SSRN Id3644987
SSRN Id3644987
Food Trade
Zongo Amara∗
April 2020
Abstract
International trade in goods requires service inputs such as transport, banking and
financial services for production and transportation. Trade in goods and services are now
closely linked and contribute to the growth of international trade. The goal of this study
is to investigate the effects of restrictions in the banking, accounting, transportation and
logistics sectors (cargo handling and custom brokerage) on food trade. We use a gravity
model with panel data from 2014 to 2018 for 36 OECD countries, the OECD indices of
individual country restrictions and regulatory difference by country pair to capture the
level of restrictions in these sectors. Our results suggest that importing and exporting
country restrictions have non-significant effects on aggregate food exports, but negative
and significant impacts on exports of agricultural raw materials and perishable products
(meat, dairy products, eggs, etc.). The regulatory disparity between countries in logistics
and banking sectors emerge as the main barrier for food exports. However, these results
can be mitigated through regulatory cooperation or harmonization of regulations.
∗ University
of Brodeaux, Office R182, +33 768 908 623, LAREFI - Bâtiment Recherche Économie
[email protected], avenue Léon Dugit, 33608 Pessac
11
10
5
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
For services, the consequences of this disparity remain very significant, UNCTAD (2010).
Indeed, the regulatory environment in the services shows a sector highly regulated
1 Data provided by the World Bank through the World Integrated Trade Solution database.
This paper examines the different effects of services restrictions on food trade and
discusses how to mitigate these restrictive impacts 3 . Our study contributes to the
literature about the impacts of non-tariff barriers on international trade. It differs from
the existing literature because we focus on the impact of restrictions and regulatory
disparity between OECD countries in the banking, accounting, transports and logistics
sectors on food exports, a topic has not been studied in the literature. Indeed, the
literature has focused on the effects of services restrictions on trade in services (NordÅs
and Rouzet (2016); Ingo and al. (2012)), and no study has so far examined food trade.
These sectors, considered as service providers, have a strong and close link with food
export activities. In addition, Figure A.2 shows significant restrictions in the banking,
accounting and transport sectors.
International trade is a risky activity, importers may not pay after receiving the goods
and exporters may not deliver if they pay in advance. To reduce the risk of international
trade, banks offer specific trade finance products4 : the most important are letters of
credit (LC) and documentary collections, Amiti and Weinstein (2011)5 , Paravisini and al
(2014)6 . According Copeland and Mattoo (2007), the development of financial services
can promote the effectiveness of service sectors by competition and thus support eco-
nomic growth.
The global financial crisis is an example of a strong impact of credit on trade (see figure
A. 4). However, the credit crunch led to a significant reduction in the availability of
external financing, thus reducing firms’ production and export capacities. The weak
economic outlook resulted in slower global demand and imports. Using monthly US
import data, Chor and Manova (2012) find that countries with higher interbank rates
and stricter credit conditions less exported to United States during the crisis. These
effects have been particularly pronounced in sectors that require significant external
financing. Moreover, Bricongne et al (2010) find that French firms’ exports in sectors
2 Maintenance costs include: costs related to the tax burden, the social security system, limiting the variety
of services, imposing fixed prices for certain services.
3 We will focus on the effects of regulatory difference on food trade.
4 We use trade finance to refer to formal borrowing by firms from banks or other financial institutions to
Transport and logistics are also major factor in international trade. Choosing the appro-
priate mode of transport and logistics is essential to ensure efficient and cost-effective
import or export operations, so-called "transit time". It provides vital distribution for
production, as well as essential personal mobility, by connecting firms to global markets.
Transport is a crucial element for economic growth and competitiveness, the most
important of which are maritime, road and air transport (cf. figure A.3). We use food
products because affected by SPS and TBT standards and require important services as
inputs.
To conduct this study, we use a gravity model based and OECD restrictiveness index,
which measures the recent level of restriction in services sector. The latter is a robust
measure compared to the World Bank index because it is a sectoral index (covering 22
sectors in 46 countries), while the World Bank index includes 5 service sectors in 103
countries. Our results suggest that individual country restrictions have non-significant
effects on aggregate food exports, but negative and significant impacts on exports of
agricultural raw materials and perishable products (meat, dairy products, eggs, etc.).
The restrictions implemented by the exporting country have significant negative effects
on exports higher than the importing country’s restrictions. Regulations in the logistics
and banking sectors are restrictive for food trade.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in the first part, we review the
literature on the effects of these restrictive measures on trade flows. In the second part,
we describe our econometric model with data, sources, and the type of regression used.
The last section presents our different results.
In this section, studies that examined the impact of restrictive policies on international
trade used two essential methods: the analysis on restriction index and analysis on
tariff equivalent. Indeed, the economic literature that studied the impact of standards
in services on trade, used the OECD/World Bank Trade Restrictiveness Index, and the
computation of tariff equivalent.
The authors that apply the gravity model to analyze the impacts of STRI index and
the regulatory heterogeneity index on service trade are NordÅs and Rouzet (2016),
NordÅs (2016). Based on a gravity model with aggregate data and the PPML (Pseudo-
Maximum Likelihood Estimator) as the estimation method, they find that the most
restrictive countries in the service sector, import and export significantly less services.
In addition, the negative impact of restrictions in services on exports is about twice as
large as on imports. The most affected sectors are the banking, financial and transport
sectors, considered as service providers. Considering the regulatory disparity between
countries, they finds that regulatory heterogeneity in services has negative impacts
on cross-border trade in services. In this case, countries trade more with partners
with similar regulations. A low heterogeneity index (harmonization or convergence of
standards) is associated with a strong stimulation of services trade. According to their
study, if the STRIs of importer and exporter countries are low, harmonization stimulates
trade in services, but if the STRIs are high, harmonization attempts to limit trade.
Another approach that differs from the first is the analysis of Ingo and al. (2012). They
use the restrictiveness index developed by the World Bank, and not the OECD measure,
to capture the impact of regulatory policies on trade in services7 . Through the PPML
estimate, they find that higher levels of STRI discourage investment. Van der Marel and
Shepherd (2013) in his analysis (very similar to the previous one) also finds a negative
relationship between the World Bank’s bilateral restrictiveness index and cross-border
trade in transport and financial services. Riker, D (2014), in his study highlights the
impact of restrictions on foreign suppliers (import restrictiveness index) and cross-border
trade in services. He also finds negative effects of the latter on cross-border trade in
services. Further, it simulates the effect on U.S. financial services exports if its trading
partner eliminated restrictions on these imports from all countries. He notes that, while
China and India do not apply any barriers to market entry, the United States is recording
a significant rise of its financial services exports, both in dollars ($186.0 million and
$42.2 million) and rate change (10.14% and 3.76%). On the other hand, in a country
like Germany, US exports have increased slightly (7.7 million dollars or 0.23%). Indeed,
according to him, in the financial services sector, Germany is a relatively important
export market for the United States, after the United Kingdom, but the impact on trade
is less, because the level of restrictiveness in this country is relatively low compared to
7 Foreign investment inflows and access to financial services through the provision of bank lending.
Another analysis that differs from those mentioned above and that is part of our paper
remains Ariu and al (2018). They explore the interaction between international goods
trade and restrictions on services. They consider data from Belgian firms from 1995 to
2005, data on PMR index (Product Market Regulation) and customs duties on goods and
services. They come to the following conclusion: when import barriers for goods and
commodities rise, we have a decrease of firms’import of services. Further, these authors
use their results to quantify the impacts of lowering barriers to goods and services on
trade between US and EU. They find that liberalization of services sector has direct and
significant effects on goods trade.
Our paper also contributes to recent literature on firm-level trade in services (Breinlich
and Criscuolo, 2011; Crozet et al, 2016; Ariu, 2016; Conti et al., 2010; Gaulier et al., 2011;
Walter and Dell’mour, 2010). These studies describe characteristics of firms exporting
services and find that very few firms are able to export services due to regulatory
barriers in the market.
In this section, two methodologies are used : the analysis by the residues obtained from
the gravity equation, Park (2000) and the fixed effects method of importing countries 8 ,
Fontagné, Guillin and Mitaritonna (2011); Guillin, A (2013) and Fontagné, Mitaritonna
and Signoret (2016). For them, the difference in trade flows between the presence of
market entry restrictions and so-called "Benchmark" restrictions explains these tariffs 9 .
In other words, tariff equivalents are deducted by comparing importing country fixed
effects or residues of model with restrictions against "benchmark" restrictions. They
come to the same conclusion that developed countries have low levels of restrictions
in their markets and developing and emerging countries apply high tariffs on services.
Although this methodology has data advantages (to fill data gaps), it also has important
weakness: this method implies that the unobserved importer-level demand factors, other
than GDP and price index measures, are captured by the trade barrier estimations. In
this case the fixed effects of importing countries do not only consider non-tariff barriers
but also the demand factors of the importing country, Deardorff and Stern (2007). The
computation of tariff equivalents using the importing country’s fixed effects not reflect
the correct tariff computation because the latter covers all unobservable events and not
just restrictions. Therefore, it is better to use the residual method.
The second-analysis of computation of tariff equivalents, which differs from the first, is
based on a standard econometric model. Authors such as Jafari and Tarr (2017); Rouzet
and Spinelli (2016) and Khachaturian (2015) compute the tariff equivalents of restrictive
policies through a price-cost margin of foreign firms. They use the price performance
index as a variable to capture tariffs for restrictive policies in services. According to
their interpretation, a positive impact increasing the price-cost margin is considered as
a consumption tax (paid by the consumer and seen as a rent for the producer) and a
negative coefficient of STRI index on price-cost margin is production tax, supported
by the producer and not imposed on the consumer. Moreover, after the econometric
analysis, they compute the tariff equivalent of regulation by differentiating the price
with restrictions from price without restrictions. Their results suggest that in all sectors,
high-income countries have lower tariff equivalents than emerging and least developed
countries. However, the analysis of tariff equivalent by prices is very limited, because it
is necessary to identify the appropriate prices to use and this is likely to be problematic.
While it is fairly easy to obtain information on the price paid by the importers of a
good, it might become difficult to obtain the domestic market price especially at a
disaggregated level 10 .
The review’s analysis shows a negative impact of STRI index on trade flows, and
significantly affects the banking and transport sectors. The divergence of regulations
between countries has a significant negative impact on trade. Our work is a extension of
previous studies that addressed the issue of standards in international trade.
Where Xij is the value of exports from country i to country j, M j represents demand of
importing country (importing country’s GDP), Si is the value of exporting country’s
GDP, G is a variable that does not depend on i or j and represents the level of global
liberalization, Φij represents the ease of access by exporter i to market j.
Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) show that the control of trade costs remains
crucial in order to properly specify the gravity equation. However, trade costs are very
important for the gravity equation. Two countries will trade less if they were separated
by an ocean or by vast stretches of deserts and mountains. Trade between two nations
for this purpose is determined by relative trade costs, i.e. trade costs between the two
nations (absolute costs) and trade costs between the country (importer, exporter) and
the rest of the world, which will be called the MTR (Multilateral Trade-Resistance).
However, the multilateral resistance can be controlled through the time fixed effects of
importing and exporting country, (Anderson and Yotov, 2012) or using a proxy.
To estimate this equation, we need to linearize it. Using the logarithm of each variable
in the model, the equation becomes :
Where a0 is the constant, a3 = 1- σ, Xij is the value of exports from country i to country
j, Yi and Yj the GDP of exporting and importing countries, tij bilateral costs between
our pairs of countries, Πi terms measuring barriers to trade between each country and
the rest of the world, Pj the price index of importing country, eij is the error term. In
practice, the gravity equation links the logarithm of monetary value of trade between
two countries to logarithm of their respective GDPs, a composite term reflecting barriers
and trade incentives between these two countries, and terms measuring barriers to trade
between these countries and rest of the world.
Using Anderson and Van Wincoop’s (2003), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), our
baseline regression equation is the following:
V. Data sources
As mentioned above, our paper attempts to analyse the effects of restrictive measures
in services on food trade flows. Indeed, we use panel data on trade in food products
between 36 OECD countries (bilateral trade between countries) from 2014 to 2018. In-
deed, panel data have the advantage of reducing the bias generated by heterogeneity
between countries. While in a cross-section, trade between pairs of countries can only
be controlled by the observed characteristics of pairs of countries (such as common lan-
guage, common border). In a panel the heterogeneity of country pairs can be controlled
using country pair fixed effects. The data for 2014-2018 are based on the implementation
and evolution of the STRI index. We focus on food products to examine the impacts of
services restrictions on this sector, so it is heavily affected by sanitary and phytosanitary
(SPS) standards and technical regulations (TBT).
To perform this study, we use informations about bilateral food exports (annual fre-
quency) from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development database (UNC-
TADstat) which uses the Classification Standard International Trade (SITC Rev.4)13 . The
choice of service sector is essential because it accounts for almost 2/3 of world GDP
and nearly 80% of total employment in OECD countries. We consider the banking,
accounting, transport and logistics sectors due to their significant role in the movement
of goods and commercial presence Ariu and al (2018). We also introduce an index
that captures the level of restrictions in services sector (STRI). The STRI Index provides
a database of regulations affecting trade in 22 service sectors in 46 countries14 . For
each sector the database covers 5 policy areas: restrictions on the entry of foreigners,
restrictions on the movement of persons, other discriminatory measures, barriers to
competition and regulatory transparency. The qualitative information on these 5 areas
has been converted into quantitative indices by sector ranging from 0 to 1 (where 0
corresponds to no restrictions and 1 to a sector completely closed to service providers).
11 Dummy variables equal 1 if countries share a common border, comman language and 0 otherwise.
12 We include dummy variables that represent European Economic Area (Intra EEA) to control the deeper
integration in services, and NAFTA, which is a major trade agreement on commodities.
13 Data can be accessed at: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/dimView.aspx
14 36 OECD countries plus Brazil, People’ s Republic of China, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia,
One way to deal a zero trade issue consists of using a two-step estimation procedure.
The decision to export is evaluated in the first step, while the second step focuses
on the value of exports. Heckman’s model appears to be the best in the literature.
However, in the presence of fixed effects in the first stage, the Heckman model leads to
the incidental parameter problem. Helpman et al. (2008) also developed a two-stage
estimation procedure that focuses both on extensive estimation (export decision from i
to j) and intensive margins (export volume) of trade. While this approach offers a better
understanding of the determinants of trade flows, it provides biased estimates in the
presence of heteroscedasticity in the trade data, Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2013. To
avoid biased estimation results, we use the Poisson estimator suggested by Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) 18 . The PPML is used in our case in order to face the constraints of zero
trade between States, it also estimates the non-linear shape of the gravity model in the
presence of heteroscedasticity. However, important assumption of PPMLs estimator is
equidispersion, which means the conditional variance of dependent variable and its
conditional mean are equal. PPML estimation can be assessed by solving the following
condition:
∑(X p -exp(Z p β)) = 0 (3)
p
where p is the country pairs, X p is the unilateral trade (i.e. exports or imports) between
country pairs in non-logarithmic levels and Z p is complete vector of gravity equation as
defined above.
15 https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=STRI.
16 We use trade agreements on both goods and services, as we study the effects of restrictions in services on
food products.
17 Indeed, zero commerce is associated with high bilateral fixed costs of trade.
18 Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (PPML).
10
11
12
With STRIheterij,kt the regulatory difference between country pair in sector k at year
t 23 , STRIsi,kt , STRIj,kt are STRIs of exporting and importing country, µit , γ jt dummy
variables that represent the exporter-importer year fixed effects (inward and outward
multilateral resistance). The inclusion of country year fixed fixed effects in the gravity
equation accounts for the multilateral price terms at the same time as well as variation
in all time-varying country variables, Feenstra, 2004; Baldwin and Taglioni 2006; Baier
and Bergstrand 2007.
The results with PPML as estimate is presented in Table A.8 and Table A.9. Columns
1 to 6 represent the results of the regulatory disparity on trade flows and the rest the
effects of our interaction terms. The regulatory difference in cargo handling, customs
brokerage and banking sectors have negative and significant values in our regression. In
addition, our interaction variables have negative and significant signs in cargo-handling,
customs brokerage and banking sectors. The negative sign of the regulatory difference
and our interaction terms suggest that the regulatory difference has negative effects
on food exports although both exporting and importing countries are totally closed or
opened to service providers.
Regulatory disparity has important effects on services trade if countries are open to
services suppliers and less important effects if they are completely closed, NordÅs and
Rouzet (2016) . In this case individual country restrictions remain the main barrier to
entry for service suppliers. In food trade, disparity of regulation in services, sanitary
and technical standards are the main barrier to entry of products.
13
restrictions in logistics, banking and road transport services. This confirms our results
and strengthens evidence that the regulatory disparity in services affects food trade.
The last robustness test examines the consequences of the regulatory disparity on
bilateral trade in manufactured and intermediate goods25 . The aim is to compare the
effects of the regulatory disparity on food and on manufactured and intermediate
goods. The results presented in Table A.14 show negative and more significant effects
on manufactured and intermediate goods than food trade.
X. Endogeneity Issue
To solve the endogeneity issue between the regulatory heterogeneity in services and
the independent variable, the literature suggests using an instrument that is correlated
with the regulatory heterogeneity variable and uncorrelated with the error term. This
endogeneity occurs when we consider liberal policies in the EU. EU countries trade
more with each other because the restrictions are lower (so we have an reverse causality
between these restrictions and food trade). Despite the free movement of goods and
services, disparities in banking, accounting and legal services among EU Member States
negatively affect trade, NordÅs and Rouzet (2016).
Regulatory Disparity are composite measures that capture each country’s restrictive
policies to create a composite index by country pair. However, it is very difficult to
find an instrument that is closely related to our variable of interest. But to reduce the
risk of bias caused by endogeneity, we will consider the lagged variable of regulatory
disparity. Indeed, the index of regulatory disparity remains invariant in some sectors,
so the measure implemented this year explains the measure for the following year.
The results are reported in Table A.14 and show negative and significant effects of
regulatory disparity in the logistics and banking sector on trade in food commodities.
14
Indeed, our paper aims to study the impacts of service standards on food trade, pre-
sented a tool for quantifying services restrictions and evaluated these effects on trade
flows. We started from a gravity modeling using panel data on bilateral trade in food
products between OECD countries from 2014-2018. We find that restrictions in services
have non-significant effects on overall food trade. However, there are negative and
significant effects on the disaggregated trade in food goods, particularly on agricultural
raw materials and perishable products. The restrictions implemented by the exporting
country have greater restrictive effects on exports than the importing country’s restric-
tions. Regulations in the logistics, banking, accounting and road transport sectors are
restrictive on food trade.
The regulatory difference between countries in logistics and banking negatively impact
overall food export.
The results seem robust to alternative specifications. Four different aspects were ana-
lyzed. First, we estimate the effects of the regulatory difference in EEA countries on
food trade, second, the effects of regulatory difference on trade between OECD and
emerging countries (North-South), and third, the impact on trade between emerging
and OECD countries (South-North). Finally, estimate the consequences of the regulatory
difference on trade between net food exporting and importing countries.
The results of our robustness checks show significant and positive effects of EEA coun-
tries regulations on trade. The regulatory disparity has negative and more significant
effects on South-North than North-South trade. It profoundly affects trade between
major food exporters and importers. The more restrictive rules of the emerging countries
have negative effects on their export performance.
Our study differed from existing literature, however, it has limitations based on the data.
Indeed, the restrictiveness indices in services are composite measures that invariant over
time for some sectors, so the data are very short (2014-2018). Regulations are adjustment
policies that require time if a firm or exporter does not have resources to conform.
Therefore, the data would not capture the effects on trade over the long term. However,
we can improve our study by considering subsidy policy coupled with regulation. It may
be useful to consider a binary variable reports the existence of a "Most favoured nation"
MFN and "National treatment" clause to take account treatment subject to foreign export
once on the domestic market.
This study of impacts of services restrictions on food products shows that regulatory
cooperation between countries has become an increasingly key element in international
food trade. Regulatory harmonization in economic integration areas or harmonization
of regulations between emerging and developed countries, net food exporters and
importers countries significantly stimulate trade flows.
15
16
Heterogeneity STRI
Logis cargo handij,t 6,300 0.237079 0.0679761 0.063 0.472
Logis customs broij,t 6,300 0.2320959 0.147744 0.03 0.822
Accountingij,t 6,300 0.3021184 0.1321572 0.083 0.867
Bankingij,t 6,300 0.2225016 0.0617251 0.055 0.426
Roadij,t 6,300 0.2035533 0.1104277 0.024 0.646
Seaij,t 4,350 0.2569039 0.0770907 0.061 0.501
Exporter STRI
Logis cargo handi,t 6,300 0.2174444 0.0637243 0.12 0.41
Logis customs broi,t 6,300 0.2171111 0.1312967 0.11 1
Accountingi,t 6,300 0.2858889 0.1610676 0.1 1
Banking j,t 6,300 0.2031111 0.053766 0.13 0.37
Roadi,t 6,300 0.2002778 0.0852739 0.1 0.62
seai,t 5,250 0.236 0.0604927 0.15 0.35
Importer STRI
Logis cargo hand j,t 6,300 0.2174444 0.0637243 0.12 0.41
Logis customs broi,t 6,300 0.2230556 0.14338 0.13 1
Accountingi,t 6,300 0.286 0.1609945 0.1 1
Bankingi,t 6,300 0.2033889 0.053568 0.13 0.37
Roadi,t 6,300 0.2003333 0.0852639 0.1 0.62
seai,t 5,250 0.2360667 0.0604364 0.15 0.35
17
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Figure A. 1:
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Figure A. 3:
Extra European Union goods transported in thousands of tonnes
18
maritime transport
Road transport
16 Air transport
14
12
10
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
0.2
Food products
110 0.15 Manufactured goods
importation Services
100
exportation 0.1
volume of credit (% GDP)
0.05
90
0
80
-0.05
70 -0.1
-0.15
60
-0.2
50
-0.25
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
40
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
19
20
Intra − EEA 0.8377∗∗∗ 0.8380∗∗∗ 0.7814∗∗∗ 0.7758∗∗∗ 0.7997∗∗∗ 0.4729∗∗ 0.7006∗∗∗ 0.6816∗∗∗ 0.6394∗∗∗ 0.6111∗∗∗ 0.6435∗∗∗ 0.2348
(0.1491) (0.1537) (0.1452) (0.1951) (0.1524) (0.2178) (0.1615) (0.1651) (0.1568) (0.1979) (0.1614) (0.2091)
Ln distij -0.9660∗∗∗ -1.0869∗∗∗ -0.9158∗∗∗ -0.9826∗∗∗ -0.9846∗∗∗ -1.0785∗∗∗ -0.9612∗∗∗ -1.0450∗∗∗ -0.9068∗∗∗ -0.9692∗∗∗ -0.9403∗∗∗ -1.1531∗∗∗
(0.2052) (0.2180) (0.2016) (0.2038) (0.2080) (0.2332) (0.2172) (0.2340) (0.2062) (0.2163) (0.2199) (0.2383)
langij 0.1167 0.1664 0.1195 0.1036 0.1079 0.1141 0.0662 0.0941 0.0729 0.0451 0.0185 0.0520
(0.2032) (0.1928) (0.1941) (0.2104) (0.2076) (0.2353) (0.2099) (0.2156) (0.1998) (0.2265) (0.2343) (0.2398)
borderij 0.8706∗∗∗ 0.8329∗∗∗ 0.8878∗∗∗ 0.8838∗∗∗ 0.8800∗∗∗ 0.9259∗∗∗ 0.9361∗∗∗ 0.9156∗∗∗ 0.9562∗∗∗ 0.9565∗∗∗ 0.9748∗∗∗ 1.0023∗∗∗
(0.2137) (0.2138) (0.1983) (0.2131) (0.2167) (0.2275) (0.2207) (0.2259) (0.2016) (0.2223) (0.2266) (0.2326)
STRI importer -1.6071 0.3360 -0.5589 -0.1405 -0.2704 -0.9301 -1.9092∗ 0.0683 -0.4298 -0.8263 -0.8637 -1.0900
(1.1393) (0.4105) (0.4886) (1.3449) (1.0372) (0.9915) (1.1587) (0.4657) (0.5025) (1.3317) (1.1613) (1.0624)
STRI exporter 1.4828 0.5939∗ -1.5281∗∗∗ -0.3725 0.1504 -1.4498 1.7268 0.4674 -2.0019∗∗∗ -0.4010 -0.1863 -1.4062
R2 0.728 0.748 0.744 0.719 0.723 0.728 0.699 0.709 0.719 0.688 0.683 0.705
Observations 5597 5597 5597 5597 5597 3769 5568 5568 5568 5568 5568 3756
Year − FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
21
Intra − EEA 0.7770∗∗∗ 0.8534∗∗∗ 0.7611∗∗∗ 0.8174∗∗∗ 0.8456∗∗∗ 0.9369∗∗∗ 1.0669∗∗∗ 1.1654∗∗∗ 1.1667∗∗∗ 0.8449∗∗∗ 1.1160∗∗∗ 0.6206∗
(0.2160) (0.1885) (0.1935) (0.3136) (0.1876) (0.3385) (0.2706) (0.2783) (0.2660) (0.3054) (0.2723) (0.3594)
Ln distij -1.0741∗∗∗ -1.2708∗∗∗ -0.9889∗∗∗ -1.0368∗∗∗ -1.2306∗∗∗ -0.8847∗∗ -1.6022∗∗∗ -1.6911∗∗∗ -1.6068∗∗∗ -1.5771∗∗∗ -1.5778∗∗∗ -1.7748∗∗∗
(0.2533) (0.2193) (0.3255) (0.2595) (0.2124) (0.3802) (0.4041) (0.4200) (0.3508) (0.3773) (0.3897) (0.3758)
langij 0.4586∗ 0.6023∗∗∗ 0.4890 0.4812∗∗ 0.6232∗∗∗ 0.4317 -0.1557 -0.1363 -0.1267 -0.1976 -0.1782 -0.1640
(0.2787) (0.1699) (0.3130) (0.2379) (0.1639) (0.3444) (0.3484) (0.4159) (0.3418) (0.4258) (0.4314) (0.3416)
borderij 0.3251 0.2233 0.3308 0.3204∗ 0.2129 0.3458 0.8505∗∗ 0.8237∗∗ 0.8312∗∗ 0.8853∗∗ 0.8699∗∗ 0.9337∗∗
(0.2212) (0.1587) (0.2587) (0.1929) (0.1551) (0.2575) (0.3780) (0.4074) (0.3551) (0.3735) (0.3988) (0.3856)
STRI importer -0.0151 0.3352 -2.0702∗∗∗ 1.5056 -0.5760 1.9961 1.5736 1.1654∗ 0.1748 1.6752 1.3919 1.7851
(1.1651) (0.3886) (0.4139) (1.3181) (0.9047) (1.4254) (2.1506) (0.6863) (0.9846) (2.1173) (1.2313) (2.2325)
STRI exporter 2.7422 2.0581∗∗∗ 1.1427∗∗ 1.4282 3.6205∗∗∗ -1.8040 -4.1272∗ -1.6135 -1.4159 -11.2385∗∗∗ -5.2190∗∗ -5.6461∗∗
R2 0.410 0.549 0.407 0.410 0.575 0.372 0.432 0.447 0.420 0.470 0.458 0.502
Observations 5411 5411 5411 5411 5411 3656 4759 4759 4759 4759 4759 3322
Year − FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
22
Intra − EEA 0.3194 0.2726 0.3431 0.2722 0.3091 -0.2354 0.5731∗∗∗ 0.5211∗∗∗ 0.5656∗∗∗ 0.3636∗ 0.5176∗∗∗ 0.1896
(0.4021) (0.3559) (0.3522) (0.3717) (0.3726) (0.4855) (0.1886) (0.1775) (0.1758) (0.1891) (0.1789) (0.1953)
Ln distij -0.1556 -0.4764 -0.1876 -0.3014 -0.3765 -0.0675 -1.0392∗∗∗ -0.9487∗∗∗ -1.0723∗∗∗ -1.0382∗∗∗ -0.9334∗∗∗ -1.2307∗∗∗
(0.4003) (0.4690) (0.3590) (0.4099) (0.4665) (0.4497) (0.2644) (0.2749) (0.2484) (0.2558) (0.2630) (0.2548)
langij -0.7048∗∗ -0.4249 -0.6644∗∗ -0.6391∗ -0.5061 -0.7857∗∗ -0.0171 -0.1254 -0.0047 -0.0993 -0.1998 -0.0036
(0.3128) (0.3261) (0.2769) (0.3341) (0.3587) (0.3727) (0.1800) (0.2098) (0.1744) (0.1984) (0.2180) (0.1873)
borderij 1.5865∗∗∗ 1.4411∗∗∗ 1.5642∗∗∗ 1.5514∗∗∗ 1.5315∗∗∗ 1.7419∗∗∗ 0.9214∗∗∗ 0.9973∗∗∗ 0.9336∗∗∗ 0.9800∗∗∗ 1.0435∗∗∗ 0.8866∗∗∗
(0.4060) (0.4389) (0.3907) (0.4258) (0.4590) (0.4803) (0.2683) (0.2789) (0.2515) (0.2725) (0.2757) (0.3031)
STRI importer -1.5564 1.7719∗∗ -0.9930 3.0567 2.4561 -7.7812∗∗ -0.7488 -0.0028 0.6495 -0.4905 -0.4732 -0.7603
(2.5825) (0.7262) (1.0024) (2.4512) (1.6362) (3.0212) (1.3732) (0.4133) (0.4471) (1.2777) (0.6795) (1.4301)
STRI exporter -1.3964 -3.4664∗ -3.9924∗∗∗ -4.2406 -8.2135∗∗∗ -1.7754 -0.8397 -2.3388∗∗∗ -2.6566∗∗∗ -4.9270∗∗∗ -4.7867∗∗∗ -1.4197
R2 0.330 0.389 0.362 0.382 0.393 0.338 0.645 0.707 0.613 0.698 0.711 0.676
Observations 3565 3565 3565 3565 3565 2446 5464 5464 5464 5464 5464 3678
Year − FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Perishable products
STIC 01 + 02 + 03
Model Cargo Custom Accounting Banking Road Sea
Handling Brokerage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln GDPi,t 1.2535∗∗∗ 1.2377∗∗∗ 1.2856∗∗∗ 1.1982∗∗∗ 1.2270∗∗∗ 0.9480∗∗∗
(0.1257) (0.1243) (0.1108) (0.1312) (0.1213) (0.1545)
23
RTAij,t 0.5146∗∗∗ 0.5991∗∗∗ 0.6640∗∗∗ 0.6386∗∗∗ 0.6588∗∗∗ 0.6801∗∗∗ 0.5324∗∗∗ 0.6162∗∗∗ 0.6594∗∗∗ 0.6469∗∗∗ 0.6737∗∗∗ 0.7137∗∗∗
(0.1471) (0.1481) (0.1493) (0.1540) (0.1452) (0.1433) (0.1464) (0.1467) (0.1481) (0.1530) (0.1467) (0.1417)
Ln distij -1.8137∗∗∗ -1.8532∗∗∗ -1.9676∗∗∗ -1.8496∗∗∗ -1.9614∗∗∗ -1.9570∗∗∗ -1.8322∗∗∗ -1.8965∗∗∗ -1.9664∗∗∗ -1.8707∗∗∗ -2.0092∗∗∗ -1.9714∗∗∗
(0.1355) (0.1285) (0.1204) (0.1134) (0.1350) (0.1300) (0.1347) (0.1235) (0.1205) (0.1142) (0.1297) (0.1279)
langij 0.0491 0.0604 0.1062 0.0866 0.1057 0.0341 0.0494 0.0777 0.1079 0.0968 0.1270 0.0636
(0.1238) (0.1226) (0.1235) (0.1197) (0.1254) (0.1476) (0.1253) (0.1218) (0.1234) (0.1199) (0.1254) (0.1512)
24
borderij 0.7305∗∗∗ 0.7396∗∗∗ 0.7319∗∗∗ 0.7506∗∗∗ 0.7312∗∗∗ 0.7365∗∗∗ 0.7329∗∗∗ 0.7269∗∗∗ 0.7291∗∗∗ 0.7325∗∗∗ 0.7154∗∗∗ 0.7359∗∗∗
(0.1143) (0.1126) (0.1121) (0.1050) (0.1140) (0.1218) (0.1146) (0.1125) (0.1121) (0.1069) (0.1119) (0.1200)
Heterogeneity scoreij,t
∗STRIi,t -12.4783∗∗∗ -7.7586∗∗∗ -0.0941 -10.3077∗∗ 4.1275 4.1869
(3.2738) (2.4186) (1.2815) (4.0711) (3.6436) (3.4320)
R2 0.938 0.940 0.936 0.940 0.936 0.940 0.938 0.940 0.936 0.940 0.937 0.941
Observations 6298 6298 6298 6298 6298 4349 6298 6298 6298 6298 6298 4349
Exporter − Year − FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer − Year − FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A.10:
Food Exports, Heterogeneity STRI: EEA restrictions
EEA
Restrictions
Model Cargo Custom Accounting Banking Road Sea
Handling Brokerage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RTAij 0.4201∗∗∗ 0.4950∗∗∗ 0.5379∗∗∗ 0.5018∗∗∗ 0.4158∗∗∗ 0.3666∗∗
(0.1484) (0.1503) (0.1525) (0.1547) (0.1460) (0.1449)
Heterogeneity scoreij,t ∗ Intra − EEA 2.7235∗∗∗ 2.2666∗∗∗ 1.0892∗∗ 1.8766∗∗ 3.5253∗∗∗ 3.6350∗∗∗
(0.7001) (0.7961) (0.5384) (0.7717) (0.7976) (0.6767)
R2 0.940 0.937 0.935 0.937 0.943 0.946
Observations 6298 6298 6298 6298 6298 4349
Exporter − Year − FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer − Year − FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
25
OECD-Emerging
Countries
Model Cargo Custom Accounting Banking Road Sea
Handling Brokerage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RTAij,t 0.6367∗∗∗ 0.5876∗∗∗ 0.5476∗∗∗ 0.6001∗∗∗ 0.6052∗∗∗ 0.6779∗∗∗
(0.2004) (0.1980) (0.1978) (0.1918) (0.1977) (0.2016)
Table A.12:
Food Exports, Heterogeneity STRI: Emerging-OECD Countries
Emerging − OECD
Countries
Model Cargo Custom Accounting Banking Road Sea
Handling Brokerage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RTAij,t 0.1014 0.0888 -0.0170 0.0951 0.0903 0.0901
(0.1574) (0.1597) (0.1697) (0.1580) (0.1621) (0.1637)
26
Regulatory
heterogeneity
Model Cargo Custom Accounting Banking Road Sea
Handling Brokerage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RTAij,t 0.5749∗∗∗ 0.6860∗∗∗ 0.7945∗∗∗ 0.6782∗∗∗ 0.7696∗∗∗ 0.7490∗∗∗
(0.1939) (0.1656) (0.1772) (0.1666) (0.1742) (0.1832)
27
Regulatory
heterogeneity
Model Cargo Custom Accounting Banking Road Sea
Handling Brokerage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RTAij,t 0.5744∗∗∗ 0.6240∗∗∗ 0.6571∗∗∗ 0.6416∗∗∗ 0.6608∗∗∗ 0.6845∗∗∗
(0.1439) (0.1459) (0.1484) (0.1510) (0.1451) (0.1459)
28
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