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2024 SCC OnLine SC 1899

In the Supreme Court of India

(BEFORE B.V. NAGARATHNA AND AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, JJ.)

Dattatraya … Appellant;
Versus
Sharanappa … Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 3257 of 2024 (@ SLP (Criminal) No. 13179 of
2023)
Decided on August 7, 2024
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Anand Sanjay M Nuli, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Suraj Kaushik, Adv.
Mr. Agam Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Nanda Kumar, Adv.
Ms. Akhila Wali, Adv.
Mr. Shiva Swaroop, Adv.
Mr. Akash Kukreja, Adv.
M/s. Nuli & Nuli, AOR
For Respondent(s) Ms. Supreeta Sharanagouda, AOR
Mr. Sharanagouda Patil, Adv.
Mr. Jyotish Pandey, Adv.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.:— Leave granted.
2. The instant appeal was originally preferred as a petition before
this Court, which is moved against the impugned Judgment dated
03.03.2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 200139 of 2019 by the High Court
of Karnataka at Kalaburagi whereby the learned Single Judge affirmed
the acquittal of the Respondent in Complaint Case No. 468 of 2014
moved for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as “NI Act, 1881”).
3. The factual backdrop giving rise to the present challenge is that
the Appellant is the original complainant who claims to know the sole
Respondent for the last six years and that he had borrowed INR
2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs only) from the Appellant on account of
family necessities and accommodation. Against the said loan the
Respondent issued a cheque bearing No. 015639 which was drawn on
the Bank of India, as a guarantee against repayment. He was to repay
the said loan amount within a period of six months thereof. An
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agreement to this effect was also signed between the parties.

4. However, since the Respondent failed to repay the loan despite
repeated requests, the Appellant presented the concerned cheque for
encashment on 22.10.2013, but nevertheless, as per the Bank Memo
dated 24.10.2013, the cheque was dishonoured on account of
“insufficient funds”.
5. Aggrieved from the said dishonour of cheque, a Demand Notice
dated 31.10.2013 was sent by the Appellant to the Respondent,
whereby, the Counsel on behalf of the Appellant alleged that the
Respondent had intentionally cheated him and had not made any
efforts to discharge his liability. Accordingly, the Respondent was said
to have committed offences punishable under Section 138 of the NI
Act, 1881 and Section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter
referred to as “Penal Code, 1860”).
6. Thereupon, the Respondent moved a Reply Notice dated
11.11.2013 whereby he claimed that the accusations made by the
Appellant are false and bereft of pertinent details of the loan
transaction, inter alia, the date and time of advancement of the said
debt, which as claimed, was never advanced.
7. Unsatisfied with the response of the Respondent through the said
Reply Notice, Appellant moved a Private Complaint No. 991 of 2013
under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as “CrPC 1973”). The said complaint came to be registered
as CC/468/2014 before Judicial Magistrate First Class at Gulbarga. As
part of the proceedings before the Trial Court, the Appellant examined
himself as PW-01, while the Respondent examined himself as DW-01.
However, the latter did not mark any documents from his side. It was
the Respondent's plea that the concerned cheque was issued in favour
of one Mr. Mallikarjun in the year 2012 for security purposes, however,
he did not return the same to the Respondent, and instead had left the
village. While dealing with the said contention, the Trial Court observed
that the Respondent had failed to explain as to how the cheque landed
in the hands of the Appellant, and for what purpose was the cheque
issued to Mr. Mallikarjun.
8. It was also revealed as part of the statement during cross-
examination of the Appellant that the cheque was originally, not given
to the Appellant as security cheque. Instead, the same was allegedly
given to the Appellant after the Respondent had thereby failed to repay
his liability as existing against the Appellant after a period of six
months. The Court further observed that the Agreement marked by the
Appellant to assist his case does not include signature of the
Respondent as against the terms of the agreement, but a signature is
made by the Respondent on the stamp paper itself, and the same is not
sustainable in the eyes of law. The Court also went on to scrutinize the
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Income Tax Returns of the Appellant, from where it was revealed that
the Appellant failed to declare the alleged loan transaction as part of his
returns to the Income Tax Department. Accordingly, vide its Judgment
dated 18.10.2019, the Trial Court adjudicated in favour of the
Respondent, resultantly dismissing the complaint moved by the
Appellant and acquitting the Respondent.
9. Aggrieved by the decision of Trial Court, the Appellant moved the
High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal No. 200139 of 2019, which
went on to observe that, admittedly, there was a contradiction in the
statement of the Appellant as to when the cheque was issued in his
favour. Furthermore, as was laid down in the decision of this Court in
1
Rangappa v. Sri Mohan , the presumption under Section 139 of the NI
Act, 1881 is a rebuttable one. The contention of the Respondent as to
the financial capacity of the Appellant to grant a loan in his favour was
to be discharged by him, and being unable to do so, it shall be
presumed that a loan transaction had not taken place. Accordingly, the
findings of the Trial Court were affirmed in the impugned Judgment
dated 03.03.2023.
10. The Appellant has thereupon moved this Court in challenge to
the said impugned judgment on the grounds that as the signature on
the concerned cheque was admitted by the Respondent, the Appellant
was able to successfully raise a presumption under Section 139 of the
NI Act, 1881 and as per the submissions of the Respondent, he had
failed to rebut the said presumption. He also put forth that the reliance
on the decision in Rangappa (supra) by the High Court was misplaced,
and even going by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, the
Respondent failed to discharge his onus.
11. Having heard the learned Senior Advocate for the Appellant as
well as the learned Counsel on behalf of the Respondent, it is
imperative to deliberate over the position of law apropos the applicable
provisions of the NI Act, 1881, and others, if any.
12. Earlier, a case of dishonour of a cheque was dealt through
provisions of Section 420 read with Section 415 of the Penal Code,
1860. To enhance the acceptability of cheques as well as to provide for
adequate safeguards to prevent harassment of honest drawers through
painting the liability arising out of dishonour of a cheque with a
punitive brush, an amendment to the NI Act, 1881 was brought about
by introducing Chapter VIII. Thence, seeking to promote credibility in
transactions through the medium of banking channels and operations
as well as their efficacy. Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 is reproduced
below as:
“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in
the account.
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Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained

by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to
another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole
or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank
unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the
credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it
exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an
agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to
have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other
provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may be extended to two years', or with fine which may extend
to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply
unless—
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of
six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the
period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the
case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said
amount of money by giving a notice; in writing, to the drawer
of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information
by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as
unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the
said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to
the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of
the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt of other
liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.”
13. This Court in ICDS Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer2, has held that
proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 can be initiated
even if the cheque was originally issued as security and was
subsequently dishonoured owing to insufficient funds. The failure to
honour the concerned cheque is per se deemed as a commission of an
offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881.
14. The NI Act, 1881 enlists three essential conditions that ought to
be fulfilled before the said provision of law can be invoked. Firstly, the
cheque ought to have been presented within the period of its validity.
Secondly, a demand of payment ought to have been made by the
presenter of the cheque to the issuer, and lastly, the drawer ought to
have had failed to pay the amount within a period of 15 days of the
receipt of the demand. These principles and pre-requisites stand well
established through Judgment of this Court in Sadanandan Bhadran v.
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3
Madhavan Sunil Kumar . There is an explicit limitation of 30 days,
beginning from period when the cause of action arose, prescribed by
the statute vide Section 142(b) of the NI Act, 1881 to initiate
proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881.
15. Furthermore, this Court expounded that the issuance of cheque
towards a liability, the presentation of the cheque within the prescribed
period, its return on account of dishonour, notice to the accused, and
failure to pay within 15 days thereof, stand as sine qua non for an
offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 as per the decision in K.
4
Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan . The same was subsequently
reiterated in numerous judgments of this Court as well as that of the
High Courts.
16. While referring to the period of limitation of one month of filing a
complaint for the purpose of Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881, the same
is to begin after the drawer of the cheque has failed to discharge his
liability to the presenter within the prescribed period of 15 days as per
the Proviso (c) to Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881. A co-joint reading of
Sections 138 and 142 of the NI Act, 1881 makes it clear that the cause
of action only arises after the failure of the drawer to pay, subsequent
to the receipt of the notice, and the complainant is restricted from
initiating multiple complaints against the concerned drawer at different
stages contemplated prior.
17. Furthermore, in light of such object encapsulated in the
Amendment to Chapter VIII, the Parliament by virtue of Section 143 of
the NI Act, 1881 prescribed procedure of summary trial enlisted in
provisions of Sections 260 to 265 of the CrPC 1973 to be adopted
during proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881. Therefore, it
can be observed that the court shall adopt a liberal approach with
regard to attendance of an accused person and until an accused's
presence is indispensable, a court can allow for an exemption, in case
of existence of any exceptional circumstances. Moreover, issuance of a
nonbailable warrant in case of absence of the accused, at the first
instance, shall, due to any circumstance, be avoided.
18. As the presumption contemplated by virtue of Section 118 of the
NI Act, 1881 entails, Section 139 was similarly introduced to provide
for a presumption that the holder of cheque had received the concerned
issued cheque towards discharging of the liability of the drawer, either
in whole or in part. Therefore, at this juncture, it is ideal to make a
reference to Section 118 of the NI Act, 1881, which is reproduced as:
“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments
Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be
made:—
(a) of consideration:—that every negotiable instrument was made
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or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument,

when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred,
was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for
consideration;
(b) as to date:—that every negotiable instrument bearing a date
was made or drawn on such date;
(c) as to time of acceptance:—that every accepted bill of
exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date
and before its maturity;
(d) as to time of transfer:—that every transfer of a negotiable
instrument was made before its maturity;
(e) as to order of indorsements:—that the indorsements
appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the
order in which they appear then on;
(f) as to stamp:— that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or
cheque was duly stamped;
(g) that holder is a holder in due course:—that the holder of a
negotiable instrument is a holder in due course : provided that,
where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner,
or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an
offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or
acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for
unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is
a holder in due course lies upon him.”
Chapter XIII of the NI Act, 1881, of which Section 118 is a part, lays
down special rules for evidence to be adduced within the scheme of the
Act herein. As the text of the said provision showcases, it raises a
rebuttable presumption as against the drawer to the extent that the
concerned negotiable instrument was drawn and subsequently
accepted, indorsed, negotiated, or transferred for an existing
consideration, and the date so designated on such an instrument is the
date when the concerned negotiable instrument was drawn. It is also
further presumed that the same was transferred before its maturity and
that the order in which multiple indorsements appear on such an
instrument, that is the deemed order thereon. Lastly, the holder of a
negotiable instrument is one in its due course, subject to a situation
where the concerned instrument while being obtained from a lawful
owner and from his or her lawful custody thereof through undertaking
of an offence as contemplated under any statute or through the means
of fraud, the burden to prove him or her being a holder in due course,
instead, lies upon such a holder.
19. Accordingly, to begin with, the bare provision of Section 139 of
the NI Act, 1881 is reproduced herein below:
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“139. Presumption in favour of holder—It shall be presumed,

unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received
the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge,
in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.”
The aforesaid presumption entails an obligation on the court
conducting the trial for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act,
1881 to presume that the cheque in question was issued by the drawer
or accused for the discharge of a particular liability. The use of
expression “shall presume” ameliorates the conundrum pertaining to
the right of the accused to present evidence for the purpose of
rebutting the said presumption. Furthermore, the effect of such
presumption is that, upon filing of the complaint along with relevant
documents, thereby prima facie establishing the case against the
drawer, the onus of proof shifts on the drawer or accused to adduce
cogent material and evidence for rebutting the said presumption, and
5
as established in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat , based on
preponderance of probabilities.
20. While describing the offence envisaged under Section 138 of the
NI Act, 1881 as a regulatory offence for largely being in the nature of a
civil wrong with its impact confined to private parties within commercial
transactions, the 3-Judge Bench in the decision of Rangappa (supra)
highlighted Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881 to be an example of a
reverse onus clause. This is done so, as the Court expounds, in the light
of Parliament's intent, which can be culled out from the peculiar placing
of act of dishonour of cheque in a statute having criminal overtones.
The underlying object of such deliberate placement is to inject and
enhance credibility of negotiable instruments. Additionally, the reverse
onus clause serves as an indispensable “device to prevent undue delay
in the course of litigation”. While acknowledging the test of
proportionality and having laid the interpretation of Section 139 of the
NI Act, 1881 hereof, it was further held that an accused cannot be
obligated to rebut the said presumption through an unduly high
standard of proof. This is in light of the observations laid down by a co-
6
ordinate Bench in Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee , whereby it
was clarified that the rebuttal ought not to be undertaken conclusively
by an accused, which is reiterated as follows:
“23. In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis
of a presumption of law exist, no discretion is left with the court but
to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the
person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and
proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when,
‘after considering the matters before it, the court either
believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a
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prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular

case, to act upon the supposition that it exists’ [Section 3,
Evidence Act].
Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively
established but such evidence must be adduced before the court in
support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence
to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the
standard of reasonability being that of the ‘prudent man’.”
Therefore, it may be said that the liability of the defence in cases
under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 is not that of proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt.
21. In light of the aforesaid discussion, and as underscored by this
7
Court recently in the decision of Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh , an accused
may establish non-existence of a debt or liability either through
conclusive evidence that the concerned cheque was not issued towards
the presumed debt or liability, or through adduction of circumstantial
evidence vide standard of preponderance of probabilities.
22. Since a presumption only enables the holder to show a prima
facie case, it can only survive before a court of law subject to contrary
not having been proved to the effect that a cheque or negotiable
instrument was not issued for a consideration or for discharge of any
existing or future debt or liability. In this backdrop, it is pertinent to
make a reference to a decision of 3-Judge Bench in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
8
Kumar , which went on to hold that if a signature on a blank cheque
stands admitted to having been inscribed voluntarily, it is sufficient to
trigger a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881, even if
there is no admission to the effect of execution of entire contents in the
cheque.
23. It is therefore apposite to make a reference to the provision of
Section 140 of the NI Act, 1881, which ruminates mens rea to be
immaterial while dealing with proceedings under Section 138 of the NI
Act, 1881. The said legislative wisdom of the Parliament which is
imbibed in the bare text of the provision is reproduced as below:
“140. Defence which may not be allowed in any prosecution
under section 138—It shall not be a defence in a prosecution for an
offence under section 138 that the drawer had no reason to believe
when he issued the cheque that the cheque may be dishonoured on
presentment for the reasons stated in that section.”
24. Through this legal fiction adopted by the legislature vide
Amendment Act of 1988 to the NI Act, 1881 it has barred the drawer of
a cheque, which was dishonoured, to take a defence that at the time of
issuance of the cheque in question he or she had no reason to believe
that the same will be dishonoured upon being presented by the holder
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of such a cheque, especially and specifically for the reasons underlined

in Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881.
25. A comprehensive reference to the Sections 118, 139 and 140 of
the NI Act, 1881 gives birth to a deemed fiction which was also
articulated by this Court in K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan9 as follows:
“Under section 118, unless the contrary was proved, it is to be
presumed that the negotiable instrument (including a cheque) had
been made or drawn for consideration. Under section 139 the court
has to presume, unless the contrary was proved, that the holder of
the cheque received the cheque for discharge, in whole or in part, of
a debt or liability. Thus, in complaints under section 138, the court
has to presume that the cheque had been issued for a debtor's
liability. This presumption is rebuttable. However, the burden of
proving that a cheque had not been issued for a debt or liability is on
the accused. The Supreme Court in the case of Hiten P. Dalal v.
Bratindranath Banerjee has also taken an identical view.”
26. Furthermore, on the aspect of adducing evidence for rebuttal of
the aforesaid statutory presumption, it is pertinent to cumulatively read
the decisions of this Court in Rangappa (supra) and Rajesh Jain (supra)
which would go on to clarify that accused can undoubtedly place
reliance on the materials adduced by the complainant, which would
include not only the complainant's version in the original complaint, but
also the case in the legal or demand notice, complainant's case at the
trial, as also the plea of the accused in the reply notice, his Section 313
CrPC 1973 statement or at the trial as to the circumstances under
which the promissory note or cheque was executed. The accused ought
not to adduce any further or new evidence from his end in said
circumstances to rebut the concerned statutory presumption.
27. Applying the aforementioned legal position to the present factual
matrix, it is apparent that there existed a contradiction in the complaint
moved by the Appellant as against his cross-examination relatable to
the time of presentation of the cheque by the Respondent as per the
statements of the Appellant. This is to the effect that while the
Appellant claimed the cheque to have been issued at the time of
advancing of the loan as a security, however, as per his statement
during the cross-examination it was revealed that the same was
presented when an alleged demand for repayment of alleged loan
amount was raised before the Respondent, after a period of six months
of advancement. Furthermore, there was no financial capacity or
acknowledgement in his Income Tax Returns by the Appellant to the
effect of having advanced a loan to the Respondent. Even further the
Appellant has not been able to showcase as to when the said loan was
advanced in favour of the Respondent nor has he been able to explain
as to how a cheque issued by the Respondent allegedly in favour of Mr.
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Mallikarjun landed in the hands of the instant holder, that is, the
Appellant.
28. Admittedly, the Appellant was able to establish that the
signature on the cheque in question was of the Respondent and in
regard to the decision of this Court in Bir Singh (supra), a presumption
is to ideally arise. However, in the above referred context of the factual
matrix, the inability of the Appellant to put forth the details of the loan
advanced, and his contradictory statements, the ratio therein would not
impact the present case to the effect of giving rise to the statutory
presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881. The Respondent
has been able to shift the weight of the scales of justice in his favour
through the preponderance of probabilities.
29. The Trial Court had rightly observed that the Appellant was not
able to plead even a valid existence of a legally recoverable debt as the
very issuance of cheque is dubious based on the fallacies and
contradictions in the evidence adduced by the parties. Furthermore, the
fact that the Respondent had inscribed his signature on the agreement
drawn on a white paper and not on a stamp paper as presented by the
Appellant, creates another set of doubt in the case. Since the accused
has been able to cast a shadow of doubt on the case presented by the
Appellant, he has therefore successfully rebutted the presumption
stipulated by Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881.
30. Moreover, affirming the findings of the Trial Court, the High
Court observed that while the signature of the Respondent on the
cheque drawn by him as well as on the agreement between the parties
herein stands admitted, in case where the concern of financial capacity
of the creditor is raised on behalf of an accused, the same is to be
discharged by the complainant through leading of cogent evidence.
31. The instant case pertains to challenge against concurrent
findings of fact favouring the acquittal of the respondent, it would be
cogent to delve into an analysis of the principles underlining the
exercise of power to adjudicate a challenge against acquittal bolstered
by concurrent findings. The following broad principles can be culled out
after a comprehensive analysis of judicial pronouncements:
i) Criminal jurisprudence emphasises on the fundamental essence of
liberty and presumption of innocence unless proven guilty. This
presumption gets emboldened by virtue of concurrent findings of
acquittal. Therefore, this court must be extra-cautious while
dealing with a challenge against acquittal as the said presumption
gets reinforced by virtue of a well-reasoned favourable outcome.
Consequently, the onus on the prosecution side becomes more
burdensome pursuant to the said double presumption.
ii) In case of concurrent findings of acquittal, this Court would
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ordinarily not interfere with such view considering the principle of

liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, unless
perversity is blatantly forthcoming and there are compelling
reasons.
iii) Where two views are possible, then this Court would not
ordinarily interfere and reverse the concurrent findings of
acquittal. However, where the situation is such that the only
conclusion which could be arrived at from a comprehensive
appraisal of evidence, shows that there has been a grave
miscarriage of justice, then, notwithstanding such concurrent
view, this Court would not restrict itself to adopt an oppugnant
view. [Vide State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dan Singh10]
iv) To adjudge whether the concurrent findings of acquittal are
‘perverse’ it is to be seen whether there has been failure of
justice. This Court in Babu v. State of Kerala11 clarified the ambit
of the term ‘perversity’ as
“if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding
relevant material or by taking into consideration
irrelevant/admissible material. The finding may also be said to
be perverse if it is ‘against the weight of evidence’, or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality.”
v) In situations of concurrent findings favoring accused, interference
is required where the trial court adopted an incorrect approach in
framing of an issue of fact and the appellate court whilst affirming
the view of the trial court, lacked in appreciating the evidence
produced by the accused in rebutting a legal presumption. [Vide
Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh12]
vi) Furthermore, such interference is necessitated to safeguard
interests of justice when the acquittal is based on some irrelevant
grounds or fallacies in re-appreciation of any fundamental
evidentiary material or a manifest error of law or in cases of non-
adherence to the principles of natural justice or the decision is
manifestly unjust or where an acquittal which is fundamentally
based on an exaggerated adherence to the principle of granting
benefit of doubt to the accused, is liable to be set aside. Say in
cases where the court severed the connection between accused
and criminality committed by him upon a cursory examination of
evidences. [Vide State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh13 and Rajesh
14
Prasad v. State of Bihar ]
32. Upon perusal of the aforementioned principles and applying
them to the facts and circumstances of the present matter, it is evident
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that there is no perversity and lack of evidence in the case of the

respondent-accused. The concurrent findings have backing of detailed
appraisal of evidences and facts, therefore, do not warrant interference
in light of above enlisted principles. In a similar set of facts as in the
present case, involving criminal liability arising out of dishonour of
15
cheque, this Court in Rajco Steel Enterprises v. Kavita Saraff dejected
from reversing the concurrent findings of acquittal of accused therein
and underscored the principle of non-interference, unless such findings
are perverse or bereft of evidentiary corroboration or lacks question of
law.
33. In furtherance of the aforesaid principles and the reasons
ascribed thereof, the present challenge to the aforesaid impugned
judgment dated 03.03.2023 by the High Court of Karnataka at
Kalaburagi is bereft of any merits and does not call for any interference
of this court.
34. The instant appeal is dismissed and the findings of the High
Court in the impugned judgment dated 03.03.2023 are affirmed.
35. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
———
1
(2010) 11 SCC 441.

2
(2002) 6 SCC 426.

3
(1998) 6 SCC 514.

4
(1999) 7 SCC 510.

5
(2012) 13 SCC 375.

6
(2001) 6 SCC 16.

7
(2023) 10 SCC 148.

8
(2019) 4 SCC 197.

9
(2001) 8 SCC 458.

10
(1997) 3 SCC 747.

11
(2010) 9 SCC 189.

12
(2023) 10 SCC 148.

13
(2024) 4 SCC 469.

14
(2022) 3 SCC 471.
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15
2024 SCC OnLine SC 518.

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