Social Science Research 75 (2018) 58–72

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Social Science Research

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssresearch

More religious, less dogmatic: Toward a general framework for T

gender differences in religion
Landon Schnabel1
Indiana University, Bloomington, United States
contexts, and failed to consider styles of religious expression. This study
draws on gender theory, brings religion and political attitudes research
into dialogue, and ex plores potential gender differences in religious
ARTICLE INFO dogmatism (e.g., religious absolutism, exclusivity, and intolerance). Using
U.S. data from the Baylor Religion Survey and cross-national data from
Keywords: the International Social Survey Programme, I demonstrate that women
Religion are generally more re ligious, but less dogmatic. As expected based on
Gender gender theory, however, the patterns I uncover are not universal and vary
Politics
by societal context (i.e., Christian vs. non-Christian nations). I argue that
Tolerance
ABSTRACT
religion appears to be a gendered sphere like any other in which we
express our gendered selves, and that gender gaps in religion are the
result not of essential differences, but of context specific gender regimes,
Gender gaps in religiosity are among the most consistent findings in the religion regimes, and the simultaneous “doing” of both gender and re
social sciences. The literature, however, has typically under-emphasized ligion.
gender theory, paid insufficient attention to variation across different

Women tend to be more religious than men, but are they subsequently more religiously dogmatic? Gender gaps in religiosity are
among the most consistent findings in the social sciences (Baker and Whitehead, 2016; Miller and Stark, 2002; Roth and Kroll,
2007). However, the literature is incomplete in three ways. First, key insights from the sociology of gender on the general question of
gender differences have been under-emphasized. Second, most relevant studies have focusd on Christian contexts and
underemphasized potential variation across other religious contexts. Third, gender differences in styles of religious expression have
not been examined. This paper's overarching theoretical argument is that we may not need a new theory specific to religion to
explain gender differences in religion, but instead could draw on general gender theories used to explain gender gaps in other areas
to understand context specific gender gaps in religion. I explore this larger framework about religions being gender-typed social
structures—and Chris tianity in particular being feminine-typed—with a more specific question of whether and how women “do
religion” differently than men, expecting women to “do Christianity” with more compassion and less dogmatism.
The sociological study of gender and religion emerged in the 1970s and 80s with feminist critiques of religion as patriarchal and

E-mail address: [email protected].

1
The author owes special thanks to Art Alderson and especially Brian Powell for their exceptional feedback on this project. He is also grateful to Clem Brooks,
Long Doan, Andy Halpern-Manners, Courtney Irby, Trent Mize, Richard Pitt, Sam Perry, Allison Schnable, Cate Taylor, Peggy Thoits, Tom VanHeuvelen, fellow
participants in the stratification and inequality workshop at Indiana University, and anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier drafts. This study was
presented at the 2015 meetings of the American Sociological Association and the 2016 meetings of Sociologists for Women in Society and the Society for the
Scientific Study of Religion, and as part of the presidential panel on gender and religion at the 2015 meetings of the Association for the Sociology of Religion. It has
been recognized by the Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity Section of the American Sociological Association, the Midwest Sociological Society, and the American
and World Associations for Public Opinion Research. Direct correspondence to Landon Schnabel, Department of Sociology, Indiana University, 744 Ballantine Hall,
1020 E. Kirkwood Ave., Bloomington, IN 47405. [email protected].

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2018.06.010
Received 3 December 2017; Received in revised form 25 April 2018; Accepted 20 June 2018
Available online 26 June 2018
0049-089X/ © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
L. Schnabel Social Science Research 75 (2018) 58–72

later developed into diverse considerations of the varied interconnections between gender and religion (Avishai, 2016). But so
ciologists of gender who study religion and sociologists of religion who study gender have not been in dialogue (Avishai and Irby,
2017), and the gender differences in religiosity literature was developed primarily by sociologists of religion who frequently un
dertheorized gender (Avishai, 2016; Avishai et al., 2015). They often treated gender as an essential characteristic (i.e., sex) rather
than conceptualizing it as a dynamic, multidimensional, and context-specific structure, status, and performance (Avishai and Irby,
2017; Cornwall, 2009; Risman, 2004) in the background of all social interaction (Ridgeway, 2011). Cornwall (2009), speaking as
editor of an issue of the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion focused on the gender gap in religiosity, said that gender scholars
would critique the literature for its insufficient application of gender theory. She asserted that religiosity is a gendered construct and,
therefore, gendering processes could easily explain gender differences in religiosity (also see Hoffmann, 2009). Avishai, Jafar, and
Rinaldo (2015), speaking as guest editors of a special issue of Gender & Society focused on religion and gender (Aune, 2015;
Avishai et al., 2015; Gerber, 2015; Khurshid, 2015; Prickett, 2015; Zion-Waldoks, 2015), similarly argued that religion is a gendered
in stitution, that the literature on religion and gender neglected key gender theories, and that scholars should turn a “gender lens” on
religion (Avishai, 2016; Baker and Whitehead, 2016; Schnabel, 2016b). This article builds on theories about gender as a
performance, status, and structure and religion as a gendered institution to lay out a framework in which women are more religious
and express more caring and tolerant forms of religion because of context-specific gendering processes.
I explore this larger theoretical framework empirically by examining the more specific question of whether women and men “do
gender” in religion in ways consistent with how they “do gender” in other social spheres. To do so, I leverage underutilized measures
from the U.S. Baylor Religion Survey and the International Social Survey Programme to examine whether, in addition to gender
differences in religiosity, there are gender differences in religious dogmatism in the U.S. and cross-nationally. I propose and use the
following working definition of religious dogmatism: “religious dogmatism” is the tendency for people to think they are cognitively and
morally right, others are wrong, and that others should follow their “right” beliefs.2 Women are more religious than men across many
societies (Freese, 2004; Hackett et al., 2016; Sullins, 2006), and religiosity is consistently linked to religious dogmatism (Allport and
Ross, 1967; Edgell et al., 2006; Merino, 2010; Meulemann, 2013; Putnam and Campbell, 2010; Rokeach, 1960). But, in “doing
gender” differently, women and men may “do religion” in gendered ways (Avishai, 2008; Rao, 2015; West and Zimmerman, 1987),
with women's religious expression being more tolerant and inclusive consistent with gender socialization and gendered norms about
women being caring, communitarian, and other-focused (Charles and Bradley, 2009; Eagly, 1987; Ridgeway, 2011). I find that
women are, on average, more religious, but less dogmatic. Conversely, men are less religious, but more dogmatic. Indicative of the
context-specific nature of gender differences and variation in how religions are gendered, these patterns are most pronounced in
Christian contexts.
In the course of applying gender theory to gender gaps in religion, this article answers Cornwall's (2009) appeal to consider how
gendering processes may lead to different expressions of religiosity for women and men, Smith et al.’s (2013) recommendation to
consider global patterns in religion, and Avishai, Jafar, and Rinaldo's (2015) call to turn a gender lens on religion. The results
suggest religion is a gendered sphere like any other in which we negotiate and express our gendered selves, and that religious
absolutism and conflict cannot be fully understood separate from gender.

1. Gender gaps in religiosity and in politics

1.1. Gender differences in religiosity

Women tend to score higher on commonly available measures of religiosity and orthodoxy (Miller and Stark, 2002; Roth and
Kroll, 2007; Sullins, 2006). In some societies, and among some religious groups, however, there are no, or even reverse, gender
differences (Hackett et al., 2016; Schnabel, 2015; Schnabel et al., 2018). But whenever scholars compare the average religiosity of
women and men in the United States and many other societies, especially where Christianity predominates, they consistently find
that women are more religious than men (Miller and Stark, 2002; Roth and Kroll, 2007). Although various theories—such as so
cialization (Collett and Lizardo, 2009), social structure and status (Hastings and Lindsay, 2013; de Vaus and McAllister, 1987),
vulnerability (Norris and Inglehart, 2011; Walter and Davie, 1998), and personality and psychology (Francis 1997; Freese and
Montgomery 2007; Thompson 1991)—have been used to explain gender differences in religiosity, risk preferences theory and the
assertion of “universal” gender differences have dominated recent debate on the topic.
Risk preferences theory argues that being irreligious is spiritually risky, men are more prone to risky behavior, and therefore men
are less religious than women (Miller and Hoffmann, 1995). Stark and Miller (Miller and Stark, 2002; Stark, 2002) attributed risk
preferences to biology, arguing that testosterone makes men engage in “risky” behaviors—such as violent crime and not going to
church.3 More recent research on gender differences in religiosity has focused on debating, nuancing, or refuting the risk
preferences approach and no alternative has yet gained traction (Collett and Lizardo, 2009; Ellis et al., 2016; Freese and
Montgomery, 2007; Lizardo and Collett, 2009; Roth and Kroll, 2007). Some scholars have focused on gendering processes to either
build upon or suggest a

2
Rokeach (1954) defined generalized dogmatism as “(a) a relatively closed cognitive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality, (b) organized around a
central set of beliefs about absolute authority which, in turn, (c) provides a framework for patterns of intolerance toward others” (p. 195). Similar to Rokeach's
(1954:194, 1960) conception of dogmatism as the convergence of “closed cognitive systems, authoritarianism, and intolerance,” I deploy dogmatism as a broad term
3
to encompass absolutism, exclusivity, prejudice, intolerance, and “othering”. This theory relies on Pascal's Wager—a 17th century apologetic argument that asserts
a logical person should be religious because of the risk of eternal pun ishment—to assert that being irreligious is risky (Miller and Hoffman, 1995; Miller and Stark,
2002; Stark, 2002).

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L. Schnabel Social Science Research 75 (2018) 58–72

move beyond religion-specific theories. For example, Collett and Lizardo (2009) argued that risk preference findings could result
from socialization processes. Edgell, Frost, and Stewart (2017) moved away from spiritual or existential understandings of risk to a
gender-theory-informed notion of social risk. They suggested that women are expected to be religious and face more social
sanctions for being non-religious. Breaking more fully from ideas of risk, Cornwall (2009) recommended that researchers stop
examining whether and how risk explains gender differences on standard religiosity measures and instead draw upon gender
scholarship to consider how gendering processes may lead to different expressions of religion for women and men.
The present study shifts the conversation by theorizing in the vein of Collett and Lizardo's (2009) work on gendering processes
and Edgell, Frost, and Stewart's (2017) emphasis on social expectations while also following Cornwall's (2009) exhortation to
consider different forms of religious expression. To do so, I explore a set of religious beliefs and values that I label religious dog
matism. Dogmatic expressions of religion are intolerant of religious differences, view religious outgroups negatively, and believe in
an absolute divine order and/or harsh deity who will punish religious others. In the process of examining potential gender differences
in religious dogmatism, this study draws on gender scholarship and bridges the literature on gender gaps in religiosity and gender
gaps in political attitudes to turn a gender lens on religion (Avishai et al., 2015).

1.2. Dogmatism and gender gaps in political attitudes

Shortly after World War II the study of absolutism, outgroup hatred, and “othering” processes was more central to the field than
today. World events motivated sociologists and social psychologists to study aspects of what some call the dark side of humanity:
for example, one-dimensional—or dogmatic—ideologies (Marcuse, 1964), absolutism (Adorno et al., 1950), intolerance (Stouffer,
1955), and linkages between religion and dogmatism (Rokeach, 1954, 1960; also see Allport and Ross, 1967). Although once
predominant in sociology, the study of authoritarianism and general intolerance has, arguably, been sidelined for several decades.
Nevertheless, two more recent, and as yet disconnected, research agendas have linked religiosity with intolerance and documented
gender gaps in politics.
The relationship between religion and conservative views is complex and contingent on elite framing, information seeking, and
partisan identities (Malka et al. 2011, 2012; Malka and Soto, 2011), and we should not assume that religiosity will, of necessity,
associate with conservative or liberal views (Converse, 1964). Nevertheless, some forms of religiousness are strongly associated
with dogmatism (Froese et al., 2008; Merino, 2010; Rokeach, 1960) and are powerful predictors of conservative stances on diversity
and minority rights issues (Olson et al., 2006; Powell et al., 2010; Putnam and Campbell, 2010; Sherkat et al., 2011). But women,
who are more religious than men, are more supportive of minority rights such as same-sex marriage. This presents a potential
paradox: Despite being more religious, women may be less religiously dogmatic.
Although questions of religious tolerance have not been considered in the gender differences in religiosity literature, there is a
robust literature on gender gaps in politics. U.S. research has found women more politically tolerant (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2004;
Olson et al., 2006), more likely to express concern for the well-being of others (Beutel and Marini, 1995), and more likely support
policies sympathetic to the needs of others, especially the disadvantaged (Beutel and Marini, 1995; Eagly et al., 2004). But women
can be more intolerant than men toward some political outgroups (e.g., communists) (Golebiowska, 1999), and, relevant to the
present study, women often believe in literalism (Hoffmann and Bartkowski, 2008) and indicate greater social distance from one
religious outgroup (atheists) (Edgell et al., 2006; but see the Edgell et al., 2016 extension that did not replicate this finding).4 Similar
trends in women being more tolerant and other-focused appear in cross-national research (Inglehart and Norris, 1999), with global
studies indicating that women are less xenophobic and homophobic than men (Hadler, 2012).
Some research links gender gaps in politics to women scoring lower on social dominance, which is preference for inequality
among social groups (Pratto et al., 1997). Other work suggests women's underdog status makes them more aware of and
concerned for the status of other structurally-disadvantaged groups (Davis and Robinson, 1991; Hunt, 1996; Schnabel, 2018).
Simlarly, Eagly et al. (2004) focused on the status and situated experiences of women and men to explain the differences in line with
Eagly's (1987) previous work, which used gender norms and expectations to explain gender differences more broadly. Eagly et al.
(2004) de monstrated that women are more compassionate, committed to equality, and less supportive of group-based dominance.
According to them, gender differences in political attitudes parallel gender differences in other communal attitudes and identities,
which I argue includes religion. In other words, general theories of group differences (e.g., the underdog principle and related
theories) could be used to account for gender differences in religion.

2. Religion as a gendered structure

Scholars have noted that gender, race, sexuality, politics, and the economy are social structures with individual, interactional,
and institutional dimensions (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; Risman, 2004). Religion, although less frequently discussed in this literature, is
likewise a social structure. It is, among other things, an identity that intersects with other identities, a social institution with particular
teachings and cultural norms, and a social good that provides social psychological benefits (Schnabel, 2017b). Moreover, it is not
just a one-day-a-week phenomenon, it is a social-organizing, sense-making, and comfort-providing structure embedded throughout
people's lives similar to gender, race, and class (Ammerman, 1997; Aune, 2015; Khurshid, 2015; Schnabel, 2016b). In addition to

4
Although the gender difference was not significant in the replication, it was in the same direction as the previous study (i.e., women indicating more social
distance from atheists).

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L. Schnabel Social Science Research 75 (2018) 58–72

being a social structure by which society is organized, experienced, and made sense of, religion is a gendered social structure
(Avishai et al., 2015; Prickett, 2015; Whitehead, 2013).
Setting aside the question of why religions as social structures first became gendered, it is understandable why something that is
gender-imbalanced and potentially seen as more the realm of women—which appears to be the case with many religions, especially
Christian ones5—could be more appealing to women and less appealing to men (Greve, 2014; Schnabel, 2017a; Schnabel et al.,
2018; Trzebiatowska and Bruce, 2012). Occupational segregation highlights how institutional spheres become feminine-typed once
enough women join them (Levanon et al., 2009; Reskin, 1991). Likewise, political parties can be seen as more masculine or
feminine in the presence of gender cleavages in politics, which then facilitates a mutually reinforcing loop that exaggerates what
started as small differences (Messner, 2013; Winter 2010). When gender gaps emerge in an institutional context, they reinforce
themselves because that setting becomes yet another place to “do gender” (Cornwall, 2009; Reskin, 1991; Trzebiatowska and
Bruce, 2012; West and Zimmerman, 1987). Women are more likely to be involved in some religions, and the roles women and men
play within these religions tend to be different, with men filling more leadership roles and women filling more caring and altruistic
roles such as managing children's programming, visitation, and charity work (Edgell, 2006). This involvement varies across religious
traditions with key differences, for example, in who tends to be more responsible for children's religious socialization (moreso
women in Christianity and moreso men in Islam), and the extent to which women are expected and integrated in public religious
engagement (men but not women count toward a quorum in Orthodox Judaism, and women are typically segregated away from
men's view in traditional Islam and Judaism).
Christianity and Christians may be viewed as more feminine and less masculine than non-religious people,6 and popular rhet
oric—as well as foundational social theory (Marx and Engels 2008; Weber 1963)—suggests Christianity is a feminized “underdog”
religion. The “Fight Church” phenomenon—pastors hosting and participating in cage-fights at houses of worship to promote
muscular Christianity—provides a vivid anecdotal example of some men's view that Christianity is too feminine, sympathetic, and
tolerant (Greve, 2014). Therefore, in Christian contexts women who are perceived as insufficiently religious could be socially
sanctioned as being insufficiently feminine; likewise, men who are perceived as too religious could be sanctioned as being overly
feminine (Edgell et al., 2017; Schnabel, 2017a; Sherkat and Wilson, 1995). Gendered perceptions and expectations about religion
may even exaggerate gender gaps with women over-reporting their religiosity due to internalized beliefs about how religious they
should be (Brenner, 2014).
It should be no surprise, then, that a family-centric, expressive, other-focused, comfort-providing, and feminine-typed structure
(i.e., Christian religion) situated in gendered societies demonstrates gender gaps (i.e., the religiosity gender gap and, potentially, a
reverse dogmatism gender gap) (Edgell, 2006; Gallagher, 2003; Schnabel, 2017a; Trzebiatowska and Bruce, 2012). From the point
of view of gender theory, we do not need wholly novel theories to understand why religion, or any other structure or institution, is
gendered (Avishai et al., 2015; Cornwall, 2009). If doing religion differently, men and women may simply be doing gender as it is
practiced and experienced in other gendered spheres such as politics (Avishai, 2008; Cadge, 2004), another key social structure
with gender gaps explained by underdog social status and general gendering processes.

3. Expectations

If general gendering processes can explain gender differences in religiosity we should expect women and men to do religion in
distinctive ways and hold distinctive beliefs in keeping with the roles they play in non-religious spheres, their social status, cultural
norms in many societies, broad interactional and institutional gender processes, and the sociopolitical attitudes women and men
hold more generally (Eagly, 1987; Edgell, 2006; Hall et al., 2012; Prentice and Carranza, 2002). In other words, we may expect
women and men to express different forms of religion with women being more tolerant, loving, and other-centered in many, but not
all, societies because of the context-specific nature of gender and religion as social structures (Charles and Bradley, 2009; Eagly,
1987; Hyde, 2005; Risman, 2004).
EXPECTATION 1: Women will be more religious and less dogmatic than men.
Scholars have argued that religion appeals to women because it provides the disadvantaged with security and comfort (Marx
and Engels, 2008; Norris and Inglehart, 2011; Trzebiatowska and Bruce, 2012; Weber, 1963) and is feminine-typed and more
expected of women (Brenner, 2014; Edgell et al., 2017; Schutz and Roth, 2014). Other research suggests that gender gaps vary by
context, highlighting some men's view that Christianity is insufficiently masculine (Greve, 2014), that gendered expectations that
women should be more religious are most pronounced among Christians (Schnabel, 2015; Schnabel et al., 2018), and that
Christianity has a strong underdog appeal (Marx and Engels, 2008; Schnabel, 2016b). Because Christianity is viewed as a
feminized “underdog” religion that values compassion and “turning the other cheek” in the face of oppression (Greve, 2014;
Trzebiatowska and Bruce, 2012; Walter and Davie, 1998), historically Christian contexts should reveal the largest differences in
religiosity and, possibly, the largest reverse gender differences in religious dogmatism.
EXPECTATION 2: Gender differences in religiosity and religious dogmatism will be most pronounced in Christian contexts.

5
The woman-typing of religion is based on everyday involvement, not leadership positions, which are often dominated by men, and this “feminization” does not
6
mean that religion is good for women (Schnabel, 2016a). Pretest findings based on MTurk data for an experimental survey study being conducted by the author
demonstrate that MTurk workers view Christians and Christianity as significantly more feminine and significantly less masculine than atheists.

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L. Schnabel Social Science Research 75 (2018) 58–72 4. Data and methods

I examine these expectations using the U.S. Baylor Religion Survey (BRS) and the International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP). The BRS was modeled on the General Social Survey but with the distinctive goal of comprehensively assessing religious
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Data were collected from a national random digit dial sample by the Gallup Organization with a 47
percent response rate and final sample of 1648. Demographic patterns from the 2007 BRS compare favorably to the GSS and
auxiliary analyses using questions about feelings toward religious minorities from the GSS yield similar patterns. Missing data on
covariates are handled with multiple imputation.7
I then test the same hypothesis—that women are more religious but less religiously dogmatic—cross-nationally with data from
the 2008 International Social Survey Programme religion module that was fielded in 40 countries.8 The ISSP is a cross-national
colla boration of standardized surveys, each fielded as part of a country's larger random survey of the non-institutionalized adult
popu lation. ISSP data provide the opportunity to test Hypothesis 2, which suggests that the proposed pattern of women being more
religious but less dogmatic will be most pronounced in Christian contexts. As with the BRS data, missing data on covariates are
imputed.9

4.1. Baylor Religion Survey measures

 To assesses whether gender differences in dogmatism parallel or diverge from gender differences in religiosity, I first examine
gender differences on typical religiosity and belief measures: religious affiliation, religious salience, attendance frequency, prayer
frequency, belief in heaven, and view of the Bible. I then examine questions related to religious dogmatism, which I categorize into
the following groupings based on what is available in the BRS: (1) afterlife exclusivity, (2) fundamentalist identity, and (3) belief in a
harsh God who will punish people who are not orthodox/orthoprax (i.e., who do not believe or do the “right” things). Respondents
were only asked to answer the afterlife exclusivity questions if they believed in an afterlife.
Gender (woman = 1) is the key independent variable. Following previous research on gender differences in religiosity and
studies using the BRS (Perry, 2014; Schnabel, 2016b), I control for key sociodemographic characteristics described in Table 1. I also
present models that control for religious salience.10

4.2. International Social Survey Programme measures

The cross-national analyses again start with standard religiosity measures. I then examine questions related to religious dog
matism, which are categorized under two headings following the measures available in the ISSP: (1) Lack of respect and
acceptance of other religions, and (2) negative views of people in other religions. Negative views of people in other religions are
based on questions fielded in 20 of the 40 countries about respondents' views of people with various religious affiliations: atheist,
Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, and Muslim. I create a summated scale (a = .91) of attitudes toward other groups (based upon
all the religions that one is not).
Gender is again the key independent variable. Paralleling the U.S.-only analyses, I control for key sociodemographic char
acteristics available across countries and supported by fit statistics (see Table 2). I also include models with a measure of religious
salience.

4.3. Analytic strategy

For the U.S.-only analyses, I first examine gender differences in religiosity and then dogmatism. Alternating Least Squares
Optimized Scaling (ALSOS) regression is used for all but the affiliation measure, for which binary logistic regression is used. Ordinal
outcome variables—such as religious salience measured from not at all religious = 1 to very religious = 4—do not always have equal
spacing between categories. ALSOS is a method for estimating models without making arbitrary and ultimately unjustifiable as
sumptions about category spacing for ordinal outcomes. ALSOS provides best-fitting estimates of value points and individual vectors
and thus transforms categorical data into linear data on which OLS calculations can be made. In other words, ALSOS procedures
are used to rescale ordinal dependent variables with empirically meaningful spacing between categories so that, for example, being
not at all religious, not too religious, somewhat religious, and very religious are rescaled to values of 1.06, 1.67, 3.24, and 3.81
instead of the arbitrary values of 1, 2, 3, and 4. Coefficients for this method can be interpreted similarly to OLS estimates because
ALSOS transformation retains the original means and standard deviations of the untransformed variables. The optimal scaling
procedure was conducted using Armstrong's ALSOS R package and subsequent regression analysis using the rescaled dependent
variables was conducted in Stata.11

7 8
Parental status (74 missing cases) and rurality (69) had the most missing data. I present unweighted results—analyses with weights yielded the same patterns.
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
9
Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. I used single imputation for the ISSP data because Stata's
10
multilevel commands are not compatible with multiple imputation. Listwise sensitivity analyses yielded the same patterns. Additional analyses with controls for
religious affiliation categories along with religious salience yielded the same patterns.

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L. Schnabel Social Science Research 75 (2018) 58–72

Table 1
Baylor religion survey descriptive statistics.
Source: Baylor Religion Survey 2007.
Measures Descriptions N Mean SD Rangea

Dependent Variables
Typical Religion Measures
Religious Affiliation Affiliated = 1 1598 .89
Religious Salience Not at All Religious = 1, Very Religious = 4 1602 2.96 .95 1.06–3.81 Attendance Frequency Never = 1, Several Times a Week = 9 1623
4.80 2.90 .54–9.62 Prayer Frequency Never = 1, Several Times a Day = 6 1632 4.09 1.77 .98–5.83 Belief in Heaven Absolutely Not = 1, Absolutely Exists =
4 1603 3.33 .98 1.53–4.08 View of Bible Ancient Book = 1, Literal Word of God = 4 1511 2.55 1.11 1.25–4.28
Religiosity Scale Standardized Religiosity Scale, a = .88 1646 0.00 1.00 −2.54–1.45 Afterlife Exclusivity
Neighbors All Go to Heaven = 0, None Go = 4 991 1.55 1.04 .39–6.75 Average Americans All Go to Heaven = 0, None Go = 4 1006 1.57 1.03 -.09–4.21
Buddhists All Go to Heaven = 0, None Go = 4 866 1.89 1.44 .72–4.11 Muslims All Go to Heaven = 0, None Go = 4 866 2.05 1.44 .55–4.24 Jews All Go to
Heaven = 0, None Go = 4 901 1.55 1.21 .39–4.37 Non-Religious All Go to Heaven = 0, None Go = 4 898 2.34 1.45 .7.-3.81
Afterlife Scale Standardized Afterlife Scale, a = .93 1127 0.00 1.00 −1.93–4.36 Dogmatic Religious Identity
Fundamentalist Not at All = 1, Describes Self Very Well = 4 1300 1.63 .97 1.01–3.96 Religious Right Not at All = 1, Describes Self Very Well = 4 1272 1.62
1.01 1.04–4.41 Theological Conservative Not at All = 1, Describes Self Very Well = 4 1281 2.01 1.15 1.00–3.88 Identity Scale Standardized Identity Scale, a =
.79 1422 0.00 1.00 −1.03–3.12
View of God
Punishing God Strongly Disagree = 1, Strongly Agree = 4 1304 2.28 1.12 1.23–4.25 Angry God Strongly Disagree = 1, Strongly Agree = 4 1255 2.83 1.04
1.06–3.85 Severe God Strongly Disagree = 1, Strongly Agree = 4 1277 1.98 1.07 1.20–4.23 Wrathful God Strongly Disagree = 1, Strongly Agree = 4 1281
2.04 1.10 1.14–4.21 Terrible-Woe-Giving God Strongly Disagree = 1, Strongly Agree = 4 1319 1.93 .76 1.46–4.75 Small-Punishments God Strongly
 Disagree = 1, Strongly Agree = 4 1313 1.91 .76 1.56–4.19 War-Requiring God Strongly Disagree = 1, Strongly Agree = 4 1271 2.16 .99 .87–3.85
Tragedy-Allowing God Strongly Disagree = 1, Strongly Agree = 4 1282 2.32 1.01 .83–3.74 Tragedy-Causing God Strongly Disagree = 1, Strongly Agree = 4
1273 1.84 .85 .92–3.90 View of God Scale Standardized View of God Scale, a = .87 1480 0.00 1.00 −2.32–5.12 Dogmatism Scale Standardized Dogmatism
Scale, a = .93 1615 0.00 1.00 −2.54–3.76 Key Independent Variable
Woman Woman = 1 1648 .55
Sociodemographic Controls
Age In Years 1648 50.95 16.42 18–96 Parental Status 1 Or More Children = 1 1648 .75
Marital Status Married = 1 1648 .67
Rural Residence in Rural Location = 1 1648 .21
South Region is South = 1 1648 .31
Education
< High School Less Than High School = 1 1648 .07
High School High School = 1 1648 .23
Some College/Junior College Some College/Junior College = 1 1648 .32
Bachelor Bachelor = 1 1648 .20
Postgraduate Work/Degree Postgraduate Work/Degree = 1 1648 .19
Religious Salience Covariate
Not at All Religious Not at All Religious = 1 1648 .11
Not too Religious Not too Religious = 1 1648 .15
Somewhat Religious Somewhat Religious = 1 1648 .42
Very Religious Very Religious = 1 1648 .32
a
Range shows the highest and lowest values from the alternate least squares optimized scaling. The individual point values are updated to
better match the real distance between categories, but the mean and standard deviation remain the same as the pre-optimized measures.

I follow a similar approach to present the international results, but in parsimonious multilevel models with random-intercepts for
country focused on whether individual-level gender differences in religiosity and dogmatism vary by predominant religion (measured
by the religious affiliation reported by the largest number of respondents in a given country): Christian, Muslim, Jewish, “other
Eastern” (a label created by the ISSP), and no religion (see Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009; Schnabel, 2016a for similar
operationalizations of country-level religious tradition). I use multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression for binary outcomes,
multilevel mixed-effects ALSOS regression for ordered outcomes, and linear mixed-effects multi-level regression for continuous
outcomes.

11
Sensitivity analyses with ordinal logistic and multinomial models demonstrated equivalent patterns.

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Table 2
International social survey programme descriptive statistics.
Source: International Social Survey Programme 2008
Measures Descriptions N Mean SD Range

Dependent Variables
Typical Religion Measures
Religious Affiliation Affiliated = 1 59,208 .79 Religious Salience Extremely Non-Religious = 1, Extremely Religious = 7 58,438 4.23 1.52 1.91–6.79 Attendance
Frequency Never = 1, Several Times a Week = 8 57,231 3.74 2.31 1.27–7.71 Prayer Frequency Never = 1, Several Times a Day = 11 58,869 5.59 3.75
1.16–11.15 Belief in an Afterlife No, Definitely Not = 1, Yes, definitely = 4 54,157 2.67 1.13 1.47–4.24 Religiosity Scale Standardized Religosity Scale, a = .82
59,943 0.00 1.00 −2.29–2.08 Lack of Respect and Acceptance for Other Religions
Not Respect All Religions Strongly Disagree = 1, Strongly Agree = 5 58,166 1.99 1.01 1.38–6.42 Reject Other Religion Marriage Definitely Accept = 1,
Definitely Not Accept = 4 56,038 1.95 .94 1.12–4.16 Reject Other Religion Political Candidate Definitely Accept = 1, Definitely Not Accept = 4 54,019 1.91 .89
1.03–4.02 Dislike People in Other Religions Scalea Very Positive to Very Negative, a = .92 28,643 0.00 1.00 −2.20–2.48
Dogmatism Scale Standardized Dogmatism Scale, a = .63 59,455 0.00 1.00 −2.79–5.77 Key Independent Variable
Woman Woman = 1 59,970 .55 Sociodemographic Controls
Age In Years 59,970 46.65 17.37 15–98 Marital Status Married = 1 59,970 .54 Education
No Formal Qualification No Formal Qualification = 1 59,970 .09
Lowest Formal Qualification Lowest Formal Qualification = 1 59,970 .14
Above Lowest Qualification Above Lowest Qualification = 1 59,970 .21
Higher Secondary Completed Higher Secondary Completed = 1 59,970 .25
Above Higher Secondary Above Higher Secondary = 1 59,970 .15
University Degree Completed University Degree Completed = 1 59,970 .16
a
Religious Salience Imputed Covariate Extremely Non-Religious = 1, Extremely Religious = 7 59,970 4.22 1.52 1–7 These questions were only fielded in 20
countries, and the sample was restricted to those being asked about a religion different from their own.

5. Results

5.1. U.S. Analyses

Table 3 demonstrates women's greater religiosity across standard measures: affiliation, religious salience, attendance, prayer,
belief in heaven, view of the Bible, and a standardized scale of these six items. In this and other tables, higher coefficients for
gender indicate that women score higher on the measures in question. These data provide the same findings on measures
commonly used in previous research and establish a baseline for considering the extent to which religious dogmatism follows, or
deviates from, this pattern of women being more religious on commonly-used measures. Further analyses (not shown) demonstrate
that these religiosity measures are positively and strongly associated with religious dogmatism (the correlation between the
religiosity scale and the dogmatism scale is .57). Therefore, based on that information alone and with no prior knowledge of gender
research, we might expect that women, who are more religious, will be more dogmatic.
Table 4 presents gender differences on dogmatism measures not examined in the gender differences in religiosity literature.
First, women are more inclusive than men in their beliefs about the afterlife. The bivariate relationship between gender and afterlife
Table 3
Gender differences (Woman = 1) on measures similar to those used in previous studies on gender differences in religiosity, baylor religion survey.
Source: Baylor Religion Survey 2007.
Measures Bivariate Sociodemographics

N B SE B SE
Religious Affiliation 1598 .62∗∗∗ .16 .62∗∗∗ .17 Religious Salience 1602 .27∗∗∗ .05 .26∗∗∗ .05 Attendance Frequency 1623 .67∗∗∗ .14 .65∗∗∗ .14 Prayer Frequency
1632 .81∗∗∗ .09 .79∗∗∗ .08 Belief in Heaven 1603 .30∗∗∗ .05 .28∗∗∗ .05 View of Bible 1511 .27∗∗∗ .06 .23∗∗∗ .05 Standardized Religiosity Scale 1646 .35∗∗∗ .05
.33∗∗∗ .05

Note: ALSOS used for all but affiliation, for which logistic regression was used. The sociodemographic models include controls for age, race,
parental status, marital status, rural residence, region, and education.
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (two-tailed).

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Table 4
Gender differences (Woman = 1) on measures of religious dogmatism, baylor religion survey.
Source: Baylor Religion Survey 2007
Measures Bivariate Sociodemographics SocioDemographics and Religious Salience N B SE B SE B SE

Afterlife Exclusivity
Neighbors 991 −.26∗∗∗ .07 −.26∗∗∗ .07 −.28∗∗∗ .07 Average Americans 1006 −.24∗∗∗ .06 −.25∗∗∗ .07 −.28∗∗∗ .07 Buddhists 866 −.20∗ .10 −.22∗ .10
−.32∗∗∗ .09 Muslims 866 −.28∗∗ .10 −.31∗∗ .10 −.41∗∗∗ .09 Jews 901 −.25∗∗ .08 −.27∗∗∗ .08 −.33∗∗∗ .08 Non-Religious 898 −.09 .10 −.12 .10 −.22∗ .09
Afterlife Scale 1127 −.17∗∗ .06 −.18∗∗ .06 −.24∗∗∗ .06 Dogmatic Religious Identity
Fundamentalist 1300 −.00 .05 −.02 .05 −.11∗ .05 Religious Right 1272 .00 .12 −.02 .06 −.12∗ .05 Theological Conservative 1281 .02 .06 −.00 .06
−.14∗ .06 Dogmatic Identity Scale 1422 .00 .05 −.01 .05 −.13∗∗ .05 View of God
Punishing God 1304 −.24∗∗∗ .06 −.26∗∗∗ .06 −.32∗∗∗ .06 Angry God 1255 .02 .06 −.01 .06 −.11∗ .05 Severe God 1277 −.25∗∗∗ .06 −.26∗∗∗ .06
−.30∗∗∗ .06 Wrathful God 1281 −.16∗∗ .06 −.18∗∗ .06 −.24∗∗∗ .06 Terrible-Woe-Giving God 1319 −.10∗ .04 −.12∗∗ .04 −.14∗∗∗ .04 Small-Punishments
God 1313 −.09∗ .04 −.10∗ .04 −.12∗∗ .04 War-Requiring God 1271 −.02 .06 −.05 .05 −.11∗ .05 Tragedy-Allowing God 1282 .02 .06 −.00 .06 −.08
.05 Tragedy-Causing God 1273 −.10∗ .05 −.11∗ .05 −.15∗∗∗ .05 View of God Scale 1480 −.12∗ .05 −.14∗∗ .05 −.22∗∗∗ .05 Dogmatism Scale 1615
−.11∗ .05 −.13∗∗ .05 −.26∗∗∗ .04

Note: ALSOS used for all outcomes. The sociodemographic models include controls for age, race, parental status, marital status, rural residence,
region, and education. The religious salience models add a measure of religious salience with sociodemographic characteristics also included. ∗p <
0.05,∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗∗p < 0.001 (two-tailed).

exclusivity is significant for all but beliefs about the non-religious: women think that more of their neighbors, more average
Americans, more Buddhists, more Muslims, and more Jews will go to heaven than men think will go to heaven. Including socio
demographic controls does not explain away the patterns, and if anything leads to slightly, but not significantly, larger coefficients.
When women's greater overall religious salience is accounted for, women are also significantly more likely to think that non-religious
people will go to heaven. So while women are more religious, they are also more inclusive than men in their afterlife beliefs.12 This
pattern indicates that, in keeping with the notion that women in our gendered society are generally more accepting and other
centered, women's religious beliefs are generally more positive toward other people than are men's.
Shifting from views of others to self-identification, Table 4 demonstrates no bivariate gender differences in holding a dogmatic
identity, but men are more likely than women to hold dogmatic identities when accounting for religious salience. Additional analyses
presented in Table A1 demonstrate that women tend toward being more likely to identify with left-of-center identities, with women
significantly more likely to identify as theologically liberal.
Table 4 also demonstrates that women hold less dogmatic God concepts. In the bivariate model, women are less likely than men
to believe in a God that is punishing, severe, wrathful, and likely to hand out terrible woes, small punishments, and cause tragedies
for not following said divinity correctly. When accounting for religious salience, which is associated with harsher views of God,
women are also less likely to believe in an angry God that requires war. In addition to being less likely to believe in harsh and
punishing views of God, women are more likely to believe in a caring and loving God as measured by God as “loving,” “kind,”
“friendly,” “forgiving,” and “concerned about the well-being of the world” (see Table A1). These gendered views about God mean that
women have a more caring and comforting conceptualization of God to parallel their more inclusive and less dogmatic views about
others and themselves. In addition to women being less dogmatic across individual measures, women are less dogmatic on scales
that combine each sub section of measures and a scale of all the dogmatism measures listed above.
Supplemental analyses with interaction terms demonstrate that although much of the pattern of women being more religious but
less dogmatic is a gender main effect (women generally tend toward less dogmatism than men across levels of religiosity), gender
differences in dogmatism tend to be largest among the moderately religious.13 Additional subsample analyses demonstrate that the

12
Additional analyses demonstrate that women are about twice as likely as men to say that everyone from each group will go to heaven (i.e., belief in
13
universalism). Additional analyses considered gender differences in dogmatism by level of religiosity. Higher religious salience is associated with more
dogmatism for both men and women across measures, but women generally tend toward less dogmatism than men across levels of religious salience. Gender
differences in dogmatism are typically largest among the somewhat religious, which is the largest religious category for both women (42 percent of women) and men
(43 percent of men). This pattern of moderately religious women doing their religion in a more tolerant way parallels a similar finding in the same-sex marriage
attitudes literature: women's
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Table 5
Gender differences (Woman = 1) on measures of religiosity and religious dogmatism, international social survey programme.
Source: International Social Survey 2008.
Measures Bivariate Sociodemographics Sociodemographics and Religious Salience N B SE B SE B SE
Religiosity
Religious Affiliation 59,208 .52∗∗∗ .02 .54∗∗∗ .02 – – Religious Salience 58,438 .37∗∗∗ .01 .38∗∗∗ .01 – – Attendance Frequency 57,231 .45∗∗∗ .02
.45∗∗∗ .02 .13∗∗∗ .02 Prayer Frequency 58,869 1.28∗∗∗ .03 1.29∗∗∗ .03 .79∗∗∗ .02 Belief in an Afterlife 54,157 .27∗∗∗ .01 .27∗∗∗ .01 .15∗∗∗ .01 Religiosity
Scale 59,943 .31∗∗∗ .01 .32∗∗∗ .01 – – Religious Dogmatism
Not Respect All Religions 58,166 −.08∗∗∗ .01 −.08∗∗∗ .01 −.06∗∗∗ .01 Reject Other Religion Marriage 56,038 −.02∗ .01 −.02∗ .01 −.03∗∗∗ .01 Reject
Other Religion Candidate 54,019 .00 .01 .00 .01 −.01 .01 Dislike Other Religions (Scale) 28,643 −.05∗∗∗ .01 −.05∗∗∗ .01 −.03∗∗ .01 Dogmatism
Scale 59,455 −.05∗∗∗ .01 −.05∗∗∗ .01 −.04∗∗ .01

Note: ALSOS mixed-effects multi-level models used for all outcomes except religious affiliation, for which logistic mixed-effects regression was
used, and the scales, for which linear mixed-effects multi-level regression was used. The bivariate models include country-level majority religion.
Sociodemographic models add controls for age, marital status, and education. The religious salience models add a continuous variable for
religious salience.
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (two-tailed).

pattern of women being more religious but less dogmatic operates clearly among Christians, but the small sample of people in other
religions (less than nine percent of the BRS sample) operates differently, with non-significant coefficients in the opposite directions.14
To explore the social correlates and implications of dogmatism, I considered the relationship between religiousness and dog matism
(each measured with a scale of all the relevant measures listed above—as noted previously, these scales are correlated with one
another at .57) and general political orientation (see Table A2), as well as some individual attitudinal items frequently studied in
relation to religion (e.g., abortion and same-sex relationship attitudes). I found that both religiousness and dogmatism are strongly
and independently linked to more conservative views, and that reverse gender differences on these two scales complicate gender
differences in political values (see Table A2).15

5.2. Cross-national analyses

The U.S.-focused analyses demonstrated that women, while more religious than men, have religious beliefs that are generally
less dogmatic. We should not assume, however, that gender operates in the same way across cultural contexts or that a finding
based on patterns in the U.S., where most people are Christian, is indicative of a broader social pattern. Therefore, I next examine
general patterns across countries, and then consider whether and how the patterns vary across religiocultural contexts.
Table 5 demonstrates that the U.S. pattern of women being more religious but less dogmatic does apply to the 40 ISSP
countries collectively.16 In multilevel models, women are more likely to be religiously affiliated, say religion is more important in their
lives, attend and pray more frequently, and believe in an afterlife. Men, however, are more likely to say that other religions do not
need to be respected, more likely to reject marriages of family members outside their religious group, and more likely to dislike
people in religions different than their own. But just because women are gererally more religious and men more dogmatic across
countries does not mean these patterns apply in the same way in different religo-cultural contexts.17 Therefore, I next present
cross-level interactions that demonstrate heterogeneous patterns.
Table 6 presents cross-level interactions between gender and the predominant religions of countries on a religiosity scale, each
of the dogmatism measures individually, and a dogmatism scale.18 Gender gaps in religiosity and inverse gaps in religious
dogmatism

(footnote continued)
14
greater acceptance of same-sex relationships is largest among political moderates (Powell et al., 2010). Additional analyses using the GSS, which has more
limited measures of religious dogmatism, parallel the BRS findings: women have more positive feelings than men toward religious minorities (Jews and Muslims), and
15
men are more prone to black and white thinking. Consistent with other research (Schnabel, 2017b), women's greater religiousness strongly suppresses what
16
would otherwise be larger gender differences in politics. Women's lesser dogmatism weakly amplifies gender differences in politics. Similar to in the BRS data,
gender differences in dogmatism are primarily main effects, although gender gaps again are sometimes larger among slightly or somewhat religious women and men.
17
I also examined another item: equal rights for different religious groups. Multinomial logistic regression demonstrated that women are especially likely to be
moderate and unlikely to be in the most dogmatic response group on this measure. Because of distribution issues and non-ordered effects, I do not include it with the
18
other measures. Bivariate models and models controlling for religion demonstrate similar patterns for interaction effects: gender differences in religiosity are
strongest in Christian nations, as are reverse differences in religious dogmatism. Moreover, supplemental models with key country-level controls demonstrated that
they were unimportant for the contextually-varying gender gaps. Finally, results that separated different Christian countries indicated that although religion in general
is

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Table 6
Cross-level interactions of gender and country's predominant religion on key religiosity and dogma measures, international social survey pro
gramme.
Source: International Social Survey 2008.
Measures Religiosity Not Respect All Religions Reject Other (Scale)
(Scale) Gender Main Effect (Man Reject Other Religion Candidate Dogmatism (Scale)
Reference) Religion Marriage Dislike Other Religions

Woman 0.34∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.01 −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Predominant Religion Main Effects (Christian Reference)
Muslim Country (Turkey) 1.17∗ −0.38 0.73∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.58∗ 0.57 (0.47) (0.38) (0.25) (0.20) (0.29) (0.33)
Jewish Country (Israel) 0.18 −0.00 1.08∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗ – 0.78∗ (0.47) (0.38) (0.25) (0.20) – (0.34)
“Other Eastern” Country −0.12 −0.29 −0.35 −0.30 – −0.44 (0.47) (0.38) (0.25) (0.20) – (0.33)
No Affiliation Country −0.54 1.52∗∗∗ 0.19 0.28∗ 0.40 1.10∗∗∗ (0.34) (0.28) (0.18) (0.14) (0.29) (0.24)
Interactions between Gender and Predominant Religion (Man and Christian Reference)
Woman*Muslim −0.38∗∗∗ 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.24∗∗∗ 0.11∗ (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Woman*Jewish −0.45∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ −0.11∗ 0.02 – 0.09 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) – (0.05)
Woman*“Other Eastern” −0.15∗∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.07 0.04 – 0.10∗ (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) – (0.04)
Woman*No Affiliation 0.02 0.07 0.15∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.04 0.16∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Constant −0.64 2.01 1.90 1.83 −0.03 −0.04 N 59,943 58,166 56,038 54,019 28,643 59,455

Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: ALSOS mixed-effects multi-level models used for individual outcomes and linear mixed-effects multi-level regression for the scales. All
models include age, marital status, and education.
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.

are most prominent in Christian nations. The large gender interaction effects for predominant religion on religiousness demonstrate
that women are not more religious than men in Turkey (a Muslim country) or Israel (a Jewish country). In fact, the coefficient is
reversed in both countries (i.e., men trend toward more religiousness than women), and the reverse gender gap is significant in
Israel (see Schnabel et al., 2018). In addition to reversed gender gaps in the Muslim and Jewish countries in the sample, women's
com paratively greater religsioty is smaller in the countries where “other Eastern religion” (again, a label created by the ISSP that
includes, among others, Taoism and Shintoism) is the majority. The gender gap in the majority-secular countries is similar to that in
the Christian countries.
Similar but inverse patterns appear for some measures of religious dogmatism: Israeli men are actually more likely than Israeli
women to say that all religions should be respected. There is also a significant gender interaction for the “other Eastern” category on
whether other religions should be respected. For disapproving of a relative marrying someone of a different faith, there are
significant but inverse gender interactions for Israel and the majority unaffiliated countries in the sample. A similar interaction
appears in majority unaffiliated countries on disapproving of political candidates of a different religion. Then on the scale constructed
from measures fielded in only 20 countries, we see that Turkish men are less likely to have negative views of people in religions
different from their own than are Turkish women, and that there are not significant gender differences in the non-religious countries
(the Jewish and “other Eastern” countries did not field these items). Finally, on a scale that includes each of the dogmatism items we
see significant interactions for Muslim, “other Eastern,” and no affiliation, with men trending toward less dogmatism in non-Christian
contexts (there is a similar though not significant interaction for Jewish).
The ISSP is one of the highest-quality sources of cross-national data, but the 40 ISSP countries with relevant data available
skew Christian. For example, Turkey is the only predominantly Muslim country in the sample. Regardless of the limitations, the
results still demonstrate important differences between Christian and non-Christian nations, and supplemental analyses using Wave
6 of the World Values Survey, which includes more non-Christian countries (but not Israel), confirmed the ISSP patterns and
provided similar variance by majority religion: Christian countries in the WVS tend to have large gender gaps with women being
more religious, secular countries have gaps similar to Christian countries, Hindu and Buddhist countries smaller gender differences,
and Muslim countries tend to demonstrate reverse pattern with men more religious than women. Also consistent with the ISSP data,
women in the WVS are less likely than men to say that people in other religions are immoral and less likely to say that their religion
is the only acceptable religion.

(footnote continued)
certainly not the same across the diverse range of Christian countries in this study, gender gaps in religiosity typically operate simarly across Christian nations. 67

L. Schnabel Social Science Research 75 (2018) 58–72

In short, the results demonstrate that just as gender differences in religiosity are largest in Christian contexts, reverse gender
differences in religious dogmatism also tend to be largest in Christian contexts. In other words, where women are more religious,
they also tend to be less religiously dogmatic. Israel is a unique case that warrants additional attention in future research, with men
more religious and less religiously dogmatic on one measure but more dogmatic on another. Therefore, how women and men “do
religion” is not universal, but culture and religion specific.

6. Discussion

This study laid out a general theoretical framework—gender differences exist in religion due to the same types of social
processes that lead to the gender-typing of other social spheres—and applied it to the question of how women and men “do
religion.” Specifically, I examined whether women's greater religiousness is paralleled by more religious dogmatism or whether
women's religious beliefs and attitudes tend to be more inclusive, compassionate, and tolerant than men's. Confirming my
expectations based on gender theory and qualitative research on gender and religion (Avishai, 2008; also see Bartkowski and Read,
2003; Ecklund, 2003; Ozorak, 1996; Zion-Waldoks, 2015), I found that women and men are doing religion differently and expressing
distinctive beliefs and values: women are generally more religious, but often less dogmatic—at least in Christian contexts. Gender
differences in religiosity may therefore be attributable to religion being yet another institutional sphere in which people do gender, so
that when doing religion people are also doing gender (Avishai et al., 2015; Cadge, 2004; Cornwall, 2009; West and Zimmerman,
1987; Whitehead, 2013). Cross-national variation suggests that just as the general impact of religiousness on attitudes and behavior
are culturally specific (Adamczyk and Hayes, 2012; Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009), gender differences in religiosity and religious
dogmatism are not universal, but specific to particular cultural contexts.
In Christian contexts, women's religious views are more inclusive and benevolent than men's. For example, American women
say people from diverse groups will go to heaven and believe in a more benevolent divinity, which suggests that women's greater
religiosity may be due in part to seeing religion as more comforting and less judgmental. Women across Christian societies, where
gender differences tend to be larger, are generally more likely to say that other religions should be respected and to have positive
views toward people in religions other than their own. But in non-Christian countries, where gender differences in religiosity tend to
be smaller or go in the opposite direction, there are fewer gender differences in dogmatism, and sometimes differences in the
opposite direction. For example, Israeli men pray more frequently and are more likely to say all religions should be respected than
Israeli women. Religion, therefore, appears to be another sphere in which we face context-specific gender norms and expectations
and express our gendered selves.
Gender differences in religiosity and dogmatism, I argue, result from social processes operating in gendered societies that dis
advantage women and expect them to take on roles, identities, and values associated with both care for others and Christian
religion (Brenner, 2014; Charles and Bradley, 2009; Eagly, 1987; Trzebiatowska and Bruce, 2012). Women fill more caregiving roles
(Charles and Bradley, 2009; Eagly et al., 2004) and are more responsible for doing spiritual tasks on behalf of their families
(Trzebiatowska and Bruce, 2012). Conversely, many men are socialized into self-sufficient, individualistic, strong-willed, and
sometimes even ag gressive masculinities that parallel religious dogmatism and general intolerance (Connell, 2005; Greve, 2014).
Apart from differential socialization (Collett and Lizardo, 2009) and the different roles women and men fill (Eagly, 1987), people also
tend to hold and act upon gender norms and stereotypes—for example, women are assumed to be more communal, expressive,
and caring—and thus sanction through social interaction those who do gender transgressively (Edgell et al., 2017; Prentice and
Carranza, 2002; Rudman and Glick, 2001; West and Zimmerman, 1987). These gendering processes are then consistent with
women's greater overall religiosity and their lower levels of religious dogmatism.
Religions are gendered structures, and a more religious social group is not of necessity more religiously dogmatic and could,
instead, perform a more sympathetic “golden rule” religion (Ammerman, 1997; Whitehead, 2013). Absolutism, intolerance, and
possibly religious conflict and violence operate not as inevitable consequences of religiosity, but instead arise at the intersection of
masculinity and even moderate religion (Cobb, 2006; Macey, 1999). This assertion, here based upon attitudinal findings, is corro
borated by the gendered nature of religious violence, the “Fight Church” phenomenon, and the notion that, despite men's traditional
dominance of religious leadership positions, Christianity is feminizing and challenging to machismo and similar masculinities (Cobb,
2006; Greve, 2014; Kimmel, 2003). Future research should explore how gender regimes and religious regimes intersect to produce
gendered religious conflict and violence.
Synthesizing existing theoretical work in the study of gender and qualitative empirical work in the study of religion, I laid out a
general framework for quantitative gender differences in religion. In this framework, we can understand gender gaps in religiosity
and dogmatism as the result of gender being a social organizing structure, religion being a gendered social structure, and people
simultaneously “doing gender” and “doing religion” (Avishai, 2008; Martin, 2004; Risman, 2004; West and Zimmerman, 1987).
Gender is not just something we are, it is a structure by which society is organized, experienced, and made sense of. Subsequently,
gender differences are not simply the result of inherent differences between individual males and females, but are a complex
outcome of identities, statuses, and interactions operating within gendered institutional domains. Therefore, gender differences are
context specific and similar processes create and recreate gender differences in different spheres, such as family, work, politics,
and, as I argue, religion. As demonstrated by an extensive intersectionality literature, which is just beginning to address the gender
differences in religiosity phenomenon (Baker and Whitehead, 2016; Schnabel, 2016b), social structures are intertwined and
identities performed together. What it means to be Black, gay, politically liberal, working class, or a particular religion varies by
gender (Crenshaw, 1991; Khurshid, 2015). Religion is a central, yet often neglected, part of our intersectional selves, and gender
differences in religiosity are similar to gender differences in other parts of our lives (Baker and Whitehead, 2016; Edgell, 2017;
Schnabel, 2016b). Accordingly,

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gender differences in religion are not universal but vary across other statuses such as sexuality, class, and race (Schnabel, 2016b;
Sherkat, 2002, 2017), and across religious systems with differently gendered expectations, norms, and incentives (Schnabel et al.,
2018).
This study is not without limitations, and I will note a few of the most important ones here. First, the argument that religion is
gendered in ways that produce context-specific gender differences may seem obvious to many sociologists of gender, especially
those conducting qualitative research on gender and religion. Although it may seem obvious to scholars in some areas, this
argument is still a key corrective to a large body of quantitative literature on purportedly “universal” gender differences in
religiousness. Second, it is hard to measure how women and men “do gender” in religion with survey items, and even harder to do
so with existing items in national and cross-national datasets. Therefore, this study measured self-reported religious affect,
orientation, and attitudes rather than actual behavior. I expect positive views toward religious others is strongly linked to inclusive
interaction with religious others, but do not have data to test this assertion. Third, this study proposed to study a specific concept,
religious dogmatism, and had to rely on existing survey data to measure it. I carefully selected the datasets and items used for this
study, and I think they provide a good proxy for what I sought to measure. I do, however, hope that future research will further
examine religious dogmatism, collecting new data with questions specifically designed to measure it. Fourth, this study synthesized
existing work to lay out a larger theo retical framework and applied it to a more specific empirical question, namely whether women
and men “do religion” differently in ways expected based on theory about how we “do gender.” Future research should further
examine this framework empirically. Finally, this study was again limited by the available data and could only examine binary gender
differences between women and men. Gender is more complex than a simple binary, and this study's own argument would suggest
that gendering processes beyond a binary are important. Future research should include multiple measures of gender, considering,
for example, how gradational femininity and masculinity relate to religion within and across gender categories.
Gender difference theories specific to just the religious sphere are incomplete because gender gaps in religion are produced by
the same types of social processes that produce gender gaps in other gendered social structures. Politics, family, and work are
gendered structures in which people always doing gender, and in which gender gaps can be explained by social processes (Charles
and Bradley, 2009; Eagly et al., 2004; West and Zimmerman, 1987). By the same token, religion is a gendered structure in which
women and men are always doing gender. I argue that to bring themselves up to date theoretically on gender and religion, religion
scholars should incorporate gender scholarship on gender regimes rather than continuing to search for universal differences
between women and men (Acker, 2006; Martin, 2004; Risman, 2004; West and Zimmerman, 1987; Whitehead, 2013). If they were
to do so, future research could move beyond the question of just gender differences in religion to higher-level considerations of
religion as an intersectional structure.

Table A1
Gender differences (woman = 1) in progressive religious identity and belief in a loving God, Baylor Religion Survey.
Source: Baylor Religion Survey 2007.

Measures Bivariate Socio-demographics Socio-Demographics and Religious Salience N B SE B SE B SE

Religious Identity
Religious Left 1252 .04 .05 .06 .05 .04 .05 Theological Liberal 1257 .11∗ .05 .14∗ .05 .12∗ .05 View of God
Loving 1363 .22∗∗∗ .04 .21∗∗∗ .04 .14∗∗∗ .04 Kind 1356 .25∗∗∗ .04 .23∗∗∗ .04 .16∗∗∗ .04 Friendly 1314 .17∗∗∗ .05
.15∗∗∗ .05 .09∗ .04 Forgiving 1400 .18∗∗∗ .04 .17∗∗∗ .04 .11∗∗ .04 Concerned with Wellbeing 1323 .28∗∗∗ .05 .27∗∗∗
.05 .17∗∗∗ .04
Note: OLS used for all outcomes. The sociodemographic models include controls for age, race, parental status, marital status, rural residence,
region, and education. The religious salience models add a measure of religious salience with sociodemographic characteristics also included. ∗p <
0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (two-tailed).

Table A2
Gender differences in political orientation (extremely conservative = 1 to extremely liberal = 7) before and after accounting for
religiousness and dogmatism, Baylor Religion Survey.
Source: Baylor Religion Survey 2007.

Measures Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Woman .33∗∗∗ .55∗∗∗ .23∗∗ .40∗∗∗ (continued on next page)

69
L. Schnabel Social Science Research 75 (2018) 58–72

Table A2 (continued)

Measures Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

(.08) (.07) (.07) (.07)

Religiousness −.69∗∗∗ −.42∗∗∗ (.04) (.04)
Religious Dogmatism −.70∗∗∗ −.48∗∗∗ (.04) (.04)
Sociodemographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Constant 4.50 3.87 4.51 4.13 N 1566 1566 1566 1566
Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: OLS used for all outcomes. Sociodemographic controls include age, race, parental status, marital status, rural residence, region, and
education. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (two-tailed).

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