Religious Education of Pakistan’s Deobandi Madaris and Radicalisation
Author(s): James D. Templin
Source: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses , Vol. 7, No. 5 (June 2015), pp. 15-21
Published by: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
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Religious Education of
Pakistan’s Deobandi
Madaris and Radicalisation
James D. Templin
Fundamentalist madaris (Islamic religious schools) in Pakistan, particularly
Deobandi madaris, represent grounds for radical indoctrination. These
madaris and the associated ulema (Islamic scholars) have also been resistant
to government efforts to change the curriculum in the schools to reflect
moderation. Therefore, policies designed to reduce the threat of madaris-
based radicalisation must be indirect and gradual. Moreover, they must
necessarily involve outreach and community-level engagement to provide a
moderate and high-quality religious education system, in sync with modern
concepts and practices that can insulate the students from radical ideas.
Introduction
In Pakistan, madaris (Islamic religious schools) are a principal source of
religious learning, but a number of these institutions, particularly within the
Deobandi subsect/interpretive tradition, have also become well-springs of
fundamentalist belief systems. These belief systems are often directly
opposed to more inclusive and moderate concepts embraced by those who
have a holistic or mature understanding of Islam. In a minority of madaris,
xenophobic traditions and militancy have poisoned the well. This has led to a
corruption of minds, the rise of violent extremist organisations (VEOs) and
sectarian violence (Fair 2008, 2, 6, 12). Reversing this trend will take time,
effort and insight.
A number of Pakistani madaris are identified as latent grounds for radicals to
sow the seeds of violence. They proliferate fundamentalist beliefs that can
prepare a consequential minority for radical actions. This social programming
through narrowly defined interpretations of Islam leads to problematic
individual motivations and socially developed codes of behaviour that make
some madaris ripe for VEO recruitment.
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Religious Education of Pakistan’s Deobandi Madaris and Radicalisation – James D. Templin
This article highlights three features of at-risk The Cold War accelerated this trend to
Pakistani madaris and their corollaries. First, the unprecedented levels and funding. The U.S.-led
majority of these madaris belong to the Sunni proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan
fundamentalist Deobandi subsect that seeks a (1979-1989) funded the Islamist policies of
return to ‘pure’ Islam. Second, the ideas of General Zia-ul-Haq (Fair 2014, 203). Zia used
fundamentalist Islam preached in these madaris these funds and links to Saudi Wahhabis to
are powerful; they offer a unique social identity, spawn mujahideen from the fundamentalist
which can be a gateway to radicalisation. Third, Deobandi subsects of Sunni Islam, particularly
a significant segment of fundamentalist ulema through madaris and mosques in western
(Islamic scholars), associated with these madaris Pakistan (Haider 2010, 41). The Pakistan Army
are resistant to the mainstream interpretation of sustained influence over these organisations
Islamic edicts (Bano 2012, 15), and preach a through direct association and political
radical discourse which serves to legitimise the connections with Jamait-ulema-Islami (JUI), the
deeds of violent extremist offenders. Deobandi Islamist party, during this period (see
Figure 1) (Behuria 2008, 221). In the 1980s, the
Pakistan Madaris in Perspective number of Pakistani fundamentalist madaris
exploded. The indoctrination of students who are
Pakistan has historically used the call to jihad to exposed to fundamentalist madaris and madaris
expand an unconventional warfare capability which spawn recruits for violent extremist
(Fair 2014, 40). policies of General Zia-ul-Haq organisations (VEOs) contribute to this trend of
(Fair 2014, 203). radicalisation which continues to perpetuate in
Pakistan.
Figure 1: Prominent Pakistani Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs) and Associated Political Organisa-
tions/Fundamentalist Traditions
Madaris of the Deobandi fundamentalist subsect of Sunni Islam are associated with the majority of the violent ex-
tremist organisations (VEOs) in Pakistan. They are the largest in terms of student intake and most likely to be uti-
lised as a recruitment source by VEOs. These (Deobandi) VEO’s range between those focused on fighting other
Islamic sects/interpretive traditions (sectarian tanzeems), the independence of Kashmir (Kashmiri tanzeems), the
governance of Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban) and control of Afghanistan (Afghan Taliban). Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami (JUI)
represents the political face of these (Deobandi) VEOs in varying degrees.
The Ahl-e-Hadith subsect/interpretive tradition is associated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). It is the preeminent
VEO in Pakistan. Lastly, the association between the political party Jamaat-e-Islami with the Hizbul Mujahideen and
various splinter groups is shown.
Source: Model and explanation extrapolated from Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War (Fair 2014, 221-222).
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Religious Education of Pakistan’s Deobandi Madaris and Radicalisation – James D. Templin
Many, like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
terrorist organisation, have become direct threats
to Pakistan and the region, as well as global
terrorist threats.
The majority of madaris are not militant, but they
are fundamentalist Deobandi. As of 2008, there
were over 11,700 madaris reported by the five
wafaqs (Islamic seminaries) of Pakistan
(Borchgrevink 2011, 2). By 2011, the number
had grown to 19,366 madaris with approximately
65 percent (over 12,500) of them being from the
Hanafi-fundamentalist Deobandi subsect (Bano
2012, 71; Borchgrevink 2011, 2) (see Figure 2).
Deobandis represent approximately 20 percent Figure 2: Pakistani Madaris by Subsect
and Barelvis represent nearly 80 percent of
Deobandi madaris represent the largest proportion
Pakistan’s Sunni population (Borchgrevink 2011, (65% of madaris) in Pakistan.
3). Sunnis are the majority and represent
Source: Information from “Pakistan’s Madrasas: Modera-
approximately 85-90% of Pakistan’s population tion or Militancy? The Madrasa Debate and the Reform
of over 196 million (CIA World Factbook 2015). Process” (Borchgrevink 2011, 2).
Although there is no reliable data, some
estimates suggest a total student population of 1
to 1.7 million enrolled in various madaris today, requires consistent and progressive influence
with approximately 65% subscribing to the over intersubjective narratives. This is not an
Deobandi order (Fair 2012, 136). Moreover, insidious concept; it is a basic assertion that
there is extremely limited access to the Federally humans affect each other by regulating
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or the Khyber- interaction within a social context. In other
Pakhtunkwa (KPK) province along the words, the ‘truth’ is subjective, and subject to
Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which are known influence: the radical religious actor is not driven
areas of Deobandi prevalence and are safe by irrational impulse (Bano 2012, 3).
havens for the majority of Pakistani VEOs. It was
in these areas that refugees sought safety in However, fundamentalist interpretation of
madaris and intermarried with foreign jihadist religious concepts entails adherence to
fighters during the Afghan Jihad and post-9/11 conservative and often literal interpretations of
years of the War on Terror (Bano 2012, 1818). the Quran and the Hadith (Sayings of the
Prophet Muhammad). In fundamentalist
Although available data is not conclusive and Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith teachings,
does not demonstrate that fundamentalist ‘Westernisation’, ‘secularisation’ and traditionalist
madaris are the primary source of extremist Barelvi Sufi Islamic teachings are vehemently
views in Pakistan, historical evidence rejected (Fair 2008, 57-58). These
demonstrates a correlation between Deobandi fundamentalist subsects seek an ‘untainted’
madaris’ education and militancy (Fair 2012, Islam, thereby limiting the decision-making
139). The largest terrorist groups, like the Afghan power of followers to narrow parameters. The
Taliban, Pakistan Taliban, Jaish-e-Muhammad lived experience of this strain of teachings
and others adhere to the Deobandi school of reinforces violent Islamic fundamentalist ideas
Islam and draw from the “archipelago” of (Bano 2012, 8). Moreover, fundamentalist
Deobandi madaris (Fair 2012, 139). teachings (like other religious teachings) are
presented as solutions to the problems of life
Power of Ideology such as poverty, marginalisation and injustice,
thereby reinforcing the power of the narrative (9).
A mind requires inputs to cultivate ideas – these In sum, Islamic fundamentalism of the type
inputs are mostly derived from an individual’s propagated by radical elements has become
family and social environment, especially when attractive because it offers an exclusionary social
one is young. The shaping of perception requires identity (Bano 2012, 178), seeking to actively
influence over these ideational inputs. Similarly, ‘resolve’ social or economic problems
the shaping of a belief system which one shares confronting the broader Muslim community.
with other members of his or her social group
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Religious Education of Pakistan’s Deobandi Madaris and Radicalisation – James D. Templin
Fundamentalist Pakistani madaris, particularly of
the Deobandi subsect, provide the theological
“ … most of the top
grounds that can rationalise radical action. For
example, they provided the basis for recruitment
leaders of the Afghan
of jihadist fighters for the Afghan Jihad (1979-
1989), and many of the terrorist leaders, like
Taliban including Mullah
Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
came to prominence during this period. This was
Omar are alumni of Jamia
encouraged under the leadership of General Zia-
ul-Haq and has since been harnessed both by
Uloom-ul-Islamia in Binori
the political and military leadership that followed
Zia-ul-Haq and VEOs. For example, most of the
in Karachi – one of the
top leaders of the Afghan Taliban including
Mullah Omar, who emerged subsequent to the largest Deobandi madaris
Zia-ul-Haq regime, were alumni of Jamia Uloom-
ul-Islamia in Binori in Karachi – one of the largest in Pakistan. It was also
Deobandi madaris in Pakistan. It was also here
that the many leaders of the Afghan Taliban and here that the many
Al Qaeda and their state benefactors met
regularly to further their reciprocal objectives leaders of the Afghan
(Gates and Roy 2014).
Taliban and Al Qaeda and
The radical ideas which encourage militancy are
born through fundamentalist Islamic teachings their state benefactors
that advance alternative notions of modernity
(Bano 2012, 177). This is not to suggest that met regularly to further
madaris train individuals for jihad; for this there is
weak evidence (183-184). However, as stated their reciprocal
previously, there is a correlation between the
ideas of Deobandi fundamentalism and objectives… ”
recruitment into jihad (Fair 2012, 139). With a
stimulus and reinforcement, fundamentalist
religious beliefs move individuals toward radical their disciples have demonstrated significant
action. resistance to the Pakistani government’s efforts
to secularise the madaris curriculum. Moreover,
In many cases, the Islamists justify militancy in they have particularly strong ties to governance
terms of a reaction to problematic policies of and the rule of law in the tribal areas (Riaz 2008,
Western and Pakistani governments (Bano 2012, 27). Attempts by the government to control
177, 184). Belief systems determine what is militancy in 2000 under General Pervez
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ and fundamentalist belief Musharraf, resulted in the establishment of an
systems are directly opposed to notions of a ulema coalition called the Ittehad-e-Tanzimatul
modern Islamic state. State policies that focus on Madaris-e-Deenia (ITMD), formed to resist laws
this objective are often viewed as a direct threat that curbed the autonomy of madaris (Riaz 2008,
to the fundamentalist ulema and their teachings. 204). This fundamentalist lobby also successfully
In other words, those who hold fundamentalist co-opted Islamist political parties like the Jamiat
Islamic ideas represent a latent threat as a Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal
primed social group that is more readily (MMA), which view Pakistan as under assault by
radicalised than members of more inclusive the hegemonic powers of the West (Riaz 2008,
belief systems. 204). Attempts to reform have consistently met
with stiff resistance from these groups.
Resistance to Change
In 2002, a US-funded reform programme offered
Resistance to modernisation and reform has US$225 million to secularise the madaris
been a natural part of the fundamentalist Islamic curriculum. However, by 2007 only 250 madaris
discourse. It is a method of cultural struggle ̶ an accepted reforms and the programme ended
effort perceived as protecting the ‘Word’ from (Bano 2012, 5). Geographic isolation, powerful
modern incursion. The fundamentalist ulema and radical ideas and a resistance to change have
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Religious Education of Pakistan’s Deobandi Madaris and Radicalisation – James D. Templin
insulated fundamentalist Pakistani madaris from
policies intended to secularise syllabi. Even the “ Pakistan is an Islamic
Madrassa Registration Ordinance of 2002 was
seen by ITMD and their political supporters as an state; it cannot and need
attack on Islam supported by the West and
Zionists (Riaz 2008, 205). not be secularised, but it
In July 2005, bombings in the London subway can be modernised. ”
was conducted by British citizens of Pakistani
origin, who visited Pakistan to “identify a suitable
school to study Islam” and were subsequently 2012, 10). Furthermore, fundamentalist ideas
radicalised (Riaz 2008, 206; House of Commons breed fervent adherence, which are susceptible
2006, 13, 20). This provided renewed impetus for to in-group manipulation and resistant to out-
reform. In response, Musharraf called for the group influence. This is a dangerous
registration of madaris, the reporting of funding amalgamation that represents a latent threat; a
sources and the expulsion of foreign students. perpetual breeding ground for potential
Under severe pressure, the ITMD agreed to radicalisation. Although, the number of madaris
register but did not expel foreign students or that actively promote violent extremism is
report funding sources (Riaz 2008, 206). Thus, comparatively small, they have actively
the fundamentalist Islamist elite have prevented contributed to sectarian violence, regional
education reform in Pakistan madaris and the instability and the perversion of Islam in general
lobby remains strong. The resistance presented with local, regional and global implications.
by the fundamentalist ulema is persuasive
because it draws upon a narrative of Diminishing these concomitant threats will
secularisation of religious teachings induced by require a multifaceted approach. Pakistan is an
Western interests, not to mention the support Islamic state; it cannot and need not be
they receive from some prominent members of secularised, but it can be modernised. The direct
formal institutions of the Pakistani political and rapid nature of past secularisation efforts
system. have been viewed as a threat to the ulema.
Therefore, policies designed to reduce the latent
Reform efforts have also been largely ineffective threat of fundamentalist madaris must be indirect
because they emphasise secularisation of and gradual. A strategy focused on including
madaris, rather than improving the quality of holistic, moderate teachings of Islam to
religious learning offered by them (Bano 2012, curriculums and subtly reducing the attraction to
56). Fundamentalist culture is resistant to secular fundamentalist madaris can shrink the scale of
changes or a reduction of religious thought and the problem in the long-term. By providing a high
practice. The result is that education in quality, but moderate religious education – both
secularised madaris is being perceived to be in terms of belief and practice ̶ the Pakistani
inadequate to meet local communities’ religious government can quench the thirst for religious
needs, thereby sustaining the appeal of the knowledge of vulnerable communities. This
fundamentalist madaris. This has also would also take in hand the resistance against
perpetuated anti-Western narratives and created reforms, which are presently seen as instruments
a social group that is susceptible to the radical of control of the madaris curriculum.
ideologies of and recruitment by VEOs.
Investments in affordable, effective and
Conclusion: Reducing the Latent Threat sustainable religious educational alternatives will
require outreach, community-level engagement
The threat presented by fundamentalist religious as well as tailored, adaptable curriculums that
ideas is complex and cloistered. The lesser bridge the gap between present local beliefs and
threat is from the effect of individuals who have the desired end-state. In this, anticipating and
already been radicalised by these ideas ̶ the controlling psychological effects are essential.
greater threat lies dormant as Pakistani madaris Pakistan must portray a positive image of
are a major source of ideational inputs for an at- modernity that entices people of vulnerable
risk minority. Fundamentalist Islamic areas to accept an education system that
indoctrination is a gateway, awaiting a stimulus tempers fundamentalist ideas and rejects
to activate radical motivations, as it can cement militancy. Further analysis of the attraction to the
violent belief and confine rational choice (Bano madaris system may offer insight into
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Religious Education of Pakistan’s Deobandi Madaris and Radicalisation – James D. Templin
operationalising strategic narratives at the local level. These strategic
narratives must effectively deliver the idea that the future of Pakistan resides
in the whole of its population embracing holistic, ‘true’ Islam, not insular
fundamentalism. As Pakistani madaris represent an important front in an
intensifying war of ideas taking place in the Islamic world, shaping perceptions
of vulnerable communities is an essential component to winning on this front.
James D. Templin is a graduate student from the Joint Special Operations
Master of Arts Program (Fort Bragg, NC) of the National Defense University,
Washington D.C., and a Special Forces officer with experience in Pakistan
and Afghanistan.
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