a network of like-minded NGOs. The WGC is, itself, an example of an
epistemic community formed through coalition building based upon chains
of equivalence (see for example, Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Haraway, 1988;
Yuval-Davis, 1997;1999; and Mouffe, 2005). It is a coalition of feminists who
work together to advance the feminist climate project. Through baby steps
and compromises, the Constituency has successfully embedded a gender
perspective (at least understood as women) in the negotiations. The impor-
tance of this should not be understated. As Ghani remarked

Yes. I totally think it makes a difference. It brings a change of perspec-

tive and it gets delegations used to having women and having their per-
spective. And the more women we have the more opportunities you have
for other women. And you know younger women see it’s possible to be a
part of delegations or to be a part of the process. And to be recognised
for their talents and expertise. I think it so so important, like I totally
get a lot of people brush aside but actually in the US it’s called, I think,
affirmation policies or whatever, and they have it in some countries,
like Norway that have a requirement for all boards to have 50% women.
 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 151
And it’s really really helped women at least be represented. Because it
provides opportunities and I think its these kinds of policies are so so
important.
(Ghani, 2017, interview)

Yet, any reflexive feminist movement should always remain mindful of the
political effect of compromise. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 5, those
consequences include a lack of consideration of men and masculinities,
and an invisibilisation of difference between women themselves as a non-
homogenous group, as well as a lack of a radical feminist drive in climate
solutions.

Option Three: Ecofeminist Transversal Politics

An ecofeminist transversal politics has the potential to harness the commit-
ment to intersectional praxis in the WGC in a way that also challenges dom-
inant frameworks and understandings of identities within the UNFCCC in
more fundamental ways than has been previously allowed. An ecofeminist
transversal politics would embody the relational terminology of intersec-
tionality such as solidarity politics, flexible dialogue and epistemic com-
munities (see Yuval-Davis, 1997; 1999). This kind of political work has long
been at the heart of intersectional praxis. For example, one of the founding
messages of the CRC statement was a commitment to coalitional organising
working with ‘other progressive organisations and movements’ as a way of
dealing with interlocking systems of oppression (Combahee River Collec-
tive, 1977). Further, the CRC was not opposed to conflict:

Learning from their own internal contestations, they would come to

more overtly identify both capitalist exploitation as well as homophobia
(and the conferred privileges of heteronormativity), for instance, as core
issues to be addressed among and between Black women.
­
(May, 2015, ­p. 50)

While an ecofeminist coalition would represent a radical change in terms of

the way politics is done in the UNFCCC, there is evidence that some within
the WGC already want such an approach. For example, a meeting of women
from Asia held in 2009 produced a statement noting

We, over 70 women from many parts of Asia with various backgrounds –
indigenous, peasant, fisher, labour- from different networks and social
justice movements, met on September 2009, in Bangkok. We exchanged
experiences with our sisters and discussed the impacts of climate change
in our communities and on us, the women, from these communities.
We discussed strategies and solutions to bring out voices and thoughts
into the discourse on climate change and shape solutions to tackle the
152 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis
climate crisis. We also resolve to continue our own education about cli-
mate issues, educate other women and policy-makers, and build alli-
ances and coalitions to work towards genuine climate justice with the
principles of gender justice.
(AWG-KP9/AWG-LCA7
­­ ​­ ­­ ​­ Meeting Participants, 2009, p.
­ 1)

Ghani also noted the need for greater coalition building in UNFCCC civil
society:

Well I don’t mind the constituencies, but I want them to interface more,
work together more. And for me, I think it’s been deliberate to have
the siloed approach because it creates expertise and it creates jobs for
certain people to focus on just one thing right? And so it’s very hard to
break through that, it’s not easy it’s something that I have tried to do
within all the organisations that I’ve worked with and it’s not easy.
(Ghani, 2017, interview)

Key to an ecofeminist transversal politics is the principle of solidarity in

allowing coalition members to embrace difference rather than harness
a collective sameness on which to hook political arguments. This kind of
feminist practice depends on building feminist solidarities across the divi-
sions of place, identity, class, work, belief and so on (Mohanty, 2003, p. 25).
Therefore, it does not hide or diminish intra-group difference. As shown
in previous chapters, there is a tendency among members of the WGC, to
downplay issues of difference in collective political action because differ-
ence is seen to have the potential to undermine the perception of unity that
is essential in legitimising collective political demands (Crenshaw, 1991). A
politics of solidarity shaping the motivations of an ecofeminist transversal
politics could also place climate justice at its core since arguments would be
less concerned about multiple identities of individuals and more concerned
with a common goal: justice for people and planet.
It is important that political coalitions based on solidarity are not the
kind of ‘opportunistic tactical alliances built and destroyed overnight’ that
Lauron suggests are commonplace in UNFCCC civil society (2017, inter-
view). Rather alliances and coalitions should be based on mutual respect
and a desire to challenge dominant knowledge frameworks in the UNFCCC.
The work of Laclau and Mouffe is helpful in understanding the strategic
role coalitions can play. For them ‘the radicalisation of democracy requires
the transformation of existing power structures and construction of a new
hegemony’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; cited in Mouffe, 2005, p. 53). That
new hegemony is formed of like-minded organisations, connected through
chains of equivalence, and in global climate politics can and should be the
next phase for UNFCCC civil society, including the WGC. A coalition
formed through chains of equivalence is inherently intersectional in nature
through connecting different struggles: the struggle for meaningful climate
 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 153
action is the struggle for gender equality is the struggle for racial equality
is the struggle for indigenous rights, for example. Of course, Laclau and
Mouffe are not the only thinkers who advocate for a coalitional politics in
the creation of a powerful counter-hegemonic force in global politics (nor
am I the first to connect this to environmental political organising). Smith,
one of the founding members of the CRC similarly understands coalitions as
important because ‘the only way we can win – and before winning, the only
way that we can survive is by working with each other, and not seeing each
other as enemies’ (Smith, in Taylor, 2017, p. 64).
Arruzza, Bhattacharya and Fraser (2019) make a similar argument in their
manifesto for a ‘feminism for the 99%’, which is useful in conceptualising how
such an approach might evolve in global climate change politics. A coalitional
politics in the UNFCCC that is based upon solidarity not sameness would di-
rectly the challenge the non-articulation of men as the norm by creating a co-
alitional force that is bound together not by a common essence of identity, but
by a common goal. A coalitional politics that is based on solidarity, not same-
ness can present a radical challenge to the status quo by demanding power to
be in the hands of the many not the few. Demarcating the 1% from the 99% is
important in articulating ‘who’ any coalitional practices are fighting against
(Arruzza, Bhattacharya and Fraser, 2019), speaking to Yuval-Davis’ (1997;
1999) notion of epistemological communities in transversal politics.
An ecofeminist coalition comprised of CSO’s with radical and progres-
sive goals importantly does not include all of civil society. As Lauron (2017,
interview) said, the Farmers Constituency, as one example, works in the in-
terests of big corporations (as do many CSOs in the BINGO Constituency),
not small scale and local farmers. An ecofeminist coalition would mark
such organisations as firmly part of the 1%, the powerful who should be
challenged and resisted. The intersectional language of solidarity and coa-
lition offers new political relationships among historically disenfranchised
people. It is important for building co-resistances in social justice-, or cli-
mate ­justice-based
​­ movements.
Perhaps the most important aspect of an ecofeminist transversal poli-
tics is ongoing dialogue. I became acutely aware during fieldwork of issues
surrounding conflict and feminist debate or dialogue, or indeed the lack
thereof. In the first week of COP23 I attended a parallel event at the Peo-
ple’s Summit in 2017. The event was held by DIVA for Equality, an activist
group of queer indigenous women from the Pacific Islands and was aimed at
holding a feminist dialogue between Global South and Global North fem-
inists (see WGC, 2017a). At the event there were various ‘feminist circles’
during which the organisers split the group into an inner Global South fem-
inist circle and an outer Global North feminist circle. The inner circle was
to talk while the outer circle listened. Themes that arose from the Global
South feminist dialogue included: silencing, white feminism, lack of a voice,
powerlessness. Solidarity must be constructed, it not something that simply
happens, and ongoing dialogue can aid in this process.
154 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis
Open debate and feminist critique are almost entirely absent among
members of the WGC currently, not out of maliciousness, but because the
perception of unity is important for both articulating and legitimising col-
lective feminist political demands. Discussions of difference are seen as a
threat to that perception. As Crenshaw (1991) observes, unity is only uni-
fying for some members of the group, typically those who are dominant or
those with access to power and privilege ‘but for’ one quality (i.e. gender).
A perception of unity, or sameness, within any heterogenous group is likely
to reproduce the very same power structures that it claims to be resisting.
But the genealogy of intersectionality offered in Chapter 2 ‘emphasises the
significance of social movement projects advanced by historically disen-
franchised people for intersectionality’s critical inquiry and praxis’ (Collins
and Bilge, 2020, p. 223). These voices should be foregrounded in an ongoing
dialogue because, as Collins and Bilge (2020) suggest, they are often most
versed in social justice praxis.
An ecofeminist transversal politics in the UNFCCC could radically
change how civil society operates and how it is viewed. Rather than slic-
ing civil society into sections that are held as separate to one another with
deliberately competing aims, civil society would be viewed as a counter-
hegemonic movement of co-resistances that is far more representative of
the world, where the fight does not have to be based entirely on what peo-
ple look like, sound like or act like. Such a structure could more readily
deal with cross- cutting or intersecting identities by not foregrounding some
identities while backgrounding others. Working in coalition feminist NGOs
and environmental NGOs, for example, can overcome the backgrounding of
either women and gender or the environment in order to make collective po-
litical arguments. This kind of transversal politics could focus more easily
on issues of masculinity and male power and the role that gender, including
both masculinities and femininities, plays in shaping global climate politics.
Not being necessarily concerned with women per se, a feminist coalition
could push for a more feminist climate politics that places at its core resist-
ance to hierarchies of power and the subordination of that which is deemed
feminine.

Conclusion
This chapter serves three important purposes. First, it speaks back to crit-
icisms seen in academic theorising on feminist environmental activism, in-
cluding climate activism. While academic criticism is to be welcomed, it
often remains removed from the practices that it comments upon. A more
integrated methodology, such as the one offered in this book, invites more
empathetic analyses of the political strategies, both rhetorical and proce-
dural, of groups such as the WGC. This chapter, then, reiterates the claim
that intersectional practices in the UNFCCC is ultimately hard work.
Viewed in this light, the successes of the WGC appear remarkable, and this
 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 155
leads to the second purpose of this chapter: lessons can be learned from
an analysis of WGC’s intersectional practice that can inform intersectional
feminist praxis in important ways. The primary lessons are: there are no
easy solutions; prevalent domains of power have hindered intersectional
praxis in the UNFCCC; and intersectional inquiry and practice cannot be
separated.
The third purpose of this chapter is to offer a basis for dialogue that
can contribute to intersectional praxis. By presenting three possible next
phases, I argue that option three – ecofeminist transversal politics – offers
the most effective solution to overcoming the challenges facing members of
the WGC. I have thereby created a space for open and ongoing debate and
for intersectional inquiry and practice ideally to work together. This process
of dialogue could result in more fruitful and mutually reinforcing ways to
develop an intersectional praxis that can challenge and transform global
climate governance. I do not presume to have offered a solution to all of the
challenges presented by dominant forces of power in the UNFCCC, but my
firm conclusion is that both intersectional theorising and political practice
are both crucial to this process.

Note

Bibliography
Aguilar, L., (2007). Speech Given at High-level Roundtable How a Changing Cli-
mate Impacts Women. In Council of Women World Leaders, WEDO and
Henrich Böll Foundation (2007) Report of High-level Roundtable How a Chang-
ing Climate Impacts Women. (online). ­ Available at: https://wedo.org/wp-
­ ­­ ​
­content/uploads/2007/12/roundtable-final-report-6-nov.pdf.
­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed:
15/07/2020.
­ ­
Ahmed, S., (1998). Differences that Matter: Feminist Theory and Postmodernism.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Alston, M., (2014). ‘Gender mainstreaming and climate change’, Women’s Studies
International Forum, 47, pp. ­ 287–294.
­ ​­ doi: 10.1016/j.wsif.2013.01.016.
­
Arruzza, C., Bhattacharya, T. and Fraser, N., (2019). Feminism for the 99%. Lon-
don: Verso.
­AWG-KP9/AWG-LCA7
​­ ­­ ​­ Meeting Participants, (2009). ­ Declaration of Women in Asia
on Climate Change. (online).
­ Available at: https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/
­ ­ ­ ­
dokumente/6_UNFCCC/Asian_Women_Declaration_on_Climate_Change.pdf.
­ ­
Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
­ ­
Bäckstrand, K. and Kuyper, J. W., (2017). ‘The democratic legitimacy of orches-
tration: The UNFCCC, non-state actors, and transnational climate governance’,
Environmental Politics, 26(4), ­ pp.­ ­764–788.
​­ doi: 10.1080/09644016.2017.1323579.
­
156 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis
Bäckstrand, K. et al., (2017). ‘Non-state actors in global climate governance: From
Copenhagen to Paris and beyond’, Environmental Politics. Routledge, 26(4),
pp. ­ ­561–579. ​­ doi: 10.1080/09644016.2017.1327485.
­
Biermann, F. et al., (2012). ‘Navigating the anthropocene: Improving earth system
governance’, Science, 335(6074), ­ pp.
­ 1306–1307.­ ​­ doi: 10.1126/science.1217255.
­
Birk, N., (2019). Advances for Gender Equality at Cop25. (online). Available at: https://
wedo.org/advances-for-gender-equality-at-cop25/.
­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 28.07.2020.
Buckingham, S. and Kulcur, R., (2009). ‘Gendered geographies of environmental
injustice’, Antipode, 41(4), ­ pp. ­ ­659–683. ​­ ­ ­
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2009.00693. ​­
Collins, P. H. and Bilge, S., (2020). Intersectionality (2nd edn.), Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Combahee River Collective, (1977). The Combahee River Collective Statement.
(online).
­ Available at: https://mronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/
­ ­­ ​­ ­ ­
­Keyword20Coalition_Readings.pdf. Last accessed: 29/07/2020. ­ ­
Crenshaw, K. (1991). ‘Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and
violence against women of color’, Stanford Law Review, 43(1241), ­ pp.
­ ­1241–1299. ​­
Fleming, J. (2017). ‘Excuse us, while we fix the sky: WEIRD supermen and cli-
mate engineering’, RCC Perspectives, 4, pp. 23–28. Published by: Rachel Carson
Center, Munich.
Fridays for Future, (2020). Fridays for Future. (online). Available at: https://
fridaysforfuture.org/. Last accessed: 31/08/2020.
Haraway, D. J., (1988). ‘Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism
and the privilege of partial perspective’, Feminist Studies, 14(3), ­ pp.­ ­575–599.
​­ doi:
10.2307/3178066. ­
International Women’s Forum, (1995). ‘Statement to the Delegates and NGO’s at the
First Conference of the Parties (COP) From the International Women’s Forum’.
(online).
­ Available at: https://gendercc.net/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/6_UNF
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
CCC/COP1_Statement_to_delegates.pdf.
­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C., (1985). Hegemony and Social Startegy: Towards a Radical
Democratic Politics. London: Verso.
MacGregor, S., (2006). Beyond Mothering Earth: Ecological Citizenship and the Pol-
itics of Care. Vancouver: UBC Press.
MacGregor, S., (2009). ‘A stranger silence still: The need for feminist social re-
search on climate change’, Sociological Review, 57(SUPPL. ­ 2), pp.
­ ­124–140.
​­ doi:
10.1111/j.1467-954X.2010.01889.x.
­ ­ ​­
MacGregor, S., (2017). ‘Moving beyond impacts: More answers to the “gender and
climate change” question’, in S. Buckingham and V. Le Masson (eds.) Understand-
ing Climate Change through Gender Relations. New York and London: Routledge,
pp. ­ ­15–30.
​­
MacGregor, S. and Paterson, M. (2020). ‘Island kings: Imperial masculinity and
climate fragilities’, in M. Hultman and P. Pule (eds.) Men, Masculinities and the
Earth, London: Palgrave, pp. ­ ­153–168.​­
May, V. M., (2015). Pursuing Intersectionality, Unsettling Dominant Imaginaries.
New York: Routledge.
Merchant, C., (1983). The Death of Nature. New York: Harper & Row.
Mohanty, C. T., (2003). Feminist without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing
Solidarity. Durham & London: Duke University Press.
Mokoena, N., (2019). Advances for Gender Equality at Cop25. (online). Availa-
ble at: https://wedo.org/advances-for-gender-equality-at-cop25/.
­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed:
28.07.2020.
 Lessons for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 157
Moore, N., (2008). ‘Eco/feminism, non-violence and the future of feminism’,
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 10(3), ­ pp. ­ ­282–298. ​­ doi: 10.1080/
­14616740802185486.
Morrow, K., (2017a). ‘Changing the climate of participation: The gender constitu-
ency in the global climate change regime’, in S. MacGregor (ed.) Routledge Hand-
book of Gender and Environment. Routledge, pp. ­ 398–411.
­ ​­
Mouffe, C., (2005). On the Political: Thinking in Action. London and New York:
Routledge.
Olson, J., (2014). ‘Whose voices matter? Gender inequality in the United Nations
framework convention on climate change’, Agenda, 28(3), ­ pp.­ ­184–187. ​­ doi:
10.1080/10130950.2014.951215.
­
Plumwood, V., (1993). Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. London: Routledge.
Taylor, K.-Y., ​­ (2017).
­ How We Get Free: Black Feminism and the Combahee River
Collective, How We Get Free: Black Feminism and The Combahee River Collective.
Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.
UNFCCC, (2001a). ­ Decision 36/CP.7 Improving the Participation of Women in the
Representation of Parties in Bodies Established under the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change or the Kyoto Protocol. (online). Available
­
at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a04.pdf#page=26. ­ ­ ­ ­ Last accessed:
15/07/2020.
­ ­
UNFCCC, (2014). ­ Decision 18/CP.20 Lima Work Programme on Gender. (online). ­
Available at: https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/lima_dec_2014/decisions/application/
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­pdf/auv_cop20_gender.pdf.
­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2015). ­ Adoption of the Paris Agreement. (online). Available at: http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf.
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 15/07/2020. ­ ­
UNFCCC, (2018b). ­ Gender Composition: Report by the Secretariat. (online). Avail-
able at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/03e.pdf%0D.
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Last accessed:
28/07/2020.
­ ­
UNFCCC, (2019b). ­ Enhanced Lima work Programme on Gender and Its Gender Action
Plan. (online). ­ Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2019_
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
L03E.pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
UNFCCC, (n.d.). ­ Floating Coconut Story. (online). Available at: https://unfccc.int/
sites/default/files/2v0160525_vanuatu_2.pdf.
­ ­ ­ Last accessed: 29/07/2020. ­ ­
WECF, (2017b). ­ Gender Just Climate Solutions. (online). Available at: http://www.
wecf.eu/download/2018/08 ­ ­ ­ August/WGCSolutionsPublicationCOP23ENGFinal.
­
pdf. Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
WECF, (2018b). ­ Press Release: Feminists Say NO to the Global Rise of Macho-
­fascism! (online). ­ Available at: https://www.wecf.org/press-release/.
­ ­­ ​­ Last accessed:
28/07/2020.
­ ­
WGC, (2016b). ­ About Us. (online). Available at: http://womengenderclimate.org/-
about-us/. ​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020. ­ ­
­
­ ​­ ­ ­ ­ ​­
­ ­
­ ­ ​­
7 Conclusion
New Directions for Ecofeminist
Intersectional Praxis

This book is motivated by a sense of empathy for feminist climate activists

who have worked tiringly to embed a gender perspective into a framework
of climate governance that is notoriously masculine in its approach (c.f.
Alaimo, 2009; Seager, 2009; Nelson, 2012). While I did not set out to dispute
these criticisms, per se, I did seek to understand the reasons behind such
strategies and to assess their effectiveness in the context of the UNFCCC.
At the heart of my research is a methodological approach that involved
watching, engaging with and listening to the women who have devoted their
working lives to the feminist climate project. This approach has produced
insights that challenge critical portrayals of feminist climate change activ-
ism and lobbying, which opens up more productive space to theorise new
strategies of feminist resistance in the UNFCCC.
Foregrounding ‘gender’ in the history of the UNFCCC, as done in
Chapter 4, tells a new story about global climate governance and lays bare
not only the importance of integrating gender into global climate politics
but also the importance of feminist activists in shaping dominant narratives
of the UNFCCC. In answer to the question, what is the story of gender
in the UNFCCC? My answer is that this story has been remarkable. The
WGC, along with feminist allies, has played an integral role in shifting the
UNFCCC from a political space that was entirely concerned with market
fixes and technocratic solutions to one that understands climate change as
an important social issue that requires innovative and new solutions. In this
political work, the WGC has certainly mobilised strategies that universal-
ise lived experience and equate gender with women, effectively invisibilis-
ing the role of masculinity and male power, consistent with claims made by
scholars such as Arora-Jonsson (2011), Resurrección (2013), Sasser (2018)
and MacGregor (2017). But these are not the only stories that the Constit-
uency tell. The WGC is clearly committed to intersectional feminism and
in recent years have been more vocal about the need for climate policies to
consider intersecting lines of oppression and marginalisation. While strate-
gies that draw upon intersectional arguments have been mobilised in ‘baby
steps’, there are encouraging signs that these arguments are making their
way into popular discourse in the UNFCCC. For example, the enhanced

DOI: 10.4324/9781003306474-7
 Conclusion: New Directions for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 159
GAP adopted in 2019 ‘acknowledges intersectional identities that women
hold, including indigenous women and women with disabilities’ (Birk, 2019).
There are important lessons that can be drawn from the political work of
the WGC for the theory of intersectionality, discussed in Chapter 6. Briefly
reiterated here the first lesson is that there are no easy solutions. Precisely
because intersectionality is multifaceted, but also because intersectionality
attempts to make political sense of a complex world (Collins and Bilge, 2020),
there are no simple solutions to making intersectional arguments in political
spaces of global climate governance. The second important lesson is that
prevalent domains of power have hindered intersectionality in the UNFCCC.
This is crucial for future theorising of intersectionality in institutions such as
the UNFCCC because feminist activists need not only the rhetorical tools
to make intersectional arguments but also the procedural strategies through
which to advance them. As a means of beginning a dialogue between intel-
lectual inquiry and political practice in a mode of feminist organising that
constitutes as praxis, I have suggested a series of options for the next phase of
feminist organising in the UNFCCC. It is the third option, ecofeminist trans-
versal politics, that offers the most radical potential for moving the political
conversation forward in its ability to shift focus from individual inequality
towards a feminist future for a better climate politics. Based on principles of
solidarity not sameness, ecofeminist transversal politics allows feminists to
make collective political demands while also remaining consistent with an
intersectional approach to feminism. So, at the end of this story, I want to
return to the two central research questions that have guided this research:
What role has the WGC played in the evolution of a gender-blind UNFCCC
to a Gender Action Plan? What does the WGC experience tell us about the
limits and possibilities of ‘doing’ intersectionality in the UNFCCC?
Without the WGC’s feminist presence in the UNFCCC, the institution
would not be as advanced in its process of gender mainstreaming. Cer-
tainly, this work has come at a cost. Through a process of working inside
the UNFCCC, the WGC has been forced ( primarily due to intersecting do-
mains of power in the UNFCCC) to pursue their goals in ways that ad-
vance simplistic and universalising narratives about women and their lives
which backgrounds the multi-axes and intersectional arguments that are at
the heart of the Constituency’s commitments. This has worked ultimately
to reduce the effectiveness of gender mandates in the UNFCCC. But the
Constituency’s political work has altered the conditions under which it op-
erates in important ways. This opens up the possibility for a new story to be
told about gender in the UNFCCC. If climate activists and academics learn
from previous successes and challenges, a new future can be shaped that
embodies intersectional praxis. Ecofeminist transversal politics offers fem-
inist activists in the UNFCCC new language for making political demands.
Through new co-resistances feminists can harness their collective power to
pursue new strategies and advance new arguments that avoid the traps of
simplification and universalisation of single-axis identities.
160 Conclusion: New Directions for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis
Original Contributions
This book contributes to existing knowledge and political practice in several
important ways. First, its empirical contribution is to tell a hitherto untold
story about global climate governance that foregrounds gender and feminist
strategy. This is an important contribution to the study of global climate
governance, whether specifically concerned with gender or not. Chapter 4 –
From Zero-Gender to GAP: Foregrounding Gender in UNFCCC History –
is the product of a content analysis of hundreds of documents, elite interviews
and my own observations at two UNFCCC conferences. It is the product of
research on and participating in gender advocacy and activism within the
WGC at the UNFCCC. As such, it provides an important side of history
that is not usually seen: feminists have been active throughout the history of
the UNFCCC and it is because of this work that the UNFCCC now includes
many mentions of gender in official decisions and mandates. In identifying
three key phases of feminist activity in the UNFCCC, from gender-blind to
GAP, I hope that this can provide feminist environmentalists with a useful
resource in understanding an alternative account of the history of global
climate change politics.
­

A second contribution of this book is a theoretical one. By putting into

productive conversation concepts of intersectionality with ecofeminist and
feminist environmental ideas, I have offered the conceptual tools to think
about intersectionality in a way that places importance of the role and posi-
tion of the natural world in structures of marginalisation and oppression. As
highlighted in Chapter 3, there has been little engagement between intersec-
tional frameworks and ecological issues. While intersectional theorists such
as Collins and Bilge (2020) acknowledge the important ways that concepts
of environmental justice can enhance intersectionality, ecofeminist ideas
have rarely made it into intersectional consciousness. This book has offered
 Conclusion: New Directions for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis 161
an important corrective in developing a framework of ecofeminist intersec-
tionality as critical inquiry and as political praxis that brings together con-
cepts of intersectionality (including concepts about ‘doing’ intersectionality
in practice) with ecofeminist thought. The product of this conversation is a
framework of intersectionality that places nature – encompassing the natu-
ral world, earth others and the environment – in the intersection of multiple
lines of oppression, marginalisation and destruction. While this framework
is not intended to be an ‘off the shelf’ framework that can be simply applied
in different contexts, it does offer feminist environmental scholars a way of
embodying intersectionality as a mode of critical inquiry.
Finally, this book offers an important political contribution; it is my po-
litical contribution to the feminist climate project. Throughout this book, I
have called on activists to engage more openly with academics and for aca-
demics to consider their work an act of activism in its own right. This is my
act of activism. It is my offering to the ongoing dialogue between feminists
from all backgrounds who are committed to the feminist climate project. It
is not intended to act as a blueprint for the future of that project, but rather
as an attempt to begin the conversation, and I hope it will be received as
such.

Coda
The lessons for intersectionality as a theoretical concept made visible
throughout this book are the product of a conversation between academic
theories of intersectionality and intersectional political practice that have
for too long remained separated in the context of global climate change gov-
ernance. The dialogue between theory and action, or thinking and doing,
in this book has opened up space for an ongoing dialogue between activists
in the UNFCCC and academics researching feminist approaches to climate
governance in ways that I hope will continue to contribute to the feminist
climate project. As I wrap up this book, I want to reiterate a key point made
throughout: both feminist intellectual projects on climate change and femi-
nist activism in the UNFCCC have been successful separately, but together
feminist intersectional praxis holds the potentiality to radically re-think
how climate politics is done.
The women (and men) that I have interviewed are all committed to their
work and have devoted their working lives to making life better for the
world’s women. This experience means that they hold vital contributions
to advancing feminist knowledge on ecologically informed intersectional-
ity in practice and should be considered an important part of the theoris-
ing process. By allowing these women’s words to richly inform this book, I
have demonstrated a methodological approach that has been, mostly, ab-
sent in feminist theorising on climate change. In doing so, I have offered
an important starting point for ongoing dialogue between academics and
162 Conclusion: New Directions for Ecofeminist Intersectional Praxis
activists involved in climate politics. Equally, feminist intellectual work that
advances the feminist climate project is, itself, deeply political work. I en-
courage those thinking and writing about positive visions for a future femi-
nist post- carbon world to consider their endeavours as critical activist work.
Collins and Bilge conclude that they ‘want to see more people involved in
the kind of dialogical intellectual and political work that pursuing intersec-
tionality entails’ (2020, p. 241). This book is my contribution to this political
work. It is my act of feminist praxis to advance the feminist climate project.

Bibliography
Alaimo, S., (2009). ‘Insurgent vulnerability and the carbon footprint of gender’,
Kvinder, Køn og Forskning (Women, Gender and Research), ­3–4,
​­ pp.­ ­22–35.
​­
­
­ ­ ​­ ­

Birk, N., (2019). Advances for Gender Equality at Cop25. (online). Available at: https://
wedo.org/advances-for-gender-equality-at-cop25/.
­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 28.07.2020.
Collins, P. H. and Bilge, S., (2020). Intersectionality (2nd edn.), Cambridge: Polity
Press.
MacGregor, S., (2017). ‘Moving beyond impacts: More answers to the “gender and
climate change” question’, in S. Buckingham and V. Le Masson (eds.) Understand-
ing Climate Change through Gender Relations. New York and London: Routledge,
pp.
­ 15–30.
­ ​­
Nelson, J., (2012). ‘Is Dismissing the precautionary principle the manly thing to do?
Gender and the economics of climate change’, IDEAS Working Paper Series, 12(-
04), pp.
­ 1–21.
­ ​­
Resurrección, B. P., (2013). ‘Persistent women and environment linkages in climate
change and sustainable development agendas’, Women’s Studies International
Forum, 40, pp. ­ ­33–43.
​­ doi: 10.1016/j.wsif.2013.03.011.
­
Sasser, J., (2018). On Infertile Ground: Population Control and Women’s Rights in the
Era of Climate Change. New York: NYU Press.
Seager, J., (2009). ‘Death by degrees: Taking a feminist hard look at the 2° climate
policy’, Women, Gender and Research (Kvinder, Køn & Forskning), ­3–4, ​­ pp.
­ ­11–21.
​­
Appendix 1
Methodology

Introduction
When Cynthia Enloe’s Bananas, Beaches and Bases was first published in
1990 the book truly broke ground. Enloe was (and still is) a radical pioneer
of feminist IR literature and posing the question 30 years ago to all fem-
inist academics – where are the women? – was hard. Not only did Enloe
challenge traditional conceptions of ‘political science’ through demanding
gender analyses, she was also challenging her own academic training and
realising all that was missing in her own teaching and writing (CFFP, 2018).
Asking where women are remains difficult, but it is largely through the work
of Enloe and other trailblazing feminist scholars that the road was paved for
a new generation of feminist academics.
Since the 1990s feminist methodology has progressed from locating
women in spaces of global politics and, while it is broadly understood that
there is no ‘feminist way’ to do research (Reinharz, 1992; Tickner, 2006),
there are several common characteristics that make feminist research dis-
tinctive. Shulamit Reinharz (1992) offers an ‘inductive definition of feminist
methodology’ ( p. 240) comprised of ten common themes that arise from her
analyses of feminist literature on methodologies in social research:

1 Feminism is a perspective, not a research method.

2 Feminists use a multiplicity of research methods.
3 Feminist research involves an ongoing criticism of non-feminist
scholarship.
4 Feminist research is guided by feminist theory.
5 Feminist research may be transdisciplinary.
6 Feminist research aims to create social change.
7 Feminist research strives to represent human diversity.
8 Feminist research frequently includes the researcher as a person.
9 Feminist research frequently attempts to develop special relations with
the people studied (an interactive research).
10 Feminist research frequently defines a special relationship with the
reader (Reinharz, 1992, p. 240).
164 Appendix 1: Methodology
Each of these themes are clear in my own reading of feminist methodologies
in global politics. For example, S. Laurel Weldon (2006) claims that femi-
nist methodologies trouble the relationship between the researcher and the
researched through a commitment to collectiveness while J. Ann Tickner
(2006, p. 20) suggests that feminist knowledge building is ‘an ongoing pro-
cess, tentative and emergent’. Ticker writes that feminist knowledge about
global politics often emerges through conversations with texts, research
subjects or data (see also Reinharz, 1992). Others such as Brooke Ackerly,
Maria Stern and Jacqui True (2006) assert that the distinctiveness of femi-
nist research lies in its commitment to reflexivity. These principles inform
the approach I have taken to conducting this research with, and about, the
WGC.
Given the diverse nature of feminist methods and methodologies, many
feminist scholars agree that what makes feminist research ‘feminist’ is not
the particular methods used but the kind of conceptual or theoretical frame-
works that are mobilised (Reinharz, 1992) as well as the types of research
questions that emerge from those frameworks (Ackerly, Stern and True,
2006). In light of the importance placed on the research question, Tickner
(2006) describes feminist research as being distinctively ‘post-positivist’
because positivist methods provide no account of the origin or the impor-
tance of the research question asked. Indeed, Tickner (2006) argues that
the types of questions asked are what gives rise to the multiplicity of femi-
nist approaches to methodology since feminists ask different questions and
these questions cannot be answered within the epistemological boundaries
of positivist approaches. For example, Enloe’s (2004) question ‘where are
the women?’ is crucial to her methodology of ‘feminist curiosity’. Devel-
oping a feminist curiosity, Enloe explains, starts with taking women’s lives
seriously, a practice that ‘implies listening carefully, digging deep, develop-
ing a long attention span, being ready to be surprised’ (Enloe, 2004, p. 3).
Feminist curiosity practices these methods while not valorising women and
being equally curious about those women who deserve feminist praise as
well as those who are complicit in violence and the oppression of others. It:

finds all women worth thinking about, paying close attention to, be-
cause in this way we will be able to throw into sharp relief the blatant
and subtle political workings of both femininity and masculinity.
(Enloe,
­ 2004, p.
­ 4)

I began this research following Enloe’s lead and asking ‘where are the women
in global climate change politics?’ The answer was found quite quickly.
Women play a relatively prominent role in global climate politics – indeed
the past two Executive Secretaries of the UNFCCC Secretariat have been
women. Yet, as Magnusdottir and Kronsell (2014) demonstrate in the context
of Scandinavian climate policy, the presence of women in the policy-making
process does not necessarily result in feminist-orientated climate policies.
 Appendix 1: Methodology 165
It was clear that it was not enough to simply be curious about women in
global climate change politics, but rather to be curious about ‘gender’. To
fully understand the construction, mobilisation and resistance to gender as
a political issue in global climate politics more questions were needed which
stemmed from my own frustrations with the narrow sense of gender that I
was finding. As such I turned to explore different kinds of questions around
what kinds of gender are being mobilised? Are ‘we’ happy with this kind of
gender?

Collecting Data: Gathering Data, Conducting Interviews and

Observation
I collected a wide range of data for analysis. This process began with a desk-
based search of historical digital data relating to gender in the UNFCCC,
which I compiled with data from transcriptions of a series of interviews
with both members of the WGC and with Party negotiators for the Gender
Agenda Item, as well as digitised versions of observations from field-notes.

Gathering Data
A large amount of textual data including gender policies, grey data made by
and for the WGC and other data relating to the UNFCCC and the COP pro-
cess were included in this research. This was necessary since, as discussed
in Chapter 2, very little scholarly attention is paid to the workings of the
WGC and I wanted to understand more fully, and make visible, the history
of gender as a political issue in the UNFCCC. Compiling these documents
was aided, in large part, by a document mandated by Parties to the COP in
the Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG): ‘Compilation of decisions,
subsidiary body reports related to gender and climate change: prepared by the
Secretariat’ (UNFCCC, 2017c). The document brings together all the re-
ports and decisions that have been adopted under the UNFCCC, the Kyoto
Protocol and the Paris Agreement and that pertain specifically to gender,
including decisions in other substantive areas with reference to gender. The
purpose of that document is to more easily identify areas of progress, po-
tential gaps, and areas that require further support for implementation. The
benefit of beginning in this way was that it pinpointed the exact references
to gender in the decisions and adopted conclusions, which were then cross-
checked with the original document in order to ascertain the context in which
it appears. Also included in the analysis were texts from gender and climate
NGOs. This process began by consulting various websites including Gen-
derCC, which includes a year-by-year documentation of feminist collective
organising specifically in the context of the UNFCCC. I also consulted the
WGC’s website which collates every intervention given by members of the
WGC in the history of the UNFCCC as well as WEDO’s website which in-
cludes lots of training materials for activists. This process was an important
166 Appendix 1: Methodology
first step in the construction of a timeline that foregrounds gender and the
WGC in the history of the UNFCCC (see Chapter 4) as well as highlight-
ing areas that required further clarification or contextualisation from inter-
views. Of course, there is always a question of credibility when relying on
documentary sources (Bryman, 2006). The texts that I have included in this
analysis have been created by, and often for, the UNFCCC and the WGC re-
spectively. As such, they hold within them certain biases. The texts included
in this analysis are written in order to convey an impression and to repre-
sent the authors, as well as those about who they write, in particular ways,
though Bryman (2016) suggests that this is precisely what makes these kinds
of documents interesting. However, these documents do not stand alone in
this research but are held in conversation with data from other sources, as
outlined below. As Ticker (2006) points out this type of conversation with
texts, research subjects or other data is common in building feminist knowl-
edge about global politics. The process of collecting historical and textual
data, conducting interviews and observing climate negotiations was not a
linear one. It was an ongoing and emergent process that ultimately led to
being able to tell a history of the UNFCCC that foregrounds ‘gender’ as a
political issue and the work of the WGC in getting it there.

Elite Interviews
­

Given the lack of visibility of feminist organising in the UNFCCC dis-

cussed above it was i mportant – politically and methodologically – to
include interviews in this research as a means of allowing ‘women to docu-
ment their own experiences in their own terms’ (Tickner, 2006, p. 41). Inter-
views with those involved with negotiations on gender in the UNFCCC
were key in revealing details, uncovering nuance, and seeking clarification
of events, processes and context directly from women (and some men) who
were present in more detailed ways than an analysis of textual data alone
could allow. For these same reasons, semi-structured interviews were more
appropriate than a more rigid interview style or survey instrument, since
 Appendix 1: Methodology 167
­
­ ​­ ­
In total 22 interviews were conducted typically lasting between 30 min-
utes to one hour (a full list can be found in Appendix 2). Interview partici-
pants included members of the WGC, such as Ulrike Röhr from GenderCC
(15 November 2017) who has been involved in the gender and climate change
community since before Rio 1992 and I have since kept in contact with her
via e-mail. Other members of the WGC included Liane Schalek (14 Novem-
ber 2017) from the Henrich Böll Foundation, the main point of contact
within the WGC on issues relating to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and
Tetet Lauron, Ibon International (15 November 2017). The sample of women
interviewed from the WGC spanned the history of the WGC, from informal
network to formal Constituency, and represented women at various career
stages and various levels of involvement with the Constituency itself. These
women provided rich insights into both the history and the structure of the
WGC, helping to develop a timeline of feminist organising in the UNFCCC.
In particular, and to my surprise, interviews (and in some cases the lack of)
with members of the WGC made visible the tensions between activists and
academics resulting in an important line of enquiry for this research.
At the official UNFCCC level, I interviewed several gender negotiators
and other Party delegates who have engaged with gender issues. One such
interview was with Colin O’Hehir (5 May 2018), head of the Irish delegation
and co-facilitator of the GAP negotiations. Delegates become co-facilitators
of negotiations through Party consensus and in O’Hehir’s own words ‘I was
new to the process and so had not real feeling about a GAP yet. They chose
me because I was neutral’. Some of the negotiators interviewed acted as
National Gender Focal Points including Erin Marchington (Canada) and
Pieter Terpstra (the Netherlands). The role of the National Gender Focal
Point remains quite unclear (both to me and, based on my conversations
with them, to the National Gender Focal Points themselves) but generally
serves to function as a point of contact for non-Party stakeholders who
wish to engage with gender and climate change related issues, including the
WGC. I had anticipated some bad feeling from negotiators towards mem-
bers of the WGC, but I was surprised that this set of interviews highlighted
the importance of, and power held by, the WGC in the negotiating process.
Several negotiators and National Gender Focal Points commented on how
invaluable they had found the expertise of the WGC. A third group of stake-
holders interviewed were other non-Party stakeholders who are either gen-
der experts or engage with gender in some way. This includes Meera Ghani
(9 March 2018) who, during COP23, along with Farhana Yamin, wrote a
series of blog posts titled ‘#MeToo’ (see Ghani, 2017) that heavily criticised
the UNFCCC as an un-safe space for women who are objects of sexual har-
assment and abuse. This set of interviews uncovered a more critical voice
about the role and potential of counter-hegemonic forces such as the WGC
in the UNFCCC infrastructure.
168 Appendix 1: Methodology
The data collected from these interviews is similar to what Reinharz
(1992) describes as ‘feminist oral histories’ which allow the creation of new
material about women. Feminist oral histories can be used to identify pat-
terns and has the ‘potential for bringing women into history’ (Reinharz,
1992, p. 134) providing an antidote to centuries of ignoring women’s voices
altogether, making them an important method in feminist research. In
short, feminist oral histories are about seeking women’s interpretation of
events. Feminists rely on these kinds of historical or narrative methodolog-
ical orientations, rather than causal analysis of pre- defined empirical pat-
terns, precisely because the knowledge generated is new (Tickner, 2006). In
this case I employed careful listening to women’s interpretations while being
careful not to reify, or overemphasise, their woman-ness, in keeping with the
intersectional framework informing my approach (see Chapter 3). Further-
more, I do not want to overstate the knowledge generated from these histo-
ries which are, by nature, subjective allowing the possibilities for individuals
to overstate their own role in history. However, the variety of individuals
interviewed in this research, coupled with methods of textual analysis and
direct observation, allows for a greater degree of accurate representation, as
discussed below.
To access interview participants, I employed a number of recruitment
techniques: relying on personal connections; listserv outreach; and develop-
ing a snowball sampling technique. This process began by contacting cer-
tain individuals whose names had appeared repeatedly in initial research
through e-mail, but this method had limited success. Making contact in
person with individuals at COP23, and at the 48th meeting of the Subsidiary
Bodies (SB48) proved to be much more fruitful. Once I was able to make
contact with a number of key individuals I found snowball sampling to be
particular useful, not only in gaining access but also helping to build a sense
of trust and credibility since I had come ‘recommended’ by a colleague (see
Reinharz, 1992). On the whole I found the newer and younger members of
the WGC were happy to discuss their role and knowledge of the negotia-
tions, as were those who were more established and had been involved in
the UNFCCC from the very early days but had now taken a back-seat in
the process. But the more currently senior members were much less forth-
coming in my requests to talk to them. I sensed a feeling of distrust towards
researchers in general. This lack of trust and adversarial academic-activist
dynamic is something that I unpack in more detail in Chapter 5.
The final sample size of 22 was not a pre-agreed or target number, rather
it was determined by theoretical saturation, or when the interviews were not
yielding any new information. Saturation was met faster with negotiators
than with activists. Ultimately, there was a finite number of individuals who
had experience of gender negotiations in global climate politics and I feel
confident that I talked with the key people in the WGC itself but also the
people who have led the GAP negotiations formally. I decided I had reached
saturation when I found I was hearing similar comments from each new
 Appendix 1: Methodology 169
person, and consensus began to emerge around the themes that addressed
the research questions (see Bryman, 2016). Though it is important to note
that saturation was reached among gender experts and those involved in
gender negotiations, not the body of the UNFCCC process in general.
In practice, the semi-structured interviews took an informal tone, al-
lowing participants to talk freely on issues, events or concerns that they
felt important (see Tickner, 2006). Interviews began from the participants’
chosen starting point by asking the interview participant to tell me about
themselves, their work/position and their interest in issues of gender and
climate change. While beginning interviews in this way is a common tactic
in feminist research in order to develop a sense of ease for the participants,
it was used in this case – a case of ‘interviewing up’ (Reinharz, 1992) – to al-
low myself that time to relax and find my bearings. Interviewing up – that is
interviewing women who held considerably more power than I – h ighlighted
some complex methodological issues around power in this research. The
issue of power seen in much feminist reflexive research, raises important
questions about the researcher/researched relationship: to assume the re-
searcher holds inherent power over the researched is to make particular as-
sumptions about which women (and men) are being researched. It (often)
assumes researched women to be women ( primarily located in the Global
South) who lack the material and knowledge resources that the researcher
holds. It also implicitly makes assumptions about what kinds of knowledge
are valued. The women (and men) that I have interviewed, observed, and
interacted with are, themselves, in positions of power. The women who so
richly inform the words on these pages are themselves elite women, who
in most cases have access to education, resources, and professional status.
They are not the women that Sarah Radcliffe refers to when she makes the
point that ‘in producing representations of (Third World) women, we are
inextricably bound up with questions of authority, communication and
representations’ (Radcliffe, 1994, p. 28; see also Rose, 1997). Nor are they
the women that Melissa Gilbert felt separated from when interviewing due
to her middle- class luxuries of education and professional status (Gilbert,
1994; see also Rose, 1997). But even if they were, the knowledge produced
from living life on the front lines of climate change is immensely important
to just climate solutions and should not be diminished. Given this complex
researcher/researched relationship it was important to find strategies which
would increase my own credibility. For this I found directly participating in
the activities of the WGC hugely important in cultivating relationships and
snowballing sampling techniques (as described above). Directly participat-
ing in the activities of the WGC allowed me to transform from an ‘outsider’
to a more trusted ‘insider’ and to develop a more egalitarian relationship as
described by Oakley (1981).
Asking participants to reflect on their own role and memories of history in
the UNFCCC additionally helped, right from the outset, to understand what
the most important issues, events or concerns were to the participant. Of
170 Appendix 1: Methodology
course, this process evolved and developed over the course of the fieldwork,
so no two interviews were identical. This did not impede on the transcrip-
tion or analysis process as I was concerned about the primary themes that
emerged rather than a comparison between different individuals’ answers.
It is worth noting that I opted not to anonymise interview participants,
unless the participant themselves desired, which, while common in femi-
nist research that aims to develop collective knowledge building as feminist
practice (Reinharz, 1992; Tickner, 2006), remains a rather contentious sub-
ject in university ethics procedures. Automatically anonymising interviews
not only assumes that the interview participant will wish to be anonymous,
but also effectively claims the researcher to be the owner of knowledge.
In order to avoid this problem, I gave participants the choice either to be
named or not, as well as whether their words could be quoted directly in the
book. Participants agreed to both choices, with the exception of a handful
of who agreed to the use of direct quotes but requested a letter be used in
place of their name (e.g. Participant A). However, in cases where comments
might cause discomfort or embarrassment to the participant, I have not in-
cluded their name.

Direct Observation
In order to see the negotiations and to understand the process through my
own eyes I conducted field work at the UNFCCC COP conferences – COP23
Fiji, hosted in Bonn from 6 to 17 December 2017 and SB48 in Bonn from 3 to
10 May 2018.1 Observation is a useful tactic helping to situate or contextu-
alise interviews (Kronsell, 2006). Observation troubles the idea of ‘research
objects’ that are detached from their real-life surroundings (Tickner, 2006)
lending itself as a useful method in a feminist methodological toolbox. In
short, observation in this research served as a supplementary method help-
ing me to add nuance and context when answering the research questions
set out above. At COP23 in Bonn I attended both strategy meetings and
the daily Women’s Caucus hosted by the WGC. These meetings were an
opportunity for members of the WGC to plan their strategy for the day and
to coordinate who would attend what negotiations as well as who would
lobby whom. It was these strategy meetings around which my own day was
structured. I decided to follow (observe and follow the progress of) the ne-
gotiations on the GAP since although gender is, occasionally, discussed in
other thematic areas, particularly finance, these instances are relatively few
and far between. Following the GAP negotiations helped gain a stronger
sense of how gender was discussed and framed by different actors within
the UNFCCC. There was some difficulty, however, when, to the surprise of
the WGC’s members, most of the negotiations on the GAP at COP23 were
closed to observers. While I was unable to observe scheduled negotiations, I
mostly attended the negotiations in the Local Communities and Indigenous
People’s Platform (LCIPP), which was the second major issue at COP23.
 Appendix 1: Methodology 171
This was because many of the negotiators who were involved in the GAP
negotiations were also involved in the LCIPP and I was curious about the
gendered relations within and between Parties and non-Party stakehold-
ers. I also followed closely the activities of the WGC’s members in order
to make observations on the political strategies of resistance, specifically
procedural strategies, employed which included lobbying efforts as well as
publicly staged ‘actions’ designed to draw attention to the issues for which
the WGC were lobbying. This involved participating in the communication
efforts of the WGC helping to draft press releases, stock tweets and taking
part in actions.
At SB48 I attended strategy meetings and the WGC’s daily caucuses as
well as actions and events hosted by the WGC, but spent more time gaining
access to negotiators and Party delegates. I attended the gender workshops
and Gender Dialogue that had been mandated by both the LWPG and the
GAP as well as continuing to pay close attention to the negotiations on the
LCIPP, which were growing more tense as time drew on without a clear
conclusion. In addition to these ‘in-person’ observations I followed various
workshops and dialogues through webcast when not able to attend in per-
son. This includes past years’ gender workshops in the run up to the GAP
negotiations as well as the Talanoa Dialogues which were open to a very
limited number of invited people. These webcasts provided great insight
into the content of the negotiations, but some of the inter-personal interac-
tions and social relations were lost in the digital format.
Enloe writes that ‘the feminist investigator always arrives before the
meeting begins to hear the before-the-meeting offhand banter and is still
wide awake and curious when the after-the-meeting continues with a select
few down the corridor and into the pub’ (Enloe, 2004, p. 5). It was this motto
that I tried to keep in mind as I carried out my fieldwork. I kept extensive
notes that where possible were written up at the time or as soon as possi-
ble thereafter. These field-notes include: exact quotes, where possible; a de-
tailed description of activities in order in which they occur; descriptions of
events without inferring meaning – my own thoughts and assumptions were
noted separately; and relevant background information to situate events.
Perhaps the primary benefit of conducting fieldwork through observation
is the opportunities that arise for informal conversations (Cohn, 2006) that
not only allowed me to build relationships with feminists in the UNFCCC,
but also to gain a far deeper understanding of UNFCCC processes and the
WGC’s role in the institution. These informal conversations often alerted
me to issues that participants might not have admitted to in a more formal
interview setting or prompted me to follow up on threads of conversations
in formal interviews. As Carol Cohn (2006) reflects, the ‘I’ in interviews not
only shapes the questions asked or responses received, but also what people
would say to me (in interviews) and in front of me (while observing). In this
way direct observation was a complementary, yet integral, method supple-
menting data gathered from interviewing.
172 Appendix 1: Methodology
Interpretation and Analysis of Documents
Cohn is perhaps best known for her extensive research on defence intel-
lectuals writing extensively on the weird relationships to the phallic shapes
and language of nuclear weapons (Cohn, 1987a; 1987b). In writing about
field experiences and her approach to research she claims a commitment
to ‘listen to the material’ and to put genuine intellectual curiosity and a
desire to understand at the heart of research (Cohn, 2006). This character-
ises my approach to the interpretation and analysis of the data gathered. I
undertook all of the interview transcription myself, transcribing verbatim
including all of the ‘ums’ and ‘ahs’, and did not attempt to edit the interview
participant’s words for clarity. Listening back to the interviews provided an
excellent opportunity to revisit the interview and to begin to identify some
common themes that emerged. This served as a preliminary form of analy-
sis. Along with the interview transcriptions hard- copy data collected during
fieldwork was digitised and included with transcriptions and online data.
Further, I digitised field-notes and included these in my data set. In total 425
documents were compiled for analysis.
Having transcribed the interviews, I used NVivo software to code and
analyse the data. The software itself has many interesting functions but it
was primarily used it as a content management system that systematically
allowed the cataloguing and categorisation of the data. It did not replace
any of the analytical or interpretive work. I used NVivo’s feature of codes,
nodes, categories and memos in my analysis. That is, particular themes are
assigned nodes that do not remove them from the original context. These
nodes were based on the data itself. Again, this was an inductive (and im-
perfect) process that began by identifying themes that arose before stream-
lining these into broader discourses of similar themes. The memos were
further used to summarise the main themes and key details for each docu-
ment analysed to help get the general gist at a glance.
I began by locating and marking out all the parts of the document that
refer to gender (aided by the 2017 UNFCCC report in the case of policy deci-
sions and adopted outcomes), primarily through a word search of the words
gender and/or women, and in some cases the phrase social- considerations
as a ‘stand-in’ for gender (a phrase learned from interviewing negotia-
tors). I also paid attention, and actively searched, for co-located phrases
or words typically associated with women and gender (influenced by my
review of the literature relating to gender and climate change but evolv-
ing over the process of analysis). Such terms included: vulnerable/virtuous,
marginalised, children, empowerment, adaptation, equality, human rights,
gender balance, participation and development. The frequent or repetitive
co-location of such words and phrases helps to understand the often more
implicit, discursive framings surrounding gender and climate change and
position the topic within a concept. While this began with a few key themes,
as indicated above, this was reviewed and revised after various readings
 Appendix 1: Methodology 173
to reflect findings so that the categories evolve from theoretical considera-
tions (from existing literature) into a fully-fledged list based on empirical ev-
idence. These themes were coded as ‘nodes’ in NVivo. Themes first derived
from an initial review of literature on gender and climate change included
phrases such as ‘women as vulnerable’ and ‘women as under-represented’
but were aided and refined as the process continued with new themes, such
as ‘intersectionality in baby steps’, being added to the list.2 This process was
integral to the creation of a timeline of UNFCCC history foregrounding
‘gender’ and the WGC (Chapter 4) as well as an analysis of the political
strategies mobilised by the WGC (Chapter 5).
The results from this analysis were gathered in order to explain what the
dominant rhetorical framing is about and how it works (i.e. build a picture
to tell the story of how gender works at COP) and looked for links to, and
resonance or dissonance with the theoretical literature on gender and cli-
mate change. As Tickner (2006, p. 20) asserts, what makes feminist research
‘feminist’ is the framework or perspective that fundamentally challenges
often unseen androcentric or masculine biases (to this I would add anthro-
pocentric). Feminist research is also, on my reading, about fundamentally
challenging single axis understandings of gender (see Collins and Bilge,
2020). It was this dialogue between the empirical material that I had col-
lected and the theoretical literatures (outlined in Chapters 2 and 3) that al-
lowed me to turn my attention to my final research questions – what lessons
can be learned for ‘doing’ intersectionality from this story? And, how can
these lessons inform a next phase of feminist organising in the UNFCCC? –
to start to envision what a ‘next phase’ of feminist organising might look
like in the UNFCCC (the answers to which I unpack in Chapter 6).
In keeping with my feminist commitment to transparency I often provide
block quotes in the interview participant’s, or in the document’s, own lan-
guage before analysing it myself (see Reinharz, 1992). This allows partici-
pants to speak for themselves but, more importantly, makes (more) apparent
the assumptions that I am making in my theoretical connections. Certainly,
in doing so I am making the final decisions about my analytical conclusions
which can be disputed by other researchers.

Internal Validity and Limitations of the Research

Ensuring validity and reliability is always complex in qualitative research
since the purpose is to tell a story and make sense of the world without
relying exclusively on numerical or statistical data (see Lincoln and Guba,
1985). Addressing the issue of reliability, or dependability is more difficult
in qualitative research since it is not possible to guarantee that if the re-
search was carried out in another context the results would be the same;
my research is more situated and contextual. Generalisation in a study like
this is neither possible nor desirable. But, through transparency readers can
174 Appendix 1: Methodology
assess the validity of my research with a full understanding of my theoreti-
cal and conceptual assumptions and a clear and transparent description of
how the results were obtained. That said, I have strived for internal validity
in my research, primarily through methods of triangulation.3 The use of
triangulation techniques in qualitative research is important in addressing
the limitations of individual techniques. The use of triangulation in this re-
search should be seen as a form of ‘complementarity’ (Nightingale, 2016) in
that different methods are not expected to provide exactly the same results
but instead complement each other. Complementarity ‘relies on using epis-
temologically consistent methods to provide answers to the same question’
(Nightingale, 2016, p. 45). The use of multiple, complementary, methods
adds layering and the different types of data can be used to refine one an-
other (Reinharz, 1992, p. 201). I have also employed techniques of repeated
contact and observation, participatory research, and peer examination all
of which enhance the internal validity of my research.
While I consider my findings internally valid there are some limitations
that should be noted that are related to the research design. One obvious
limitation is the focus on the UNFCCC process. While I have focused much
of my scholarly attention to the work of the WGC and its members, I have
focused this attention on the specific work inside of the UNFCCC. The
WGC, however, is made up of 29 individual NGOs most of whom under-
take extensive advocacy work in their communities outside of the COP.
This work, due to the constraints (namely time and financial) of a doctoral
research project, has not been included in this book. Similarly, being just
one researcher with limited time and resources for fieldwork I focused my
attention on the gender specific negotiations at the COP. I have explained
my reasons for this above, though it is worth noting here that this limits
my ability to be able to discuss in more detail ‘gender’ as a wider issue in
the COP. I have attempted to address this through a rigorous analysis of
UNFCCC wide documents.

Notes
 Appendix 1: Methodology 175

Bibliography
Ackerly, B. A., Stern, M., and True, J., (2006). ‘Feminist methodologies for Inter-
national Relations’, in B. A. Ackerly, M. Stern, and J. True (eds.) Feminist Meth-
odologies for International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
pp. ­ ­1–17.​­
Bryman, A., (2016). Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
CFFP, (2018). ­ Interview with Cynthia Enloe. (online). Available at: https://
centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/interviews/2018/3/8/cynthia-enloe. ­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ​­ Last ac-
cessed: 29/07/2020. ­ ­
Cohn, C., (1987a). ‘Sex and death in the rational world of defense intellectuals’,
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 12(4), ­ pp.­ ­687–718.
​­
Cohn, C., (1987b). ‘Slick’Ems, Glick ‘Ems, Christmas trees, and cutters: Nuclear
language and how we learned to pat the bomb’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
43(5), ­ pp. ­ ­17–24. ​­
Cohn, C., (2006). ‘Motives and methods: Using multi-sited ethnography to study US
national security discourses’, in B. A. Ackerly, M. Stern, and J. True (eds.) Femi-
nist Methodologies for International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. ­ ­91–107. ​­
Enloe, C., (1990). Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of Interna-
tional Politics. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Enloe, C., (2004). The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of
Empire. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Ghani, M., (2017). Me Too: I left the Climate Movement because of Its Toxic Cul-
ture. (online).
­ Available at: https://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/11/08/i-left-
­ ­ ­ ­ ­­ ­​­­ ­​
­­climate-movement-toxic-culture/.
­​­­ ­​­­ ​­ Last accessed: 28/07/2020.
­ ­
Gilbert, M. R., (1994). ‘The politics of location: Doing feminist research “at home”’,
Professional Geographer, 46, pp. ­ 90–96.
­ ​­
Lincoln, Y. and Guba, E. G., (1985). Naturalistic Inquiry. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Magnusdottir, G. L. and Kronsell, A., (2015). ‘The (In)visibility of gender in Scan-
dinavian climate ­policy-making’, ​­ International Feminist Journal of Politics, 17(2), ­
pp. ­ 308–326.
­ ​­ doi: 10.1080/14616742.2014.896661.
­
Nightingale, A. J., (2016). ‘Adaptive scholarship and situated knowledges? Hybrid
methodologies and plural epistemologies in climate change adaptation research.’
Area, 48(1), ­ pp. ­ ­41–47.​­
Oakley, A., (1981). ‘Interviewing women: A contradiction in terms’, in H. Roberts
(ed.)
­ Doing Feminist Research. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 30– 61.
176 Appendix 1: Methodology
Radcliffe, S. A., (1994). ‘(Representing) post- colonial women: Authority, difference
and feminisms.’ Area, 26, pp.­ 25–32.
­ ​­
Reinharz, S., (1992). Feminist Methods in Social Research. New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Rose, G., (1997). ‘Situating knowledges: Positionality, reflexivities and other tactics’,
Progress in Human Geography, 21(3),­ pp.
­ ­305–320.
​­ ­
doi: 10.1191/030913297673302122.
Tickner, J. A., (2006). ‘Feminism meets international relations: Some methodolog-
ical issues’, in B. A. Ackerly, M. Stern, and J. True (eds.) Feminist Methodologies
for International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19– 41.
­
UNFCCC, (2017c). Gender and Climate Change: Compilation of Decisions, Subsidiary
Body Reports Related to Gender and Climate Change. (online). Available at: https://
unfccc.int/files/gender_and_climate_change/application/pdf/gcc_drc_2017_1_
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
9may2017.pdf. Last accessed: 29/07/2020.
Weldon, L. S., (2006). ‘Inclusion and understanding: A collective methodology for
feminist International Relations’, in B. A. Ackerly, M. Stern, and J. True (eds.)
Feminist Methodologies for International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, pp.
­ ­62–88.
​­
Index

Note: Bold page numbers refer to tables; italic page numbers refer to figures and
page numbers followed by “n” denote endnotes.

Abzug, B. 1, 92 Bambara, T. C. 29
Acha, M. A. R. 116 Bee, B. A. 5
Acker, J. 53 Bhattacharya, T. 61, 153
Ackerly, B. 164 Bilge, S. 12, 15, 29, 47, 50–1, 54, 59,
activism 1, 10, 14, 16, 36, 39, 40, 160, 146–7, 154, 160, 162; Intersectionality
161; feminist climate 15, 16n1, 21–6, 146–7
31, 39, 67, 141, 147–9; feminist BINGOs see business and industry
environmental 31, 39, 61, 154; political non-governmental organisations
32; in UNFCCC 56, 67 (BINGOs)
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long- Black Feminism 29
term Cooperative Action under the Black Political Thought (Collins) 63
Convention (AWG-LCA) 79–80 Black Power movement 29
Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Boer, Y. de 79
Platform (ADP) 84 Bolsonaro, J. 123, 141–2, 155n1
advocacy networks 104, 124 Bonn Zone 124
Aguilar, L. 76, 143 Borderlands/La Frontera (Anzaldúa) 30
Ahmed, S. 131n4 Braidotti, R. 28
Alaimo, S. 29, 51, 143 Bretherton, C. 12, 32, 34, 36, 49, 53,
Alber, G. 103, 107 113, 115
All India Women’s Conference (AIWC) Bryman, A. 166
103–4, 117 Buckingham, S. 3
Alston, M. 3, 34–5 Bula Zone 124
Anzaldúa, G.: Borderlands/La Burns, B. 82, 84, 110, 117
Frontera 30 business and industry non-governmental
Arora-Jonsson, S. 5, 21–2, 25, 41n1, 158 organisations (BINGOs) 2, 9, 70, 153
Arruzza, C. 61, 153 Butler, J. 16n2, 27
Assiter, A. 62, 64n1
Association for Women’s Rights in CEDAW see Convention on the
Development (AWID) 88 Elimination of all Forms of
asymmetrical treatment 53 Discrimination Against Women
AWG-LCA see Ad Hoc Working Group (CEDAW)
on Long-term Cooperative Action Centre for 21st Century Issues
under the Convention (AWG-LCA) (C21C) 104
Chipko movement 51
backgrounding 12, 14, 47, 50–1, 144, 154 civil society organisations (CSOs) 72, 78,
Bali Action Plan (BAP) 77–8 82, 84–5, 90, 93, 123–4, 153
178 Index
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Davis, A. 62–3
72, 120 Democratic Republic of the Congo
Climate Action Network (CAN) 81, (DRC) 139
122, 146
climate change 4–6 ecofeminism 16n1, 27–8
climate justice 12, 23, 25, 39, 55, 59, 75, ecofeminist intersectionality 10, 12,
84–5, 87, 125–6, 139, 150, 152–3 14–15, 47–9, 48, 51, 55–6, 60, 64, 117,
Coalition of Female Leaders for 140, 161
the Environment and Sustainable Ecofeminist Natures (Sturgeon) 27
Development (CFLEDD) 139 ecological justice 23, 47, 59–60, 148
Coates, L. 84 empowerment of women 106–9, 130,
Cohn, C. 171–2, 175n3 144–5
Cohn-Lois, A. 109 ENERGIA 72, 108
Collins, L. 39 Enloe, C. 54, 163–4, 171
Collins, P. H. 12, 15, 29, 47, 50–1, 54, environmental non-governmental
59–60, 63, 146–7, 154, 160, 162; Black organisations (ENGOs) 2, 9, 70, 122,
Political Thought 63; Intersectionality 125, 143–4, 150
146–7 epistemic communities 12, 15, 49, 61–3,
Combahee River Collective (CRC) 30, 64n1, 124, 126, 144, 150–1
40, 151, 153 Ergas, C. 22, 37
complexity 16, 25, 52, 57–9, 61, 63–4, Eschle, C. 39
117, 130, 140–1 essentialism: gender 27–8; strategic
Conference of the Parties (COP) 7–8, 10, 27–9
13, 67–75, 78–83, 86, 89, 91–3, 103, European Union (EU) 7, 70, 72, 114,
107, 109, 112, 122–8, 139, 165, 174; 120, 142
COP12 Nairobi 74; COP13 Bali 74–5,
77–8, 109; COP16 79–80, 86; COP22 Federation of American Women’s Clubs
86–7; COP26 93 Overseas (FAWCO) 105
23rd Conference of the Parties (COP23) feminism 11, 16n2, 27, 46, 48, 116, 142,
2–3, 89–90, 118, 122, 124–5, 153, 153, 158–60
167–8, 170 The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy
Conference of the Parties serving as the (Ferguson) 53
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto feminist climate activism 15, 16n1, 21–6,
Protocol (CMP) 8 31, 39, 67, 141, 147–9
Conference of the Parties serving as the feminist environmental activism 31, 39,
meeting of the Parties to the Paris 61, 154
Agreement (CMA) 8 Ferguson, K.: The Feminist Case Against
Connell, R. W. 53–4 Bureaucracy 53
contextuality 54–6 Fijian Presidency at COP23 (COP23
Convention on the Elimination of all Fiji) 3, 87, 89
Forms of Discrimination Against Finland 88
Women (CEDAW) 118, 149 flexible dialogue 63–4
Cooper-Hall, L. 142 Foster, E. 5
COP see Conference of the Parties Fraser, N. 61, 153
(COP) free market 1, 71
Copenhagen Accord 79, 94
CRC see Combahee River Collective Gaard, G. 35, 38, 40
(CRC) Gay, Lesbian, Bi-sexual, Trans, Queer
Crenshaw, K. 29–30, 40, 154 (GLBTQ) 35
CSOs see civil society organisations GCF see Green Climate Fund (GCF)
(CSOs) Gender Action Plan (GAP) 3, 9–10, 13,
67, 83–94, 103, 107, 117–20, 122–3,
Danish Family Planning Association 127, 139, 149, 159–60, 167–8, 170–1
(DFPA) 105 GenderCC 3, 25, 74–5, 80, 93, 103,
Dankelman, I. 2 106–7, 110, 121, 126, 165, 167
 Index 179
Gender, Environment and Development Krizsan, A. 33
(GED) 4 Kronsell, A. 5, 12, 31, 33, 37, 46–7, 52–5,
gender equality 5–6, 10, 15, 24, 33, 35, 59, 82, 164
76, 78–9, 81, 83–6, 88, 92, 102–3, Kulcur, R. 3
105–10, 112–13, 116–20, 122, 129, 131, Kyoto Protocol 7–9, 71–2, 81, 106, 120,
139–40, 144–6, 153 126, 165
gender essentialism 27–8
Ghani, M. 113, 145, 150, 152, 167 Laclau, E.: Hegemony and Social
Girmai, A. 89 Strategy 62
Global Environment Facility (GEF) 9 Lauron, T. 90, 123, 152–3, 167
Global Gag Rule 23, 41n2 Least Developed Countries
Global Gender and Climate Alliance (LDC) 107
(GGCA) 75, 93, 107, 110, 120, 129 Lee, A. 117
Goldner, Lisa 123 Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, Trans
Green Climate Fund (GCF) 9, (LGBT) 29
79–80, 167 Lima Work Programme on Gender
Gunnarsson, H. 122–3, 142 (LWPG) 10, 83, 86–8, 94, 139,
165, 171
Haraway, D. J. 49, 62 Local Communities and Indigenous
Hawthorne, S. 35 People’s Platform (LCIPP) 170–1
hegemonic masculinity 6, 12, 24,
53–4 MacGregor, S. 5, 11, 23–4, 27–9, 40, 56,
Hegemony and Social Strategy 146–7, 158
(Laclau and Mouffe) 62 Magnusdottir, G. L. 37, 164
Hemmati, M. 22, 32, 72–3 Maiguashca, B. 39
Higer, A. 37 Marchington, E. 119
homogenisation 50, 57, 62 Mary Robinson Foundation (MRF) 23,
Hurricane Katrina (Tuana) 55 81, 93
Mathews, F. 58
identity politics 11, 29, 61 Matsuda, M. J. 50
Indigenous Peoples Organisations (IPO) Mellor, M. 40
50, 125 Merchant, C. 12, 47, 50, 56–7
inequality 15, 24, 29, 33–5, 47, 50–1, 54, Mertz, F. 124, 129
57, 59, 82, 130, 138, 140, 159 Meyer, M. 32
Intended Nationally Determined Miami Women’s Congress 1–2
Contributions (INDCs) 4, 86 Mies, M. 56
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Mohanty, C. T. 22, 57, 61
Change (IPCC) 76 Mokoena, N. 103–4
international non-governmental Morrow, K. 12, 25–6, 36, 49, 69, 124,
organisations (INGOs) 34 139, 150
International Union for Conservation of Mouffe, C.: Hegemony and Social
Nature (IUCN) 75–6, 78 Strategy 62
intersectional analyses 12, 16, 30, 33, 47,
51–5, 58–60, 145 Nagel, J. 5–6, 24
Intersectionality (Collins and Bilge) National Adaptation Programme of
146–7 Action (NAPA) 68, 110
intersectionality, ecofeminist 10, 12, National Gender Focal Point 87–8, 103,
14–15, 47–9, 48, 51, 55–6, 60, 64, 117, 129, 142, 146, 167
140, 161 National Organisation of Women
(NOW) 37–8
Kaijser, A. 5, 12, 31, 33, 46–7, 52–3, New Social Movements (NSM) 31
55, 59 non-governmental organisations
Keck, M. 37 (NGOs) 2–3, 9, 14, 25, 32, 34, 37–9,
Kingdon, J. 37 41n2, 70–3, 75, 78, 85, 87, 90, 102–5,
Kings, A. E. 46–7 117, 123–5, 129, 145, 150, 154, 174
180 Index
Oakley, A. 166, 169 Small Island Developing States
O’Hehir, C. 89–90, 123, 167 (SIDS) 79
Olson, J. 26, 38 social inequality 6, 12, 14, 34, 47, 50–4,
On Infertile Ground: Population Control 59, 71, 130, 140, 144–5, 148
and Women’s Rights in the Era of social justice 30, 40, 47, 59, 141, 151,
Climate Change (Sasser) 22 153–4
Otzelberger, A. 129 ‘Solidarity in the Greenhouse’ 69–70
solidarity politics 12, 49, 61–2, 151
Paris Agreement 7–9, 13, 84–9, 93–4, Spalter-Roth, R. 37
107, 118–19, 131, 144, 148–9, 165 Spivak, G. C. 27, 36
Pataki, G. 76 Squires, J. 33
Patoutis, J. 110 Stern, M. 164
Plugar-Vidal, M. 83 Stienstra, D. 38
Plumwood, V. 12, 47, 57–8, 143 strategic essentialism 27–9
power relations 12, 28–30, 37–8, 47, Sturgeon, N. 27–8
51–6, 59, 61, 82, 141 Subsidiary Body for Implementation
pragmatic insiders 31–7 (SBI) 8–9, 82, 87
Prügl, E. 32 Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice (SBSTA) 8
Quinstorp, E. 69–70 Support for Women in Agriculture and
Environment (SWAGEN) 104–5
radical outsiders 31–7 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
Raj, Kalyani 103 118–19
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Degradation (REDD) 80 Thew, H. 123
Reinharz, S. 163, 168, 175n3 Tickner, J. A. 164, 166, 173
relationality 56–8, 60 transversal politics 11–12, 15–16, 48–9,
Resurrección, B. P. 5, 23, 25–8, 39, 158 49, 59–64, 86, 124, 148–54, 159
Reyes, E. 82, 91, 119, 127 Trauger, A. 5
rhetorical strategy 4, 11, 13–14, 22–3, True, J. 164
26–31, 41, 48, 50–2, 57–8, 60, 64, Trump, D. 41n2, 123, 155n1
105–17, 138, 144, 160 Tuana, N. 12, 47, 54–5
Rice, J. 5
Rio Earth Summit (1992) 1–2, 7, United Nations Conference on
68–9, 75 Environment and Development
Robinson, M. 24 (UNCED) 1, 144
Röhr, U. 22, 25, 32, 71–2, 74–5, 82, United Nations Development
113–14, 120, 128, 138, 146–8, 167 Programme (UNDP) 75
Rural Women Energy Security United Nations Framework Convention
(RUWES) 104 on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2–16,
Russell, K. 31 8, 22–5, 31–2, 34, 36–7, 41, 48, 49–51,
53, 55–6, 60, 64, 67–94, 68, 78, 83, 94,
Saleh, A. 40 102–3, 105–12, 114, 116–19, 122–31,
Sanchez, D. V. 111, 143 138–43, 145–6, 148–55, 158–61,
Sasser, J. 22–3, 28, 158; On Infertile 164–74
Ground: Population Control and
Women’s Rights in the Era of Climate vagueness 119–20
Change 22
Schlosberg, D. 39 Waititu, A. 74
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Wandel, A. 70
Rights (SRHR) 23 Watershed Organisation Trust
Sikkink, K. 37 (WOTR) 105
Skjeie, H. 33 Weldon, S. L. 164
 Index 181
women: capacity and joint strategising Women’s Environment & Development
124–8; empowerment 106–9, 130, Organisation (WEDO) 1, 3, 28, 35, 38,
144–5; equating gender with 70, 75–6, 88–9, 103, 107–8, 110, 112,
113–15 120, 165
Women and Gender Constituency Women’s Environment Programme
(WGC) 2–4, 6–7, 9–15, 23, 25–6, 31–2, (WEP) 117–18
38–9, 41, 46, 49–50, 60, 63–4, 67, women’s international non-governmental
81–2, 84–94, 102–8, 110–13, 115–31, organisations (WINGO) 32
131n1, 138–55, 155n1, 158–60, Working Group 4 87
164–71, 173–4, 174n2
Women, Environment and Development Yamin, F. 167
(WED) 21, 23, 25 York, R. 22, 37
Women in Europe for a Common Future Youth Non-Governmental Organisation
(WECF) 72, 104–5, 120 (YOUNGO) 150
Women’s Action Agenda 21 1–2 Yuval-Davis, N. 12, 30, 48–9, 60–2,
Women’s Caucus 34, 75–6, 80, 170 64n1, 126
Women’s Delegate Fund (WDF)
107, 109 zero gender 3, 13, 67–77, 68