人因验证
人因验证
Technical Report
Non-Proprietary
September 2013
Copyright ⓒ 2013
Revision History
Page
Revision Description
(Section)
ABSTRACT
The purpose of human factors (HF) verification and validation (V&V) is to perform a comprehensive
evaluation and to determine that an integrated system design conforms to human factors engineering
(HFE) design principles, thus allowing operating personnel to achieve their intended goals by successfully
and safely carrying out their required tasks.
This implementation plan will achieve the plant safety and power production goals to ensure the public
health and safety by preventing or mitigating the consequences of postulated accidents and the safe
production of electric power.
Information provided in this report describes five evaluation methods, as specified in NUREG-0711,
“Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model:”
This report also provides the iterative resolution process of the human engineering discrepancies.
Additionally, this document provides a basis for the information contained Chapter 18 of the APR1400
design control document.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 OVERVIEW 1
1.1 Purpose 1
1.2 Scope 2
1.3 Definitions and Acronyms 3
2.0 REFERENCES 7
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES
List of Acronyms
1.0 Overview
The Human Factors (HF) Verification and Validation (V&V) Implementation Plan (IP) describes
the plan and additional detail for how to manage, perform, and document HF V&V activities.
The HF V&V IP also provides information describing operational conditions, scenarios, testing,
HSI inventory and characterization, verification and validation processes, evaluation methods, etc.
Specifically, this implementation plan meets the information and guidance as presented by
NUREG-0711 (Reference 4), including the following HF V&V processes:
This implementation plan also provides the basis for the information presented in Section 18.10 of
the APR1400 Design Control Document (DCD) Chapter 18.0.
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of the HF V&V IP is to provide more detail and descriptions of the steps that need to
be taken to perform effective HF V&V evaluations that are acceptable to the NRC staff. Effective
HF V&V evaluations provide a comprehensive determination that the HFE design conforms to
HFE design principles and that it ensures plant personnel will be able to successfully perform
their tasks to achieve the plant safety and power production.
• Descriptions of the HSI inventory and characterization include all HSI displays, controls and
related equipment within the scope defined by the sampling of operational conditions.
• The HSI provides the needed alarms, information, controls and task support defined by the
task analysis (TA) for personnel performing their tasks.
• The design of the HSIs conforms to the HFE guidelines specified in the Style Guide
(Reference 18).
• The integrated system design (i.e., hardware, software, procedures and personnel elements)
supports the safe operation of the plant as determined by the performance-based tests.
1.2 Scope
The HF V&V Implementation Plan applies to conducting the HF V&V process for all HSI's in the
main control room (MCR), remote shutdown room (RSR), technical support center (TSC) and
emergency operations facility (EOF). This implementation plan also applies to conducting the HF
V&V process for the HSIs at the local control stations (LCSs) associated with important human
actions (IHAs).
The HF V&V process consists of six steps: (1) sampling of operational conditions, (2) HSI
inventory and characterization, (3) task support verification, (4) HFE design verification, (5) ISV,
and (6) HED resolution verification.
(1) The sampling of operational conditions (1) identifies conditions representative of the range of
events that could be encountered during the plant operation, (2) reflects the characteristics
expected to contribute to variations in the system performance, and (3) considers the safety
significance of HSIs.
(2) Determining the HSI inventory and characterizing HSI accurately describes HSI displays,
controls, and related equipment that are within the scope defined by the selected sample of
operational conditions.
(3) Task support verification verifies that the HSI provides the needed alarms, information,
controls, and task support defined by the TA for personnel performing their tasks.
(4) HFE design verification verifies that HSI design conforms to the Style Guide (Reference 18).
(5) The ISV step validates that the integrated system design (i.e., hardware, software,
procedures and personnel elements) supports the safe operation of the plant.
(6) The HED resolution step (1) evaluates HEDs to determine if they require corrections, (2)
identifies design solutions to address HEDs that must to be corrected, and (3) verifies the
completed implementation of these HED design solutions.
1.3 Definitions
Bias
Component
The meaning of the word "component" depends on its context. In the context of the entire plant, it
is an individual piece of equipment such as a pump, valve or vessel, usually part of a system. In a
HSI context, a component is one part of a larger unit, such as a display meter on a control board.
A human engineering discrepancy is a departure from the benchmark of system design suitability
for the roles and capabilities of the plant operator. This may include a deviation from a standard or
convention of human factors engineering practice, an operator preference or need, or an
instrument/equipment characteristic that is implicitly required for an operator's task but is not
provided to the operator.
The application of knowledge about human capabilities and limitations to plant, system and
equipment design. HFE ensures that the plant, system, equipment design, human task and work
environment are compatible with the sensory, perceptual, cognitive and physical attributes of the
personnel who operate, maintain and support it.
Important human actions consist of those actions that meet either risk or deterministic criteria in
terms of plant safety.
• Risk-important human actions: Actions defined by risk criteria that plant personnel use to
assure plant safety. There are absolute and relative criteria for defining risk important
human actions. For absolute criteria, a risk-important action (RIHAs) is any action whose
successful performance is needed to reasonably assure that predefined risk criteria are met.
For relative criteria, the risk-important actions are defined as those with the greatest risk
compared to all human actions. Risk-important human actions based on relative criteria can
be identified quantitatively from risk analyses, and qualitatively from various criteria, such as
an evaluation of the task performance based on considering performance-shaping factors.
A human system interface (HSI) is that part of the system through which personnel interact to
perform their functions and tasks. Major HSIs include alarms, information displays, controls, and
procedures. HSI use can be influenced directly by factors such as (1) the organization of HSIs
into workstations (e.g., consoles and panels); (2) the arrangement of workstations and supporting
equipment into facilities, such as a main control room, remote shutdown station, local control
stations, the technical support center (TSC), and the emergency-operations facility (EOF); and (3)
the environmental conditions in which the HSIs are used, including temperature, humidity,
ventilation, illumination, and noise. The use of HSIs also can be affected indirectly by other
aspects of plant design and operation, such as personnel training, shift schedules, work practices,
and management and organizational factors, such as the safety culture of the plant staff.
An operating experience review (OER) is a review of previous designs similar to the current
design to identify, analyze and address HFE-related problems and issues; to analyze negative
features in previous designs so that they are avoided in developing the current system while
retaining the positive features.
Performance-based tests
Plant
The operating unit of a nuclear power station, including the nuclear steam supply system, the
turbine, electrical generator, and all associated systems and components (commonly referred to
as the balance of plant). For a multi-unit plant, the term “plant” refers to all systems and
processes associated with a specific unit’s ability to produce electrical power, even though other
units might share some systems or portions of systems.
Plant Safety
Plant safety is also referred to as “safe operation of the plant.” A general term used herein to
denote the technical safety objective as articulated by the international nuclear safety advisory
group of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the “Basic Safety Principles for
Nuclear Power Plants” (Reference 17): “To prevent with high confidence accidents in nuclear
plants; to verify that, for all accidents taken into account in the design of the plant, even those of
very low probability, radiological consequences, if any, would be minor; and to provide reasonable
assurance that the likelihood of severe accidents with serious radiological consequences is
extremely small.”
Primary Tasks
Primary Tasks are those tasks performed by personnel to supervise the plant (i.e., monitoring,
detection, situation assessment, response planning, and response implementation).
Procedures
Written instructions providing guidance to plant personnel for operating and maintaining the plant,
and for handling disturbances and emergency conditions.
Secondary Tasks
Secondary tasks are those tasks personnel must complete when interfacing with the HSI, such as
navigation through computer screens to find a needed display and HSI configuration.
Complicated secondary tasks often have negative effects on the performance of primary tasks.
Simulator
A facility that physically represents the HSI configuration and that dynamically represents the
operating characteristics and responses of the plant in real time.
System
An integrated collection of plant components and control elements that carry out a function alone,
or with other plant systems.
Task
A group of activities with a common purpose, often undertaken and timed closely together.
Verification
The process by which the design is evaluated to determine whether it (1) provides the information,
controls, and task-support needed to accomplish tasks; and (2) conforms to the HFE design
guidance.
Validation
The set of activities to ensure that a system can accomplish its intended use, goals, and
objectives in the particular operational environment.
2.0 References
2. NUREG-0800, Rev. 2, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for
Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition”, 2007.
7. Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 4, "Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for Nuclear
Power Plants," USNRC, 2006.
9. NUREG/IA-0137, “A Study of Control Room Staffing Levels for Advanced Reactors,” USNRC,
2000d.
10. ANSI/ANS-3.5-2009, "Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Use in Operator Training and
Examination,” ANSI and ANS.
11. Endsley, M.R., “Towards a theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems, Human
Factors,” Vol. 37, pp. 32-64, 1995a.
12. Endsley, M.R., “Measurement of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems, Human Factors,”
Vol. 37, pp. 65-84, 1995b.
13. Hill, S.G., Iavecchia, H.P., Byers, J.C., Bittier, A.C., Zaklad, A.L., & Christ, R.E., “Comparison
of four subjective workload rating scales. Human Factors,” 34, pp.429-440, 1992.
14. Paul Salmon, Neville Stanton, Guy Walker & Damian Green, “Situation Awareness
Measurement: A review of applicability for C4i environments. Journal of Applied Ergonomics,”
37, 2, pp. 225-238, 2007.
15. Sandra G. Hart, Lowell E. Staveland, “Development of NASA-TLX (Task Load Index): Results
of Empirical and Theoretical Research,” NASA/CR-1997-205754, 1988.
16. Sebok, A., “Team performance in process control: influences of interface design and staffing
level, Ergonomics,” Vol. 43, pp. 1210-1236, 1988.
17. INSAG-12, Rev.1, “Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants 75-INSAG,” IAEA, 1999.
The purpose of sampling the operational conditions (SOCs) is to select representative operational
conditions that are expected to occur during the lifetime of the plant, and to reflect characteristics
(including HSI design) that may affect system performance. Sampling supports the evaluating the
adequacy of the task scope for V&V of task support verification, HFE design verification, and ISV.
Sampling is necessary due to the fact that testing every important operational condition during
the operation of the plant is neither possible, nor reasonable considering the cost and the time
involved.
Sampling is performed according to appropriate methods and procedures to achieve the purpose
of being representative, as stated above. The methods and procedures ensure that the conditions
selected by sampling are representative and include characteristics that affect the variability of
the system performance. However, there are obvious limitations to the SOCs when compared to
the variety of operational conditions that may actually occur, even if appropriate the SOCs were
made according to the methods and procedures. Therefore, the selected conditions may not
assure representation of plant operational conditions due to these limitations. Multidimensional
sampling strategy (see Section 3.1) is applied in order to ensure their representativeness.
Applying the multidimensional sampling strategy means selection of operational conditions based
on a variety of operational conditions that may be expected to occur during the lifetime of the
plant, including the operational tasks to be carried out by operators under conditions and
situational factors which influence the operator performances of the tasks.
A. Plant Conditions
Operational conditions consist of normal operation, that commonly takes place during the life of
the plant, abnormal operation due to an equipment failure or a system failure, and emergency
operation resulting from an unexpected event that may lead to radiation release. Operational
conditions are described in more detail below.
Normal Operation
Normal operation includes the following operational modes:
• Plant startup, including hot standby to minimum load (nuclear startup), turbine startup, and
synchronization of the generator
• Plant shutdown, including shutdown to hot standby, operating at hot standby, and hot
standby to cold shutdown
• Refueling
• 100% power operation
• Changes in operating power
Abnormal Operation
Abnormal operation includes operation with the following failures present (and in one case a DBA
in progress):
• I&C system failure and degraded conditions, including sensor, monitoring, automation, and
control/communications subsystem failures and malfunctions (e.g., safety system logic and
control unit, fault tolerant controller)
• Common cause failure of the I&C system during a design basis accident (as defined by BTP
7-19, Reference 2)
• HSI failure including, loss of processing or display capabilities for alarms, displays, controls,
and computer-based procedures
B. Personnel Tasks
The following types of personnel tasks are included in the sampling of operational conditions.
• All personnel tasks identified as problematic during the operating experience review
Knowledge-Based Tasks
• Tasks that are not well defined by detailed procedures (e.g., steam generator tube rupture
with a failure of radiation monitors on the secondary)
Human Interactions
The sample includes the range of interactions among plant personnel, including tasks performed
independently by individual crew members, and those undertaken by a team of crew members,
including:
• MCR operators (e.g., operations, shift turnover process)
• MCR operators with auxiliary operators and other plant personnel performing tasks locally
(e.g., maintenance or I&C technicians, chemistry technicians, etc.)
• MCR operators and the TSC and the EOF staff
• MCR operators with plant management, the NRC, and other outside organizations
A variety of situations exist that adversely affect human performance factors. The operators may
experience an abnormal plant operating situation that is not anticipated such as failure of safety
equipment or accidents that could threaten plant safety and require an urgent immediate action.
Under such a condition, the urgency and the need for an accurate assessment of the situation
demands a significantly increased operator task burden and imposes an increased operator
fatigue level compared to normal operation. Therefore, the following situational factors are
reflected in the selection of the operational conditions.
High-Workload Situations
Selection of operational conditions includes:
• Situations where variations in human performance due to high workload on multi-tasking
situations can be assessed.
Varying-Workload Situations
Selection of operational conditions includes:
• Conditions where there is a sudden increase in the number of signals that must be detected
and processed after a period of infrequent signals
• Conditions where there is a rapid reduction in the need for detecting signals and processing
demands following a time of high sustained task-demand
Fatigue Situations
Selection of operational conditions includes:
• Situations that may be associated with fatigue, such as work on backshifts and tasks
performed frequently with fatigue, such as repeated inputs to a touch screen during plant
operations
Environmental Factors
Selection of operational conditions includes:
• Environmental conditions that may cause human performance to vary (e.g., poor lighting,
extreme temperatures, high noise, and simulated radiological contamination)
HF V&V scenarios are based on the operational conditions selected in Section 3.1, and the
scenarios are developed excluding the following attributes:
These types of scenarios are excluded because the operators are likely to have high
performance in carrying out the tasks, the tasks are relatively easy to perform, or it is expected
the operators will have a high degree of familiarity with the tasks from training.
Scenarios that allow the operators to easily anticipate associated operational conditions while
executing the scenario should also be excluded from the final group of scenarios. Duplicate
scenarios are not included.
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ISV scenarios are compatible for use in the full-scope simulator, and each scenario is developed
to simulate actual plant operator tasks. Included among ISV scenarios, is the scenario associated
with the control transfer from the main control room to the RSR includes the actual time required
for acquiring the protective equipment and manning the RSR.
Each scenario includes the following items such that the event flow of a scenario is clearly
understandable to operations experts and human factors engineering professionals. For each
scenario, the following information is defined to reasonably assure that important dimensions of
performance are addressed, and to allow the scenarios to be accurately and consistently
presented for repeated trials:
• A description of the scenario and any pertinent prior history necessary for personnel to
understand the state of the plant at the start-up of the scenario
• Specific initial conditions; a precise definition of the plant’s functions, processes, systems,
component conditions, and performance parameters (e.g., shift turnover)
• Events (e.g., system failures) that occur during the scenario and their initiating conditions
(e.g., based on time, or a value of a specific parameter)
• Precise definition of workplace factors (e.g., environmental conditions, such as low levels of
illumination)
• Needs for task support (e.g., procedures and technical specifications)
• Staffing level
• Details of communication content between control room personnel and remote personnel
(e.g., load dispatcher via telephone)
• Scripted responses for test personnel who will act as plant personnel in the test scenarios
• The precise specification of what, when, and how data are to be collected and stored
The ISV scenarios will consist of seven scenarios selected per Section 3.1, designed per Section
3.2 and with the components described in Section 3.3.
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The purpose of the HSI inventory and characterization activity is to identify the displays, controls
and instrumentation required to operate the power plant within the scope defined by the sampling
of operating conditions, and to provide input to the task support verification and HFE design
verification. In order to achieve these objectives, the HSI inventory and characterization is
prepared through analysis of the various design documents, and then it is compared with the HSI
final design content.
4.1.1 Scope
The scope of HSI inventory and characterization is to identify all HSI inventory and
characterization required by personnel to complete the tasks covered in the validation scenarios
that were identified in the sampling of operational conditions and necessary for plant operation.
The scope includes the relevant information for using the HSI features and the navigation method
to search for interface information.
The documentation for HSI inventory and characterization includes the following information, as a
minimum. It also includes samples such as HSI display drawings, as appropriate that can
specifically confirm HSI inventory and characterization.
and type of control modes, accuracy, precision, dynamic response, and control format)
• User-system interaction and dialog types (e.g., navigation aids and menus)
• Physical location in the HSI (e.g., control panel section), as applicable
In order to ensure that the current state is accurately reflected in the HSI inventory and
characterization document, HSI inventory and characterization is performed in accordance with
the following steps:
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The purposes of task support verification is to verify task support items identified during the TA,
which is conducted on the selected operational conditions, are available, and to verify that all HSI
(e.g., alarms, controls, and displays), which are needed to carry out the operator tasks, are
provided in the HSI design. Task support verification includes input data from the HSI inventory
and characterization and task support items identified from the TA.
The HSI task support criteria are based on the alarms, controls, displays, and task support
needed by personnel to complete their tasks, as identified by the applicant’s task analysis.
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If the results of task support verification identify any of the following items, they are designated as
HED items:
• HSIs needed for task performance (e.g., a necessary control or display) is unavailable
• HSI characteristics do not match the requirements of the personnel task (e.g., a display
shows the needed plant parameter, but not within the range or precision needed for the task)
• HSIs are available that are not needed for any task.
Documentation of HEDs will identify the HSI, the tasks affected, and the basis for the deficiency,
e.g., what aspect of the HSI was identified as not meeting task requirements. The HED items
identified by task support verification are managed and documented in accordance with Section 6.
The purpose of the HFE design verification is to ensure that the HSI of the selected operational
conditions are suitable considering the human capabilities and limitations; i.e., that the design of
the HSIs conforms to HFE guidelines. HSI designs include HSI inventory and characterization as
well as normal environmental conditions of the control room where the HSIs are installed.
• The individual HSI inventory and characterization (e.g., pump symbol, pump controller,
engineering units),
• A combination of or an integrated form of the individual HSI design (e.g., LDP, information
display page, and display network),
• The physical facilities (e.g., large display panel and control room console) provided to
display the above two types of information, and
• The control room environment factors (e.g., background noise, temperature, and humidity)
where those physical facilities are installed.
The review criteria for the verification of above four factors are based on the specification in
NUREG-0700 (Reference 3).
HFE design verification is performed using the four criteria of the HSI design described in Section
4.3.1 verification criteria. The design verification process is shown in Figure 2. The details are as
follows:
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4) Environmental Factors TS
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The HED items identified by HFE design verification are controlled and documented in
accordance with Section 6.5.
The ISV is the final evaluation process of HF V&V activities. By applying the human performance-
based evaluation methodology, ISV is how the integrated system (i.e., hardware, software,
procedures, and personnel elements) is verified to support plant operation. The ISV process is
shown in Figure 3.
ISV is different from the previous HF V&V activities (i.e., HFE design verification and task support
verification). Realistic operating scenarios are developed to determine if human errors could
occur due to operational complexity or excessive task load. The scenarios are developed, and
are carried out in tests using a full scope simulator. Tests are conducted after significant HEDs
identified in previous reviews have been resolved.
The ISV is a human performance-based evaluation. The performance evaluation data will include
directly observable performance data such as the execution time of operator tasks, the frequency
of human error occurrence and performance data that are measurable (e.g., SG level, pressurizer
pressure, etc.). Data also include indirectly measurable performance data such as operator task
load, situational awareness, and collaboration between operators. Various forms of performance
evaluation techniques are applied to collect and analyze the evaluation data in detail.
The performance evaluation techniques include statistical analytical methods as well as reliable
and subjective human performance evaluation tools. To ensure reliability of the ISV results, the
verification is done by individuals or groups other than those who performed the original design or
analysis, but may be from the same organization.
The validation team is an organization independent from the design organization and the team is
not involved in any design work. The validation team is organized as follows:
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As stated at the beginning of Section 5.0, the objective of the test is to ensure that the integration
of the various aspects of as-designed HSI provide usable work ensembles that support the
successful accomplishment of the operator's required tasks (i.e., to validate performance of the
integrated HSI system).
• Validate the acceptability of the shift staffing level (i.e., minimum shift staffing levels, nominal
levels, maximum levels, and shift turnover), the assignment of tasks to crew members, and
crew coordination within the control room, between the control room and LCSs and support
centers, and with individuals performing tasks locally.
• Validate that the HSI design has adequate capability for alerting, informing, controlling, and
feedback such that personnel tasks are successfully completed during normal plant
evolutions, transients, design-basis accidents, and under selected risk significant events
beyond-design basis, as defined by sampling operational conditions.
• Validate that specific personnel tasks can be accomplished within the time and performance
criteria, with effective situation awareness, and acceptable workload levels that balance
vigilance and personnel burden.
• Validate that the HSIs minimize personnel error and assure error detection and recovery
capability when errors occur.
• Validate that the personnel can effectively transition between the HSIs and procedures in
accomplishing their tasks, and that interface management tasks, such as display
configuration and navigation, are not a distraction or an undue burden.
A full-scope simulator developed to meet ANSI/ANS 3.5-2009, (Reference 10) is used as the
validation testbed.
• Interface Completeness
The testbed completely represents the integrated system. It includes HSIs and procedures
not specifically required in the test scenarios.
The testbed’s HSIs and procedures represent the APR1400 design with high physical fidelity,
including the presentation of alarms, display, controls, job aids, procedures,
communications equipment, interface management tools, layout, and spatial relationships.
The testbed’s HSI and procedures represent the APR 1400 design with high functional
fidelity. All HSI functions are available.
• Environment Fidelity
Information and data provided to personnel completely represent the APR1400 systems
design that they monitor and control.
The testbed’s data dynamics represent the APR 1400 design’s data dynamics with high
fidelity. The process model is able to provide input to the HSI, so that information flow and
control responses occur accurately and within the correct response time (e.g., information
should be sent to personnel with the same delays as occur in the plant).
• For IHAs at complex HSIs remote from the main control room (e.g., RSR), where precise
actions are essential, the use of a simulator or mockup is used to verify that the
requirements for human performance can be met. For less IHAs or for non-complex HSIs,
human performance is assessed on analysis, such as TA, rather than on simulations.
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4) Situation Awareness TS
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5) Workload
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In this section, the actual methods used and measurements obtained for the ISV are discussed
and compared to those measurements described in Section 5.5.1, Types of Performance
Measures to verify the suitability and the basis. Finally, specifics of the compatibility criteria are
explained.
First, it is determined in what form (e.g., surveys, observation, and simulator logging) and at what
point in time (e.g., prior to, during, and after execution of a scenario), the performance
measurement values are obtained in the actual measurement.
Second, the suitability criteria and the basis are selected in accordance with the following four
criteria:
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4) Situation Awareness
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5) Workload
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ISV establishes the test procedure and follows them in order to minimize the performance effect
on the operator due to the direction or interface with the evaluators. ISV is carried out according
to clear procedures established to meet the following requirements.
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Since those operators who participate in the ISV, including the shift supervisor and reactor
operators should be familiar with the APR1400 HSI design as well as system design.
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4) Situation Awareness
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5) Workload TS
Table 12. Example: Acceptance Criteria for an Individual Scenario including IHA TS
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Table 13. Example of an Acceptance Criteria for ISV
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The objective of the HED resolution process is to ensure that HEDs are evaluated for importance,
important HEDs are resolved and corrected, and HED corrections are acceptable. HEDs are
identified through the task support verification, the HFE design verification and the ISV processes.
The HED resolution process will (1) evaluate HEDs to determine if they require correction, (2)
identify design solutions to address HEDs that must be corrected, and (3) verify the completed
implementation of HED design solutions.
1. Communication TS
2. Team spirit TS
3. Openness TS
4. Coordination as a crew
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