JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTERTM

2024 JURISTS PRE-BAR REVIEW PROGRAM

BAR REVIEW NOTES AND CASES ON

CRIMINAL LAW
(Basic Principles and Criminal Law 1)
By: Prof. MODESTO A. TICMAN, JR.

Part I
Basic Principles

1. Significant Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Enact

Penal Laws.

1.1 No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.
1.2 Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or inhuman
punishment inflicted.
1.3 No person shall be imprisoned for debt.
1.4 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
1.4.1 An ex post facto law is one which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a
person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the
punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict
the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law
which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the
proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences,
alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. (People vs. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA
241)

1.4.2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or

members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a
specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment,
penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last element, the total lack of court
intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be
imposed, is the most essential. (Misolas vs. Panga, 181 SCRA 648)

2. Characteristics of Philippine Criminal Laws.

2.1 GENERALITY – Philippine penal laws binding upon all persons who live or
sojourn within the Philippine territory.

2.1.1 Exceptions: those exempt from criminal prosecution by virtue of – [a] the
universally-accepted principles of Public International Law, such as
sovereigns, heads of states, ambassadors, charge d’ affaires; [b] treaties
and treaty stipulations; and [c] laws of preferential application.

2.2 TERRITORIALITY – Philippine penal laws undertake to punish crimes

committed within the Philippine territory.

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2.2.1 Exceptions: [a] crimes committed on board a Philippine registered vessel or

aircraft cruising on international waters or airspace; [b] crimes involving
counterfeiting or forging of coins or currency notes or introduction thereof
into the Philippines; [c] crimes committed by public officers while in the
exercise of their functions; [d] crimes against national security and the laws
of nations under Arts. 114-123 of the RPC; and [e] violations of certain
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (R.A. No. 11479).

2.2.2 Exceptions to the exceptions: Treaties and laws of preferential application.

2.3 PROSPECTIVITY – Philippine penal laws cannot make an act punishable

which when committed are not yet so. They cannot be given retroactive effect.

2.3.1 Exception: Those which establish conditions that are favorable or lenient
to the accused.

For as long as a penal law is favorable to the accused, it shall find application regardless of
whether its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if
service of sentence has already begun. The accused shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law
warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving his previous
sentence, and said service already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. (Hernan vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 05 December 2018)

Penal laws are laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses and
prescribing penalties for their violation. While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime or provide a
penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation component of our correctional system, its provisions have the
purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. (Inmates of the New Bilibid
Prison, et al. vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima, et al., G.R. No. 212719, 25 June 2019)

2.3.2 Exceptions to the exceptions: [a] habitual delinquents; or [b] if made

expressly inapplicable to pending actions or existing causes of action.

3. Interpretation of Penal Laws.

3.1 The fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all
doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused. This is in
consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and
until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. It is well-settled that the scope of a penal statute
cannot be extended by good intention, implication, or even equity consideration. Only those persons,
offenses, and penalties, clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered, within the
statute's operation. (Pulido vs. People, G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021)

3.2 If the statute admits two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which
operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred. (People vs. Sullano, G.R.
No. 228373, 12 March 2018)

4. Mistake of Fact.
4.1 Mistake of fact is the misapprehension of facts on the part of the accused. It is
an absolutory cause. It

Requisites: [1] the act would have been LAWFUL had the facts been as the
accused believed them to be;
[2] the INTENTION of the accused was lawful; and
[3] the mistake was WITHOUT fault or carelessness on the part
of the accused.

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4.2 Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the
intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general
intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or state of
mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and
reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or the
existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. (Yapyuco vs.
Sandiganbayan, 674 SCRA 420)

5. Motive vs. Intent.

5.1 Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. It
is not an element of a crime. As such, it need not be proven by the prosecution EXCEPT
when – [a] the identity of accused is in dispute; [b] there is a need in ascertaining the truth
between two antagonistic versions of the killing; [c] the evidence is merely circumstantial.

5.2 Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect a definite result. It is
an element of a crime, except for culpable felonies, and thus, must be proven by the
prosecution.

6. Mala in se vs. mala prohibita.

6.1 Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and
acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This
distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is
that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been
violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. When the doing of an act is prohibited by
law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.

A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while
all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be mala in se crimes
under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended. Similarly, there may be mala prohibita
crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical malversation.

The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of
the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then
it is a crime mala in se, - on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its
commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime
involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances
surrounding the violation of the statute. (Dungo vs. People, 761 SCRA 375)

6.2 When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they
are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of
the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. (Mabunot vs. People, 803 SCRA 349)

6.3 Crimes penalized under Secs. 5(i) [denial of financial support] and 5(e) of R.A. 9262 are mala
in se, not mala prohibita, even though R.A. 9262 is a special penal law. The acts punished therein are inherently
wrong or depraved, and the language used under the said penal law requires a mental element. Being a crime
mala in se, there must thus be a concurrence of both actus reus and mens rea to constitute the crime. xxx.

xxx. In other words, to be punishable by Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the
accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological
violence upon her, with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to
accomplish said purpose.

This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to
the level of criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In

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other words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support,
but the accused merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. (Acharon
vs. People, G.R. No. 224946, 09 November 2021)

6.4 Dispensing with proof of criminal intent for crimes mala prohibita does not, in any way,
discharge the prosecution of its burden to show that the prohibited act was done intentionally by the accused. It is
important to distinguish between intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act - while a person may
not have consciously intended to commit a crime regarded as malum prohibitum, he or she may still be held liable
if he or she did intend to commit an act that is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. Thus, for acts that are
mala prohibita, the intent to perpetrate the prohibited act under the special law must nevertheless be shown.

In contrast to crimes mala in se, which presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal
intent in doing so, crimes mala prohibita do not require such knowledge or criminal intent; rather, what is crucial is
volition or the intent to commit the act. While volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done
(as opposed to knowledge of the nature of the act), criminal intent is the state of mind that goes beyond
voluntariness, and it is this intent which is punished by crimes mala in se. To hold an offender liable for an offense
that is malum prohibitum, it is sufficient that there is a conscious intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the
special law, for the essence of mala prohibita is voluntariness in the commission of the act constitutive of the
crime. (Valenzona vs. People, G.R. No. 248584, 30 August 2023)

7. Entrapment vs. Instigation.

7.1 In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce
the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense and become co-principals themselves. (People vs.
Pacis, 384 SCRA 696)

7.2 There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension
of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to
commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the
mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him.
In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the
idea and carries it into execution. (Chang vs. People, 496 SCRA 321) The legal effects of entrapment do not
exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does. (People vs. Sta. Maria, 519 SCRA 621).

8. Alibi as a defense.

8.1 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for
this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the witnesses. For the defense
of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its
commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and
the location of the accused when the crime was committed. The accused must demonstrate that he was so far
away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime
was committed. (People vs. Ambatang, G.R. No. 205855, 29 March 2017; People vs. Llobera, G.R. No. 203066,
05 August 2015).

9. Corpus Delicti.

9.1 Proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecutions for felonies and offenses. Corpus delicti
has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime
has actually been committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission by someone of
the particular crime charged. Corpus delicti refers to the specific injury or loss sustained. It is the fact of the
commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimonies of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti
does not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide with the
use of unlicensed firearms, or to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. (People vs. Obedo, 403
SCRA 431; Rieta vs. People, 436 SCRA 273)

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9.2 The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to
possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the
burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess or carry the same. (Sayco vs. People, 547 SCRA 368)

9.3 In arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire,
e.g., the charred remains of a house burned down and of its having been intentionally caused. (People vs.
Gonzales, 560 SCRA 419)

9.4 In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner,
and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. (Zapanta vs. People, 694 SCRA 25)

9.5 In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous
drug itself. The corpus delicti is established by proof that the identity and integrity of the prohibited or regulated
drug seized or confiscated from the accused has been preserved; hence, the prosecution must establish beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug to prove its case against the accused. The prosecution can
only forestall any doubts on the identity of the dangerous drug seized from the accused to that which was
presented before the trial court if it establishes an unbroken chain of custody over the seized item. (People vs.
Asjali, G.R. No. 216430, 03 September 2018)

10. Conspiracy.

10.1 Conspiracy to commit a crime is not punishable unless there is a law that
specifically provides a penalty therefor. However, if the crime subject of the conspiracy has
actually been committed, it shall be deemed absorbed in the crime and shall become a
manner of incurring criminal liability. In such case, all persons who may have participated
therein shall be held equally liable regardless of the extent, nature or degree of their
participation.

10.2 Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless
abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown
to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. (People vs.
Vasquez, 430 SCRA 52)

10.3 It is not necessary to prove a previous agreement to commit a crime if there is proof that the
malefactors have acted in concert and in pursuance of the common objectives. Direct proof is not essential to
show conspiracy since it is by its nature often planned in utmost secrecy and it can seldom be proved by direct
evidence. (People vs. Yu, 428 SCRA 437)

10.4 There is an implied conspiracy when two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, are in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. In other words, there must be unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the
unlawful objective. (People vs. Bermudo, G.R. No. 225322, 04 July 2018)

10.5 To hold one as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he performed an
overt act in pursuance of or in furtherance of the conspiracy, although the acts performed might have been distinct
and separate. This overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it
may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the
crime, or by exerting a moral ascendance over the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement
the criminal plan. (People vs, Raguro, G.R. No. 224301, 30 July 2019)

10.6 Mere presence at the scene of the crime is not, by itself, sufficient to establish conspiracy.
There must be evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is
required. Knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to

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a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose. (People vs. Escobal, G.R. No. 206292, 11 October 2017)

Part II
Revised Penal Code – Book 1

11. Praeter intentionem.

11.1 Any person may be held liable for an intentional felony although the wrong
done is not intended by him, if:

1. he has committed an intentional felony;

2. the wrong done or injury caused is the direct, natural or logical consequence of the
felony committed;
or
if the intentional felony committed is the proximate cause of the injury or damage
incurred by the victim.

Notes: (a) Although the accused may be held guilty of the offense which he did not intend to
commit, he may however be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of “no intent to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed” under par. 3 of Art. 13 of the RPC.
(b) If the accused has performed an act which does not constitute an intentional
felony but which, through his negligence or imprudence, has resulted to the death of
or infliction of physical injuries upon the victim, he may be held liable for Reckless
Imprudence/Negligence resulting to Homicide/Physical Injuries, a culpable felony.

11.2 Proximate cause is the causal connection between the felonious act and the resultant injury,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. “Efficient intervening cause”: [a] deliberate act of the offended
party; or [b] an active force based on an act or fact absolutely foreign from the criminal act. The following pre-
existing conditions may not be efficient intervening causes: [i] pathological condition of the victim; [ii]
predisposition of the offended party; [iii] physical condition of the offended party; [iv] concomitant or concurrent
conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors; or [v] the conditions supervening the felonious act such
as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene. (Quinto vs. Andres, 453 SCRA 511)

12. Impossible crimes.

In impossible crimes, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or
property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. That the offense cannot be produced because the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be in
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform
an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act, (3) there is a performance of the
intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The
impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand
in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and finds the pocket empty. (Intod vs.
CA, 215 SCRA 52)

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13. Stages of execution.

13.1 The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident
other than his spontaneous desistance.

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed. (Macapagal-Arroyo vs. Sandiganbayan, 797 SCRA 241)

13.2 The elements of a frustrated felony as the following:

1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. (People vs. Caballero,
400 SCRA 424)

13.3 Stages of execution in Homicide cases.

1. Consummated Homicide: if the victim dies or is killed.

2. If the intended victim survives, the accused is guilty thereof either in its attempted or
frustrated stage only.

2.1 Frustrated Homicide. The accused is deemed to have performed all acts of execution which
would have produced the felony of Homicide, etc. if the wound sustained by the victim is fatal
or mortal, which could have caused his instantaneous death where it not for a cause
independent of the offender’s will, say, timely medical intervention.

2.2 Attempted Homicide. The accused has not performed all the acts of execution where the
wound inflicted on the victim is not fatal or mortal, or even if the latter has not incurred any
injury.

3. In attempted and frustrated homicide, there must always be intent to kill. Otherwise, the
accused may be held guilty of physical injuries or other lesser offenses only. However, the accused may
be held liable for Homicide, Infanticide or Parricide, even absent intent to kill, if the death of the victim
resulted under the circumstances referred to in Art. 4, par. 1 of the RPC. In Murder in whatever stage,
intent to kill is essential. (Ticman, The Preweek Reviewer for Jittery Bar Takers, Vol. III, 2021 ed., pp.
191-192)

13.4 Theft or Robbery has no frustrated stage. They are either attempted or
consummated. It is already produced upon the “taking of personal property of another xxx.” There was no need
for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of
the proprietary rights of the owner is enough to constitute the crime in its consummated stage. (Valenzuela vs.
People, 525 SCRA 306)

13.5 There is no frustrated stage in Rape; it is either attempted or consummated. For its
consummation, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is
sufficient. It is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution were
performed. (People vs. Orita, 184 SCRA 114)

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14. Justifying circumstances.

14.1 Self-defense. The elements of self-defense are: (1) that the victim has committed unlawful
aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) that
there be reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that
there be lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense or, at least, that any
provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense be not the proximate and immediate cause of the
victim’s aggression. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be
successfully pleaded (People vs. Asis, 634 SCRA 491)

14.2 Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical
injury upon a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression, unless
the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. There must be an
actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendant’s life in real peril.
(Manaban vs. CA, 494 SCRA 503)

14.3 A mere threatening or intimidating attitude or an exchange of insulting words and invectives
between the accused and victim, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression,
unless coupled with physical assault. (People vs. CA and Tangan, 352 SCRA 599)

14.4 The unlawful aggression must be continuing or must have been existing at the time the defense
is made. Once unlawful aggression ceases, the one making the defense no longer has any right to injure, much
less kill the victim. (People vs. San Juan, 386 SCRA 400; People vs. Dijan, 383 SCRA 15)

14.5 In defense of property rights, unlawful aggression as an element thereof need not be coupled
with an attack upon the person making such defense. (People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389)

14.6 The means employed to repel the unlawful aggression must be reasonable and necessary. It
does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is a
rational equivalence, considering certain factors, such as: the emergency, the imminent danger to which the
person attacked is exposed, and the instinct more than reason, that moves or impels the defense. The
proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such injury.
(Velasquez vs. People, G.R. No. 195021, 15 March 2017).

14.7 When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential
element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of
exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the
provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and should immediately precede the
act. This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2)
when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was
not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person defending
himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression. (Urbano vs. People, 576 SCRA 826)

14.8 State of necessity. The infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or
injury may not befall one’s self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least possible
prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to another or, if
there is no such other way but the damage to another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to one’s
self, then such course should be taken. (People vs. Punzalan, 687 SCRA 675)

14.9 If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future,
this defense is not applicable. For the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should
not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. (Ty vs.
People, 439 SCRA 220)

14.10 Fulfillment of duty. The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of a right or office rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the

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lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused, or the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. (Mamangun vs.
People, 514 SCRA 44)

14.11 Obedience to order. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following requisites
must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for some lawful purpose; and
(3) the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful. (Ambil vs. Sandiganbayan, 653 SCRA
576).

14.12 Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality,
the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith. (Tabuena vs.
Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332)

15. Exempting circumstances.

15.1 Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the
act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced
by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. Thus,
in order to lend credence to a defense of insanity, it must be shown that the accused had no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts. (People vs. Umawid, 725 SCRA 597)

15.2 Age of the offender/child in conflict with the law as a circumstance which
may affect his criminal liability.

Age Extenuating Circumstance

15 years or below (Sec. 6, R.A. 9344) Exempting
Over 15 years but under 18 years, who acted Exempting
without discernment. (Sec. 6, R.A. 9344)
Over 15 years but under 18 years, who acted Privileged Mitigating
with discernment. (Sec. 6, R.A. 9344)
Under 18 years (for the crimes of prostitution [Art.
202, RPC], mendicancy [PD 1563] and sniffing
Exempting
rugby [PD 1619]), with or without discernment.
(Sec. 58, R.A. 9344)
Over 18 years but under 70 years Full responsibility
Over 70 years (Art. 13 [2], RPC) Generic Mitigating
(Ticman, The Preweek Reviewer for Jittery Bar Takers, Vol. III, 2021 ed., p. 199)

15.3 The existence of Accident must be proved by the appellant to the satisfaction of the court. For
this to be properly appreciated in appellant’s favor, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the accused was
performing a lawful act with due care; (2) that the injury is caused by mere accident; and (3) that there was no
fault or intent on his part to cause the injury. The accused must convincingly prove the presence of these
elements in order to benefit from the exempting circumstance of accident. (People vs. Latosa, 621 SCRA 586)

15.4 Irresistible force and uncontrollable fear. The duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of
such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. A
speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear of future injury, is insufficient. (People vs. Dequina, 640 SCRA 111;
People vs. Licayan, 764 SCRA 227). Additionally, the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that
committed.

16. Mitigating circumstances.

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16.1 No intent to commit so grave a wrong. In homicide cases, the

determination of the real intention of the offender may be based on the weapon used, the part
of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. In other cases, the
utterances and/or demeanor of the accused, before, during or after the commission of the
crime may be considered. This circumstance is always appreciated in favor of the accused if
he incurs criminal liability for an offense which he does not intend to commit under par. 1 of
Art. 4 of the RPC (praeter intentionem).

16.2 Threats and provocation. Before the same can be appreciated, the following elements
must concur: (1) That the provocation or threat must be sufficient or proportionate to the crime committed and
adequate to arouse one to its commission; (2) That the provocation or threat must originate from the offended
party; and (3) That the provocation must be immediate to the commission of the crime by the person provoked.
(People vs. Beltran, 503 SCRA 715).

16.3 The threat must not be offensively and positively strong, i.e., such is not
accompanied by an act manifesting the intention of the victim of making good of his threat.
Otherwise, the threat may constitute unlawful aggression that could give rise to self-defense.

16.4 Vindication of a grave offense. For such to be credited, the following requisites must
be satisfied: (1) that there be a grave offense done to the one committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees;
and (2) that the felony is committed in vindication of such grave offense. (Napone vs. People, G.R. No. 193085,
29 November 2017)

16.5 A lapse of time is allowed between the grave offense and the vindication if the
influence thereof, by reason of its gravity and the circumstances under which it was inflicted,
lasted until the moment crime was committed.

16.6 Passion or obfuscation. For this mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be

shown that (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended
victim; (2) that the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission of the unlawful
act that produced the obfuscation in the accused’s mind; and that (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from
lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge. To be entitled to this mitigating circumstance,
the following elements must be present: (1) There should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
condition of mind; (2) the act that produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime
by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. (People vs.
Gonzalez, 359 SCRA 220; People vs. Cuasay, 569 SCRA 870)

16.7 Provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-
settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as
one mitigating circumstance xxx and not as two separate mitigating circumstances. (Romera vs. People, 434
SCRA 467)

16.8 Voluntary surrender. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following
elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders himself to a
person in authority or to the latter’s agent, and 3) the surrender is voluntary. To be sufficient, the surrender must
be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally,
either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will
necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them. (People vs. Casta, 565 SCRA 341) If none of these
two (2) reasons impelled the accused to surrender, because his surrender was obviously motivated more by an
intention to insure his safety, his arrest being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous. (Belbis vs. People, 685
SCRA 518)

16.9 The filing of information and/or the issuance of warrant will not automatically make the
surrender involuntary. Despite the pendency of an arrest warrant, the accused may still be entitled to the
mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of giving
himself up, such as, if immediately upon learning that a warrant for his arrest was issued, and without the same
having been served on him, he surrendered to the authorities. (De Vera vs. De Vera, 584 SCRA 506)

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16.10 Confession of guilt. To be entitled to such mitigating circumstance, the accused must
have voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.
The following requirements must therefore concur: (1) the accused spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the
confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before a competent court trying the case; and (3) the
confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. (People vs. Montinola, 360
SCRA 631). To be voluntary, the plea of guilty must be to the offense charged. People vs. Dawaton, 389 SCRA
277).

16.11 Similar and analogous circumstances. Although restitution is akin to voluntary

surrender, restitution (in Malversation, Theft, Robbery and Estafa) should be treated as a separate mitigating
circumstance in favor of the accused when the two circumstances are present in a case, which is similar to
instances where voluntary surrender and plea of guilty are both present even though the two mitigating
circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering that
restitution is also tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part of the accused, it is proper to consider it as a
separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused. (Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan, 672 SCRA 270)

17. Aggravating Circumstances.

17.1 Abuse of Public Position. To appreciate this aggravating circumstance, the public
officer must use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him as a means by which he realizes
his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the inquiry “Did the accused abuse his office to commit
the crime?” (People vs. Villamor, 373 SCRA 254) If the accused could have perpetrated the crime even without
occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. (People vs. Amion, 353 SCRA 410)

17.2 In contempt of or with insult to public authorities. The requisites of this

circumstance are: (1) the public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties and (2) he is not the person
against whom the crime is committed. (People vs. De Mesa, 354 SCRA 397)

17.3 Disregard of Age or Sex. Anent the circumstance of age, there must be a showing that
the malefactor deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim. Neither could disregard of respect
due to sex be appreciated if the offender did not manifest any intention to offend or disregard the sex of the victim.
In other words, killing a woman is not attended by the aggravating circumstance if the offender did not manifest
any specific insult or disrespect towards the offended party’s sex. (People vs. Taboga, 376 SCRA 500)

17.4 Dwelling. It Includes every dependency of the house that forms an integral part thereof,
including the staircase of the house and its terrace. (People vs. Rios, 333 SCRA 823). It may also mean
temporary dwelling; it may be aggravating even if the victim was not the owner of the house where the crime was
committed, be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bedspacer, as what the law seeks to protect is the sanctity of the
home. (People vs. Dela Torre, 373 SCRA 104)

17.5 It is not aggravating if the offended party has given provocation, which must be sufficient, and
have immediately preceded the commission of the crime (People vs. Rios, 333 SCRA 823); if the building where
the crime was committed was NOT solely, entirely and exclusively used for dwelling purposes (People vs. Taño,
331 SCRA 448); when both offender and offended party reside in the same house; and In Robbery with use of
force upon things and Trespass to dwelling, because it is inherent in both crimes.

17.6 Abuse of confidence. For this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show
that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some
advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act. The confidence must be a means of facilitating the
commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party’s belief that the former would not
abuse said confidence. (People vs. Arrojado, 350 SCRA 679)

17.7 Nighttime, Band, or Uninhabited Place. By and of itself, nighttime (band or

uninhabited place) is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially
sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by
ensuring the offender’s immunity from capture. (People vs. Silva, 387 SCRA 77). In default of any showing that

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the peculiar advantage of nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by the accused, the fact that the
offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain nocturnidad. To be aggravating, this circumstance must
concur with the intent or design of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic impunity afforded by the darkness of
night. (People vs. Balais, 565 SCRA 555).

17.8 “Aid of armed men”. In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices only. They must
not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are
to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. (People vs. Enojas, 718 SCRA 313)

17.9 Distinctions among the forms of repetition.

Recidivism Habituality Quasi-Recidivism Habitual Delinquency

(Reiteracion)
Accused was previously convicted by final judgment of (a) crime/s and
is convicted anew of another.
Offense/s which the Offense of which the Offenses which the
Offense which the accused was previously accused was previously accused was previously
accused was previously punished for and of which convicted and for which convicted of (which
convicted of and of he is convicted anew need he is serving sentence is should be robbery, theft,
which he is convicted not be embraced under the punished under the RPC serious/less serious PI,
anew must be same Title of the RPC; or SPL, while the offense estafa or falsification) and
embraced under the both offenses however that he commits while of which he is convicted
same Title of the RPC. must be punished under serving sentence therefor anew must be punished
the RPC. must be punished under under the RPC.
the RPC.
Previous conviction by Service of sentence is Previous conviction by Previous conviction by
final judgment is required. final judgment is enough. final judgment is enough.
enough.
Within 10 years from
No period between No period between No period between release or last conviction
previous and last previous and last previous and last for robbery, xxx, accused
convictions. convictions. convictions. was found guilty thereof,
a third time or oftener.
Generic Agg. Circ. Generic Agg. Circ. Special Agg. Circ. Extra-ordinary Agg. Circ.
Can be offset by Mit. C. Can be offset by Mit. C. Not offset by Mit. C. Not offset by Mit. C.
If not offset by MC, If not offset by MC, serves Serves to increase
serves to increase to increase penalty to penalty to maximum Additional penalty is
penalty to maximum maximum period. period. imposed.
period.
Always an Agg. Circ. Not always an Agg. Circ. Always an Agg. Circ. Additional penalty is
always imposed.
(Ticman, The Preweek Reviewer for Jittery Bar Takers, Vol. III, 2021 ed., pp. 210-211)

17.10 Price, reward or promise. The accused had used money or other valuable
consideration for the purpose of inducing another to perform a criminal act. It is not
aggravating if the person supposedly induced had other personal reasons to commit the
crime or if he would have nonetheless committed the crime with or without such price,
reward, or of its offer or promise.

17.11 By means of fire, poison, inundation, explosion, and other artifice

involving great waste or ruin. If the offender, with intent to kill, kills another by means of
fire or explosion, he is guilty of Murder. But if the offender, absent intent to kill, destroys a
property by means of fire or explosion and as a result, a person dies or is killed, he is guilty of
Arson with Homicide (a special complex crime) or Destruction with Homicide (ordinary
complex crime), as the case may be.

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17.12 Evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following

requisites must be shown: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such a
determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon the consequences of his act and
to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of the will if he desired to hearken to its warning. (People vs.
Dimacuha, G.R. No. 191060, 02 February 2015; People vs. Cirbeto, G.R. No. 231359, 08 February 2018).

17.13 Evident premeditation may not be appreciated if the attack was the result of rising tempers or
made in the heat of anger (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 224498, 11 January 2018) as well as if the victim is
different from that intended unless if it is shown that the accused was determined to kill not only the intended
victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance. (People vs. Ventura, 433 SCRA 389)

17.14 Abuse of superior strength/Means to weaken defense. They may be taken as

one and the same aggravating circumstance. Employment of means to weaken the defense is, at the very least,
subsumed under the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. In determining whether the qualifying
circumstance of employing means to weaken the defense is present, the Court is guided by the same standard in
determining the presence of abuse of superior strength, i.e., notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor's and purposely selected or taken
advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. (People vs. Maron, G.R. No. 232339, 20 November 2019)

17.15 Abuse of superior strength is appreciated whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and his aggressors, and the latter took advantage of such inequality to facilitate the
commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. Unlike in treachery, where the victim was not
given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not
mean that the victim was completely defenseless. It is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural
strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means
weakening the defense, although not annulling it. (People vs. Pagapulaan, G.R. No. 216936, 29 July 2019).

17.16 An attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded
him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. (People vs. Enojo, G.R. No. 240231, 27 November
2019)

17.17 Treachery. It is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make In turn, its
elements are: (1) employment of means, method or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the
malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim; and (2) deliberate adoption of such means,
method or manner of execution. In other words, the means of attack, consciously adopted by the assailant,
rendered the victim defenseless. (People vs, Bermudo, G.R. No. 225322, 04 July 2018). It is not enough that the
attack was "sudden," "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." (People vs. Bagabay, G.R. No.
236297, 17 October 2018)

17.18 There can be no treachery when the victim was "forewarned of the danger he was in," "put on
guard," or otherwise "could anticipate aggression from the assailant" as when "the assault is preceded by a
heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the hostility of the
assailant towards the former." (People vs. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 232380, 04 September 2019)

17.19 Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his
person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate. The essence of treachery lies on the deliberate, swift, and unexpected attack on the hapless, unarmed,
and unsuspecting victim, leaving the latter no chance to resist or escape. (People vs. Angeles, G.R. No. 224289,
14 August 2019)

17.20 Cruelty. For cruelty to exist, there must be proof showing that the accused delighted in
making their victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical and moral pain in the
consummation of the criminal act. (People vs. Catian, 374 SCRA 514). The crime is not aggravated by cruelty

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simply because the victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of which were fatal. For cruelty to be considered as
an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that, in inflicting several stab wounds on the victim, the
perpetrator intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering of the victim. The number of wounds inflicted on the
victim is not proof of cruelty. (Simangan vs. People, 434 SCRA 38).

18. Alternative Circumstances.

They are those which must be taken into consideration as (generic) aggravating or
(generic) mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions
attending its commission. They are: (1) Relationship, (2) Intoxication, and (3) Degree of
instruction and education.

18.1 Intoxication. It is the consumption of such quantity of any alcoholic

beverage as to blur one’s reason and deprive him of certain degree of control.

18.2 It is mitigating if it is not habitual and not intentional, i.e., not

subsequent to the plan to commit a crime; it is aggravating if it is habitual or intentional,
i.e., subsequent to the plan to commit a crime.

19. Persons Criminally Liable.

19.1 As to the Degree of Participation.

PRINCIPALS ACCOMPLICES ACCESSORIES

Conspirators NOT conspirators NOT conspirators
Participate before, during Participate before or during Participate after the
or after the commission of the commission of the crime. commission of the crime.
the crime.
May be liable for May be liable forMay be liable for
consummated, frustrated consummated, frustrated and consummated and
and attempted felonies. attempted felonies. frustrated felonies only.
May be liable for Grave, May be liable for Grave, Less May be liable for Grave
Less Grave and Light Grave and Light Felonies. and Less Grave Felonies
Felonies. only.
Penalty: that prescribed by Penalty: one (1) degree lower Penalty: two (2) degrees
law for the offense. than that prescribed by law lower than that prescribed
for principals. by law for principals.
(Ticman, The Preweek Reviewer for Jittery Bar Takers, Vol. III, 2021 ed., pp. 217-218)

19.2 Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered principals by
direct participation if the following requisites are present: [a] they participated in the criminal resolution and [b]
they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end.
(People vs. Dacillo, 427 SCRA 528)

19.3 Even if there is no conspiracy, one is criminally liable as principal by direct participation if he
performs overt acts which produce the crime. It is sufficient if said acts contributed to the accomplishment of the
crime and thus is liable therefor by reason of his individual and separate overt criminal acts. (People vs.
Cabareño, 349 SCRA 297)

19.4 The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires [a] that the inducement be
made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and [b] that such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission by the material executor. Inducement may be by acts of command, advice
or through influence or agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the influence must have actually
moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. (Ambagan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, 14
October 2015; People vs. Batin, 539 SCRA 272)

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19.5 To be regarded as an accomplice, it must be shown that (i) he knew the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, and concurred with the latter in his purpose; (ii) he cooperated in the execution by
previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in
an efficacious way; and (iii) his acts bore a direct relation with the acts done by the principal. (Gurro vs. People,
G.R. Nos. 224562 and 237216, 18 September 2018). An accomplice needs to have had both knowledge of and
participation in the criminal act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in conjunction
and directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal design.
(People vs. Tolentino, 380 SCRA 171).

19.6 Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation
after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to
cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. However, where
one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of
execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice. (People vs. Pilola, 405 SCRA
134).

19.7 Conspirators vs. Accomplices. Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in
common: they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention
because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the
principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators
decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the
crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are
the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense. (People vs. Salvador, 695 SCRA 660)

19.8 Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines an accessory as one who had knowledge of the
commission of the crime and did not participate in its commission as principal or accomplice, yet took part
subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting oneself or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in
order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the
crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime. To convict an accused as an accessory, the following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of
the commission of the crime and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes. (People
vs. Tolentino, 380 SCRA 171).

20. Multiple Offenses.

20.1 Complex crimes under Art. 48 of the RPC, as distinguished from special
complex crimes and continuous crimes.

Ordinary Complex Crimes Special Complex Crimes or Continued or Continuous

Composite Crimes Crimes
Two or more crimes are actually committed, yet, in the eyes of the law, they constitute only one crime. Thus,
only one penalty is imposed.
They result from (1) a single act
constituting 2 or more grave or They result from different acts or They result from different acts or a
less grave felonies [compound that one offense may not be series of acts but all arising from
crimes]; or (2) the commission of necessary for the commission of one criminal resolution.
an offense as a necessary means another crime.
of committing another crime
[complex crime proper].
The combination of the offenses
is not specified but generalized, The composition of the offenses The composition of which is not
i.e., grave and/or less grave, or is fixed by law. specified by law; 2 or more
one offense being the necessary violations of the same penal

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means to commit the other. provision.

The penalty is that corresponding
to the more/most serious offense, The penalty is specific, i.e., that The penalty is specific, i.e., that
to be imposed in the maximum which is prescribed by law. which is prescribed by law for the
period. offense.
Light felonies are treated as a
separate offense, except in quasi- Light felonies are absorbed. N/A
delicts.
Applicable to crimes under the Applicable to crimes under the Applicable to crimes under the
RPC. RPC and SPL. RPC and SPL.
Examples: RPC – Theft of 2 or
Examples: Multiple murder, Direct Examples: RPC – Robbery more personal properties from the
Assault w/Homicide, Forcible w/Homicide, Rape w/ Homicide, same place and at the same
Abduction w/Rape, Theft thru Kidnapping w/Rape; SPL – period; SPL – viol. of Sec. 3 (e),
Falsification of Commercial Carnapping w/ Homicide (R.A. R.A. 3019 [Santiago vs.
Document. 10883) Garchitorena: favoring 32
unqualified aliens with the benefits
of the Alien Legalization Program]
(Ticman, The Preweek Reviewer for Jittery Bar Takers, Vol. III, 2021 ed., pp. 217-218)

20.2 Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done
in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex
offense. (People vs. Sanidad, 402 SCRA 381)

20.3 In forcible abduction with rape, forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus,
the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with
rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the forcible abduction. (People vs. Garcia,
378 SCRA 266)

20.4 There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, because the
immediate effect of falsification of private document is the same as that of estafa. The falsification of a private
document cannot be said to be a means to commit estafa, because the fraudulent gain obtained through deceit in
estafa, in the commission of which a private document was falsified, is nothing more nor less than the very
damage caused by the falsification of such document. (L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code-Criminal Law, Book
II, 2021 ed., p. 292). If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the
proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a
document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. (Batulanon vs. People, 502 SCRA 35)

20.5 In Quasi-delicts, light felonies are not treated and punished as offenses separate from grave
and less grave felonies. (Ivler vs. San Pedro, 635 SCRA 191)

21. Preventive imprisonment (Art. 29, RPC)

21.1 It is detention of the accused while being prosecuted for a crime, either
because he is charged of a non-bailable offense or if bailable, he cannot put up the required
bail.

20.2 The period during which the accused has undergone preventive imprisonment
may be deducted from the penalty to which he is sentenced, as follows: [a] FULL TIME of
preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, unless - (a) he is a recidivist, or has
been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime, and (b) when, upon being
summoned for the execution of his sentence, he has failed to surrender voluntarily, OR [b]
4/5 of the period of preventive imprisonment, if he does not agree in writing to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

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22. Penalties.

22.1 Although reclusion perpetua has a definite duration, it remains to be an indivisible penalty and,
when it is the prescribed penalty, should be imposed in its entirety without a fixed period for its duration,
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime. In
prescribing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, its duration in years need not be specified. (People vs. Zacarias,
375 SCRA 278)

22.2 Order of payment of pecuniary liabilities: [1] Reparation of the damage

caused, [2] Indemnification of consequential damages, [3] FINE, [4] Cost of the proceedings.

22.3 Subsidiary imprisonment. In case failure to pay FINE, the convict shall be
subjected to subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day for each amount equivalent
to the highest minimum wage rate in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment
of conviction by the trial court.

22.4 Limitations: [1] if the penalty is prision correccional, arresto mayor or arresto
menor and FINE, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed 1/3 of the sentence and in
no case shall it continue for more than one year; [2] if the penalty is FINE only: not more
than 6 months for grave or less grave felony; [3] no subsidiary imprisonment if the penalty
is prison mayor or higher; and [4] if the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment
in case of failure to pay the penalty of fine. (People vs. Alapan, G.R. No. 199527, 10 January 2018)

22.5 Indeterminate Sentence Law (IS Law); Disqualified offenders: {1} those
convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment (and reclusion
perpetua, as it is equated as synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of the IS Law.
[People vs. Enriquez, 465 SCRA 407]) {2} if the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed
one (1) year; {3} those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; {4}
those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; {5} those convicted
of piracy; {6} those who are habitual delinquents; {7} those have escaped from confinement
or evaded sentence; and {8} those who have violated the terms of conditional pardon granted
to them.

22.6 Rules on the application of the IS Law.

22.6.1 RPC - Maximum term: the appropriate period of the prescribed

penalty, after appreciating mitigating and/or aggravating
circumstance/s, if any;
Minimum term: within the range of the penalty next lower
to the prescribed penalty.

22.6.2 SPL - Maximum term: not to exceed the prescribed penalty;

Minimum term: not less than the prescribed penalty.

22.7 In both cases, it is mandatory that the minimum and maximum terms be specified. “The need
for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be
exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral
record.” (Luy vs. People, 805 SCRA 710)

22.8 When an offense is defined in a special law, but the penalty therefor is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the RPC, the legal effects under the system of penalties relative to the RPC would necessarily
apply to the special law. (People vs. Padlan, G.R. No. 214880, 06 September 2017).

23. Service of Sentence.

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23.1 In case the offender is sentenced to suffer multiple penalties, they may be
served SIMULTANEOUSLY, if the nature of the penalty permits it, such as perpetual and
temporary disqualifications, suspension, destierro, public censure, fine, and bond to keep the
peace, civil interdiction, and confiscation and payment of costs. Otherwise, they are to be
served SUCCESSIVELY, in the order of the penalties’ severity, with the most severe penalty
to be served first.

23.2 Limitation: the maximum duration shall not be more than three-fold the
length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed, which shall not
exceed 40 years.

23.3 Probation Law; Disqualified offenders: {1} those sentenced to serve a

maximum term of imprisonment of more than 6 years; {2} those convicted of any crime
against the national security; {3} those previously convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of more than 6 months and 1 day and/or a fine of more than
₱1,000.00; and {4} those who are once on probation.

23.4 The application for probation must be [i] in writing and filed with the [ii] court
which rendered judgment [iii] within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal (15
days).

23.5 Probation may be granted whether the sentence is imprisonment or fine (for
subsidiary imprisonment).

23.6 The filing of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of right to appeal.
Reasons: (1) Appeal and Probation are mutually exclusive remedies as they rest on diametrically opposed legal
positions. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led
to the judgment of conviction [Almero vs. People, 718 SCRA 698]; (2) Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the accused has applied for
probation. This is totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976, as
amended), which in part provides that the filing of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of the right to
appeal. Thus, there was no more opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having
become final by the filing of an application for probation. [Vicoy vs. People, 383 SCRA 707]

23.7 Gen. Rule: No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if

the accused has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Exception: When a judgment imposing a non-probationable penalty is

appealed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a
probationable penalty.

Exception to the exception: Where there are several accused where some
have taken further appeal (and obtained a modified judgment, i.e., from non-
probationable to probationable penalty), the other accused (who did not
appeal) may, upon application, be granted probation.

24. Community Service.

24.1 Community service shall consist of any actual physical activity which inculcates civic
consciousness and is intended towards the improvement of a public work or promotion of a public service. The
Court may, in its discretion, and lieu of service in jail, require that the penalties of arresto menor and arresto
mayor be served by the convict by rendering community service in the place where the crime was committed, and
under such terms as the court shall determine, taking into consideration the gravity of the offense and the
circumstances of the case. It is merely a privilege since the offended cannot choose it over imprisonment as a
matter of right. Furthermore, in requiring community service, the Court shall consider the welfare of the society
and the reasonable probability that the person sentenced shall not violate the law while rendering the service.
[see Art. 88a, RPC as introduced by R.A. No. 11362; Realiza v. People, G.R. No. 228745, 26 August 2020.]

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25. Total Extinction of Criminal Liability.

25.1 Effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities:

“1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado,
in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,
civil liability ex delicto in sensa strictiore."
“2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
'may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a. Law
b. Contracts
c. Quasi-contracts
d. xxx
e. Quasi-delicts
“3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action
for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject
to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

“4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.”
(People vs. Monroyo, G.R. No. 223708, 09 October 2019)

25.2 Prescription of crimes. The period of prescription starts to run from the date
of the discovery of the crime by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. It is
interrupted by the filing of the – {a} complaint (with the prosecutor’s office for purposes of
inquest or preliminary investigation), or {b} information (only in those cases governed by the
Rules of Summary Procedure or those where direct filing is allowed [Jadewell Parking Systems vs.
Lidua, 706 SCRA 724]). Unless the offender is absent from the Philippines, it commences to run
again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted or
is unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him and for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.

25.3 Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall “commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, xxx.” In
People v. Reyes, this Court has declared that registration in public registry is a notice to the whole world. The
record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All
persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. (Recebido vs. People, 346 SCRA 881)

25.4 Cyber Libel is a crime defined and penalized by the RPC, thus the latter governs in
determining the prescriptive period thereof, i.e., par. 4 (1 year), not par. 2 (15 years) of Art. 90 of the RPC. Hence,
the crime of Cyber Libel prescribes in one year, the prescriptive period of Libel under Article 355 of the RPC and
Cyber Libel under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, in relation to Article 355 of the RPC, must be counted from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the. offended party, the authorities, or their agents. Prescription is
counted from discovery of the published libelous matter by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents (not
from the date of positing or publication), because they could hardly be expected to institute criminal proceedings

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for Libel without prior knowledge of the same. The prescriptive period may be reckoned from the publication of
the libelous matter only when it coincides with the date of discovery by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents. (Causing vs. People, G.R. No. 258524, 11 October 2023)

25.5 Prescription of penalties. The period of prescription begins to run only

when the convict evades the service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence. It is interrupted if the convict, before the expiration of the period – (a) surrenders,
(b) is captured, (c) goes to foreign country with which the Philippines has no extradition
treaty, or (d) commits another crime (other than Evasion of Service of Sentence under Art.
157, RPC).

25.6 Prescription of penalties applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are
serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of penalties begins only
when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. One who has not
been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. (Pangan vs. Gatbalite, 449 SCRA 144; Del
Castillo vs. Torrecampo and People, 394 SCRA 221)

25.7 Marriage of the offended woman under Art. 344. Felonies wherein valid
marriage between the offended woman and offender extinguishes the criminal liability are: (a)
Acts of lasciviousness [Art. 336], (b) Consented Acts of lasciviousness [Art. 339], (c) Qualified
Seduction [Art. 337], (d) Simple Seduction [Art. 338], (e) Forcible Abduction [Art. 342], and (f)
Consented Abduction [Art. 343] and (g) Rape [Arts. 266-A and 266-B, in relation to Art, 266-
C]. Except in Rape, the extinction of criminal action and liability by virtue of marriage
extends to the co-principals, accomplices, and accessories.

25.8 Absolute Pardon vs. Amnesty. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such
it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to
classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution
of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from
the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment,
and for that reason it does ‘not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,’ and it ‘in no case exempts the culprit from
the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence’ (Article 36, RPC). While amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense. (People vs. Patriarca, 341 SCRA 464)

25.8.1 The President cannot revoke a grant of amnesty without concurrence from
Congress. (Trillanes vs. Medialdea; People vs. Trillanes, G.R. Nos. 241494, 256660 & 256078 [2023])

26. Partial extinction of criminal liability.

26.1 Conditional pardon. It is akin to absolute pardon, except that it: (a) has
conditions that need to be complied with; (b) must be accepted by grantee; and (c) is
revocable. Violation of conditions of such pardon is dealt with under Art. 159, RPC.

26.2 Commutation of sentence. An act of the Chief Executive of reducing the

degree of the penalty inflicted upon the convict, by decreasing the length of imprisonment or
the amount of fine.

26.3 Good conduct time allowances (GCTA). These are deductions from the
term of the sentence for good behavior and for study, teaching or mentoring service
rendered, while undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.

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26.3.1 Article 97 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10592, is clear that any
convicted prisoner, whether he be a recidivist, habitual delinquent, escapee,
and persons deprived of liberty convicted of heinous crimes, is entitled to
GCTA as long as the prisoner is in any penal institution, rehabilitation or
detention center, or any other local jail. (Guinto vs. DoJ; Inmates of New Bilibid Prison
vs. DoJ, G.R. Nos. 249027 and 249155 [2023])

26.4 Special Time Allowance for Loyalty (STAL). This entitles a convict to a 2/5
or 1/5 deduction, as the case may be, from his original sentence, if he stays in the penal
facility on the occasion of disorder, or after having left the facility on such occasion, returns
thereto within 48 hours following proclamation of the Chief Executive announcing the passing
away of the calamity or catastrophe. (Art. 98, as amended by R.A. No. 10592). If the convict
does not return within the time allowed, he shall suffer an increase of 1/5 of the remaining
term of sentence, not to exceed 6 months. (Art. 158, RPC).

26.5 Parole. It relates to the suspension of the sentence and release of a convict
after serving the minimum penalty, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence shall be
suspended, as authorized by the Board of Pardons and Parole. (Sec. 5, Act No. 4103).

27. Subsidiary Civil Liability.

27.1 Proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons criminally liable,

proprietors of establishments are civilly liable for: (a) crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by their employees; and/or (b) restitution
of goods taken through robbery or theft from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have: [i] notified in advance the
establishment, of the deposit of such goods therein; and [ii] followed the directions which it
may have given the guests with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods.
However, proprietors incur no civil liability in case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the establishment's employees.

27.2 Employers. The subsidiary civil liability of the employer is enforceable in the same criminal
proceeding where the award is made. However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a
determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of [1] the existence of an employer-employee relationship; [2] that
the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; [3] that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and
found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties not necessarily any offense he commits "while"
in the discharge of such duties; and [4] that said employee is insolvent. (Basilio vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA
341). The determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s
liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced xxx, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings
for the execution of the judgment. (Calang and Philtranco vs. People, 626 SCRA 679)

27.2.1 Employers are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in
substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of
their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latter’s lawyers, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend
the accused. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. People, 427 SCRA 526)

27.2.2 Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a defense on the part of the
employer and may not free the latter from subsidiary liability for the employee’s civil liability in a
criminal action. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability – Articles 102
and 103 – are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus,
in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the
subsidiary liability of the employer (Pangonorom and MMTC vs. People, 455 SCRA 211), as it is
deemed written therein.

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- ooo0ooo -
#updated050924

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