Luo, T. (2016). Augmenting combat power: Military translation in China-Burma-India Theater.

Linguistica Antverpiensia, New Series: Themes in Translation Studies, 15, 143–161.

Augmenting combat power: Military translation in China-Burma-

India Theater1

Tian Luo
Chongqing Jiaotong University, China
University of Macau, China
[email protected]

Despite the growing academic interest in translators and interpreters in

war situations, there is still a need to discuss the nature and role of
translation from the perspective of military principles. This paper, drawing
upon the theories about combat power, defines military translation as an
intangible factor of combat power involving information and knowledge,
and proposes a framework to map out how translation acts upon the
internal mechanism of war. Based on the relevant historical records about
and memoirs by the interpreters serving in the China-Burma-India Theater,
the case study was able to discover that interpreters contributed greatly to
the victory of the Alliance through their bilingual services that increased
tangible and other intangible factors of combat power, and aided in its
execution. This paper concludes that military translation can help reshape
the combat power relations between the parties involved in conflicts, and
ultimately influence the outcome of the war.

1. Introduction

The role of translators and interpreters in war can never be underestimated.

In the Pacific Theater in World War II, more than 6,000 Nisei linguists,
who were second generation Japanese Americans, served in the US army
and worked as translators, interpreters and interrogators (McNaughton,
2006; Takeda, 2007). They contributed to the victory of America to such a
degree that General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur’s Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, remarked that “their work shortened the war by two years”
(McNaughton, 2006, p. 460).
Recently, there has been increasing academic interest in military
translation (see Apter, 2006; Dragovic-Drouet, 2007; Inghilleri, 2008;
Salama-Carr, 2007; Stahuljak, 2000, 2010; Footitt & Kelly, 2012; Footitt
& Tobia, 2013). Baker (2006, 2010), for example, draws on narrative
theory to position translators and interpreters as participants in the
construction of war narratives. She investigates how they are narrated by
other participants in the war zone, and how they participate in elaborating
the range of public narratives of the conflict and, in so doing, influence the
course of the war. Rafael (2007) suggests that translation is an instrument
Military translation in China-Burma-India Theater 143

of surveillance that magnifies the aliennesss of alien speech and a tool of

empowerment because it can establish connections and contacts across
linguistic and other divides. Wong (2007), adopting a historical-descriptive
approach, chronicles the work of translators and interpreters during the
Opium War between Britain and China, and foregrounds their multiple
roles which were crucial but have been overlooked in the historical record.
As the above-mentioned studies have shown, scholars have agreed
on the indispensable role of translators and interpreters in conflict zones
and discussed it from narrative, cultural or historical perspective. However,
military translation has rarely been approached within the framework of
military principles. Further investigation still needs to be done about
whether translators and interpreters can act upon the internal mechanism
of war, reshape the power relations and influence the result of war. The
present paper tries to address the issue of military translation by referring
to military theory and by examining the case of interpreters in the China-
Burma-India Theater (hereafter referred to as “CBI Theater”).

2. Translation, combat power and war

In this section, some concepts about combat power will be reviewed and a
framework to map out the role of military translation in war will be
proposed. To avoid redundancy, translation is used in this paper as an
umbrella term including both written rendition and oral interpretation that
transfer information and knowledge across different languages.
To know what military translation is in nature, it is necessary to
understand in advance the concept of combat power. According to
Principles of War, combat power, as the direct instrument for war, is often
a decisive element in the victory over the opponent (West, 1969, pp. 12–
13). The USA Army Field Manual 3-0 defines combat power as “the total
means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a
military unit or formation can apply at a given time” (HDA, 2008, p. 4-1).
It is a potential that can be converted into effective action by army
command. In a set time and space, the result of battle is determined by the
respective combat powers of adversaries, and the side with the greater
combat power will win (Raymond, 1993, p. 30).
It is generally agreed that in combat power, there are tangible and
intangible factors (HDA, 2011; US Marine Corps, 1997a, 1997b; West,
1969, pp. 11–14). Tangible factors refer to “the number of persons (military
personnel strength) and the quantity and quality of material” (West, 1969,
pp. 12–13). These measurable factors include the quantity of soldiers,
weapons and equipment, logistics and other physical elements. As the basis
for combat power, they are used as destructive power, tactical mobility,
and other physical strengths.
Intangible factors are understood as “the mental and bodily
capabilities of the individuals and groups that comprise the military units
144 Tian Luo

(forces), the most important one being the spiritual strength of the units and
forces” (West, 1969, pp. 11–14). These less easily measured factors include
military intelligence, quality of leadership, state of discipline, troop morale
and fighting spirit, quality of training, the spirit of teamwork, etc. Two
characteristics of intangible factors are manifest: firstly, they are
indivisible elements attaching to tangible factors and contributing to
victory; and secondly they change greatly, depending on people and
conditions.
There is an interaction between tangible and intangible factors.
Changes made to either of them will lead to the alteration of the other. If
intangible factors are effectively managed, the overall combat power can
be multiplied; if poorly managed, the combat power will be reduced.

Figure 1. Tangible and intangible factors of combat power

In a given time and space, both tangible and intangible factors are
generated or executed into combat power in air, land or sea by command
as shown in Figure 1 (based on HDA, 2012a , pp. 5–19; Nedialkov, 2007,
p. 55; West, 1969, pp. 11–14). In war, commanders apply the potentials of
combat power into operations of fires, movement and manoeuvre,
protection and sustainment by using leadership and information. To
accomplish mission command, they need to share information, knowledge
and perceptions so as to integrate and enhance action. Commanders are put
in charge of the following tasks: (1) drive the operations process through
their activities of understanding, directing, and assessing operations; (2)
develop teams both within their own organizations and with joint or
multinational partners; (3) inform and influence audiences inside and
outside their organizations.
Military translation in China-Burma-India Theater 145

Before we discuss how translation influences the combat power as well as

the result of war, we need to understand in advance another two key factors
in the process of command: information and knowledge. They are two
closely related concepts, as important as lethal action in determining the
result of military operations.
Information is a “critical, and sometimes the decisive factor in
campaigns and major operations” (HDA, 2008, pp. 7–1). Over 2,000 years
ago, Sun Tzu has pointed out the importance of information in warfare: “If
you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
hundred battles” (Sun Tzu, Giles trans., 1910, p. 24). Intelligence is a type
of information about the current or potential adversary, used to understand
the enemy and to support force generation. Every engagement, battle, and
major campaign requires information. Information is conveyed to various
audiences such as adversaries, neutral parties and friendly forces. In war,
commanders at all levels depend on information and intelligence
particularly “to make informed decisions on how best to apply combat
power” (HDA, 2012a, p. 3-1). They also use information and intelligence
as a weapon against enemy command and control, and as a tool to boost
the friendly morale, so as to increase the effectiveness of the warfighting
(HDA, 2008, pp. 4-1–4-3). Information can have a great impact on the
tangible factor of combat power. For instance, “disruption of the flow of
information or corruption of the information itself can negate the effects of
weapons and systems” (HDA, 1996, p. iv). Therefore, in war, every party
tries its best to develop the capacity in information collection, processing,
and dissemination. Such information operations involve cultural, social,
political, and economic issues within the area of military operations and
target at sources such as people, equipment, and documents.
Knowledge is the understanding obtained from analysis of
information and data, or “the comprehension gained through study,
experience, practice, and human interaction that provides the basis for
expertise and skilled judgment” (HAD, 2012b, p. 1-2). There are two types
of knowledge in the army: tacit and explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge
means each individual’s personal store of knowledge gained from life
experiences, training, and networks of acquaintances. It is important to the
leaders’ decision-making and to the subordinates’ performance. Explicit
knowledge consists of written or documented information that can be
organized, applied and transferred, such as dictionaries, field manuals,
technical manuals, tactics, and memorandums. It is important to support
situational awareness and shared understanding. Two kinds of knowledge
operation are common in the army: knowledge transfer and creation (HAD,
2012b, p. 1-3). Knowledge shall be moved from one person to another,
between individuals and units. Knowledge creation means developing new
knowledge or combining existent knowledge in response to identified
knowledge gaps. Knowledge is created when there is a new technology, or
when the commander requires critical information.
146 Tian Luo

Based on the understanding of the concepts about combat power and

its execution, a framework is proposed to investigate the role of translation
in war as shown in Figure 2. This framework provides an insight into
military translation: what it is in nature, and how it influences the result the
war.

Figure 2. The role of translation in war (based on HDA, 1996, pp. 1–11)

Military translation may occur between friend and foe, or among different
parties in a coalition. When a war breaks out between tribes, nations, or
international groups speaking different languages, a need emerges for
translators or interpreters to provide linguistic service. In other cases, if
there is a joint military operation inside a coalition by soldiers from
different language communities, a demand for translation also surfaces.
Translation may cover the whole duration of war, as pointed out by Baker
(2006) that the very process of mobilizing military power and management
of conflict is heavily dependent on continuous acts of translation.
Translation, if put within the above-mentioned framework of
combat power, falls into the category of intangible factor. Firstly,
translation does not function as physical strength such as weapons and
equipment contributing directly to the destructive power. Translators and
interpreters usually do not act as the soldiers fighting with guns in the
battlefield. Secondly, similar to other intangible factors such as intelligence,
fighting spirit and quality of training, translation cannot be measured with
numbers. However, its contribution to the overall combat power cannot be
neglected as it involves information and knowledge that is critical in every
war. In this sense, translation constitutes a unique and indispensable
intangible factor of combat power.
Military translation works with information and knowledge to
increase the tangible and other intangible factors of combat power.
Translators’ and interpreters’ bilingual capacity enables them to spread
among the officers and soldiers the valuable military, geographical, social,
and cultural information that are essential for successful operations. They
can transfer both tacit and explicit knowledge in military training to
enhance the soldiers’ skills in surveillance, charging, fighting, or retreating.
If translators and interpreters help in teaching soldiers how to use a new
weapon from other countries, fire power can be amplified. More
importantly, translators and interpreters may become creators of the
knowledge needed in the battlefield for the improvement of combat power
Military translation in China-Burma-India Theater 147

by translating technical or tactics manuals. As pointed out by Tymoczko

and Gentzler (2002), in polyvalent and multicultural environments, “the act
of translation is itself very much involved in the creation of knowledge” (p.
xxxiii).
Translation is also important in the command, or the execution of
combat power. As we have known, information is crucial for commanders
to make and disseminate effective decisions. Translators and interpreters
can help ensure the availability, protection, and delivery of information. In
most cases, intelligence about adversary party is gathered through
translation. When describing, assessing and leading operations among
troops featured international partnership, commanders may need assistance
from translators and interpreters for the sake of communication and
teamwork. If commanders want to inform and influence audiences outside
their organizations speaking different languages, translators and
interpreters are also needed.
To sum up, military translation can be viewed as an intangible factor
of combat power involving information and knowledge. It may exert a
great impact on other factors of combat power as well as its execution,
change the relative combat power relations between/among the parties
involved in war, and consequently become influential or even decisive to
the outcome of a war.
In the following part, the results of a case study of interpreters in the
CBI Theater will be reported, using the analytical framework proposed
above. The interpreters’ role in war will be discussed from the three aspects,
namely tangible factors, intangible factors and the execution of combat
power, after an overview of the CBI Theater is given.

3. The CBI Theater and its need for interpreters

CBI Theater is a term used by the United States Army for the battle zones
of China, Burma, and India, where the Allied air and land forces fought
against the Japanese army. In 1941, the Japanese forces occupied Burma
and cut off the China-Burma Road, the last supply line between China and
the outside world. In order to help China to reach international aid, the CBI
Theater was established in 1942 by the Alliance. In April 1945, the
Alliance won a great victory, with the Japanese troops being driven out of
Burma and southwest China, and the China-Indian Road, another overland
supply route, being reopened for China. The victory in the CBI Theater
ensured the safety of southwest China, supported the American counter-
offensive in the Pacific Theater and constituted a great contribution to the
global war against Fascism.
Various causes for the victory of allied armies in the CBI Theater,
such as good quality of training, advanced weaponry and air supremacy,
have been addressed by scholars (e.g., Liu, 2008; Ni, 2007). However, the
research on the role of interpreters in winning this war is scarce. The
148 Tian Luo

present paper takes translation in the CBI Theater as a case for study for
the following reasons: firstly, the recruitment and service of interpreters
lasted over five years from 1941 to 1945; secondly; more than 4,000
interpreters were involved in the war, a rare number in war history; and
thirdly, translation was done not only for the conflicts between friend and
foe, but also for cooperation among the Allied troops. Therefore, the CBI
Theater becomes a typical locale to investigate military translation.
The great, urgent demand for interpreters came mainly from the
communication among the parties involved in the CBI Theater (see Figure
3). On the Alliance side, there were Chinese, US and British forces; while
on the Japanese side, there were the Japanese army and some surrendered
Burmese soldiers. In the Alliance, Chinese troops were the largest in
quantity, seconded by US forces, with the British soldiers being a small
proportion. Consisting of mainly Chinese Expedition Forces and the
Chinese Army in India, the Chinese troops added up to 400,000. According
to the statistics, in April 1945, the US forces in the China Theater alone
amounted to 43,100, including more than 31,300 in the air force, 11,100 in
ground forces, and 700 in other units (Romanus & Sunderland, 1959, p.
258). Famous US units included the Flying Tigers, the 5307th Composite
Unit (Provisional), and the 5332nd Brigade (Provisional).

Figure 3. Translation among the parties involved in the CBI Theatre

In order to ensure smooth communication between the Chinese troops and

US army men coming in increasing numbers since 1941, US liaison
officers and advisors were assigned to each battalion, regiment and division
(Wang, B., 2005, pp. 183–186). However, a huge linguistic gap existed
between Chinese forces and US counterparts. At that time, most of the
Chinese officers could hardly understand English, and few of the US
officers spoke Chinese. As a result, a large number of US soldiers were
stuck in the hotel and the military facilities from US were stored up in the
warehouse without being timely dispatched to battlefields (Tang, 2005, pp.
174–178). Due to time and financial constraints, it was impossible and
Military translation in China-Burma-India Theater 149

impractical to train all the relevant officers or soldiers with bilingual

competence. Eventually, the only solution was to recruit interpreters from
within China, to provide them with a short training and to send them out to
perform linguistic service.
The recruitment of interpreters began as early as August 1941, when
the American Volunteer Group (AVG), a team of fighter plane pilots, came
to China’s aid to provide air defence and to operate the “over-the-hump”
flights. As they needed interpreters in handling the military and logistic
affairs, the War Area Service Corps of the Chinese Nationalist Government
began to recruit military interpreters.
Later, when the demand for interpreters in the CBI Theater
increased drastically, the Chinese Foreign Affairs Bureau (FAB) took the
responsibility of enlisting more interpreters and running interpreter schools
to offer training in both language and military affairs. Altogether, over
4,000 interpreters were recruited from within China, most of them were
college students who knew both Chinese and English (Luo, 2011). They
were given a brief training of several weeks, and dispatched to various
locations in India, Burma and China for bilingual service in the army. Their
presence can be found in US units such as the Flying Tigers and the 5307th
Composite Unit, Chinese Expedition Forces and the Chinese Army in India,
the Chinese Aviation Committee, various kinds of training centers or
schools, and logistics departments. Their service period ranged from one
year to three years. When the war in the CBI Theater ended in April 1945,
most of the interpreters left the army.
These Chinese linguists in the CBI Theater in most cases dealt with
oral interpretation between English and Chinese, and they were usually
called “interpreters” in American documents and 译员 in Chinese files.
However, it has to be noted that they also engaged in written translation
from time to time. Since these interpreters were employed and paid
according to their corresponding military ranks as captains, majors or
lieutenant colonels, they were also addressed as 翻译官 in Chinese, or as
“interpreting officers” in English and occasionally “fan-i-kuan” according
to the Chinese pronunciation of 翻译官. The present paper follows suit and
refers to these linguists as interpreters, without any intention to exclude
their work in written translation.
The focus of our study is on the Chinese interpreters working for
Chinese and US troops due to two reasons. Firstly, this paper discusses how
interpreters contribute positively to the result of the war and the Alliance
was the victorious side. Secondly, there are much more relevant data at
hand about the interpreters in the Allied Forces than that about the
interpreters in the Japanese side.
To ensure that our study is representative of the 4,000 interpreters
in the CBI Theater, relevant data were gathered from a variety of sources
by different authors from different countries from 1945 to 2012. They
include 70 memoirs by interpreters who themselves served in the CBI
Theatre (e.g., Chen, 2003; Mei, 2004; Wang, 2003; Xu, 1996; You, 1945),
150 Tian Luo

18 pieces of oral history scripts (e.g., He, 2004), 8 texts of news reports
about the CBI Theater by the US and Chinese Army during World War II
(e.g., Sultan’s HQ, 1945), 10 journal papers (e.g., Jiang, 2007a, 2007b; Ni,
2007), 3 academic monographs on military history (e.g., Romanus &
Sunderland, 1959), 2 PhD theses on the US-China military (e.g., Pickler,
1971) and other unpublished file records. The large number of first-hand
accounts by interpreters themselves constitutes a valuable source from
which we can gain an overall and detailed understanding of their work in
the war. Other texts serve as supporting evidence from different
perspectives.
The purpose of this descriptive and interpretive case study is to
arrive at a deep understanding of translation in the CBI Theater with
detailed analysis and to test the applicability of the framework to
investigate the role of translation in war as proposed above. Relevant data
are analysed from three aspects: tangible factors, intangible factors and the
execution of combat power. Examples of interpreters are enlisted from the
data source to showcase how interpreters contribute to these three aspects.
For each individual interpreter, attention is given to who he was, where and
when he performed his tasks, and more importantly how his translation
contributed to the increase of combat power. Generalization is then made
on the basis of the analysis of individual examples. The findings of the
analysis are presented in the following sections.

4. Interpreting for tangible combat power

Weaponry and equipment is one of the key tangible factors of combat

power. In the CBI Theater, interpreters participated in the process of
receiving, distributing and utilising weapons and equipment, and
contributed to the increase of tangible combat power of the Allied Forces.
In the CBI Theater, the combat power of the Chinese troops
increased to a large extent when the majority of them were facilitated with
advanced US-made weapons, ammunition, vehicles, telecommunication
and medical equipment. For instance, each division of The New First Army
of The Chinese Expedition Forces was equipped with 3,000 vehicles,
200 cannons, 300 scatter-guns, 300 sub-machineguns or carbines in
addition to flamethrowers and bazookas. Besides, soldiers were provided
with the American-style field gears which included their uniform, helmet,
boots, backpack, rifle, and bayonet.
Interpreters aided in the supply and the distribution of weaponry.
When the 50th Division of the Chinese Army in India were fighting in the
jungles of northern Burma, the supplies were mostly air-dropped. Items
needed by the Chinese army were listed through interpreters and then
turned over to the American liaison group, who would inform the rear
services via radio for airdrop in batches. Wang Ruifu, like many other
interpreters, helped in the supply of weapons (Wang, R., 2005, pp. 187–
Military translation in China-Burma-India Theater 151

198). You Xin once worked in the US Liaison Group which was in charge
of food, weapons and ammunition supply (You, 1945, p. 47).
Interpreters also translated the manuals, instructions and
specifications of weapons so that they could be properly and extensively
used by the Chinese army. This process involved not only information
transmission, but also knowledge transfer or creation. For instance, in
December 1943, Mei Zuyan worked as an interpreter in the US Army
headquarters in Kunming, to ensure the cooperation between the relevant
American and Chinese ordinance departments which were in charge of the
production of Americanised weapons in Kunming, such as rifles and
machineguns. When the US Army was putting the flamethrower in trial
operation, a weapon able to inflict violent and lethal burns with great
destructive power, Mei Zuyan translated the manual, which was crucial for
its subsequent extensive use (Mei, 2004, p. 55). In this example, Mei Zuyan
aided in the increase of tangible power through the creation and transfer of
tacit knowledge about weapon usage in the Chinese army.
Some interpreters promoted the technological advancement in the
army with their linguistic service. For instance, about 15 college students
majoring in engineering were purposefully recruited by the Chinese
General Sun Liren so that they could work as both linguists and experts for
technique improvement in the army. Some of them majoring in civil
engineering were sent to the engineering or artillery battalion. Some in
mechanics served in vehicles battalion or the ordinance department in
division headquarters. Others, like Jiang Dazong and Yun Zheng, were
dispatched to telecommunication units and put in charge of the
maintenance and replenishment of the telecommunication apparatus (Jiang,
2007a, p. 68). Wang Bohui, a student from the Civil Engineering
Department of the National Southwest Associated University, worked as
one of many interpreters in engineering battalions which undertook
construction tasks in the army. In January 1945, when two American
engineering companies were building a 440-foot-long “Bailey bridge” for
quick manoeuvring of troops across a river, Wang Bohui and another
interpreter assisted Captain Carey, the supervisor of the construction
project. They participated in the decision-making and helped in speeding
up the construction (Wang, 2005, p. 186).
Interpreters were also important in the proper function of the
American medical apparatus supplied to the Chinese army. Since the
healing of the wounded may mean more soldiers fighting in the front line,
medical treatment can contribute to the increase of tangible combat power.
For instance, In the 20th General Hospital in the CBI Theater, an
interpretation department was set up to ensure the medical treatment for
wounded soldiers, since the hospital was run by American army doctors
while most of the patients were Chinese soldiers (Jiang, 2007b, p.74).
Zhang Xiuzheng, after being trained for two weeks about medical terms,
worked as an interpreter in a field hospital in north Burma (Zhang, 2013).
According to Yu (1997, pp. 102–103), who worked with the 73th
152 Tian Luo

Evacuation Hospital, there were twenty wards for patients and fourteen
interpreters. Each morning, doctors, nurses and interpreters would survey
the wards in a team. Interpreters worked with nurses’ reports, doctors’
inspection and consultation, and patients’ questions. LaVonne Camp (1997,
p. 39), one of the American nurses who worked at the 14th Evacuation
Hospital in the CBI Theater, remembered that when she was assigned to a
ward filled with about fifty Chinese patients, the Chinese Army provided
her with an interpreter, “a real necessity”. Her interpreter, Yang Jei-pen,
was a serious young man, well educated and very helpful in keeping the
names of the patients sorted out.
The role of interpreters in weaponry and equipment was acclaimed
by Roundup, a free weekly newspaper printed in India, published by and
for the US Forces in the CBI Theater. It was composed of news and pictures
supplied by staff members, war correspondents, and War Department news
services. On April 12, 1945, there was a feature by Sultan’s Headquarters
in Burma, entitled Chinese Fan-I-Kuan Mouthpieces for American Liaison
Officers, reporting the role interpreters played in the military conflicts. It
highlighted interpreters’ contribution to the proper function of weapons
and equipment:

They are indispensable at rear echelon ordnance automotive

maintenance depots where Chinese soldiers are being taught
American know-how in operation and maintenance of jeeps, trucks,
and command cars. Without them, American-commanded, Chinese-
manned artillery couldn’t function. (Sultan’s HQ, 1945, p.7)

The news article also commented favourably on the role of interpreters in

medical assistance: “They are a vital cog in their operation of American
portable surgical hospitals attached to Chinese combat troops” (Sultan’s
HQ, 1945, p.7).

5. Interpreting for intangible combat power

In the CBI Theater, a large number of interpreters assisted in the military

training, intelligence gathering and transmitting, as well as liaison and
teamwork. All these contributed to the boost of intangible factors of combat
power.
With regards to military training, combat power becomes decisive
when applied by skilled commanders leading well-trained soldiers and
units (HDA, 2008, p. 4-2). In the CBI Theater, one of the missions for US
troops was to train the Chinese army with military tactics and knowledge
in using US weaponry and equipment. For this purpose, the infantry School,
the Field Artillery School, the Drivers School, the Command and General
Staff School, as well as many other training centres were established in
Kunming, Chongqing, Guilin and other locations (Romanus and
Military translation in China-Burma-India Theater 153

Sunderland, 1959, p.20). For instance, in August 1942, General Joseph

Stilwell began to train the Chinese Troops in India at the Ramgarh Training
Center and over 32,000 soldiers were trained under the supervision of
American officers according to the American standards (Feng, 2000,
pp. 206–215).
A large number of interpreters offered their linguistic aid in military
training. A typical example is related to Cao Yuehua. In the beginning of
1943, he and other 19 college students were recruited as interpreters by the
FAB and worked in the artillery, infantry, and drivers school under the
direction of the Kunming Cadre Training Center of the Chinese National
Military Council (Cao, 2004, pp. 53–56). Cao Yuehua was assigned to the
artillery school, where the American army took charge of the management
and teaching affairs. There were four training groups: the cannon,
telecommunication, animal packing, as well as veterinarian group. Cao
Yuehua worked in the vet group, interpreting for more than 10 American
teachers. After having interpreted for several sessions, he could give
additional help by supplementing what the teachers neglected. In April
1945, the number of interpreters working in the Kunming Field Artillery
Training Center alone reached 160 (Wong, 1995). Lu Guowei was an
interpreter who worked for the US Combat Staff. In May to July, 1944, his
major task was to translate weapon manuals and textbooks for field
operation training. He finished translating piles of such documents in less
than a month. He then volunteered and went to interpret in the Tank School
at the Ramgarh Training Center in India (Lu, 2005, pp. 50–55).
“The interpreters were indispensable” at the Ramgarh Training
Center (Romanus & Sunderland, 1953, p. 119). American officers served
as the primary instructors and trainers, supported by hundreds of Chinese
student interpreters (Babb, 2012, p. 130). According to Huang (2005, p. 90),
who was a soldier in the 5th Company, 2nd Battalion, Technical Training
Regiment in the Chinese Army in India being trained at Ramgarh, each
company had “one American lieutenant-commander coach officer, one
Chinese lieutenant-commander interpreter and four American sergeants”.
Interpreters “paired off with American instructors to teach the Chinese
soldiers everything from how to fix flat tires to how to load a mule with
pack artillery” (Weidenburner, 2005).
As Pickler (1971, p. 259) commented, interpreters were also
“absolutely essential” in the training of Chinese air force pilots and
technicians. From 1943 to August, 1945, the American Air Force offered a
variety of courses for about three thousand Chinese at thirteen different
training sites in America (He, 2004, p. 252; Pickler, 1971, p. 261). Each
training site employed at least six interpreters. Consequently, sixty
interpreters were serving in early 1945 and yet twenty-one were needed
(Pickler, 1971, p. 261).
Next, we will discuss military intelligence. Intelligence supports the
commander across operations and “helps the commander decide when and
where to concentrate sufficient combat power to overwhelm the enemy”
154 Tian Luo

(HDA, 2010). Interpreters also played an indispensable role in the

collecting, processing and circulation of intelligence in the CBI Theater.
Wang Ruifu, for example, translated and reported intelligence about
enemy presence, military maps as well as air photos (Wang, R., 2005,
p. 193). The main task of Cheng Yaode, an interpreter in Transition and
Editing Office of the Chinese Aviation Committee, was to translate the
intelligence about enemy activity sent from staff office every day and
deliver it to the US Army Combat Command in China (He, 2004, pp. 249–
251). He translated information about the re-deployment of the Japanese
forces along the Peking-Hankou Railway, the location of Japanese airports,
barracks, and warehouses, as well as the transportation on the Yangtze
River. His work was a great aid in the bombing against Japanese troops by
Allied airplanes from rear bases. Lin Guangmin, an interpreter in the 14th
Air Force，once translated a piece of intelligence saying a ten-thousand-
ton Japanese ship carrying ammunition had reached the harbour of Hankou
in preparation for unloading. This translated intelligence was very helpful.
The next day, a news report confirmed that the Japanese ship had been sunk
by Allied bombing with all the ammunition on the ship destroyed (He,
2004, pp. 253–254).
Now, we will discuss liaison and teamwork. Liaison is the contact
or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or
other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and
action. “Liaison activities augment the commander’s ability to synchronize
and focus combat power” (HDA, 2011, pp. 9-1). Interpreters, by bridging
the linguistic gap, contributed to the better liaison and teamwork among
different units of the Alliance in the CBI Theater.
The liaison and cooperation among troops from different countries
in the Alliance called for interpreters’ aid. The victory at the battle of
Bhamo, Namhkam and many other places greatly depended on the
collaboration among the allied forces. For instance, in the Battle of
Myitkyina in May, 1944, there was a close cooperation between Chinese
combat forces (such as the 42nd and 150th Chinese Infantry Regiments)
and the US 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). In these battles, the
linguistic support from the interpreters was indispensable in liaison.
Inside some US-Chinese joint units, interpreters were also needed
for smooth communication. For example, in the Joint Chinese-American
1st Provisional Tank Group activated at Ramgarh, India in 1943, there were
over 200 American soldiers and officers in the 1st and 2nd Battalions, and
more than 1800 Chinese soldiers in the 3rd through 6th Battalions. For such
joint units, interpreters were essential to connect the English speaking
officers with Chinese counterparts. Other units, like The 5332d Brigade
(Provisional), known as the Mars Task Force, consisting of the 475th
Infantry, 124th Cavalry and 1st Chinese Regiment, also had a great demand
for linguistic aid.
Lack of interpreters from time to time would result in the reduction
of combat power. Major W. Loar Gerguson, a liaison officer with a Chinese
Military translation in China-Burma-India Theater 155

tank group, believed that whenever there was a mishap or a slip-up in an

operation, it had been due to the absence of a fan-i-kuan who could make
things clear to officers and men (Sultan’s HQ, 1945). Lt. Col. McPherson
LeMoyne, who was attached to a tank unit, stated that without interpreters,
American troops would “be groping in the fog” (Sultan’s HQ, 1945, p. 7).
Fortunately, interpreters, on most occasions, managed to establish
sound communication between the Chinese and American troops, boosted
up the teamwork, and finally contributed to the increase of combat power
in the CBI Theater. Lt. Col. Wellus A. Rhodes commented on the
interpreters:

They live with us and learn to interpret our thoughts with complete
fidelity. Most of them know the importance of their mission,
understand the importance of good feeling, unanimity and co-
operation among Chinese and Americans. Each one feels it is part
of his job to increase this spirit of co-operation. Most of them will
do anything to make things better. (Sultan’s HQ, 1945, p.7)

6. Interpreting for the gain of air supremacy

In the CB Theater, interpreters aided in the execution of combat power, for

instance, in the gain of air supremacy. Air supremacy is a position where
one side holds complete control of air warfare and air power over adversary
forces. Before 1941, the Chinese air force was rather weak, and the
surrender of air to Japanese planes led to the severe losses on the Chinese
side. However, the situation changed when Flying Tigers began to provide
assistance. Flying Tigers is a term for the three blood-related US air forces
fighting for China, AVG set up in August 1941, US Army 23rd Fighter
Group established in July 1942, and 14th Air Force (hereinafter referred to
as 14th AF) established in March 1943. They maintained the same insignia
and used similar tactics under the command of Claire Lee Chennault. From
the beginning of 1944, the Flying Tigers, together with the Chinese air
force, won the air supremacy in southwest China. By the end of World War
II, China claimed air superiority over all parts of its sky. The Flying Tigers
made a remarkable contribution to the Allied victory in the CBI Theater
with regards to air attacks and defence, cargo transport, and coordinated
operations in the battles (Wei, 2005, pp. 88–92).
Since air fighting features rapidity and flexibility, there is higher
demand for timely intelligence and prompt battle commands to win in the
air. Interpreters can come to aid in gathering and transmitting intelligence
of the enemy air force and issuing out battle commands. Aware of the
importance of linguistic support, translation and edition departments were
established in both US and Chinese air units to the make use of the bilingual
competence and subject knowledge of interpreters. Many examples have
displayed the vital role of interpreters in aiding the Flying Tigers to
156 Tian Luo

compete against Japanese air forces, such as Li Chengde (Chen, 2003), Xu

Yuanchong (Xu, 1996, pp. 113–123), and Wang Shizhong (Wang, 2003).
One typical instance is Li Chengde, who worked as an interpreter
for Chennault. One of his tasks was to translate the intelligence needed by
the American air force (Chen, 2003, pp. 7–11). On December 20, 1941, he
received a piece of intelligence in Chinese saying 10 Japanese planes were
going to attack Kunming. After a quick translation into English, this
message was delivered to Chennault. Because of the timely reporting of
this intelligence, Chennault had enough time to plan for the coming
fighting. The next day, well prepared AVG pilots beat the Japanese
airplanes when they flew near Kunming. As a result, 6 Japanese planes
were knocked down and 3 heavily damaged, without any loss on the AVG
side. At the celebration that night, AVG soldiers and officers were hailed
as heroes. Li Chengde was also highly appreciated for his translation and
Chennault went up to toast him for his significant support (Chen, 2003, p.
9). In this example, the prompt translation of intelligence became the
prerequisite of a quick and smart decision in commanding.
At the beginning of 1944, the 14th Air Force planned to take charge
of the air defence in north China. Six air-ground liaison teams were
organized and sent out to get the timely first-hand intelligence from
headquarters at different battle areas so as to send planes to air-bomb
enemy in cooperation with the ground forces (Wang, 2003). Each team
consisted of an American intelligence officer, two telegraphers, and an
interpreter. Wang Shizhong and Yan Binyuan worked respectively in two
of these air-ground liaison teams as interpreters, contributing to the air
supremacy in north China. They gathered intelligence about the location of
Japanese barracks, warehouses, arsenals, ships and airports, the
manoeuvring of Japanese forces, and the transportation on Yangtse River
as well as along railways in north China. Much valuable intelligence was
obtained, collated and sent back to 14th Air Force, which were helpful in
bombing attack of allied air force (He, 2004, p. 247–251).
To ensure the proper operation of the air force, a translation and
editing department was established in the 5th Command of the Chinese air
force. The major task of the Department was to translate the intelligence
upon receipt and exchange with the headquarters of 14th AF (He, 2004, pp.
253–254). In 1944, there were four interpreters with the Department: one
working for the Commander, while Lin Guangmin and another two were
translating the daily intelligence, the official documents as well as the daily
battlefield report from 14th AF. The information and intelligence was
about the situations of both sides in war and other issues such as the request
for the 14th AF to coordinate in battles. At 19:00 each day, intelligence
was sent by phone or radio from the 1st Section of the Aviation
Commission in Chongqing to the 1st Department of the 5th Command.
Three interpreters took turns to work at night. Sometimes, there was such
a large amount of information received that they had to work till the next
morning. This example once again illustrates that interpreters’ work was
Military translation in China-Burma-India Theater 157

important for the smooth communication and efficient command of the US

and Chinese air forces in the CBI Theater.

7. Conclusion

In the CBI Theater, interpreters were active in various Allied units. They
could “be found with the Chinese Infantry, with the Mars Task Force, with
American-Chinese tank units” (Sultan’s HQ, 1945, p.7). Our case study
discovered that interpreters helped transmit the needed information among
different units of the Alliance, and were involved in the transfer and
creation of knowledge. The influence of these interpreters on the war can
be summarized in three ways: they aided in the enhancement of tangible
factors of combat power, such as weapons and equipment; boosted other
intangible factors, such as military training, intelligence, liaison and
teamwork; and contributed to the efficient execution of combat power,
such as the gain of air supremacy. All these added up to the effect that
translation increased the combat power, and eventually contributed to the
victory of the Allied Forces.
The case study revealed that translation, as an intangible factor of
combat power, can impact on the internal mechanism of war and play a
crucial role for victory. It will continue to do so because future warfare is
increasingly dependent on information superiority and knowledge
advantage.

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_____________________________

1 This work has been supported by the research project 16YJA740025 hosted by Tian Luo and
funded by the Ministry of Education of P. R. China. It is also aided by the research programme
MYRG2015-00234-FAH hosted by Professor Meifang Zhang at the University of Macau.