sustainability

Article
Towards Resilient Civil Infrastructure Asset
Management: An Information Elicitation and
Analytical Framework
Yifan Yang 1 , S. Thomas Ng 1, *, Frank J. Xu 1,2,3 , Martin Skitmore 4 and Shenghua Zhou 1
1 Department of Civil Engineering, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong
2 Xiaoxiang Research Institute of Big Data, Changsha 410000, China
3 College of Mathematics and Econometrics, Hunan University, Changsha 410082, China
4 School of Civil Engineering and Built Environment, Queensland University of Technology,
Brisbane Q4001, Australia
* Correspondence: tstng@[Link]




Received: 27 July 2019; Accepted: 15 August 2019; Published: 16 August 2019


Abstract: It is rather difficult for the stakeholders to understand and implement the resilience
concept and principles in the infrastructure asset management paradigm, as it demands quality data,
holistic information integration and competent data analytics capabilities to identify infrastructure
vulnerabilities, evaluate and predict infrastructure adaptabilities to different hazards, as well as to
make damage restoration and resilience improvement strategies and plans. To meet the stakeholder’s
urgent needs, this paper proposes an information elicitation and analytical framework for resilient
infrastructure asset management. The framework is devised by leveraging the best practices
and processes of integrated infrastructure asset management and resilience management in the
literature, synergizing the common elements and critical concepts of the two paradigms, ingesting the
state-of-the-art interconnected infrastructure systems resilience analytical approaches, and eliciting
expert judgments to iteratively improve the derived framework. To facilitate the stakeholders in
implementing the framework, two use case studies are given in this paper, depicting the detailed
workflow for information integration and resilience analytics in infrastructure asset management.
The derived framework is expected to provide an operational basis to the quantitative resilience
management of civil infrastructure assets, which could also be used to enhance community resilience.

Keywords: resilience management; infrastructure asset management; information elicitation;

analytical framework

1. Introduction
Currently, civil infrastructure systems are facing unprecedented challenges ranging from ageing
assets, limited maintenance budget, surging facility usage to society’s outcry for quality services and
natural hazards due to climate change [1]. The growing interdependencies and interconnectedness
have exacerbated the difficulties and complexities of managing and operating these systems, risk
governances, and particularly of improving their capacity, reliability, and sustainability against climate
change, natural disaster, adverse events, or man-made threats. There have been myriad theories,
models, tools, processes and frameworks related to infrastructure asset management (IAM), resilience
management (RM), system reliability and vulnerability analysis, risk management, and emergency
and disaster management [2,3]. However, it is still a daunting task for the stakeholders to use them
effectively in making resilience improvement strategy, developing tactical and operational plans,
monitoring execution, and optimizing performance. There is an urgent need for a synthesized
framework for integrated resilient IAM, as existing research and practices mainly focus on coping with

Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439; doi:10.3390/su11164439 [Link]/journal/sustainability

Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 2 of 24

limited specified hazards and processes, and using them in an isolated manner by decision-makers
from different disciplines could lead to unintended and inconsistent results. The framework needs to
be capable of articulating the explicit inputs for the resilience analysis of infrastructure systems under
different adverse event scenarios (e.g., acute service disruptions, chronic stress like ageing issues, and
uncertain natural hazards); supporting different RM processes (e.g., pre-event mitigation and post-event
recovery), incorporating good engineering practices (e.g., resilience engineering by Hollnagel and
others) [4,5]; and integrating with various quantitative modeling approaches and qualitative analysis
methods, such as a system-theoretic accident model and process (STAMP), functional resonance
analysis method (FRAM), and resilience analysis grid (RAG) methods.
In response, this paper develops an information elicitation and analytical framework for resilient
inter-networked infrastructure asset management (RIAM). The framework comprises two components:
Asset information elicitation and resilience analytical workflow. The asset information elicitation
describes what types of data are required for RM, e.g., infrastructure asset configuration and condition
data, community characteristics, hazards and disruption profiles, and infrastructure performance
metrics. The resilience analytical workflow depicts the detailed steps for analyzing the resistant and
absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and recoverability of interdependent infrastructure systems. The
framework is designed in a modular manner; different stakeholders can reuse, replace, or implement
any of its sub processes according to their data availability, analytics capability, and unique business
objectives. Two general cases are presented to illustrate the applicability of the proposed framework,
which can guide soliciting and organizing information and for analyzing the resilience of community
infrastructures by a community manager. The framework is effective in assembling and aggregating
the fragmented and diverse infrastructure data source. Besides, flexible decision-making analysis
models can also be configured, integrated, or developed to carry out resilience analyses at different
temporal and spatial scales and in corresponding real or speculated hazard scenarios. The study
contributes to the integration of domain knowledge from diverse disciplines to make maximum use of
existing theories, models, and frameworks to facilitate RIAM, and provides an operational approach to
the RM of civil infrastructure systems, which could also be used to enhance community resilience.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews core data source and
analytical capabilities in IAM, RM related concepts, theories, and processes, and investigates the
synergy between IAM and RM. Section 3 briefly introduces the methodology adopted in this research.
Section 4 details the information elicitation and the analytical framework. A brief validation is
presented in Section 5. Two typical use cases are presented in Section 6. Finally, conclusions, the
study’s implications, and directions for future research are given in Section 7.

2. Background

2.1. Core Data Sources and Analytical Capabilities in Infrastructure Asset Management (IAM)
Infrastructure asset management (IAM) is defined as a series of coordinated activities in
organizations to achieve the predefined level of services through cost-effectively managing their
infrastructure assets. Great efforts have been made to standardize the IAM process in terms of
information and process integration, and cross-sector coordination to avoid functionality fragmentation
and information “silos”, which would affect the effectiveness of communication and coordination across
different infrastructure system owners or operators when joint decisions pertinent to sustainable and
resilient infrastructure are made. Notably, the authors have devised an integrated infrastructure asset
management framework to structure associated sub-processes such as asset inventory management,
condition monitoring, performance assessment, criticality identification/vulnerability analysis and
rehabilitation, and renewal and capital improvement to facilitate consistent and effective IAM practice
within and between organizations [6].
Emerging information and communication technologies (ICT) serve as important catalysts to
transform the practices of infrastructure asset management (IAM) since a large amount of timely
 Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 3 of 24

Sustainability 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 3 of 26

data would enable informed decision-making. Ironically, adopting cutting-edge technologies has
led agencies to collect abundant data and create vast databases, which have not always been useful
95 would enable informed decision-making. Ironically, adopting cutting-edge technologies has led
96 oragencies
necessary for supporting
to collect abundantthe decision-making
data process. This
and create vast databases, implies
which have that in many
not always cases,
been theor
useful data
97 collection
necessary for supporting the decision-making process. This implies that in many cases, the data in
activities have not been designed specifically to support the decision process inherent
98 asset management.
collection activitiesIthave
is thus
not both
been effective
designedand pragmatic
specifically to link data
to support collection
the decision policies,
process standards,
inherent in
99 and practices
asset to theirItasset
management. management
is thus both effective decision-making
and pragmatic toprocesses, especiallypolicies,
link data collection for project selection.
standards,
100 Ideally, analytical
and practices capabilities
to their of infrastructure
asset management asset management
decision-making should
processes, be elaborated
especially andselection.
for project predefined
101 inIdeally,
advanceanalytical
of data collecting
capabilitiespractice. Figure 1 outlines
of infrastructure the core datashould
asset management sources, be enabling
elaborated tools
andand
102 mainly analytical
predefined capabilities
in advance proposed
of data collecting forpractice.
IAM, which
Figure follows an “Input–Process–Output”
1 outlines the core data sources, enabling principle.
103 tools and
“Input” mainlythe
denotes analytical capabilities
core asset data used proposed for IAM,
for further whichby
analysis follows an “Input–Process–Output”
enabling tools. “Output” indicates
104 principle. “Input” denotes the core asset data used for further
the expected outcomes for strategic decision-making encompassing identified needs analysis by enabling [Link]
“Output”
solutions,
105 evaluated the expected
indicatesoptions outcomes for
and investment strategic
versus decision-making
performance tradeoff encompassing
results. “Process” identified needsdetailed
represents and
106 solutions,
analytical evaluatedIAM
capabilities options and investment
may equip versus performance
with. The peripheral tradeoff results.
portion of “Analytical “Process”
capabilities for IIAM”
107 represents
modules detailed
in Figure analytical capabilities
1 constitutes performance IAM may equip
tradeoffs [Link]
within The peripheral portioninvestment
for different of “Analyticallevels.
108 capabilities for IIAM” modules in Figure 1 constitutes performance
While the inner parts of the analysis module represent those performance tradeoffs acrosstradeoffs within programs for
programs
109 fordifferent
differentinvestment levels. While the inner parts of the analysis module represent those performance
investment levels. Regardless of within- and across-program analysis, all the analytical
110 tradeoffs across programs for different investment levels. Regardless of within- and across-program
functions accommodate the two convergent characteristics of IAM analytics: 1) Measure the level of
111 analysis, all the analytical functions accommodate the two convergent characteristics of IAM
“performance enhancement” when asset management improvement strategies are implemented; 2)
112 analytics: 1) Measure the level of “performance enhancement” when asset management
tradeoff analysis when allocating limited funds. Further analytics should be well suited to helping with
113 improvement strategies are implemented; 2) tradeoff analysis when allocating limited funds. Further
decisions that cross the boundaries of asset types (e.g., pavement versus bridge), mode (e.g., highway
114 analytics should be well suited to helping with decisions that cross the boundaries of asset types (e.g.,
115 versus transit),
pavement workbridge),
versus class (e.g., maintenance,
mode operations,
(e.g., highway versusortransit),
capital),work
and objective (e.g.,
class (e.g., safety, quality,
maintenance,
116 preservation,
operations, or capital), and objective (e.g., safety, quality, preservation, or mobility). It isobjectives
or mobility). It is worth noting that since different programs adopt different worth
117 and performance
noting measures,
us formulating commonthusmeasures
formulating common measures
for comparison for comparison is imperative.
is imperative.
118
▪Determine the average
▪Conduct tradeoff analysis ▪Assess the current
annual expenditure
between routine performance versus target
required to fulfill a target
Analytical Capabilities for IIAM maintenance and capital or projected performance
performance within a
investment allocation. given investment levels.
selected timeframe.

▪Verify the cost efficiency

of different preventive ▪Identify packages of projects of different types that may have synergistic effects (viz. ▪Integrate customer
versus deferred/corrective interdependency effects) to achieve highest long-term benefit and cost savings (e.g. satisfaction and priorities
maintenance policies in a corridor upgrade). with engineering
given service timeframe. decisions.
▪Conduct marginal analysis to determine where the marginal dollar should go given a set
of candidate pavement/bridge/safety/quality/prevention projects.

▪Fine-tune alternative ▪Implement what-if analysis to understand system outcomes considering investment allocation
work packaging and across different asset types; ownership, schemes of administrative or funding responsibility; ▪Evaluate the effects of
scheduling options for functional systems; classes of facilities; corridors; portions of network and geographic areas. work zones on social and
project arrangement. environment perspectives.

▪Forecast condition-based ▪Estimate agency and

▪Adopt deterioration
life-extension outcomes user costs, social and
curves to model changes
from different levels of environmental impacts as
in service life or specified
maintenance function of deteriorating
performance indicator.
expenditures. assets.

Core data source for IIAM

Enabling tools for IIAM

▪ Geography and standard location referencing ▪ Service life and deterioration models
▪ Asset inventory ▪Needs and solutions ▪ Life-cycle cost analysis (LCCA)
▪ Operation information ▪ Cost/benefit analysis (CBA)
▪ Inspection information ▪ Probabilistic-based risk analysis
▪ Maintenance, rehabilitation and renewal (MRR) ▪ Heuristic needs simulation
history ▪ multi-objective optimization/multi-criteria
▪ Programmed work decision analysis (MCDA)
▪Investment versus ▪ GIS query and analysis tools
▪Evaluation of
performance ▪ Database query and reporting tools
options
tradeoffs

Legend A-Performance
tradeoffs within programs
Output for Decision Making Legend B-Performance tradeoffs across
for different investment
levels programs for different investment levels
119
120 Figure1.1. Core
Figure Core data
data sources,
sources, enabling
enabling tools
tools and
andanalytical
analyticalcapabilities
capabilitiesforforinfrastructure asset
infrastructure asset
121 management(IAM),
management (IAM), summarized
summarized by authors
by the the authors with reference
with reference to the
to the IAM IAM standards
standards and
and specifications
122 specifications
listed listed inwork
in our previous our previous
[6]. work [6].

123 2.2. Resilience Related Concepts

Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 4 of 24

2.2. Resilience Related Concepts

Resilience-related concepts and practices appear to be imperative recently since ageing problems,
and frequent and severe natural hazards as well as antagonistic man-made accidents collectively stress
the infrastructure systems in both the short- and long-term timeframe. Resilience received its first
fundamental definition in the ecological domain, thus called ecological resilience [7], concentrating
on the dynamic attribute of system equilibrium rather than the sole steady state. This type of
resilience could potentially apply to socio-economic systems. Comparably, engineering resilience
emphasizes stability near one equilibrium state, in which capabilities of resistance to disturbance
and speed of return are adopted to measure resilience property [8]. Besides ecological resilience
versus engineering resilience, static resilience vs. dynamic resilience is another pairwise of concepts
worthy to be distinguished. Static resilience is the ability of a system to maintain function when
shocked, which focuses on the resistance capability of a certain system. While dynamic resilience
considers speeding up the recovery process to re-attain the desired state, which highlight the restoration
capacity of one system [9]. The above two pairs of concepts (viz. ecological vs. engineering resilience
and static vs. dynamic resilience) are the most elementary and acceptable that many subsequent
derivative definitions could be found [10]. It is inevitable that overlaps would exist when so many
resilience-related concepts prevail in research, so it would be beneficial and indispensable to draw
relatively identifiable boundaries between concepts such as risk, reliability, vulnerability, robustness,
resilience, etc.
Table 1 summarizes the main attributes of these resilience related concepts.

Table 1. Clarification of resilience-related concepts.

Concepts Main Attributes

- Four typical questions: “What can happen? How likely is that? What are the consequences?
What can be done with it?”
- Risk scenario as a “triplet”: A scenario description, the probability, and the consequences
Risk (measure of damage) [11]
- Risk is conceptualized as all the set of possible such as the “triplet” [12]
- Typically focus on identifying hazards or threats to the system and the likelihood of scenarios
occurring
-”The probability of a device performing its purpose adequately for a timeframe intended
under the operating conditions encountered” [13], with no focus on the inherent ability to
survive and recover from failure [14]
Reliability
- Appropriate for high frequency–low impact events [15]
- Applicable to component level, system level, and “system of systems” level
-”The susceptibility of the system or any of its constituents to harmful external pressures”
[16,17]
Vulnerability - Appropriate for low frequency–high impact events
- Vulnerability analysis focus on the consequences that arise given system failures and not on
the likelihood of the various hazardous events [18]
- “No performance loss is allowed in the case of robustness” [14,19,20]
Robustness - Appropriate for high (or medium) frequency–moderate impact events
- Normally treat as an alternative mitigation strategy when vulnerability is regarded as
unacceptable
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 5 of 24

Table 1. Cont.

Concepts Main Attributes

- Ecological resilience [7] vs. engineering resilience [8]
- Static resilience vs. dynamic resilience [9,21]
-”Emphasize response of system, its elasticity or capacity to rebound after a shock, indicated
by the degree of flexibility, persistence of key functions, or ability to transform” [16,22]
Resilience2019, 11,
Sustainability -”Ax resilient
FOR PEER system may permit a (sometimes temporary) performance loss in “bouncing 5back”
REVIEW of 26
from the adverse event” [14,19]
- Normally treat
- Appropriate foraslow
an frequency–high
alternative mitigation strategy when vulnerability is regarded
impact events
as unacceptable
- More appropriate for system and “system of systems” level
- Normally treat as an alternative mitigation strategy when vulnerability is regarded as
unacceptablethe main attributes of these resilience related concepts. For specific
Table 1 summarizes
clarification, Figure 2 (a) illustrates schematically the distinction between reliability and vulnerability.
The horizontal
For specificaxis representsFigure
clarification, the increasing severity
2a illustrates of consequence
schematically and thebetween
the distinction vertical reliability
axis indicatesand
the cumulative probability of scenarios with consequence greater than a predefined
vulnerability. The horizontal axis represents the increasing severity of consequence and the vertical level. In the
occurrence
axis indicates of the
“low frequency–high
cumulative impact”
probability events,with
of scenarios vulnerability
consequence theory is more
greater than appropriate
a predefined to be
level.
leveraged for further decision-making. While when encountering “high frequency–low
In the occurrence of “low frequency–high impact” events, vulnerability theory is more appropriate to be impact”
events,
leveraged reliability
for further theory is more suitable
decision-making. Whilesince
whenwe base it on “high
encountering statistical estimates with
frequency–low abundant
impact” events,
empirical
reliability data
theory about frequencies
is more and consequences.
suitable since Additionally,
we base it on statistical antagonistic
estimates attacks empirical
with abundant are genuinelydata
challenging to predict both with respect to frequency and location as compared
about frequencies and consequences. Additionally, antagonistic attacks are genuinely challenging to natural threats andto
technical and human-error failures for which it is possible to collect statistics
predict both with respect to frequency and location as compared to natural threats and technical and that are beneficial for
prediction
human-error and prevention
failures for which[23].
it isFigure
possible 2 to
(b)collect
outlines the relationship
statistics between
that are beneficial vulnerability,
for prediction and
robustness, and resilience. The curve shape depends on ex ante mitigation, which
prevention [23]. Figure 2b outlines the relationship between vulnerability, robustness, and resilience. leads to reduced
loss of function
The curve shapeand on exon
depends post
exadaptation, which
ante mitigation, generates
which leads atorapid
reducedrecovery
loss ofprocedure.
function and Theonresidual
ex post
system function after disruption indicates the level of robustness. The area between
adaptation, which generates a rapid recovery procedure. The residual system function after disruption the dotted lines
that respectively corresponds to the target performance and reduced performance
indicates the level of robustness. The area between the dotted lines that respectively corresponds to after shock
denotes
the targetconditional
performance vulnerability
and reduced [23,24].
performance after shock denotes conditional vulnerability [23,24].

illustrating the
Figure 2. (a) Risk curve illustrating the distinction
distinction between
between reliability
reliability and
and vulnerability,
vulnerability, by courtesy
of [23];
[23]; and
andthethe(b)(b)resilience
resiliencecurve andand
curve effects of exof
effects ante
ex mitigation and exand
ante mitigation postex
adaptation, by courtesy
post adaptation, by
of [23,24].of [23,24].
courtesy

2.3. Infrastructure Resilience Analysis Frameworks Against Natural Disasters

2.3. Infrastructure Resilience Analysis Frameworks Against Natural Disasters
The ability (of an asset, a system, or an organization) to withstand, adapt to, and recover
The ability (of an asset, a system, or an organization) to withstand, adapt to, and recover from a
from a disruption is generally referred to as resilience [19,25]. It is crucial to quantify resilience
disruption is generally referred to as resilience [19,25]. It is crucial to quantify resilience
systematically through the lens of comparing system performance of interrelated disaster management
systematically through the lens of comparing system performance of interrelated disaster
management sub-processes, viz. mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Current resilience
management (RM) research has moved forward from the conceptual debate to operational
paradigms. In response, many resilience assessment frameworks and toolkits have emerged with
representative studies encompassing the system-theoretic accident model and process (STAMP),
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 6 of 24

sub-processes, viz. mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Current resilience management
(RM) research has moved forward from the conceptual debate to operational paradigms. In response,
many resilience assessment frameworks and toolkits have emerged with representative studies
encompassing the system-theoretic accident model and process (STAMP), functional resonance
analysis method (FRAM), and resilience analysis grid (RAG) methods by Hollnagel, Woods, and
others [4,5,26,27], 4R model [28], four-cornerstone model [4,29], three-stage resilience analysis
framework [30], compositional demand/supply framework (Re-CoDes) [31], and physics-based
framework [32] in order to enlighten the resilience assessment of urban infrastructure systems while
the disaster resilience scorecard for cites [33], baseline resilience indicators for communities (BRIC) [34],
and PEOPLES resilience framework [35] mainly address the community or regional-level disaster
resilience analysis. These frameworks can explain how people deal successfully with unexpected
and unforeseen events, highlighting the steps from work-as-imagined to work-as-done resilience
and even promoting more strategic and tactical control within daily operations. The common
characteristics in terms of representative infrastructure resilience assessment frameworks pertains to
that they address the constrained infrastructure system functionality degradation and rapid recovery
process after the disruption. Detailed analytical sub-processes in these frameworks involve hazard
characterization, infrastructure component fragility modeling, adverse consequences propagating
between interdependent infrastructure systems, restoration strategies planning, etc. These frameworks
are of value to be investigated as we can identify and tease out the themes and processes emphasized
in each framework, which facilitates the reconfiguration of these selected processes in our derived
RIAM framework to reveal the potential interactions between IAM and RM analytical capabilities.

2.4. Synergy of the IAM Process, Resilience Analysis, and Disaster Management
Traditional IAM primarily focuses on the practices of asset operations, asset condition monitoring
and assessment, maintenance and rehabilitation, and capital improvement planning, which generally
assume that the infrastructure systems function as expected under normal conditions. Currently, a
number of regulations and guidelines governing climate change mitigation, natural disasters, and
prevention of man-made incidents have posed new expectations. A broad range of theories and
approaches have been developed for meeting such expectations, including risk management, reliability
engineering, vulnerability system analysis, and system robustness tests [14,22]. The most popular recent
resilience engineering treats infrastructures as systems of systems, considering the effect of component
failures on the performance of interdependent systems or networks. This transforms IAM from an
asset inventory-centric focus to a higher systematic-level discipline-resilient IAM (RIAM) [11,36,37],
where interdependency has become the nexus of IAM and RM due to the growing interconnectedness
of infrastructure systems. From an IAM perspective, failing to understand the interdependency
between and among infrastructure systems can lead to the disarrangement of resources, ineffective
responses and inadequate coordination between agencies and decision-makers. While from a resilience
perspective, interdependency is practically demonstrated by tangible and physical interactions between
systems, which could result in knock-on or ripple effects even from minor component failures.
Ultimately, a synergized holistic landscape of RIAM, as shown in Figure 3, could demystify their
intricate relationships and assemble diverse processes (IAM, risk and reliability analysis, vulnerability
analysis, resilience assessment, and even disaster management). The landscape includes both
pre-disaster processes (e.g., risk and vulnerability analysis) and post-disaster processes (e.g., response
and recovery). Underpinned by these process models, it is possible to identify which concepts (viz.
risk, reliability, vulnerability, and robustness) contribute to which resilience sub-processes. In IAM,
once a large amount of statistical data is accumulated, a risk-based and reliability analysis can be used
for decision-making to deal with certain types of natural hazards [38]. Complementarily, vulnerability
analysis is suitable for less-frequent hazards. Figure 3e articulates the resilience analysis framework’s
three core elements, formulated based on the landscape for resistant, absorptive, and restorative
capability [30,39].
 Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 7 of 24
Sustainability 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 7 of 26

Asset management process Resilience analysis process

Knowing what Knowing what
to look for has happened

Asset Register Knowing what

Knowing what
to expect Monitoring to do Learning
(Critical) (Factual)

(c)
Anticipating Responding
Condition (Potential) (actual)
Monitoring Disruption▪ Chronic stress (viz. infrastructure ageing)

Performance Level
(risk-based and reliability analysis)
▪ Natural hazard
(risk-based and reliability analysis +
vulnerability analysis)
▪ Antagonistic attack
Performance 100% A (Vulnerability analysis) B
Assessment

Risk-based Vulnerability
I
criticality analysis
identification
Response

Disaster Damage Assessment

Preparedness Reaching to prevention propagation and resources Recovery
Rehabilitation & emergency situation (e) mobilization
in short term
Renewal & Capital
0 t0 t1 t2 tE Time
improvement
Mitigation Training civil Minimizing the socio-
(a) defense staffs and economic impacts in Resistant capacity- Absorptive capacity- Restorative capacity-
installing warning the long term described by described by described by
“hazard “maximum impact “recovery time”and
systems
frequency”and level” “recovery cost”
(d) Identifying and “initial damage
Physical Geographic
reducing risks via stage”
infrastructure Recovery
improvement
Cyber Logical

(b)
Interdependency Disaster management process
218
219 Alignmentofofthe
[Link]
Figure theIAM,
IAM,resilience
resilienceanalysis,
analysis,and
anddisaster
disastermanagement
managementprocesses,
processes,with
with(a)
(a)the
the
220 IAM process; (b) interdependency; (c) resilience analysis process (viz. four cornerstones model),
IAM process; (b) interdependency; (c) resilience analysis process (viz. four cornerstones model), by by
courtesy of [5]; (d) disaster management process, by the courtesy of [40]; and (e) different stages and
221 courtesy of [5]; (d) disaster management process, by the courtesy of [40]; and (e) different stages and
corresponding capacities of resilience assessment (viz. three-stage resilience analysis framework), by
222 corresponding capacities of resilience assessment (viz. three-stage resilience analysis framework), by
courtesy of [30].
223 courtesy of [30].

A comprehensive literature review reveals a lack of harmonized framework for the resilient asset
224 A comprehensive literature review reveals a lack of harmonized framework for the resilient asset
management of interdependent infrastructure systems due to the broadness of the resilience related
225 management of interdependent infrastructure systems due to the broadness of the resilience related
concepts and discrepancies between the emphasis in IAM and RM analytical processes. Therefore, to
226 concepts and discrepancies between the emphasis in IAM and RM analytical processes. Therefore, to
cope with the growing complexity of infrastructure systems and uncertain adverse events/hazards, a
227 cope with the growing complexity of infrastructure systems and uncertain adverse events/hazards, a
multi-disciplinary synergistic approach that addresses and coordinates both IAM and RM analytical
228 multi-disciplinary synergistic approach that addresses and coordinates both IAM and RM analytical
requirements is clearly needed for informed decision-making.
229 requirements is clearly needed for informed decision-making.
3. Research Methodology
230 3. Research Methodology
Owing to the exploratory and interpretive nature of this study, qualitative approaches are adopted
231 Owing to the
to investigate theliterature
exploratory and and interpretive
current practices of nature
both ofthethis
IAMstudy, qualitative
processes and RMapproaches
analysis, which are
232 adopted to investigate the literature and current practices of both the IAM
could inform the derivation of the framework. Conforming to the principles of grounded theory, processes and RM analysis,
233 which
which could inform the derivation of the based,
is a “code-concept-category-theory” framework. Conforming
hierarchical, to the principles
and inductive of grounded
research paradigm, code
234 theory, which is a “code-concept-category-theory” based, hierarchical,
source is primarily determinant to validity and authenticity of the formulated framework [41]. and inductive research
Apart
235 paradigm, codefrom
from soliciting sourcethe is primarily
literature, determinant
expert judgments to are
validity and authenticity
also posited as code sourcesof the formulated
to complement
236 framework [41].information
and refine the Apart fromsolicited
solicitingthrough
from the literature,
literature expert
review judgments
process. are alsotoposited
We referred the four aslinked
code
237 sources to complement and refine the information solicited through literature
sequential phases suggested by [42] to elicit the constitutes that experts recommend to be involved review process. We
238 referred to the four
in the induced linked sequential
framework: phases
(1) Structuring andsuggested by [42]
conditioning, in to elicitwe
which thedevelop
constitutes
waysthat experts
to structure
239 recommend
the expert judgments, according to background knowledge that pertains to required information we
to be involved in the induced framework: (1) Structuring and conditioning, in which and
240 develop ways to structure the expert judgments, according to background knowledge
processes for RIAM that we have prepared through literature content analysis; (2) expert interviews, in that pertains
241 to required
which information
we introduce and processes
the basic for RIAM that
concepts summarized fromweliterature
have prepared throughexperts,
to the selected literature
andcontent
identify
242 analysis; (2) expert interviews, in which we introduce the basic concepts
from their remarks in each selected themes the key categories to be addressed in the framework; summarized from literature(3)
243 todata
the synthesis,
selected experts, and identify from their remarks in each selected themes
in which we assemble the results of individual interviews into preliminary checkliststhe key categories to
244 beandaddressed
diagrams; in(4)theinformation
framework;sharing,
(3) datafeedback,
synthesis,and in revision,
which weinassemble the resultsisofconducted
which a workshop individualto
245 interviews into preliminary checklists and diagrams; (4) information sharing, feedback, and revision,
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 8 of 24

allow information sharing among the interviewees, clarify the vagueness and build the consensus, and
update the preliminary results.
It is noteworthy that in the step of structuring and conditioning, related IAM guidelines and reports,
pioneer RM frameworks presented in peer-reviewed journals were examined prior to interviews to
identify preliminary information and analytical requirements. Based on our previous work in [6], we
scrutinized the listed representative IAM standards and specifications to identify the hints for resilience
expectations in these IAM-specific documents. On the other hands, existing resilience assessment
frameworks were also investigated and we rethought the opportunities to incorporate IAM features
in our formulated RIAM framework. This resulted in five themes of interview being designed to
obtain insights into the requested information and analytical capabilities from the perspective of
practitioners, of:
(i) The role of IAM in RIAM, including such sub-topics as asset inventory, condition grading,
criticality identification, and interdependency considerations;
(ii) Vulnerability analysis in infrastructure systems, constituting the network topology, functioning
mechanism, strategies to identify component fragility, system performance degradation, and societal
consequence due to service disruption;
(iii) Delineation of hazards or disruptions, consisting of the frequent hazards encountered by the
community and identified hazard prone areas;
(iv) Restoration of failed components of infrastructure systems, encompassing emergency
management, project scheduling, and strategies for resource prioritization;
(v) Performance metrics for assessing infrastructure resilience, investigating the participants’
opinions concerning the suitable and multi-dimensional selection of performance metrics to evaluate
infrastructure resilience.
Twelve participants were selected by convenience and snowball sampling [43]. Individuals selected
for the interviews were organizational specialists on infrastructure engineering and system performance
or emergency response, or both. Table 2 summarizes their widespread range of profiles—ensuring the
interview results would be representative, generalizable, and referenceable. The interview participants
were asked to highlight the information required for decision-making under each of the five themes.
We asked questions about how the infrastructure systems plan for extreme events, what source of
hazards to be investigated, how to accommodate infrastructure component conditions during the
resilience assessment process, what types of information need to be solicited and aggregated, about
ways to reduce regional vulnerability to interdependencies among infrastructures. Following [44],
valid remarks were then identified from the recorded transcripts and further classified into key
findings. Excerpts of the remarks and key findings are summarized in Table 3. These key findings
were developed into broad patterns, theories, or generalizations to complement the existing literature
and are also addressed in the framework [45].
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 9 of 24

Table 2. Profiles of the interview participants.

Code Infrastructure Sector Institution Position Experience (Work Years)

Government
1 Water-related Assistant Director >10
department
Government
2 Water-related Senior Engineer >5
department
Government
3 Water-related Senior Engineer >5
department
Government
4 Road Chief Engineer >10
department
Government Senior O&M
5 Road >5
department Engineer
Government Senior O&M
6 Road >5
department Engineer
Senior Operation
7 Electricity Service provider >5
Engineer
Senior Operation
8 Electricity Service provider >5
Manager
Senior Electrical and
9 Railway Service provider >5
Mechanical Engineer
Senior Electrical and
10 Railway Service provider >5
Mechanical Engineer
11 Utilities Consultancy Senior Engineer >10
12 Utilities Consultancy Engineer >3

Based on the comments in Table 2, the framework was aimed at addressing the following eight
issues: (i) Integrating condition-based IAM with RM; (ii) combining topology-based and flow-based
analysis paradigm in RIAM; (iii) operationalizing interdependency in vulnerability analysis; (iv)
conducting hazard map delineation to identify hazard prone areas; (v) treating ageing components in
the infrastructure system as a special type of hazard; (vi) treating restoration decision as an optimization
issue with available resources as a constraint; (vii) identifying priorities (e.g., special technical and
societal considerations) in the restoration process; and (viii) selecting performance metrics from a
multi-dimensional standpoint. Afterwards, a workshop was held to invite the interviewed experts
and the purpose was to (1) provide all participates with an overview of interview findings, (2) entitle
opportunities for feedback and revisions, and (3) develop a consensus perspective on the information
and analytical requirements in the RIAM framework. In such a way, the framework was validated
and modified based on the feedback from the current and future implementers of IAM and resilient
practices. Case studies were further conducted for illustrative purposes—one focusing on information
aggregation practices, and the other to elaborate the RIAM analytical processes. The proposed RIAM
framework in this research is developed through the overall research procedures summarized in
Figure 4.
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 10 of 24

Table 3. Excerpts from the interview participants’ remarks on the selected themes.

Selected Themes Participant Remarks Identified Key Findings

# “ . . . it is necessary to incorporate infrastructure asset condition grading in resilience assessment

since the ageing problem besets the community . . . ”
# “ . . . we can reap the benefit of integrating condition assessment with network analysis . . . ”
# “ . . . from an asset management perspective, we are accustomed to allocating maintenance and
rehabilitation resources based on condition assessment results, with insufficient consideration of
The role of resilient IAM the network level, while from a system engineering standpoint, they usually conduct network (i) Integrate condition-based IAM in resilient IAM
analysis regardless of the different default conditions of the system components . . . thus it is
really a good opportunity to merge these two paradigms . . . ”
# “ . . . if you want to conduct risk analysis at the network level, you should tease out the required
information as inputs; broad information stored in an asset management system, especially that
on the operational side, can lend you a great hand . . . ”

# “ . . . vulnerability analysis should be conducted in a comparative manner, since we have limited

resources and we should allocate resources firstly to the most vulnerable components . . . ”
# “ . . . we also have the process of vulnerability assessment in our IAM platform, but it is
condition-based . . . if we complement this analysis with topological and functional information, (ii) Combine thetopology-based and flow-based
Vulnerability analysis of the results can be totally different . . . ” analysis paradigms in resilient IAM
infrastructure systems # “ . . . we are interested in how to combine the different vulnerability analysis models to facilitate (iii) Operationalize interdependency in vulnerability
decision making . . . ” analysis
# “ . . . we have noticed that some of the problems in our infrastructure system are not induced by
vulnerabilities within our system scope, but the unexpected events outside our system boundary,
which are out of our control . . . what is worse, we seldom conduct this kind of vulnerability
analysis that transcends two different systems . . . ”

# “ . . . our department has the delineation of a landslide-prone area in our system . . . and as I
know the highway department uses this information to make traffic-regulation decisions during
heavy rain . . . ”
# “ . . . we have a hotpot of flooding in our system . . . which is based on empirical data collected (iv) Conduct hazard map delineation to identify the
Hazard or disruption over the years . . . ” hazard prone areas
delineation # “ . . . it is valuable to analyze the potential hazard . . . essentially, you need to identify the most (v) Treat the problem of ageing components in
frequent hazard encountered by our community since different communities have different infrastructure system also as a special type of hazard
concerns about hazards . . . ”
# “ . . . the chronic stress in IAM is ageing components, which could be treated as a special hazard
threatening the community . . . ”
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 11 of 24

Table 3. Cont.

Selected Themes Participant Remarks Identified Key Findings

# “ . . . our department has the delineation of a landslide-prone area in our system . . . and as I
know the highway department uses this information to make traffic-regulation decisions during
heavy rain . . . ”
# “ . . . we have a hotpot of flooding in our system . . . which is based on empirical data collected (iv) Conduct hazard map delineation to identify the
Hazard or disruption over the years . . . ” hazard prone areas
delineation # “ . . . it is valuable to analyze the potential hazard . . . essentially, you need to identify the most (v) Treat the problem of ageing components in
frequent hazard encountered by our community since different communities have different infrastructure system also as a special type of hazard
concerns about hazards . . . ”
# “ . . . the chronic stress in IAM is ageing components, which could be treated as a special hazard
threatening the community . . . ”

# “ . . . restoration work is much more related to the emergency plan enacted by each authorized
agency . . . ”
# “... the responsible agency should have a detailed recovery plan when service disruption occurs
. . . and priorities should be identified . . . so to some degree, the restoration can be treated as an (vi) Treat restoration decision making as an
Restoration of failed optimization problem . . . ” optimization issue with the constraint of available
components in # “ . . . we usually choose to recover the critical nodes and lines first because of their dominance in resources
infrastructure systems the network . . . moreover, we usually choose to recover the node connected to other systems (vii) Identify priorities in the restoration process
first . . . and nodes that serve a special group of community members (e.g., disadvantaged
groups) are presumed to be recovered first . . . ”
# “ . . . we can have different recovery strategies in the decision pool and choose the one with the
most rapid recovery process of infrastructure performance . . . ”

# “ . . . it is necessary to choose suitable performance metrics to measure the dynamics . . . ”

# “ . . . you should have your own preference when selecting the performance metrics . . . for
example, you can select the connectivity metrics on the technical side, and you can also select the
Performance metrics for proportion of the users with recovery service on the social side . . . ” (viii) Select performance metrics from a
assessing infrastructure # “ . . . you can refer to the available performance metrics in each infrastructure sector rather than multi-dimensional perspective
resilience devising new ones . . . and I think each infrastructure sector have their generally used
performance metrics . . . ”
# “ . . . it is reasonable to investigate performance recovery from multiple dimensions and to make
the trade-off between different dimensions . . . ”
on the information and analytical requirements in the RIAM framework. In such a way, the
framework was validated and modified based on the feedback from the current and future
implementers of IAM and resilient practices. Case studies were further conducted for illustrative
purposes—one focusing on information aggregation practices, and the other to elaborate the RIAM
analytical processes.
Sustainability The proposed RIAM framework in this research is developed through 12the
2019, 11, 4439 of 24
overall research procedures summarized in Figure 4.

Figure 4. The
Figure overall
4. The research
overall procedure
research to develop
procedure the resilient
to develop civil civil
the resilient infrastructure asset asset
infrastructure management
(RIAM) framework. management (RIAM) framework.
4. The Resilient Civil Infrastructure Asset Management (RIAM) Framework
4. The Resilient Civil Infrastructure Asset Management (RIAM) Framework
The framework comprises of two parts: The information aggregation process and resilience
The framework comprises of two parts: The information aggregation process and resilience
analytical workflow. The information aggregation process describes what types of data (e.g.,
analytical workflow. The information aggregation process describes what types of data (e.g., asset
asset location and condition data, community characteristics, hazards and disruption models, and
location and condition data, community characteristics, hazards and disruption models, and
infrastructure performance metrics) are required for RM. Resilience analytical workflow, on the
infrastructure performance metrics) are required for RM. Resilience analytical workflow, on the other
other hand, depicts the detailed steps for analyzing the absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and
hand, depicts the detailed steps for analyzing the absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and
recoverability of interdependent infrastructure systems. The information aggregation process outputs
recoverability of interdependent infrastructure systems. The information aggregation process
and results can be used as inputs for some steps in the resilience analytical workflow. Deep and
outputs and results can be used as inputs for some steps in the resilience analytical workflow. Deep
seamless integration of infrastructure asset data with resilience analysis can complement the risk
and seamless integration of infrastructure asset data with resilience analysis can complement the risk
management practices adopted in the traditional IAM, and support comprehensive resilience decision
management practices adopted in the traditional IAM, and support comprehensive resilience
making for cross-sector integrated infrastructure operation and management.
decision making for cross-sector integrated infrastructure operation and management.
4.1. RIAM Information Elicitation
Sustainability 2019, 11, x; doi: FOR PEER REVIEW [Link]/journal/sustainability
The initial step to operationalize the resilience-related theories and concepts is an information
model. The model’s elements can be materialized from four dimensions: (i) Data pertaining to IAM;
(ii) information characterizing community members and their needs; (iii) information for specified
disruptions; and (iv) performance metrics. Note that (i) and (ii) are not exhaustive because of the
complexities and diversities of the services, configurations, operations, and management of different
infrastructure systems. Therefore, only a generic information model is provided, which can be
customized based on the stakeholders’ unique organizational characteristics, distinctive management
granularities, and diverse business objectives.

4.1.1. Information Pertaining to IAM

A global unique identifier (GUID) is designated to identify an individual asset entity in the
infrastructure asset encoding system [46] for linking the static and dynamic data of an entity. The static
data comprises spatial and non-spatial data. Location information including latitude and longitude
can be used to depict the absolute location of an asset unit in the global coordinate system, while
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 13 of 24

connectivity and adjacent data provide its relative location. Non-spatial data, such as geometric and
physical information, provide a rudimentary boundary representation of an asset. Such myriad asset
attributes as material type, condition, functional properties, ownership, construction, and installation
dates also need to be embedded for maintenance and rehabilitation purposes [47]. Maintenance and
rehabilitation records are tracked mainly for condition assessment. Cost information is needed for
conducting a tradeoff analysis since cost is the main determinant of project selection. This information,
together with as-built drawings (e.g., building information models) and operation specifications are
critical for risk management and RIAM. For example, the technical specifications could include the
statistical profile of response and repair times for different categories of components facing different
hazards with varying intensities.
Mature and standard data models have already been adopted and deployed by a wide range of
municipalities and utility companies for municipal IAM. Representative examples include the Federal
Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) data standard; Spatial Data Standards for facilities, infrastructure,
and environment (SDSFIE); Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) data models; LandXML;
Municipal Infrastructure Data Standard (MIDS); Pipeline Open Data Standard (PODS); and an ongoing
endeavor called ‘IFC (viz. Industrial Foundation Classes) for GIS’. For pipeline information, these
standards define the detailed physical parameters involved, including the pipe location, material,
diameter and depth, exterior coating, joint type, lining type, roughness, date of installation, type of
pressurization, type of value, and work order administration [48]. Some standards have their own
emphasis. For example, LandXML is dedicated to describing the hydraulic properties of pipelines,
such as pipe flow, maximum flow levels, and hydraulic grade attributes [49]; the PODS data standard
elaborates asset inspection and condition [50].

4.1.2. Information Characterizing Community Members and Their Needs

Communities comprising different races, cultures, income and education levels, and demographics
may have different resilience capabilities and be affected differently by similar infrastructure disruptions,
so their recoverability and adaptability may be unique given their socio-economic characteristics. Many
empirical studies show that hazard and disaster risks differ between communities [51]. Improving
community resilience involves incorporating infrastructure network resilience with other social
capital for the allocation of pre-disaster resources and aiding post-disaster recovery and priorities.
The potentially influential characteristics affecting community infrastructure investment decisions
include (i) such demographic data as age, gender, and education level, (ii) the geographic locations of
disaster-prone areas, (iii) social vulnerabilities and inequities within the population (e.g., proportion
of special needs groups within the community), (iv) diversity of community members’ needs, (v)
community economic profile (e.g., employment rate), and (vi) insurance coverage [34,52,53]. Moreover,
the user costs of intervention strategies can be crucial for some maintenance and rehabilitation projects.
For example, the user costs due to the partial or full loss of transportation assets (e.g., lane and bridge
closures) should be well documented since they determine the effect of transportation construction
projects on a community scale. Furthermore, the impact of infrastructure component damage and its
service condition, as well as the socio-economic benefit of prompt recovery, are necessarily measured
by user cost at the community level [54].

4.1.3. Information for Specific Disruption

Identifying and understanding all hazards (e.g., hazard types, frequencies, patterns, magnitude and
potential intensity, duration, and estimated spatial extent of impact) that a community has experienced
or could experience is necessary for analyzing and managing infrastructure and community resilience.
For example, areas along the U.S.’s Southeast Gulf Coast are more susceptible to hurricanes [55],
Japan’s coastal cities experience more earthquakes and induced tsunamis [56], and riverine cities in
Queensland, Australia need to handle flooding and inundation issues [57]. With hazard information
and the delineated hazard maps, communities can make informed decisions for pre-event prevention
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 14 of 24

and mitigation. By monitoring the evolution of such hazards as tidal, precipitation, tropical cyclone
paths, and intensity, governments can produce specified hazard delineation maps to display liquefaction
zones, seismic faults, subsidence areas, floodplains and landslide prone areas, etc. Integrated with the
geospatial information of infrastructure asset entities, stakeholders can identify the parts and locations
of infrastructure systems that are prone to fail, which provide the input for further vulnerability and
resilience analysis of whole networks/systems.

4.1.4. Performance Metrics

The performance metrics of infrastructure assets and systems provide another type of
fundamental information for resilience analysis and RM. These can relate to both an operationalization
perspective, in terms of the operational performance of its constituting physical components and their
interdependencies, and a system and network perspective. The network metrics, for example, include
the node degree, characteristic path length, cycle length distribution, average clustering coefficient,
node average betweenness, centralization, meshedness, system modularity, degree of assortativeness,
and network efficiency [58,59].
The framework proposed by the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research
(MCEER), on the other hand, suggests quantifying infrastructure system resilience from four interrelated
dimensions, i.e., technical, organizational, social, and economic dimensions [28,60], from which metrics
for each dimension can be introduced. Utility agencies in each infrastructure sector can obtain their
system performance measures for daily operation. For instance, the Transportation Research Board of
the National Academies in US has proposed performance measures for asset management ranging from
preservation of assets, operation and maintenance, mobility and accessibility to the safety category [61].
The Water Research Foundation has also formulated system performance indicators encompassing
reliability, efficiency, adequacy, and water quality dimensions [62]. Virtually all these performance
indicators could be adopted and leveraged to derive measures for quantifying system resilience.
By obtaining quality data according to the proposed data aggregation model, RM and analysis
can be conducted to support decision-making. [63] defines three types of resilience analytics, namely
descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive analytics. Descriptive analytics depicts the statistical
characteristics of the performance of interdependent infrastructure systems before, during, and
after disruptions; while predictive analytics focuses on quantifying the likelihood of future adverse
events and their effects; while prescriptive analytics aims to identify a feasible course of interventions
and strategies to best achieve the systems’ resilient objectives. The next section elaborates the
formulation of these analytics.

4.2. RIAM Analytical Workflow

A modularized workflow is proposed to provide a comprehensive and consistent RIAM analytics
methodology. As delineated in Figure 5, this entails four parts: (i) A preparatory process; (ii) resilience
curve-resistant and absorptive capacity analysis; (iii) resilience curve-restorative capacity analysis;
and (iv) considerations for long-term improvement. In accordance with the theoretical basis, the
workflow encompasses not only the core elements originating from IAM, but it also incorporates the
methodologies for topology- and flow-based network analysis. It articulates absorptive, resistant, and
restorative capacities, which are the main characteristics of the resilience concept and interdependent
infrastructure asset systems. Considering the changing nature of infrastructure systems, the workflow
also stresses the long-term prospects for improvement. Detailed sub-processes are interpreted
as follows.
415 capacity analysis; and (iv) considerations for long-term improvement. In accordance with the
416 theoretical basis, the workflow encompasses not only the core elements originating from IAM, but it
417 also incorporates the methodologies for topology- and flow-based network analysis. It articulates
418 absorptive, resistant, and restorative capacities, which are the main characteristics of the resilience
419 concept and interdependent infrastructure asset systems. Considering the changing nature of
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 15 of 24
420 infrastructure systems, the workflow also stresses the long-term prospects for improvement. Detailed
421 sub-processes are interpreted as follows.
Climate Demand Long-term
Preparatory Process Resilience curve-resistant and absorptive capacity analysis change surge improvement
Hazard with known statistical frequencies consideration
Infrastructure
asset Topological
inventory Occurrence distribution
Joint probability density evolution
Single hazard
function
Intensity distribution
Extraction of Disaster-prone area with New
network risk categorization technology
configuration Chronic stress adaptaion
Single hazard analysis
Multiple hazard
process
One type of natural hazard Component fragility
Designation of
model
operation
mechanism Hazard with unknown statistical attributes
Global vulnerability analysis
Interface
design between Network performance
Vulnerability analysis Critical component analysis
infrastructure assessment
systems Geographical vulnerability analysis
Resilience curve-restorative capacity analysis
Optimization of Community resilience Restoration strategy Potential catalog of
restoration process considerations initialization components in fragility
422
Figure 5. Analytical workflow for RIAM.
423 Figure 5. Analytical workflow for RIAM.
4.2.1. Preparatory Process
424 4.2.1. Preparatory Process
The preparatory process involves four steps.
425 The
1. preparatory process
Representative involves
infrastructure four are
assets steps.
selected from an inventory.
2. Supported by the basic attributes bundled with tangible infrastructure assets, the network
426 1. Representative infrastructure assets are selected from an inventory.
configuration is extracted to provide the connectivity information between infrastructure elements
427 2. Supported by the basic attributes bundled with tangible infrastructure assets, the network
needed to initialize topological properties.
428 configuration is extracted to provide the connectivity information between infrastructure elements
3. The operation mechanism, which is also described as the flow-based information, is designated
429 needed to initialize topological properties.
for different infrastructure systems as it dominates their functional performance. To do this, domain
430 3. The operation mechanism, which is also described as the flow-based information, is
knowledge (e.g., the electricity system cascading effects and water pipeline system hydraulic analysis)
431 designated for different infrastructure systems as it dominates their functional performance. To do
is requested to depict the system’s operating state. There are several types of such domain knowledge,
432 this, domain knowledge (e.g., the electricity system cascading effects and water pipeline system
including a generalized betweenness centrality model [64] harnessed in water supply systems; a
433 hydraulic analysis) is requested to depict the system’s operating state. There are several types of such
DC power flow model [65], recursive load redistribution algorithm [66], and a complex network
434 domain knowledge, including a generalized betweenness centrality model [64] harnessed in water
betweenness model [58] leveraged in electric power transmission and distribution systems; and a gas
435 supply systems; a DC power flow model [65], recursive load redistribution algorithm [66], and a
delivery model [65] and maximum network flow model [67] exploited in natural gas supply systems.
436 complex network betweenness model [58] leveraged in electric power transmission and distribution
4. The interdependency concept, the interface design between two different systems, is materialized
437 systems; and a gas delivery model [65] and maximum network flow model [67] exploited in natural
to reveal the interaction between infrastructure systems [64,68]. In addition to the binary and
438 gas supply systems.
deterministic connections between components within different systems, interdependent strength is
439 4. The interdependency concept, the interface design between two different systems, is
introduced to mirror connection intensity by probabilistic means [65].
440 materialized to reveal the interaction between infrastructure systems [64,68]. In addition to the binary
441 and deterministic
4.2.2. connectionsCapacity
Resistant and Absorptive betweenAnalysis
components within different systems, interdependent
442 strength is introduced to mirror connection intensity by probabilistic means [65].
For resistant and absorptive capacity analysis, two scenarios—the capacity of systems against
443 known and unknown
4.2.2. Resistant hazards—need
and Absorptive to be
Capacity studied using different underlying theories and modeling
Analysis
procedures. For known and foreseeable single hazards delineated by statistical frequencies, a Poisson
process may furnish a good fit for the distribution of the occurrence time and interval between two
consecutive hazards [69]. To capture the uncertainty and variations in hazard intensity, a specific
distribution, such as the Gaussian [70] or power law [30], is embedded in the modeling. Consequently,
a joint probability density function can be generated. A Poisson pulse process may be suitable when
considering hazards in one timeframe. Owing to the spatial distribution of infrastructure systems, the
hazard exposure delineation of different infrastructure components needs to vary to differentiate areas
of possible unequal hazard and associated risk categorization [71,72]. For example, spatial differences
of flooding are not only due to rainfall distribution and storm duration, but also local terrain features,
roughness coefficients, stage boundary conditions, and hydraulic timing.
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 16 of 24

Usually, multiple scales of known hazards also need to be investigated simultaneously. In the daily
operation and maintenance of infrastructure assets, regular failures of certain components occur due to
ageing, human errors, or abrupt events (outlined in Figure 3 as chronic stress) can also be assumed to
comply with specific possibility distributions. When combined with the distribution rules of a specific
natural hazard, a joint distribution can be deduced to describe a synthesized hazard. The identical
procedure of single hazard modeling can then be referred to as embodying both hazard occurrence
time and intensity. In summary, a disaster-prone area with risk categorization is regarded as an
elementary input for component fragility modeling, which, enabled by probabilistic reliability theory,
elaborates component functioning state with due consideration of such environmental properties
as local hazard intensity, terrain, vegetation, and other spatial factors. In this way, a catalogue of
potentially disrupted components can be obtained, endorsed by the component fragility model, and
the resilience performance metric ultimately re-measured based on the updated topological structure
and renewed flow-based information.
For unknown hazards without significant statistical characteristics, vulnerability analysis is more
suitable. This uses stochastic simulation to assess system performance in the presence of numerous
hypothetical combinations of disrupted components [36]. Global vulnerability analysis can provide
a reference for condition-based component failure sequences; degree-based and load-based attack
strategies can be used to simulate system performance when criticalities are malfunctioned; while
geographical vulnerability analysis can concentrate more on the characteristics of neighborhood
community since a relatively less critical component in a topological dimension may serve a population
with sensitive demographics. Using such risk-based, reliability and vulnerability analyses, the
absorptive capacity of infrastructure systems can be practically revealed by simulating the performance
losses involved.

4.2.3. Restorative Capacity Analysis

The restoration process, involving mobilizing resources and arranging projects to minimize
recovery time under resource constraints, is more pertinent to the organizational capability and
available resources of the utilities responsible. Different restoration strategies can be formulated
by adjusting the parameter settings in the simulation process. Based on node betweenness, the
characteristic path length, or relative criticality of damaged facilities, etc. [60], a suitable component
restoration sequence can be identified. This enables the efficiency and effectiveness of different
restoration strategies to be evaluated within, and under, a joint restoration strategy across system
boundaries [73,74]. In addition, it will help accentuate the community vulnerability index’s role in
the restoration process [75], and track its dynamic features to help quantify and qualify the recovery
capacity with respect to the baseline condition, and complement the evaluation of the restoration
strategies [76].

4.2.4. Consideration of Long-Term and Continuous Resilience Improvement

RM and the analysis of infrastructure systems need to be carried out continuously across different
temporal and spatial scales. A long-term resilience strategy can help tackle the occurrence of more
frequent and severe chronic stresses and natural hazards caused by climate change; meet the surging
demand with diverse use patterns; improve reliability; and adapt to the changes arising from the
adoption of new technology, reconfiguration, and reengineering of topological structures and operation
mechanisms, etc. These future expected improvements could be simulated by simply changing the
related parameters in the simulation model. Such parameters in the joint hazard distribution probability
function as the return period and average intensity would be altered to mimic scenarios of natural
hazards becoming more frequent and severe. Likewise, the demand-of-load node in the infrastructure
network can also be adjusted to mirror increasing demand scenarios. Technically, the topological
configuration can be changed, e.g., by introducing redundant capacity into a node to allow buffer
time when disrupted, or modifying the operating mechanism to imitate the outcome of adopting new
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 17 of 24

technology [77]. In this way, the dynamic process of resilience can be demonstrated, and potential
strategies to improve future system resilience can be identified through comparative studies.

5. Validation
Given the circumstance that one cannot validate the RIAM framework in terms of outcomes, it is
nevertheless important to consider validation in terms of the process employed to obtain the judgments.
The RIAM framework is formulated by adopting the methodological approach proposed and tested
in expert judgment elicitation in terms of infrastructure resilience performance (i.e., robustness and
recovery rapidity) against extreme events [42]. Besides, the method is iterative and consensus-based
thus improving the judgment forecasting, as is the Delphi approach. Based on the judgment validation
strategies suggested in traditional probability elicitation methods, convergence can be realized by
asking the same questions multiple times, both in individual interview process and the subsequent
workshop. All basic themes solicited from literatures are clearly defined and explained to the experts,
ensuring that the interviewees have the identical scenarios in mind when providing the judgments.
Besides, since the preliminary information and analytical requirements of the RIAM framework is
provided to interview participants as the background preparation for the survey and workshop, it
is convinced that such data sources are partially verified to illuminate the judgment elicitation from
experts. Obviously, the expert judgment-based RIAM framework cannot be completely validated
unless it could be applied and demonstrated effectiveness in real cases. To this end, we further devised
two use cases in the following section to strengthen the claim that RIAM framework would provide
structured information and knowledge needed to conduct further quantitative analyses.

6. Use Cases
Two case studies from actual industry practice were presented in this section to demonstrate the
framework’s applicability and practicality. The first case concerned the information orchestration by
the unified modeling language (UML) class diagram, while the second exhibited the analytical process
of generic resilience assessment adopted by a community IAM agency.

6.1. Information Orchestration by UML Class Diagram

Figure 6 shows an excerpt of the unified modeling language (UML) class diagrams
of the Water Research Foundation’s infrastructure resilience analysis data model, with two
representative asset entities, namely the WaterLine and PavementSegment, from the water supply
and roadway pavement systems respectively. Generally, the attributes of the classes and
class relationships can be inherited from the geography markup language (GML) profile,
which is essentially the type of extensible markup language (XML) encoding for modeling
and exchanging spatial and non-spatial attributes of infrastructure assets. New attributes
representing infrastructure lifecycle data (e.g., WaterInspectionRecord, ConditionAssessmentRecord,
WaterLineBreakRecord, and WaterLineMaintenanceRecord), community (e.g., CommunityUnit), and hazard
(e.g., Hazard, HazardOccuranceParameter, HazardIntensityParameter) were defined. A confluent class
AnalysisUnit was added for further resilience analysis. Class definitions include the elements describing
the relationship with other interdependent infrastructure systems, while relationship classes can be
defined between different objects. For example, the WaterLine class has a 0..* association relationship
with the PavementSegment class. The HazardIntensityParameters class is expected to be associated with
both the WaterLineRiskParameters class and CommunityUnit class, demonstrating that the hazards would
affect both the infrastructure systems and communities. The confluent AnalysisUnit class has a 1..*
association relationship with the PerformanceMetrics class, indicating that infrastructure resilience can be
analyzed from multi-dimensional (e.g., technical, social, organizational, and economical) perspectives.
The UML class diagrams can be easily mapped onto the XML schema for sharing data across different
IAM applications.
 Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 18 of 24

1
PerformanceMetrics Technical Social Organizational Economical
Performance
* Metrics
WaterNetworkFeature SystemValve

* AnalysisUnit CoumunityUnit

1 11

1
1 +GUID

*
1
+DisasterProneAreaClassifications
PavementFeatures

1
+AgeLevel
ControlValve +EducationLevel
+IncomeLevel

*
+EmploymentRate
+InsuranceCoverageRate
+AverageUserCosttoInfraServiceLoss
WaterLine PavementSegment +WaterDemand

1 0..*

0..1
* *
1

+GUID
1
+GUID

1
1

+InstallDate +ConstructionDate
+LifecycleStatus +RoadwayClassification PavementJunctions Community
+GroundSurfaceType +ForwardSegmentID
characteristics and

1
+LocationDescription +BackwardSegmentID
+PipeClass +Material needs
+Material
+Diameter
-Roughness WaterInspectionRecord
*
+ExteriorCoating
+LiningType
*
+JointType1 *
+JointType2 ConditionAssessmentRecord Hazard

1
+StartPoint +HazardType

1
1
+EndPoint
+DefectCode
+Severtiy
+Score
MainLine LateralLine +ConditionRating
* HazardIntensityParameters
*

*
WaterLineBreakRecord

1
1

PressurizedMain GravityMain
WaterLineMaintenanceRecord 1
HazardOccuranceParameters Specified disruption
*

1
WaterLineHydraulicParameters 1 WaterLineRenewalPlanningParameters WaterLineRiskParameters
1

1
1

*
WaterLineCostParameters
Infrastructure
1

Asset
Management
553
554 Figure
Figure 6. Excerpt
6. Excerpt of the
of the unified
unified modelinglanguage
modeling language(UML)
(UML)indicating
indicating the
the classes
classes and
and relationships
relationshipsofofsources
sourcesofofinformation forfor
information RIAM.
RIAM.

Sustainability 2019, 11, x; doi: FOR PEER REVIEW [Link]/journal/sustainability

Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 19 of 24

6.2. Infrastructure Resilience-to-Earthquakes Analysis Processes

6.2. Infrastructure Resilience-to-Earthquakes Analysis Processes
This
Thiscase
casedemonstrated
demonstrated the the analytics workflowformulated
analytics workflow formulatedwith
withthe
the framework
framework to to assess
assess thethe
resilience
resilience of the water utility network of Shelby County (in southeast U.S.) to an earthquake hazard, as
of the water utility network of Shelby County (in southeast U.S.) to an earthquake hazard,
well as toasexamine
as well to examinethethe
interdependency
interdependencybetween
betweenthe
the water systemand
water system andthe
thecounty’s
county’s electric
electric power
power
utility network (The scenario is based on the tutorials provided by the open source tool
utility network (The scenario is based on the tutorials provided by the open source tool Ergo v4.0.0 Ergo v4.0.0
([Link] The workflow
([Link] The workflow consists consists
ofof
the
thenine
ninesteps
stepsillustrated
illustratedininFigure
Figure 7, as follows:
follows:

[Link]
Figure Infrastructure resilience
resilienceanalysis
analysisworkflow
workflowagainst
againstearthquake hazard.
earthquake hazard.

(1)(1)Specify
Specify thetheGISGISdatadataofofShelby
ShelbyCounty.
County. TheThe GIS
GISdatadataisisfundamental
fundamental to to
conduct
conduct damage,
damage,
resilience,and
resilience, andinterdependency
interdependency analysis. analysis. The
Thedata
datacan
canbebeused
usedtotosuperimpose
superimpose and andlayer thethe
layer spatial,
spatial,
property, and condition information of the county’s water and electric
property, and condition information of the county’s water and electric power utility networks, power utility networks, andand
provide end users with a friendly frontend interface to visualize the
provide end users with a friendly frontend interface to visualize the aggregated hazard impactsaggregated hazard impacts on on
the
the networks.
networks.
(2)(2)Solicit
Solicit
thethe inventory
inventory dataofofthe
data thewater
water and
and electric
electricpower
powerutility
utilitynetworks.
networks. Sample
Sampleinventory
inventory
data attributes include the network node IDs, linking edges, pipe types, pipe length and diameter,
data attributes include the network node IDs, linking edges, pipe types, pipe length and diameter, joint
joint types, soil types, and pipe and cable capacity. This data can be extracted, transformed, and
types, soil types, and pipe and cable capacity. This data can be extracted, transformed, and cleansed
cleansed from sector specific IAM systems according to the RIAM information model, and then
from sector specific IAM systems according to the RIAM information model, and then imported into
imported into such a resilience and risk analysis tool as Ergo to carry out further detailed
such a resilience and risk analysis tool as Ergo to carry out further detailed investigation.
investigation.
(3)(3)Conduct a descriptive data analysis on the ingested water utility and electric power utility
Conduct a descriptive data analysis on the ingested water utility and electric power utility
inventory. The statistical
inventory. The statistical features
features ofof
thethe
inventory
inventory data setset
data andandthethe
network
network structure
structure of the utilities
of the can be
utilities
explored
can be graphically using a variety
explored graphically usingofa statistics and
variety of visualization
statistics techniques, such
and visualization as the mean,
techniques, such asstandard
the
deviation,
mean, standard deviation, sampling, missing value processing, principal component analysis,and
sampling, missing value processing, principal component analysis, association analysis,
clustering
association analysis.
analysis, This
andstep assistsanalysis.
clustering end users to select
This targetend
step assists variables
users to(e.g.,
selectperformance
target variablesindicators),
(e.g.,
and suitable simulation
performance indicators), andand prediction models forand
suitable simulation further resilience
prediction and interdependency
models for further resilience analysis.
and
(4) Import or generate
interdependency analysis. the earthquake hazard data. The required general seismic data includes
the period, depth,or
(4) Import peak ground
generate theacceleration, attenuation
earthquake hazard data. Thefactor, latitude,
required longitude,
general seismic dataand magnitude.
includes
theinformation
The period, depth, canpeak ground acceleration,
be obtained attenuation events
from past earthquake factor, latitude, longitude, and magnitude.
or evaluated/generated through site
The informationtechniques,
characterization can be obtained from past earthquake
scenario-based, events ground
and probabilistic or evaluated/generated
shaking hazardthrough modelssitebased
characterization techniques, scenario-based, and probabilistic ground
on historical and current data of surface and subsurface geometry, soil and rock properties, andshaking hazard models based
on historicalconditions
groundwater and current of data of surface and subsurface geometry, soil and rock properties, and
the site.
groundwater conditions of the site.
(5) Determine the performance indicators as the target attributes for resistant and absorptive
capacity(5)analysis.
Determine the case
In this performance
study, suchindicators as the
indicators target pipe
as water attributes for resistant
breakage and leakage and absorptive
rate, number
capacity analysis. In this case study, such indicators as water pipe breakage and leakage rate, number
of power facility breakdowns, service flow reduction rate, and connectivity loss of water and electricity
of power facility breakdowns, service flow reduction rate, and connectivity loss of water and
networks are selected to estimate the earthquake’s damage and cascading effects on the water and
electricity networks are selected to estimate the earthquake’s damage and cascading effects on the
power utilities.
water and power utilities.
(6) Perform resistant and absorptive capacity analysis with suitable models and model parameters.
Sustainability
Sector-specific 2019, 11, x; doi: FOR PEER
performance REVIEW evaluation models for [Link]/journal/sustainability
and hazard utility and power networks and
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 20 of 24

appropriate algorithm parameters need to be configured to carry out the analysis. Domain knowledge
is required to select an appropriate configuration from a variety of probabilistic and statistical models,
graph theory tools, complex network-based techniques, etc.; the models developed in Hazus-MH
4.0 provide a good reference. The other advanced modeling parameters set for this analysis include
buried pipe fragility curves, potable water fragility mapping, Hazus electric power fragility graphs,
and hazard uncertainty and liquefaction probabilities.
(7) Conduct interdependency analysis. Geographic and physical interdependency between the
water and electric power utility networks is employed to estimate the earthquake’s cascading damages.
The input parameters include the water and electric power network damage from step 6, network
interdependency table, number of simulation runs, and homogeneous interconnectedness level; while
the analysis results include the connection loss and service flow reduction of the two networks.
(8) Perform restorative capacity analysis to generate strategies and plans for recovering from
the damage. Various types of decision-making analysis techniques can be exploited to determine the
optimal restoration solution corresponding to available resources and the target objective of minimizing
recovery time or cost. The techniques include such traditional approaches as the cost–benefit analysis,
cost-effective analysis, multi-criteria analysis, multi-attribute utility analysis, and risk-based decision
making methods, as well as emerging deep learning-enabled prediction tools.
(9) Generate the resilience curves and output a customized resilience analysis report. The report
presents the details of the above analysis steps, the aggregated vulnerability hotspot map, damage and
breakdown charts, and decision-making graphs.
The open source tool Ergo 4.0 does not implement all these functions, although the workflow
is developed by leveraging the software suite. Researchers, developers, emergency managers, and
community infrastructure managers could employ and integrate different software tools to carry out
the resilience analysis tasks on-demand by referring the framework. Stakeholders are encouraged to
contribute knowledge and expertise to refine the framework and enrich the functions of Ergo 4.0. A
software system that integrates easy-to-use data processing tools and diverse modeling algorithms
will also be developed to facilitate the resilience analysis of user-customized scenarios.

7. Conclusions and Future Work

This paper proposed a RIAM information elicitation and analytical framework that aimed to
facilitate infrastructure stakeholders to operationalize resilience principles and practices into their
existing asset management processes and systems. The framework was developed using a devised
qualitative research methodology. Theoretical foundations in terms of IAM and RM integration were
first built through a thorough content analysis of IAM guidelines and worldwide practices, RM related
concepts and frameworks. The hints of both incorporating resilience considerations in IAM and
encapsulating IAM features in resilience analysis were identified and justified theoretically. This also
resulted in candidate themes for further interviews to obtain insights of our proposed RIAM framework
from the perspective of practitioners. The research findings were validated and refined through
interviews with different stakeholders from selected infrastructure sectors in Hong Kong and Mainland
China. Two case studies were presented to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed framework,
which could be leveraged to conduct interdependency and resilience analysis of infrastructure systems
and utility networks. This alignment contributes to the integration of domain knowledge from diverse
disciplines to make maximum use of existing theories, models, and frameworks to facilitate RIAM.
Practically, the framework further stimulates quantitative operationalization of the basic concepts
involved (e.g., interdependency and resilience) and the assessment of diverse strategies from both
IAM and RM perspectives.
The framework has a valuable potential for aligning the understanding and practice of different
sectors in implementing RIAM. Based on the framework, fragmented and diverse infrastructure data
could be assembled and aggregated, and explicit and beforehand information inputs for conducting the
RIAM analysis would inform and improve the accuracy and efficiency of stakeholders’ data collection
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4439 21 of 24

practices. The analytical workflow for RIAM articulates the procedure of infrastructure system resilience
with IAM considerations (e.g., involving component conditions in resilience analyses). Stakeholders
would reference to the procedure meanwhile considering the local contexts and requirements. The
flexible decision-making analysis models can be configured, integrated, or developed to carry out
resilience analyses at different temporal and spatial scales and in corresponding real or speculated
hazard scenarios. Moreover, two different paradigms entitle the decision makers to choose either
risk-based or vulnerability-based analysis according to the hazards facing the community. The
infrastructure ageing problem is also involved in the RIAM workflow through either abstracting the
ageing problem as chronic hazard delineated by specified hazards curves or manipulating physical
parameters to represent the component deteriorating effects when modeling the infrastructure systems.
Due to its versatility and flexibility, the framework can therefore be adopted by cities and communities
of varying sizes to enhance community and urban infrastructure resilience. Moreover, municipalities
can hone and customize the framework into their smart and sustainable city technology plans. For
future research, a suite of built environment-oriented resilience indicators, a set of data integrated
adaptors, a hybrid of resilience evaluation models, and a ‘big data’-enabled resilience analysis service
platform prototype need to be developed to refine and enrich the framework. More case studies also
need to be devised to further validate the framework and demonstrate its use to enhance the resilience
and sustainability of community infrastructures.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, Y.Y. and S.T.N.; methodology, Y.Y.; data collection and processing, Y.Y.,
F.J.X. and S.Z.; writing—original draft preparation, Y.Y. and F.J.X.; writing—review and editing, S.T.N. and M.S.
Funding: This research was funded by Research Grants Council of the HKSAR Government, grant number
17202215 and 17248216.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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