1st HAKEEM ABDUL HAMEED NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022

Before the

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF KRONOS

(CRIMINAL ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION)

DARIAN GREY v. UNION OF KRONOS

[Writ Petition (Civil) No. 22 of 2021]

Along-with

DARIAN GREY V. NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION OF DUNDER

[Special Leave Petition (Criminal)No. 99 of

2021] (Arising out of Criminal Misc. OP No.

1223/2021) Along-with

DARIAN GREY V. EAGLE LLC & UNION OF KRONOS

[Writ Petition (Civil) No. 197 of 2021]

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KRONOS

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT~

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 1|
~LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS~................................................................................................4

~INDEX OF AUTHORITIES~.................................................................................................7

~STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION~...................................................................................10

~STATEMENT OF FACTS~..................................................................................................12

~ISSUES RAISED~.................................................................................................................14

~SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS~.........................................................................................15

Arguments Advanced.................................................................................................................1

I. THAT THE SAID PETITIONS FILED BY DARIAN GREY ARE NOT

MAINTAINABLE AND ‘PRIVATE ENTITIES CAPABLE OF DISCHARGING
PUBLIC FUNCTIONS’ ARE NOT AMENABLE TO WRIT JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT...............................................................................................................1

A. That the writ petition challenging IT Rules is not maintainable...................................1

1. That no fundamental right is infringed......................................................................1

2. That an alternate remedy was available.....................................................................2

D. ‘Private entities capable of discharging public functions’ are not amenable to writ
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court......................................................................................5

II. THAT DARIAN GREY’S STATEMENTS WHICH VIRTUALLY MOBILIZED

LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE AMOUNTS TO SEDITION, AND SHE IS NOT
ENTITLED TO PROTECTION FROM ARREST................................................................7

A. That Darian grey’s statements which virtually mobilized a large number of people
amounts to sedition............................................................................................................7

1. The content's language must be reasonable and not something that could spark
violence, cause disaffection, or public disorder.............................................................8

2. restrictions on freedom of speech and expression in the interests of public order are
protected by the mandate of Article 19(2).....................................................................9

B. Ms. Grey is not entitled to protection from arrest under section 482 of CrPC............11

1. Granting protection from arrest under section 482 should be an exception and a
rarity than an ordinary rule...........................................................................................12

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 2 | Page

 2. Such Reliefs Would Dislocate Investigation Thereby Amounting To Travesty Of
Justice...........................................................................................................................13

III. THAT THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (INTERMEDIARY GUIDELINES

AND DIGITAL MEDIA ETHICS CODE) RULES, 2021 ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.....13

A. The Power of Reasonable Classification given to the State........................................13

IV. RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN CANNOT BE DECLARED AS A FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHT..................................................................................................................................16

[A] That the “right to be forgotten” cannot exist in the sphere of the administration of
justice...............................................................................................................................16

[B] That the principle of open justice has been identified as a central tenet of the rule of
law ...................................................................................................................................18

Prayer.......................................................................................................................................16

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3 | Page

 ~LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS~

ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

& AND

§ SECTION

¶ PARAGRAPH

ALL. ALLAHABAD

ANRS. ANOTHER

ART. ARTICLE

AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER

BOM. BOMBAY

BA BAIL APPLICATION

CAL. CALCUTTA

CONST. CONSTITUTION

DEL. DELHI

ED. EDITION

FC FEDERAL COURT

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 4 | Page

 FIR FIRST INFORMATION REPORT

GOVT. GOVERNMENT

HC HIGH COURT

ILR INDIAN LAW REPORTER

IPC INDIAN PENAL CODE

L.ED. LAWYER’S EDITION

LR LAW REPORTER

NAG. NAGPUR

NO. NUMBER

NCT NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY

ORS. OTHERS

PVT. PRIVATE

SC SUPREME COURT

SCC SUPREME COURT CASES

SCR SUPREME COURT REPORTER

SLP SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 5 | Page

 U.P. UTTAR PRADESH

V. VERSUS

C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE

J. JUSTICE

Int’l INTERNATIONAL

US UNITED STATES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 6 | Page

 ~INDEX OF AUTHORITIES~

CASES

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 10

A.V. Venkateshwaran v. R.S.Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1906. 2
Abdul Hamid Shamsi v. Abdul Majid, (1988) 1 SCC 507 10
Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1 11
Anchit Chawla v. Google India WP(C) 13921/2018 17
Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller of Imports, AIR 1974 SC 1539 1
Annie Besant v. Advocate General of Madras, AIR 1919 PC 31. 11
Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., (1970) 1 SCC 98 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 67 9
Arunachal Nadar v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 300 10
Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B., (2004) 3 SCC 349 5
Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery, AIR 1979 SC 1889 2
B. Singh (Dr) v. Union of India, (2004) 3 SCC 363 5
Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar, (2015) 3 SCC 251 7
Calcutta Gas Co. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 2
Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P., (1990) 4 SCC 449 5
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118 10
Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd., 1962 Supp (3) SCR 549
4
Common Cause & Anr. v. UOI, (2016) 15 SCC 269 8
Debi Soren and Ors. v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254 8
Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills v. CIT AIR 1955 SC 65 4
Dharamraj Bhanushankar Dave v. State of Gujarat, 2017 SCC OnLine Guj 2493 17
Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 4
Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar, (2005) 6 SCC 211 4
Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 5 SCC 136 5
Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 2 SCC 177 9
Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, (2004) 3 SCC 214 3
Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 5
K. Prabhakar Reddy v. State of A.P., 1998 SCC OnLine AP 52 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 7 | Page

Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1159 2
Karthick Theodre v. Registrar General, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2755 16
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 8
Kerala Union of Working Journalists v. Union of India & Ors., (2021) SC 234. 3
King Emperor v. Khawaja Nazir Ahmad, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 29. 13
KP Varghese v. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173 10
Kushum Lata v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 180 5
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 600 1
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Chairman, CBDT, (2004) 6 SCC 431 5
Mohammed Ishaq v. S. Kazam Pasha, (2009) 12 SCC 748 3
Nathu v. the State of U.P., (1979) 3 SCC 574 12
Nazir Khan v. the State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461 11
Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401 12
Neetu v. State of Punjab, (2007) 10 SCC 614 5
Noise Pollution (VI), In re, (2005) 8 SCC 794 11
Nutan Takur (Dr.) v. Union of India, 2014 SCC OnLine All 15185 5
P.N. Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1987) 4 SCC 609 2
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111 5
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Union of India, (2002) 5 SCC 111 6
Queen Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1898) ILR 22 Bom 112 8
Queen Empress v. Ramchandra Narayan, ILR (1898) 22 Bom 152 8
Queen Express v. Jogendra Chandra Bose, (1892) 19 ILR Cal 35 8
Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 1 10
Regina (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v. City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court, [2011]
1 WLR 3253 18
Roychan Abraham v. State of U.P., 2019 (3) ADJ 391 (FB) 6
Saddik v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 10 SCC 663 4
Sameet Rakesh Thakkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 3765 3
Sanwant Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 715 4
Scott v. Scott, 1913 A.C. 417, (HL) 18
Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Vindhya Telelinks Ltd., (2009) 14 SCC 16 3
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523 10
Som Mittal v. State of Karnataka, 2008 AIR SCW 1003 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 8 | Page

Som Prakash v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 212 11. 6
Sparsh Samaj Kalyan Samiti (Regd) v. Union of India, 1993 SCC OnLine Del 635 5
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 12
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 293 10
State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779 12
State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402 5
State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284 13
State of West Bengal v. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited, (2010) 4 SCC 453 2
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598 5
Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India, (2018) 10 SCC 639. 18
U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijai Narain (1987) 3 SCC 395 6
Union of India v. Paul Manickam, AIR 2003 SC 4622 2
Virender v. the State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 986 10
Zee Telefilms Ltd & Anr v Union of India & Ors (2005) AIR 2677 SC 5

STATUTES

INDIA CONST. 1
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 11
THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (EU) 2016/679. 17
THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 7

BLOGS

Special Leave under Article 136 of the Constitution under Article 136 of the Constitution
and Keeping the Question of Law Open”, 2020 SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 125 4
Zachary Laub, “Hate Speech on Social Media: Global Comparisons” available at:
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hate-speech-social-media-global-comparisons
(Visited on February 19, 2022) 10

BOOKS

R.A. NELSON, “INDIAN PENAL CODE” (10TH ED. 2008) 8

V.N. SHUKLA, “CONSTITUTION OF INDIA” 145 (MAHENDRA P. SINGH REV., 12TH ED.

2016) 11
W.R. DONOGH, “A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SEDITION AND COGNATE
OFFENCES IN BRITISH INDIA” (Thacker, Spink and Co. 8th ed. 2013) 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 9 | Page

 11

Whitney v. California 71 L. Ed. 1095 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 10 | Page

 ~STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION~

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 11 | Page

With reference to the circumstances that have been present in the instant case, the Appellant
humbly submits to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Kronos under Article 32
of the Constitution of Kronos. Article 32 reads as follows:

“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.

(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this
Part.

(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and (2),
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).

(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided
for by this Constitution.”

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 12 | Page

 ~STATEMENT OF FACTS~

The Republic of MEMELAND, a technologically advanced nation known for its prowess in AI,
robotics, and cybersecurity, is embroiled in a complex situation involving various entities.
GALACTICZ, a private company in MOONLAND, has played a crucial role in launching satellites for
MEMELAND and its neighboring country, MAMALAND. Meanwhile, BratApp, an instant
messaging service owned by HETA in MOONLAND, faced a critical incident when a video featuring
popular politician Mr. Yoda circulated, containing hate speech and leading to violence. MEMELAND
responded by ordering BratApp to take down the video and investigating the incident, with Mr. Yoda
claiming it to be a deep fake. The situation escalated with cyber-attacks by the banned terrorist
organization FREEDOM WARRIORS on MEMELAND's satellite communications, prompting
MEMELAND to retaliate with AI-controlled weapons. This led to international objections and
accusations of war crimes by MAMALAND, which also claimed a data breach by BratApp and sought
compensation. MEMELAND defended its actions, citing self-defense and accusing MAMALAND of
cyberattacks. The conflict further intensified, resulting in extensive human tragedy and a legal dispute
filed by MAMALAND in the International Court of Justice, raising concerns about humanitarian aid
and adherence to international law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS 13 | Page

 ~ISSUES RAISED~

-ISSUE I-

Does the act of MEMELAND amount to self-defence or is it considered as Use of

Force? If self-defence, is it proportionate or in violation of the principles of
sovereignty?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 14 | Page

I. THAT THE SAID ACT OF MEMELAND AMOUNTS TO SELF-DEFENCE AND
IS IT PROPORTIONATE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Kronos that the petitions
filed by Darian Grey i.e. [1] writ petition challenging IT rules, [2] SLP filed against the
order of the high court, and [3] writ petition against Eagle LLC and Union of Kronos
under article 32 is not maintainable. Furthermore, it is submitted that ‘private entities
capable of discharging public functions’ are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.

It is humbly submitted that writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 32 can be
invoked when the infringement complaint is against the “state”. As it is established that Eagle
LLC is a private entity capable of discharging public functions does not fall under the ambit
of state under article 12 of the Constitution. Hence it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.

II. THAT DARIAN GREY’S STATEMENTS WHICH VIRTUALLY MOBILIZED

LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE AMOUNTS TO SEDITION, AND SHE IS NOT
ENTITLED TO PROTECTION FROM ARREST

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court that [A] Darian Grey’s statements
fall under the definition of disaffection given in Section 124-A and amounts to sedition. [B]
Ms. Grey is not entitled to protection from arrest under section 482 of CrPC.

It is humbly submitted that the present case does not qualify the criteria of rarest of rare case
and providing protection from arrest under 482 of CrPC would dislocate investigation.
Therefore, the High Court’s order to dismiss her application was right and Ms. Grey is not
entitled to protection from arrest under section 482 of CrPC.

III. THAT THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (INTERMEDIARY GUIDELINES

AND DIGITAL MEDIA ETHICS CODE) RULES, 2021 ARE CONSTITUTIONAL

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Information Technology
(Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 are constitutional. To

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 15 | Page

substantiate the claim the respondents, submit a two-fold argument. [A] The Power of
Reasonable Classification given to the State and [B] Doctrine of Harmonious Construction of
Statutory Provisions.

IV.THAT “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN” BE DECLARED AS A FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF KRONOS AND EAGLE LLC IS LIABLE
TO BRING DOWN ALL SUCH POSTS AS REQUESTED BY DARIAN GREY

It is humbly contented before the hon'ble supreme court of Kronos that the Right to Be
Forgotten can be declared as a fundamental right under the Constitution of Kronos. The
Respondents hereby submit a two-fold argument to prove the same. [A] That the “Right to Be
Forgotten” cannot exist in the sphere of the administration of justice [B] That the principle of
open justice has been identified as a central tenet of the rule of law.

Thus, it is humbly submitted that the request of Ms. Grey to take down the discharge order of
session court passed in 2017 goes against the principle of open justice. Hence, bringing it
down should not be a viable option at the hon’ble court’s plate.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 16 | Page

 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. THAT THE SAID PETITIONS FILED BY DARIAN GREY ARE NOT

MAINTAINABLE AND ‘PRIVATE ENTITIES CAPABLE OF DISCHARGING PUBLIC
FUNCTIONS’ ARE NOT AMENABLE TO WRIT JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Kronos that the petitions filed
by Darian Grey i.e. [1] writ petition challenging IT rules, [2] SLP filed against the order of
the high court, and [3] writ petition against Eagle LLC and Union of Kronos under article 32
is not maintainable. Furthermore, it is submitted that ‘private entities capable of discharging
public functions’ are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

A. THAT THE WRIT PETITION CHALLENGING IT RULES IS NOT MAINTAINABLE

¶1. It is humbly submitted that the writ petition filed by Ms. Grey under article 32 of the
constitution of Kronos challenging the IT rules is not maintainable. The following is
submitted in a three-fold argument. [1]. That no fundamental right is infringed. [2]. That an
alternate remedy was available and [3]. The Apex court Discouraging the use of art 32.

1. THAT NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IS INFRINGED

¶2. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble High Court that the writ petitions filed under
Article 321 by Darian Grey are not maintainable as there has not been a violation of
fundamental rights as every fundamental right comes with certain reasonable restrictions
which are in the wider interest of the public order and sovereignty and integrity of the
country. This was authoritatively held in Laxmi Khandsari v. the State of U.P2 that the “rights
enshrined in Part III of the Constitution are neither absolute nor unlimited but are subject to
reasonable restrictions which may be imposed by the State in the public interest.”

¶3. It is humbly submitted before the supreme court of Kronos that in Andhra Industrial Works
v. Chief Controller of Imports3, It has been held that no action lies in the Supreme Court
under Art. 32 unless there is an infringement of a Fundamental Right. It is further submitted
that a person acquires a locus standi when he has to have a personal or individual right that
has been

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 1 | Page

1
INDIA CONST. art. 32.
2
(1981) 2 SCC 600.
3
AIR 1974 SC 1539.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 2 | Page

violated or threatened to be violated.4 Since no fundamental right of the petitioner has been
infringed, she has no locus standi before the Court.

2. THAT AN ALTERNATE REMEDY WAS AVAILABLE

¶4. 4. It is humbly submitted that alternative remedy is a bar unless there is a complete lack of
jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take action impugned. 5 However, the existence of a
competent body (High Court) to hear this particular case questions the maintainability of the
writ petition filed. It was held by the Hon’ble apex court in Asstt. Collector of Central Excise
v. Jainson Hosiery6 that where there is alternative statutory remedy court should not interfere
unless the alternative remedy is too dilatory or cannot grant quick relief. Thus, the
respondents humbly submit that the present writ petition is not maintainable on the ground
that alternative remedy has not been exhausted.

¶5. It is further submitted that the hon’ble apex court in Union of India v. Paul Manickam7
has held that in order to invoke the jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Constitution to approach
this Court directly, it has to be shown by the petitioner as to why the High Court has not been
approached, could not be approached or it is futile to approach the High Court. Unless
satisfactory reasons are indicated in this regard, filing of the petition in such matters directly
under Art. 32 of the Constitution is to be discouraged.

¶6. It is humbly submitted that in cases such as Union of India v. Paul Manickam8, Kanubhai
Brahmbhatt v. the State of Gujarat9, and P.N. Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi10,
require the exhaustion of local remedies before approaching the Court under Art. 32.

¶7. It is humbly submitted that in State of West Bengal v. Ratnagiri Engineering Private
Limited11, the court refused to entertain the petition and observed, “the petitioner can file a
writ petition before the High Court under Article 22612 of the Constitution for this purpose.
Hence, we are not inclined to entertain this writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution.” In the

4
Calcutta Gas Co. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044.
5
A.V. Venkateshwaran v. R.S. Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1906.

6
AIR 1979 SC 1889.
7
AIR 2003 SC 4622.
8
Ibid.
9
AIR 1987 SC 1159.
10
(1987) 4 SCC 609.
11
(2010) 4 SCC 453.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 3 | Page

12
India Const. art. 226.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 4 | Page

present case, the petitioner had an alternate remedy to approach the high court under article
226 but she did not. Hence the writ petition filed by her in the supreme court is not
maintainable.

3. The Apex court Discouraging the use of art 32.

¶8. It is humbly submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has itself imposed self-restraint in
its humbly submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has itself imposed self-restraint in its
own wisdom on the exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 32 where the party invoking the
jurisdiction has an effective adequate alternative remedy in the form of Art. 226 of the
Constitution, although this Rule is a Rule of convenience and discretion rather than a Rule of
law.13

¶9. It is further submitted that while handling the case of journalist Siddique Kappan14, The
Supreme Court said that it is “trying to discourage article 32 petitions” and asked why the
petitioners could not go to the High Court. The same court in the case of Sameet Thakkar15
reiterated that “even high courts can uphold fundamental rights” thus discouraging the
petitioner from directly approaching the apex court.

¶10. It is submitted that Ms. Grey directly approaching the Supreme Court under article 32 of
the constitution is not maintainable as no fundamental right has been infringed and the
petitioner did not exhaust the alternate remedies before approaching the supreme court. So,
the writ petition challenging the IT rules should not be entertained.

B. THAT THE SLP FILED AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE HIGH COURT IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.

¶11. It is It is humbly adduced before the Hon’ble court that, as per a plethora of Supreme
Court judgments, the discretionary power vested with the court under article 13616 is to be
used sparingly, and in cases where there has been a gross injustice, and on limited grounds. 17
In Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai18, it was held that this
power cannot be invoked in a routine manner, but only “when a question of law of general
public

13
Mohammed Ishaq v. S. Kazam Pasha, (2009) 12 SCC 748.
14
Kerala Union of Working Journalists v. Union of India & Ors., (2021) SC 234.
15
Sameet Rakesh Thakkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 3765.
16
India Const. art. 136.
17
Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Vindhya Telelinks Ltd., (2009) 14 SCC 16.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 5 | Page
18
(2004) 3 SCC 214.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 6 | Page

importance arises or a decision sought to be impugned before this Court shocks its
conscience.” In the present case, there exist no exceptional circumstances.

¶12. Furthermore, the court has on several occasions remarked that it was the High Court that
was intended to be the final court of appeal, and Article 136 was just a provision to ensure
that substantial justice is done.19 Having said that, the corollary, which can be corroborated by
the Supreme Court decisions, is that the provision is to be used judiciously. A vast number of
Special Leave Petitions are filed and summarily dismissed by the court. The backlog of the
cases ironically vitiates the actual objective of the article. Wastage of Court's time leads to
unnecessary delay in conclusions.20

¶13. It is humbly contended that there exist no exceptional circumstances and a substantial
question of law, au contraire, this case merely involves the application of the well-settled
principles and laws. This was also held in the five-judge judgment of Chunilal vs. Century
Spg, where justices noted that this court will not invoke its special jurisdiction for “mere
question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question
would not be a substantial question of law.”21

¶14. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that, Per Curiam, Ganga
Kumar Srivastava v. the State of Bihar22, where it was held that the Supreme Court has some
self- imposed limitations on criminal appeals, and will not consider special leave petitions in
criminal cases, especially when there are concurrent findings of fact unless there are
exceptional circumstances, such as perversity or impropriety, violation of natural justice
principles, error of law or record, or misreading of the evidence. Therefore, when it comes to
criminal cases, that too involving sovereignty and integrity of India, the threshold of
maintainability is higher and the general rule of non-interference is to be followed.23

C. THAT THE WRIT PETITION FILED AGAINST EAGLE LLC AND UNION OF KRONOS IS
MAINTAINABLE

¶15. The Supreme Court in Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India24 emphasized
that “The violation of Fundamental Right is the sine qua non of the exercise of the right
conferred

19
Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills v. CIT AIR 1955 SC 65.
20
Sanwant Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 715.
21
Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd., 1962 Supp (3) SCR 549.
22
Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar, (2005) 6 SCC 211.
23
Saddik v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 10 SCC 663.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 7 | Page

24
AIR 1981 SC 344.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 8 | Page

by Art. 32.” but in the case, at hand, no fundamental right has been violated as at present
Kronos criticized the unmindful practice of filing writ petitions. 25 In the case of Janata Dal vs
H.S. Chowdhary26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referring to other notable authorities,
criticized the practice. The bench observed that, though it is the responsibility of this Court to
enforce fundamental rights, it is also the responsibility of this Court to ensure that Article 32
is not misused, resulting in a bottleneck, preventing the court from considering other genuine
violations of fundamental rights.”27

¶17. It is humbly submitted that the hon'ble apex court in the famous case of Zee Telefilms vs.
UOI28 stated some points of criteria for an entity to come under ambit of article 12, firstly the
body should be created by a statute. Secondly, there should be deep and pervasive state
control. Considering these criteria Eagle LLC does not fall under the ambit of state under
article 1229.

¶18. There is a catena of pronouncements by the Hon'ble Supreme court upholding the trite
law that a petition under Art 32 is not maintainable if the alleged respondent is not a state as
per art 12, one of the landmark cases is Pradeep Kumar Biswas 30 where the court dismissed
the petition as it was not maintainable because it was against a non-state entity similarly
further the ones which are private limited companies have no state interference, hence cannot
be even by any stretch of imagination brought under the ambit of Art 12.

¶19. Thus, it is humbly submitted that the said petition filed by Ms. Grey is liable to be
dismissed because the right to be forgotten is not a fundamental right under the constitution
and private entities are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of SC.

D. ‘PRIVATE ENTITIES CAPABLE OF DISCHARGING PUBLIC FUNCTIONS’ ARE NOT AMENABLE

TO WRIT JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

¶ It is humbly submitted that article 12 of the Constitution defines the state. It states
“Definition In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the
Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the
States and all local

25
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Chairman, CBDT, (2004) 6 SCC 431; State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant
Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402; Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 5 SCC 136; Neetu v. State of
Punjab, (2007) 10 SCC 614; Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B., (2004) 3 SCC 349; B. Singh (Dr) v. Union
of India, (2004) 3 SCC 363; Kushum Lata v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 180.
26
(1992) 4 SCC 305.
27
Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P., (1990) 4 SCC 449
28
(2005) AIR 2677 SC.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 9 | Page
29
India Const. art.12.
30
(2002) 5 SCC 111.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 10 | Page

or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of
India”. Private entities capable of discharging public functions do not fall under the definition
of state, provided in article 12 of the constitution.

¶21. It is further submitted that in Roychan Abraham vs State Of U.P.31, the Allahabad High
Court held that the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 32 could be invoked
only in respect of rights conferred by Part-III in relation to 'State' actions. To invoke the
constitutional remedy, the infringement complained must essentially be against 'State' under
article 12. Thus, the Supreme Court would decline relief and petition under Article 32 upon
finding that the infringing authority is not a 'State', in that event writ petition under Article 32
would not be maintainable.

1. That, private entities cannot be considered as state under article 12 of Indian constitution

22. It is humbly submitted that a body can be considered as a “state” within article 12 when
the body is financially, functionally, and administratively dominated by or under the control
of the government and such control is particular to the body and is pervasive. If the control is
merely regulatory, it will not be a State.32

¶23. It is further submitted that the Supreme Court in various cases like U.P. Warehousing
Corporation v. Vijai Narain33 and Som Prakash v. Union of India34 has been of the view that,
only the entities that were constituted under a statute, owned, or controlled by the
Government was an agency or instrumentality of the Government can be considered as
“state” within the meaning of Article 12.

¶24. It is humbly submitted that the hon'ble apex court in the famous case of Zee Telefilms v.
UOI35 stated some points of criteria for an entity to come under the ambit of article 12, firstly
the body should be created by a statute, i.e., it should be a statutory body created by an Act of
Parliament, for example, Reserve Bank of India established under the Reserve Bank of India
Act, 1934.- or the Bar Council of India or a State Bar Council created by the Advocates Act,
1961. Secondly, there should be deep and pervasive state control.36

31
., 2019 (3) ADJ 391 (FB).
32
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Union of India, (2002) 5 SCC 111.
33
(1987) 3 SCC 395.
34
AIR 1981 SC 212 11.

35
Supra note 29.
36
Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar, (2015) 3 SCC 251.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 11 | Page

¶25. In the present situation, the company (Eagle LLC) is not created by any act of
parliament, it is also not a statutory body, rather it is a private entity based in the US.
Furthermore, there is no deep and persuasive state control i.e., state has no control over the
finance or management of the company as well as no control in the decision-making process
in running the affairs of the company.

¶26. It is humbly submitted that writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 32 can
be invoked when the infringement complaint is against the “state”. As it is established that
Eagle LLC is a private entity capable of discharging public functions does not fall under the
ambit of state under article 12 of the Constitution. Hence it is not amenable to the writ
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

II. THAT DARIAN GREY’S STATEMENTS WHICH VIRTUALLY MOBILIZED LARGE

NUMBER OF PEOPLE AMOUNTS TO SEDITION, AND SHE IS NOT ENTITLED TO
PROTECTION FROM ARREST.

¶27. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court that [A] Darian Grey’s
statements fall under the definition of disaffection given in Section 124-A and amounts to
sedition. To substantiate this, claim the respondents submit a two-fold argument. [1] The
content's language must be reasonable and not something that could spark violence, cause
disaffection or public disorder. [2] restrictions on freedom of speech and expression in the
interests of public order are protected by the mandate of Article 19(2). [B] Ms. Grey is not
entitled to protection from arrest under section 482 of CrPC.

A. THAT DARIAN GREY’S STATEMENTS WHICH VIRTUALLY MOBILIZED A LARGE NUMBER

OF PEOPLE AMOUNTS TO SEDITION

¶28. It is humbly submitted that the definition of Sedition under the section 124A of IPC 37
clearly states that whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representation, or otherwise brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or
attempts to excite disaffection towards, the Government established by law in India shall be
punished. The decisive ingredient for establishing the case of sedition under section 124 A of
IPC is the doing of certain acts which would bring the govt established in India by law in
hatred or contempt. In the case at hand Ms. Grey’s statement uses phrases like “the gov has
failed to

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 12 | Page

37
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §124A.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 13 | Page

curb the menace”, “boycott these rules”, “lets protest against it” has clearly mobilized a large
number of people by inculcating into them hatred/enmity/disloyalty against by gov.

1. THE CONTENT'S LANGUAGE MUST BE REASONABLE AND NOT SOMETHING THAT COULD SPARK
VIOLENCE, CAUSE DISAFFECTION, OR PUBLIC DISORDER.

¶29. It is further submitted that the issue of sedition was first tried in 1892, Queen-Empress v.
Jogendra Chunder Bose38 wherein the Court distinguished between “disaffection” (dislike or
hatred) and “disapprobation” (disapproval), and expressly linked “disaffection” to “a
disposition not to obey the lawful authority of the government”. 39 Furthermore, in Queen
Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak40, the meaning of “disaffection” was clarified, wherein the
court equated it to “disloyalty”, “ill-will” and “enmity”. 41 The Court held that the strength of
the feeling was immaterial; in particular, the Court held that one did not need to advocate
mutiny, rebellion, or disturbance in order to be hit by the Section; all that was needed was the
advocacy of “feelings of enmity”.42

¶30. It is humbly submitted that after the pronouncement in the case of Kedarnath by the
Supreme Court, the public disorder has been considered to be a necessary ingredient of
section 124A IPC by the courts. The Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Kedar Nath
Singh v. State of Bihar43, and the subsequent decisions have clearly and uniformly held that a
penal action can be taken if the words spoken or written, etc. have pernicious tendency or
intention of creating public disorder.

¶31. It is further submitted that a prayer was made in the case of Common Cause & Anr. v.
Union of India44, to issue directions for review of pending cases of sedition in various courts,
where a superior police officer may certify that the seditious act either led to the incitement of
violence or had the tendency or the intention to create public disorder. The court granted the
prayer and directed the authorities that while dealing with section 124A IPC, they are to be
guided by the principles laid down in Kedar Nath.

38
1892) 19 ILR Cal 35.
39
R.A. Nelson, “INDIAN PENAL CODE” (10th ed. 2008).
40
(1898) ILR 22 Bom 112.
41
Debi Soren and Ors. v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254.
42
Queen Empress v. Ramchandra Narayan, ILR (1898) 22 Bom 152.
43
AIR 1962 SC 955
44
(2016) 15 SCC 269.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 14 | Page

¶32. It is humbly submitted that in Arun Ghosh v. the State of W.B.45, the court drew a
distinction between the serious and aggravated form of breaches of public order that endanger
public peace and minor breaches that do not affect the public at large would be apposite. In
consonance with the constitutional mandate of reasonable restriction and doctrine of
proportionality in facts of each case, it has to be ascertained whether the act meets the top of
Clapham omnibus test and whether the act was “likely” to lead to disturbance of the current
life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of public order; or it may affect an
individual or some individuals leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed. The latter
and acts excluded on the application of the top of the Clapham omnibus test are not covered.
Therefore, anti-democratic speech in a general and political extremist speech in particular,
which has no useful purpose, if and only when in the nature of incitement to violence that
“creates”, or is “likely to create” or “promotes” or is “likely to promote” public disorder,
would not be protected.

¶33. It is further submitted that the court in Harpreet Kaur v. the State of Maharashtra 46, held
that Crime is a revolt against the whole society and an attack on the civilization of the day. In
their essential quality, the activities which affect “law and order” and those which disturb
“public order” may not be different but in their potentiality and effect upon even tempo of the
society and public tranquillity, there is a vast difference.

¶34. Hence, the intent of the section was to punish an act of exciting feelings of disaffection
towards the government, but this disaffection was to be distinguished from disapprobation.
Thus, people were free to voice their feelings against the government as long as they
projected a will to obey its lawful authority.47

2. RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION IN THE INTERESTS OF PUBLIC ORDER

ARE PROTECTED BY THE MANDATE OF ARTICLE 19(2).

¶35. It is humbly submitted that a bare reading of the provision of Article 19(2) 48 of the
Constitution of India makes it sufficiently clear that any legislation which seemingly
impinges on the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a)49
should, inter-

45
1970 SCC (Cri) 67.
46
(1992) 2 SCC 177.
47
W.R. Donogh, “a treatise on the law of sedition and cognate offences in british india” (Thacker, Spink and
Co. 8th ed. 2013).
48
INDIA CONST. art.19 cl.2.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 15 | Page

49
Id at cl.1(a).

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 16 | Page

alia, be in the interests of public order.50 This position of law has been affirmed by this
Hon’ble court in the case of Virender v. State of Punjab 51 wherein the Hon’ble Court held that
any law which is enacted in the interest of public order may be saved from the vice of
constitutional invalidity.52

¶36. It is further submitted that In Whitney v. California53 Justice Brandeis in his famous
concurring judgment said: “To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced”. As per the facts Ms.
Grey took the support of social media and tried to propagate her hateful stand against the gov.
Social media posts can be used to brainwash and create hate against the government to
succeed the propaganda.54

¶37. It is further submitted that the Supreme Court has been consistently pronouncing in
various judgments that the right to free speech and expression is not absolute in nature.55 It is
subjected to reasonable restrictions as enshrined in Article 19(2) and other laws, such as
section 124A of IPC.56 In the case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India57 it was held that only
when advocacy reaches the level of incitement, a law may be made curtailing the speech or
expression that leads inexorably to cause public disorder.58

¶38. It is humbly submitted that In Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India59, this Court has
observed that rights of citizens under Article 19(1) have to be balanced against the rights of
citizens and persons under Article 2160 and the latter rights cannot be sacrificed as this would
lead to detrimental consequences and even anarchy. Moreover, Article 19(1)(a)61 cannot be
pressed

50
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 293.
51
AIR 1958 SC 986.
52
KP Varghese v. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173; Abdul Hamid Shamsi v. Abdul Majid, (1988) 1 SCC 507.
53
71 L. Ed. 1095.
54
Zachary Laub, “Hate Speech on Social Media: Global Comparisons” available at:
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hate-speech-social-media-global-comparisons (Visited on February 19,
2022).
55
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
56
Arunachal Nadar v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 300.
57
AIR 2015 SC 1523.
58
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118.
59
(2011) 8 SCC 1.
60
India Const. art.21.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 17 | Page

61
Id at art.19 cl.1(a).

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 18 | Page

into service for defeating the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21 as if one claims the
right to speech, the others have the right to listen or decline to listen.62

¶39. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized the impact that acts of sedition have on
the public order.63 Seditious statements seed ‘hatred’ and ‘contempt’ by imputing the
government to dishonourable motives in charge of its duties and unjustly accuses the
government of indifference to the people.64 The feelings of disloyalty disseminated as a result
of this offense tend to give rise to public disorder leading to disruption of state and even
threat to its security. Sedition is described as disloyalty in action and it considers all
endeavours to promote public disorder.65

¶40. It is submitted that the persons of influence, keeping in view their reach, impact, and
authority they wield on the general public or the specific class to which they belong, owe a
duty and have to be more responsible.66 Ms. Grey being an influential personality spoke
words that are not in line with the fundamental right of free speech and are subject to the
reasonable restriction imposed under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution in the interest of
national integrity, public order, sovereignty, and security of the state and nation.

B. MS. GREY IS NOT ENTITLED TO PROTECTION FROM ARREST UNDER SECTION 482 OF CRPC.
¶41. It is humbly submitted that section 482 of CrPC 67 provides saving of the inherent powers
of the high court such as quashing an FIR or providing interim protection from arrest as may
be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of
any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ms. Grey is not entitled to protection
from arrest, on the grounds that such protection can only be granted in rarest of rare cases and
not under normal circumstances and the police have the statutory right to investigate
circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime. Moreover, such reliefs would dislocate
investigation thereby amounting to the travesty of justice.

62
Noise Pollution (VI), In re, (2005) 8 SCC 794.
63
Nazir Khan v. the State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461.
64
Annie Besant v. Advocate General of Madras, AIR 1919 PC 31.
65
V.N. Shukla, “CONSTITUTION OF INDIA” 145 (Mahendra P. Singh rev., 12th ed. 2016).
66
Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1.
67
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 482.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 19 | Page

1. GRANTING PROTECTION FROM ARREST UNDER SECTION 482 SHOULD BE AN EXCEPTION AND A
RARITY THAN AN ORDINARY RULE

¶42. The exercise of power conferred by section 482 of CrPC is an exception, not a rule. 68 It
must only be exercised in the rarest of the rare cases. The criteria for the same were laid down
by Hon’ble SC in the State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal69. In the case on hand, the FIR filed
prima facie constitutes an offense (sedition) which is of cognizable nature and is duly backed
by evidence and lacks mala fide intentions given that the statement made by accused Ms.
Grey did mobilize a large number of people on social media causing serious threat to peace
and security of the nation. Thus, the present case does not qualify the criteria of rarest of rare
cases and cannot be sustained on the touchstone of the principles which have been
consistently laid down by the Supreme Court.

¶43. It is further submitted that the Supreme Court in M/s. Neeharika70 gave the view that
high courts passing an interim order to the effect that “no coercive steps to be adopted” is a
grave error of law. And, even in exceptional cases where the High Court is prima facie of the
view that case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, the High Court
has to accord brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted. Thus, there has to be the
application of the judicial mind and such order cannot be paused mechanically. It was held
that

“However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing
petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be
passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically.”

¶44. It is humbly submitted that in State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani 71, the Court
deprecated recent practices where High Courts dismiss quashing petitions under Section 482
CrPC and pass interim orders for a stay on investigation or arrest. Such interim orders have
been held prima facie illegal and unwarranted as they encroach upon the domain under
Section 438 CrPC.

¶45. Moreover, in Nathu Singh vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh72, the bench explained that the
discretionary power could not be exercised by the high courts “in an untrammelled manner”.

68
Som Mittal v. State of Karnataka, 2008 AIR SCW 1003.
69
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri).
70
Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401.
71
(2017) 2 SCC 779.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 20 | Page

72
(1979) 3 SCC 574.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 21 | Page

Such directions by the High Courts exceed its judicial discretion and amounts to judicial
largesse, which the courts do not possess.

2. SUCH RELIEFS WOULD DISLOCATE INVESTIGATION THEREBY AMOUNTING TO TRAVESTY OF

JUSTICE.
¶46. It is submitted that in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad 73, wherein it has been held
that there exists a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of
an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities.
Police have the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate cognizable offenses.

¶47. It is humbly submitted that the present case does not qualify the criteria of rarest of rare
case and providing protection from arrest under 482 of CrPC would dislocate investigation
thereby amounting to the travesty of justice. Therefore, the High Court’s order to dismiss her
application for an order to seek protection from arrest was right and Ms. Grey is not entitled
to protection from arrest under section 482 of CrPC.

III. THAT THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (INTERMEDIARY GUIDELINES AND

DIGITAL MEDIA ETHICS CODE) RULES, 2021 ARE CONSTITUTIONAL

¶48. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Information
Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 are
constitutional. To substantiate the claim the respondents, submit a two-fold argument. [A]
The Power of Reasonable Classification given to the State and [B] The rules prevent the
spread of misinformation and disinformation

A. THE POWER OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION GIVEN TO THE STATE

¶49. It is humbly submitted that Article 14 74 of the Constitution states that “the State shall not
deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the
territory of India”. No one is above the law of the land and the Rule of Law shall prevail
before anything. However, this rule is subject to exceptions.

73
1944 SCC OnLine PC 29.

74
India Const. art.14.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 22 | Page

This standing has been further bolstered in the case of Anwar Ali Sarkar v. The State of West
Bengal75. The hon’ble court opined that the Rule of Law cannot prevent a certain class of
persons from being subject to special laws and thus, giving state the power to make laws
operating differently on different classes of persons, in order to follow principle of equality of
civil rights and equal protection of the law.

¶50. The power of Reasonable Classification given to the State must not be arbitrary,
artificial, or evasive and must always rest upon some real and substantial grounds. In the
same case the Supreme Court laid down the twin test for reasonable classification. The court
held that for the classification to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled:
i.) Classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that
are grouped together from others and
ii.) The differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.

¶51. It is humbly submitted that the classification of intermediaries done under the
Information Technology rules, 2021 is reasonable and not arbitrary, artificial, or evasive.
In accordance with the twin test, it is founded on intelligible differentia, as the distinction
between digital media and mainstream media is constitutional. Mainstream media, being
centuries old domain, is already well regulated and has numerous acts like Press Council Act
197876 guiding its working. On the contrary, the digital domain being a neophyte spectrum
lacks rules and regulations. It is imperative to monitor the misuse of these platforms since
practically everyone now has Internet access and not everyone is using it properly. Thus,
enacting law particularly for digital media for bringing about a robust regulatory mechanism
is well within the ambit of constitutionality. The differentia has a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the Act, which is better regulation of social media by the
intermediaries. Therefore, the IT Rules, 2021 are constitutional.
B. The rules prevent the spread of misinformation and disinformation

¶52. It is humbly submitted that the IT rules, 2021 have been framed to prevent the spread of
misinformation and disinformation through regulation of the content being uploaded. They
provide for a robust mechanism for the monitoring of the content and protection of the user’s
rights.

75
1952 SCR 284.
76
Act 25 of 1867.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 23 | Page

¶53. Moreover, the rules do not have a chilling effect on the freedom of speech and
expression as they do not impose any penalties on users who post anything in contravention
of the IT Rules. The only consequence for the users is the removal of such content or the
termination of the user’s account by the intermediary, which may be challenged by the user
under the grievance redressal mechanism laid out in the IT Rules or by way of judicial
review.

¶54. It is also important to note here that the right to privacy is not absolute and whenever the
need be, the right to privacy can be intruded upon to protect the fundamental rights of the
citizens.

¶55. It is further submitted that under the rules, content can only be removed if it is unlawful
and after a court order, and on being notified by the authorised agency.

¶56. It is further submitted that in the case Sneha Kalita v. Union of India,77 the court upheld
the banning of dangerous and suicidal games and other forms of violent and immoral games
as they are dangerous to life and cannot be allowed. Therefore, the IT Rules will regulate
media in a similar manner to prevent its users from suffering from any harm or loss.

¶57. It is further submitted that in Bhavesh D. Parish & Anr. Vs. Union of India78, the
Supreme Court was concerned with the validity of a particular section of the reserve bank of
India act. The submissions of the petitioners was that the impugned section brought
unreasonable restrictions on their right to carry on their business. The court observed that
unless the provision is manifestly unjust or glaringly unconstitutional, the courts must show
judicial restraint in staying the applicability of the same, and the principle of presumption of
the constitutional validity of any legislation, ought to be considered till the same is set-aside
at the final hearing.

¶58. In Health for Millions v. Union of India79, the Supreme Court has observed that the rules
can be quashed if the same are found to be unconstitutional or ultra vires the provisions of the
Act, however, the operation of the statutory provision cannot be stultified by granting an
interim order except when the Court is fully convinced that the parts under enactment or the
rules are ex facie unconstitutional and the factors like balance of convenience, irreparable
injury and public interest are in favour of passing an interim order.

77
(2018) 12 SCC 674.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 24 | Page
78
, AIR 2000 SC 2047.
79
(2014) 14 SCC 496.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 25 | Page

¶59. In State of Bihar v. Rai Bahadur Hurdut Roy Moti Lal Jute Mills 80, the Supreme Court
held In cases where the vires of statutory provisions are challenged on constitutional grounds,
it is essential that the material facts should first be clarified and ascertained with a view to
determine whether the impugned statutory provisions are attracted; if they are, the
constitutional challenge to their validity must be examined and decided. If, however, the facts
admitted or proved do not attract the impugned provisions there is no occasion to decide the
issue about the vires of the said provisions. Therefore, the IT Rules cannot be declared
unconstitutional.

¶60. Thus, when it comes to the constitutionality of legislation or government guidelines the
court should take into account the gravity of the unconstitutionality. Further, it should be
presumed to be legal unless it has been challenged in a court of law which was held in the
case of State of Tamilnadu v. P. Krishnamurthy81, which has not happened in the present case.
Therefore, the IT Rules are constitutional.

IV. RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN CANNOT BE DECLARED AS A FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHT

¶61. It is humbly contented before the humble supreme court of kronos that the Right to Be
Forgotten can be declared as a fundamental right under the Constitution of Kronos. The
respondents hereby submit a two-fold argument to prove the same. [A] That the “right to be
forgotten” cannot exist in the sphere of the administration of justice [B] That the principle of
open justice has been identified as a central tenet of the rule of law.
[A] THAT THE “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN” CANNOT EXIST IN THE SPHERE OF THE

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

¶62. It is humbly adduced that the Madras High Court in the case of Karthick Theodre v.
Registrar General82 has explained that the “right to be forgotten” cannot exist in the sphere of
the administration of justice particularly in the context of judgments delivered by courts. It
was opined that the needed to be a proper policy formulated in this regard through specific
rules.

80
, (1960) 2 SCR 331.
81
[2006] 4 SCC 517s
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 26 | Page
82
2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2755.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 27 | Page

Furthermore, it was held that “The sanctity of an original record cannot be altered or
otherwise dealt with except in a manner prescribed by law”.

83
¶63. Furthermore, the court in Karthick Theodre v. Registrar General held that this 'right'
can be a difficult thing in thus digital era. In 2018, CIMA published information Not Found, a
report that examined how the so-called " right to be forgotten" threatened the ability of
journalists to research and investigate public interest news stories. Some opined RTBF to be a
threat to freedom of expression and speech. Therefore, both should be properly balanced.
¶64. Moreover, The EU in 2018 adopted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
Article 1784 of which provides for the right to erasure of certain categories of personal data —
that which is considered no longer necessary, that for which consent has been withdrawn or
processing of which has been objected to, personal data unlawfully processed, and data where
there is a legal obligation for erasure. However, the regulations limit the right to erasure in
certain circumstances, including for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, for
archiving purposes “in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or
statistical purposes in accordance” and for “establishment, exercise or defence of legal
claims.” In the present case the removal of the posts as contented by Ms. Grey is not in public
interest or scientific or defence of legal claims.
¶65. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble supreme court that in various cases like
Dharamraj Bhanushankar Dave v. State of Gujarat85, and Anchit Chawla v. Google India86,
the right to seek disablement of search results in the manner sought by the plaintiff, has been
rejected by the courts.
¶66. Furthermore, an exception to the aforesaid position can be seen in cases of victims of
rape and other sexual offences where the Supreme Court itself has directed that the identity of
victims cannot be disclosed. But in present situation, petitioner was not the victim of rape or
other sexual offences, hence this exception would also not apply to the present situation.
¶67. Although the Supreme Court has adopted a broad approach to interpreting the scope of
the article 21, but it does not mean that the article embraces an unlimited scope of activity. It
must be proved beyond satisfactory threshold that how the activity bolsters right to life in
order

83
Ibid.
84
The General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

85
2017 SCC OnLine Guj 2493.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 28 | Page

86
Anchit Chawla v. Google India WP(C) 13921/2018.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 29 | Page

to be included within the ambit of art. 21. Hence right to be forgotten should not be declared
as a fundamental right under Constitution of Kronos.

[B] THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF OPEN JUSTICE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CENTRAL TENET OF
THE RULE OF LAW

¶68. It is humbly submitted that the principle of open justice is a 'safeguard against judicial
arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy and maintains the public confidence in the administration of
justice'.
¶69. It is humbly submitted that the High Court in Karthick Theodre v. Registrar General87
citing the decision of House of Lords in Scott v. Scott88, stated that the principle of open
justice must yield to the still more paramount duty to do justice. After all, publicity is only a
means to an end. Furthermore, the Court added that in India the principle of open justice has
been identified as a central tenet of the rule of law.
¶70. Moreover in Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India89, it has been established that
public access to judgments of Courts is an integral percept of the concept of open justice,
promoting the rule of law. In present case, petitioner also requested to remove the discharge
order of Sessions Court passed in 2017, if such things happen it would go against the
principal of open justice.
¶71. It is humbly adduced before the Hon’ble supreme court of Kronos that in the case of
Guardian News and Media Ltd v. City of Westminster Magistrates' Court90, it was held that
“In a democracy, where power depends on the consent of the people governed, the answer
must lie in the transparency of the legal process. Open justice lets in the light and allows the
public to scrutinise the workings of the law, for better or for worse.”
¶72. It is further put forth that the Madras high court in Karthick91 held that “Public
confidence in the judiciary and in the process of judicial decision making is crucial for
preserving the rule of law and to maintain the stability of the social fabric. Peoples' access to
the court signifies that the public is willing to have disputes resolved in court and to obey and
accept judicial orders. Open courts effectively foster public confidence by allowing litigants
and members of

87
2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2755.s
88
Scott v. Scott, 1913 A.C. 417, (HL).
89
, (2018) 10 SCC 639.
90
Regina (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v. City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court, [2011] 1 WLR 3253.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 30 | Page

91
2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2755.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 31 | Page

the public to view courtroom proceedings and ensure that the Judges apply the law in a fair
and impartial manner.”

¶73. Thus, it is humbly submitted that the request of Ms. Grey to take down the discharge
order of session court passed in 2017 goes against the principle of open justice. Hence,
bringing it down should not be a viable option at the hon’ble court’s plate.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 32 | Page

 PRAYER

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF FACTS STATED, ISSUES RAISED,

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND AUTHORITIES CITED, IT IS MOST HUMBLY
PRAYED AND IMPLORED BEFORE THE HOB’BLE SC OF KRONOS THAT IT
MAY BE GRACIOUSLY PLEASED TO ADJUDGE AND DECLARE THAT:

I. The petitions filed by Ms. Grey are not maintainable and ‘private entities
discharging public functions’ are not amenable to jurisdiction of SC.

II. Darian Grey is guilty for sedition and she is not entitled to protection from arrest.

III. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines And Digital Media Ethics

Code) Rules 2021 not be declared unconstitutional.

IV. ‘Right to be Forgotten’ not be declared a fundamental right. And, Eagle LLC is
not liable to bring down all requested posts.

And/or pass any such order or directions the hon’ble court deems fit and proper in the
furtherance of justice, equity and good conscience, all of which is respectfully submitted.

For this act of kindness, the Respondent shall duty bound forever pray.

~S/d~

Counsels on behalf of the Respondents

PRAYER 16 | Page