Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-39419, April 12, 1982
FACTS:
FACTS:
Petitioner Aisporna was charged with violating Section 189 of the Insurance Act after her
husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, was licensed as an agent for Perla Compania de Seguros. A 12-
month Personal Accident Policy was issued to Ana M. Isidro, who died by violence during the
policy's lifetime. The petitioner was charged because she did not possess a certificate of authority
to act as an agent from the Insurance Commission's office. The petitioner argued that she
naturally assisted Rodolfo in his work and that the policy was a renewal. The trial court found
her guilty, but the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions, finding her guilty of a
violation of Section 189 of the insurance act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of
the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused is acquitted of the
crime charged.
A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person
from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for
insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance
Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who an insurance agent is within the intent of
this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its
violation.
The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended
to define the word “agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an
insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in
the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section
189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize
and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. More importantly the doctrine of
associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning
may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it
is associated.
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also
applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive compensation by the agent is
an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section..
In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts
by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and
having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
