166 Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014

DOI: 10.12731/2070-7568-2014-6-14
UDC 327 (470+571)

Russian Soft Power:

Origins, Institutions, Effectiveness

Sergunin A.A.

Purpose. The paper examines conceptual and institutional

aspects of Russia’s soft power strategy over the last decade.
Methodology: research is made on the basis of the institu-
tional approach which requires the analysis of both configura-
tion and internal structure of the object. The study of an institu-
tion’s behavior and its interaction with the external environ-
ment is an integral part of this approach as well.
Results. The sources of Moscow’s interest in the soft power
strategy are explained. Various methods, techniques and insti-
tutional mechanisms that are used by Moscow to exercise its
soft power in its geopolitical neighborhood are explored. The
effectiveness of Russia’s soft power politics is evaluated.
Practical implications: the results of this research can be
taken into consideration by the Russian governmental agencies
responsible for the soft power strategies (e.g. the Rossotrud-
nichestvo and ‘Russian world’).
Keywords: Russia; foreign policy; soft power.
Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014 167

Introduction
In the post-Cold War era key international players prefer to exer-
cise soft rather than hard power. According to the adepts of the soft
power concept, the economic, socio-cultural, institutional and legal
instruments are much more efficient now than the military strength
or direct political pressure [6; 7; 8]. For many nations, hard power
became an exceptional tool and a last resort in their foreign relations
rather than a day-to-day practice. The hard power is now mainly ap-
plicable to those international actors who violate international law or
directly threaten national, regional or global security [2].
Since mid-2000s Russia tries to develop the soft power concept
and implementation mechanism of its own. The soft power concept
was formally introduced to the Russian foreign policy doctrine of
2013 [1] and the Russian top leaders (including President Putin) have
declared that soft power instruments are the most important ones in
Moscow’s international strategy arsenal.
On the other hand, Moscow has repeatedly used the hard power in-
struments in the post-Soviet space over the last decade, most recently
in the cases of Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) which is dissonant
with Russia’s officially proclaimed adherence to non-violent/peaceful
foreign policy methods.
Having in mind this contradiction this study addresses the fol-
lowing interrelated questions:
1) What are the sources of the Kremlin’s interest in the soft power
concept?
2) What soft power resources and instruments of are available
for Russia? Whether the Kremlin’s soft power policies are
efficient or not?
168 Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014

The sources of Russia’s interest in the soft power strategy

There are several explanations why the soft power concept be-
came fashionable among the Russian political elites.
First, there was a need to revisit the foreign policy concept after
the presidential election. As followed from President Putin’s decree of
7 May 2012 (issued right after his inauguration) the basic goals of the
previous concept have not been achieved [10].
Second, there was a need to improve Russian international im-
age which has seriously suffered after the ‘five-day war’ with Georgia
(2008) and public protests against the alleged fraud during the 2011
parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections.
Third, Russia was lagging behind other major international ac-
tors which have already developed and started to implement their soft
power doctrines. As estimated by the 2013 Russian foreign policy
concept, sometimes the soft power is used by these actors in a rather
destructive and illegitimate way [1]. Some countries (for example, the
U.S.) are using the soft power as a compliment to the military/coercive
instruments rather than the only method of their foreign policies [2; 3;
11].
Fourth, with the help of the soft power concept Kremlin tries to
foster the economic, political and socio-cultural integration in the
post-Soviet space. The previous policies were mostly elite-oriented
that, in practical terms, meant securing local regimes’ positions (of-
ten) at the expense of Russia’s security and economic interests. It
appeared, however, that the pro-Russian regimes lost their power in
some CIS countries (e.g. Viktor Yanukovych), while potential suc-
cessors may opt for playing an anti-Russian card to consolidate their
Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014 169

power. It should be noted that even in the most stable and traditionally
pro-Russian countries such as Kazakhstan or Belarus, the popular sup-
port for integration with Russia is not strong enough. In applying the
soft power techniques Russia hopes to improve its international image
and increase its attractiveness to both elites and societies in the CIS
countries.

Soft Power: Potential and Resources

According to Joseph Nye, the author of the concept, the soft power
is, first and foremost, an ability to be attractive. The soft power of
a country rests primarily on three resources: «its culture (in places
where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up
to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are
seen as legitimate and having moral authority)» (9, p. 11). There are
also economic dimensions of the soft power albeit they can effectively
serve as hard power’s instruments.
The Russian political class believes that the country possesses a
huge soft power potential but it is often misused or used ineffectively.
For example, in the Baltic Sea region (BSR), Russia has a significant
economic potential which can be applicable to this area. At the same
time, the global financial crisis hit the Baltic economies much stronger
than the Russian one. As a result of this Russia has overtaken some
of the Baltic States by the GDP per capita indicator. Besides, Russia
is returning positions as an export market for the Baltic States. Now
Russia is an attractive market for the foreign labour force rather than
a source of severe socio-economic problems (e.g. illegal migration
or smuggling) for the neighbours. With the introduction of the Baltic
170 Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014

Pipeline System (2001) and Nord Stream gas pipeline (2011) Russia
has reinforced its positions of the main energy supplier for Europe.
The ‘cultural component’ of the soft power based on the assump-
tion that the attractiveness of Russian ‘high’ culture is world-wide re-
cognized and it is highly respected by Russia’s neighbouring countries.
For example, the Russian Ministry of Culture sponsors the Annual
Theatre Festival The Golden Mask in the Baltic States, the festival
that presents the most prominent Russian performances to the Baltic
public. The cultural exchanges between Russia and the post-Soviet
state tend to grow as well.
The Russian higher education system is still attractive for students
from the former Soviet republics because the best Russian universities
of Moscow, St. Petersburg and some other provincial cities are still
able to provide foreign students with good training both in the ‘hard’
sciences and humanities.
The Russian diasporas in the post-Soviet states are viewed by the
Kremlin as a channel for projecting soft power. For example, in case
of the Baltic States Moscow possesses a unique compatriot’s resource,
having in mind that the Russian speaking population constitutes about
1/3 in Latvia and Estonia. These communities are relatively consoli-
dated (despite some internal controversies). They often feel them-
selves discriminated by the local regimes. In general, the Russian-
speaking minorities in the post-Soviet countries view Moscow as a
natural protector and have a rather positive attitude to Russia and the
Russian culture.
Political values are one more key soft power’s component. As as-
sumed by Nye, soft power increases «when a country’s culture in-
Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014 171

cludes universal values and its policies promote values and interests
that others share» (9, p. 11). An attractive domestic model (if any)
could potentially become another value-based soft power resource.
The attractive foreign policy of a country is a valuable asset for the
soft power strategy as well.
If we take again as an example the BSR, prior to the Ukrainian cri-
sis Moscow made great strides in improving its bilateral relations with
the countries of the region.. In addition to Russia’s traditionally friend-
ly relations with Finland, over the last several years Moscow tried to
improve its relations with Lithuania and Sweden as well as to ‘re-
pair’ its complicated bilateral ties with Denmark (because of the 2002
Chechen Congress in Copenhagen), Estonia (after the 2007 ‘Bronze
Soldier’ conflict), Latvia and Poland (both countries had numerous
historical conflicts with Russia). The 2009 Medvedev’s European Se-
curity Treaty (EST) proposal had a ‘Baltic dimension’ with the aim
to strengthen the regional security system. The Russian CBSS presi-
dency programme (2012-2013) was designed in a way to augment the
EST proposal with the soft security component. In other words, the
BSR has become one of the key regional priorities for testing Russian
soft power strategy.
It is interesting to know that the Soviet experience of international
propaganda and positive image-making is viewed as useful by the
present-day Russian soft power strategists. The Head of Rossotrud-
nichestvo Konstantin Kosachev acknowledged, his agency is a logical
successor of «the traditions and practical skills which emerged yet in
the old Soviet times.» According to him, the Soviet Union actively
utilized techniques of soft power, while the international reputation of
172 Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014

the USSR was very high [5]. In practical terms, it has been proposed to
re-launch the system of ‘friendship societies’ with foreign countries,
as well as to organize the Festival of Youth and Students in 2017.

Institutions and Mechanisms

The process of the Russian soft power’s institutionalization has
started even before the term itself became a part of the official vo-
cabulary. In 2007, the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation was
established by a presidential decree (although with the NGO status).
The Foundation’s main function is to promote the Russian language,
culture and education system abroad.
For example, the Russkiy Mir has several centres and ‘corners’ in
the BSR: five in Estonia, two in Finland, two in Latvia and three in
Lithuania. The Foundation nominates the best teachers and students
of the Russian language and culture for the position of ‘Professor of
the Russkiy Mir’ and ‘Student of the Russkiy Mir’. It also has fellow-
ship and internship programmes for foreign scholars and students to
be hosted in Russia. The Foundation organizes various conferences,
competitions and Olympiads on the regular basis.
In 2008, the Rossotrudnichestvo, Federal Agency for the CIS,
Compatriots Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation,
was established with nearly the same purposes as the Russkiy Mir but
with the governmental status and being subordinated to the Foreign
Ministry.
In addition to these two main institutions, a number of (often
state-affiliated) NGOs, such as the Gorchakov Foundation for Public
Diplomacy, Andrei Pervozvanny Fund, International Foundations for
Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014 173

Working with Diasporas Abroad «Rossiyane», International Council

of Russian Compatriots, Library ‘Russian-language literature abroad’,
International Association of Twin Cities, etc. partake in the soft power
activities.
Historically, the City of Moscow was a pioneer in pursuing its
‘foreign policy’ in the post-Soviet space. In 1999 the Moscow Foun-
dation for Support of Compatriots named after Yuri Dolgorukiy was
established by the Decree of then Mayor Yuri Luzhkov (currently it
is a Moscow Foundation for International Cooperation). The founda-
tion has a scholarship programme for the Russian-speaking students,
mostly targeted to compatriots in the Baltic States. The Russian capital
invested in a network of the Houses of Moscow, which should serve as
centres of culture and business cooperation.
The growing activism in the sphere of soft power policy is demon-
strated by the Russian north-western regions, which are ‘specialized’
on developing twinning, humanitarian contacts and support of com-
patriots abroad. For example, St. Petersburg, the Leningrad Oblast,
Kaliningrad and Karelia are traditionally active in twinning with the
BSR towns and partaking various Euroregions. The programs of co-
operation with compatriots have recently been launched by some of
these regions.
The Russian higher education system gradually builds-up its soft
power potential as it is increasingly becoming internationalized via the
introduction of the Bologna Process and increasing the state quota for
foreign students to be trained in Russian universities. The frameworks
for academic exchanges are diversifying. The state-funded ‘slots’
for study in Russian universities are distributed through the Russian
174 Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014

embassies (70-100 slots for each country annually). A number of lea-

ding universities (such as Moscow State University, St. Petersburg
State University, Higher School of Economics, etc.) organize student
enrolment independently through competitions. The leading regional
universities, such as Kant Baltic Federal University (Kaliningrad),
St. Petersburg-based universities, Kuban State University, Voronezh
State University, Siberian and Far Eastern universities, etc., have nu-
merous cooperative programmes with the partner universities in the
neighbouring countries, including joint undergraduate and graduate
programmes and research projects. The Russian academic community
is quite active in using professional associations to increase its soft
power capabilities. For example, Russia’s north-western universities
play a prominent role in the BSR University Network being able to
promote academic exchanges in the region.

The Limits and Constraints of Russia’s Soft Power

The post-Soviet countries are quite suspicious about Moscow’s
soft power policies in this region. For example, Moscow’s economic
strategies were critically evaluated by the regional actors. So, Russia’s
energy potential was perceived only as ‘energy weapons’, i.e. a hard
rather than soft power instrument. As far as Russia’s modernization
programs with European countries are concerned the conceptual ap-
proaches to modernization applied by the parties actually differ from
each other. Whereas Russia has mostly opted for European invest-
ments and high-tech transfer, the European side favours developing a
more general vision of modernization (including the implementation
of profound legal and socio-political reforms) in the context of this
Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014 175

programme. Russia’s quite pragmatic interpretation is not fully in line

with the broader views on modernization held by the European part-
ners.
As for the ‘cultural dimension’ of Russia’s soft power policies,
the valuable asset of the Russian ‘high’ culture is always difficult to
instrumentalize for practical purposes. Besides, Russia’s rich cultural
traditions are often overshadowed by negative perceptions of current
political developments in this country.
It should be also noted that in contrast with ‘high’ culture the cur-
rent Russian mass culture, lifestyle and media products seem to be
less attractive for foreigners, even for Russia’s compatriots. The (ex-
cessive) presence of Russia-made entertainment and news in the lo-
cal media is often viewed as a threat to constructing a ‘true’ national
or European identity. It is often claimed that ethnic minorities in the
post-Soviet countries live in the Russian ‘information space’, which
allegedly undermines their loyalty to the states of domicile. In general,
one may find that attitude of Russian compatriots towards Russia is
quite ambiguous. On the one hand, they express certain affinity with
Russia and even with the ruling political regime (e.g. vast majority of
the Russian citizens residing in Estonia voted for Putin in 2012). On
the other hand, when they have to make a choice between countries
where to get education and/or where to migrate they prefer Europe or
North America to Russia.
The role of compatriots in Russia’s soft power strategy is a sub-
ject to criticism as well. The Russian-speaking communities are of-
ten perceived by the local political elites as a sort of a Russian «fifth
column», working against statehood. The statements about necessity
176 Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014

to consolidate Russian compatriots abroad. On the other hand, some

Russian experts believe that opportunities to use compatriots as a soft
power instrument used to be overestimated, since the size of Russian
communities in the post-Soviet states is decreasing, while their cultur-
al and political orientations are getting more diversified, complicating
the task of their consolidation.
Regarding the attractiveness of the Russian political values, as
many foreign experts maintain, Russia has problems with harmoniz-
ing its traditional and internationally recognized democratic values
and standards. On the one hand, Kosachev [4] assumes that «freedom,
democracy, rule of law, social stability and respect for human rights
have become ‘a consumer basket’ of the modern world» but, on the
other, he insists that «there are differences in their [values] individual
manifestation due to national, historical and other specifics.» In other
words, Moscow finds it difficult to persuade others that it shares uni-
versal values and is ready to disseminate them throughout the world.
Equally, Russia is unable to make its domestic socio-economic and
political model attractive and sell it to other nations. Even Kosachev
admits that Russia cannot export its specific model since «it has not
developed any such model yet».
Moscow is also short of efficient foreign policy tools in the soft
power domain. None of Russia’s large-scale foreign policy initia-
tives (including the EST draft and the Russian CBSS presidency pro-
gramme) gained a solid international support.
In its soft power activities the Kremlin sometimes does not take
into account the ‘local peculiarities’. For example, the three Baltic re-
publics still suffer from a sort of an ‘inferiority complex’ because the
Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014 177

local statehood and identities are not strong enough and still in their
formative phase. The very process of state- and identity-building is
often based on negative ‘othering’ Russia. In this context, any Russian
soft power efforts are interpreted as attempts to breach the Baltic state-
hood, identities and security. Besides, Russia is blamed for having a
‘hidden plan’ to reintegrate the Baltic States in its sphere of influence.
To continue the analysis of Russia’s soft power’s shortcomings, it
should be noted that Moscow’s instruments in this field are predomi-
nantly ‘statist’, i.e. government-based and controlled. The NGO po-
tential and resources are basically not in demand. The NGOs that are
‘officially’ allowed to participate in the soft power activities, in reality
are semi-governmental and perceived by the ‘target audiences’ in the
post-Soviet countries accordingly.
Moscow often tends to forget what Nye wrote about the interac-
tion between the government and non-government sectors in the soft
power sphere: governments should «make sure that their own actions
and policies reinforce rather than undercut their soft power» (9, p. 17).
On a number of occasions the Kremlin undercut what was done by
Russian regions, municipalities, private companies, universities and
NGOs to promote their cooperation with international partners in the
economic and humanitarian spheres.
Duplication is another problem of the Russian soft power policies
in the post-Soviet space. For example, there is a lack of clear division
of labour between the Rossotrudnichestvo and Russkiy Mir; their part-
ners in foreign countries were often puzzled by rather chaotic activi-
ties of these two Russia’s leading soft power agencies.
178 Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014

Conclusions
To sum up, the soft power concept has deeply embedded in both
the Russian foreign policy discourse and machinery over the last de-
cade.
However, the Russian understanding of soft power strongly devi-
ates from either the ‘classic’ one (Nye-based) or suggested by other
Western academics and practitioners. The Russian interpretation of
soft power is rather pragmatic and interest-centric. As mentioned,
the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 defines the soft power
as a ‘set of instruments’ which is helpful in achieving foreign policy
aims by means of civil society institutions, ITs and communication,
humanitarian and other methods that are different from classical diplo-
macy. President Putin was even more pragmatic and instrumentalist
by defining the soft power as a mere foreign policy tool or technology
that helps either to lobby Moscow’s interests in foreign countries or
improve Russia’s international image [10].
Currently, Russia’s soft power strategy represents a combination
of ideational and material motives. On the one hand, the Kremlin
sees soft power as an important instrument in returning and maintai-
ning Russia’s status of a great power as well as in shaping the future
world order and making the West (particularly the U.S.) abide by the
rules of that order. On the other hand, Moscow – in a quite pragmatic
way – views the soft power strategy as an efficient tool in promot-
ing its national interests in foreign countries, coalition-building and
counter-balancing the West in the global geopolitical game.
Is Russia able to effectively implement its soft power strategy? In
general, the answer is «yes» and numerous evidences can be found,
Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014 179

especially in the post-Soviet countries. However, it goes without

saying that the above-mentioned shortcomings as well as international
crises such as the Georgian and Ukrainian ones make the Russian soft
power policies less efficient and sometime undercut the Kremlin’s
strategies in the neighbouring regions. It is still a long way to go to
bring Moscow’s soft power strategy to widely-accepted standards and
make Russia a really attractive international partner.

References

1. Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation. February 12,

2013. http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/Brp_4.nsf/arh/6D84DDEDED
BF7DA644257B160051BF7F?OpenDocument (accessed March
23, 2013).
2. Konyshev V.N., Sergunin A.A. Novaya voennaya doktrina Bara-
ka Obamy i natzional’nye interesy Rossii [Barak Obama’s new
military doctrine and Russia’s national interests]. Natzional’nye
interesy: prioritety i bezopasnost – National Interests: priorities
and security, no. 14 (2012): 2-9.
3. Kornilov A.A. Bezopasnost’ prevyshe vsego. Kontseptzii vneshney
politiki i natzional’noy bezopasnosti gosudarstva Izrail’ [Security
is above all. Foreign policy and national security concepts of the
state of Izrael]. Niznhy Novgorod: Nizhny Novgorod State Uni-
versity, 2005.
4. Kosachev K. The specifics of Russian soft power. Russia in Glob-
al Affairs, 7 October (2012). http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/
The-Specifics-of-Russian-Soft-Power-15683 (accessed March 23,
2013).
180 Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014

5. Kosachev K. V mire slozhilas prezumptsiya vinovnosti Rossii

[Presumption of Russia’s culpability exists in the world]. Kom-
mersant, September 1 (2012).
6. Kubyshkin A.I., Tzvetkova N.A. Publichnaya diplomatiya SShA
[U.S. public diplomacy]. – Moscow: Aspect-Press, 2013.
7. Makarychev A.S., Sergunin A.A. «Myagkaya sila» v deistvii: Ger-
maniya i Kaliningrad [«Soft power» in action: Germany and Ka-
liningrad]. Rossiya i sovremenniy mir – Russia and contemporary
world, no. 1 (2013): 73-89.
8. Makarychev A.S., Sergunin A.A. Postmodernizm i zapadnaya
politicheskaya nauka [Postmodernism and the Western political
science]. Sotzial’no-gumanitarnye znaniya – Socio-humanitarian
knowledge, no. 5 (1996): 151-168.
9. Nye J. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. – New
York: Public Affairs, 2004.
10. Putin V. Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 7 Maya 2012 No. 605 «O merakh
po realizatsii vneshnepoliticheskogo kursa Rossiyskoi Federatsii»
[Decree of the President of the RF, 7 May 2012, No. 605 «On the
measures on the implementation of the Russian Federation’s fo-
reign policy course»]. http://text.document.kremlin.ru/SESSION/
PILOT/main.htm (accessed 23 February 2014).
11. Rykhtik M.I. Kontzeptual’noe osmyslenie natsional’noi bezopas-
nosti SShA [Conceptional comprehension of the U.S. national
security]. Vestnik Nizhegoroskogo universiteta imeni N.I. Lo-
bachevskogo – N.I. Lobachevsky Nizhny Novgorod University
Messenger, no. 1 (2003): 73-85.
Наука Красноярья, № 6(17), 2014 181

DATA ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sergunin Aleksandr Anatolyevich, Professor of the Department
of International Relations Theory & History, Ph.D. in Political Science
St. Petersburg State University
1/3 Smolny St., St. Petersburg, 191060, Russia
e-mail: [email protected]