9/25/24, 2:46 PM G.R. No.

208912

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G.R. No. 208912/G.R. No. 209018, December 7, 2021,

♦ Decision, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 208912. December 07, 2021 ]

AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. RODOLFO C. AQUINO AND ABBULAH C. AQUINO,
RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 209018]

RODOLFO C. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A child whose parents did not marry each other can inherit from their grandparent by their right of
representation, regardless of the grandparent's marital status at the birth of the child's parent.

For this Court's resolution are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari1 concerning a nonmarital
child's2 right to inherit from her grandfather's estate.

The Petition in G.R No. 2089123 questions the Court of Appeals Decision4 disqualifying Amadea Angela K.
Aquino (Angela) from inheriting from her alleged grandfather's estate.5

Meanwhile, the Petition in G.R. No. 2090186 assails the Court of Appeals Decision7 and Resolution8 denying
Rodolfo C. Aquino's (Rodolfo) Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy and for violating the rules against
forum shopping and the principle of res judicata.9

On May 7, 2003, Rodolfo filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the letters of administration of his
father's estate.10

Rodolfo alleged that his father, Miguel T. Aquino (Miguel), died intestate on July 5, 1999, leaving personal and
real properties. The estate of his first wife, Amadea C. Aquino (Amadea), who had died earlier on September 27,
1977, was already settled in 1978. Miguel was survived by: (1) Enerie B. Aquino, his second wife; (2) Abdulah C.
Aquino (Abdulah) and Rodolfo C. (Rodolfo) Aquino, his sons with Amadea; and (3) the heirs of Wilfredo C. Aquino,
his son with Amadea who also died earlier. Miguel was also predeceased by another son with Amadea, Arturo C.
Aquino (Arturo).11

On July 2, 2003, Angela moved that she be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel's estate.12 She
alleged that she was Arturo's only child.13 She presented a July 5, 2003 Certification14 from the hospital, stating that
she was Arturo and Susan Kuan's daughter.15

According to Angela, Arturo died on January 10, 1978,16 before she was born on October 9, 1978. While her
parents were not married, they did not suffer from any impediment to marry. Her parents were planning to marry

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before Arturo died.

Angela claimed that her grandfather, Miguel, took care of her mother's expenses during her pregnancy with
her.18 Her mother was also attended by the Aquinos' family doctor.19 Moreover, Angela lived with her mother and the
Aquino family at their ancestral home.20

Since her birth, her father's relatives had continuously recognized her as Arturo's natural child.21 Her father's
brother, Abdulah, was even her godfather.22 In support of this, Angela presented her baptismal certificate23 stating
that she was Arturo's daughter.24

Angela narrated that Miguel, who fondly called her "Maggie," provided for her needs and supported her
education.25 Before Miguel died, he provided instructions on how his properties were to be distributed.26 Based on a
certain July 2, 1999 "INSTRUCTION OF MIGUEL T. AQUINO,"27 Angela was among the heirs who would receive
portions of Miguel's estate.28 Miguel gave her a commercial lot, which rentals were now paid to her.29

On November 12, 2003, Rodolfo opposed30 Angela's Motion, claiming that Arturo never legally recognized
Angela as his natural child in his lifetime.31 Angela also never presented sufficient evidence to prove her
filiation.32 Moreover, Rodolfo alleged that Angela was born more than nine months from Arturo's death.33 Therefore,
there was no way of knowing if Angela was Arturo's child.34

On November 17, 2003, Abdulah filed his Comment on Rodolfo's Petition35 and moved for the issuance of
letters of administration of Miguel's estate in his favor.36

On December 18, 2003, Angela filed a Manifestation and Reply37 to Rodolfo's opposition. She alleged that she
was born less than nine months, or particularly 272 days, from Arturo's death.38

Recognizing that Rodolfo had expressed his intention to yield the administration in favor of Abdulah, the trial
court issued the letters of administration on September 3, 2004, and appointed Abdulah as administrator of Miguel's
estate.39

On March 7, 2005, Angela filed a Motion for Distribution of Residue of Estate or for Allowance to the
Heirs.40 She alleged that as Arturo's natural child, she has a legal right to a monthly allowance like those given to
Miguel's other heirs.41 Rodolfo opposed,42 while Abdulah commented43 on this motion.44

On April 22, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order45 that granted Angela's July 2, 2003 and March 7,
2005 Motions.46 It ruled that the Aquino clan was already estopped from denying Angela's filiation.47 As heir, Angela
was deemed entitled to a share in Miguel's estate.48 The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

ACCORDINGLY, Amadea Angela K. Aquino is hereby considered and declared an acknowledged

natural child or legitimated child of Arturo C. Aquino, for purposes of determining her share in the estate
of her grandfather, Miguel T. Aquino, in representation of her father Arturo, and pending the distribution
of the residual estate, the Administrator is hereby directed to immediately give her a monthly allowance
of P64,000.00, upon the latter's posting a bond of P100,000.00.

SO ORDERED.49

Rodolfo and Abdulah separately moved for reconsideration,50 though Rodolfo's was later deemed
withdrawn.51 Later, the trial court denied Abdulah's Motion in its March 6, 2008 Order.52

Rodolfo filed a Petition53 for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's April 22, 2005 and
March 6, 2008 Orders.54

On August 23, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision,55 denying Rodolfo's Petition on the grounds of
wrong remedy and violation of the principles of forum shopping and res judicata.56 Rodolfo moved for
reconsideration, but his motion was also denied in an August 1, 2013 Resolution.57

On September 30, 2013, Rodolfo filed a Petition for Review58 before this Court, assailing the Court of Appeals'
August 23, 2012 Decision and August 1, 2013 Resolution.59 This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 209018.60

Rodolfo argued that Angela was already barred from claiming her nonmarital filiation to Arturo, since she was
born after his death.61 Even if she were Arturo's nonmarital child, Rodolfo noted that she cannot represent him in
Miguel's estate under Article 992 of the Civil Code.62 Moreover, assuming that she was Miguel's granddaughter, she
was still not entitled to the grant of P64,000.00 monthly allowance since, says Rodolfo, the Civil Code limits the
provision of an allowance to the decedent's widow and children.63

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Rodolfo also contended that he availed of the right remedy in elevating his case via a Petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, since the trial court's Orders, one of which was an interlocutory order, were issued with
grave abuse of discretion.64 If he did avail of the wrong remedy, he says that the Court of Appeals should have
consolidated his Petition with Abdulah's appeal, since it already treated his Petition as an appeal.65

Finally, Rodolfo claimed that he did not commit forum shopping because he filed his Petition for Certiorari before
Abdulah filed his appeal. Furthermore, he was not a party in Abdulah's appeal.66

Rodolfo prayed for the reversal of the Court of Appeals' August 23, 2012 Decision and August 1, 2013
Resolution.67

Meanwhile, Abdulah appealed the trial court's April 22, 2005 and March 6, 2008 Orders before the Court of
Appeals68 claiming that Angela failed to prove her filiation and, in any case, Angela could not inherit from Miguel ab
intestato.69

On January 21, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision70 in favor of Abdulah.71 It held that Angela failed
to prove her filiation in accordance with Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code. Moreover, she failed to present
birth records showing Arturo's paternity or any document signed by Arturo admitting her filiation. Since Arturo died
before she was born, Angela cannot also establish open and continuous possession of her status as Arturo's child,
under Article 172(3) of the Family Code. Thus, Miguel's or the Aquino clan's overt acts cannot translate to legal
recognition of her status as Arturo's child.72

In any case, even if Angela were able to establish her filiation, the Court of Appeals ruled that she could not
inherit ab intestato from Miguel. It cited Article 922 of the New Civil Code, which provides that nonmarital children
cannot inherit ab intestato from their parents' marital relatives.73

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated April 22, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Davao City as well as it's the [sic] Order dated March 6, 2008 are hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. Movant-appellee Amadea Angela K. Aquino's, (1) July 2, 2003 Motion to be Included in
The Distribution and Partition of the Estate, and (2) February 22, 2005 Motion for Distribution of
Residue of Estate or for Allowance to the Heirs are DENIED for her failure to prove her filiation with
Arturo Aquino. Accordingly, movant-appellee Amadea Angela K. Aquino is hereby declared disqualified
to inherit from the intestate estate of decedent Miguel T. Aquino.

SO ORDERED.74

Angela moved for reconsideration,75 which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its July 24, 2013 Resolution.76

On October 2, 2013, Angela filed a Petition for Review77 before this Court, assailing the Court of Appeals
January 21, 2013 Decision.78 This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208912.79

Angela argued that since she enjoyed the same love and support from her grandfather and his family, as they
would to marital children, the principle of estoppel should apply. She claimed that the Aquino clan's acknowledgment
of her status as her father's natural child should stop them from questioning her filiation.80

Moreover, Angela contended that Article 992 of the Civil Code's presumed antagonism between the marital and
nonmarital family should only apply to immediate families.81 Her grandfather "cannot be presumed to hate his own
grandchild."82 Article 992 cannot be interpreted to apply to the relatives in the ascending line. It should only apply to
collateral relatives.83

Angela prayed that the Court of Appeals January 21, 2013 Decision be reversed, and that the trial court's April
22, 2005 and March 6, 2008 Orders be reinstated. Angela also prayed for a declaration that she was her grandfather
Miguel's legal heir.84

On October 21, 2013, this Court's Third Division issued a Resolution85 consolidating G.R. Nos. 208912 and
209018.86 This Court denied both Petitions in its November 11, 2013 Resolution,87 which reads:

In G.R. 208912, the CA did not commit any reversible error in holding that petitioner Amadea
Angela Aquino is disqualified to inherit from the intestate estate of decedent Miguel T. Aquino.
Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from
inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.

In G.R. 209018, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition. A petition for certiorari may only be
availed of when there is no adequate, plain, or speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner
Rodolfo C. Aquino is also guilty of forum shopping and litis pendentia for pursuing different remedies for
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a single objective. Moreover, the petition lacked proof that its copy was served on the lower court
concerned in violation of Section 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5 of the same rule as well as Section
5(d) of Rule 59 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.88

Angela moved for reconsideration89 on January 10, 2014, citing the following grounds:

ART. 992 SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN A VACUUM. IN THE CASE OF IN THE MATTER OF THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, petitioner,
vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, respondent, IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT ART. 992 SHOULD BE
CONSTRUED TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE.

THERE IS NO REMEDY IN LAW FOR A PERSON LIKE PETITIONER WHO WAS BORN AFTER
THE DEATH OF HER FATHER TO BE LEGALLY RECOGNIZED AS HIS CHILD. IN FACT, THERE IS
ALSO NO REMEDY FOR A PERSON SAME AS PETITIONER WHO WAS BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK
TO A FATHER WHO HAS NEVER BEEN MARRIED TO ANOTHER. THUS, SINCE THE COURT IS A
COURT OF EQUITY, JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS DICTATES[sic] THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF
ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE APPLIED TO GRANT RECOGNITION TO PETITIONER AS A DAUGHTER
OF ARTURO AQUINO WHO IS A LEGITIMATE CHILD OF THE DECEDENT, FOR WHICH REASON,
SHE CAN INHERIT AB INTESTATO FROM HER GRANDFATHER.90 (Citation omitted)

On April 25, 2014, Angela moved to have the case referred to this Court En Banc,91 She asserted that this Court
should revisit its ruling in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court.92 In Diaz, this Court held that the word "relatives" in
Article 992 was a broad term that, when used in a statute, "embrace[d] not only collateral relatives" but also all of the
person's kin, unless the context indicated otherwise.93 Thus, Angela argued that it included the grandparents of
nonmarital children.94 According to Angela, referral of the case to the En Banc was proper, as only it could reverse a
doctrine or principle laid down by this Court.95

On April 29, 2014, this Court's Third Division issued a Resolution96 granting Angela's Motion.

On May 30, 2014, Angela filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration97 arguing that the interpretation that
grandparents are included in the prohibition under Article 992 of the Civil Code is unconstitutional for violating the
equal protection clause.98 The law allows nomnarital descendants to inherit from a nonmarital child, putting
nonmarital descendants of marital children, like Angela, at a more disadvantageous position.99

On September 2, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution100 granting Angela's Motion for Reconsideration,
reinstating the Petitions, and requiring Abdulah and Rodolfo to submit their comment.

Abdulah filed his Comment101 on October 17, 2014, while Rodolfo filed his Comment102 on October 30, 2014.
Angela filed her Consolidated Reply103 on January 14, 2015.

On January 27, 2015, this Court issued a Resolution104 giving due course to the Petitions and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.

On April 17, 2015, Rodolfo filed his Memorandum.105 He reiterates that Angela can no longer prove that she was
Arturo's nonmarital child since Arturo died before she was born.106 Assuming that she was Arturo's nonmarital child,
Rodolfo says that she still could not inherit from Miguel's estate since a nonmarital child was "barred to inherit from
the legitimate family of her [or his] putative father under the iron bar rule in Article 992 of the New Civil Code."107

On April 28, 2015, Abdulah filed his Memorandum.108 He averred that the Court of Appeals did not err when it
ruled that Angela "failed to present competent proof of her filiation with Arturo[.]"109 Angela's birth record states that
her mother was Maria Angela Kuan Ho and her father was Enrique Ho.110 Angela also allegedly failed to present any
public document or any private handwritten document made and signed by Arturo, admitting that he was Angela's
father.111 There was likewise no evidence showing that Angela openly and continuously possessed the status of a
nonmarital child.112 He adds that she never even instituted any action "for recognition or acknowledgement by her
putative father within the periods allowed by law."113

Abdulah contended that the Court of Appeals did not err when it held that the principle of estoppel in Tongoy v.
Court of Appeals,114 could not be applied. In Tongoy, there was overwhelming evidence that the nonmarital child was
in continuous possession of the status of natural children. Meanwhile, Angela failed to present evidence to prove her
allegations.115

Abdulah further maintained that the Court of Appeals correctly held that, under Article 992 of the Civil Code,
Angela was barred from participating in the settlement of Miguel's estate.116 Article 992 "categorically bars an
illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of [their] father or
mother."117 Lastly, Abdulah argued that Angela cannot question the constitutionality of Article 992 in a settlement

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proceeding. It should be done in a case for declaratory relief before the trial court, with notice to the Solicitor
General.118

On May 13, 2015, Angela filed her Memorandum119 insisting that Arturo recognized and acknowledged her
filiation. She asserted that even Rodolfo and Abdulah admitted this in their judicial admissions, thus estopping them
from claiming otherwise.120

Angela added that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied the iron curtain rule to her.121 According to Angela,
interpreting Article 992 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Articles 902, 982, 989, 990, 995, and 998 will show that
"Article 992 only prohibits reciprocal succession between collaterals, not between descendants and ascendants."122

Finally, Angela asserted that when the Court of Appeals considered grandparents and other direct ascendants
as "relatives" under Article 992, it violated the Constitution's equal protection clause. She argued that a less
restrictive measure should be considered:123

Article 992 [must] be construed to prohibit only the reciprocal intestate succession between collateral
relatives separated by the lines of illegitimacy, not between the illegitimate child and his relatives in the
direct line. If the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can inherit from his or her grandparent by right of
representation, so too should the illegitimates of a legitimate child.124

On July 3, 2018, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General to submit its
Comment on the Petitions.

In its Comment125 filed on July 16, 2018, the Office of the Solicitor General concurred with the Court of Appeals
ruling that Rodolfo's Petition should be denied "for being an erroneous remedy and for violating the rules on forum
shopping."126 It likewise agreed with the Court of Appeals that Angela's failure to prove her filiation with Arturo
prevented her from inheriting from Miguel's estate.127

Further to a July 9, 2019 Resolution,128 this Court conducted oral arguments on the consolidated petitions on
September 3 and September 17, 2019. Dean Cynthia Del Castillo (Dean Del Castillo) and Professor Elizabeth
Aguiling-Pangalangan (Professor Aguiling-Pangalangan) were appointed as amici curiae.129 After the oral arguments
concluded, the parties were given 20 days to file their respective memoranda.

On October 7, 2019, Angela,130 the Office of the Solicitor General,131Abdulah,132 and Professor Aguiling-
Pangalangan133 filed their respective Memoranda. On the same day, Dean Del Castillo submitted a Supplemental
Opinion134 to her earlier-submitted Opinion of Amicus Curiae.135 Rodolfo filed his Memorandum on October 17,
2019.136 The Memoranda filed by Angela, Rodolfo, and Abdulah substantially reiterate their previous arguments
before this Court.

In addition to arguments already made in its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that Angela's
alleged birth certificate attached to Abdulah's Comment in G.R. No. 208912, which shows the father named as one
Enrique A. Ho, means that Angela's father is not Arturo, as she claims.137 The Office of the Solicitor General,
Abdulah, and Rodolfo all argue that Article 992 of the Civil Code does not violate the equal protection clause,
maintaining that marital and nonmarital families should be kept separate to reduce resentment between them.138

This Court resolves the following issues:

First, whether or not Amadea Angela K. Aquino (the alleged nonmarital child of Arturo C. Aquino, who was a
marital child of Miguel T. Aquino) can inherit from her grandfather's estate; and

Second, whether or not Amadea Angela K. Aquino was able to prove her filiation.

There is a distinction between a challenge to the constitutionality of a legal provision and revising the
interpretation of a legal provision to make it more harmonious with the Constitution and, whenever applicable,
provisions of treaties that have the effect of law in our jurisdiction.

As the Constitution is the fundamental law of our land, its provisions are deemed written in every statute and
contract. All other laws must conform to it:

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a

nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes
the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is
founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other
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laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates
any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without
any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.139 (Citations omitted)

Because of this, it is within this Court's power and duty to declare void all laws repulsive to the Constitution.
When there is conflict between the Constitution and a law, the Constitution must prevail.140

Any attack on the constitutionality of any statute should be raised at the earliest time and in a proper case.
These are among the requirements for a valid exercise of judicial review when the constitutionality of a provision is
challenged:

Fundamentally, for this Court to exercise the immense power that enables it to undo the actions
of the other government branches, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable of judicial determination; (2) the
parties raising the issue must have standing or locus standi to raise the constitutional issue; (3) the
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity, thus ripe for adjudication; and (4)
the matter of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case, or that constitutionality must be
essential to the disposition of the case.141 (Citation omitted)

In her May 27, 2015 Memorandum,142 Angela alleged that the continuing inclusion of grandparents and other
direct ascendants in the word "relatives" in Article 992 of the Civil Code violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. She argued:

It is against this yardstick of heightened or immediate scrutiny that we ought to gauge the validity of
subcategorizing illegitimate children based on the legitimacy of their parents. Following the edict in the
seminal case of Clark v. Jeter, decided by the United States Supreme Court, a statutory classification
must be substantially related to an important governmental objective in order to withstand heightened
scrutiny. Consequently they have invalidated classifications that burden illegitimate children for the
sake of punishing the illicit relations of their parents, but acknowledged that it might be appropriate to
treat illegitimate children differently in the support context.

Such "important governmental objective", however, is wanting in this case. Petitioner respectfully
contents that there is no apparent and legitimate purpose behind prohibiting an illegitimate issue of a
legitimate child from representing the latter in intestate succession while at the same time allowing the
illegitimates of an illegitimate child to do so. It cannot be said that an apparent state interest rationally
related to the prohibition set against the illegitimate issues of legitimates exist when illegitimate children
are not themselves set to suffer the same prohibition. To rule otherwise would be patently
discriminatory as the Civil Code and Family Code would favor more the illegitimate children of
illegitimate children themselves over illegitimate issues of legitimate children. Moreover, it cannot be
successfully argued that the prohibition is expected to promote and preserve institution of marriage or
discourage illicit recourse.143 (Citation omitted)

Nonetheless, when a provision is challenged, courts must first adopt an interpretation of the provision based on
the ambient facts that will be: (1) constitutional; and (2) consistent with statutes and treaties which have the effect of
law. Laws are joint acts of the Legislature and the Executive, co-­equal branches of government to which this Court
extends a becoming courtesy.144 Whenever possible, courts avoid declaring laws as unconstitutional,145 especially if
the conflict between the Constitution and the statute may be resolved by interpreting and construing the latter's
words and phrases.

Hence, even if the attempt to declare a statutory provision as unconstitutional is not properly raised or in its
proper form, courts must still interpret the law consistent with the Constitution, other statutes, and treaties that have
the effect of law.

In this regard, as this Court seeks to ensure certainty and stability of judicial decisions, whenever we set
precedents, we ensure that it is applied to succeeding cases with similar facts.146 Yet, this Court should not hesitate
to abandon established doctrines if there are strong and compelling reasons to do so, such as changes in law or
public policy, evolving conditions, or the most pressing considerations of justice.147 "But idolatrous reverence for
precedent, simply as precedent, no longer rules. More important than anything else is that the court should be
right."148

Associate Justice Alfred Benjamin S. Caguioa posited that examining Article 992 of the Civil Code is premature
when there are evidentiary matters that first need to be addressed.149 However, this does not account for how the
current state of Article 992 bars Angela from making any claims to Miguel's estate even if she proves that she is
Arturo's nonmarital child.
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Refusing to timely address Article 992 is to subject the parties to even more protracted litigation. Even if the trial
court finds for Angela on the facts, she will still not obtain the ultimate relief she seeks, because the absolute bar in
Article 992 that persists in our legal system places her firmly outside Miguel's successional line.

The Sisyphean futility of attempting to prove nonmarital filiation in cases like Angela's is illustrated in Leonardo v.
Court of Appeals,150 where this Court held that even if the petitioner could prove that he was the nonmarital child of
the deceased's son, he could not represent the son in the deceased's estate.

The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in its January 21, 2013 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 01633:

Besides, granting arguendo that Amadea has indeed proven that she is an illegitimate child of
Arturo, still as argued by appellants and to which we agree, Amadea cannot inherit from the decedent
Miguel T. Aquino because of the prohibition laid down in Art. 992 of the New Civil Code or what is so
commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family" . . .

....

Hence, even if indeed Amadea is an illegitimate child of Arturo, the law however prohibits her from
inheriting through intestate succession from her father Arturo's legitimate relative, in this case the
latter's father, the decedent Miguel T. Aquino. While the provision of the law may seem to be partial to
illegitimate children, the law as it is however should be applied.151

At the very least, to rule upon Article 992 at this juncture, rather than at some indefinite future, will obviate
repetitively and successively litigating a question that this Court is perfectly competent to answer now. It is in the
greater interest of judicial economy and effective administration of justice to do so.

II

The statutory prohibition against reciprocal intestate succession between nonmarital children and the marital
children and relatives of their parents is rooted in Article 943 of the Spanish Civil Code, made effective in the
Philippines on December 7, 1889:

ARTICLE 943. A natural or a legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such
children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

This is in line with what this Court had considered as the regime under the Spanish Civil Code: The "legitimate"
relationship is the general rule, and exceptions made for nonmarital ascendants or descendants, which would allow
properties of the marital family to pass to nonmarital relatives, must be expressly stated.152

Under the Spanish Civil Code, "natural children”153 and "legitimated children"—natural children made legitimate
children through subsequent marriage of the parents, provided the child is acknowledged by the parents,154 and by
royal concession155—were covered by the prohibition. However, they could still inherit in intestate succession, but
only in their own right.156 Nonmarital children who were neither "natural" nor "legitimated" had no right at all to inherit
in intestate succession.157

When Republic Act No. 386, ordaining and instituting the Civil Code of the Philippines, took effect in 1950,
nonmarital children, or "illegitimate children,"158 was classified as the following: "natural children," or those whose
parents were unmarried at the time of conception, and not disqualified to marry each other;159 "natural children by
legal fiction," or those conceived or born of marriages void from the beginning;160 and "illegitimate children other
than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction[.]"161 Later, the Family
Code would eliminate the distinctions among the various categories of nonmarital children:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children — legitimate (and those who, like the legally
adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside
a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.

Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: "Children conceived or born before the judgment
of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall
be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall
likewise be legitimate."

Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one
category, without any distinction between natural and spurious. The concept of "natural child" is

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important only for purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child remains
an illegitimate child.162 (Citations omitted)

Because the Civil Code changed the classification of nonmarital children, so did the wording of the prohibition,
reflected now in Article 992:

ARTICLE 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.

The Civil Code now allows all nonmarital children as defined in the Civil Code to inherit in intestate succession.
But because of Article 992, all nonmarital children are barred from reciprocal intestate succession:

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]).The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233
[1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of
who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. RFC, 110 Phil.
42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly
but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general
rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication
(Samson v. C.A. 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one
category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children
should be treated differently, in the negative.

It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).163

The prohibition extends to the descendants of the nonmarital child. In Rodriguez v. Reyes:164

Now, the record before us is totally barren of proof as to any personal acts of recognition by Juan
Villota with regard to Luciano; nor is there evidence on the question of who was Luciano's father. The
Court of First Instance cites no proof; and the evidence of the appellees is merely to the effect that
Gavino and Luciano were "full blood brothers", which is only a conclusion of the witnesses and
irrelevant to the issue of legitimation or recognition, especially under the laws of Toro. For under the
Law XI the son had to be acknowledged by the parent and by no other person, said law expressly
requiring "con tanto que el padre le reconozca por su hijo." (Sent. Trib. Sup. of Spain, 23 June 1858). It
is well to recall here that the conferment of the status of acknowledged natural child by acts of the
members of the parent's family (authorized by Article 135, No. 2, of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889)
was entirely without precedent in the pre-Codal legislation of Spain and its colonies.

....

In the absence of reliable proof that Juan Villota had begotten and acknowledged Luciano de los
Reyes as his natural son, his legitimation can not be declared duly proved.

"To hold otherwise would make possible the admission of fraudulent claims made
after the decease of a married couple, based upon an allegation that the claimant was
the fruit of illicit relations prior to their marriage, and without any attempt to show that
the putative father had ever recognized the claimant as his child or even knew of its
existence; and the mere possibility that such claimants might present themselves
would cast doubt and confusion on may inheritances, and open wide the door to a form
of fraud which the legitimate heirs would find great difficulty in combating." (Siguiong
vs. Siguiong, supra.)

And without such legitimation, Luciano could not succeed to the estate of Gavino Villota y Reyes, in
view of Article 943 of the Civil Code of 1889 (later clarified by Article 992 of the new Civil Code):

"ART. 943. A natural child has no right to succeed ab intestate legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children
or relatives so inherit from the natural child."

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"ART. 992. (New Civil Code) An illegitimate child has no right to inherit an intestate
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children
or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child."

And the disqualification of Luciano to succeed Gavino Villota extended under these articles to
Luciano's own progeny, Zoilo and Andres and Martin Macatangay, since they could not represent him[.]

In conclusion, we hold:

....

(3) That a natural child, not recognized as required by the law XI of Toro, is not legitimated by the
subsequent marriage for his parents; and therefore, he is barred from succeeding to the
legitimate issue of said parents.

(4) That such disqualification to inherit extends to the descendants of the unrecognized natural
child.165 (Citations omitted)

The prohibition affects the nonmarital child's right of representation under Articles 970 to 977 of the Civil
Code.166

In Landayan v. Bacani,167s this Court denied the right of representation to a nonmarital child, as the child was
disqualified to inherit intestate from the marital children and relatives of the child's father:

As stated above, petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar,
he being only an acknowledged natural child of Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of petitioners, whom
they claim to be the sole legitimate daughter in first marriage of Teodoro Abenojar. If this claim is
correct, Severino Abenojar has no rights of legal succession from Teodoro Abenojar in view of the
express provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

"ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child."

The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar depends on the
truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an acknowledged
natural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this assumption, his right to inherit from Teodoro Abenojar is
recognized by law (Art. 998, Civil Code). He even claims that he is the sole legal heir of Teodoro
Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who are admittedly the children of the deceased
Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal successional rights from Teodoro Abenojar, their mother being a
spurious child of Teodoro Abenojar.

Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino Abenojar is an
illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar. The right of
representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is disqualified to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father. (Art. 992, Civil Code). On this supposition, the subject
deed of extra-judicial partition is one that included a person who is not an heir of the descendant whose
estate is being partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article 1105 of the Civil Code, reading as
follows:

"Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is
not, shall be void only with respect to such person."168

Similarly, in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals,169 a grandchild was found not to have the right to represent his
predeceased mother in his grandmother's estate, because the grandchild was a nonmarital child of the mother:

Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner [grandchild] is the child
of Sotero Leonardo [mother], still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate
left by the deceased Francisca Reyes [grandmother] considering that, as found again by the Court
of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on
September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more,
his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate
child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father,
like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)170

The prohibition in Article 992 is so restrictive that this Court has characterized it as an "iron curtain"171 separating
marital and nonmarital relatives. In Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court,172 this Court after conducting oral

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arguments on the matter even rejected an interpretation of the word "relatives" that would bar reciprocal intestate
succession only between collateral relatives:

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is
broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p.
2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. II, Third Revision, Eighth Edition)[.] The record reveals that from the
commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:

"The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be
understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general
one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a
distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera
debemus. Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia defines parientes as "los que estan relacionados por los vinculos de la
sangre, ya sea por proceder unos de otros, como los descendientes y ascendientes,
ya sea por proceder de una misma raiz o tronco, como los colaterales."(cited in
Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457).(p. 377, Rollo)

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense
than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states
that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word
collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it
was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which, as already discussed earlier, is not so in the
case at bar.

To recapitulate, We quote this:

"The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates, which goes back
very far in legal history, have been softened but not erased by present law. Our
legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children on exactly
the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the
gradation between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done away with
the subclassification of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be correct
to say that illegitimate children have only those rights which are expressly or clearly
granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed., vol. III,
p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended to
clarify the term "relatives", there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby
reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.173 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)

Yet, while Article 992 prevents nonmarital children from inheriting from their marital parents' relatives, there is no
such prohibition for the nonmarital child whose parent is a nonmarital child as well. Articles 989 and 990 of the Civil
Code provide:

ARTICLE 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of
another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by
right of representation.

ARTICLE 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children
shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of
representation from their deceased grandparent.

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Because of this, the reciprocity in intestate succession of nonmarital children now depends on their parents'
marital status. The parity granted to nonmarital children is more illusory than real. This disparity of treatment was not
left unnoticed. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in his Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, stated:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the
legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can
not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil
Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the
Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and
998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate
child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an
illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future
revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate
issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more
in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.174 (Emphasis supplied)

II(A)

Article 992 carves out an exception to the general rule that persons, by operation of law, inherit intestate from
their blood relatives up to a certain degree. It does so through a classification of persons based on their birth status.
The classification created in Article 992 is made upon persons at their conception and birth—when they are
children.175 Children bear the burden of this classification, despite having no hand in it and its creation dependent on
matters beyond their control, and without any power to change it176 or even mitigate some of its most pernicious
effects.177 As this Court conceded in Concepcion v. Court of Appeals:178

The law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the
child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is
entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and mother, full support and full inheritance. On the
other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the surname and be under the parental authority
only of his mother. He can claim support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half
of that of his legitimate counterpart. Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination
against him), in the eyes of society, a 'bastard' is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of
dishonor.179

In 1974, Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, was passed.
Among its salient features is the recognition, promotion, and protection of the child's rights, without distinction,
among others, to their parents' marital status. It states in part:

ARTICLE 3. Rights of the Child. — All children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth
without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents,
and other factors. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution affirms the dignity of children as human beings,180 and mandates the promotion and protection
of their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being:

ARTICLE II

....

SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote
and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

It is our State policy to protect the best interests of children,181 referring to the "totality of the circumstances and
conditions which are most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child and most
encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional development."182 Article XV, Section 3(2) of the
Constitution states:

SECTION 3. The State shall defend:

....

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development[.]

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183
In line with these, the Philippines has bound itself to abide by universal standards on children's rights
embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Convention, a human rights treaty
signed by the Philippines on January 26, 1990 and ratified on August 21, 1990,184 contains several State obligations,
including a commitment to nondiscrimination of children and the enforcement of their best interests as a primary
consideration in actions concerning children:

Preamble

The States Parties to the present Convention,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United
Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in
fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have determined to
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,

Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed
that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,

....

Considering that the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought
up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular in the
spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity,

....

Have agreed as follows:

....

Article 2

1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each
child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her
parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national,
ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.

2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all
forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or
beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.

2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or
her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other
individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and
administrative measures.185 (Emphasis supplied)

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is operative in Philippine law. Its principles and
policies have been embraced in many laws on children and social welfare.186 Notably, Section 2 of Republic Act No.
7610,187 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act, provides:

SECTION 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the State to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
and discrimination, and other conditions, prejudicial to their development including child labor and its
worst forms; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and
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deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. The
State shall intervene on behalf of the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or
custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation and discrimination
or when such acts against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person
having care and custody of the same.

It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely threatened or
endangered by circumstances which affect or will affect their survival and normal development and
over which they have no control.

The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principle of First Call for Children as enunciated
in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote
the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life. (Emphasis supplied)

This Court has repeatedly invoked the Convention to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children in
matters of custody;188 filiation and paternity;189 adoption;190 crimes committed against them;191 and their status and
nationality.192 As amicus curiae Professor Aguiling-Pangalangan pointed out:

29. The Court has anchored several decisions on the Convention on the Rights of the Child in a long
line of cases, to wit:

29.1.Perez v. CA [G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996 where the Court awarded the custody to the
mother petitioner Nerissa Pere[z] as this was for the best interest of the child and held that: "It
has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare
and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child provides: 'In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.'"

29.2.In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Astorga Garcia [G.R. No. 148311, March 31,
2005 in deciding the issue of the name of an adopted child, the Court held that: "The modern
trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed,
confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the
Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with
social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.
Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the 'Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,' secures these
rights and privileges for the adopted."

29.3.Gamboa-Hirsch v. CA [G.R. No 174485, July 11, 2007 where the Court stated: "The
Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that 'in all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.' The Child
and Youth Welfare Code, in the same way, unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding
the care and custody, among others, of the child, his/her welfare shall be the paramount
consideration." The Court held that "the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly
incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to
wrench the child from the mother's custody."

29.4.Thornton v. Thornton [G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 2004 where the Court cited the UN
CRC as basis for its ruling that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction despite
RA 8369 explicitly stating that family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
habeas corpus. The Court stated that "... a literal interpretation of the word 'exclusive' will result
in grave injustice and negate the policy 'to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children'
under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child [...]."

30. These decisions, having referred to the CRC, are part of the legal system in accordance with
Article 8 of the Civil Code [R.A. 386, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1949 that states that: "Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines."193 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, our Constitution, our laws, and our voluntary commitment to our treaty obligations, when taken together,
extend special protection to children, in equal measure and without any qualifications. When we affirm our
international commitments that are in harmony with our constitutional provisions and have already been codified in

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our domestic legislation, we do nothing more than to recognize and effect what has already formed part of our legal
system.

In this instance, should children's successional rights be at stake, then the best interest of the child should be of
paramount consideration.

The Civil Code dates back to 1950, when it took effect. The most recent interpretation of Article 992 by this
Court, was promulgated in 1990, when the present Constitution was still relatively new194. Since then, developments
in children's rights should be deemed as a new lens through which our laws may be scrutinized. In David v. Senate
Electoral Tribunal:195

This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ, mandated to effect the
Constitution's dictum of defending and promoting the well-being and development of children. It is
not our business to reify discriminatory classes based on circumstances of birth.196

This case may be resolved without passing upon the constitutionality of Article 992. However, that provision
should now be reexamined in order to be consistent with the Constitution.

II(B)

In In re Grey,197 decided under the Spanish Civil Code, this Court cited the commentaries of the Spanish civilist
Manresa in explaining the philosophy behind the prohibition in Article 992:

Under article 943 of the Civil Code, the oppositors, as natural children of Ramon Fabie y Gutierrez,
cannot succeed ab intestate their deceased cousin Rosario Fabie y Grey. Said article reads:

"ART. 943. A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor
shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child."

Commenting on the aforequoted article, Manresa has this to say:

"Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called
relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law
does not recognize it. In this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon
the presumptive will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural
child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the
product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is
ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment." (7 Manresa, 3d ed., p. 110.)198

This philosophy has been repeated in cases decided under Article 992, such as Corpus,199 Diaz200 Pascual v.
Pascual-Bautista201 and Manuel v. Ferrer.202

Intestate succession is based on the decedent's presumed will.203 Article 992 then assumes that the decedent's
disposition of their property would not have included any nonmarital children, due to a supposed hostility between
the marital family and the nonmarital child because the latter was the outcome of an extramarital affair.204

However, a nonmarital child is not defined that way. Nonmarital children, or "illegitimate children" as used under
Article 165 of the Family Code, are "[c]hildren conceived and born outside a valid marriage[.]"205 The phrase "outside
a valid marriage" does not necessarily mean an extramarital affair. Parents may choose not to get married despite
having no legal impediment to marry. The 2016 report of the Philippine Statistics Authority on Marriage in the
Philippines206 showed a declining trend in the number of marriages—from 490,054 registered marriages in 2007 to
419,628 in 2016.207 In 10 years, the number decreased by 14.4% 208

If there is a legal impediment, it does not necessarily follow that the impediment is that either or both parents are
married to another person. It is entirely possible that one or both of them are below marriageable age.209 The
Philippine Statistics Authority also reported that in 2017, 196,478 children were born to adolescent—19 years old
and under—mothers and 52,342 children were sired by adolescent fathers.210

Another reason why a child could have been born "outside a valid marriage" is because their mother was a
victim of sexual assault211 who did not marry the perpetrator. This is an unfortunate and wretched reality.

Too, our courts, in passing judgment upon the validity of marriages, bestow the status of a nonmarital child.212
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There are also times when the father of an unborn child may have died before being able to marry the child's
mother, as what has been alleged in Angela's case.

Children born from these circumstances are also considered "illegitimate." Yet, there may be no "antagonism or
incompatibility," "hate," or "disgraceful looks" to speak of. If Article 992 merely recognizes existing conditions, then it
should be construed to account for other circumstances of birth and family dynamics. Peace within families cannot
be encouraged by callously depriving some of its members of their inheritance. Such deprivation may even be the
cause of antagonism and alienation that could have been otherwise avoided.

This Court has recognized that the alleged resentment and hostility presumed by Article 992 can be proven by
evidence to be non-existent. Particular facts of a case may show that the decedent's will does not distinguish
between marital and nonmarital relatives, precluding a rigid application of Article 992.

In In re Intestate Estate of Cristina Agidnaldo-Suntay:213

Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:

The law [of intestacy] is founded . . . on the presumed will of the deceased . . .
Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the
law first calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always
preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that
the deceased would have done so had he manifested his last will... Lastly, in default of
anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is
in accordance with his presumed will that his property be given to charitable or
educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession,
i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and
illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico. who, in fact, legally raised the status of
Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this
case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992
of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate
descendants of a deceased.214

This Court abandons the presumption in In re Grey, Corpus, Diaz, and In re Suntay, among others, that
nonmarital children are products of illicit relationships or that they are automatically placed in a hostile environment
perpetrated by the marital family. We are not duty bound to uncritically parrot archaic prejudices and cruelties, to
mirror and amplify oppressive and regressive ideas about the status of children and family life. The best interest of
the child should prevail.

We adopt a construction of Article 992 that makes children, regardless of the circumstances of their births,
qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants—such as their grandparent—by their right of representation. Both
marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents
and other ascendants. Nonmarital children are removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as
marital children. Nomnarital children of marital children are also removed from their parents and ascendants in the
same degree as nomnarital children of nonmarital children.

This interpretation likewise makes Article 992 more consistent with the changes introduced by the Family Code
on obligations of support among and between the direct line of blood relatives. As explained by amicus curiae Dean
Del Castillo:

53. This interpretation of Article 992 is also supported by the Family Code. Particularly, it is
consistent with the provisions of the Family Code on support.

54. Article 195 of the Family Code identifies the persons who are obliged to support each other. It
provides that parents and their children and the children of the latter, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
are obliged to support each other.

"Family Code. Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the
following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the
preceding article:

1) The spouses;

2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

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3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children
of the latter;

4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children
of the latter; and

5) legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.

55. The mandatory nature of the support from grandparents to grandchildren, regardless of status,
is intentional. It reflects the evolution of the legal view towards illegitimate children from the time of the
Spanish Civil Code and the Civil Code to the time of the Family Code.

56. The deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted the Family Code show
the rationale behind the aforementioned paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 195:

"The illegitimate children are clearly burdened with the stigma of bastardy and
there is no reason why the committee should further inflict punishment or other
disabilities on them. The committee is trying to ameliorate as much as possible the
stigma. In addition, the sentiment of the present Civil Code of 1950 was best captured
in the words: 'There are no illegitimate children, there are only illegitimate parents.' The
committee is therefore implementing this rule. The committee has sufficiently studied
the grounds for claim of support and believe that they are sufficient."

57. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the rules on support (under the Family Code) and
succession (under the Civil Code) should be reciprocal. Grandchildren, regardless of their status and
the status of their parents, should be able to inherit from their grandparents by right of representation in
the same way that the grandchildren, also regardless of their status, are called upon by law to support
their grandparents, if necessary. In the case of support, the grandchildren could not even shy away
from the obligation because support is considered to be "the most sacred and important of all the
obligations[.]215 (Citations omitted)

Accordingly, when a nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased parent to succeed in their grandparent's
estate, Article 982 of the Civil Code shall apply. Article 982 provides:

ARTICLE 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation,
and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be
divided among the latter in equal portions. (Emphasis supplied)

The language of Article 982 does not make any distinctions or qualifications as to the birth status of the
"grandchildren and other descendants" granted the right of representation. Moreover, as pointed out by Senior
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, to allow grandchildren and other descendants, regardless of their birth
status, to inherit by right of representation will protect the legitime of the compulsory heir they represent; otherwise,
the legitime will be impaired, contrary to protections granted to this legitime in other areas of our law on
succession.216

Applying Article 982 in situations where the grandchild's right to inherit from their grandparent is in issue is more
in accord with our State policy of protecting children's best interests and our responsibility of complying with the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

To emphasize, this ruling will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of representation to their parent's
share in her grandparent's legitime. It is silent on collateral relatives where the nonmarital child may inherit by
themself. We are not now ruling on the extent of the right of a nonmarital child to inherit in their own right. Those will
be the subject of a proper case and, if so minded, may also be the subject of more enlightened and informed future
legislation.

III

However, the application of Article 982 here does not automatically give Angela the right to inherit from Miguel's
estate. Angela must still prove her filiation.

We must first resolve the rules concerning proof of filiation that govern this case.

The Office of the Solicitor General, Abdulah, and Rodolfo insist that Angela failed to prove her filiation to Arturo
under Article 175,217 in relation to Article 172,218 of the Family Code. Even if the provisions under the Civil
Code219 were applied, they say that Angela's claim will not prosper since she did not file any action for recognition
within four years from the time she attained the age of majority, when she turned 18 years old in 1996.

They are mistaken.

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Angela was born on October 9, 1978, before the Family Code was created and when the Civil Code provisions
on proving filiation applies. Meanwhile, she moved that she be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel's
estate on July 2, 2003, when the Family Code was already in effect.

The question as to what provisions should be applied was already settled. As thoroughly explained in Bernabe v.
Alejo:220

Under the new law [Family Code], an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the
former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a
chance to dispute the claim, considering that "illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in
secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. . . . The putative parent should
thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child's filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or
she is already dead."

Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its
enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:

"ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."

The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrian's right to an action for recognition,
which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the
Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.

A vested right is defined as "one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of
which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency...." Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural
in nature and that "as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws."

Bustos v. Lucero distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:

". . . . Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect
may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those
rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates
rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that
part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for
their invasion."

Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto, the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
procedural or substantive:

"[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice
and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive
right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes
away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure."

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law,
as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age.
Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian's right to file an action for recognition,
because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

....

To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect
and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under
Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested
right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.

Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have
filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents.221 (Emphasis supplied, citations

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omitted)

Per the ruling in Bernabe, Angela, who was not yet born when the Family Code took effect, has the right to
prove that she was her father's daughter under Article 285 of the Civil Code within four years from attaining the age
of majority. Under Article 402 of the Civil Code, the age of majority is 21 years old. Angela attained majority on
October 9, 1999. She had until October 9, 2003 to assert her right to prove her filiation with Arturo. Thus, when she
moved to be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel's estate on July 17, 2003, she was not yet barred
from claiming her filiation.

However, there is no provision in the Civil Code that guides a child, who was born after their father's death, in
proving filiation with him.

Article 283 of the Civil Code222 provides for the compulsory recognition of natural children, one ground for which
is "continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by direct acts of the latter or of his family[.]"
Angela certainly qualifies as a natural child as defined in the Civil Code, there being no contest that her putative
parents were unmarried, yet had no impediment to marry each other at the time of her birth. But as been held by this
Court, the enjoyment or possession of the status of a natural child is only a ground for obligatory recognition by the
alleged father, and not by itself a sufficiently operative acknowledgment.223 Compulsory recognition involves the
father's express recognition of his paternity,224 which is impossible in this case. A person may possess,
uninterrupted, the status of a "natural child," but this Court has held that only those "natural children" legally
acknowledged according to the requirements of the Civil Code are entitled to inherit:

Petitioners' contention is tenable. We are bound by the finding of the Court of Appeals in its
decision that said respondents are the natural children of Justo Magallanes, that the petitioners do
not deny their status as such, and that it can be inferred from the records that they enjoyed such
status during the lifetime of their deceased father. Nonetheless, we are also bound by its finding that
the record fails to adequately show that said respondents were ever acknowledged as such natural
children. Under article 840 of the old Civil Code, above quoted, the natural children entitled to inherit
are those legally acknowledged. In the case of Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, the following
pronouncement was made: ". . . the actual attainment of the status of a legally recognized natural
child is a condition precedent to the realization of any rights which may pertain to such child in the
character of heir. In the case before us, assuming that the plaintiff has been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of natural child, she is undoubtedly entitled to enforce legal recognition; but
this does not in itself make her a legally recognized natural child." It being a fact, conclusive in this
instance, that there was no requisite acknowledgment, the respondents' right to inherit cannot be
sustained.225

Yet, this Court in Tongoy v Court of Appeals226 recognized that there are circumstances where the natural child
in question has already been enjoying the benefits and privileges of an acknowledged natural child, treated as such
not just by the putative parent, but also by the extended family. In these instances, requiring the natural child to
undergo the formalities of compulsory recognition, for fear that they be deprived of their hereditary rights, may be
"rather awkward, if not unnecessary":

Of course, the overwhelming evidence found by respondent Court of Appeals conclusively shows
that respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and Norberto have been in continuous possession of
the statue of natural, or even legitimated, children. Still, it recognizes the fact that such continuous
possession of status is not, per se, a sufficient acknowledgment but only a ground to compel
recognition (Alabat vs. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479; Pua vs. Chan, 21 SCRA 753; Larena vs. Rubio, 43 Phil.
1017).

Be that as it may, WE cannot but agree with the liberal view taken by respondent Court of Appeals
when it said:

". . . It does seem equally manifest, however, that defendants-appellants stand on

a purely technical point in the light of the overwhelming evidence that appellees were
natural children of Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and were treated as
legitimate children not only by their parents but also by the entire clan. Indeed, it does
not make much sense that appellees should be deprived of their hereditary rights as
undoubted nature children of their father, when the only plausible reason that the latter
could have had in mind when he married his second wife Antonina Pebello just over a
month before his death was to give legitimate status to their children. It is not in
keeping with the more liberal attitude taken by the New Civil Code towards illegitimate
children and the more compassionate trend of the New Society to insist on a very
literal application of the law in requiring the formalities of compulsory acknowledgment,
when the only result is to unjustly deprive children who are otherwise entitled to
hereditary rights. From the very nature of things, it is hardly to be expected of

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appellees, having been reared as legitimate children of their parents and treated as
such by everybody, to bring an action to compel their parents to acknowledge them. In
the hitherto cited case of Ramos vs. Ramos, supra, the Supreme Court showed the
way out of patent injustice and inequity that might result in some cases simply because
of the implacable insistence on the technical amenities for acknowledgment.

Thus, it held —

'Unacknowledged natural children have no rights whatsoever (Buenaventura vs.

Urbano, 5 Phil. 1; Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil. 5, 11; Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil.
738; Crisolo vs. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862). The fact that the plaintiffs, as natural children
of Martin Ramos, received shares in his estate implied that they were acknowledged.
Obviously, defendants Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the late Jose Ramos
and members of his family had treated them as his children. Presumably, that fact was
well-known in the community. Under the circumstances, Agustin Ramos and Granada
Ramos and the heirs of Jose Ramos, are estopped from attacking plaintiffs' status as
acknowledged natural children (See Arts. 283 4 and 2666 3, New Civil Code). [Ramos
vs. Ramos, supra].'

"With the same logic, estoppel should also operate in this case in favor of
appellees, considering, as already explained in detail, that they have always been
treated as acknowledged and legitimated children of the second marriage of Francisco
Tongoy, not only by their presumed parents who raised them as their children, but also
by the entire Tongoy-Sonora clan, including Luis D. Tongoy himself who had furnished
sustenance to the clan in his capacity as administrator of Hacienda Pulo and had in
fact supported the law studies of appellee Ricardo P. Tongoy in Manila, the same way
he did with Jesus T. Sonora in his medical studies. As already pointed out, even
defendants-appellants have not questioned the fact that appellees are half-brothers of
Luis D. Tongoy. As a matter of fact, that are really children of Francisco Tongoy and
Antonina Pabello, and only the technicality that their acknowledgment as natural
children has not been formalized in any of the modes prescribed by law appears to
stand in the way of granting them their hereditary rights. But estoppel, as already
indicated, precludes defendants-appellants from attacking appellees' status as
acknowledged natural or legitimated children of Francisco Tongoy. In addition to
estoppel, this is decidedly one instance when technicality should give way to
conscience, equity and justice (cf. Vda. de Sta. Ana vs. Rivera, L-22070, October 29,
1966, 18 SCRA 588)" [pp. 196-198, Vol. I, rec.].

It is time that WE, too, take a liberal view in favor of natural children who, because they enjoy the
blessings and privileges of an acknowledged natural child and even of a legitimated child, found it
rather awkward, if not unnecessary, to institute an action for recognition against their natural parents,
who, without their asking, have been showering them with the same love, care and material support as
are accorded to legitimate children. The right to participate in their father's inheritance should
necessarily follow.227

Similarly, in Pactor v. Pestaño,228 a nonmarital child was permitted to participate in the settlement of the intestate
estate of his father despite the lack of formal recognition during his father's lifetime. This Court noted that the
nonmarital child, due to the father's acts and the widow's as well, had been in continuous possession of the status of
a child of his father. As such, extending the application of the rule in Tongoy is proper in this case.

Moreover, DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity and filiation.229 Under the Rule on DNA
Evidence, among the purposes of DNA testing is to determine whether two or more distinct biological samples
originate from related persons, known as kinship analysis.230 The Rule on DNA Evidence permits the use of any
biological sample, including bones,231 in DNA testing. This Court has sanctioned the exhumation of bodies for DNA
testing.232 In Estate of Ong v. Diaz,233 this Court affirmed the use of DNA testing in an instance when the putative
father was dead:

From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a
person's body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes
blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.

Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of
obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
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And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v. Umanito,
citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections, this Court held:

The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March
2004, 424 SCRA 277 likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our
jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to."

It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of
AAA's child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair
and correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts
are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing.
However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to
receive and act on the matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
and does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more
appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in
appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties.234

Likewise, while the Rule on DNA Evidence refers specifically to DNA testing as probability of parentage involving
a putative father,235 it does not prohibit the use of kinship analysis through DNA testing of other genetically related
persons, when there is prima facie evidence or reasonable possibility236 of genetic kinship. Thus, in the absence of
viable biological samples of the putative father, DNA testing may be used as corroborative evidence237 of two or
more persons' exclusion or inclusion in the same genetic lineage, subject to scientific analysis of the likelihood of
relatedness of those persons based on the results of the tests. This is in keeping with the liberalization of the rule on
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, in the paramount consideration of the child's welfare and best
interest of the child.238

The matter of how filiation may be proved under the present circumstances having been settled, we proceed to
the factual issues raised in this case.

This Court is not a trier of facts.239 "It is not [our] function to examine and determine the weight of the evidence
supporting the assailed decision."240 This is consistent with the rule that only questions of law may be resolved in
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

An exception to this general rule, however, is when there exist conflicting factual findings in the lower
courts,241 such as what has occurred here. The Regional Trial Court found that Angela should be considered "an
acknowledged natural child or legitimated child of her father, Arturo C. Aquino,"242 while the Court of Appeals held
that Angela "failed to present any competent proof of her filiation with Arturo Aquino through any of the means
provided by law."243

However, resolving several factual matters raised in the parties' pleadings and during the oral arguments
requires receiving additional evidence, which this Court is not equipped to do. Documents may need to be
presented and authenticated; witnesses' testimonies received and examined; and DNA testing ordered and
conducted, to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations raised by the parties before this Court. This Court finds
it prudent to remand these cases to their court of origin for reception of evidence, in conformity with the legal
principles articulated here.

IV

Succession is not only a mode of acquiring ownership: a way for properties to be transferred from one person to
another. Our laws have made succession a fixed point in the life cycle of a family. To whom a decedent's property is
given and how much is our civil laws approximation of familial love: first descending, then ascending, and finally
spreading out.244 In its own way, an inheritance may be viewed as recompense, however pitiful and inadequate, for
a permanent loss of which there can never be sufficient satisfaction. The laws on succession have social, cultural,
and even moral dimensions, affecting and affected by ever-evolving norms of family, marriage, and children.

While not binding upon our jurisdiction, the changes in legitimacy statutes and successional rights in other
countries may offer alternative perspectives that can help foster an overdue conversation about our civil laws.

As early as 1967, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations Economic and
Social Council appointed a special rapporteur to study discrimination against nonmarital children, then called as
"persons born out of wedlock," across different member-nations, including the Philippines.245 One outcome of this
study was a set of draft general principles submitted by the Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and

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246
Protection of Minorities "to enable all members of society, including persons born out of wedlock, to enjoy the
equal and inalienable rights to which they are entitled,"247 including inheritance rights:

12. Every person born out of wedlock shall, once his filiation has been established, have the
same inheritance rights as persons born in wedlock. Legal limitations or restrictions on the freedom
of a testator to dispose of his property shall afford equal protection to persons entitled to inheritance,
whether they are born in wedlock or out of wedlock.248

Spain, after whose legal regime the Philippines had patterned—with improvements—its civil law
system,249 abolished the distinctions between marital and nonmarital children in 1981.250 This resulted in a
divergence from our successional laws:

Since 1981 the compulsory or forced heirs of the testator as referred to in art. 807 [of the
Spanish Civil Code] are (1) First, children and descendants. (2) In the absence of children or
descendants, the parents or ascendants of the testator (3) In any case, the widower or widow,
succeeds the testator in the manner and to the extent established by the Civil Code. Therefore,
there is no longer any discrimination between children due to their origin, and the live-in partner is
not a forced heir. Moreover, the widowed spouse is only appointed on a usufruct share, and not the
ownership of a share.251 (Citation omitted)

More generally, the 1975 European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock, ratified by
23 Council of Europe states,252 includes a provision on nondiscrimination of children in succession:

Article 9

A child born out of wedlock shall have the same right of succession in the estate of its father
and its mother and of a member of its father's or mother's family, as if it had been born in wedlock.

In 2013, the European Court of Human Rights observed that among its member-states, 21 countries gave
children inheritance rights independent of their parents' marital status; 19 countries still retained a distinction
according to the parents' marital status but the distinction did not extend to inheritance; 1 country—Malta—still made
some distinctions in inheritance; and only Andorra treated nonmarital children less favorably than their marital
counterparts in inheritance matters.253

Similarly, the United States Supreme Court struck down a state law which limited the intestate succession of
nonmarital children to the matrilineal line, upon a finding that this limitation—not applicable to marital children—
violated the equal protection clause.254 There, it was acknowledged that although there was a legitimate purpose in
promoting the family unit, this could not be achieved by discriminating against a cohort of children who could "affect
neither their parents' conduct nor their own status."255

Our own laws also reflect progress in treating persons, regardless of their birth status, more equally. The Family
Code and its amendments256 sought to improve the living conditions of nonmarital children, by conferring upon them
the rights and privileges previously unavailable under the Civil Code and its antecedents. Numerous social welfare
laws grant benefits to marital and nonmarital children alike.257 Moreover, laws such as Republic Act No. 8972, or the
Solo Parents' Welfare Act, and Republic Act No. 10165, or the Foster Care Act, demonstrate that the family as a
basic autonomous social institution is not restrictively defined by traditional notions of marital relations, moving
toward unshackling the status of a child from the acts of their parents.

All children are deserving of support, care, and attention. They are entitled to an unprejudiced and nurturing
environment free from neglect, abuse, and cruelty. Regardless of the circumstances of their birth, they are all
without distinction entitled to all rights and privileges due them. The principle of protecting and promoting the best
interest of the child applies equally, and without distinction, to all children. As observed by Justice Gregory Perfecto
in Malonda v. Malonda:258

All children are entitled to equal protection from their parents. Only a distorted concept of that
parental duty, which springs from and is imposed by nature, may justify discriminatory measures to
the prejudice of those born out of illicit sexual relations. The legal or moral violations upon which
some of our present day legal provisions penalize illegitimate children with social, economic and
financial sanctions, are perpetrated by the parents without the consent or knowledge of the children.
If the erring parents deserve to have their foreheads branded with the stigma of illegitimacy, it is
iniquitous to load the innocent children with the evil consequences of that stigma. There can be
illegitimate parents but there should not be any illegitimate children.259

Nonetheless, the present state of our family laws constrains us to apply the Civil Code and the Family Code as
they are, including the classifications and distinctions embedded in them. Reshaping policies with a profound effect
on the basic framework of Philippine civil law may be better left to the Filipino people, through their duly elected
representatives, empathetic to and steadfast in our constitutional commitment to our children.
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WHEREFORE, Amadea Angela K. Aquino's Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 208912
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The January 21, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 01633 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The cases are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of origin for resolution, within 90 days of
receipt of this Decision, of the issues of Amadea Angela K. Aquino's filiation—including the reception
of DNA evidence upon consultation and coordination with experts in the field of DNA analysis—and
entitlement to a share in the estate of Miguel T. Aquino, in accordance with this Decision and the re-
interpretation of Article 992 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., See separate opinion.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see Separate Concurring Opinion.

Caguioa, J., See Concurring and Dissenting.

Hernando, Carandang, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

Lazaro-Javier, J., Pls. see Separate Opinion.

Zalameda, J., With Separate Concurring Opinion.

Dimaampao, J., On Official Leave.

Footnotes
1
The Petitions were filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2
Whenever practicable and not required by direct reference to statute and jurisprudence, the term
"nonmarital child" is used in place of "illegitimate child" to refer to the status of a child whose parents who are
not married to each other. See Gocolay v. Gocolay, G.R. No. 220606, January 11, 2021, <
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/67250> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

Similarly, "marital child" is used in place of "legitimate child." Various sources have discouraged the use
of the term "illegitimate" to refer to children because it is a pejorative term that perpetuates a historical
stigma. See, for example, Edward Schumacher-Matos, Start the Debate: Language, Legitimacy and a
"Love Child", available at < https://www.npr.org/sections/publiceditor/2011/07/12/137792538/start-the-
debate-language-legitimacy-and-a-love-child>, (last accessed on December 6, 2021); Edward
Schumacher-Matos, Stylebook Survey: Newsroom Policy on "Illegitimate Children", available at <
https://www.npr.org/sections/publiceditor/2011/07/18/137861815/stylebook-survey-newsroom-policy-
on-illegitimate-children>, (last accessed on December 6, 2021); Mallary Jean Tenore, AP Stylebook
adds entry for "illegitimate child," advises journalists not to use it, available at <
https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2012/ap-stylebook-adds-entry-for-illegitimate-child-advises-
journalists-not-to-use-it/>, (last accessed on December 6, 2021).

Nonetheless, it is likewise acknowledged that even the terms "marital" and "nonmarital" children carry
connotations regarding the perceived desirability of traditional two-person opposite-sex marriage, even
though our laws and norms recognize other family configurations (e.g., single-parent households,
unmarried cohabitation, foster care, adoptive families, and families of choice). At every opportunity, this
Court ought to promote the dignity of every person in our choices of words and language.
3
Rollo (G.R. No. 208912), pp. 12-35.
4
Id. at 41-58. The January 21, 2013 Decision in CA-G.R. CV. No. 01633 was penned by Associate Justice
Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla and concurred in by Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Marie Christine
Azcarraga-Jacob of the Twenty-First Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
5
Id. at 58.
6
Rollo (G.R. No. 209018), pp. 4-34.
7
Id. at 36-47. The August 23, 2012 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 02269-MIN was penned by Associate Justice
Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Renato C. Francisco

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9/25/24, 2:46 PM G.R. No. 208912
of the Twenty-Second Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
8
Id. at 49-52. The August 1, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 02269-MIN was penned by Associate
Justice Edgardo A. Camello and concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Francisco and Edward B.
Contreras of the Twenty-Second Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
9
Id. at 40-46, Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 02269-MIN.
10
Rollo (G.R. No. 208912), p. 42, Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 01633.
11
Id. at 42-43.
12
Id. at 44, Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 01633, and 89-96, Motion to be Included in the
Distribution and Partition of the Estate.
13
Id. at 44 and 89.
14
Id. at 98.
15
Id. at 60, April 22, 2005 Regional Trial Court Order in Spl. Proc. No. 6972-2003.
16
Id. at 97, Death Certificate of Arturo C. Aquino.
17
Id. at 44 and 89-90.
18
Id. at 44 and 90.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 44-45 and 90.
21
Id. at 60 and 90.
22
Id. at 45, 60, and 90.
23
Id. at 60, 90, and 99.
24
Id. at 99, Baptismal Certificate of Amadea Angela Aquino.
25
Id. at 45, 60, and 91.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 100.
28
Id. at 60.
29
Id. at 45 and 91.
30
Id. at 101-107.
31
Id. at 46, 60; and 102, Opposition to Claimant's Motion to be Included in the Distribution and Partition of the
Estate.
32
Id. at 60 and 103.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 61.
35
Id. at 111-115.
36
Id. at 43 and 114.
37
Id. at 142-149.
38
Id. at 61 and 148.

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39
Id. at 44.
40
Id. at 150-151.
41
Id. at 46 and 150.
42
Id. at 153-155.
43
Id. at 156-158.
44
Id. at 46.
45
Id. at 60-65. The Order was penned by Judge William M. Layague of Branch 14, Regional Trial Court,
Davao City.
46
Id. at 47 and 64.
47
Id. at 48 and 63.
48
Id. at 63.
49
Id. at 64.
50
Id. at 48.
51
Id. at 49.
52
Id. at 66-68.
53
Rollo (G.R. No. 209018), pp. 54-68.
54
Id. at 67.
55
Id. at 36-47.
56
Id. at 40-46.
57
Id. at 49-52.
58
Id. at 4-33.
59
Id. at 31.
60
Id. at 4-34.
61
Id. at 10-14.
62
Id. at 14-18.
63
Id. at 18-19.
64
Id. at 19-23.
65
Id. at 28-30.
66
Id. at 23-28.
67
Id. at 31.
68
Rollo (G.R. No. 208912), pp. 41-42.
69
Id. at 49-50.
70
Id. at 41-58.
71
Id. at 57-58.
72
Id. at 53-56.

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73
Id. at 56-57.
74
Id. at 57-58.
75
Id. at 69-75.
76
Id. at 79-81.
77
Id. at 12-35.
78
Id. at 33.
79
Id. at 12-35.
80
Id. at 23-30.
81
Id. at 31-32.
82
Id. at 32.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 33.
85
Id. at 204-205.
86
Id. at 204.
87
Id. at 206-207.
88
Id. at 206.
89
Id. at 208-221.
90
Id. at 208-209.
91
Id. at 233-238.
92
261 Phil. 542 (1990) [Per J. Paras, En Banc].
93
Id. at 552.
94
Rollo (G.R. No. 208912), p. 235, Motion to Refer the Case to the Honorable Court En Banc.
95
Id. at 237.
96
Id. at 249.
97
Id. at 259-264.
98
Id. at 260.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 268.
101
Id. at 272-297.
102
Id. at 306-332.
103
Id. at 370-386.
104
Id. at 389-390.
105
Id. at 405-436.
106
Id. at 410-423.
107
Id. at 423.
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9/25/24, 2:46 PM G.R. No. 208912
108
Id. at 444-491.
109
Id. at 459.
110
Id. at 461.
111
Id. at 462.
112
Id. at 466.
113
Id.
114
208 Phil. 95 (1983) [Per J. Makasiar, Second Division].
115
Rollo (G.R. No. 208912), pp. 472-477, Abdulah Aquino's Memorandum.
116
Id. at 477-489.
117
Id. at 478.
118
Id. at 481-489.
119
Id. at 510-560.
120
Id. at 524-541.
121
Id. at 541-546.
122
Id. at 541.
123
Id. at 546-554.
124
Id. at 552.
125
Rollo (G.R. No. 209018), pp. 490-512.
126
Id. at 502.
127
Id. at 502-507.
128
Id. at 626.
129
Id.
130
Rollo (G.R. No. 208912), pp. 944-991.
131
Id. at 1052-1108.
132
Id. at 1136-1177.
133
Id. at 1014-1042. On September 2, 2019, Professor Aguiling-Pangalangan submitted a Memorandum for
the oral arguments (Id. at 739-761).
134
Id. at 1043-1051.
135
Id. at 844-869.
136
Id. at 1263-1333.
137
Id. at 1056-1063.
138
Id. at 1077-1098; 1156-1171; and 1215-1247.
139
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, 335 Phil. 82 (1997) [Per J. Bellosillo, En
Banc].
140
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, 661 Phil. 390 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc].

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141
Falcis v. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019, <
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65744> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
142
Rollo (G.R. No. 208912), pp. 510-556.
143
Id. at 550.
144
Cawiling, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 420 Phil. 524 (2001) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
145
Insular Lumber Company v. Court of Tax Appeals, 192 Phil. 221, 228 (1981) [Per J. De Castro, En Banc].
146
Justice Leonen's Separate Concurring Opinion, Kolin v. Kolin, G.R. No. 228165, February 9, 2021, <
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/67171> [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc],
citing Department of Transportation and Communications v. Cruz, 581 Phil. 602 (2008) [Per J. Austria-
Martinez, En Banc].
147
Justice Leonen's Separate Concurring Opinion, Kolin v. Kolin, G.R. No. 228165, February 9, 2021, <
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/67171> [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc], citing Quintanar
v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Philippines, Inc., 788 Phil. 385 (2016) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. See, e.g., Villaflor v.
Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc]; Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249 (1947)
[Per J. Padilla, First Division]; Urbano v. Chavez, 262 Phil. 374 (1990) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc]; Ebralinag
v. The Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 292 Phil. 267 (1993) [Per J. Griño-Aquino, En
Banc]; Bustamante v. National Labor Relations Commission, 332 Phil. 833 (1996) [Per J. Padilla, En
Banc]; Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 772 Phil. 672 (2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En
Banc]; Gomez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216824, November 10, 2020, <
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/67025> [Per J. Gesmundo, En Banc].
148
In re Fernandez v. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30,36 (1933) [Per J. Malcolm, Second Division].
149
Associate Justice Caguioa's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, pp. 7-9.
150
205 Phil. 781 (1983) [Per J. Leonardo De Castro, Second Division].
151
Rollo (G.R. No. 208912), pp. 56-57.
152
Nieva v. Alcala, 41 Phil. 915 (1920) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
153
CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 119 states:

Article 119. Only natural children can be legitimated.

Natural children are those born out of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of such
children, could have married with or without dispensation.
154
CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 121 states:

Article 121. Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been
acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof.
155
CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 120 states:

Article 120. Legitimation may be effected:

1. By the subsequent marriage of the parents.

2. By royal concession.
156
CIVIL CODE (1889), arts. 134 and 844, in relation to art. 846, state:

Article 134. An acknowledged natural child is entitled:

1. To bear the surname of the person acknowledging it.

2. To receive support from such person, in accordance with Article 143.

3. To receive the hereditary portion, if available, determined by this Code.

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Article 844. The hereditary portion of children legitimated by royal concession shall be the same
as that established by law in favor of acknowledged natural children.

Article 846. The right of succession which the law grants natural children pertains reciprocally in
the same cases to the natural father or mother.
157
See CIVIL CODE (1889), sec. III in relation to art. 845; and see Divinagracia v. Rovira, 164 Phil. 311
(1976) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].
158
See Hofileña v. Republic, 145 Phil. 467,471 (1970) [Per J. Dizon, En Banc].
159
CIVIL CODE, art. 269 states:

Article 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to many each other, are natural.
160
CIVIL CODE, art. 89 states:

Article 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning
shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are
called natural children by legal fiction.

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be

considered as legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights
and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by
legal fiction.
161
CIVIL CODE, art. 287 states:

Article 287. Illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with article 269 and
other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights
as are granted in this Code.
162
Briones v. Miguel, 483 Phil. 483 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
163
Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, G.R. No. 84240, March 25, 1992,207 SCRA 561,567-568 [Per J. Paras,
Second Division].
164
97 Phil. 659 (1955) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L, First Division].
165
Id. at 665-668.
166
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are:

Article 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the
rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

Article 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the
person represented would have succeeded.

Article 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending.

In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether
they be of the full or half blood.

Article 973. In order that representation may take place, it is necessary that the representative
himself be capable of succeeding the decedent.

Article 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate shall be
made per stirpes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall not inherit
more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit. (926a)

Article 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall
inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they
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alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions. (927)

Article 976. A person may represent him whose inheritance he has renounced.

Article 977. Heirs who repudiate their share may not be represented.
167
202 Phil. 440 (1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division].
168
Id. at 444-445.
169
205 Phil. 781 (1983) [Per J. De Castro, Second Division].
170
Id. at 788.
171
Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 234 Phil. 636 (1987) [Per J. Paras, Second Division]; De La Puerta v.
Court of Appeals, 261 Phil. 87 (1990) [Per J. Cruz, First Division]; Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, G.R. No.
84240, March 25, 1992 [Per J. Paras, Second Division]; Manuel v. Ferrer, 317 Phil. 568 (1995) [Per J. Vitug,
Third Division]; Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 635 Phil. 136 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
172
261 Phil. 542 (1990) [Per J. Paras, En Banc].
173
Id. at 551-552.
174
Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 234 Phil. 636, 642 (1987) [Per J. Paras, Second Division],
citing Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, Volume 4, Issue No. 1, First Quarter, JOURNAL
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, pp. 40-41 (1976).
175
As noted by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment No. 7 on
implementing child rights in early childhood:

12. Young children may also suffer the consequences of discrimination against their
parents, for example if children have been born out of wedlock or in other circumstances that
deviate from traditional values, or if their parents are refugees or asylum-seekers. States
parties have a responsibility to monitor and combat discrimination in whatever forms it takes
and wherever it occurs - within families, communities, schools or other institutions. Potential
discrimination in access to quality services for young children is a particular concern,
especially where health, education, welfare and other services are not universally available
and are provided through a combination of State, private and charitable organizations. As a
first step, the committee encourages States parties to monitor the availability of and access to
quality services that contribute to young children's survival and development, including
through systematic data collection, disaggregated in terms of major variables related to
children's and families' background and circumstances. As a second step, actions may be
required that guarantee that all children have an equal opportunity to benefit from available
services. More generally, States parties should raise awareness about discrimination against
young children in general, and against vulnerable groups in particular, (at p. 6, UN Committee
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 7 (2005): Implementing child rights in
early childhood, 1 November 2005, CRC/C/GC/7)
176
A child may only be legitimated by a subsequent marriage between their parents (Family Code, Art. 178).
While a child may prove their filiation by action (see FAMILY CODE, arts. 172-173; 175), any change in status
is still dependent on the court's judgment.
177
While strides have been made in equitable treatment of nonmarital children, they are often granted fewer
rights and privileges than marital children. Some of these areas include custody, use of surnames, legitimes,
and the Social Security Law. (See, for example, Sandra M.T. Magalang, Legitimizing Illegitimacy: Resisting
Illegitimacy in the Philippines and Arguing for Declassification of Illegitimate Children as a Statutory Class, 88
PHIL. L.J. 467, 490-492, 495-497 (2014); and Republic Act No. 11199 (2019), section 8(k), which states that
dependent nonmarital children are entitled to 50% of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted
children.)
178
505 Phil. 529 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
179
Id. at 543-544.
180
CONST., art. XIII, sec. 1 states:

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Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good.
181
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, 782 Phil. 282,723 (2016)
[Per J. Perez, En Banc].
182
Republic Act No. 9344 (2005), sec. 4(b). The law is called the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.
183
Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 501 Phil. 303 (2005) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
184
United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, < http://indicators.ohchr.org/> (last
accessed on December 6, 2021).
185
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, <
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx> (last accessed on December 6, 2021).
186
See, for example, Republic Act No. 8043 (1995), otherwise known as the Inter-Country Adoption Act, sec.
9(g); Republic Act No. 8552 (1998), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, sec. 2(b); Republic Act
No. 8369 (1997), otherwise known as the Family Courts Act, sec. 13; Republic Act No. 9208 (2003), as
amended by Republic Act No. 10364 (2013), otherwise known as the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act, sec. 2; Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act, sec. 2; Republic Act No. 9745 (2009), otherwise known as the Anti-Torture Act, sec. 2(d);
Republic Act No. 9775 (2009), otherwise known as the Anti-Child Pornography Act, sec. 2(c); Republic Act
No. 9851 (2009), otherwise known as the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law,
Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity, sec. 15(d); Republic Act No. 7600 (1992), as amended by
Republic Act No, 10028 (2010), otherwise known as the Expanded Breastfeeding Promotion Act, sec. 2;
Republic Act No. 10165 (2012), otherwise known as the Foster Care Act, sec. 2; Republic Act No. 10821
(2016), otherwise known as the Children's Emergency Relief and Protection Act, sec. 2; Republic Act No.
11148 (2018), otherwise known as the Kalusugan at Nutrisyon ng Mag-Nanay Act, sec. 3(h); Republic Act No.
11166 (2018), otherwise known as the Philippine HIV and AIDS Policy Act, sec. 3(i); and Republic Act No.
11188 (2019), otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children in Situations of Armed Conflict Act, sec.
2(a).
187
Republic Act No. 7610 (1992), as amended by Republic Act No. 9231 (2003).
188
In re Thornton, 480 Phil. 224 (2004) [Per J. Corona, Third Division]; Perez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil.
1014 (1996) [Per J. Romero, Second Division]; Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals, 554 Phil. 264 (2007) [Per
J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
189
Dela Cruz v. Gracia, 612 Phil. 167 (2009) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Concepcion v. Court of
Appeals, 505 Phil. 529 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
190
Cang v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 129 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division]; In Re Adoption of
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 494 Phil. 515 (2005) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].
191
People v. Udang, Sr., 823 Phil. 411 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division]; People v. Tulagan, G.R. No.
227363, March 12, 2019, < https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65020> [Per J. Peralta,
En Bnac].
192
David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 795 Phil. 529 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
193
Rollo (G.R. No. 208912), pp. 752-753.
194
261 Phil. 542 (1990) [Per J. Paras, En Banc].
195
795 Phil. 529 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
196
Id. at 610.
197
68 Phil. 128 (1939) [Per J. Concepcion, First Division].
198
Id. at 130-131.
199
175 Phil. 64 (1978) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].

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200
261 Phil. 542 (1990) [Per J. Paras, En Banc].
201
G.R. No. 84240, March 25, 1992 [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
202
317 Phil. 568 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].
203
Roxas v. De Jesus, 219 Phil. 216 (1985) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division]; Manuel v. Ferrer, 317 Phil.
568 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].
204
In re Grey, 68 Phil. 128 (1939) [Per J. Concepcion, First Division], citing Manresa, 7 Manresa, 3d ed., p.
110.
205
FAMILY CODE, art. 165 states:

Article 165. Children conceived and bom outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided
in this Code. (n)
206
Philippine Statistics Authority, Marriage in the Philippines, 2016 < https://psa.gov.ph/content/marriage-
philippines-2016> (last accessed on July 23, 2018).
207
Philippine Statistics Authority, Table 1. Number of Marriages and Percent Annual Change, Philippines:
2007-2016, < https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/crd/specialrelease/Table%201.pdf> (last
accessed on December 6, 2021).
208
Philippine Statistics Authority, Marriage in the Philippines, 2016, < https://psa.gov.ph/content/marriage-
philippines-2016> (last accessed on December 6, 2021).
209
See FAMILY CODE, art. 5, which states:

Article 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
210
Philippine Statistics Authority, Births in the Philippines, 2017, available at <
https://psa.gov.ph/content/births-philippines-2017> (last accessed on December 6, 2021).
211
See, for example, People v. Baay, G.R. No. 220143, 810 Phil. 943 (2017) [Per J. Tijam, Third
Division]; People v. Villamor, 780 Phil. 817 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], People v. Buenaflor, 453
Phil. 317 (2003) [Per J. Puno, Third Division]; People v. Pagcu, Jr., 315 Phil. 727 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second
Division]; and People v. Villacampa, 823 Phil. 70 (2018) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
212
See, for example, FAMILY CODE, arts. 43(1), 53, and 54.
213
635 Phil. 136 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
214
Id. at 149-150.
215
Rollo (G.R. No. 208912), pp. 862-863.
216
J. Perlas-Bernabe, Separate Concurring Opinion, p, 12.
217
FAMILY CODE, art. 175 states:

Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
218
FAMILY CODE, art. 172 states:

Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

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In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
219
CIVIL CODE, Book I, Title VIII, Chapter 4, Section 1.
220
424 Phil. 933 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
221
Id. at 940-944.
222
CIVIL CODE, art. 283 states:

Article 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his
natural child:

(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;

(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the

alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;

(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant
is his father.
223
Alabat v. Alabat, 129 Phil. 734 (1967) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc]; Paa v. Chan, 128 Phil.
815 (1967) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
224
Javelona v. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393 (1943) [Per J. Bocobo, First Division].
225
Magallanes v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 795, 798 (1954) [Per C.J. Paras, En Banc].
226
208 Phil. 95 (1983) [Per J. Makasiar, Second Division].
227
Id. at 120-121.
228
107 Phil. 685 (1960) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
229
Agustin v. Court of Appeals, 499 Phil. 307 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
230
DNA EVID. RULE, sec. 3(e). A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC.
231
DNA EVID. RULE, sec. 3 (a).
232
See People v. Adalia, G.R. No. 235990, January 22, 2020, <
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66026> [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].
233
565 Phil. 215 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
234
Id. at 231-232.
235
DNA EVID. RULE, sec. 3(f).
236
Lucas v. Lucas, 665 Phil. 795 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
237
Herrera v. Alba, 499 Phil. 185 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
238
Abella v. Cabanero, 816 Phil. 466 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
239
Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
240
Blanco v. Quasha, 376 Phil. 480, 491 (1999) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

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241
Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 132 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First
Division]; Basilio v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 120 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, Second Division].
242
Rollo (G.R. No. 208912), p. 63.
243
Id. at 54.
244
In re Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay, 635 Phil. 136 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
245
Vieno Voitto Saario, Study of Discrimination against Persons born out of wedlock, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/265/Rev. 1 (1967).
246
United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report Of The Nineteenth Session Of The Sub-Commission
On Prevention Of Discrimination And Protection Of Minorities To The Commission On Human Rights,
E/CN.4/930 (1967).
247
Id. at 59.
248
Id. at 61.
249
See Ruben F. Balane, The Spanish Antecedents of the Philippine Civil Code, 54 PHIL. L.J. 1 (1979).
250
José Manuel de Torres Perea, A Different Approach To The Study Of "Forced Shares" Or "Legitimas",
Based On A Comparative Study Of Spanish And Philippine Succession Law, 2019, available at <
https://revista-estudios.revistas.deusto.es/article/view/1718/2092> (last accessed on December 6, 2021).
251
Id.
252
Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 085, available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-
list/-/conventions/treaty/085/signatures?p_auth=dKU19sxf>.
253
Fabris v. France, European Court of Human Rights, 16574/08, Grand Chamber, 2013.
254
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
255
Id. at 770.
256
Specifically, Republic Act No. 9255, which allowed nonmarital children to use their father's surname.
257
See, for example, CHILD & YOUTH WELFARE CODE, art. 3; Republic Act No. 541 (1950), sec. 2;
Republic Act No. 772 (1952), sec. 8; Republic Act No. 8291 (1997), sec. 2(f); Republic Act No. 10699 (2015),
sec. 7, Republic Act No. 11199 (2019), sec. 8(e)(2); Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
11223 (2019), Rule III, sec. 8.1.b.
258
81 Phil. 149 (1948) [Per J. Bengzon, First Division].
259
Id. at 153-154.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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