IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA

AT PAR ES SALAAM

(CORAM: MWARIJA. J.A.. KEREFU, J.A., and KENTE. J.A.T

CONSOLIDATED CIVIL APPLICATION NOs. 76 & 90 OF 2016

1. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK

2. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (HONG KONG) .APPLICANTS
3. WARTSILA NEDERLAND B.V
4. WARTSILA TANZANIA LTD
VERSUS

VIP ENGINEERING & MARKETING LIMITED............................. .RESPONDENT

AND

1. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (T) LTD ~1

2. THE JOINT LIQUIDATORS OF MECHMAR f7..............NECESSARY PARTIES
CORPORATION (MALAYSIA

(Application for Revision of the Decision and Orders of the High Court of
Tanzania at Dar es Salaam)

(Bonqole, 3.)

dated the 18thday of February, 2016

in
Civil Case No. 229 of 2013

RULING OF THE COURT

21st February & 7th March, 2022

KEREFU. J.A.:

This Ruling responds to the consolidated Civil Applications Nos. 76 &

90 of 2016 which were lodged by the first and second applicants on 21st

March, 2016 and third and fourth applicants on 4th April, 2016 respectively.

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The notices of motion were made under section 4 (3) of the Appellate

Jurisdiction Act, [Cap. 141 R.E. 2019] (the A3A) and Rule 65 (1) of the

Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009 as amended (the Rules) inviting the

Court to exercise its power to revise the proceedings, rulings and orders of

the High Court of Tanzania (Bongole, J.) made on 16th to 18th February,

2016 in respect of Civil Case No. 229 of 2013. The applications are

supported by two affidavits duly sworn by James Nicholas Denham, the

Senior Legal Counsel of the first and second applicants and Laura Susi-

Gamba, the Vice President, Legal Affairs, Energy Solutions for the third and

fourth applicants. The common grounds of complaint for the intended

revision, as indicated in both applications are as follows: -

(a) That, there is apparent error on the interpretation of

Order VII Ruies 14 and 18 read together with Order
XIII Rule 1 (1) o f the Civil Procedure Code, [Cap. 33.
R.E. 2019] (the CPC); and

(b) That, the interpretation o f Order VII Rules 14 and 18

read together with Order XIII Rule 1(1) o f the CPC
by the trial court has brought confusion on the rule
regulating filing and admissibility o f plaintiff's
documentary evidence which has been in application
for decades, posing serious implication on the

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 outcome o f the Civil Case herein and other suits in
future.

On the other part, the respondent has filed two affidavits in reply on

30th June, 2016 and 25th July, 2016, respectively, opposing the

applications. It is noteworthy that, the 1st and 2nd necessary parties,

though duly served, did not file affidavits in reply.

In order to appreciate the context in which the applications have

arisen, we find it apposite to briefly provide the material facts of the matter

as obtained from the record. On 12th November, 2013, the respondent

instituted a suit, (Civil Case No. 229) before the High Court against the

applicants and the necessary parties claiming that the applicants had

conspired with the other parties to cause the IPTL and the respondent, its

shareholder to incur unnecessary costs leading to a greater debt burden

and greatly diminished profits. The respondent claimed for payment of

damages at the tune of US$ 414.2 million for loss of dividends and US$ 77

million as legal fees and costs. Upon being served with the plaint, the

applicants filed their written statements of defence disputing the

respondent's claim.

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 It is on record that a final pre-trial conference was conducted on 19th

January, 2016 where a total of twenty-three issues were framed and

agreed upon by the parties. On the same date, the learned counsel for the

respondent indicated that, prior to the date of hearing of the matter, he

would file additional documents to be relied upon by the respondent during

the trial. The trial Judge informed the parties that he would need to be

convinced before he could permit the respondent to add any further

documents at that later stage of the proceedings.

However, on 9th February, 2016, the learned counsel for the

respondent filed in court seven voluminous files of additional documents,

under Order XIII Rule 1 (1) of the CPC, which the respondent intended to

rely upon during the trial. The said documents were served to the

applicants and the necessary parties on 10th February, 2016. Furthermore,

on the first morning of 16th February, 2016, the trial date, the respondent

filed and served to the applicants and the necessary parties another set of

new documents.

On the first day of hearing of the suit, the applicants objected to an

attempt by the respondent to file the said documents without leave of the

court and they urged the trial Judge to expunge the said documents from
the record. Upon hearing the parties on the said objection, the trial court

found that the additional documents filed by the respondent were properly

filed under the ambit of Order XIII Rule 1 of the CPC which allows parties

to the suit to produce, at the first hearing date, all documentary evidence

they intend to rely on during the trial. In addition, the trial Judge found

that the additional documents did not introduce any new case different

from the one indicated in the plaint In the event the learned trial Judge

overruled the objection raised by the applicants and allowed the

respondent to rely on the filed additional documents which were filed

during the trial.

Aggrieved, the applicants lodged the current applications as indicated

above. The said applications were confronted with a notice of preliminary

objection lodged by the respondent on 15th April, 2016 challenging the

competence of the applications on the grounds that; one, the same are

incompetent for being initiated by an incomplete record; two, there are no

any exceptional circumstances, irregularities or existence of confusion in

the interpretation of Order VII Rule 14 and 18 read together with Order

XIII Rule 1 of the CPC by the trial court; three, the ruling and orders

sought to be revised being interlocutory are neither appealable nor

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amenable to revision; four, the affidavits in support of the notices of

motion are incurably defective for containing extraneous matters, legal

arguments, opinions, speculations, conclusions and prayers; five, the

supporting affidavits are improperly verified; six, the notices of motion are

bad in law for joining therein "necessary parties" which parties are not

provided for by any law or practice; seven, the notice of motion, certificate

of urgency and supporting affidavit in Civii Application No. 76 of 2016, are

all bad in law for being improperly drawn, endorsed and lodged by a

counsel with no locus or right of audience before the Court; eight, the

purported record has not been certified; nine, that by consent of all the

parties to the Civil Case No. 229 of 2013, the trial court (Hon. Bongole, 1)

on 25th February, 2016 adjourned the hearing to proceed from 18th to 20th

April, 2016 and 9th to 20th May, 2016; and ten, the applications are

vexatious, frivolous and an abuse of the court process aimed at delaying

the hearing and determination of Civil Case No. 229 of 2003. Furthermore,

on 30th May, 2016, the respondent lodged another notice of preliminary

objection comprised of one ground to the effect that: -

"The applications for revision are untenable and

unmaintainable in law in that the applicants' remedy

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 against the impugned findings, ruling and orders is
an appeal with or without leave."

At the hearing, the first and second applicants were represented by

Mr. Gasper Nyika, learned counsel and the third and fourth applicants were

represented by Dr. Alex T, Nguluma assisted by Mr. Daudi Ramadhani,

both learned counsel. The respondent was represented by Mr. Michael

Joachim Tumaini Ngalo assisted by Mr. Respicius Didace, both learned

counsel whereas the first and second necessary parties were represented

by Ms. Faiza Salah, learned counsel who was holding brief for Ms. Samah

Salah, learned counsel.

As it is the practice, we had to determine the preliminary objections

first before going into the merits or demerits of the applications. Having

that in mind, we invited the counsel for the parties to address us on the

preliminary objections raised by the respondent. It is noteworthy that, prior

to the hearing of the preliminary objections, Mr. Ngalo prayed for leave of

the Court, which we granted, for him to abandon the sixth, ninth and tenth

points of objections and submitted only on the remaining points.

We wish to begin, right away, with the seventh point of objection

which challenges the drafting, endorsement and lodging of the notice of

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motion in Civil Application No. 76 of 2016. It was the argument of Mr.

Ngalo that the said notice of motion was drawn, endorsed and lodged by

advocate Faiza Salah who, by that time, in 2015, did not have the

qualifications prescribed under Rule 33 (3) of the Rules. That, the

infraction renders the application incompetent.

In his response, Mr. Nyika contended that the point of objection

raised is not on a pure point of law and does not qualify the test of a

preliminary objection as it requires evidence to ascertain whether at the

point of drafting, endorsing and lodging of the notice of motion, the said

advocate was qualified or not. Mr. Nyika contended further that, Rule 33

(3) of the Rules cited by Mr. Ngalo is not relevant in the circumstances as

the same is not related with drafting, endorsing and lodging of the notice

of motion. He argued that the cited Rule is on the audience and/or

appearance of advocates before the Court which does not include drafting,

endorsement and lodging of documents in the Court. To buttress his

argument, he referred us to the Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, and

argued that, the term 'audience' is defined to mean, "A hearing before

judges! and the ’right o f audience' is defined to mean, M right to appear

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and be heard in a given court...' As such, Mr. Nyika urged us to overrule

the seventh point of objection for lack of merit.

On their part, Dr. Nguluma and Ms. Salah associated themselves with

the submission made by Mr. Nyika. In addition, Ms. Salah stated that at the

time of preparing and lodging the said notice of motion, she had two years

of practice. She however insisted that the point raised does not qualify to

be a preliminary objection.

Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the

parties on this issue, we agree with the learned counsel for the applicants

that the conditions stipulated under Rule 33 (3) of the Rules do not relate

to drafting, endorsement and lodging of documents in Court. The said Rule

only restricts an advocate who has not practiced for a period of not less

than five years from appearing before the Court. As such, we find the

seventh point of objection devoid of merit.

We will next address the eighth point of objection where the

respondent alleged that the record of the applications was not certified. On

this point, Mr. Ngalo challenged the validity of the record before the Court

for its authenticity not being certified by the applicants or their advocates

as the true and accurate record of the trial court's proceedings. To support

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his proposition, he cited Rule 96 (5) of the Rules and argued that, although

the said Rule deals with certification of record of appeal, it also extends to

applications for revision. He thus urged us to sustain the preliminary

objection and struck out the record of the two applications with costs for

being incompetent.

In their responses, both Mr. Nyika and Dr. Nguluma challenged the

submission made by Mr. Ngalo for being misconceived as they argued that

the record was properly certified by the counsel for the applicants.

Specifically, Dr. Nguluma referred us to Civil Application No. 90 of 2016

and stated that he personally certified the said record on 25th February,

2016.

It is our considered view that, determination of this point should not

detain us. We have since perused the record of Civil Application No. 90 of

2016 and indeed the same was properly certified by Dr. Nguluma on 25th

February, 2016 and received and signed by the Registrar on 4th April 2016.

We thus find the point of objection devoid of merit.

The fourth and fifth points of objection are on the defects in the

affidavit supporting Civil Application No. 76 of 2016. Citing instances of the

said defects, Mr. Ngalo argued that the affidavit is incurably defective for

10
contravening the principles of law which require affidavits to be confined to

facts and must be free from extraneous matters. He specifically referred us

to paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of

said affidavit and argued that the same are incurably defective on account

of containing extraneous matters, legal arguments, opinions, speculations

and conclusions. To support his proposition, he referred us to Phantom

Modern Transport (1985) Limited v. D.T. Dobie (Tanzania)

Limited, Civil Reference Nos 15 of 2001 and 3 of 2002 and Rustamali

Shivji Karim Merani v. Kamal Bhushan Joshi, Civil Application No. 80

of 2009 (both unreported) and urged us to find that the said paragraphs

are offensive and deserve to be expunged. It was his further argument

that after expunging the said offensive paragraphs, there will be no

sufficient information in the affidavit to support the said application.

In addition, Mr. Ngalo argued that, the said affidavit is also

accompanied by a defective verification clause, as the deponent

erroneously indicated that the information contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3,

5, 17, 18, 19 and 21 were to the best of his knowledge and belief, while it

is clear that, the information contained under paragraphs 17 and 19 were

based on the advice he received from his counsel. He argued that the said

ii
infraction had also rendered the application incompetent. In the light of the

said defects, Mr. Ngalo urged us to strike out the Civil Application No. 76 of

2016 for being accompanied by an incurably defective affidavit.

In his response, Mr. Nyika disputed the submission made by Mr.

Ngalo and contended that the said paragraphs are on the deponent's

statements of facts on what transpired before the trial court based on the

best of his knowledge and beliefs and some are on what he was advised by

his counsel. He thus distinguished authorities cited by Mr. Ngalo arguing

that, they are not applicable in the present situation. He added that, even

the verification clause was properly verified as the deponent clearly

separated the paragraphs on matters of facts based on his personal

knowledge and belief and those he received from his advocate. As such,

Mr. Nyika urged us to overrule the said objection as according to him, the

application is supported by a valid affidavit.

In the alternative, Mr. Nyika urged the Court to only expunge the

offensive paragraphs, if it so finds, as he said that the remaining

paragraphs contain sufficient material facts that can still support the

application. To support his proposition, he referred us to our previous

decision in Stanbic Bank Tanzania Limited v. Kagera Sugar Limited,

12
Civil Application No. 57 of 2007 (unreported). On the verification clause, he

added that, if the Court will find that the verification clause is incurably

defective, the remedy is to allow the applicants to amend the same and file

a fresh affidavit. Having perused the contents of the said affidavit and

considered the submissions by the counsel for the parties, we wish to state

that, Rule 49 (1) of the Rules, requires formal applications to the Court to

be supported by one or more affidavits of the applicant or some other

person having knowledge of the facts. In the case of Uganda v.

Commissioner of Prisons Exparte Matovu (1966) EA 514, the Court

stated that: -

"As a generai rule o f practice and procedure an

affidavit for use in court, being a substitute
for orai evidence, shou/d on/y contain
statements of facts and the circumstances to
which the witness deposes either o f his own
knowledge... such affidavit should not contain
extraneous matters by way o f objection or
prayer or iegai argument or conclusion/'
[Emphasis supplied].

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Again, in the case of Phantom Modem Transport (1985) Limited
(supra) the Court, when faced with a preliminary objection in respect of
an affidavit which was alleged to contain offensive paragraphs, stated that:

"Where the offensive paragraphs are

inconsequential, they can be expunged leaving the
substantive parts o f the affidavit remaining intact."

Furthermore, an affidavit must be verified by the deponent on what

is true based on knowledge, belief or information whose source must be

disclosed in the verification clause of the affidavit. In Salima Vuai Foum

v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies & Three Others (1995) TLR 75,

the Court when confronted with a preliminary objection on a verification

clause which did not reveal the source of deponent's information and

knowledge of some facts, it stated that: -

"Where an affidavit is made on information, it

should not be acted upon by any court unless the
sources o f information are specified."

In the light of the above position of the law, and having scrutinized

the contents of the said affidavit, we agree with Mr. Ngalo that, indeed

some of the paragraphs therein contain legal arguments, opinions,

speculations and conclusions, these include paragraphs 5, 7, 9, 10, 17 and

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19. We, however, find that the rest of the paragraphs contain statements

of facts based on the deponent's knowledge and some, are based on the

information and/or advice he received from his counsel. As such, we

equally agree with Mr. Nyika that the said offensive paragraphs could be

safely expunged from the record, as we hereby do, without affecting the

substance of the affidavit.

We equally find that the verification clause was properly verified,

except only for paragraphs 17 and 19 where the deponent wrongly

indicated that the information contained therein was to the best of his

knowledge while the contents of the said paragraphs clearly indicated that

the information was the advice he received from his counsel. However,

having expunged the said offensive paragraphs, it is our settled view that

the verification clause was properly verified. As such, the fourth and fifth

points of objection are partly sustained.

As for the first point of objection, Mr. Ngalo contended that the

record of both applications is incompetent for non-inclusion of the entire

proceedings of the Civil Case No. 229 of 2013 including all pleadings,

rulings, drawn orders and all documents filed by the parties thereto. That,

the applicants have only included the proceedings and decision of the trial

15
court from 16th to 18th February, 2016. It was his strong argument that,

since the said documents, which are subject of the applications were

omitted from the record, it has rendered the record of both applications

incomplete and incompetent as the Court will not manage to examine the

said record and arrive to an informed decision. He argued that, it is trite

law that, a party who moves the Court for revision under the provisions of

section 4 (3) of the AJA read together with Rule 65 (1) of the Rules is

enjoined to avail a complete record of the proceedings from which the

revision is sought. To bolster his position, he referred us to the cases of

Benedict Mabalanganya v. Romwald Sanga [2005] 2 EA 152 and

Tanzania Telecommunications Co. LTD v. Alfred Anasa Shara, Civil

Application No. 226 of 2013 (unreported). He then urged us to strike out

the two applications with costs for being incompetent.

Upon being probed by the Court as to whether the applicants are

seeking revision of the entire proceedings of the trial court or the revision

is only sought on specific proceedings, decisions and orders of the trial

court, Mr. Ngalo responded that, according to the notices of motion, the

applicants targeted only the proceedings of three days i.e from 16th to 18th

16
February, 2016. He however, maintained that the record availed to the

Court is incomplete.

In his response, Mr. Nyika contended that, in both notices of motion

the applicants have clearly indicated that the revision sought was for the

specific proceedings of the trial court from 16th to 18th February, 2016 and

the resultant ruling issued on 18th February, 2016. It was his argument

that, since the applicants have attached all necessary and relevant

documents to the applications, the record availed to the Court is sufficient

for the Court to exercise its revisional powers. He thus distinguished the

case of Benedict Mabalanganya (supra) cited by Mr. Ngalo by arguing

that it is not applicable in these applications. He then urged us to invoke

the provisions of section 3A (1), (2) and 3B (1) (b) and (c) of the AJA, as

amended by the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 3) Act,

2018 (Act, No. 8 of 2018). He further urged the Court to take note that the

matter is long overdue, thus should be finally concluded.

In the alternative, Mr. Nyika argued that, if the Court will find that

the record of the entire proceedings is necessary for the determination of

the applications, may grant leave to the applicants to lodge supplementary

record to include the omitted documents instead of striking out the

17
applications. To buttress his proposition, he cited the case of Jovet

Tanzania Limited v. Bavaria N. V, Civil Application No. 207 of 2018

(unreported). Dr. Nguluma and Ms. Salah associated themselves with the

submission made by Mr. Nyika on this point.

Having carefully considered the submissions made by the counsel for

the parties and the record before us, we find, with respect, that the

submission made by the counsel for the respondent is misconceived. It is

on record that in both applications, the applicants sought for an order of

revision by this Court on specific proceedings of the trial court from 16th to

18th February, 2016. This can be evidenced by the prayers sought in the

notices of motion. In Civil Application No. 76 of 2016 the first prayer

sought by the applicants is as follows: -

"The honourable Court be pleased to call for,

examine and revise the proceedings, rulings and
orders o f the High Court o f Tanzania (Bongole, J.)
in Civil Case No. 229 o f 2013 from l& h to I8 h
February, 2016..."

In Civil Application No. 90 of 2016, the first prayer sought is couched thus -

"The honourable Court be pleased to call for and

inspect the record o f the High Court...in particular

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 the ruling herewith attached in Civil Case No, 229 of
2013 ...for the purpose o f satisfying itself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety o f such ruling
delivered on lf f h February, 2016..."

Since, it is not in dispute that, the trial court's proceedings and the

subsequent ruling subject of the sought revision are all attached to the

record of the applications, we agree with Mr. Nyika that the applicants

have availed all necessary and relevant documents for the Court to

exercise its revisionary powers. As such, we equally agree with him that

the case of Benedict Mabalanganya (supra) cited by Mr. Ngalo is

distinguishable. In that case, the applicant was required to avail the entire

record of the case because the revision was sought after the dispute

between the parties had been finally determined by the primary court and

appeals unsuccessfully referred to the District and High Courts, which is

not the case herein. We thus find the first point of objection devoid of

merit and is hereby overruled.

In addressing the third point of objection, Mr. Ngalo contended that

the applications are untenable for being prohibited by section 5 (2) (d) of

the AJA. He argued that the said provisions of the law bars applications for

revision from interlocutory decisions or orders of the High Court which do

19
not have the effect of finally and conclusively determining the rights of the

parties. To support his proposition, Mr. Ngalo referred us to the cases of

Gulamali Shah Bokhari and Another v. The Director of Public

Prosecutions, Criminal Appeal No. 170 of 2007 and Karibu Textile Mills

Ltd v. New Mbeya Textile Mills Ltd and Three Others, Civil

Application No. 27 of 2006 (both unreported). He then implored us to find

that the two applications are incompetent as the challenged decision of the

trial court is interlocutory in nature.

[n his response, Mr. Nyika contended that the applicants are not oniy

disputing the ruling of the trial court dated 18th February, 2016 but also the

confusion in the proceedings and the procedure adopted by the trial court

to allow the respondent to file the additional documents contrary to the

law. To support his proposition, he cited the case of Stanbic Bank

Tanzania Limited v. Kagera Sugar Limited (supra) and urged us to

overrule the said objection and determine the applications on merit. Dr.

Nguiuma and Ms. Salah supported the submission made by Mr. Nyika on

this point without more.

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 Rejoining, Mr. Didace insisted that the revision is sought on an

interlocutory decision of the trial court which had not finally determined the

rights of the parties.

It is common ground that the decision of the trial court, subject of

the applications herein is interlocutory as it had not finally and conclusively

determined the rights of the parties in Civil Case No. 229 of 2013. That

means, as matters stand today, that suit is still pending before the trial

court awaiting the determination of these applications. We have keenly

considered the argument by Mr. Nyika that they do not only challenge an

interlocutory decision, but also the confusion and the procedure adopted

by the trial court to allow the applicants to file additional documents. Mr.

Nyika seemed to suggest and urged us to ignore the fact that the

impugned decision of the trial court is interlocutory in nature and adopt his

reasoning and stand. With respect, we do not find any merit in his

submission. We say so having regard to the mandatory provisions of

section 5 (2) (d) of the AJA, which provides that: -

"No appeal or application for revision shall He

against or be made in respect o f any preliminary or
interlocutory decision or order o f the High Court

21
 unless such decision or order has the effect of
finally determining the charge or su it"

The above provision, in our view, unambiguously prohibits appeals or

applications for revision against interlocutory decisions or orders of the

High Court which did not have the effect of finally determining the rights of

the parties.

Admittedly, the determination of an issue as to whether the decision

or order is final or interlocutory depends on the circumstances of each

case. In Tanzania Motors Services Limited and Another v. Nehar

Singh t/a Thaker Singh, Civil Appeal No. 115 of 2005, the Court

adopted the test propounded in Bozson v. Artincham Urban District

Council (1903) I KB 547 where Lord Alveston observed that: -

"It seems to me that the real test for determining

this question ought to be this: Does the
judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of
the rights of the parties? I f it does, then I think,
it ought to be treated as final order; but if it does
not, it is then, in my opinion, an interlocutory
order."

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 Again, in Britania Biscuits Limited v. National Bank of

Commerce Limited and Doshi Hardware (T) Limited, Civil Application

No. 195 of 2012, the applicant had applied for revision against the order to

deposit TZS. 100,000,000.00 as security for costs by the High Court. The

application was confronted with a preliminary objection challenging its

competence that it did not have the effect offinally determining the suit

which was pending before the High Court. In upholdingthe preliminary

objection, the Court found the application incompetent in terms of section

5 (2) (d) of the AJA and observed that: -

"...We are o f the opinion that the Ruling and Order

o f the High Court sought to be revised is an
interiocutory order... because in that order nowhere
it has been indicated that the suit has been finaily
determined."

In the light of the foregoing, we have no hesitation in holding, as we

hereby do, that the applications before us, having been preferred in

violation of section 5 (2) (d) of the A]A, are incompetent. In the

circumstances, we sustain the third point of objection. Now, since the

determination of the third point of objection suffice to dispose of the

23
applications, the need for considering the other remaining points of

objection does not arise.

In the event, we proceed to strike out the incompetent applications

with costs. We order that the matter before the High Court should

proceeds from the stage it had reached before the filing of these

applications.

DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 4th day of March, 2022.

A. G. MWARIJA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

R. J. KEREFU
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

P. M. KENTE
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

The Ruling delivered this 7th day of March, 2022 in the presence of
Ms. Faiza Salah holding briefs for Mr. Gasper Nyika, counsel for the 1st &
2nd applicant and Mr. Alex Nguluma, counsel for the 3rd and 4th applicants
and in presence of Mr. John Chuma assisted with Ms. Sist Bernad holding
brief for Michael Ngalo, learned counsel for the respondent and Ms. Faiza
Salah, learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd necessary parties is hereby
certified as a true copy of the origin

E. G
DEPUTY REGISTRAR
COURT OF APPEAL

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