ZAC 2019; 23(1): 21–35

Lavinia Cerioni*
Bodily Souls? Paradoxical Bodies in
Origen’s Theology of Progress
https://doi.org/10.1515/zac-2019-0002

Abstract: This article analyses and discusses the Origenian terminology con-
cerning the creation, existence and resurrection of the body. Starting from a
close analysis of the textual evidence, it proposes the working definitions of
those terms – such as εἶδος, σῶμα πνευματικὸν, χιτῶνες δερμάτινοι, ὑλικὸν
ὑποκείμενον – which constitute the intricate vocabulary of Origen’s doctrine of the
body. In particular, it stresses the difference between the εἶδος (corporeal form)
and the ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον (material substratum). On the one hand, the εἶδος is
the corporeal form of the body, which is strictly intertwined with the λογικός and
represents the individuality of each intelligence. On the other hand, the ὑλικὸν
ὑποκείμενον represents the materiality of the body, which changes according to
different qualities and is destined to be eschatologically destroyed. In summary,
this article suggests that Origen distinguishes corporeality from materiality, thus
envisioning both the destruction of the flesh and the resurrection of the body.

Keywords: Origen of Alexandria, Body, Materiality, Corporeality, Progress.

The question regarding the status of bodies in Origen’s theology has challenged
ancient, modern and contemporary readers of Origen’s work alike.1 Every scholar

1 Most ancient commentators, like Methodius of Olympus, opposed fiercely Origen’s theory
of bodies, since they believed Origen had denied the resurrection of bodies, see Methodius of
Olympus, De Resurrectione as included in Epiphanius, Panarion 2,19–62 (GCS 31, 430,6–499,19
Holl) and also Epiphanius’ explanation in Panarion 2,64 (503,7–504,19 H.). For more information
on Origen’s influence on Renaissance philosophy, see Pasquale Terracciano, Omnia in Figura.
L’impronta di Origene tra ‘400 e ‘500 (Roma, 2012). During the Modern Age, Origenist theories
resurfaced especially in the philosophy of the Cambridge Platonists, see Christian Hengster-
mann, “Pre-Existence and Universal Salvation. The Origenian Renaissance in Early Modern
Cambridge,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (2017): 971–989. To a lesser extent,
Origenian echoes can be found in the debate concerning resurrected bodies during the Reforma-
tion, since Origen’s theory underlies Erasmus’ discourse on the resurrection of the body. In this
regard, see the contribution of Maria Fallica enclosed in this volume.

*Corresponding Author: Lavinia Cerioni, Humanities, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD,
United Kingdom, e-mail: [email protected]

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22 Lavinia Cerioni

who approaches this subject is compelled to admit that this aspect of Origen’s
doctrine presents, at the very least, many controversial elements, thus making it
almost impossible to draw a definitive conclusion.2
Contemporary scholarship has often proposed contrasting theories regarding
the corporeal status of bodies in Origen’s theology. The different interpretations
can be grouped in three major scholarly trends. The first one is represented by
those scholars, such as Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, who have claimed
that Origen did not reject the idea of the resurrection of the body, but he envi-
sioned an eschatological spiritual body that maintains rarefied traces of mate-
riality.3 The second trend groups those scholars who believe that Origen denied
the presence of the body in the eschatological time, such as Anders Jacobsen or
Gaetano Lettieri.4 Only few scholars, among whom Mark Edwards is one of the
most renown, have instead claimed that Origen believed in the resurrection of the
flesh, identifying it with material bodies.5
My research is grounded on the works of scholars who belong to the first
scholarly trend, but it radically rethinks the notion of spiritual bodies. In par-
ticular, this article will show that it would be more correct to use the term corpo-
real form (εἶδος) rather than spiritual body (σῶμα πνευματικὸν), for this termi-
nology expresses better Origen’s view on corporeality and might help avoiding
further confusion. In particular, this article aims at discussing the ontolog-
ical status of the body in Origen’s theology of progress, which understands
history as a pedagogical path of purification in which the body plays a primary
role. For the sake of clarity, this article is divided in three parts. First, I will
discuss the status of the body in protological times. Secondly, I shall explore
the status of bodies in their worldly existence. Lastly, I will discuss the escha-

2 In this regard, the loss of Origen’s work on the resurrection of the body and of his Commentary
on Genesis represent a great obstacle for our understanding of his thought.
3 See Henri Crouzel, Origène et la “Connaissance Mystique” (Museum Lessianum. Section
Théologique 56; Paris, 1961); idem, “L’Anthropologie d’Origène: de l’Arché au Telos” in Arché e
Telos: l’Antropologia di Origene e di Gregorio di Nissa: Analisi Storico-Religiosa: Atti del Colloquio,
Milano, 17–19 Maggio 1979 (ed. Ugo Bianchi and Henri Crouzel; Studia patristica Mediolanen-
sia 12; Milano, 1981), 36–57; Manlio Simonetti, I Principi, Contra Celsum e altri Scritti Filosofici
(Collana di Classici della Filosofia Cristiana 7; Firenze, 1975).
4 See Anders Jacobsen, “Genesis 1–3 as a Source for the Anthropology of Origen,” VigChr 62
(2008): 213–232; Gaetano Lettieri, “Il Corpo di Dio. La Mistica Erotica del Cantico dei Cantici dal
Vangelo di Giovanni ai Padri,” in Il Cantico dei Cantici nel Medioevo (ed. Rossana E. Guglielmetti;
Firenze, 2008) 3–90.
5 See Mark Edwards, “Origen’s Two Resurrections,” The Journal of Theological Studies 46 (1995):
502–518; idem, Origen against Plato (Ashgate Studies in Philosophy and Theology in late Antiq-
uity; Aldershot, 2002).

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  Paradoxical Bodies in Origen’s Theology of Progress 23

tological place of bodies in Origen’s theology. Hence, by using a wide range

of textual evidence, I hope to provide a comprehensive analysis which covers
all aspects of the life of the body: from its creation to its (eventual) redemp-
tion.

1 Protological and Pedagogical Bodies

The complexity of Origen’s doctrine of the body in protological times derives
primarily from his theory of a double creation, for Origen postulated a two-stage
creation of humankind.6 First, God created purely rational beings (that is, the
λογικοί) that pre-existed in the λόγος.7 At a later time, after the protological fall
of the λογικοί, God created material bodies, which clothed these rational intelli-
gences as a veil.8
In Origen’s works, the account of Gen 1:26–279 is identified with the creation
of the λογικοί, whereas that of Gen 2:7 and Gen 3:21 is interpreted as the creation
of material bodies.10 In his description of the first creation, there is no reference
to the creation of bodies. On the contrary, it would seem that God’s creation was
purely rational and there was no other element besides it. Consequently, Origen’s
exegesis of Gen 1:26–27 is focused mainly on determining the extent to which it is
possible to affirm that these rational intelligences were created according to the
image of God, identified by Origen with the λόγος.11
While Origen dedicated several passages to the creation of humankind in
God’s image, he never enquired about the precise nature of the body created in

6 Such an interpretation of the Genesis’ passages was also proper to Philo. For instance, see
Philo of Alexandria, De opificio mundi 18,134 (ed. David Runia, On the Creation of the Cosmos
according to Moses. Introduction, Translation and Commentary [Philo of Alexandria Commentary
Series 1; Leiden, 2001], 82).
7 Most scholars are convinced that Origen postulated the pre-existence of the soul. There are
only few exceptions to this interpretation; see Edwards, Origen against Plato (see note 5), 87–122.
8 Origen discussed the double creation in several passages, see Origen, Homiliae in Genesim
1,13–14 (SC 7, 56,1–66,29 Doutreleau); Origen, Commentarii in Iohannem 20,182–184 (SC 290,
246,48–248,66 Blanc).
9 Gen 1:26–27 (LXX): καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽
ὁμοίωσιν, καὶ ἀρχέτωσαν τῶν ἰχθύων τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῶν πετεινῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν
κτηνῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς γῆς καὶ πάντων τῶν ἑρπετῶν τῶν ἑρπόντων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.
10 Gen 2:7 (LXX): καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ
πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν.
11 Origen, De principiis 1,1,8 (SC 252, 106,257–108,293 Crouzel/Simonetti) and Commentarii in
Iohannem 1,37,267 (SC 120, 192–194 Blanc).

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24 Lavinia Cerioni

Gen 2:7.12 Indeed, a brief survey of Origen’s quotations of Gen 2:7 shows that most
of them are ambiguous concerning the nature of the body, since the focus is often
on the breathing of living spirit into human beings rather than on the composi-
tion of the body. For instance, it is possible to list only two occurrences of Gen 2:7
in Origen’s De Principiis.13 In both instances, Origen’s interest is concerned with
the spirit which is blown into human beings by God, rather than with the body
which is formed from the dust. Similarly, in his Commentarii in Iohannem, two
of the three quotations of Gen 2:7 are used as supporting evidence for the pres-
ence of the spirit in human beings.14 The same can be observed in Origen’s Contra
Celsum, where Origen talked about a generic corruptible body without linking it
to a specific moment of the creation, but used Gen 2:7 as a reference to the spirit in
human beings.15 This insistence on the breathing of the spirit in Origen’s exegesis
of this passage has led some scholars, such as Crouzel or Simonetti, to believe
that Origen envisioned Gen 2:7 as the moment in which the so-called spiritual
body was created. This spiritual body would be made of a subtle substance, which
differs from the heavy matter of which material bodies are made. Notwithstand-
ing this is a plausible interpretation of Origen’s doctrine, there are two quotations
of Gen 2:7 which are particularly problematic for those who support this theory.
The first one is found in Origen’s Homiliae in Genesim, where he affirmed that the
body was moulded, and not made, by God from the ground: Non enim corporis
figmentum Dei imaginem continet, neque factus esse corporalis homo dicitur, sed
plasmatus.16 Here, the creation from the dust indicates explicitly the creation of a
material, corruptible, fleeting body. The second passage is found in Origen’s Com-
mentarii in Iohannem, where he affirmed: Καὶ ἡμῶν δὲ ἡ προηγουμένη ὑπόστασίς
ἐστιν ἐν τῷ κατ’εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος· ἡ δὲ ἐξ αἰτίας ἐν τῷ ληφθέντι ἀπὸ τοῦ χοῦ
τῆς γῆς πλάσματι.17 In contrast with the previous passage, the corporality is here

12 The most important passages are: Origen, De principiis 1,2,5 (118,125–120,140 C./S.); Origen,
De principiis 4,4,1 (SC 268, 400,1–402,33 Crouzel/Simonetti); Origen, Commentarii in Iohannem
1,105 (114–116 B.); Origen, Commentarii in Iohannem 2,20 (220–221 B.); Origen, Contra Celsum 6,63
(SC 147, 334,1–339,35 Borret).
13 Origen, De principiis 1,3,6 (156,192–193 C./S.) and Origen, De principiis 2,8,1 (338,38–40 C./S.).
14 Origen, Commentarii in Iohannem 13,140–142 (SC 222, 106,32 Blanc).
15 Origen, Contra Celsum 2,60 (SC 132, 424,1–427,23 Borret) and Origen, Contra Celsum 4,37
(SC 136, 276,1–278,30 Borret).
16 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,13 (56,7–57,9 D.): “One says neither that the form of the body
contains the image of God, nor that the corporal man is made, since he is moulded (out of the
ground).” In the following paragraph, Origen developed further this argument by explaining
that the separation between sexes happened only after the creation of the λογικοί.
17 Origen, Commentarii in Iohannem 20,182 (248,54–56 B.; trans. Ronald E. Heine, Commentary
on the Gospel of John. Book 13–32 [FaCh 80; Washington, 1993], 244–245): “Now, our true sub-

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  Paradoxical Bodies in Origen’s Theology of Progress 25

interpreted as the mortality which followed from Adam’s and Eve’s original sin,
thus representing the most deteriorated element of the human body.
Origen’s description of the creation of the body is further complicated by his
exegesis of the χιτῶνες δερμάτινοι (skin coats) described in Gen 3:21.18 There are
five quotations of Gen 3:21 in the Origenian corpus, and the skin coats symbolize
the mortality proper of the human body in four of these citations.19 In this sense,
Origen’s exegesis of Gen 3:21 appear similar to his exegesis of Gen 2:7, especially
as formulated in the Commentarii in Iohannem. The fifth quotation of Gen 3:21 is a
passage from the Fragmenta e catenis in Genesim,20 which is also found in Procop-
ius of Gaza’s Commentarii in Genesim.21 Here, Procopius reported the information
according to which some unnamed allegorists interpreted Gen 2:7 as the crea­
tion of a spiritual body, and Gen 3:21 with the creation of a material body. Most
scholars are persuaded that Procopius was referring to Origen’s lost Commentary
on Genesis, thus attributing to Origen the paternity of this interpretation.22 Nev-
ertheless, such an interpretation would contradict the other four occurrences of
Gen 3:21 in the Origenian corpus.
This brief survey of Origen’s quotations leaves us with an open question.
If the information expounded from the Origenian corpus are correct, how can
we reconcile Origen’s interpretations of Gen 2:7 and 3:21? Is there a difference
between the two creations of the body? Or should we interpret them as equiva-
lent? Unfortunately, none of these passages are conclusive concerning the status
of the body in the protological creation. From the abovementioned exegeses,
the only certainty is that Origen’s anthropology presents a dichotomy, which

stance too is in our being according to the image of the creator, but the substance resulting from
guilt is in the thing moulded, which was received from the dust of the earth.”
18 Gen 3:21 (LXX): καὶ ἐποίησεν κύριος ὁ θεὸς τῷ Αδαμ καὶ τῇ γυναικὶ αὐτοῦ χιτῶνας δερματίνους
καὶ ἐνέδυσεν αὐτούς. The ambiguities between Origen’s interpretation of Gen 2:7 and 3:21 have
been discussed in detail by three scholars: Jacobsen, “Genesis 1–3” (see note 4); Alexandra
Pârvan, “Genesis 1–3: Augustine and Origen on the Coats of Skins,” VigChr 66 (2012): 56–92,
which is, however, mainly focused on Augustine’s interpretation of the skin coats; and Man-
lio Simonetti, “L’interpretazione Origeniana di Genesi 2,7 e 3,21,” in Origene Esegeta e la sua
Tradizione (ed. Manlio Simonetti; Letteratura Cristiana Antica 2; Brescia, 2004), 112–122.
19 Origen, Homiliae in Ieremiam 18,9 (SC 238, 208,1–212,55 Nautin); Origen, Homiliae in Leviti-
cum 6,2 (SC 286, 270,1–278,118 Borret); and twice in Origen, Homiliae in primum Regnorum librum
1,6 (GCS 33, 10,13–12,3 Baehrens).
20 Origen, Fragmenta e catenis in Genesim (PG 12:101).
21 Procopius of Gaza, Commentarii in Genesim (PG 87,1:221). This passage is discussed widely by
both Jacobsen, “Genesis 1–3” (see note 4), 215 and Simonetti, “Genesi 2,7 e 3,21” (see note 18),
117–119.
22 Against the attribution of Procopius’ passage to Origen, see Jacobsen “Genesis 1–3” (see
note 4), 215.

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26 Lavinia Cerioni

opposes a rational principle to a corporeal one. This dichotomy has already

been observed and discussed by Jacobsen, who has rightly connected it with the
Pauline notion of an inner and outer man. According to him, while the former
is immaterial, invisible and incorruptible, the latter is material, visible and cor-
ruptible.23 Jacobsen has pushed this dichotomy further by affirming that the
outer man is that created in Gen 2:7, whilst the χιτῶνες δερμάτινοι of Gen 3:21
ought to be interpreted with the condition of mortality which surrounds the
inner man. Contrariwise, Simonetti has taken a more nuanced position, con-
cluding that Origen maintained both interpretations. In other words, Simonetti
concluded that Origen might have interpreted both Gen 2:7 and Gen 3:21 as refer-
ring to a material body and the condition of mortality which befall on human
beings after the fall, varying his interpretation according to his exegetical and
hermeneutical needs.24 My analysis of the texts—particularly the quotation from
the Commentarii in Iohannem—seems to confirm Simonetti’s hypothesis, since
Origen used Gen 2:7 and Gen 3:21 to indicate both the material body and its mor-
tality.
Given the lack of conclusive evidence regarding the status of protological
bodies in Origen’s interpretation of the Genesis’ accounts of creation, I decided
to enquire whether an explanation of the composition of the body is traceable in
Origen’s discourse on human life in this aeon.

2 T
 he Nature of Bodies
Having analysed the scattered information about the composition and status of
the body in the protological creation, I will now enquire about the textual pas-
sages where Origen provided more insights concerning the status of the body in
the world.
Taking the moves from Platonic doctrines,25 Origen acknowledged the exist-
ences of two natures: one corporeal and visible, and one rational and invisible.26

23 Jacobsen, “Genesis 1–3” (see note 4), 216–223.

24 Simonetti, “Genesis 2,7 e 3,21” (see note 18), 121–122.
25 Such as that presented in Plato, Phaedro 79a-b.
26 Origen, De principiis 3,6,7 (250,222–235 C./S.; trans. John Behr, Origen. On First Principles,
[Oxford Early Christian Texts; Oxford, 2017], 450–451): Omnis igitur haec ratio hoc continet, quod
duas generales naturas comderit deus: naturam uisibilem, id est corpoream, et naturam inuisi-
bilem, quae est incorporea. Istae uero duae naturae diuersas sui recipiunt permutationes. Ille
quidem inuisibilis quae et rationabilis est, animo propositoque mutatur pro eo quod arbitrii sui
libertate donata est; et per hoc aliquando in bonis, aliquando in contrariis inuenitur. Haec uero

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  Paradoxical Bodies in Origen’s Theology of Progress 27

These two substances are both subject to change, considering that the changes to
the rational substance are reflected onto the corporeal one. Indeed, the changes
onto the corporeal nature are determined by the qualities taken on by that matter
which underlies bodies. This claim is supported by Origen’s own words, when he
specified that:

Verumtamen illud scire opertet, quoniam numquam substantia sine qualitate subsistit, sed
intellectu solo discernitur hoc, quod subiacet corporibus et capax est qualitatis, esse ­materia.27

Similarly:

Materiam ergo intellegimus quae subiecta est corporibus, id est ex qua inditis atque inser-
tis qualitatibus corpora subsistunt. Qualitates autem quattuor dicimus: calidam, frigidam,
aridam, humidam. Quae quattuor qualitates ὕλη, id est materiae, insertae … diuersas cor-
porum species efficiunt. Haec tamen materia quamuis, ut supra diximus, secundum suam pro-
priam rationem sine qualitatibus sit, numquam tamen subsistere extra qualitates inuenitur.28

Therefore, that which underlies bodies—here also called ὕλη—can be separated by

its qualities and can be called matter only from a logical perspective. Although the
qualities assumed by the ὕλη determine the form assumed by the body, the body is
always formed by both qualities and matter, since a substance never exists without

natura corporea substantialem redpit permutationem; unde et ad omne quodcumque moliri uel
fabricari uel retractare uoluerit artifex omnium deus, materiae huius habet in omnibus famula-
tum, ut in quascumque uult formas uel species, prout rerum merita deposcunt, naturam corpo-
ream transmutet et transferat. (“The whole argument, then, comes to this, that God has created
two universal natures, a visible, that is a bodily one, and an invisible one, which is incorporeal.
These two natures each undergo their own different changes. The invisible, which is also the
rational nature, is changed through the action of the mind and will for it has been endowed with
freedom of choice; and as a result of this it is found existing sometimes in the good and some-
times in its opposite. The bodily nature, however, admits a change in substance so that God the
Artificer of all things, in whatever work of design or construction or restoration he may wish to
engage, has at hand the service of this material for all purposes, and can transform and transfer
it into whatever form and species he desires, as the merits of things demand.”)
27 Origen, De principiis 4,4,7 (416,244–247 C./S.; trans. 575 B.): “It must be known that a sub-
stance never exists without quality, but, in understanding alone, that which underlies bodies
and is capable of receiving quality, is demarcated as matter.”
28 Origen, De principiis 2,1,4 (240,108–242,117 C./S.; trans. 151 B.): “By matter, then, we under-
stand that which underlies bodies, that is, that from which, with the inclusion and insertion of
qualities, bodies exist. We speak of four qualities: heat, cold, dryness and wetness. These four
qualities, being implanted in ὕλη, that is, matter … produce the different kinds of bodies. Yet,
although this matter, as we have said above, exists according to its own proper definition without
qualities, it is however never found without qualities.”

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28 Lavinia Cerioni

qualities.29 However, it is worth noting that this relation between matter and quali-
ties is not mutual since, unlike matter, the qualities can exist without a material sub-
stratum to in-form. Furthermore, I believe these passages provide precious insights
about the origin of matter. If matter cannot exist without qualities—for the two can
only logically be separated—it seems plausible to admit that matter was created
as a consequence of the fall of the rational intelligences, that is, when the rational
intelligences underwent a qualitative change according to the places which they
occupied in the cosmos. This is further confirmed by Origen’s claim that humans
are “beginning of what was moulded from dust.”30 After the fall, the corporeal form
of the rational intelligences changed according to their merits and it was therefore
instantiated in different material bodies, according to a hierarchical order of per-
fection.31 Henceforth, it would appear that Origen distinguishes between body and
matter, for the latter underlies the former. While matter is a formless substra-
tum which needs to receive a form from outside, the body is a union of the
qualities which inform matter and the matter which receives these qualities.
Nevertheless, this theory about the composition of the body is insufficient to
explain how it would be possible to distinguish one’s identity throughout these
qualitative changes. For instance, in his Commentarii in Iohannem, Origen made
the example of John the Baptist, whose body once had angelic qualities, whilst
now has a human form.32 How can we tell that John the Baptist is the same if his
body has assumed first angelic qualities and now human qualities? If it is pos-
sible to shift from an angelic status to a human condition, rational intelligences
must be characterized by a corporeal form, which remains always the same in
spite of the qualitative changes which occur in the material substratum. The most
explicit and clear explanation about the composition and status of the body in its
post-lapsarian existence can be found in Origen’s Commentary on Psalm I, which

29 In Origen, Commentarii in Iohannem 13,127 (98,24–29 B.; trans. 94 H.), it is specified that: Εἰ
δὲ πᾶν σῶμα ὑλικὸν ἔχει φύσιν τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ ἄποιον τυγχάνουσαν, τρεπτὴν δὲ καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ
δι’ ὅλων μεταβλητὴν καὶ ποιότητας χωροῦσαν, ἃς ἐὰν βούληται αὐτῇ περιτιθέναι ὁ δημιουργός,
ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν θεὸν ὑλικὸν ὄντα τρεπτὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ μεταβλητόν. (“If every material
body has a nature that is without quality in its characteristic disposition, and is mutable and
subject to variation and change in general, and contains whatever qualities the Creator may wish
to bestow on it, God too, if he is material, must be mutable and subject to variation and change.”)
A similar explanation is also given in Origen, Contra Celsum 4,56 (326,1–328,30 B.). It is likely that
Origen inherited the idea that matter is a substratum without qualities from Platonic works in
which this theory is well attested, see Plato, Timaeus 50b-51c and also Plotinus, Enneades 2,4,8
(SCBO, 172,2–173,30 Henry/Schwyzer).
30 Origen, Commentarii in Iohannem 20,182 (248,52–55 B.).
31 Origen, De principiis 2,9,3 (356,59–358,95 C./S.).
32 Origen, Commentarii in Iohannem 2,175–185 (146–152 B.).

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  Paradoxical Bodies in Origen’s Theology of Progress 29

is extant in Epiphanius, Panarion 62,10 and 64,12–16. It is worth mentioning that,

although this passage has been bequeathed by Methodius and reported by Epi­
phanius, many scholars have underlined its trustworthiness, thus acknowledg-
ing its importance for the study of Origen’s notion of the body:33

Τοῦτο οὖν εἰς τὸν τόπον τοῦτον διαληπτέον, ὅτι πᾶν σῶμα ὑπὸ φύσεως συνεχόμενον
τῆς καταταττούσης ἔξωθέν τινα δίκην τροφῆς εἰς αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπεκκρινούσης ἀντὶ τῶν
ἐπεισαγομένων ἕτερα, ὥσπερ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων, τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον οὐδέποτε
ἔχει ταυτόν. Διόπερ οὐ κακῶς ποταμὸς ὠνόμασται τὸ σῶμα· διότι, ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀκριβὲς τάχα,
οὐδὲ δύο ἡμερῶν τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν· καίτοι γε τοῦ
οἷονεἰ Παύλου, ἢ Πέτρου, ἀεὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος, οὐ τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν μόνου, ἧς ἡ οὐσία οὔτε
ῥεῖ καθ’ ἡμᾶς, οὔτ’ ἐπεισαγόμενόν τι ἔχει ποτὲ, κἂν ῥευστὴ ἦ ἡ φύσις τοῦ σώματος, τῷ τὸ
εἶδος τὸ χαρακτηρίζον τὸ σῶμα ταυτὸν εἶναι· ὡς καὶ τοὺς τύπους μένειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς
τὴν ποιότητα Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου τὴν σωματικὴν παριστάνοντας.34

According to this passage, Origen deemed the body to be composed by two dis-
tinct elements: a) a corporeal form (εἶδος); b) a material substratum (ὑλικὸν
ὑποκείμενον). The corporeal form (εἶδος) identifies the body, remains the same
throughout the entire life of a λογικός, and is not affected by the qualitative changes
of the material substratum. By contrast, the material substratum changes accord-
ing to the accidents which occur from the outside, assuming different qualities
according to the external accidents. It is indeed only this material substratum
which changes according to the different qualities, whereas the corporeal form is
not affected by any substantial modification. If so, only the material substratum
(ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον) is corruptible and it is, therefore, destined to change each
day, whilst the corporal form remains the same and allows the identification of
a person. Could then this εἶδος be identified with the ψυχὴ? According to this
passage, εἶδος and ψυχὴ are two very distinct elements, although they are both
immune to external changes. Origen described the human εἶδος as possessing a

33 See Giulia Sfameni Gasparro, “Corpo,” Origene. Dizionario: la Cultura, il Pensiero, le Opere
(Roma, 2000): 87–92; Edwards, “Origen’s Two Resurrections” (see note 5), 502–518; Manlio
Simonetti, I Principi, Contra Celsum ed altri Scritti Filosofici (see note 3), 462–463.
34 Epiphanius, Panarion 2,64,14,2–4 (423,8–19 H.; trans. Frank Williams, Panarion of Epiphanius
of Salamis [NHMS 79; Oxford, 2012], 145): “At this point it must be understood that each body is
controlled by nature—which puts inside some substances from outside, such as food, and elimi­
nates others to supply for the ones put inside, such as the ones of plants and animals—and it has
never the same material substratum. Thus, the body has not inaptly been called a river since,
strictly speaking, the first substratum in our bodies is scarcely the same for two days. Yet, the
body of Peter and the one of Paul remains always the same not only in the soul, the essence of
which is not fluid and it does not accept anything from outside, but also in the body, the nature
of which is fluid. This is because the form which identifies the body is the same, in a way that the
physical features of Paul’s or Peter’s body remain always the same.”

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30 Lavinia Cerioni

fluid essence, which interacts with the material substratum, but it is not affected
by its changes. As a matter of fact, if a substance is separated by its qualities only
at a logical level, the corporal form and the corporeal matter can be distinct by the
intellect, but they appear as one to the human eye.
This theory is also expounded in two passages of Origen’s Contra Celsum:

Ὕλη γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασιν ὑποκειμένη τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ ἄποιος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος, τὰς
ποιότητας οὐκ οἶδα κατὰ Κέλσον, τὸν μὴ θέλοντα φθαρτόν τι ἔργον εἶναι τοῦ θεοῦ, ὑπὸ τίνος
λαμβάνουσα.35

Similarly:

Λέγομεν γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ κόκκου τοῦ “σίτου” ἐγείρεται στάχυς, οὕτως λόγος τις ἔγκειται
τῷ σώματι, ἀφ’ οὗ μὴ φθειρομένου “ἐγείρεται” τὸ σῶμα “ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ.”36

Besides confirming that the material substratum which underlies all bodies is the
result of the composition of various qualities, this passage reveals some more ele-
ments about the relation between εἶδος and λογικός. I believe that, in this case,
the choice of the word λόγος to describe the incorruptible principle of the body
is symptomatic of the strict connection between εἶδος and λογικός. On the one
hand, the εἶδος individuates the λογικός, thus distinguishing one rational intel-
ligence from the other. As such, the εἶδος ought to be interpreted as an inherent
property of the λογικοί, for it individuates rational intelligences (λογικοί), thus
allowing differences in the protological creation of intelligences. Hence, the crea­
tion of λογικοί would have implied the creation of as much εἴδεα to individu­
ate one λογικός from another, since each one was endowed with its proper and
unique form. On the other hand, the εἶδος represents the highest and most pure
form of the human body. Following Origen’s own word in the Contra Celsum, one
could say that the εἶδος is the body in its intellectual form.
Thus far, my findings seem to suggest that Origen envisioned three different
elements which constitute a body: 1) an unchangeable corporeal form (εἶδος);
2) a material substratum (ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον); 3) the different qualities which
inform the material substratum. The corporeal form represents the individuation

35 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,56 (SC 136, 326,10–329,13 Borret; trans. Henry Chadwick, Origen. Con-
tra Celsum [Cambridge, 1953], 230): “The same matter underlies all bodies and, strictly speaking,
is without qualities and shape, though by what agency Celsus thinks it receives its qualities, I
do not know.”
36 Origen, Contra Celsum 5,23 (68,4–71,7 B.; trans. 281–282 C.): “For we hold that, as from the
grain of corn an ear rises up, so in the body there lies a certain principle which is not corrupted
from which the body is raised in incorruption.” The example of the grain is also used in Origen,
De principiis 2,10,3 (380,79–382,120 C./S.).

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  Paradoxical Bodies in Origen’s Theology of Progress 31

principle of each rational intelligence. In this regard, the abovementioned pas-

sages seem to suggest that each rational nature (λογικός) had been endowed with
a corporeal form during the protological creation, since Origen underlined the
strict connection between εἶδος and λογικός. As such, we could hypothesise that
the εἶδος represents the body in its logical and intellectual form. The other two
parts of the body are the material substratum and its qualities. Although they
can be conceived separately, they never exist independently, since the ὑλικὸν
ὑποκείμενον changes according to the qualities which give form to it.

3 Eschatological Bodies
Since protology and eschatology are strictly connected in Origen’s theological
system,37 this reconstruction of Origen’s theory of the body poses further issues
concerning the eschatological destiny of the body. If εἶδος and λογικός were
created at the same time in the first creation described in Gen 1:26–27, whereas
materiality was created only at a later time as described in the creation of Gen 2:7
and 3:21, what is the eschatological destiny of the body? In other words, given that
materiality was not contemplated in the protological participation of the λογικοί
in the λόγος—for we have established that matter is consequence of sin and it was
created only at a later time—should one conclude that materiality prevents the
eschatological reunion between the λογικοί and the λόγος?
Concerning the status of the body in the eschatological times, the schol-
arly debate is still very much open. To my understanding, it is difficult to affirm
that Origen did not believe in the resurrection of the body, since there are many
passages in which he affirmed openly his belief in such an event. For instance,
Origen wrote in his De Principiis: Si confitentur etiam ipsi quia resurrectio sit mor-
tuorum, respondeat nobis: quid est quod mortuum est, nonne corpus? Corporis ergo
resurrectio fiet. Tum deinde dicant si utendum putant nobis esse corporis aut non?38
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that these blunt statements about Origen’s belief in
the resurrection of the body do not provide many clues about how he envisioned
this corporeal resurrection. Little information can be found in Origen’s De Prin-
cipiis and Contra Celsum, in which he used once more the metaphor of the grain
to explain this difficult concept:

37 Origen, De principiis 1,6,1–4 (194,1–206,185 C./S.).

38 Origen, De principiis 2,10,1 (374,19–23 C./S.; trans. 255 B.): “If they (the heretics) admit that
there is resurrection of the dead, let them answer to us: what is that died, if not a body? There will
therefore be a resurrection of the body!”

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32 Lavinia Cerioni

Ita namque etiam nostra corpora uelut granum cadere in terram putanda sunt; quibus insita
ratio ea, quae substantiam continet corporalem, quamuis emortua fuerint corpora et corrupta
atque dispersa, uerbo tamen dei ratio ilia ipsa, quae semper in substantia corporis salua est,
erigat ea de terra et restituat ac reparet, sicut ea uirtus, quae inest in grano frumenti, post
corruptionem eius ac mortem reparat ac restituit granum in culmi corpus et spicae.39

A similar passage can also be found in Origen’s Contra Celsum:

Μὴ βουλέσθω οὖν ὁ θεὸς παραλόγως αἰώνιον ἀποφῆναι μήτε τὸν τοῦ “σίτου” “κόκκον” ἀλλ’
εἰ ἄρα τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ στάχυν, μηδὲ τὸ σπειρόμενον “ἐν φθορᾷ” ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐγειρόμενον
“ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ.”40

Both these quotations seem to confirm what has been observed concerning
the body thus far. Here, Origen seems to distinguish between an immortal and
unchangeable corporeal form (εἶδος/λόγος/ratio) and a material substratum
which underlies the bodies (ὕλη/substantia corporis) and which is affected by
qualitative changes. While the latter substance is compared to a grain which is
sown and undergoes corruption, the former element is compared to the ear which
grows from the grain. In particular, it seems noteworthy that Origen acknowl-
edged the existence of the corporal form even while the grain was in a state of
corruption, thus confirming that the principle which makes the grain what it is, is
not affected by the corruption of the material substance. As the grain is corrupted
but the ear will be clothed in incorruptibility in virtue of the corporeal form which
is in the grain, so the corruptible body formed by both material substratum and
qualities will be changed in an incorruptible body because of the corporeal form
which makes it that specific body.
Although in a very metaphorical way, the same idea recurs also in Origen’s
Commentary on the Song of Songs, where the problem of the body is intertwined
with that of the reunion with God—namely, the mystical vision face-to-face.41 In

39 Origen, De principiis 2,10,3 (380,102–382,110 C./S.; trans. 259 B.): “For in the same way, our
bodies also must be supposed to fall into the earth like a grain, in which is implanted that princi-
ple which holds together the bodily substance, so that although the bodies die and are corrupted
and dispersed, yet, by the word of God that very principle which is always preserved in the sub-
stance of the body, raises them up from the earth and refashions and restores them, just as the
power, which exists in the grain of wheat, after its corruption and death, restores and refashions
the grain into a body with stalk and ear.”
40 Origen, Contra Celsum 5,24 (74,21–75,24 B.; trans. 282 C.): “Let us not, therefore, suppose that
contrary to reason God wishes to make everlasting the grain of corn, rather than the ear which
it produces, or the body sown in corruption, rather than the body which rises from it in incor-
ruption.”
41 For a detailed discussion of the soul’s eschatological vision of God in Origen’s work, see Lav-
inia Cerioni, “‘For Now we see in a Mirror, Dimly, but Then we will see Face to Face’ (1Cor 13:12).

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  Paradoxical Bodies in Origen’s Theology of Progress 33

this regard, some Origenian passages suggest that humans cannot achieve the
vision face-to-face while they are still in a material body.42 One of these passages
is the following:

Quod autem per retia prospicere dicitur fenestrarum, illud sine dubio indicat quod, donec in
domo huius corporis posita est anima, non potest nudam et apertam capere Dei sapientiam,
sed per exempla quaedam et indicia atque imagines rerum uisibilium illa quae sunt inuisibilia
et incorporea contemplatur, et hoc est prospicere ad eam sponsum per retia fenestrarum.43

In this passage, Origen’s opinion seems incontrovertible: the soul ought to

possess a different body from the one it has during its life to achieve the perfect
knowledge of God. The knowledge of this world is always mediated by images,
analogies and symbols, and it can never be a face-to-face apprehension of God. It
would appear that, whilst the soul can understand the spiritual meanings while
it is incarnated, it cannot participate in God as long as it is burdened by “heavy
matter.”44 Furthermore, in another passage, Origen explained that:

Commune autem sibi cubile quod dicit esse cum sponso, corpus hoc mihi uidetur indicari animae,
in quo adhuc posita digna habita sit adscisci ad consortium Verbi Dei. Idque umbrosum, utpote
non aridum, sed fructuosum memorat et tamquam densitate boni operis nemorosum.45

Origen was therefore establishing a distinction between receiving the wisdom of

God as long as the soul is in domo huius corporis (“in the house of the body”) and

Pauline Reception in Origen’s Commentary on the Song of Songs,” in Studia Patristica (forth-
coming 2019).
42 See Origen, Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum 3,14,19 (SC 376, 666–667 Brésard/Crouzel);
4,2,7–8 (700–703 B./C.).
43 Origen, Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum 3,14,19 (666–667 B/C.; trans. R. P. Lawson, The
Song of Songs: Commentary and Homilies [Ancient Christian Writers 26; London, 1957], 234–235):
“But that He is said to look ‘through the nets’ of the windows doubtless points the fact that so
long as the soul is in the house of this body (in domo huius corporis), she cannot receive the
naked and plain wisdom of God, but beholds the invisible and the incorporeal (sunt inuisibilia et
incorporeal) by means of certain analogies and tokens and images of visible things. And this is
what is meant by the Bridegroom looking at her through the nets of the windows.” Interestingly,
nets and windows are explicitly connected with the mirror of 1Cor 13:12. Similar ideas can be
found in Origen, Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum 2,4,30 (SC 375, 346–347 Brésard/Crouzel)
and 4,1,2 (678–679 B./C.).
44 See Origen, Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum 3,5,16 (532–533 B./C.).
45 Origen, Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum 3,2,2 (502–503 B./C.; trans. 172 L.): “The bed
which she (the soul) shares with the Bridegroom seems to me to denote the soul’s body (corpus
animae): in which she has been considered worthy to be admitted to the company of the Word of
God (ad consortium Verbi Dei). And she says that it is shady—that is to say, not dry, but fruitful,
and as it were bushy with a thicket of good words.”

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34 Lavinia Cerioni

being ad consortium Verbi Dei (“admitted to the company of the Word of God”)
while the soul is in the corpus animae (“body of the soul”).46 God being utterly
immaterial, the idea that the soul shares a material body with the Bridegroom
would have been unthinkable for Origen, thus ruling out the possibility that the
corpus animae that the soul shares with the Bridegroom is a material body. It
seems that Origen is here distinguishing between the domus huius corporis and
the corpus animae: one is a material body, whilst the other is an immaterial one.
Although these passages highlight possible ambiguities in Origen’s interpre-
tation of human body, they give some good insights in what he considered the
eschatological body to be. The vision face-to-face is here described as a deep and
complete apprehension of God’s wisdom, as well as a proper consortium in God.
This consortium is possible into the comune cubile (the “shared bed”), namely,
the perfect unity between the soul and Christ. This common body can only be the
body that the rational beings had protologically while they were with the λόγος in
the proximity which they had before the fall. Henceforth, from what it is deduc-
ible from Origen’s Commentary on the Song of Songs, such a proximity will be
enjoyed once more by the fallen souls, but only after a lifetime journey in which
they have gained a spiritual understanding of the Word of God and they have
detached themselves from materiality,47 while conserving their individuality and
thus their corporeal but immaterial form, namely their εἶδος.
In conclusion, from what it is deducible from the Commentary on the Song of
Songs, it would appear that the true consortium with God will be achieved only at
the eschatological time when the soul will rest in contemplation God maintaining
a soul’s body (corpus animae or εἶδος)—that is, the corporeal form which individ-
uates the λογικός but it is devoid of material features.

4 Conclusion
From the textual evidence illustrated in this article, I have concluded that the
greatest issue with Origen’s doctrine of the body—as to with every scholarly
account of such doctrines—lies in the variable terminology used by Origen.
Although he was a systematic thinker, he was not a systematic writer and, con-
sequently, his terminology was not always consistent, thus failing to maintain a

46 I would like to underline here the appellative of Verbi Dei that can be intended also as the
Scriptures.
47 It is worth specifying that Origen is open to the possibility that this process requires more
than one lifetime, see Origen, De principiis 1,3,4 (148,80–152,135 C./S.).

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  Paradoxical Bodies in Origen’s Theology of Progress 35

terminological consistency which would have clarified his position regarding the
body.
Nevertheless, it would appear that Origen separated the ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον
from the εἶδος. He defined ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον as the substratum which underlies
bodies and reflects the qualitative changes which happen according to the place
that the rational intelligence occupies in the cosmos, as in the case of John the
Baptist. This union of underlying matter and the qualities is considered by Origen
as the post-lapsarian body. By contrast, he defined the εἶδος as the corporeal form
which is unchangeable and individuates each rational creature; consequently,
this corporeal form remains always the same throughout the life (or lives) of the
rational creature.
Although I could not find any explicit textual evidence regarding the moment
in which the corporeal form was created, I have hypothesized that it was created
at the same time as the rational intelligences, that is, during the creation of
Gen 1:26–27. My suggestion is grounded on the fact that Origen often used ratio/
λόγος to indicate the principle which instantiates the bodies. This remains,
however, an educated guess, for I could not identify any texts which confirm my
deduction. By contrast, I have been able to locate several Origenian texts regard-
ing the resurrection of the body. Here, I noticed that Origen maintained the dis-
tinction between corporeality (that is, the corporeal form) and materiality (that
is, the matter which underlies bodies). While the material body’s corruption will
not be transformed in a glorious body, the corporeal form proper of each rational
creature will be restored in glory, that is, it will be transformed so to become
worthy of being admitted to the presence of God.
In this regard, my findings contribute to the contemporary debates on Ori-
gen’s doctrine of the body in several ways. On the one hand, my findings support
the thesis of scholars such as Jacobsen or Lettieri insofar I have attempted
to prove that Origen did not envision the redemption of matter (ὕλη/ὑλικὸν
ὑποκείμενον), namely of material bodies in their strict sense. In this regard, I
have taken a diametrically opposed stand to Edwards, for I have not found any
evidence which may suggest the resurrection of the material substance. On the
other hand, against Jacobsen and Lettieri, I have presented several textual evi-
dences which confirm the presence of a theory of the resurrection of the body in
Origen’s theology, thus being forced to wonder whether the body will survive in
certain form. Unlike Simonetti and Crouzel, I have been reticent to use the term
spiritual body to identify this resurrected body, for it implies the transformation
of the material substratum into something entirely opposite to it. I have preferred
instead the term corporeal form (εἶδος), which better translates the three terms
used by Origen to describe the principle which makes possible for a person to be
identified as that person, regardless of the material changes its body undergoes.

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