UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LEGAL STUDIES- COMPULSORY

MOOT- 9th SEMESTER, 2024

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF

PUNJAB AND HARYANA

IN THE MATTER OF:

Mr. Samarveer and Anr........................................................... PETITIONER

VERSUS

State of Haryana and Anr. ........................................................ RESPONDENT

Criminal Case No. of 2021

(Under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973)

As submitted to the Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab

and Haryana.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

NAME- JASKARAN SINGH MATHARU

ROLL NO. 381/20
B.COM.LLB [Hons.]
SECTION F
th
9 SEMESTER

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

S. NO. TABLE OF CONTENTS PG.

NO.

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 8

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 9

5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 10

6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 11

7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 12

7(A). 12
ISSUE I: WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID FIR (NO. 110) DATED 30 JANUARY
2021 IS LIABLE TO BE QUASHED?

7(B) ISSUE2: WHETHER THE INGREDIENTS OF SECTION 498A OF IPC AND 20

SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961 ARE SATISFIED IN
F.I.R. REGISTERED AS CASE CRIME NO. 110/2021?

7(C) ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ‘BENEFIT OF 25

DOUBT’ IN ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE?

8. PRAYER 26

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 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

S.NO. ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

1. @ At

2. § Section

3. fj Paragraph

4. fjfj Paragraphs

5. A.I.R. All India Reporter

6. ACC Anticipation Claim Chart

7. AD Application Date

8. CC Claim Chart

9. SRA Specific Relief Act

10. CL Compulsory Licensing

11. Co. Company

12. Ed. Edition

13. v. Versus

14. Govt. Government

15. HC High Court of Sargam

16. HJLP Harvard Journal of Law &

Technology
17. Hon’ble Honorable

18. I.L.R. Indian Law Reporter

19. ICA Indian Contract Act

20. SC Supreme Court

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

S. NO. CASES PG. NO.

1. State of Haryana V. Bhajan Lal 1922 Supp (1) SCC 335 12

2. Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 13

3. Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, AIR 2015 SC 14

923

4. Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, [(2004) 8 SCC 100] 14

5. Shri v. State of Karnataka [(1979) 2 SCC 563] 15

6. Jai Prakash v. State of Haryana (2003) 6 SCC 130 15

7. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) 1 SCC 335 15

8. Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Manju Sharma (2005) 6 SCC 281 16

9. Geeta Mehrotra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 10 SCC 741 16

10. M. S. M. Sharma v. Krishna Sinha 1959 AIR 395 16

11. Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Manju Sharma (2005) 6 SCC 281 17

12. Nandini Satpathy vs. P. L. Dani 1978 AIR 1025 17

13. K. K. Verma v. State of U.P. (1994) 1 SCC 487 17

14. K.S. Prakash v. State of Karnataka [(2005) 12 SCC 144] 17

15. Sanjeev Kumar v. State of Haryana 2016 (5) ILR (Punjab & Haryana) 18
256

16. K. Krishnan v. State of Kerala, (2003) 7 SCC 622 18

17. Appasaheb & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2007 SC 763. 20

18. Arnesh Kumar V. State of Bihar 2014 (3) SCC (CRI) 44 21
19. Vishnu v. State of Kerala 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 5131 22

20. Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 958. 23

21. Ghusabhai Raisangbhai Chorasiya v. State of Gujarat, Criminal 23

Appeal (SC) No. 262 of 2009.
22. Akula Ravinder v. State, AIR 1991 SC 1142. 23

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 23. Mohan Lal v. State, (1984) 1 Chand. LR 647 (P and H); Ashok Kumar 23
v. State, 1987 Cr LJ 1412 (P&H).

24. Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2004 (3) SCC 98. 24

25. Hira Lal v. State of Delhi (Government of NCT), 2003 Cr. LJ 3711 24
(SC);
26. State of Andhra Pradesh v. RajGopal Asawa, 2004 Cr. LJ 1791 (SC). 24

27. Kunhiabdulla v. State of Kerela, 2004 Cr. LJ 5005 (SC). 24

28. Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637 25

29. Anil W. Singh v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67; 25

30. Reddy Sampath W. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2005) 7 SCC 603; 25

31. Ramreddy & Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 25
10 SCC 172
32. Sher Singh alias Partapa v. State of Haryana, 2015 CrLJ 1118 (SC). 25

33. Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2007 Cr LJ 1435 (SC). 25

34. Sharadbhai Jivanlal Vaniya v. State of Gujarat, 2012 Cr LJ 1575 (SC). 25

35. Durga Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 9 SCC 73. 25

S.NO. BOOKS

1. FLETCHER, G.P. (2000), RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

2. DRESSLER, J., STRONG, F.R., & MICHAEL MORITZ, E. (2001)-

UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW

3. JUBAER, S. M. O. F., & AHMED, J. “DEFICIENCY IN EVIDENCE LAW OF

EVIDENCE LAW OF CONCERNING TECHNOLOGICAL SUPPORT AND
EXPERT SUPPORT
4. CHIEF JUSTICE M. MONIR, LAW OF EVIDENCE (17th ed. LexisNexis 2016).

5|Page
5. JUBAER, S.M.O.F., MOSTOFA, S.H., DEB, B., MOUMI, A., & RAHMAN, F.
(2021). THE IDEA OF RIGHTS: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE APPROACH

6. JUBAER, SHAH. (2012). THE VARIOUS CONTRADICTORY REMEDIAL

PROVISIONS IN PENAL CODE 1860: AN ANALYTICAL FINDINGS

7. RATANLAL & DHIRAJ LAL, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (26th ed. LexisNexis
2021).

8. HOQUE, LIQA. (2021). EDUCATION AND WRONGDOING: AN

ANALYTICAL STUDY

9.
DEB, BISHAL.(2021). THE CONCEPT OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL : A
METHODICAL OBSERVATION

10. FELSON, M., & BOBA, R.L. (EDS.). (2010). CRIME AND EVERYDAY LIFE

11. NARENDRA KUMAR, INIDAN PENAL CODE, 1872 (1st ed. Allahabad
Law Agency, 2015).

12. SARKAR, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 (7th ed. Sweet & Soft,
2020).

13. NILSJANSEN, REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, COMMENTARIES

ON
EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAWS (Online ed. New York, Oxford UniversityPress,
2018).
14. PHILIP CLARKE, JULIE CLARKE, CRIMINAL LAW: COMMENTARIES,
CASES AND PERSPECTIVE (1 ed. Oxford Publishing House, 2007).

15. RAM JETMELANI & DS CHOPRA, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2nd ed. West
Thomson Reuters 2016).

16. H.K. SAHARAY, DUTT ON LAW OF CRIMES: THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
(11th ed. Eastern Law House, 2018).

17. DR. R.K. MALIA, INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT (15th ed. Allahabad Law Agency,
2015).

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18. CM ROW, LAW OF INJUNCTIONS (10th ed. Universal Law Publishing, 2017).

19. NARAYAN SAXENA, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (1st ed. Alpha

Edition, 2019).

20. JUSTICE GP SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

(15th ed. LexisNexis, 2022).

21. SARKAR, SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT (18th ed. LexisNexis, 2020).

22. JOHN CARTWRIGHT, MISREPRESENTATION, MISTAKE AND NON-

DISCLOSURE (5th ed. SWEET AND MAXWELL, 2019).

23. DR. S.K. KAPOOR, CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY (15th ed. Central
Law Agency, 2019).

24. SURENDRA MALIK & SUNDEEP MALIK,

SUPREME COURT ON
EVIDENCE ACT (2nd ed. Vol. 4, Eastern Book House, 2018).
25. SANJIVA ROW‟S, LAW RELATING TO EVIDENCE ACT (12th ed.
Delhi Law House, 2020).

S.NO. ONLINE DATABASE

1. EBC

2. Hein Online

3. JSTOR

4. LexisNexis

6. Manupatra

7. SCC Online

8. Thomson Reuters

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Criminal Case No. of 2021

The Petitioner submits before the jurisdiction of this Hon‟ble High Court under Section4821
of The Code of Criminal Procedure.

1
482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.

- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice.

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 STATEMENT OF FACTS

~BACKDROP~

Samarveer, a young and successful entrepreneur from Lucknow, comes from a well-established family comprising
his parents and younger sister. He leads a comfortable life with his family, enjoying the privileges of modern
living and prosperity. His upbringing in a supportive and secure environment, with sufficient household help,
ensures that no one in the family, especially his wife Preeti, is burdened with domestic responsibilities. In 2020,
Samarveer met Preeti, a 24-year-old woman from Jaipur, through a dating app. Preeti, who lived with her family
in Jaipur, shared a similar modern outlook. Their relationship grew over time, leading to love and eventually
marriage. They tied the knot on 18th May 2020, in a grand Sikh wedding ceremony in Gurgaon, attended by their
friends and family.

~THE MAIN TUSSLE~

However, tensions surfaced on 30th December 2020, when Preeti‟s mother-in-law asked her to prepare food for
the family as the house help was away. Preeti refused, reiterating that she had made it clear before the marriage
that she would not be involved in household chores. This refusal led to a confrontation between Preeti, her mother-
in-law, and her sister-in-law, which escalated into a full-blown argument. When Samarveer returned home, he
found the three women embroiled in a heated dispute. In an attempt to diffuse the situation, Samarveer pulled
Preeti into their room and locked her inside to avoid further conflict.

~THE FIRST INFORMATION REPORT~

The next day, Preeti left the house without informing anyone and returned to her parents in Jaipur. Despite several
attempts by Samarveer to contact her, she ignored his calls and refused to communicate with him. On 5th January
2021, Samarveer was shocked to learn that an FIR (no. 110) dated 3rd January 2021 had been lodged against him
and his family members, accusing them of harassment and dowry demands under Section 498-A of the Indian
Penal Code and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The complaint alleged that despite Preeti's parents spending
generously on the marriage and gifting items to her in-laws, Preeti faced continuous harassment and dowry
demands from her mother-in-law and sister-in-law. Subsequently, the family approached the Hon'ble High Court
of Punjab & Haryana, seeking to quash the FIR on the grounds that the allegations were false and lacked
jurisdiction since the events took place in Lucknow, not Gurgaon, where the FIR was filed.

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 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID FIR (NO. 110) DATED 3 JANUARY 2021 IS LIABLE TO
BE QUASHED?

ISSUE 2:

WHETHER THE INGREDIENTS OF SECTION 498A OF IPC AND SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF

DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961 ARE SATISFIED IN F.I.R. REGISTERED AS CASE
CRIME NO. 110/2021?

ISSUE 3:

WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ‘BENEFIT OF DOUBT’ IN ABSENCE OF

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE?

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

[ISSUE 1]
WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID FIR (NO. 110) DATED 3 JANUARY 2021 IS LIABLE TO
BE QUASHED?

The Counsel for the Petitioner most humbly submits that the allegations in the F.I.R. against the Petitioner do
not prima facie constitute any of the alleged offences. The evidence collected in support of the allegations
does not discloses commission of any of the offences and nor any other substantial evidence has been
adduced to corroborate the commission of the alleged offences. Thus, there is no sufficient ground to
proceed against the accused Petitioner.
This legal opinion seeks to quash the FIR filed by Preeti against her husband, Samarveer, and his family
under Section 498-A of the IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act. The key arguments are that the FIR was
improperly filed in Gurgaon, where the court lacks jurisdiction, as the alleged incidents occurred in
Lucknow. Additionally, the allegations of dowry harassment are vague, lack sufficient evidence, and appear
to be motivated by personal malice. The opinion emphasizes that the case does not meet the legal
requirements for prosecution, making the FIR liable to be quashed.
It is therefore humbly contended that the grounds for quashing the F.I.R. No. 110/2021 are made out and the
said F.I.R. must be quashed.

ISSUE 2:

WHETHER THE INGREDIENTS OF SECTION 498A OF IPC AND SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF

DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961 ARE SATISFIED IN F.I.R. REGISTERED AS CASE
CRIME NO. 110/2021?

The petitioner argues that the FIR filed under Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and Section 498-A
of the IPC is baseless and lacks the essential ingredients required for these provisions. They assert that no
demand for dowry was made before, during, or after the marriage, and no conclusive evidence supports the
allegations. The domestic dispute between Preeti and her in-laws was related to household chores and not
linked to dowry demands. Moreover, Preeti‟s allegations are vague and unsupported by specific instances or
evidence of harassment or cruelty. The petitioner emphasizes that Section 498-A addresses cruelty related to
dowry or severe mistreatment, which does not apply in this case as Preeti led a comfortable life without being
forced into household work. Additionally, Samarveer‟s father was not present during the alleged incident, yet
he is falsely implicated. Therefore, the FIR appears retaliatory and is not a valid case of dowry-related
harassment.
ISSUE 3:

WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ‘BENEFIT OF DOUBT’ IN ABSENCE OF

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE?

The petitioner argues that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and allegations alone without solid
evidence are insufficient for conviction. There is no direct evidence or witnesses supporting dowry demands or
harassment claims. The complainant has failed to prove criminal intent, entitling the petitioners to the "benefit
of doubt."

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE I: WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID FIR (NO. 110) DATED 3 JANUARY 2021
IS LIABLE TO BE QUASHED?

"Justice is conscience, not a personal conscience but the conscience of the whole of
humanity.Those who clearly recognize the voice of their own conscience usually recognize
the voice of justice."

Respectfully Showeth;
1. That this legal opinion addresses the contentious issues surrounding the FIR filed by
Preeti against her husband Samarveer and his family, under Section 498-A of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The central argument
here is to seek the quashing of the FIR on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and false
allegations.
2. That it is most humbly submitted that the Hon‟ble High Court is justified in quashing the
F.I.R. only when the case falls within the ambit of either of the case conditions illustrated
in the landmark case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal1 and when the essentials
established in the aforesaid case are duly sufficed. In the aforesaid decision the Court
identified the following cases in which F.I.R can be quashed:

“102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even
if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of anyoffence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a

1
State of Haryana V. Bhajan Lal 1922 Supp (1) SCC 335

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 specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress
for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(6) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or
where the proceedings is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.”

3. That also, the grounds to justify quashing of criminal proceedings were also laid down
in the case of Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor2, the High Court is required to
undertake step-wise enquiry as mentioned in Para 30 of the decision and if answer to all
the questions are in affirmative, the High Court would be justified in quashing the
criminal proceedings.63 Thus, to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised
by the accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Sec. 482, the
Court must pay regard to the following;

“30.1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound,
reasonable and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?

30.2. Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the
assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is
sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint
i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and
condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false?

Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been
refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be
justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

Step four: whether proceeding with the trial court would result in an abuse of
process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?‖

If answer to all the aforesaid steps is in the affirmative then the High Court will be
justified in exercising its powers under Sec. 482 for quashing the F.I.R. registered
against the accused.

4. That it is further submitted that a case becomes „prima facie‟ case when all essentials
ingredients of the alleged offence are present as per the statements & evidences recorded
under Sec. 200 or 202 Cr.P.C. and as per investigation report (if any) prepared by an
investigation agency u/s 202 Cr.P.C. If all the essential ingredients are satisfied then

2
Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330

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 „sufficient ground‟ for proceedings is made out.3

[1.1] THAT THE GROUNDS FOR QUASHING THE FIR REGISTERED AS 110/2021
ARE MADE OUT

5. That the Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner most humbly submits that: firstly, the said
FIR registered in Gurgaon lacks jurisdiction [1.1.1.]; secondly, the allegations in the
F.I.R. No. 110/2021 are vague and ambiguous [1.1.2.]; thirdly¸ there is no sufficient
ground or evidence to proceed against the accused petitioners [1.1.3.] and lastly, the
criminal proceedings against the accused petitioners are maliciously motivated [1.1.4.].
It is therefore most humbly contended that the grounds for quashing the F.I.R.
registered against the petitioners as case crime no. 110/2021 are made out.

[1.1.1] THAT THE FIR REGISTERED IN GURGAON LACKS JURISDICTION

6. That the first ground for quashing the FIR pertains to the issue of jurisdiction. The FIR
has been registered in Gurgaon, Haryana, whereas the marital discord and subsequent
events occurred primarily in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. As per the provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), jurisdiction for cases falling under Section 498-A IPC
lies in the place where the accused resides or where the offense has occurred.

7. That the petitioner most respectfully contends that the FIR has been registered at
Gurgaon, where the marriage took place as per Sikh rites and the complainant, Preeti,
resided in Lucknow with her in-laws. It is pertinent here to mention that the
complainant, Preeti had her maternal home in Jaipur and was residing in Lucknow with
her in-laws. In this situation, since the petitioners reside in Uttar Pradesh and the alleged
acts of cruelty are stated to have occurred in Lucknow, the FIR lacks the jurisdictional
validity under Section 177 of the CrPC. Which states;
177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.
- Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose
local jurisdiction it was committed.

8. That as per the principles established in Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police,4 there
must be a nexus between the offence and the jurisdiction of the court. The allegations,
as outlined in the FIR, pertain to both Lucknow and Jaipur, where Preeti has returned
post-incident. Given that the essential ingredients of the offence are not linked to
Gurgaon, the FIR merits quashing on grounds of jurisdiction.

3
Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, AIR 2015 SC 923
4
Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, [(2004) 8 SCC 100]

14 | P a g e
 9. That the Supreme Court has reiterated in Shri v. State of Karnataka5 that FIRs must be
filed in the jurisdiction where the offence has occurred, not merely based on the place of
registration.

10. That the first and foremost ground for quashing the FIR lies in the jurisdiction aspect.
According to Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an offence can be
tried where:

a. - The offence was committed.

b. - The first act of the offence was done.
c. - Any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was situated.
d. - Where the accused resides.
Thus, according to Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), an offense
can be tried where it was committed, or where the consequences of the offense
occurred. Since the alleged harassment and refusal of duty are claimed to have
happened in Lucknow, the jurisdiction lies with the courts in Uttar Pradesh, not in
Haryana.

11. That in the present case, the allegations made by the complainant, Preeti, pertain to
incidents that allegedly occurred primarily in Jaipur, considering she resided there
before her marriage and has since returned there post-separation. As such, the
conditions laid out under Section 178 would establish that the FIR should have been
filed in Jaipur, where the complainant resides and alleges the dowry-related harassment
occurred. The registration of the FIR in Gurgaon, where the marriage took place, does
not meet the jurisdictional requirements as prescribed under CrPC.

12. That additionally, the Supreme Court in Jai Prakash v. State of Haryana6 held that
criminal proceedings should be initiated in areas where the accused reside or where the
actions took place. If an FIR is filed in a place without proper jurisdiction, it must be
quashed.

13. That the petitioners submit that there is no evidence to substantiate that any act that
constitutes an offence under Section 498-A IPC occurred within the jurisdiction of
Gurgaon. Furthermore, as Preeti has returned to Jaipur and has established residence
there, any alleged harassment or demands for dowry must have occurred in that
jurisdiction if they did occur at all.

14. That in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal7, the Supreme Court laid down the principles

5
Shri v. State of Karnataka [(1979) 2 SCC 563]
6
Jai Prakash v. State of Haryana (2003) 6 SCC 130
7
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) 1 SCC 335

15 | P a g e
 regarding the quashing of FIRs, emphasizing that if the allegations made do not disclose
any cognizable offence or are clearly false, the FIR may be quashed. The said principle,
compounded with the jurisdictional aspect, calls for the quashing of this FIR.

15. That according to Section 498-A IPC, the jurisdiction to file a complaint is typically
where the aggrieved party resides or where the acts of cruelty took place. In this case,
Preeti's claim that dowry demands and harassment occurred while she was living with
her in-laws suggests that jurisdiction would lie in Lucknow, the local area where the
incident transpired.

16. That in Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Manju Sharma8: The Supreme Court held that Section
498-A must not be misused and that the jurisdiction must align with the place where the
incident allegedly occurred or where the accused resides. The Apex Court also held that
a complaint must reflect the actual occurrence of cruelty and harassment under its
definition.

17. That in Geeta Mehrotra v. State of Uttar Pradesh9, it was elucidated that the need for
proving the factum of cruelty, leading to the filing of Section 498-A complaints, is
paramount. The action should not be presumptive but should involve verified claims of
dowry harassment or cruelty.

[1.1.2] THAT THE SAID FIR IS MADE UP OF FALSE AND BASELESS

ALLEGATIONS

18. That the allegations made against the Petitioner and his family members are inherently
vague and lack specificity, which is a prerequisite for FIRs under Section 498A. The
Supreme Court in M. S. M. Sharma v. Krishna Sinha10 laid down the stipulation that
vague generalities in allegations cannot substitute for substantive claims. The complaint
falls short by failing to provide precise details regarding the nature of demands for
dowry or instances of alleged harassment.

19. That moreover, it is pertinent to highlight Preeti's own admission that they discussed her
unwillingness to engage in household chores before the marriage. This sets the stage for
understanding the dynamics of the relationship and undermines claims of dowry
demands.

20. That the complaint falls short by failing to provide precise details regarding the nature

8
Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Manju Sharma (2005) 6 SCC 281
9
Geeta Mehrotra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 10 SCC 741
10
M. S. M. Sharma v. Krishna Sinha 1959 AIR 395

16 | P a g e
 of demands for dowry or instances of alleged harassment. The delay in filing the FIR
and lack of a coherent narrative regarding the alleged dowry harassment points to the
likelihood of the allegations being fabricated to expedite divorce or for other ulterior
motives, as emphasized in Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Manju Sharma11.

21. That the FIR presents generalizations about the expenditures and demands allegedly
placed upon Preeti. However, merely stating that extensive amounts were spent on
marriage and that Post-marriage gifts were made does not automatically lead to
conclusions of dispossession or malfeasance. In Nandini Satpathy vs. P. L. Dani12, the
Supreme Court reinforced the principle that well-defined and specific allegations are
mandatory for proceedings under IPC. The broad assertions made by Preeti lack
specificity, inviting presumption of frivolity, seeking redress without evidence.

22. That the allegations against the petitioners primarily center around the charge of dowry
harassment. However, the complainant has provided no substantial evidence to support
her claim that they made persistent demands for dowry. The records indicate that Preeti
was not subjected to any undue pressure or harassment by her in-laws post-marriage.
The refusal to cook a single meal on the given day, coupled with her outright dismissal
of household responsibilities, is not an act of cruelty but a reflection of the relational
dynamics at play.

23. That moreover, the petitioners would like to highlight that the marriage was conducted
with considerable financial support from Preeti's parents, thus negating any logical
premise for dowry demands. In fact, reference can be taken from the case of K. K.
Verma v. State of U.P.13 the Supreme Court held that mere allegations of harassment
without substantive proof do not constitute an offence under Section 498-A IPC.

24. That it is also most humbly submitted that the father-in-law was not even present at the
time of the aforementioned incident and adding his name in the FIR (110/21) seems to
be something arbitrary and against the principles of equity and good conscience. Thus
making the said FIR vague and ambiguous.

25. That it is critical, as noted in K.S. Prakash v. State of Karnataka14, that facts must be
clearly specified to substantiate the allegations, thereby providing the accused an
opportunity to respond adequately. The complainant claims harassment regarding
dowry demands, yet does not specify any instances, need, or pressure that she faced
from the petitioner or his family during her stay in the matrimonial home.
11
Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Manju Sharma (2005) 6 SCC 281
12
Nandini Satpathy vs. P. L. Dani 1978 AIR 1025
13
K. K. Verma v. State of U.P. (1994) 1 SCC 487
14
K.S. Prakash v. State of Karnataka [(2005) 12 SCC 144]

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 [1.1.3] LACK OF SUFFICIENT GROUND OR MATERIAL EVIDENCE

26. That Preeti's allegations, as framed in the FIR, are unsupported by any material
evidence. She initially communicated that she would not be engaging in household
activities, which suggests an absolute unwillingness to participate in familial life post-
marriage. There was no instance of coercion or torture demonstrated during the period
of their cohabitation.

27. That moreover, the petitioner, Samarveer, attempted to resolve the situation peacefully
but was forced to take Preeti inside their room to de-escalate the conflict, which again
does not constitute as cruelty, as defined by Section 498-A IPC.

28. That in Sanjeev Kumar v. State of Haryana,15 - The court observed that mere harassment
or slight discord does not amount to cruelty under 498-A of IPC. Also in K. Krishnan v.
State of Kerala,16- The court ruled that mere demands for dowry without establishing a
nexus to causing harassment do not attract provisions of 498-A IPC.

29. That the absence of substantial evidence tied directly to cruelty or demands from the
family and the nature of Preeti‟s refusal to partake in household duties must be noted.
The facts indicate a refusal to cooperate which could be construed as leading to
interpersonal conflict rather than dowry demands.

[1.1.4] THE SAID PROCEEDINGS ARE MALICIOUSLY MOTIVATED

30. That it is most humbly submitted that the Complainant, Preeti‟s lifestyle was never
questioned by the petitioner‟s mother in law or his sister, till the last incident that
occurred. She was never asked to cook or never harassed by them apart from the one
that when they were borne out of necessity when there was no house help available at
the house.

31. That it is pertinent here to mention that the said charges have arisen because of this said
incident and this per se establishes a possibility of feeling of personal grudge and
vengeance owing to the mother in law and the sister. There is also no question of cruelty
or dowry being demanded from the complainant or her family. It is stated that it is this
incident which maliciously ignited this said frivolous matter.
32. That Preeti‟s sudden departure from her matrimonial home on 31.12.2020 and the filing
of the FIR on 03.01.2021 was an act of retaliation rather than a genuine complaint of

15
Sanjeev Kumar v. State of Haryana 2016 (5) ILR (Punjab & Haryana) 256
16
K. Krishnan v. State of Kerala, (2003) 7 SCC 622

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harassment. Her refusal to communicate with Samarveer or return to the matrimonial
home, followed by the filing of the FIR in a different jurisdiction, could be portrayed as
an attempt to falsely implicate Samarveer and his family.

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 ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE INGREDIENTS OF SECTION 498A OF IPC AND
SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961 ARE SATISFIED IN
F.I.R. REGISTERED AS CASE CRIME NO. 110/2021?

33. The Counsel for Petitioner most humbly submits that: firstly, the ingredients of Sec. 3 &
4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 are not satisfied [2.1]; secondly, the ingredients of
Sec. 498-A are not satisfied [2.2]. It is therefore contended that the F.I.R. registered
against the Petitioner as case crime no. 110/2021 is liable to be quashed in light of
justice.

[2.1] THAT THE INGREDIENTS OF SECTION 3 AND 4 OF DOWRY PROHIBITION

ACT, 1961 ARE NOT SATISFIED

34. That it is most humbly submitted that Sec. 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 defines
“dowry” as “any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly” by either of the parties to the marriage at or before or any time
after the marriage “in connection with the marriage”.

35. That furthermore, Sec. 3 of the Act provides that,

“If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving
or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand
rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more.”

36. That also, Sec. 4 of the Act penalises the demand for such dowry, whether be direct or
indirect, from the parents or other relatives of the bridegroom. It is explicit from the
aforesaid provisions that for attributing criminal liability under Sec. 3 & 4 of the Act the
following pre-requisites are to be sufficed: firstly, there shall be some demand for any
property or valuable security; secondly, such demand shall be made to the relatives of
the bridegroom; thirdly, such dowry shall be given or taken at or before or any time after
the date of marriage; and fourthly, such demand shall be “in connection with the
marriage”.17

37. That it is humbly contended that no evidence has been produced to corroborate the
demand for dowry and in absence of any substantial evidence establishing the demand
for dowry the criminal liability under Sec. 3 & 4 of the Act cannot be attributed. The
liability cannot be attributed merely on the basis of statements of interested witnesses.

38. That it is stated that in the present case there was no dowry exchanged between the said
parties. That is to say there are mere allegations of dowry and that there is no conclusive

17
Appasaheb & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2007 SC 763.

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 evidence pertaining to the same. Taking reference from Arnesh Kumar V. State of
Bihar18;

The fact that Section 498-A is a cognizable and non-bailable offence has lent it
a dubious place of pride amongst the provisions that are used as weapons rather than
shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the husband and his
relatives arrested under this provision. In a quite number of cases, bed-ridden grand-
fathers and grand-mothers of the husbands, their sisters living abroad for decades are
arrested. ―Crime in India 2012 Statistics‖ published by National Crime Records
Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs shows arrest of 1,97,762 persons all over India
during the year 2012 for offence under Section 498-A of the IPC, 9.4% more than
the year 2011. Nearly a quarter of those arrested under this provision in 2012 were
women i.e. 47,951 which depicts that mothers and sisters of the husbands were
liberally included in their arrest net. Its share is 6% out of the total persons arrested
under the crimes committed under Indian Penal Code. It accounts for 4.5% of total
crimes committed under different sections of penal code, more than any other crimes
excepting theft and hurt. The rate of charge-sheeting in cases under Section 498A, IPC
is as high as 93.6%, while the conviction rate is only 15%, which is lowest across all
heads. As many as 3,72,706 cases are pending trial of which on current estimate,
nearly 3,17,000 are likely to result in acquittal.

Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and cast scars forever. Law makers know it
so also the police. There is a battle between the law makers and the police and it seems
that police has not learnt its lesson; the lesson implicit and embodied in the Cr.PC. It
has not come out of its colonial image despite six decades of independence, it is largely
considered as a tool of harassment, oppression and surely not considered a friend of
public. The need for caution in exercising the drastic power of arrest has been
emphasized time and again by Courts but has not yielded desired result. Power to
arrest greatly contributes to its arrogance so also the failure of the Magistracy to check
it. Not only this, the power of arrest is one of the lucrative sources of police corruption.
The attitude to arrest first and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It has become
ahandy tool to the police officers who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive.

39. That Section 3 of the THE DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961 states that;

[(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation to,— (a) presents which are
given at the time of a marriage to the bride (without any demand having been made in
that behalf): Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance

18
Arnesh Kumar V. State of Bihar 2014 (3) SCC (CRI) 44

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 with the rules made under this Act; (b) presents which are given at the time of a
marriage to the bridegroom (without any demand having been made in that behalf):

It is pertinent here to mention that the alleged money spent on the marriage and alleged
gifts given to all family members of her husband fall under this exception and thus
cannot be constituted as dowry in the present matter.

19
40. Taking reference from the case of Vishnu v. State of Kerala,
wherein, the Hon‟ble Kerala High Court has clearly stated that;

―Presents given at the time of marriage to the bride without any demand having made in
that behalf and which have been entered in a list-maintained accordance with rules
made under this Act will not come within the purview of Section 3(1) which prohibits
giving or taking of dowry.‖

It is thus clear from the said line of reasoning that from the prima facie evidence, it can
be understood that there was no dowry in question anytime and that the said allegations
are false, vague and malicious as stated in the previous arguments.

[2.2] THAT THE INGREDIENTS OF SECTION 498-A OF I.P.C. ARE NOT SATISFIED

41. It is most humbly submitted that Sec. 498A of the I.P.C. is worded as,

―Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects
such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.–For the purposes of this section, ―cruelty‖ means-

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her
or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to
meet such demand.‖

42. It is well settled that for attributing criminal liability under Sec. 498 A certain pre-
requisites are to be sufficed: firstly¸ there shall be such conduct which inflicts cruelty on
the woman or harassment of the woman; secondly, the conduct shall be willful and
voluntary; and thirdly, the cruelty shall be such as is likely to drive the woman to commit

19
Vishnu v. State of Kerala 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 5131

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 suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health & the harassment should
be such so as to coerce the woman or any of her relative to meet any unlawful demand.20

43. It is further submitted that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Pawan Kumar v.
State of Haryana21 held that cruelty or harassment under Sec. 498A need not to be
physical, and mental torture in a grave case would be sufficient for conviction. In the
case of Ghusabhai Raisangbhai Chorasiya & Ors. v. State of Gujarat22 the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court held that when there is no evidence that mental cruelty was of such
degree that it would drive the deceased wife to commit, the criminal liability under Sec.
498A cannot be attributed to the accused and that conviction under Sec. 498A on the
basis of the said allegations alone is not proper.

44. Further, in the case of Akula Ravinder v. State23 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court ruled that
to bring an accused within the ambit of Sec. 498A, it must be proved that the woman
was subjected to only such cruelty as has been provided under this section and cruelty of
no other kind. In the instant case no substantial evidence has been produced before the
Court to establish cruelty or harassment. The conviction under Sec. 498-A cannot be
called for merely on the basis of statement of the interested witnesses. It is well settled
that where there was evidence of only a slight harassment of the deceased by her in-laws
as a result of which she committed suicide, this by itself is not enough to convict the
husband and in-laws.24

45. Thus, it can be clearly understood here that “cruelty” shall be differentiated from
“ordinary petulance, discord and difference in domestic life”.25 There is a very thin line
of demarcation between “ordinary petulance” and “cruelty” and confusing between the
two is not unlikely. Also, how a person interprets the conduct of another person is also a
dynamic question. Thus, it is plausible that Preeti might have confused the two owing to
her personal beliefs and thoughts.

[2.2.1] That the Petitioner and his family members never raised the demand for
dowry from Preeti

46. It is further submitted that from the evidence placed on record it is ex facie that there was
no demand for dowry from Preeti as is also contended in [2.1] since not every demand
for money is dowry it is probable that the demand might be in relation to some domestic
fiscal stringency.

20
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 498A, No. 45 of 1860, Acts of Parliament (India).
21
Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 958.
22
Ghusabhai Raisangbhai Chorasiya v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal (SC) No. 262 of 2009.
23
Akula Ravinder v. State, AIR 1991 SC 1142.
24
Mohan Lal v. State, (1984) 1 Chand. LR 647 (P and H); Ashok Kumar v. State, 1987 Cr LJ 1412 (P&H).
25
Mahavir Supra note 27, ¶ 39.

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 [2.2.2] That Preeti was not subjected to cruelty or harassment by her in-laws for dowry

47. It is further submitted that from the evidence placed on record it is ex facie that
Preeti was not subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand of
dowry as is also contended in [2.1] Furthermore, The Hon‟ble Supreme Court further in
the case of Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh26 remarked that there should not be too
much time lag between cruelty and harassment in connection with demand of dowry and
the death in question. It was also held that thereshould be a “proximate and live link”27
between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demands and death of the woman. The
Court held that if the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale,
not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman, it would be of no consequence28 but no
straight jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of “soon
before” and it thus also depends on the circumstances of each case.29 In the instant case
no “proximate and live link” can be established since there was no demand for dowry
was made from and no cruelty inflicted on Preeti.

48. It is also further contended in the said matter that Preeti was given utmost freedom and
was not asked to do any household work, showing the intention of the family members
to demand dowry from her and her family. Here, if it was their intention to demand
dowry from Preeti, the petitioner‟s family would have subjected her to constant cruelty,
coercion and threatening which does not seem to be the case in this present case as
understood, her lifestyle did not include any disturbance of any kind whatsoever.

49. It is also pertinent here to mention that in the present case, the Petitioner, Samarveer
tried to stop the quarrel between her wife and his mother and sister that led to the instant
FIR. Also, his father was not even at the house during this instance. However as seen in
the FIR, him and his father have been made a party to the said FIR when there was no
cruelty subjected on their part whatsoever leading us to question the factor of cruelty in
the said matter.

26
Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2004 (3) SCC 98.
27
Hira Lal v. State of Delhi (Government of NCT), 2003 Cr. LJ 3711 (SC); State of Andhra Pradesh v. RajGopal Asawa, 2004 Cr. LJ 1791 (SC).
28
Mahavir Supra note 27, ¶ 30.
29
Kunhiabdulla v. State of Kerela, 2004 Cr. LJ 5005 (SC).

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 ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO „BENEFIT OF DOUBT‟ IN
ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ?

50. That it is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused is to
be established by the prosecution beyond the possibility of any reasonable doubt. Even if
there may be an element of truth against the accused but considered as a whole there is
invariably a long distance to travel and whole of distance must be covered by legal,
reliable and unimpeachable evidence before an accused can be convicted.30

51. That in the case of Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab31 the wife died of poisoning
within seven years of marriage. There was no substantial evidence to show that she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellate husband or his relatives for or in
connection with any demand of dowry. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that
presumption arising under Sec. 304B of I.P.C. or Sec. 113B of Evidence Act, 1872 could
not be invoked against appellants. Further, in the absence of evidence showing that the
deceased was subjected to any cruelty within the meaning of Sec. 498A of I.P.C., the
appellant accused cannot be convicted under Sec. 306 merely because he was not found
guilty under Sec. 304B.

52. That a similar view was expressed in the case of Sharadbhai Jivanlal Vaniya v. State of
Gujarat32 it was held that in absence of sufficient evidence, the conviction is ultra vires
the Code. In the case of Durga Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh33 it was held that
since the prosecution was not able to establish that the deceased had been subjected to
cruelty or harassment soon before her death in connection with any demands for dowry
thus he deserves to be acquitted.

53. That in the instant case also there is no independent witness and there is no direct
evidence to establish beyond doubt that Petitioners either demanded or instigated Preeti to
get dowry. Neither the element of mens rea has been successfully proven by the opposing
counsels. The Complainant here has failed to establish complete and conclusive chain of
circumstances to prove guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. It is
therefore humbly contended that the Petitioners are entitled to “benefit of doubt”.

30
Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637; Anil W. Singh v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67; Reddy Sampath W. v. State of
Andhra Pradesh, (2005) 7 SCC 603; Ramreddy & Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 10 SCC 172; Sher Singh alias
Partapa v. State of Haryana, 2015 CrLJ 1118 (SC).
31
Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2007 Cr LJ 1435 (SC).
32
Sharadbhai Jivanlal Vaniya v. State of Gujarat, 2012 Cr LJ 1575 (SC).
33
Durga Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 9 SCC 73.

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 PRAYER

Wherefore, may it please the Hon‟ble Court of Sessions, in the light of facts and
circumstances of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Prosecution prays that this Hon‟ble Court may be pleased to adjudge, rule upon, and
determine the following:

1. That the said FIR (No. 110) dated 3 January 2021 is liable to be quashed.

2. That the ingredients of Section 498A of IPC and sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961 are not satisfied in FIR. registered as case crime no. 110/2021.

3. That the petitioner is entitled to „benefit of doubt‟ in absence of sufficient evidence.

AND/OR

Pass any other order it may deem fit in the interest of Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience.

All of which is most respectfully prayed and humbly submitted.

(Signed)

Place:

Date Counsel for Petitioner

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