Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil.

738
TOPIC: Search and Seizure – Basis for issuance of search warrant

FACTS:
• Upon application of the officers of the government (respondent prosecutors), several
judges (respondent judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners & or
the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the
persons named and/ or the premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or residences, and
to seize several personal properties as the "subject of the offense; stolen or embezelled
or the fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing
the offense" as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and
the RPC."
• Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null & void, said petitioners Stonehill,
et.al. filed w/ the SC this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the right against unlafwful search and seizures may be invoked by artificial
beings?
2. Whether or not the search warrants in question were validly issued?
3. Whether or not the articles seized by virtue of the warrants are admissible in evidence?

RULING:

1. YES. Artificial beings are also entitiled to the guarantee although they may be required to open
their books of accounts for examination by the State in the exercise of POLICE POWER.

2. YES. Two points must be stressed in connection with Art. III, Section 2 of the Constitution: (a)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner
set forth therein; and (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with.

Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." No specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of a probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile
and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine
what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority
is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court
14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall
issue for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to
wit:

"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,

ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements."

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to ALL business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of
peace officers. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights-- THAT THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED BE PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBED-- as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

3. NO. Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondent- Prosecutors maintain
that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.

Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in
the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law
rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, such as
the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured
the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal
search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such
other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of
Judge Learned Hand:
 "As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that
wrong be repressed".

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962 are null and void.